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Title: Kazakhstan
Author: CrimethInc.
Date: 2022
Language: en
Topics: Kazakhstan; uprising; analysis
Source: Retrieved on November 6, 2022 from [[https://crimethinc.com/zines/kazakhstan-anarchist-reports]]

CrimethInc.

Kazakhstan

I. The Uprising in Kazakhstan

A full-scale uprising has broken out in Kazakhstan in response to the

rising cost of living and the violence of the authoritarian government.

Demonstrators have seized government buildings in many parts of the

country, especially in Almaty, the most populous city, where they

temporarily occupied the airport and set the capitol building on fire.

As we publish this, police have recaptured downtown Almaty, killing at

least dozens of people in the process, while troops from Russia and

Belarus arrive to join them in suppressing the protests. We owe it to

the people on the receiving end of this repression to learn why they

rose up. In the following report, we present an interview with a

Kazakhstani expatriate who explores what drove people in Kazakhstan to

revolt – and explore the implications of this uprising for the region as

a whole.

“What is now happening in Kazakhstan has never happened here before.”

“All night there were explosions, police violence against people, and

some people burned police cars, including some random cars. Now people

are marching around the main streets and something is happening near

Akimat (the parliament building).”

The last message we received from our comrade in Kazakhstan, an

anarcha-feminist in Almaty, shortly before 4 pm (East Kazakhstan time)

on January 5, before we lost contact.

We should understand the uprising in Kazakhstan in a global context. It

is not simply a reaction to an authoritarian regime. Protesters in

Kazakhstan are responding to the same rising cost of living that people

have been protesting all around the world for

years

. Kazakhstan is not the first place where an increase in the cost of gas

has triggered a wave of protests—exactly the same thing has happened in

France

,

Ecuador

, and

elsewhere

around the world, under a wide range of administrations and forms of

government.

What is significant about this particular uprising, then, is not that it

is unprecedented, but that it involves people confronting the same

challenges we confront, too, wherever we live.

The urgency with which Russia is moving to help to suppress the uprising

is also significant. The Collective Security Treaty Organization [CSTO],

a military alliance comprised of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—with Russia calling the shots—has committed

to sending forces to Kazakstan. This is the first time that the CSTO has

deployed troops to support a member nation; it refused to assist Armenia

in 2021, during its conflict with Azerbaijan.

It is instructive that the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan did not

warrant CSTO intervention, but a powerful protest movement does. As in

other imperial projects, the chief threat to the Russian sphere of

influence (the “Rusosphere”) is not war, but revolution. Russia has

profited considerably from the civil war in Syria and the

Turkish invasion of Rojava

, playing Syria and Turkey against each other to gain a foothold in the

region. One of the ways that Vladimir Putin has held on to power in

Russia has been by rallying Russian patriots to support him in wars in

Chechnya and Ukraine. War—perpetual war—is part and parcel of the

Russian imperial project, just as war has served the American imperial

project in Iraq and

Afghanistan

. War is the health of the state, as

Randolph Bourne

put it.

Uprisings, on the other hand, must be suppressed by any means necessary.

If the millions of people in the Rusosphere who languish under a

combination of kleptocracy and neoliberalism saw an uprising succeed in

any of those countries, they would hurry to follow suit. Looking at the

waves of protest in

Belarus in 2020

and in

Russia a year ago

, we can see that many people are inclined to do so even without hope of

success.

In capitalist democracies like the United States, where elections can

swap out one gang of self-seeking politicians for another, the illusion

of choice itself serves to distract people from taking action to bring

about real change. In authoritarian regimes like Russia, Belarus, and

Kazakhstan, there is no such illusion; the reigning order is imposed by

despair and brute force alone. In these conditions, anyone can see that

revolution offers the only way forward. Indeed, the rulers of all three

of those countries owe their power to the wave of revolutions that took

place starting in 1989, bringing about the fall of the Eastern Bloc. We

can hardly blame their subjects for suspecting that only a revolution

could bring about a change in their circumstances.

Revolution—but for what purpose? We cannot share the optimism of

liberals who imagine that social change in Kazakhstan will be as simple

as chasing out the autocrats and holding elections. Without

thoroughgoing economic and social changes, any merely political change

would leave most people at the mercy of the same neoliberal capitalism

that is immiserating them today.

And in any case, Putin will not give up so easily. Real social change—in

the Rusosphere as in the West—will require a protracted struggle.

Overthrowing the government is necessary, but not sufficient: in order

to defend themselves against future political and economic impositions,

ordinary people will have to develop collective power on a horizontal,

decentralized basis. This is not the work of a day or a year, but of a

generation.

What anarchists have to contribute to this process is the proposal that

the same structures and practices that we develop in the course of the

struggle against our oppressors should also serve to help us create a

better world. Anarchists have already played an important role in the

uprising in Belarus

, showing the value of horizontal networks and direct action. The dream

of liberalism, to remake the entire world in the image of the United

States and Western Europe, has already proved hollow—the United States

and Western Europe are implicated in many of the reasons why efforts to

realize this dream have failed, in Egypt and

Sudan

and elsewhere. The dream of anarchism remains to be tried.

In response to the events in Kazakhstan, some supposed

“anti-imperialists” are once again parroting the timeless talking point

of Russian state media that all opposition to any regime that is allied

with Putin’s Russia can only be the result of Western intervention. This

is particularly egregious when the nations in Russia’s sphere of

influence have largely abandoned any pretense of socialism, giving

themselves over to the sort of neoliberal policies that sparked the

revolt in Kazakhstan. In a globalized capitalist economy, in which we

are all subjected to the same profiteering and precarity, we should not

let rival world powers play us off against each other. We should see

through the whole charade. Let’s make common cause across continents,

exchanging tactics, inspiration, and solidarity in order to reinvent our

lives.

The ordinary people in Kazakhstan who rose up this week showed how far

we can go—and how much further we have to go together.

The Background of the Uprising

Early on January 6 (East Kazakhstan Time), after internet blackouts made

it impossible to complete an interview with participants in the movement

in Almaty, we conducted the following interview with a Kazakhstani

anarchist advocate living abroad.

For context, what anarchist, feminist, and ecological projects or

movements have existed in Kazakhstan in the 21st century?

Early on, there was an opposition to the first ex-communist president,

Nursultan Nazarbayev, who ended up leading post-Soviet Kazakhstan.

Beginning in the 1990s, he started becoming more authoritarian—for

example, dismissing a more political plural parliament twice in 1993 in

order to obtain loyal members of parliament, extending his first

presidential term, and changing the structure of governance to acquire

stronger executive powers through referendums that were deemed rigged in

1995. This earned Nazarbayev opponents within the political elite itself

from across a wide political spectrum including Communists, Social

Democrats, Centrists, Liberals, and Nationalists who collaborated to

call for a more democratic constitution with limited presidential

authority and a multi-party legislature.

As for movements from below, there were anarchists, who were more of an

underground movement, and there was a unusually loud socialist movement

group, whose leader Ainur Kurmanov ended up fleeing Kazakhstan in the

end. There were nationalists and radical Islamists as well, but again,

they weren’t really that prominent and they too were sort of

underground.

As for environmentalists, if they did have some public attention through

media or promotion, it was mostly from advocacy groups or, as they’re

called “public associations” there. In Kazakhstan, only six political

parties are registered by the government right now, and they are the

only ones legally permitted to participate in general elections; the

others that have tried to form political parties end up seeing their

required registration processes systematically rejected by the ministry.

However, whenever the Kazakh authorities do in some circumstances

proclaim their political pluralism to the public, they make a show of

this using loyal public associations, especially during presidential

elections.

Are there any opposition parties in Kazakhstan?

Regarding opposition parties, there are basically none in Kazakhstan

that are deemed legal. There used to be such independent functioning

political parties back in the 1990s and early 2000s, but they were all

shut down or banned by the government, along with independent press and

media. Today, there are people who claim to represent the opposition,

but they live abroad in countries such as Ukraine. They have no real

connection to the street.

There is also some sort rivalry within them: I’ve heard all of them

accusing each other of collaborating with the government or intelligence

agency. A typical characteristic of the controlled opposition in

Kazakhstan is that the so-called declared oppositions try to lure

dissatisfied citizens into doing things that don’t actually pose any

threat to the government, things that give the illusion of making

change, like telling people to engage in peaceful dialogue with local

officials or to participate in the election by purposefully ruining the

ballot as a way to “protest”—any tactic that gives the illusion of

fighting the government, when in reality it is just a waste of time.

In recent years, this sort of opposition actually started to appear

inside country, as well; out of nowhere, there were random activists

forming political movements and holding pickets without experiencing any

form of persecution, whereas ordinary people who have no connections are

always detained by police immediately whenever they tried to protest.

One unusual opposition group—I can’t tell whether it is controlled

opposition—is called Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan. It is led by a

former businessman and politician living in France named Mukhtar

Ablyazov. If you search his name, you’ll see articles about supposed

money laundering cases and lawsuits. He was a cabinet minister in the

1990s, until he broke ranks with the government that was predominately

loyal to President Nazarbayev. He was jailed by the Kazakh government,

but eventually released; he ended up fleeing from Kazakhstan and living

in exile like other disloyal officials of Nazarbayev’s. Since then, he

has led the political opposition with the most support on social media.

Most anyone associated with his movement has been persecuted and

arrested; this has been happening ever since he re-established the

movement again in 2017 on various social media platforms. Every protest

he has organized from abroad has been repressed, with a massive police

presence in public areas. There have been cases in which the internet

was partially restricted nationwide.

In any case, what is happening in Kazakhstan now is completely

unexpected.

What tensions within Kazakhstan preceded these events? What are the

fault lines in Kazakh society?

What really sparked the mass unrest took place in the town of Janaozen.

This town produces oil profits, yet the people there are among the

poorest in the country. The town is known for the bloody events of

December 2011, when there was a labor strike and the authorities ordered

the police to shoot demonstrators. Although the tragedy ended quietly,

it still remained in many Kazakhs’ minds, especially among the town’s

residents. Since then, more small strikes have taken place there in the

oil industries—though those were peaceful and didn’t lead to bloodshed.

Since 2019, strikes and protests have become more common there. At the

same time, due to economic factors, people have become more active in

politics across country as oil prices plunged worldwide, impacting

Kazakhstan economically. As the Kazakhstani currency—the tenge—became

weaker, people could afford less and less.

There are also serious problems in Kazakhstan: lack of clean water in

villages, environmental issues, people living in debt, public mistrust,

corruption and nepotism in a system in which any objection can easily be

shut down. Most people have gotten used to living in these conditions

while the economy has served billionaire oligarchs who have ties with

government officials and other prominent people. In the early 2000s,

people in Kazakhstan had a glimpse of hope as the economy grew thanks to

natural gas reserves; as a consequence, many people’s standard of living

rose. But it all changed in 2014, when oil prices dropped worldwide and

the war in Ukraine led to sanctions against Russia—which impacted

Kazakhstan, since it is dependent on Russia.

There were some small protests from 2014 to 2016, but they were easily

suppressed. From 2018 to 2019 they grew more, thanks in part to the

aforementioned opposition businessman, Mukhtar Ablyazov, who used social

media to gain traction. Political protests and activism were organized

under the banner of the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan party. This did

lead to longtime President Nazarbayev resigning after ruling for almost

three decades, but he had his position taken over by his long trusted

ally, the current President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Tokayev barely

received any trust from Kazakh citizens; he was viewed as Nazarbayev’s

political puppet, as he barely took any steps towards widely demanded

reforms and took no executive action against government officials that

the public despises.

Kazakhstan’s political system and President Nazarbayev’s leadership have

defined Kazakhstani society for the entire history of its independence.

I mentioned before how Nazarbayev basically became an authoritarian

ruler via various means that catalyzed the opposition against him. Under

Nazarbayev, the Kazakh government had never allowed any actual

opposition statesmen to challenge him through the country’s presidential

or parliamentary elections. The rest of the politicians and legal

parties that were contestants in the elections were simply different

people with different faces but the same pro-government stances, all as

a poorly implemented illusion to make Kazakhstan look like a

“democratic” country in which one strongman and his ruling party happen

to win every election with an unconvincing, even surrealistic majority

of votes—despite documented cases of electoral fraud. This is similar to

the situation in Russia, Belarus, and other dictatorial post-Soviet

countries. As time passed, things really got dire as a cult of

personality was created around Nazarbayev. The government spent millions

in state budget naming and erecting streets, parks, squares, airports,

universities, statues, and the capital city of Astana after him. All

this accomplished was to irritate the public more, making Nazarbayev

look like a narcissist.

The situation in Kazakhstan became worse after 2020, when the COVID-19

pandemic hit. People lost their jobs; some were left without any way to

pay for goods, receiving very little support whatsoever from the

government, while health restrictions made people more frustrated and

distrustful of the government. And then the price of goods rose for food

specifically—this has taken place worldwide, but for Kazakhstan, it had

a considerable impact.

To return to the town of Janaozen, which has a history of bloodshed, the

price for liquefied gas skyrocketed—in the very place where the fuel is

actually produced. That cost has grown steadily for the past ten years,

but it finally increased even more when the government stopped subsiding

it, instead letting the market decide.

There had already been small protests about this issue in that city—but

on January 1, 2022, the price for the liquefied gas that is used to

power vehicles unexpectedly doubled. This enraged people. They protested

in the square in massive numbers. Law enforcement seemed hesitant to

disperse the protest. Other villages in the province rose up and started

blockading roads in protest. Then, in a few days, the protests spread

nationwide.

What started with a protest over the hike in gas prices grew largely

because of the other problems I mentioned previously. These motivated

people to go out on strike and into the streets more.

Describe the different agendas of the different groups on both sides of

this struggle. Are there identifiable factions or currents within the

demonstrations?

At first, the government ignored the gas price problems by trying to get

people used to it, even blaming consumers for the high demand.

Eventually, they lowered the price, but this didn’t stop the protests.

Then the state essentially denied their involvement in letting the gas

prices inflate—but as the protests intensified, the government began to

concede more to try to calm people down. For example, they pledged to

introduce some policies to offer people economic assistance, after

ignoring them for years.

But the protests still haven’t stopped. Few people trust or support the

government. The people demonstrating simply want a better life, like

they imagine people have in developed European countries. Of course,

there are different demands from different people—some seek the

resignation of the entire government, while others want a new form of

democratic government, specifically a parliamentary form without an

executive president, and still others want more jobs and industry and

better social conditions.

Some of the fiercest rioting and looting is taking place in the old

Soviet capitol of Almaty, which is the financial metropolis and the

largest city in Kazakhstan now. People are looting stores and setting

things on fire. They have burned down the Almaty administrative building

(or akimats, as they are referred in Kazakhstan) in front of the central

square, as well as the law enforcement headquarters.

In my view, the government has contributed to this situation, because

they haven’t fulfilled the demand to resign peacefully and let an

opposition-run interim government form a new democratic political

system. The current president of Kazakhstan, who is a close ally of the

former and first president, Nazarbayev, is adding fuel to the fire by

refusing to transfer his power. The longer he holds on to his position,

the more violence will occur, since neither the government nor the

protesters can compromise. As long as this goes on, the people who are

doing violent acts will be able to continue to get away with it. There’s

lawlessness in Almaty; it seems that nobody is sure who’s in charge

there now, since the mayor’s office was burned down and he disappeared

from public view. The entire city is barricaded with armed protesters

walking around.

The city is under a curfew, in theory, but in practice, law enforcement

is absent or has joined the protests—so the city is like a commune

[i.e., as in the Paris Commune] from what I hear. At this point,

considering how the events are unfolding, I wouldn’t call the people

there protesters, but revolutionaries—especially seeing armed civilians

there.

In response, the government which presides at the country’s capital of

Nur-Sultan (or Astana) has send various security “anti-terror” forces to

take control of the city, turning the usually peaceful town into a

nightmare war zone.

Present a chronology of the events of the past week.

The protest started in the oil-producing town of Janaozen on January 2.

By the next morning, other cities and villages in western Kazakhstan had

begun protesting in solidarity.

The most massive protests took place at night as the unrest spread to

other cities, including Almaty. Late at night on January 4, people in

Almaty marched to the main square in front of city hall. Huge troops of

police were positioned there. Clashes broke out, but the protestors got

the upper hand.

They were dispersed early in the morning of January 5, but they

regrouped again by around 9 am in the foggy morning. Some law

enforcement officers even switched sides and joined the protest as

videos from social media show. Eventually, the protesters marched to the

square again around 10 am and managed to storm the city hall, setting

the building on fire. Government security officers fled Almaty, leaving

the city under the control of the protesters.

Since then, President Tokayev sent some troops there again in an attempt

to take control via a “terrorist cleaning” operation. I don’t how it’s

playing out at every minute, but I’ve seen on social media that during

the night of January 5 or early in the morning of January 6, things in

Almaty became chaotic as people started looting and breaking into

weapons’ deposits in order to obtain them and gunshots were reported.

In other cities, it’s more peaceful, with massive protests in the

central squares. I heard unverified information that some protesters

have taken over the local government buildings in a few other cities,

but as far as I know, those are less chaotic compared to Almaty.

In the capital, Nur-Sultan, it is quiet, but people have witnessed huge

numbers of riot police surrounding the Aqorda presidential palace.

Basically, the entire place is now a fortress.

In short, all Kazakhstan is now like The Hunger Games. If you have seen

the Hunger Games trilogy or if you know a basic summary of the plot, you

know what I’m talking about. Protestors are attempting to take control

of various cities one by one in an attempt to topple the government.

Again, incumbent President Tokayev doesn’t want to hand over power. If

that doesn’t happen, I expect the chaos to continue until the government

is overthrown or the uprising is brutally suppressed, or some even worse

scenario.

Do you think the participants in these protests have any reference

points for the protest movements that have broken out in France,

Ecuador, and elsewhere around the world in response to increasing fuel

prices? What is informing the tactics they are using?

I think a lot of them are influenced by the protests that have taken

place in other post-Soviet countries like Belarus and Kyrgyzstan. It

seems that in Almaty, the residents drew on the example of neighboring

Kyrgyzstan, where people also stormed the government and burned down

buildings—but compared to Kyrgyzstan, the government was overthrown more

quickly. (In my view, this was partly due to it being a smaller country

with just one major capital city.) Kyrgyzstan has experienced three

revolutions so far; considering its close proximity and cultural ties to

Kazakhstan, since both countries speak Turkic languages, I think its

example has played a significant role in Kazakhstan.

What are the possibilities for what will happen next?

From my point of view, I can imagine a couple scenarios. Either the

government resigns—or is overthrown—and Kazakhstan starts down the path

to democratization, or the government suppresses the uprising with a

tremendous use of force, including involving other countries. Or an even

worse scenario—a prolonged and destructive civil war between the

government and rebelling Kazakhs.

The president of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, is asking the CSTO

[the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a military alliance

comprised of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and

Tajikistan] to send in “peacekeeping” soldiers. In short, the president

is inviting foreign troops into Kazakhstan to try to suppress the

protests. Either the armed protesters somehow repel these forces and the

government falls, or the revolutionaries give up and are crushed.

Kazakhstan faces a dark future. It’s a war for liberty or defeat, and

defeat would mean a potential loss of more liberties and possibly

sovereignty.

What can people outside Kazakhstan do to support the participants in the

struggle?

The only realistic way for people outside in Kazakhstan to support is by

bringing more attention to the events and maybe organizing some sort of

aid.

Conclusion: A View from Russia

In the following text, a Russian anarchist reflects on the implications

of the uprising in Kazakhstan for the region. You can read a perspective

from Belarusian anarchists

here

.

After decades of repression, failures, and defeats, why is hope rising

again and again, as we see in Belarus, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, and now in

Kazakhstan? Why, after our relatives, friends, and neighbors fall, shot

dead by the police or the army, do people still struggle? How is it that

we still get these chances to experience the wind of change and

excitement, which gives us a taste of all that our lives could be?

We can feel some answers in the lines of Kazakh musician Ermen Anti from

a band named Adaptation:

“No matter how much they shoot, the bullets won‘t be enough.

No matter how much they crush, nevertheless the seedlings

Of fair anger are sprouting up

Prometheus children, carrying fire to the people freezing cold.”

When we look at the events of the past decades in Kazakhstan, Belarus,

Russia, and Kyrgyzstan, we need to ask what cooperation between

initiatives and movements struggling towards liberation could accomplish

on an international level. Such connections could enable us to exchange

political and cultural experiences, to strengthen the common cause which

the people of these countries should share. Yet in contrast to how much

the economies and political realities of these countries are

interconnected and interdependent, the anarchist movements are

disconnected.

Kazakhstan can be an example for what can happen tomorrow in Russia,

Belarus, and other countries in this part of the world. Today, people in

Russia fear for their lives when they think about expressing any form of

dissent. But tomorrow, we can see Zhanaozen and Almaty in the cities of

Russia, Belarus (again!), and other countries. We can forget about the

assurances that “It can’t happen here”—what can and cannot happen

depends first and foremost on what we can imagine and desire.

When situations unfold like what we see today in Kazakhstan, we can see

how important it is to be connected with others in our society. Today,

we are surprised—we often might not even be among the people in the

streets, fighting and defending each other shoulder to shoulder, or

doing other important work to support the uprising. To be ready and

connected, we need to be able to face the contradictions within our

communities and within our society as a whole. We need to be able to

communicate our ideas and bring proposals to people around us in

situations like these. Conflicts, disagreements, and isolation are

smothering comrades who could otherwise dedicate their lives to the

struggle. When I ask myself what is needed for us to see each other in

the streets and in people’s homes, walking together, caring for each

other and fighting together, I imagine us approaching each other in

different way—making it possible for each other to struggle, to develop,

to survive.

We can ask ourselves: what do we need to change in how we approach each

other and other people, how do we approach the struggle and our

movements, in order to make them a source of life and inspiration that

can offer people ways to think, fight, and live?

For example, we remember the feminist movement in Kazakhstan, which was

the center of the public attention and discourse for some years in the

2010s, which published a feminist magazine and brought up that topic in

Kazakhstan in ways that no one had before, connecting a lot of groups

and communities along the fault line of domestic violence and

patriarchy. This is an example of how we can position ourselves to

address issues that will connect us to a wide range of other people in

our society.

We in the ex-Soviet republics have an impressive heritage of resistance

and uprisings to draw upon. We need to connect to each other so we can

access this heritage.

Solidarity and strength to everyone fighting in Kazakhstan and across

all the post-Soviet countries. As people say, the dogs may bark but the

caravan shall go on. Today, they may stomp on our necks, but the

struggle won’t cease, and those who fell in the streets of Almaty won’t

be forgotten.

II. Kazakhstan after the Uprising

Eyewitness Accounts from Almaty; Analysis from Russian Anarchists

Following up our coverage of last week’s uprising in Kazakhstan, we have

translated an array of perspectives on the situation from various

Russian anarchist sources and interviewed two anarchists from Almaty,

the largest city in Kazakhstan and the place where the fighting became

most intense.

This text also includes previously unpublished photographs taken by our

contacts in Almaty.

The following sources should serve to debunk any facile

misrepresentations of the uprising from the authorities in Kazakhstan,

Russia, or the United States—or their misguided supporters.

To those who spread conspiracy theories about the United States

attempting to stage-manage a “color revolution” in Kazakhstan, we must

point out that the protests began in response to the government

canceling its subsidy on gas, which is produced under a profitable state

monopoly in Kazakhstan. Those who defend the governments of Kazakhstan

and Russia are defending repressive forces that are imposing neoliberal

austerity measures upon exploited workers in an extraction-based

economy. The honorable place for all who genuinely oppose capitalism is

at the side of ordinary workers and other rebels who stand up to the

ruling class, not supporting the governments who claim to represent

protesters while gunning them down and imprisoning them.

This is not to say that the clashes in Kazakhstan represent a unified

anti-capitalist struggle, or for that matter a labor movement. The

most credible accounts

of the composition of the protests acknowledge that there have been a

wide range of different participants utilizing different tactics to

pursue different agendas. Of course, if we are sympathetic to workers

who protest against the rising cost of living, we can also understand

why the unemployed and marginalized might engage in looting.

A crisis like the uprising in Kazakhstan opens up all the fault lines

within a society. Every preexisting conflict is pushed to a breaking

point: ethnic and religious tensions, rivalries among the ruling elite,

geopolitical contests for influence and power. We saw this to a lesser

degree in France during the

Yellow Vest movement

and in the United States during the

George Floyd Uprising

and its aftermath, though those crises did not proceed as far as the

uprising in Kazakhstan, where, owing to the entrenched authoritarian

power structure, any struggle is immediately an all-or-nothing venture.

If it is true, as we have argued, that the protesters in Kazakhstan were

opposing the same forces that rest of us face all around the world, then

the violent suppression of those protests by the soldiers of six

nations’ armies poses questions that we all must confront. It seems that

such explosions are becoming practically inevitable as economic,

political, and ecological catastrophes hit one after the other all

around the world. How do we prepare in advance, in order to maximize the

likelihood that these ruptures will turn out well despite all the forces

that are arrayed against us? In moments of revolutionary potential, how

can we propose transformative questions to the others who make up this

society with us, focusing the lines of conflict along the most

generative and liberating axes even as we compete with a variety of

factions that aim to centralize their own ideologies and interests? How

do we avoid both conspiracy theories and manipulation, both defeatism

and defeat?

In the following overview, composed in collaboration with Russian

anarchists, we present the analysis of the uprising in Kazakhstan that

has come out of the ex-Soviet region, then share an interview we

conducted with anarchists in Almaty as soon as internet access was

reestablished following the crackdown.

The Prison of Nations

Starting on January 1, what began as a single protest against the rising

cost of living escalated to a full-scale nationwide uprising, which for

now has been brutally suppressed by a combination of domestic and

foreign military force.

At first, the protesters sought the resignation of government, a

reduction in the price of gas, and the removal of the

ex-president—Nursultan Nazarbayev, the Grey Cardinal of Kazakhstan—from

the head of the National Security Council. The slogan of the whole

country for these days became “Shal ket!”—”Grandpa, go away!” As the

protests gained momentum, people quickly came to the point of not

wishing to agree to anything less than a complete change in the

government, including the ouster of current president Kassym-Jomart

Tokayev.

The regime attempted to suppress the protests. Yet the protesters

managed to seize weapons from the police and fight back, looting shops

and burning down or occupying municipal buildings. President Tokaev

declared a state of emergency and sent military against the protesters

with orders to shoot on sight anyone who dared to resist. At the same

time, Tokaev officially asked the Collective Security Treaty

Organization (CSTO, consisting of Russia and several neighboring

countries) for support in regaining the control over the country.

According to Kazakhstan’s Interior Ministry,

nearly 8000

people were arrested during the demonstrations, and at least 164 people

killed; since then,

much higher

figures have circulated. Some prominent bloggers and union leaders are

reported to have disappeared. The internet was shut down for days.

People were shot in the squares and on the street by snipers and other

soldiers.

The military suppression of the uprising, including the intervention of

the CSTO, played a key role in the outcome. As of January 10, media

reports and testimonies of people in Kazakhstan show that the fighting

has stopped in Almaty and mass gatherings have ceased in other cities.

Here is the analysis that

Anarchist Fighter

, an anarchist platform looking on from Russia, published on their

Telegram channel:

1) CSTO intervention. All more or less sane sources among the Kazakhs

perceive this as an intervention and an attempt of “Big Brother” on

their sovereignty. Every hour of presence of these forces in the country

multiplies the aversion and anger;

2) Authoritarian rule has not disappeared. President Tokayev has

concentrated more power in his hands, invited foreign military, ordered

his troops to “shoot without warning”
 But Kazakhstanis are not used to

government brutality. It does not stop them, and the dissatisfaction

with the government is not going away.

3) The economic crisis will not cease without fundamental reforms

towards social justice. Enforcement is essentially just a postponement

of price increases. No measures to overcome poverty and reduce

inequality in society are offered by the authorities. Consequently, the

discontent they have created will not abate either.

“Wahhabis, Terrorists, Protesters”—Misinformation about the Uprising

According to the

avtonom.org

podcast, “

Trends of order and chaos,

”

“The Kazakh authorities are trying very hard to save face and construct

their version of reality. The punitive operation is called

“counter-terrorist,” as if a “terrorist” is any person who opposes the

authorities by violent means. Rebellious people, respectively, are

“militants and bandits, they must be killed,” and the reason for the

uprising is allegedly “free media and foreign figures,” which is

literally what Tokayev said. We are witnessing the development of

militant propaganda virtually live on air. The lie that black is white

and war is peace, not to the point of sentimentality, and whoever

doesn’t believe it—to the wall. After all, no one will feel sorry for

the “terrorists,” this is a mantra that post-Soviet dictators have

learned well.”

From the beginning of the fighting, both Kazakh and foreign media made

claims regarding the identities of the protesters. The definitions

ranged from “protesters,” “aggressive youth,” and “marauders” all the

way to “nationalist squads,” “20,000 bandits attacking Almaty,” and

“Islamic terrorists.” It is true that a variety of groups and factions

participated in the uprising. But that is not itself a problem—an entire

society was represented in the uprising, with all its differences and

contradictions. It is safe to assume that different people participated

in different actions against the regime, including fighting and looting.

From Anarchist Fighter:

The journalist Maksim Kurnikov said some very interesting things on Ekho

Moskvy’s morning broadcast. He remarked that the scheme “to take weapons

from gun stores and then attack security forces” is not new in

Kazakhstan.

Exactly the same thing happened in the city of Aktobe in June 2016:

several dozen young men, divided into groups, took weapons from two gun

stores, seized vehicles, and attacked a part of the National Guard,

where they were defeated. The authorities of Kazakhstan have been much

muddled about the case: It is still not very clear what the basis is for

their claims of an “Islamist connection.”

Kurnikov also spoke of paramilitary guards at illegal oil refineries in

western Kazakhstan, made up of local villagers, disparagingly called

“mambets” (collective farmers) by Kazakhstani townsfolk. These groups

have also at times engaged in armed confrontations with police officers.

What does all this tell us? Of course, President Tokayev’s words about

“terrorist groups carefully trained abroad” are pure propaganda and most

likely a gross lie. That armed cells capable of seizing security

institutions and arsenals suddenly materialized from a motley crowd also

sounds unlikely. That said, we have no evidence of Islamist or

nationalist involvement in the Almaty events. However, as we can see,

organized groups capable of active armed resistance exist in Kazakhstani

society in principle. It is likely that those people who engaged in

direct confrontation with the security forces were partly

representatives of such groups and partly spontaneous self-organized

protesters. There is an analogy with the 2014 Maidan [i.e., the

protests in Kiev

], where the defense was organized both spontaneously by the crowd and

with the participation of radical organized groups that joined in.”

Claims about Islamic fundamentalists participating in the events may

well be true to some extent. But it is also certain that the authorities

will make use of any information about them to discredit all the other

groups, identities, and participants involved in the uprising. Economic

desperation and social and political persecution often drive people to

fundamentalism as well as other forms of radicalism.

According to Anarchist Fighter:

“The question about the real balance of forces among non-state actors of

the events is still urgent:

Opposition journalist Lukpan Akhmedyarov, on Ekho Moskvy radio station,

expressed confidence that the armed attack on the authorities in Almaty

was the work of Nazarbayev’s people. The arguments for this confidence

are not clear.

It is noteworthy that Akhmedyarov noticed in his native Uralsk on the

square next to the protesters a group of several dozen organized people

calling for an assault on the Akimat. A small group of “identically

dressed instigators” was also reported from Kostanai.

What is it? Some shadowy organized rebel force, criminal groups or

really provocateurs from state services? Or maybe a “non-violent”

narrative, seeking to immediately label supporters of direct action as

such? There are no answers.

One thing is clear: dividing protesters into “peaceful” and “terrorists”

is a distortion of reality. Even before the events in Almaty, there were

clips from the same Uralsk, where the demonstrators were bravely

liberating the detainees from the police.

Let’s allow ourselves a truism: yes, a radical “violent” protest does

not guarantee success at all, nor is it immune to provocations. But a

purely “non-violent” protest in our authoritarian reality is simply

doomed in advance. “You have been heard, we’ll sort it out, and we’ll

put the most violent of you in jail”—that’s always the answer from the

powers that be in Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan


The various rumors about internal conflicts within the power structure

in Kazakhstan and the speculations about geopolitical schemes at play in

the uprising could all be true. But to elevate these rumors and

speculations to the central position in the narrative about what is

happening in Kazakhstan is a political choice: it is a decision to deny

the agency of the countless ordinary people who participated in the

uprising for their own reasons. Like all conspiracy theories, this

assumes that the only people who have any agency in the situation are

shadowy global power players; it also serves to distract people from the

obvious things that everyone knows are happening, such as the political

elite of Kazakhstan profiting at the experience of everyone else.

Rumors and speculation serve to influence the events and the ways that

others understand and engage with them. True or not, each of these

interventions serves to focus attention on certain figures, to spread a

certain set of assumptions about how the world works. If these

conspiracy theories cast doubt on the participants in the uprising

enough to distract people from supporting the protesters who are

standing up for themselves against economic exploitation and political

domination, then they will have succeeded in their purpose to keep

everyone everywhere dependent on political elites.

Tokayev himself has not hesitated to propound the most outlandish

stories, claiming that the international terrorists who allegedly led

the revolt cannot be identified because their bodies have been stolen

from the morgues.

According to Anarchist Fighter,

“It turns out that the terrorists can’t be shown to the public even if

they are dead. Their comrades-in-arms kidnapped the dead right from

morgues!

And the main thing is that Kazakhstani authorities with no shame openly

state that radical demonstrators dressed up as the police and the

soldiers (!!!) Now any atrocity of the punishers can be attributed to

the revolutionaries themselves. Maybe the protesters were shot by those

“in disguise”? And if it now turns out that the children and journalists

were shot by men in uniform and with shoulder straps - then you already

know: of course it was the disguised “rioters” and not the brutal

executioners of the Tokayev special forces.

Beyond the question of who participated in the uprising, it is important

to ask who benefits from its suppression. As one commentary put it:

“Putin is not a nationalist, but a guarantor. He guarantees the security

of the post-Soviet elite and the safety of their property. He used to

guarantee it only in the Russian Federation, but now it seems that he

guarantees it in Kazakhstan as well. After all, there is Russian capital

there too.

Look at Kazakhstan’s Forbes list. The real beneficiaries of the

peacekeeping operation are listed there. The list, by the way, is

interestingly international. The first two lines are occupied by the

Kazakhstani Koreans of Kim. The first one is the major shareholder of

KAZ Minerals, a “british copper company”, as Wikipedia describes it. In

2021, his fortune increased by $600 million. The second Kim, together

with Baring Vostok, owns one of the main Kazakh banks, Kaspi Bank, which

is also traded in London and has shown impressive growth, despite the

pandemic. In third place I was surprised to find a citizen of Georgia

Lomatdze, who is also a co-owner of Kaspi Bank and its manager.

Then comes a certain Bulat Utemuratov, who in the Nazarbayev’s

government of the 90’s specialized in foreign trade. He owns ForteBank,

whose net income for 2020 “amounted to 53.2 billion tenge” ($121

million), as well as the major stakes in the major mobile operators, 65%

of the gold mining company RG Gold and a bunch of other assets,

including a Burger King franchise and “Ritz-Carlton hotels in

Nur-Sultan, Vienna and Moscow”


The fifth and sixth places are shared by Nazarbayev’s daughter and

son-in-law. His son-in-law, Timur Kulibayev, owns “the controlling stake

in Singapore’s Steppe Capital Pte Ltd”, which owns the “Dutch”

KazStroyService Infrastructure BV and Asset Minerals Holdings (Caspi

Neft JSC, 50% of Kazazot JSC).

Dinara Kulibayeva, Nazarbayev’s daughter, together with her husband,

owns Halyk Bank of Kazakhstan—the bank’s “market capitalization reached

£3.1 billion ($4.3 billion).” In seventh place is a Russian financial

speculator and founder of the “American investment company” Freedom

Holding Corp. Timur Turlov. “According to the company’s financial

statements, its assets tripled in 2020 to $1.47 billion ($453.5 million

in 2019), equity almost doubled to $225.5 million ($131.3 million

respectively), net income jumped 10-fold to $42.3 million ($4 million

respectively).”

And so on.

And on the other side of the barricades are all those who either work

for all this beau monde for 300 bucks a month (this is approximately how

the median salary in Kazakhstan is estimated), extracting minerals for

“British” and “Singaporean” corporations or serving fellow citizens in

the service sector, which also belongs to all the same from the list; or

those who have not found work at all in large and medium-sized business,

whose earnings could only be guessed (it is believed to be even lower).

Workers, concentrated around enterprises, demand social guarantees

(lower utility prices, free medical care, higher wages, etc.). Those who

aren’t even workers are simply trying to get their own from retail

chains and banks through broken windows and looted shops.

Considering that workers are sure to be dumped as soon as the heat

subsides, the actions of the latter cannot be called irrational or

unjust.

A Spring that Has Been Delayed for Thirty Years

Again, according to the avtonom.org podcast, “Trends of order and

chaos,”

“The Kazakh authorities and President Tokayev did not trust their own

policing and governmental structures in the first place. The police and

the army had already begun to move to the side of the rebels, and it was

obvious that any of a variety of outcomes was possible. Under these

circumstances, Tokayev decided on the last extreme—to call in the

punitive forces from neighboring countries. This was political suicide:

in fact, he admitted that he was at war with his own people and even

with his own state apparatus.”

The sitution in Kazakhstan escalated very quickly—not only the protests,

but also the brutality with which they were suppressed. The fighting in

the streets is a consequence of the ways that the patience of people in

Kazakhstan has been tried for decades now. Kazakh society has seen

fighting and shooting in the streets before—in 1986, when Mikhail

Gorbachev’s government suppressed an uprising in Almaty, carrying out a

massacre,[1] and in 2011, when police shot striking workers in

Zhanaozen, killing dozens.

When the first news of domestic military intervention came out, this did

not seem to cause a major setback for the uprising. The fighting did not

cease then—on the contrary, it intensified. We saw videos of disarmed

soldiers in the crowd of people, welcomed for changing sides.

Then the internet was shut down. The official reason for the internet

blackout was “preventing terrorists from various countries who are

fighting in Almaty from coordinating with their headquarters.” That

caused a crucial lack of information from the places where uprising was

taking place, making it easier to represent—or misrepresent—the events.

In a time when everything is filmed, photographed, uploaded, and shared,

cutting off a social uprising from means of communication serves to

erase it from reality, opening a space in which falsehoods can thrive.

Yet one of the most important events took place in plain sight: the

intervention of the CSTO. This raised many contradictions at once.

Formally designated as “peacekeeping assistance from the Collective

Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),” it includes a contingent up to 200

hundred soldiers from Armenia and Tajikistan, 500 from Belarus from

dictator Lukashenko (who recently suppressed an uprising of his own), an

unspecified number of Kyrgyz soldiers, and 3000 soldiers from Russia. It

is significant that the Russian paratroopers who have been moved into

Kazakhstan are commanded by Anatoliy Serdyukov, who is experienced in

the Chechen wars, the annexation of Crimea, and the war in Syria. We can

see Russia’s imperial activities on full display here.

In Kazakhstan, the regime is striving to remain in power by any means

necessary, resorting to inviting neighboring dictatorships to invade.

For people in Kazakhstan, this should mean the final loss of any

legitimacy Tokayev might have had in their eyes. Everyone in the region

can see that the CSTO represents the unity of its governments against

their peoples.

According to avtonom.org:

“A president who calls the people of his own country ‘terrorist gangs’

represents a nadir even by the standards of post-Soviet authoritarian

‘republics.’”

In fact, this is an invasion of another country by force on the side of

the authorities who have lost the trust of the people. It would mean the

endless reproduction of the “Russia is a prison of nations” scenario and

would be on a par with the suppression of the Hungarian revolutions in

1848 and 1956, with tanks in the streets of Prague in 1968, and with the

invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

From Zhanaozen to Almaty: Remembering the Dead

From Anarchist Fighter:

“The current uprising in Kazakhstan began with the protests in

Zhanaozen. The same city where, in December 2011, the authorities shot

striking oil workers. The tragedy in Zhanaozen has left a mark on the

protest culture in Kazakhstan. The people have cherished the memory of

the dead. The duty of the living was to continue the work of the fallen.

And in January 2022, Zhanaozen rose again. The first city in the

country, an example for all the others. The formal reason for the

protests was the increase in gas prices and rising food prices. But, as

noted by Mikhail Bakunin, mere dissatisfaction with the material

situation is not enough for the revolution, a mobilizing idea is needed.

In Kazakhstan, one such idea was the loyalty to the fighters who died in

2011. The workers who died then under the bullets will never see the

world they dreamed of, but death for the sake of a dream became a

testament to the living to continue their cause. And so for the rebels

of Kazakhstan there is no way back now.

Kazakhstan’s rebellious culture has much to learn from. We, too, must

keep the memory of the martyrs of the liberation movement in Russia and

Belarus. About Michael Zhlobitsky, Andrey Zeltzer, Roman Bondarenko and

other heroes. They died to make us braver and stronger, and we are

indebted to them. We must tell how they lived and what they gave their

lives for. As events in Kazakhstan show, fallen martyrs are capable of

raising people to revolt.”

Interview: Eyewitness Testimony from Anarchists in Almaty

To get more perspective on the events in Kazakhstan, we reached out to

two anarcha-feminists who witnessed some of the scenes from the uprising

firsthand. They were not at the front of the clashes, but they are known

activists who have participated in feminist organizing in the city for

years,[2] so they have the closest thing to a “neutral” standpoint on

the events that we could find.

Introduce yourselves and the situation you are speaking from.

We are two anarchists from Kazakhstan, both she/her. We have

participated in many left-anarcho-fem-eco, animal liberation, vegan

activities in Almaty over the last eleven years, but we are not so

active at the moment.

I can’t name any anarchist movements in Kazakhstan in the 21st century.

There were some underground activities in the 1990s, but for the

present, nothing like that exists. I used to take part in a left-Marxist

group: meetings, a reading group, some public lectures. I don’t know

what the ex-members who stayed here are doing now. I hear nothing about

any “left-wing” groups here.

I was one of the organizers of one of the first feminist movements

here—Kazfem. We organized many public activities and performances,

published a feminist magazine named Yudol’, and organized demonstrations

for March 8

International

Women’s

Day

].

There is a youth liberal movement here called Oyan Kazakhstan (“Wake up,

Kazakhstan”) that is active now. They organize public meetings,

performances, marches, and are often harassed by police. It started

after the banner action that Beibarys Tolymbekov and Asya Tulesova

carried out at the city marathon in 2019.[3] They were jailed for 15

days and it started a big wave of attention, especially in social media,

which hadn’t happened before. There is a conspiracy theory that all

these activists are pro-government, because nobody is in jail now, but I

don’t think it is true. I know many of them personally. They also

support feminist and LGBTQ activities. On the opposing side—mostly

haters on the internet and some government media outlets—people claim

that all of this is the work of “the West” (Europe and the United

States).

Kazakhstan is an authoritarian country. We had the same president

[Nursultan Nazarbayev] for 28 years, and the new one [Kassym-Jomart

Tokayev] is just a puppet. But when the first president quit, people

started to think about change. The cult of personality around Nursultan

Nazarbayev didn’t disappear after he quit. The capital, Astana, was

renamed “Nursultan,” which caused many protests. Over the past few

years, the economic situation has been worsening, especially after the

pandemic, very high inflation, corruption, etc. Also, there has been a

lot of selling and renting our lands to China and other countries.

The situation has always been like this—but ten years ago, or even five

years ago, more people were loyal to the president and afraid of

“destabilization.” At that time, there was a hope that we [Kazakhstan]

were “developing,” that things would be better soon.

Even at the time of the events in Zhanaozen in 2011, when the protesting

workers were shot, there was very little support from Almaty. Many

people thought that what happened there was right.

Before, if there was any protest, it was organized and supported by the

older generation, by workers and people from the regions, the auls

(villages), usually led by the shady opposite leader Mukhtar Oblyazov.

But over the last three years, young people from the urban middle class

have become political activists. It was mostly people from Almaty, but

there was support in other cities too.

By the way, I think that the ecological problems in Almaty—where we

experience extremely high levels of pollution and it becomes worse every

year—are the big reason for youth protest here. Alongside the

development of social media, of course.

Tell us what you experienced in Almaty last week.

Soon after the New Year, news began to arrive about a workers’ uprising

in Zhanaozen. The protest was peaceful, but the demands were quite

radical—ranging from lower gas prices to the resignation of the

government. Protests also began in other cities. It became known that

there would be solidarity actions in Almaty on January 4, but I did not

have precise information.

On the way home that day, I learned of protests in different parts of

the city and the arrests of activists from [the aforementioned youth

liberal movement] Oyan Kazakhstan. I live a little outside the city, in

the mountains, and already at home it became clear that something

serious was happening. In the evening, all internet connections went

offline. I didn’t know where to go and whether I could come back.

Regarding what happened in the city during that time, my comrade Daniyar

Moldabekov, a political journalist,

wrote

:

When the demonstrators approached the square, police began throwing stun

grenades and tear gas. Me and thousands of others choked, our eyes and

faces stung, we felt sick, we coughed ceaselessly. It’s a miracle I

didn’t pass out. They must have fired off more than a hundred stun

grenades between 11 pm and 4 am, which was when my colleagues had to get

me home. I could still hear the bangs from my apartment.

About an hour after the crowd reached Republic Square, they headed down

to Abai Street. There they faced down an armored personnel carrier

coming in their direction. A truck drove past carrying citizens waving

Kazakh flags. Some of them were holding shields they appeared to have

snatched off riot police.»

People heard explosions all night. I refused to believe it. In the

morning, the news was reported by phone. I called everyone for half a

day, heard about victims, the activists were released. It was only

possible to get online at the house of some friends. The Akimat building

(the town hall) was being occupied. Everyone was trying to persuade us

to stay home. Speculating that the protests might have a nationalist

character, some people started to be afraid (I am ethnically Russian in

Kazakhstan).

There was no information available about who was in the square or in the

city at that time. My friend and I decided to go to see for ourselves.

The city was half empty. Cars with Kazakhstani flags on them drove

through the streets, shouting something joyful. Everything was closed.

On the doors, there were signs reading “we are with the people.” An

atmosphere of excitement. As we got closer to the square, there were

more groups of young men. I saw a police shoulder strap lying on the

road. There were people with sticks meeting. It became a little scary,

but no one was aggressive. At the monument to the events of 1986 (the

uprising against the Soviet regime), we met protesters with police

shields. There was not a single policeman or soldier to be seen.

Then we saw the Akimat burning. We couldn’t believe our eyes. People

were tending bonfires. Everyone was calm. They smashed the doors to the

building opposite the Akimat. There were TV channels and other

government services. Men came up to us again: “Why did you come?” (They

meant—why did you come, since you are ethnically Russian?).

“This is my city and country as well as yours,” I answered. They greeted

us cheerfully. We did not feel any aggression from them.

We offered the protesters hot tea. The man told us that he was at the

protests from the very beginning—that it all began peacefully, until the

authorities began to detonate flash-bang grenades and use violence.

“Now,” he said, “They are shooting combatants.” The guards remained only

near the Akimat building itself.

He and other men there had seen people shot in the head. They called

taxi services and put injured people in the cars to get them to the

hospital. He told us that they planned to occupy the airport, so that

the Russian military would not be able to land there.

Many of the bourgeois high-level government and business people had

already left the country on private flights. There were rumors that N.

Nazarbaev had left the country, too.

None of the people we saw on the square looked like “marauders” [sic].

They wanted the government to resign. They were not carrying out orders;

no one was pulling their strings. This was a nationwide labor uprising.

No one was scared to die, but we didn’t see any anger. They showed us

injuries from rubber bullets and warned us that soon there would be

serious shooting, that it would be better for us to leave.

The sound of explosions and shooting became closer and more frequent. We

left. One man gave us a lift in his car. All those days, people showed

solidarity to each other.

My friends and I decided to stay together in my home. We all felt

excited. This was before any news appeared about destruction, looting,

and civilian casualties. At midnight, between January 5 and 6, all

internet connections were shut down. For four days, we were in

isolation; we could only make and receive calls, and those didn’t work

well.

That night, the whole city was abandoned by all services, including the

fire department and medical services. Fires were extinguished by

volunteers. Also, some protesters and volunteers tried to stop

“robbers.”[4]

On January 7, some shops and ATMs far from the city center were still

working. In that part of the city, mostly everything was clear, except

the burned government buildings around the square. Some services were

working there. The previous day, it had been possible to get inside the

buildings; no one guarded them. This time, we took some photos and then

there was a gunshot in the air nearby and we left this area.

On the evening of January 9, it became possible to get an internet

connection with proxy services. A mobile connection was still

unavailable. On the morning of January 10, the connection worked

everywhere, but only until 1 pm and then from 5:30 to 7:30 pm.

There has been a lot of talk from outside Kazakhstan about who is

“behind” the protests. Do these accusations have any credibility? We

have also seen some news reports claiming that clashes between rival

factions inside the power structure are also contributing to the

situation. How much do you think that Islamic fundamentalism is involved

in these events?

President Tokaev still rules, in spite of rumors about his retirement.

Now government TV channels and media are spreading so much

disinformation and propaganda. It’s very early to draw conclusions, but

some things are clear.

Everything started as a popular uprising. Yes, they burned Akimat, but

no one led them. They just wanted the old regime gone. They were not

“criminals” [sic].

After it started, some other forces showed up. We don’t know who they

were. But it’s true that they were organized. But by whom? Now there are

many rumors. Some official media says they are from [neighboring]

Kyrgystan, where there have been several revolutions since independence

[like Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan became independent when the Soviet Union

broke up in 1991]. Those outlets are also spreading reports about the

Taliban or jihadists. People I know personally said they saw people on

the streets who “looked like them” [sic].

Here in Kazakhstan, I haven’t seen any talk about the CIA [the Central

Intelligence Agency of the United States government]. I think that is

Russian propaganda.

The former adviser of the president has been making claims about a

conspiracy inside governmental structures, claiming that for several

years there were “training camps” in mountains and the National Safety

Committee was hiding this information. He claimed: “I have exclusive

information that, for example, 40 minutes before the attack on the

airport, an order was given to completely remove the cordon and guards.”

What can you say about the internal dynamics of the uprising?

Everyone outside of Kazakhstan is trying to analyze what’s going on and

it’s very difficult to do that without context, and those inside the

country can’t do it because of the lack of complete information. I think

that even we—the residents of this country—won’t understand what

happened for a long time yet. In addition to the fact that there is no

stable internet connection now, and that before that, there was not even

a cell phone connection, all the news channels are severely censored,

and it is only going to get worse.

I will not describe the theories that are circulating now, but they all

concern different power struggles between the Nazarbayev clan and others

seeking power—for example, there is one theory that Tokayev, with the

assistance of the Russian military, is securing his position in power.

The scary thing about all this is that tens of thousands of people were

involved in the game and their well-intentioned attempts to change the

social and political conditions in this country for the better, for

everyone’s sake, are now being used by a few people to divide the

resources of this country among themselves in a new way. Yes, it all

started with the economic demands of workers in western Kazakhstan, who

were protesting the sharp hike in gas prices. Then the demands became

political: the resignation of the government and president, the election

of akims (mayors), and a parliamentary republic. Some of the demands

were met, but not at once, and when they were ignored, a wave of protest

and solidarity spread to all the cities of Kazakhstan, so that from

outside it looked like a big revolutionary outburst, which in our

country has not occurred throughout thirty years of authoritarian

regime.

We can’t say anything for sure now, except one thing—this protest had no

public leader, and the street riots and occupations of administrative

buildings had no voiced demands. But there were murders and a huge

number of victims among the population, who suffered first in battles

with the police, then with each other in the streets, from which the

police fled, and then the shooting of civilians in the streets by the

armed forces of Kazakhstan and the CSTO (although we are promised that

they only protect state facilities now).

The mass media that were permitted to continue functioning began to tell

us about radicals and Islamists, using the image of the enemy from

outside. Before that, during the first days of the protests, there was a

discourse calling to “engage in a peaceful dialogue with the

protesters”—and a day later there was already an order to shoot to kill

(in President Tokayev’s speech). After the entry of CSTO troops and two

days of constant shooting in the streets, Tokayev equated protesters

with terrorists, as well as activists and human rights defenders, and

independent media in his words became a threat to stability. State

discourse is constantly changing in the process of this search for an

enemy: yesterday that enemy was supposedly bribed unemployed people from

Kyrgyzstan, today it’s already radicals from Afghanistan. We all hope

that tomorrow it won’t be the activists who have advocated for political

reforms in Kazakhstan for the last three years and came out to rallies.

What can you tell us about the repression?

Kyrgyz musiсian Vicram Ruzakhunov was arrested and tortured by Kazakh

authorities as a “terrorist” and was made to record a video and

“confess.” Now he is free.

Local independent journalist Lukpan Akhmediyarov has been arrested.

Another independent journalist, Makhambet Abjan, messaged that on

January 5, police came to his apartment; now he is missing. My friends

and many other people on social media report that their relatives and

friends are missing too.

Officials have already confirmed the deaths of hundreds of victims,

including two children. Activists from labor unions are

missing—including Kuspan Kosshigulov, Takhir Erdanov, and Amin Eleusinov

and his relatives.

In Almaty, journalists from Channel Dozhd’ (йДлДĐșĐ°ĐœĐ°Đ» Đ”ĐŸĐ¶ĐŽŃŒ), who tried

to take footage in the municipal morgue, were shot at (they were not

harmed).

On January 6, volunteers came to the square. Some activists displayed a

banner reading “We are not terrorists.” Police shot at them, killing at

least one.

How do you think that Russian troops entering Kazakhstan will change the

situation, in the long term?

The entry of Russian troops is very worrying. In the situation of a war

with Ukraine, we could imagine all the worst scenarios. Everyone I know

agrees that this is inappropriate, and that we can call it an

occupation.

Personally, I’m afraid that Russian troops entering this country will

cement the already strong influence of Russia on Kazakhstan politically,

and Kazakhstan will become like the Russia that we know now, with

tortured activists and trumped up cases. Our political opposition is

already completely silenced, and the population of the country

completely intimidated. Considering that this is the second shooting

during protests (2011 and 2022), and in the history of Kazakhstan there

was also a brutal suppression of an uprising under the USSR in 1986, and

the information on the number of people killed back then is still

classified
 then there is no hope that in the near future we will know

what really happened and how many people were killed and wounded. The

count most likely goes to thousands people.

What do you think will happen next?

Now it’s very early to imagine the outcome, in a situation of

information wars, propaganda, and isolation. I’m not a political expert.

For sure, repression will intensify now. The internet and all media will

be censored. Now the government tries to put on a “good face,” like they

are the saviors who saved us from terrorists. I am not sure this will

work. But for the time being, I think it will be quiet. People are too

scared and shocked.

Is there anything that people outside Kazakhstan can do to support you

or others there?

To spread information, of course. Maybe soon, there will be more

repression, and some activists will require help to leave country.

The most important support is informational. In 2019, after the

presidential election, we were all arrested at the rallies and the only

ones that wrote about it were foreign media and independent Kazakhstani

media (which are very few and the sites are often blocked). Now it is

very important that the bloody January in Kazakhstan was not just a

beautiful revolutionary picture as many left-wing publications write,

but also that it is not remembered as a terrorist act from outside, as

all the official sources from different countries say.

Links:

The articles are taken from the CrimethInc. website:

https://crimethinc.com

Links to the articles:

https://crimethinc.com/2022/01/06/the-uprising-in-kazakhstan-an-interview-and-appraisal

https://crimethinc.com/2022/01/12/kazakhstan-after-the-uprising-analysis-from-from-russian-anarchists-eyewitness-accounts-from-anarchists-in-almaty

[1] From December 17-19, 1986, there were protests in Almaty in response

to Mikhail Gorbachev, then-General Secretary of the Central Committee of

the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, dismissing the longstanding

First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan and replacing him

with an official from Russia. (Gorbachev later claimed he was trying to

prevent Nursultan Nazarbayev from concentrating too much power in his

hands; Nazarbayev went on to rule Kazakhstan for 28 years.) In 1986, as

in 2022, the protests ended in a massacre at the hands of state forces.

In 1986, as in 2022, rumors spread that the protesters were bribed with

vodka or led astray via leaflets.

[2]

Kazfem

, arguably the first feminist movement in Kazakhstan since the collapse

of the Soviet Union, publishes the feminist magazine

Yudol’

and organizes

demonstrations

for March 8, International Women’s Day.

[3] On April 21, Asya Tulesova and Beibarys Tolymbekov

were jailed for 15 days

, charged with violating Kazakhstan’s law regarding public assembly

after hanging a banner along the marathon route in Almaty, reading “You

can’t run from the truth”—a comment on the presidential elections.

[4] This

news article

explores this issue, albeit from a partisan position.