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Title: Cyberpunk and Technology
Author: Alfredo M. Bonanno
Date: 1992
Language: en
Topics: cybernetics, anarcho-transhumanism, technology
Source: https://archive.elephanteditions.net/library/alfredo-m-bonanno-cyberpunk-and-technology][archive.elephanteditions.net]].  Proofread text source from [[http://www.revoltlib.com/?id=4913, retrieved on December 10, 2020.
Notes: Original title “Cyberpunk e tecnologia”, in *Anarchismo* 68.

Alfredo M. Bonanno

Cyberpunk and Technology

The main characteristic of cyberpunk is that it escapes definition. This

is not only due to the wide range of choices in the ideas of its

supporters, it is also a direct effect of the possibilities offered by

the new methods of information technology. Nothing in this field can be

neatly separated from the rest. In many narrative texts the style of the

story reflects the means that make it into a transmittable object, and

this same story then has consequences on the elaboration of future

technology.

The mechanism undoubtedly allows for an autonomy of individual

consciousness and sophistication in decision-making capacity, if nothing

else as far as timing is concerned. It is impossible to predict the

amount of intellectual capacity, the rational element that supports all

the weight of the rigid pigeon-holing of procedures. Here all mandatory

remarks seem almost an attempt to exorcise an uncertainty one cannot

help perceiving.

The individual who accepts this relationship with information technology

soon moves towards a generic refusal of centralised authority, a path in

the forest that could lead them to conclusions that would be very

important from a liberatory point of view were it not that they

immediately come up against the obstacle of the instrument itself. The

actor-instrument interaction does not have any real outlet other than

constituting an atmosphere of tolerance, when not exactly indifference,

concerning all aspects that in any case are threatened by a rampant

spreading of the means of information technology around the somewhat

obscure operative field.

It should be said that all manifestations of cyberpunk almost

unwittingly end up producing a hedonistic view of life. Scepticism is

accepted as a value, an intelligent way of thinking which every level of

specialist is pushed towards, and the computer itself ends up becoming a

specialisation with its own language and mentality. A symbiosis between

those who start a dialogue with the machine and the machine itself is

thus inevitable. But this is occult, so much so as to be systematically

denied, negation becoming a further element of concealment. And the

specialist mentality is always a step ahead. The more it advances in the

field of manageable objectivity, the more it cradles itself in the sense

of security that comes from feeling at ease in the ambit of procedures

that know each other, interact, increasingly delimit the confines of a

world deprived of procedure that is just waiting to be regulated, so

taken back to the sphere of the measurable. The specialist is

distinguishable precisely because of his certainty of values that tend

to flow outwards in the direction of a knowledge of which he as a

specialist knows nothing, or almost nothing, about. But this ignorance

no longer seems to him to be a negative element to be remedied but

simply a remote, desolate place to be colonised, wild chaos that needs

to be put in order and understood.

All this must not take a rigid view of reality. Not measure and

technocrats. That would have been inevitable in other times, far from

the computer era of today. The elaboration of new procedures shows a

considerable level of creativity, allowing ironic reflections on the

organisational aspects of society. The paradoxical and the contradictory

therefore have access to reasoning techniques. That allows for an

explosion of practices in the visionary and perhaps surreal direction,

if one could only agree on the term. But that matters little. What does

matter is the parallel mechanism of acceptance of all the techniques

that make the visionary rupture of reality possible. In a way the

journey is realised at the cost of the dream mechanism, a neurological

level that we are unable to control, safeguarding it from unconscious

ordinative implications.

There thus emerges an implicit realism that constructs itself

independently of the decisions and desires of the participants in the

cyberpunk experience. The processes of the electronic organisation of

data build this reality within which all experience, even the violently

visual kind, ends up being codified in numbers in the same digital

communication. The virtual adventure which is at the centre, at least

for the moment, of cyberpunk culture, could run the risk of

disseminating intentions precisely in that territory of codification

where each game could be read in a key that confirms power. The implicit

ideology of tolerance towards hacking, no matter how extreme, is born

and nourishes itself in the idea, for the time being undeclared but

underground, that power is capable of recuperating and managing any

behaviour whatsoever in the information technology sector. Over the next

few years, the conditions of this relationship could change, both a

realisation of the dreams of the cyberpunks (in the sector things go

ahead by leaps and bounds), and an acutening of the preoccupations of

social control.

It is true that there are also attempts to demystify, and that the

action of recuperation and subtraction indirectly serve to study the

behaviour of power as it manages and controls data. But all that soon

comes back under the cover of the technology itself, interfering with

the intentions, putting it beyond one’s own project unbrakably. The

invention of new procedures is certainly an abstraction that uses cabled

means because they present themselves; but it itself ends up being the

opportunity of an intermediate part of the means itself, starting from

the uncontrolled threshold of the whole system of technological

interaction. It should be noted that all this happens at two levels: at

the specific level, in that no creation can subtract itself from its

interactivity within the system. At the technological level in general,

in that a wider interaction would end up playing on the development of

all the technological sectors that in a way are completely beyond

control. There is nothing in the world, either cyberpunk or the system

of control, that is capable of controlling this second level of

technological interaction.

Many have pointed out the negative aspects of a collaboration of certain

participants in this movement with the German government, or are

sarcastic about the restitution of money stolen via computers aimed at

demonstrating the weaknesses of the counterpart.

I do not consider these to be serious arguments within the sphere of a

substantial critique of the process of interaction with information

technology. First of all because these are personal decisions, and

second because the field of any critique must be that of the eventual

use of technology in general, information technology in particular, in a

way that is different to that controlled and managed by power. In other

words, the only valid question to ask is whether a really individual use

of computer technology is possible. The end of communication, visible in

the tatters of the written word, seems to mark the beginning of the

third millennium. Can virtual space constitute an effective

communication space, or will it become a way of sealing the coffin of

the individual? The massified management of communication is proceeding

vertically, while space for relating between individuals is shrinking.

When this survives, it is englobed in the unified code of the sector,

i.e. they appear as transmitters of uniformity, news becomes significant

precisely because it is preventively homologised in an identical

container. Everything depends on seeing whether the virtual model being

proposed is really capable of moving horizontally or whether this

movement is no more than a passage from intention to homologation. That

the other, precisely in its role as interlocutor, is finally substituted

by the machine itself and its virtual potential. But all that has one

conditional premise, at least for the cyberpunk: that it remains to be

proven that the machine can really be put to the service of man, and

that power cannot, parallelly, store up all the information necessary to

manage information technology and, in the present state of affairs, the

totality of production and control. Hacking would therefore only be

capable of demonstrating how many cracks there are in the controlled

structures of the dominant information technology, and where they

reside. If this aim were practicable, the opposite consideration should

also be certain, that the dominant structure would not have the means to

take radical measures. Now, no matter what experience there might be in

other fields and other modalities of attack, the capacity to take

measures always exists; and this capacity remains, let us say, only a

dialogue in the case in which the attack remains in the field of

symbolic procedure. Entering the sphere of real destruction the power

structure modifies its behaviour and adds countermoves that are not only

repressive but are also organisational.

What I am trying to say is that any demonstrative disturbance could

simply convince the counterpart to include it in the variables of

management, as a percentage of uncertainty. A more radical disturbance

leads to measures that cannot be studied and evaluated at the

technological level by those who simply chip in with the power

structure, precisely because their action does not provoke them, so does

not force it to come out. Remaining such an approach, which seems fairly

generalised, the for and against arguments are no more than simple

petitions of principle.

To suppose that results obtainable through the use of electronic

technology do not directly lead to a growth in human awareness simply

because they find themselves in the hands of a minority itself devoid of

social awareness, is either a tautology without hope, or an illusion

grafted into the social function of technology in general and computer

in particular. Can the excluded make a different use of it? Can this

hypothetical different use become the objective of all those who intend

to attack the management of power? The problem is the classical one of

the struggle against those managing power. But now, in addition to the

traditional aspects of this problem, one must also bear in mind the

elements and interactions specific to electronic means.

I am not trying to say here that one should desist from demonising all

aspects of electronic technology, or limit oneself to attacking the

negative expressions that are closest to hand. This would prevent a

direct awareness of the possible psychological effects of this

technology, therefore of any attacks aimed at remedying the problem by

contrasting it with relative social and political implications. It is

just that it seems to me to be naive to trust the equation that puts

things in a linear process of interesting oneself in these problems and

making a certain theoretical effort, concluding with the possibility of

understanding and deciding to put an end to the negative aspects, while

conserving the positive ones.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding, and consequently pointless

arguments concerning the use of computers or a return to the quill pen,

one should point out that there is nothing sacred about suspecting

rationality in general, or against penetrating, armed with a long-term

project, the strategy (moreover which is quickly replaced and constantly

on the verge of being superseded) of information technology. There are

two points to note on this problem: first, it does not seem to me to be

indispensable to have sophisticated knowledge of it in order to realise

the dangers of this technology at the level of revolutionary awareness.

Second, one should not forget the specialistic effect that this work of

penetration into the world of computer technology has on the individual.

Someone might say that to limit this cognitive entrance into a world

that is itself travelling towards global extinction is equivalent to

being on a train and not being interested in where it is going. A good

objection, without necessarily making one feel obliged to become train

drivers in order to understand better whether the destination is the

right one.

There are many ways to enjoy oneself, and virtual reality prospects new,

fascinating ones. However, one cannot lightly maintain that this is

equivalent to action that we could carry out (but often don’t want to)

in reality. There is a considerable difference between the passive

fruition of telematic means such as TV, and the active one, starting

from simple video games. But strangely this difference corresponds in a

way that is suspect to what power expects of us, i.e. a falsely active

response to its solicitations, a competition to realise the pace of

homologised initiatives of global consensus. The figure of the present

day spectator drinking his beer in front of the TV watching his

favourite football team, could in the not too far off future be replaced

by a spectator (the same one) playing his own game on TV or another

telematic instrument; while elsewhere the included are deciding his fate

as passive subject who is suddenly deceiving himself that he possesses

fantastic strength capable of upturning the world.

But the world is elsewhere, and this “else” would be far from our reach.