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Title: Anti Natalism
Author: Anonymous
Language: en
Topics: antinatalism, anti natalism, anti-natalism, philosophy, theory, Natalism

Anonymous

Anti Natalism

Antinatalism and my arguments for it

First Argument: The Russian Roulette Analogy.

Antinatalism is a tenable position following the assumption that we

ought to minimize harm (negative utilitarianism). If bringing someone

into existence through procreation makes it possible that that person

will be subjected to the possibility of terrible harm (such as accidents

that leave a person paralyzed from the neck down), then it follows that

we should not create new humans because of the said possibility. This is

compounded by uncertainty about what the future might be. No matter how

loving or caring the parents are, they cannot say with 100% confidence

and certainty that the child will not contract a debilitating disease

that will greatly reduce the quality of its remaining life.

Now, this uncertainty can be compared to a game of Russian roulette. If

there is a 33% chance that a person dies in a game of Russian roulette

(since there are two bullets in the barrel and the barrel has six

rounds), then it is sound to think that playing such a game is a bad

thing because of the odds of dying from it. The same judgment applies if

there is only one bullet in the barrel (16% chance) because ultimately,

the chance of dying in the game is higher than it not playing the game

altogether.

If playing such a game is a bad thing and the chances of a person

suffering from terrible harm are akin to that, then we can then say that

the natalist stance allows for the possibility of terrible suffering,

similar to a game of Russian Roulette. Add to that the more problematic

situation in which life's Russian Roulette is being played by unwilling

participants. Parents who choose to conceive do so without thinking

about the very real possibility of terrible harm that will be

experienced by the potential child. It's as if the potential child was

forced to play a cruel and merciless game of chance.

If we can't eliminate the possibility of terrible harm, how then can we

possibly say that procreation is a good thing? This, of course, comes

with the knowledge that there are no safeguards for life, and the one

playing life's Russian Roulette was never asked for consent before it.

Second Argument: Biological Needs

This argument goes against the grain of thought about the existence of

pleasure in life. I've read somewhere on the internet about a natalist

counter-argument on the possibility of self-actualization and happiness

derived from Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs. The response that went

on in my head was that of the lowest tier in Maslow's pyramid: that of

biological needs. Happiness cannot be possible if a person's existence

is constantly threatened (if hunger and thirst are not being satisfied).

One might simply ask, is happiness or pleasure really important in the

grand scheme of things if these biological needs are not met? And a

further question can be drilled in: what is the value of these needs?

Animals also feel hunger, thirst and they can be deprived of sleep. If

these needs are nonexistent (as in the case of extinct animals, or

hypothetical aliens on Mars), then deprivation is not something to be

bothered about. We will require happiness, self-esteem, success, you

name it, the moment that these biological needs were already met. But if

no one will feel hunger, thirst, and the need for sex, then there will

also be no one who will need to experience the pleasures of life. To

bring a person into existence is to give rise to these biological needs.

So the question is, what's the value of these biological needs? Are they

intrinsically significant? If so, then the biological needs of a

countless number of animals are also intrinsically significant. If they

are not significant, if they lack value, why then must we bring these

needs into existence?