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Title: Analytical Anarchism Author: Alan Carter Date: April 2000 Language: en Topics: the State, anti-state, analysis Source: *Political Theory* Volume: 28 issue: 2, page(s): 230–253 Issue published: April 1, 2000. DOI:10.1177/0090591700028002005
In the 1980s, Marxist political philosophy suffered mixed fortunes. On
one hand, it underwent a considerable demise in Eastern Europe as a
state- promoted ideology. On the other hand, it enjoyed a profound and
positive development in Western academia, principally as a result of the
seminal work of G. A. Cohen,[1] whose clarifications of key Marxist
concepts and explanatory claims gave birth to the fecund school of
analytical Marxism. Historically, Marxist political philosophy has been
subjected to incessant critiques from anarchists. However, now that
Marxism has evolved into a form that can hold its own within the
anglophone tradition of analytical philosophy, anarchism, which at one
time was the major alternative on the revolutionary Left to Marxism,
would appear to have been left well and truly behind.
But is it really the case that anarchism is incapable of enjoying a
similar intellectual development? In what follows, I attempt some
clarifications of concepts and explanations that show that there is more
mileage in anarchist political theory than might at first be assumed.
Thus, such clarifications might serve to rescue anarchist political
thought and the often profound insights it contains from an otherwise
premature burial by both liberal and Marxist academics.
Now, whereas many of Karl Marx’s theoretical claims were offered as a
response to anarchist thinkers (for example, Max Stimer and
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon),[2] some anarchists (in particular, the Russian
Mikhail Alexandro- vitch Bakunin) developed their views in opposition to
Marx’s. The anarchist theory that follows is a development in response
to what is currently the most sophisticated version of Marxist
theory—Cohen’s. And just as Cohen has developed his clarifications
firmly within the tradition of analytical philosophy, the following
discussion is also located within that tradition. Consequently, as Cohen
has given us analytical Marxism, what follows could be regarded as an
exploration into “analytical anarchism.”
First, though, how should we conceptualize “anarchism,” in the sense of
a political belief system? As “anarchy” literally means “without rule”
(thus signifying a situation in which no person rules over another),
then a condition of pure anarchy might be thought to consist of a
complete equality of political power—perfect political equality, as it
were. But, many would object, if anarchists seek pure anarchy in this
sense, then, quite simply, they are seeking the unattainable. In any
practicable social arrangement, some people are bound to possess more
power than others.
However, anarchism is not the only system of political beliefs that
seems at first sight to be incoherent insofar as its adherents appear to
be striving for a condition that is, arguably, unattainable;
egalitarianism has been dismissed on similar grounds. If egalitarians
are seeking perfect equality (which, it is often assumed, means that
everyone is to be made exactly the same), then, many would object, they
are seeking the unattainable. In response, John Baker has denied that
egalitarians are seeking perfect equality in this sense. Rather, in his
view, egalitarians merely oppose certain substantive inequalities.[3]
And if “egalitarianism” is construed as the opposition to certain
substantive inequalities, it is not so easy to dismiss.
Perhaps, then, “anarchism” should be interpreted in a similar way. Not
all anarchists should be dismissed out of hand for attempting to bring
about pure anarchy. Rather, anarchists could more profitably be viewed
as those who oppose certain substantive political inequalities and not
merely economic ones. Anarchists oppose certain inequalities in
political power, just as egalitarians oppose certain inequalities in,
especially, economic power. And the most significant political
inequalities, for anarchists, are those that flow from centralized,
authoritarian forms of government.
This suggests that “anarchism,” as a political belief system, might best
be construed as having both a normative and an empirical component.
Anarchism could be viewed as containing a normative opposition to
certain substantive political inequalities, along with the empirical
belief that political equality (in the sense of an absence of specific,
substantive political inequalities) is inevitably undermined by state
power. Given the normative component, anarchism can thus be regarded as
a form of egalitarianism—political egalitarianism. However, many of
those who advocate representative democracy would also regard themselves
as political egalitarians. It is the second feature—namely, the
empirical belief (which most of those who describe themselves as
“anarchists” tend to hold) that centralized, authoritarian forms of
government (including varieties of representative democracy) cannot
deliver political equality—that would distinguish anarchists from others
who claim to value political equality.
Thus, given the conceptualization of “anarchism” proposed here, for an
individual to be an anarchist, he or she would have to hold both the
normative opposition to certain substantive political inequalities and
the empirical belief that they principally derive from, are preserved
by, or are embedded within, certain centralized forms of power.[4]
Hence, all anarchists, on the proposed definition, oppose the state. But
that should not be confused with an opposition to society. Nor should it
be confused with a rejection of all the rules that a society might
need—for example, moral rules. In fact, most anarchists are highly
moral.[5] Consequently, when discussing anarchism, it is extremely
important to realize that “without rule” does not have to signify
“without rules,” nor does it have to mean a lack of structure. What is
surely crucial to any version of anarchism worth its salt is that the
anarchist structures it proposes be empowering to those within them and
do not lead to a centralization of power or decision making. Even with
those restrictions, the possibilities for anarchist social organization
are clearly far greater than most opponents of anarchism realize or than
is portrayed in popular stereotypes of anarchist practice.
Having offered what might appear a more attractive and fruitful way of
conceptualizing anarchism—namely, as the opposition to certain
substantive political inequalities, combined with the belief that the
state inevitably embodies, generates, and/or preserves those
inequalities—I now turn to consider the central respect in which
anarchist political theory and thus anarchist political practice differ
from their Marxist counterparts. This will lead us into an analysis of
the crucial relationship between the political and economic inequalities
that anarchists oppose.
Certain Marxists—in particular, Leninists—have been willing to adopt a
vanguardist approach to revolutionary change, while Marx, himself,
sanctioned a transitional form of governmental power—what he referred to
as “the dictatorship of the proletariat.”[6] And insofar as this would
be coercive and centralized,[7] then it would be some form of state.
Anarchists have traditionally most opposed Marxists on these grounds,
arguing that a revolutionary vanguard would soon turn itself into a new
statelike form and further arguing that no statelike form could be
relied on to engineer an effective transition to an egalitarian society.
But this anarchist objection, if it is to be at all compelling, requires
a coherent theory of historical change. As Cohen has provided the
clearest foundations for a Marxist theory of history, I now attempt to
provide similarly clear foundations for a contrasting anarchist
theory—foundations that employ conceptual and explanatory clarifications
that parallel Cohen’s.
What specific conceptual tools does a cogent anarchist theory of history
require, then, if it is to serve as the basis for a plausible political
theory (especially one that can hold its own against recent developments
in Marxist theory)? It seems likely that anarchists must, at the very
least, be in possession of the concepts employed by the most
sophisticated version of Marxism if they are to oppose it successfully.
So let me begin my attempt at providing a few of the main components of
an anarchist conceptual toolkit by appropriating some of the important
concepts that Cohen has usefully clarified.
Following Marx, Cohen distinguishes between a “superstructure” of
noneconomic institutions (in particular, legal and political
institutions) and the structure of relations of production that comprise
the “base” or “foundation,” in Marx’s terminology. For brevity’s sake,
we can regard this as a distinction between a set of political relations
and a set of economic relations. Cohen further distinguishes between the
relations of production and the forces of production. According to
Cohen, the relations of production are best construed as relations of,
or relations presupposing, effective control of the productive forces.
And it is the development of these forces of production that explains
historical transition, on Cohen’s interpretation of Marx’s theory of
history. Within the forces of production, Cohen distinguishes between
the labor-power of the producing agents and the means of production
(which are primarily tools and raw materials). What develops when the
forces of production develop, therefore, is labor-power in the form of
skill and knowledge, on one hand, and tools and machinery, on the other.
For convenience, I shall refer to this as “technological development.”
But why does Cohen define the economic structure as a set of relations
of, or presupposing, effective control of the productive forces, rather
than as it is standardly conceived—namely, as a set of ownership rights?
He does so because a common objection raised by analytical philosophers
against Marx’s theory of history is that the base cannot be effectively
distinguished from the superstructure because economic relations are
legal relations, and legal relations are superstructural. By defining
economic relations in a rechtsfrei manner, Cohen side-steps this
objection.
However, construing economic relations as relations of, or presupposing,
effective control of the productive forces gives rise to the question of
how such control is enabled and preserved—a question that anyone at all
sympathetic to anarchism is bound to ask. Just as Cohen argues that it
is a mistake to confuse rechtsfrei economic relations with legal ones,
an anarchist is likely to argue that it is at least as serious an error
to fail to separate economic relations when construed as relations of,
or presupposing, effective control from whatever the ability to exercise
that control rests on. Such an ability cannot just be taken for granted.
It requires power.[8] How, then, is that ability enabled and preserved?
Without doubt, partly by the coating of legality it has been sprayed
with—in other words, by a general acceptance of the legal standing of
the economic relations. But it is also enabled and preserved coercively
by agents of the state—by those actors deemed responsible for securing
economic control: namely, the police and, in the last resort, military
personnel. But these agents are not economic forces, economic relations,
or legal or political relations, although they might be situated within
political relations, just as the economic forces are situated within
economic relations.
In short, Cohen distinguishes between the political and the economic, on
one hand, and between relations and forces, on the other. But, an
anarchist is compelled to object, the set of categories Cohen thereby
employs within his theory of history is incomplete. He only employs
economic forces, economic relations, and political relations. To
complete the list, we would need to draw a distinction within the
political sphere that parallels the one drawn within the economic. Let
us therefore distinguish between both the political and the economic
instances and between their respective relations and forces. This gives
us four categories: political relations, economic relations, economic
forces, and political forces—the latter category containing forces of
defense. And as this new category—political forces—comprises the forces
that empower the state, it is obviously going to figure predominantly in
any cogent anarchist political theory.
So, on the basis of the discussion so far, an anarchist conceptual
toolkit would need to include at least the following: on one hand, like
Cohen’s, it would require instruments for distinguishing between
relations of production and forces of production. Thus, it requires, at
the most general level, the distinction between economic relations and
economic forces. The set of economic relations, constituting the
economic structure, comprises relations of, or presupposing, effective
control over production and, I would also want to add, relations of, or
presupposing, effective control over exchange.[9] Relations of
production, specifically, are relations of, or presupposing, effective
control of the productive forces. And these economic forces—the forces
of production—comprise economic labor-power (that capacity that the
agents of production supply) and the means of production (for example,
machinery). On the other hand, venturing beyond Cohen’s limited set of
distinctions, an anarchist conceptual toolkit would require the further
distinction, also at the most general level, between political relations
and political forces.
But what more needs to be said concerning this additional distinction
between political relations and political forces? As the ability to
control effectively the economic forces rests, at least in modem
societies, on both the accepted legality of the economic relations and,
most important, on their preservation by the political forces, then any
such ability is, at least in part, dependent on relations of power—in
other words, political relations involving the following:
Included within the set of political relations, constituting the
political structure, are these power relations, essential for enabling
and preserving the relations of control over production and exchange and
that are embodied in the various legal and political institutions. The
political institutions, specifically, are relations of, or presupposing,
effective control of the defensive forces. In the modem state, these
political forces—the forces of “defense” (which are more often offensive
than genuinely defensive)—are coercive in nature. And such forces of
coercion can comprise political labor-power (that capacity that, for
example, agents of coercion supply—in other words, the work offered by
soldiers, police, and so on for payment) and means of coercion (for
example, weapons, prisons, even instruments of torture).
With these various distinctions in mind, we now possess some of the
conceptual apparatus necessary to reach some understanding of the role
played by the modem state in historical transitions—a role that
anarchist theory must be able to describe convincingly if its rejection
of the vanguardist and statist approaches to revolutionary
transformation advocated by Marxists is to be in the least compelling.
First, though, if an anarchist theory of historical change is to be
developed in contraposition to Marx’s, what precisely is Marx’s theory?
According to Cohen, Marx’s theory of history can only be presented in a
coherent fashion if it is interpreted as employing functional
explanations. In particular, Marx’s theory, on Cohen’s interpretation of
it, claims that specific economic relations are “selected” because they
are functional for the development of the forces of production. By
employing functional explanations, Cohen is able to reconcile Marx’s
claim that it is technological development that has explanatory
primacy[10] with his seemingly contradictory claim that the economic
relations significantly affect technological development.[11] Similarly,
Cohen’s interpretation of Marx’s account of the relationship between the
base and superstructure involves functional explanations. Specific legal
and political institutions are “selected” because they stabilize the
economic relations. The remarkable strength of Cohen’s account is that
it manages to acknowledge both the effect of the economic relations on
technological development and the effect of the structure of legal and
political institutions on the economic relations while nevertheless
still allowing the “selection” by the economic forces of the economic
relations to enjoy explanatory primacy.
Cohen’s conceptual and explanatory clarifications thus allow the
following theory of history to be stated: certain economic relations
are, for a while, functional for technological development. But at a
certain point in time, they become dysfunctional for further
technological development (or, perhaps in the case of a transition to
postcapitalism, for the optimal use of the prevailing technology). A
revolution then occurs whereby the structure of legal and political
institutions is transformed into one that stabilizes new economic
relations that are functional for technological development beyond the
present level (or, perhaps, that are functional for the optimal use of
the prevailing technology). Moreover, the new structure of legal and
political institutions is chosen precisely because it stabilizes the new
economic relations that are functional for further technological
development (or, perhaps, for the optimal use of technology).
But why should anyone suppose that the economic forces, the economic
relations, and the political relations are connected in this way? Well,
Cohen provides the following elaboration in support of his theory: there
is a tendency for the forces of production to develop through history
(what he calls “the Development Thesis”). This is due to two main,
albeit controversial, factors:
It is to be assumed that human beings are rational and that they face a
situation of scarcity (in the sense of having to work more than they
would wish). It is also assumed, and this is uncontroversial, that it is
within the capability of some to develop new technologies. As it appears
rational for individuals in a situation of scarcity to develop
technology further, then it can be assumed that there will be a tendency
for technological development to take place. If, to develop technology
further or faster, it is necessary to select economic relations (e.g.,
capitalist relations) that would be functional for that development,
then it would appear rational for such relations to be selected. And if
the legal and political institutions must change in order that the
required economic relations be stabilized, then it is rational to select
new and more appropriate legal and political institutions. Thus, Cohen
seems to have presented a cogent, purposive elaboration of his
conjunction of functional explanations.
So, according to Cohen, technological development plays the key role
within the process of historical change. Put another way, on Cohen’s
account, central to Marx’s theory of history is the development of the
forces of production. These economic forces explain the nature of the
economic relations, which in turn explain the nature of the political
relations. However, earlier, we identified a fourth category—one that
appears to be omitted from this Marxist theory—namely, political forces
(the forces of defense or, more usually, of coercion). Obviously, such
forces will be of great concern to anarchists given their hostility to
the state and given that the power of state institutions is, at least in
part, premised on these forces. And it is also obvious that anarchists
are likely to be dismissive of any political theory that fails to pay
due attention to the bases of state power. How, then, are the political
forces to be fitted into a theory of historical transition that includes
political relations, economic relations, and economic forces? And
crucially, does the resulting theory support anarchist rather than
Marxist approaches to revolution?
Cohen, as we have noted, accords explanatory primacy to the development
of the economic forces. So, it might be useful to turn our attention to
how the development of the economic forces relates to the political
forces.
One consequence of the development of the forces of production has been
the generation of an extractable surplus that has facilitated the
development of the political forces—especially coercive forces—to
provide greater security. In other words, there has not just been a
development of the productive forces but “defensive” development too.
And this defensive development, along with the growth of nationalistic
sentiments, has led to antagonistic nation-states.
Now, it is widely accepted that Marxist theory, because of its emphasis
on the economic, has proved itself to be quite inadequate with regard to
analyzing convincingly the phenomenon of nationalism. Cohen, for one,
has come to doubt the ability of traditional Marxism to account for this
important social feature. (Other features that pose similar difficulties
are ethnicity, gender relations, and religion.) We have seen that two
main factors—rationality and scarcity—motivate his theory of history. To
deal with phenomena such as nationalism, Cohen has, more recently, been
led to specify a third important factor, which he introduces as follows:
Marxist philosophical anthropology is one-sided. Its conception of human
nature and human good overlooks the need for self-definition, than which
nothing is more essentially human. And that need is part of the
explanation of the peculiar strength of national and other
self-identifications, which Marxists tend to undervalue.[12]
Perhaps by taking this additional factor into account, along with (a)
rationality and (b) scarcity, Marxists might be in a position to explain
the features of society that otherwise appear to fall outside the ambit
of historical materialism (e.g., nationalism). This third important
factor can be characterized as
But for Cohen to introduce this factor as an afterthought, as it were,
is procedurally questionable. Cohen’s theory of history was constructed
principally on the basis of factors (a) and (b). Factor (c) was not
present in the formation of the theory. A later introduction into
Marxist theory of this additional factor is problematic because, with
this factor in operation but ignored in the theory’s presentation, we no
longer know that the theory of history can still be constructed in a
convincing manner.
Cohen argues that it is rational to develop technology in a situation of
scarcity. If only factors (a) and (b) are in play, the Development
Thesis—that the productive forces tend to develop through history—can
easily be supported. When individuals are faced with a situation of
scarcity, it does appear rational to develop the productive forces and
increase production. But the significance of factor (c) is that
different individuals identify with different groups. Individuals often
define themselves in terms of exclusive communities.[13] And it is
within such different groupings that rational individuals face scarcity.
Now that factor (c) has been introduced, we need to know whether it is
always rational for individuals who identify with different and possibly
conflicting groups to develop the productive forces.
Yet it seems that it is not always rational for them to do so. For
example, on one hand, one’s group might reduce undesirable toil and
solve the problem of scarcity with less effort by plundering the produce
of another group. On the other hand, if some external group has decided
to plunder rather than produce, then an increase in one’s own production
capability might make one more likely to be plundered. In a situation in
which some have chosen to plunder, it might be extremely unwise to make
oneself a more attractive target by increasing production. When factor
(c) is in play, then, it can no longer just be assumed that it is
rational to develop the productive forces. Factor (c)—self-definition
within a community—therefore interferes with the construction of Cohen’s
theory.
However, those who wish systematically to consume the surplus produced
by others would benefit greatly from the development of political
forces—in particular, forces of coercion. And forces of coercion can
only be developed if the productive forces have reached a level of
development that creates a surplus above mere subsistence. Once such a
level has been attained and coercive forces have been developed by one
grouping, it can systematically force another group to produce more and
consume less than it might otherwise. The resulting surplus can then be
extracted continually from the subordinate group. This could be viewed
as exemplified in class-divided societies. But, in time, the individuals
within such a society, through living together, might come to define
themselves as members of one nation and, collectively, wish to oppress
another. This would be rational, for oppressing a foreign group could
reduce the need for coercion within the national community. It offers
the prospect of increased wealth for all nationals as long as it can be
extracted from foreigners. Exploiting foreigners also increases the
overall surplus available to those in control of the political forces.
As it is rational for such groupings to form and behave thus to meet
scarcity, then factors (a), (b), and (c), combined together, contribute
to an explanation of class-divided, imperialist nation-states. (In fact,
such a process of expanding self-definition could continue further, for
the peoples of oppressed nations, through living with their colonial
administrators, could come to define themselves in their masters’ terms,
thus giving rise to a genuine empire or, later, a commonwealth.)
Furthermore, it is rational not only to oppress another group and impose
on it greater toil to reduce one’s own but also to resist the imposition
of greater toil. And to resist another nation seemingly determined to
impose greater toil on one’s own, it appears beneficial to develop the
forces of coercion. Hence, such resistance equally seems to require the
production of a surplus above subsistence requirements so that the
coercive forces might be developed.
On both imperialist and defensive counts, then, it is quite
understandable that within nations, some of the population have come to
be expertly engaged in producing the society’s wealth, part of which
goes to others who have become expertly engaged in “defense” and who, in
consequence, are themselves no longer employed directly in production.
It is quite understandable that workers, fearing that their nation might
be subjugated by another, should support those who are charged with
their defense. And it is quite understandable that those who are in
effective control of the productive forces (the dominant economic class)
should support those exercising political control, when the latter
choose to stabilize relations of production that simultaneously develop
the productive forces and increase the private wealth of those in
control of production. Moreover, it is quite understandable that those
exercising political control should back economic relations that develop
the productive forces that create the very surplus that is required for
exercising political control.
In short, the development of the productive forces creates the surplus
that is needed to finance a standing army and a police force, for
weapons research and so on, and these forces of coercion are precisely
what enable the state to enforce the relations of production that lead
to the creation of the surplus that the state requires. Moreover, given
its need for the development of such forces of coercion and given that,
unlike other groups, it is not primarily engaged in production, the
state could be expected to have its own interests vis-a-vis the rest of
society.[14] And being in control of the instruments of coercion, the
state would be in a position both to protect and to further its own
interests. What is significant about all this is that any account along
these lines would certainly justify anarchist suspicions about the
wisdom of employing any form of state as a means for bringing about
political and economic equality.
Cohen’s theory claims that economic forces select economic relations
that develop or optimally employ the economic forces, and the economic
relations that are selected themselves select political relations that
stabilize those economic relations. Earlier, I argued that Cohen’s
theory is restricted to these three principal categories because he
fails to distinguish between the political relations and the political
forces—the forces of defense or, in present circumstances, of coercion.
On the basis of the considerations sketched out in the previous section,
I now propose, in contraposition to Cohen’s theory, an alternative that
employs as its principal categories not only the economic forces,
economic relations, and political relations but also the political
forces.
Generally, according to the alternative theory now proposed, the
political relations ordinarily select economic relations that develop or
optimally employ the economic forces because that facilitates the
development of the political forces, which usually empower the political
relations. Moreover, the political forces stabilize the economic
relations that are selected—relations that themselves support the
development of the political forces by providing the surplus needed to
finance it.
Put another way, in the modem era, except in special circumstances,[15]
the legal and political institutions enact and implement legislation
that determines a specific economic structure because that structure is
functional for those institutions by encouraging the development of, or
by optimally employing, the forces of production—principally productive
skills and technologies—that are needed to produce the ever-growing
surplus that is required for further development of the forces of
defense, for it is precisely this defensive development that the power
of the legal and political institutions ultimately seems to be premised
on. When those individuals who, de facto, in direct control of the
defensive forces are not those who are at the head of the legislative,
it is normally in the interests of the former to empower the latter
because the latter both confer legitimacy on the former (they might even
be taken by the former to possess legitimacy!) and are responsible for
managing the revenue that the state as a whole requires, including that
which those in direct control of the defensive forces need for their
development. In addition, it is this defensive development (usually in
the form of expanding forces of coercion) that preserves the economic
structure selected—an economic structure that is also functional for
defensive development by providing it, through taxation, with the
surplus it requires.
In short, according to the alternative theory proposed here, a structure
of political relations ordinarily selects economic relations that are
functional for it. And the political forces stabilize those economic
relations that are simultaneously functional for the development of the
political forces by producing the surplus their development requires.
Here, then, is an alternative theory that employs functional
explanations, like Cohen’s, but that reverses their direction. Whereas
the principal direction of explanation in the Marxist theory is from the
economic to the political, the alternative theory reverses the direction
of explanation. In Cohen’s theory, it is technological development that
has explanatory primacy; in the alternative theory, it is the structure
of legal and political institutions combined with the defensive
forces—in other words, the state. It seems appropriate, therefore, to
label this alternative “the State-Primacy Theory.”
As a theory of history, the State-Primacy Theory can briefly be stated
as follows: certain economic relations, by furthering technological
development, are, for a while, simultaneously functional for both the
structure of legal and political institutions, on one hand, and the
political forces, on the other. But at a certain point in time, they
come to constrain any further technological development (or, perhaps in
the case of motivating a transition to postcapitalism, they come to
prevent the optimal use of the prevailing technology) and thus become
dysfunctional. A revolution then occurs that involves the state ceasing
to stabilize the current relations of production[16] and choosing,
instead, to stabilize new ones that are functional for it insofar as
they further, beyond the present level, the development (or, perhaps,
allow the optimal use) of technology. Moreover, the new economic
relations are selected precisely because they are functional for the
state by furthering technological development (or, perhaps, by allowing
optimal use of the already developed technology). And with new economic
relations, the legal and political institutions are free to alter their
form to one that appears more appropriate.[17] Like Cohen’s
interpretation of Marx’s theory of history, this too is a complex of
functional explanations.
As an aid to clarifying how the State-Primacy Theory differs from
Cohen’s interpretation of Marx, it is possible to condense their major
theoretical differences into two contrasting theses. The first, Cohen
calls “the Primacy Thesis.” But because of its stress on technology and
because I am about to propose an alternative primacy thesis, I shall
rename it “the TechnoPrimacy Thesis.” Cohen puts this thesis as follows:
The Techno-Primacy Thesis: The nature of a set of production relations
is explained by the level of development of the productive forces
embraced by it (to a far greater extent than vice versa).[18]
By way of contrast, consider an alternative thesis, which I shall term
the State-Primacy Thesis and which can be stated thus:
The State-Primacy Thesis: The nature of a set of production relations in
a society is (ultimately) explained by state interests.
Clearly, these two theses differ radically, and whereas Cohen’s
interpretation rests on the Techno-Primacy Thesis, the State-Primacy
Theory rests on the State-Primacy Thesis.
But is there any reason for believing that there might be some truth in
the State-Primacy Thesis? Well, it can be supported by the following
elaboration, which, in the process, supports the State-Primacy Theory:
state actors can only continue to enjoy their positions while the state
remains secure. It is, therefore, ordinarily in the interests of state
actors to ensure that their nation’s economy is as productive as those
of neighboring states. If their economy were weaker than a neighboring
state’s, then the state would not normally be able to fund the
development of its defensive capability to the same degree as that
neighboring state could and, in the long-run at least, would be unable
to defend itself. To retain power, therefore, state actors have an
interest in selecting and stabilizing appropriate economic relations.
Hence, ordinarily, it is rational for the state to select economic
relations that it regards as appropriate to developing further the
productive forces beyond the level of development they have so far
reached because that is in its interests. And it is because the state
contains within it very powerful political forces that it possesses the
power to select economic relations that satisfy its interests by
increasing that very power. So, just as Cohen’s interpretation of Marx
can be supported by a purposive elaboration, the State-Primacy Theory
can too.
However, if such an elaboration is to be employed, the following
question immediately arises: is it the state as a structure that selects
economic relations that are in its interests, or is it state actors that
act in their own interests? In other words, it appears as if the
State-Primacy Theory could be interpreted in one of two mutually
exclusive ways. For example, we could regard the structure of legal and
political institutions literally as what selects the economic relations.
This would provide us with the basis for a “structuralist anarchism.”
Alternatively, it could be claimed simply that political actors select
an economic structure that is in their interests. This would provide the
basis for a methodological individualist anarchism.[19] But it is, in
fact, possible to steer a middle course. Such a view would not view
collectives as entities in themselves with causal effects on their
members. Nor would it reduce social explanation to the psychology of
unrelated individuals. Instead, it would attempt to explain social
phenomena in terms of the rational choices taken by individuals who act
within certain relationships to one another. The causal influences, in
this case, are recognized to be from one individual or group of
individuals to another and not from a collective entity to its parts,
while individuals are recognized to be related within a structure,
rather than all structures simply being reduced to mere collections of
individuals.[20]
My own preference is for this third approach, for it strikes me as the
least problematic. And on this favored approach, when it is claimed in
the State- Primacy Theory that the legal and political institutions
select economic relations, that claim should be construed as “the agents
acting within the structure of legal and political institutions select
for stabilization one set of economic relations in preference to
another.” Moreover, when it is simultaneously claimed that the forces of
defense enforce economic relations, that claim should ordinarily be
construed as “those agents who live by means of their coercive
labor-power use the means of coercion at their disposal to protect
specific economic relations as opposed to others.”
However, this explication necessitates a further refinement. As the
various state actors will occupy different positions within the state,
then their choices will not all push in exactly the same direction.
Furthermore, their respective decisions will be differently weighted
according to their different locations within the state. Hence, what the
state decides to select and enforce will be a vector of these variedly
directional and weighted decisions. Such a vector will be what the
“collective decision” of state actors actually signifies. In other
words, we can regard “state interests” as a resultant “parallelogram of
forces” resolving the numerous interests of state actors with their
differing powers for promoting their interests. What enables us still to
talk of “state interests” in this sense, as if they were the interests
of the state conceived of as a collective entity, is that although the
relevant individual interests push in slightly different directions
(army personnel would prefer more state revenue allocated to them than
to the police, for example), all state actors share a common interest in
preserving the state. Nevertheless, although all state actors have
interests pushing in that direction, there remains the possibility of
fracturing within the state because of other interests taking diverging
directions.
Now, the State-Primacy Theory claims that states ordinarily select
economic relations that serve their interests by developing the
technology that increases the surplus available to the state. As all
state actors have an interest in preserving the state, does this mean
that every agent of the state will necessarily be committed to selecting
economic relations that are optimal for maximizing the state’s revenue?
If this were the case, then at least part of the State-Primacy Theory
could apparently be established a priori. Unfortunately for the theory,
matters are not so simple. There is a debate within the theory of the
firm that bears on this question. The debate concerns whether managers
seek to maximize the profits of their companies or whether they are
content with levels of profit that will be satisfactory to their
shareholders— thus allowing the managers to keep their jobs. A parallel
question could be raised concerning senior state actors. Are they
maximizers or satisficers with respect to state revenue?
It might be thought that those nonelected state actors who are secure in
their positions or who lack ambition will be content to behave as
satisficers, whereas those seeking promotion will wish to impress by
acting as maximizers. If such maximizers were the most successful at
obtaining promotions, it might safely be assumed that they would be the
ones who would come to occupy the most senior posts. Senior state actors
have greater power with respect to the execution of their decisions than
juniors. In other words, the decisions of the former carry greater
weight. Hence, it might be concluded that the state will act so as to
maximize its revenue, and it will do so because of how the hierarchical
structure of its various internal institutions determines which
personality-type of state actor rises highest within them.
However, “pushy” state actors seeking promotion by adopting a maximizing
stance could, alternatively, be viewed as risky appointments who were
likely to “rock the boat ” This might make them less likely to attain
senior positions than “dependable” and “reliable” satisficers. Moreover,
maximizers who obtained senior positions within the state would only
have effective power to the extent that those below them in the chain of
command complied with, rather than chose to frustrate, the execution of
their decisions. Thus, the likelihood that maximizers would obtain
senior positions or that, having attained them, they would be able to
act effectively will depend on the particular culture of the state in
question. Hence, whether the state decision- vector would always select
optimal or satisfactory economic relations is an open question and
cannot be decided a priori. This seems to vitiate, to some degree, the
immediate plausibility of the State-Primacy Theory.
There is another feature of the process affecting promotion within the
structure of legal and political institutions that might be thought to
undermine the plausibility of the State-Primacy Theory. Eligibility for
promotion is determined not by those seeking it but by those higher up
the management chain. Those who occupy senior positions, and thereby
determine the criteria by which an individual’s suitability for
advancement within a state institution is to be judged, will already
have risen within that structure and will thus tend to value the “older”
approaches that they are familiar with. Moreover, they will display
personalities and adopt approaches that met the approval of an earlier
generation of state actors occupying senior positions. This means that
there will tend to be a conservative bias at work in filtering out those
deemed appropriate for promotion. The probable result is that those who
come to be senior state actors will lean strongly toward traditional
perceptions of and means for securing state interests. And that suggests
that they might not be too inclined to select new economic relations.
How powerful, though, are such nonelected state personnel? Consider
Britain: John Dearlove and Peter Saunders describe a British “secret
state” consisting of
state institutions that are nonelected, that enjoy substantial autonomy
from the control of government and Parliament (no matter what
constitutional theory might assert), and that tend to be closed and
secretive as to the ways in which they exercise their very substantial
powers.[21]
Within this “secret state” they list “the civil service; the
nationalized industries (including the Bank of England); the judiciary;
the police; the security services; and the military.”[22] And if one
examines the behavior of the British civil service, never mind the other
institutions of the “secret state,” it soon becomes apparent that it
tends to serve as a powerful conservative force within the state
machine. It is skeptical of the case for change; committed to continuity
and ordered, steady, progress, and so is eager to contain the wilder
excesses of party politicians keen to implement their manifestos with
practical talk of the need to attend to “reality” and “the facts.” The
civil service is organized in such a way that it is best able to exert a
negative power which blocks the cry for innovation. It is keenly attuned
to the maintenance of established policy (after all, it did much to
establish the policy over the years), and the recruitment and
socialization of senior civil servants suggests that the service is
likely to be concerned to maintain the essentials of the established
society and economy.[23]
Clearly, the power of such state actors has to be taken very seriously,
indeed. Thus, any cogent political theory would obviously have to take
such power into account. And whereas Marxists tend to de-emphasize it
because of their stress on economic factors, the State-Primacy Theory
does at least assign a central place to the power of state actors, even
if the conservative tendencies of such agents might be thought to
diminish the plausibility of the theory as an explanation of
revolutionary transformations.
All the above considerations notwithstanding, there is, nevertheless, a
very powerful and overriding argument that can be deployed in support of
the State-Primacy Theory. The desire to select economic relations
optimal for providing the state with revenue could be expected with
considerable certainty when the state finds itself in a situation of
military competition with another state (precisely the situation that
states usually find themselves in), for otherwise the state would simply
not survive. And should the state behave irrationally by not attending
to its defense requirements, it could expect its nation to be
incorporated into the territory controlled by one of the more militarily
successful states—in other words, one that did attend to the economic
requirements of an expanding military capacity. But then, the former
territory of the defeated state would have economic relations imposed on
it that served the interests of the militarily successful state.
Clearly, the only way for even the most conservative of states to avoid
what for them would be such a disastrous outcome is for them to select
those economic relations that, at that time, are most suited to
technological development. Thus, by a Darwinian mechanism, the states
that survive will tend to be those that the State-Primacy Theory
describes. In short, there is good reason to think that the
State-Primacy Theory successfully describes the behavior of existing
states.
Given that I have been focusing on states and on agents acting within
state institutions, one obvious question stands in need of an answer:
what exactly is the state? This question could be answered intensionally
or extensionally. The most famous intensional reply is that of Max
Weber, who defines “the state” as “a human community that (successfully)
claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a
given territory.”[24] Probably the most famous extensional reply is
Ralph Miliband’s, who identifies the state as a system of institutions
that comprise “the government, the administration, the military and the
police, the judicial branch, sub-central government, parliamentary
assemblies,”[25] and so on. And it is precisely from within these
various institutions that the differently weighted decisions coming from
differently positioned agents with correspondingly different interests
are taken and that form the state-decision vector—a vector that is
directed ultimately toward the preservation of the state.[26]
My aim has been to indicate how it might be possible for an analytical
version of anarchism to evolve in opposition to analytical Marxism by
providing the necessary conceptual groundwork for such an evolution.
Central to any such project would be the development of a theory of
history that supports anarchist, rather than Marxist, claims about the
process of revolutionary change. By way of conclusion, having outlined
the basic features of such a theory of history—the State-Primacy
Theory—I indicate some of its more important implications—implications
that do, indeed, support anarchism in preference to Marxism. First,
though, to make these implications more apparent, I shall summarize
certain key aspects of the argument so far.
According to Cohen’s Marxist “Techno-Primacy Theory,” economic forces
select economic relations that select political relations. But this is
to leave out a vitally important category: the political forces. They
can be fitted into a coherent theory of history by reversing its
direction of explanation. This provides us with the State-Primacy
Theory: political relations select economic relations that develop
economic forces that enable the development of the political
forces—these political forces stabilizing economic relations that
provide them with the surplus they require. And the State-Primacy Theory
can be supported by the following purposive elaboration: to oppress
another national group and meet scarcity or to resist another national
group threatening to impose greater scarcity, ordinarily the actors
dominant within the state will collectively decide to stabilize specific
economic relations that encourage the development of the productive
forces and thus allow a surplus to be extracted that finances the
development of the forces of coercion necessary for those state actors
to protect or further their interests. In this alternative theory, using
Marx’s terminology, the “superstructure” selects a “base” that develops
the productive forces and does so for its own politically motivated
reasons.
One implication of this is that the cogency of the most sophisticated
Marxist theory of history—Cohen’s—which accords explanatory primacy to
the productive forces over the economic relations and the
superstructure, must be left in some doubt when a complex of functional
explanations that accords primacy to the “superstructure” over the
economic relations and the productive forces can just as easily be
forwarded. In fact, it is possible to go even further in criticizing
Cohen. It is not only that the State-Primacy Theory can be formulated
just as clearly as Cohen’s Techno-Primacy Theory, but it is also the
case that the former is conceptually superior, for it does not rely on
any dubious metaphors. When Cohen develops his interpretation of Marx’s
theory of history, he writes of the productive forces “selecting”
specific relations of production because the latter are functional for
their development. As he puts it, “Forces select structures according to
their capacity to promote development.”[27] But “select” must, in this
instance, be metaphorical. Forces of production, as Cohen must intend
them in this passage, neither act nor have intentions. Consequently,
even though he denies that he is a functionalist, Cohen leaves himself
open to the charge that he is relying on the “free- floating intentions”
associated with functionalism.[28] One considerable advantage of
according explanatory primacy to the state is that state personnel
(unlike technology, for example) do have intentions and are the sorts of
entities that can make selections—thus allowing a genuinely purposive
elaboration of the State-Primacy Theory.
Now, perhaps the most important political implication of Marx’s theory,
including Cohen’s interpretation of it, is that if states are selected
by inegalitarian economic relations to preserve them, then if there were
no economic inequalities to be preserved, no state would be required. If
egalitarian economic relations are attained, then the state will, to use
Engels’s famous phrase, “wither away.”[29] Unfortunately, the Russian
Revolution, which did most to raise the standing of Marxism on the Left,
does not corroborate this theory—but not because egalitarian relations
failed to appear. In fact, egalitarian economic relations did arise.
Factory committees, run by the workers themselves, emerged within
Russian industry. But rather than this leading to the state withering
away, the Bolshevik state replaced the factory committees with
inegalitarian “one-man” management.
What is especially interesting is Lenin’s justification for this. Within
a year of coming to power, Lenin proclaimed, “All our efforts must be
exerted to the utmost to ... bring about an economic revival, without
which a real increase in our country’s defense potential is
inconceivable.”[30] Ironically, then, the revolution in Russia, led by
Marxists, not only contradicts Marx’s theory of history, but it also
corroborates the State-Primacy Theory, for rather than the economic
relations determining the form of the state, the state determined the
form of economic relations that came to preponderate—and the outcome was
both highly authoritarian and extremely inegalitarian. And this is not
surprising, given that egalitarian economic relations controlled by the
producers themselves are unlikely to be perceived by the state as
guaranteeing the productivity and the surplus that it requires to retain
power. The state is likely to think that workers in control of their own
production will either choose to work less arduously or to consume more
of their own produce, thereby offering less of a surplus to the state.
In a word, egalitarian economic relations are not in the state’s
interests. Hence, structures of inegalitarian political relations will
only select structures of economic relations that are inegalitarian. As
the Russian Revolution of 1917 clearly corroborates the State-Primacy
Theory while contradicting Marxist theory, and as an implication of the
State-Primacy Theory is that states will either not introduce or not
retain egalitarian economic relations, then Marxist political practice
would appear to be both seriously flawed and lacking in justification.
This leaves us with perhaps the major political implication of the
State- Primacy Theory: given that, according to this theory, states
select relations of production that are in their interests rather than
egalitarian relations that are in the interests of the mass of the
population, then a necessary (though not necessarily a sufficient)
condition for human emancipation and equality must be the abolition of
the state by the citizens themselves. This is the only practicable means
by which the process perpetuating inegalitarian relationships, as
identified by the State-Primacy Theory, can be terminated. In other
words, the State-Primacy Theory not only exposes the utter inadequacy of
Marxist revolutionary strategy, it also completely supports anarchist
political practice.
In short, then, Marxists, by considering the use of state power or in
advocating a revolutionary vanguard (which would eventually form a new
state power) as acceptable means toward equality and freedom, advocate
courses of action that, as the State-Primacy Theory reveals, would
perpetuate the extensive inequalities Marxists ostensibly oppose. And
they are uncritical of such courses of action because their theory
overlooks the fundamental importance of the state and, especially, state
power. The result of this is the promotion of a strategy that
inadvertently perpetuates unfreedom and inequality.[31] Consequently,
the State-Primacy Theory indicates that anarchists are indeed correct to
oppose all statist and vanguardist approaches to revolutionary change.
In this respect, the State-Primacy Theory provides anarchism with the
theory of historical transition it requires.[32]
So, an anarchist theory of history can be developed that offers the
promise of being at least as effective as Marxist theory in explaining
technological, economic, and political developments but that has the
added advantage, by drawing attention to the tremendous power that the
state can exert, of predicting accurately the outcome of statist and
vanguardist revolutions. This is in stark contrast with Marxist theory,
which, through underemphasizing the power of the state because of an
unbalanced stress on the economic, has created such a dangerous pitfall
for the Left. By stressing the technological and the economic, Marxists
have distracted attention from the state. This proved disastrous in the
Russian Revolution, the Chinese Revolution, and numerous revolutions in
the Third World and will do so time and time again until Marx’s theory
of history is eventually abandoned by the Left.
Once again, the flaws in Marxist theory are most clearly revealed from
an anarchist perspective. And the perspective that most clearly reveals
the inadequacies of analytical Marxism is that of analytical
anarchism.[33]
---
Alan Carter is chair of the Department of Philosophy at Heythrop
College, University of London. He is the author of A Radical Green
Political Theory (London: Routledge, 1999), The Philosophical
Foundations of Property Rights (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester-Wheatsheaf,
1989), and Marx: A Radical Critique (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988). His
web site can be visited at http.’/Avww.heythrop.ac.uk/carthome.htm.
[1] See G. A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defense (Oxford,
UK: Clarendon, 1978).
[2] See P. Thomas, Karl Marx and the Anarchists (London: Routledge Kegan
Paul, 1980).
[3] The principles of equality that, according to Baker, egalitarians
generally wish to defend aie the following: first, everyone’s basic
needs ought to be met. Second, everyone deserves sufficient respect for
snobbery and patronizing attitudes to be unacceptable. Third, massive
income differentials should not exist, and some should not be forced to
spend their lives confined to unpleasant work. Undesirable tasks ought,
instead, to be shared out. Fourth, power should be more equal so that
those who are presently powerless have greater control over their own
lives. Fifth, different treatment based on color, sex, culture,
religion, or disability ought to be opposed. In Baker’s opinion,
egalitarians usually wish to defend these five principles. Thus, in his
view, the demand for equality is not a demand for one simple thing, such
as the same income for everyone. Rather, it is a demand for a number of
substantive inequalities to be removed. See John Baker, Arguing for
Equality (London: Verso, 1987), 4–5. However, while Baker does mention
inequalities in power, which includes political power, most egalitarians
have tended to focus their opposition on inequalities in economic power.
[4] Moreover, it seems to me that this conception of what it is to be an
“anarchist” captures all of the classical anarchist theorists, including
William Godwin, Max Stimer, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin, and
Peter Kropotkin, as well as more recent anarchists such as Paul Goodman,
Noam Chomsky, Colin Ward, Nicholas Walter, and Murray Bookchin.
Furthermore, it avoids anarchists having to offer attempted defenses of
seemingly indefensible views, such as feeling compelled to advocate a
society without any power relations or authority whatsoever.
[5] For one interpretation of several of the major anarchist theorists
that stresses the central role of morality in their thought, see George
Crowder, Classical Anarchism: The Political Thought of Godwin, Proudhon,
Bakunin and Kropotkin (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1991).
[6] See, for example, Karl Marx, “Letter to Weydemeyer, 5 March 1852,”
Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan (Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press, 1977), 341.
[7] Regarding coercion: “As long as the other classes, and in particular
the capitalist class, still exist, as long as the proletariat is still
struggling with it (because, with the proletariat’s conquest of
governmental power its enemies and the old organization of society have
not yet disappeared), it must use coercive means, hence governmental
means” Karl Marx, “On Bakunin’s Statism and Anarchy,” Selected Writings,
561. Regarding centralization, in response to Bakunin’s query concerning
whether the proletariat as a whole will head the government, Marx
answers with the rhetorical question: “In a trade union, for example, is
the executive committee composed of the whole of the union?” Ibid., 562.
For one account of Marx’s political approach, see Alan Carter, “The Real
Politics of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels,” Studies in Marxism 6(1999):
1–30.
[8] For an appropriate conception of “power,” see Alan Carter, “A
‘Counterfactualist,’ FourDimensional Theory of Power,” The Heythrop
Journal 33, no. 2 (April 1992): 192–203.
[9] I include within the category “economic relations” the relations of
control not just over production but also over exchange because, it
seems to me, the common Marxist view that exploitation in capitalist
societies only occurs at the point of production and only results from
an employer-employee relationship misses what is perhaps the most
important kind of exploitation in the world today—namely, that of the
Third World by the advanced countries. Such exploitation can take place
without the First World as a whole employing the Third World and without
First World firms employing Third World workers. Exploitation can take
place because the First World, having a dominant position in the world
market, can effectively insist on a high price for its products and a
low price for what is produced elsewhere. By the First World selling its
products dear and buying Third World goods cheap, the surplus-product of
the Third World is transferred to the First World. This is not
exploitation of employees by employers, nor is it a case of the Third
World exploiting itself. It is a case of market exploitation. For a more
appropriate theory of exploitation than that employed by traditional
Marxists, see John Roemer, “New Directions in the Marxian Theory of
Exploitation and Class,” Analytical Marxism, ed. John Roemer (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986). On Roemer’s theory, exploitation
“can be accomplished, in principle, with or without any direct
relationship between the exploiters and the exploited in the process of
work” (ibid., 95), and his theory therefore allows us to comprehend the
exploitation of the Third World by the First through “unequal exchange”
(see ibid., 112).
[10] This claim is most famously indicated in Karl Marx, “Preface to a
Critique of Political Economy,” Selected Writings. See especially pp.
389–90.
[11] This appears to be Marx’s view in The Communist Manifesto. See, for
example, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, “The Communist Manifesto,” in
Marx, Selected Writings, 224.
[12]
G. A. Cohen, “Restricted and Inclusive Historical Materialism,” Irish
Philosophical Journal 1, no. 1 (1984): 25.
[13] See Frank Parkin, Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique
(London: Tavistock, 1981), 44–73, for a pertinent Weberian theory of
“social closure as exclusion.”
[14] On the speculative history outlined above, as states are
theoretically conjectured to have originated out of exclusionary
groupings formed to prey on the surplus produced by others, and as
states have continued to extract such surplus for their own
requirements, then states would clearly have interests different from
(indeed, have certain interests against) the other groupings within
their territories.
[15] It can sometimes be rational for a Third World state to be
complicit in the underdevelopment of its nation’s economy. See Alan
Carter, “The Nation-State and Underdevelopment,” Third World Quarterly
16, no. 4 (December 1995): 595–618. And for some indication of how the
theory outlined here can deal with the realities of international
politics in a world of unequal states, see ibid.
[16] Note that Marx, himself, acknowledges that the state, during the
period of the absolute monarchy, “helped to hasten” what he describes as
“the decay of the feudal system.” See Karl Marx, “The Eighteenth
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” Selected Writings, 316.
[17] The form could come, eventually, to have the appearance of being,
for example, pluralist or even corporatist. Regarding the latter, for an
account (drawing on the work of M. J. Smith and assuming state autonomy)
of how it was functional for the British state to invite the National
Farmers Union “into government” by according it “a statutory right to be
consulted over agricultural policy,” thus ensuring that its relationship
with the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) was a
privileged one, see Robert Gamer, Environmental Politics (Hemel
Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1996), 157–60.
[18] Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History, 134.
[19] This parallels the famous disagreement in Marxist circles between
Nicos Poulantzas and Ralph Miliband. See their respective contributions
in Robin Blackburn, ed., Ideology in Social Science (London: Fontana,
1972).
[20] See Alan Carter, “On Individualism, Collectivism and
IntenelationismThe Heythrop Journal 31, no. 1 (January 1990): 23–38.
[21] John Dearlove and Peter Saunders, Introduction to British Politics:
Analyzing a Capitalist Democracy (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1984), 116.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid., 125.
[24] Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” From Max Weber,; ed. H. Gerth
and C. Wright Mills (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1970), 78.
[25] Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London: Quartet,
1973), 50. And as Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O’Leary add, ‘The state
is a recognizably separate institution or set of institutions, so
differentiated from the rest of its society as to create identifiable
public and private spheres.” Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O’Leary,
Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy (London:
Macmillan, 1987), 2.
[26] Given that the state comprises various institutions, then there
will be conflicts of interests between them. In fact, the institutions
themselves may well contain fairly severe internal fractures. Hence, the
state should never be regarded as monolithic or homogeneous. This
notwithstanding, all state institutions, like virtually all state actors
within them, are at least united in having an interest in the
preservation of the state.
[27] Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History, 162.
[28] See Jon Elster, Making Sense of Marx (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1985), 17.
[29] See Frederick Engels, Anti-Duhring, Herr Eugen Diihring’s
Revolution in Science (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1976), 363.
[30]
V. I. Lenin, The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government (Moscow:
Progress Publishers, 1970), 6.
[31] Moreover, as Bakunin so prophetically writes, “It is clear why the
dictatorial revolutionists, who aim to overthrow the existing powers and
social structures in order to erect upon their ruins their own
dictatorship, never are or will be the enemies of government, but, on
the contrary, always will be the most ardent promoters of the government
idea. They are the enemies only of contemporary governments, because
they wish to replace them. They are the enemies of the present
governmental structure, because it excludes the possibility of their
dictatorship. At the same time they are the most devoted friends of
governmental power. For if the revolution destroyed this power by
actually freeing the masses, it would deprive this pseudo-revolutionary
minority of any hope to harness the masses in order to make them the
beneficiaries of their own government policy.” Michael Bakunin, Bakunin
on Anarchy, ed. Sam Dolgoff (London: Allen & Unwin, 1973), 329.
[32] There are, of course, numerous objections that could be leveled
against the State-Primacy Theory, but, it seems to me, the theory
possesses the resources to deal with them. Lack of space militates
against a full response to the objections that might be raised, so I
shall confine myself to some brief remarks in reply to the most obvious
of them. (1) The events of 1917 in Eastern Europe might corroborate the
State-Primacy Theory, but those of 1989 do not. To the contrary, whereas
a state-planned economy might have been thought in 1917 to provide a
greater revenue to the state, by the 1980s it was clear that the Russian
economy could not compete with that of the United States, and hence the
former Soviet Union could not continue to compete militarily because it
lacked the required revenue. It was therefore rational for the Russian
state to support a move to a capitalist economy that offered the
prospect of greater revenue. (2) Explanatory primacy cannot be accorded
to the state because it is the instrument of capitalists who can
withdraw their capital and hold the state to ransom. But, in response,
capitalists can only retain or withdraw their capital on the state’s
sufferance. States have nationalized private capital and have imposed
currency restrictions. Moreover, capital, in the form of money, can be
moved rapidly from one country to another, but what it is especially
useful for acquiring cannot be. Certain productive forces that are
ultimately essential for increasing capital—fields and factories—are
immobile. (3) States have their policies dictated to them by global
financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
But, in response, the behavior of such institutions is determined by
states. They impose terms and conditions on weaker states that are in
the interests of stronger ones, usually by increasing the surplus
available to the more powerful states. See, for example, Alan Carter,
“State-Primacy and Third World Debt,” The Heythrop Journal 38, no. 3
(July 1997): 300–14.
[33] For further arguments on the superiority of the State-Primacy
Theory over Cohen’s Marxist theory, see Alan Carter, “Fettering,
Development and Revolution” The Heythrop Journal 39, no. 2 (April 1998):
170–88. Moreover, the State-Primacy Theory also possesses the resources
to ground a radical environmental political theory. See Alan Carter,
‘Towards a Green Political Theory,” The Politics of Nature: Explorations
in Green Political Theory, ed. Andrew Dobson and Paul Lucardie (London:
Routledge, 1993).