đž Archived View for library.inu.red âş file âş anonymous-revolution-destituent-power-english-2.gmi captured on 2023-01-29 at 07:34:44. Gemini links have been rewritten to link to archived content
âĄď¸ Next capture (2024-07-09)
-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Title: Revolution & Destituent Power Author: Revoution & Destituent Power Date: February 28th 2020 Language: en Topics: Revolution, Insurrection, Agamben, anti-statism, philosophy, anti-authoritarianism, anarchism, walter benjamin Source: https://ruinsofcapital.noblogs.org/files/2021/05/Revolution-and-Destituent-Power-PRINT.pdf Notes: Further Reading : Giorgio Agamben, âFrom the State of Control to a Praxis of Destituent Powerâ Giorgio Agamben, The Use of Bodies Robert Hurley, âCommunist Ontologyâ Fred Moten & Stefano Harney, The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning & Black Study
This is a edited transcript of a presentation given anonymously on
February 28th 2020 in so-called Olympia Washington.
A recording of this talk with a slideshow is available on YouTube from
Resonance Audio Distro.
This talk was transcribed and edited by Wort Distro. Further editing and
layout done by some friends.
Type set in Helvetica Now and Freight Text. Cover photo of police in
Colombia, May 2021.
Historically, the revolutionary process in the West has centered on
violently destroying a certain order and then re-founding a new order
based on that prior violence. From the revolutionary terror of the
French Revolution, and the writing of the American constitution in the
wake of revolutionary war, to the authoritarian nightmare of the Soviet
Union, to contemporary demands in Chile for a constitutional assembly,
it seems impossible for revolutions to escape the logic of sovereignty,
constituency, and security. How do we escape the vicious spiral of
terrorism and the State?
Seeking a way out of the traps of modernity, some theorists and
revolutionary movements have proposed an idea of destituent power: a
revolutionary process that breaks the law not in order to found a new
law, but to do away with the logic of law altogether.
[]
I. Introduction
Revolution and Destituent Power: How do we de-activate the State without
founding a new one?
Historically, the revolutionary process in the West has centered on
violently destroying a certain order and then re-founding a new order
based on that prior violence. From the revolutionary terror of the
French Revolution, and the writing of the American constitution in the
wake of revolutionary war, to the authoritarian nightmare of the Soviet
Union, to contemporary demands in Chile for a constitutional assembly,
it seems impossible for revolutions to escape the logic of sovereignty,
constituency, and security.
How do we escape what Giorgio Agamben calls the vicious spiral of
terrorism and the State? Seeking a way out of the traps of modernity,
some theorists and revolutionary movements have proposed an idea of
destituent power: a revolutionary process that breaks the law not in
order to found a new law, but to do away with the logic of law
altogether. This talk presents an overview of Italian philosopher
Giorgio Agambenâs writing on the question of destituent power, tracing
the history of the idea from Walter Benjamin and Georges Sorel, through
the Italian Autonomia movement and the refusal of work, and into present
theories of destituent power.
Finally, we briefly discuss the interesting points of intersection
between the largely European concept of destituent power, and the
decidedly Black and North American concepts of fugitivity and the
undercommons, rooted in Fred Motenâs work.
II. Constituent & Constituted Power
Weâll start with the most exciting part, the etymology: destitution, or
destituent, is posed directly against constituent power and weâll talk
about that soon but in order to talk about it weâll first talk about the
roots. Constitute comes from the Latin, means to stand or make firm
together or to enter into formation as a necessary part. So, âcom-â:
together with, âstatuareâ is to stand, to set up, to make firm.
Incidentally the indo-european root of statuare which is âstaâ is also
the root of state. Opposed to constitute, to destitute would be to
abandon, to forsake, or to stand apart.
Destitute has a slightly different etymology and history than the way
that it usually gets used in an American or English contextâsimply
impoverishment or poverty. While a constituent power would be a group of
constituents coming together to create a political body that represents
them, a destituent power would abandon, deactivate, and forsake
political power or representations entirely. The easiest place to
understand destituent power is starting with constituent and constituted
power. In order to do that we have to start with some controversial
thinkers. Thomas Hobbes who is a 17th century English social philosopher
and Carl Schmitt a 20th century German jurist. Neither of them are
particularly sympathetic. Thomas Hobbes was nasty, British, and short.
Carl Schmitt was a Nazi. However their ideas have been enormously
influential to modern conceptions of politics and if we donât understand
them we may not realize how trapped we are within the frameworks that
they established.
Consider Thomas Hobbes 1651 book Leviathan for which heâs famous. This
book was written in the wake of the English Civil War and on the cover
we can see the image of the sovereign made up by the multitudinous
bodies of the populace. So in this image and in the book Leviathan the
sovereign is constituted by the people. The sovereign is the head that
manages the body politic. He wields force to protect the people from
outside threats but also from themselves. in Hobbes the state of
natureâa war of all against allâeveryone is out for themselves and itâs
only through a social contract enforced by the lethal power of a
sovereign (Leviathan) that we get to have nice things like borders and
cities and cars and cops and private property
That is the heart of constituted power. The sovereign is the state. The
sovereign represents the interests of the people. Whatever the sovereign
does in the interest of the people is therefore legitimate. This is the
root of arguments like those of Alan Dershowitz at Trumpâs impeachment
hearing who said âanything your President does to stay in power is in
the national interestâ and there was kind of a liberal panic over this.
If you look at sovereignty and look at the history youâre like yeah
totally that makes sense. You can compare this with a quote from Thomas
Hobbes in Leviathan where he says âhe that complaineth of injury from
his sovereign complaineth that whereof he himself is the author, and
therefore ought not to accuse any man but himself, no nor himself of
injury because to do injury to oneâs self is impossible.â
Another way of framing this is if the police are beating you, you have
nothing to complain about because you gave the sovereign his power. This
is the extreme version of the liberal favorite: âif you didnât vote you
canât complainâ. Except in this case itâs more like if you were born
into the social contractâand you wereâthen you canât complain because
itâs better than the alternative.
But constituted power or the power of the sovereign has to emerge from
something or at least make a claim for its legitimacy. That claim is
constituent power. If you think about how politicians and the mainstream
talk about politics they talk about constituents all the time. Who are
the constituents of a senator or a representative? How our politicians
accountable to their constituents? And so on. You can also think of
constituency as entangled with and inseparable from representation.
Imagine the ways that the media treats every social movement. They want
to know who the subjects are and what demands theyâre making of
politicians. They treat them as constituents and they regard the work of
elected representatives as being that weighing and balancing the needs
of all their constituents. To the extent that liberals launch critiques
against the government or inequality it is limited to critiquing the
state for not treating all of their constituents equally
Below is a diagram of the relationship between the sovereign and the
people, or between constitutive power and constituent power. In this
framework we have the people and we have the possibility of constituent
power, what Walter Benjamin calls âlawmaking violenceâ. but the endpoint
of a constituent power is a new constituted powerâa sovereign, which is
concerned with preserving the new status quo. This sovereign is able to
deploy law-preserving violence in threat or in actuality which is the
famous âmonopoly on violenceâ. And so this cycle of constituent and
constituted power goes as follows. There exists a regime which after a
period of contestation via revolution or civil war loses its legitimacy.
Once the revolutionary demand (i.e. âthe people want the fall of the
regimeâ) is met, âthe peopleâ assemble and decide on a path forward.
This can look like a new round of elections, or like a constituent
assembly to create a new constitution, or like a military leader coming
in and promising to restore order. Whatever the outcome the process of
constitution dissolves the people as a political force and then it
reframes them instead as a source of legitimacy for the new regime which
then promises to defend the gains of the previous movement.
[]
But once the legitimate government is established we return to a
framework of sovereignty and âlaw preserving violenceâ and the wheel of
history keeps on turning. There are a couple of quotes that perhaps
helpful for framing a cycle. One is from The Invisible Committee which
says âConstituent power is a fiction retrojected by constituted powers
beginning from the moment they have succeeded in stabilizing the
situation.â Referring to the Arab Spring, they say what has happened in
Egypt in recent years is an exemplary case for understanding this. âIn
no time at all the people are again being massacred in the name of âThe
Peopleââ. And then from [Giorgio] Agambenâs book Stasis on civil war he
says âthat the very instant that the people choose the sovereign, [the
people] dissolves itself into a confused multitude.â This happens not
only in a monarchy but even in a democracy or an aristocracy where as
soon as the council has been constituted, the people simultaneously
dissolve.
You can read this in the present moment with regards to Trump very
easily, as the rhetoric around the impeachment saying âWeâll let the
people decide in the election. We shouldnât have an impeachment. We
shouldnât prosecute him for any crimes.â And so the people become this
abstract source of legitimacy that have no actual real power except in
these brief moments of constitution. So hopefully that clarifies at
least a little bit the concept of constituent and constituted power and
Iâll keep returning to that. I want to talk now about sovereignty.
Hobbes did a lot to theorize sovereignty but perhaps the most
influential thinker on the subject was Carl Schmitt who was a German
legal theorist who among other things was instrumental in helping Hitler
develop the legal theories that legitimized the Nazi regime. You can see
Schmitt as a villain and he certainly was an enemy. But you can also see
him as explaining more clearly the underlying logic of the state even
within liberal democracy and thereby revealing something important and
damning about the whole thing.
Schmitt famously just defined the sovereign as he who decides on the
exception and so it was interesting after September 11th when George W.
Bush constantly referred to himself as âThe Deciderââacting outside of
the norm to decide what was best for the nation in a state of emergency.
For Schmitt the power of the sovereign rests precisely in what he calls
the state of exceptions. While the sovereign manages a nation bounded by
the rule of law, he can always suspend the law in order to protect that
nation. This is the logic that allowed Hitler to suspend the Weimar
Constitution and to act outside of it while never formally abolishing
it. This is what allowed Bush the second to detain enemy combatants at
Guantanamo Bay outside the laws of both due process and the conventions
of prisoners of war. Itâs what allowed Obama to assassinate US citizens
with drones abroad and so on. Schmittâs contribution here is important
because he recognizes that every state, every sovereign ultimately rests
on this state of exception regardless of how democratic it appears. Even
the most liberal democratic state will eventually face an existential
crisis that can only be solved by suspending the norms of that
democratic state.
The sovereign decides who is friend and who is enemy, protects its
subjects from enemies. Laws and constitutions aside this is the heart of
the sovereigns power and the logic of the state. This also means
importantly, that the sovereign can decide which lives are expendable
and which are not. What is a crisis and what is not. that crisis might
be terrorism or may be climate change or it may be a pandemic, but
whatever the crisis the following logic is the same: expendable lives
are confronted directly by lethal force with no mediation by the law.
And remember for Hobbes and Schmitt and therefore for Western political
thought writ large, the sovereign is necessary because the state of
nature is a war of all against all. Itâs the specter of civil war or
disorder that legitimizes the state and sovereignty.
The political combat that has been playing out in DC over Trumpâs
impeachment is simply a demonstration that understand sovereignty and
the Democrats donât. When Democrats say that Trump is not above the law
theyâre making a moral argument but at the same time demonstrating its
falsity. Trump is above the law because he did what he wanted and got
away with it because heâs consolidated enough power to erode any
challenges. No matter how dearly you hold your democratic principles,
power is about power. Interestingly when Senator Lamar Alexander voted
against witnesses his reasoning to the media was that the impeachment
would pour gasoline on cultural fires. Which is yet another example of
the fear of civil war that haunts the state and legitimizes the
sovereign.
This lawlessness that at the heart of the law is critical to its
functioning, and itâs a lawlessness that liberal, Marxist, and anarchist
traditions all tend to miss. Which is one of the useful parts of
thinking of destituent power and Agamben scholarship. To quote Agamben
again: âWalter Benjamin once wrote that thereâs nothing more anarchic
than the bourgeois order.â In the same sense Pasolini has one of the
officials in the film Salò say that âtrue anarchy is the anarchy of
powerâ. âBecause power is constituted through the inclusive exclusion of
anarchy, the only possibility of thinking a true anarchy coincides with
the lucid exposition of anarchy internal to power anarchy is what
becomes thinkable only at the point when we grasp and render destitute
the anarchy of power.â (The Use of Bodies by Giorgio Agamben)
So, in some ways we may thank Trump for his lucid exposition of the
anarchy internal to power but I think that this is a point that we often
miss when we describe the state, or we think about how it functions. We
think that it functions more or less according to its own laws or rules
and we think of anarchy or anarchism as something completely separate
and alien from it that would solve the problem. The argument here is
that anarchy or a foundationlessness is central to the exercise of power
and helps to define it and constitute it. If we donât recognize that
weâre going to be caught in this dialectic between the two.
To sum it up and return to our diagram we can add that the sovereign can
always act outside the law in order to preserve it and can also decide
who can be killed in the interest of security. Constituent power depends
on the concept of a body of people defined by identity: a nation, or a
constituency, or even the working class, asserting its identity and then
demanding representation or power. In this sense the workersâ movements
of the 20th century were all rooted in constituent power, as were the
anti-colonial struggles and revolutions around the world. The communist
and socialist revolutions by and large centered the working-class as new
constituents rather than doing away with the concept of work or with
constituency altogether. The problem is that once the constituent power
resolves into constituted power the logic of sovereignty takes hold and
the power of a sovereign ultimately rests on its ability to decide on an
exception. Itâs important to add here that the state of exception is not
a one-off event or an all-or-nothing affair. You can see the state of
exception as both constantly internal to the logic of governance but
also gradually becoming more and more permanent, more and more
totalizing as governance, where the sovereign uses each crisis to assume
more emergency powers, declare more and more things outside the law.
This is all overview so far of constituent power and sovereignty.
Hopefully itâs helpful but I havenât yet defined destituent power. So
weâll take a shot.
III. Destituent Power
Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben introduces destituent power as
follows: he says âif revolutions and insurrections correspond to
constituent powerâthat is to a violence that establishes and constitutes
the new lawâin order to think of destituent power we have to imagine
completely other strategies whose definition is the task of becoming
politics. A power that was only just overthrown by violence will rise
again in another form. In the incessant inevitable dialectic between
constituent power and constituted power. Violence which makes the law
and violence that preserves it.â
When he introduces destituent power in his texts, Agamben very
specifically references Walter Benjaminâs work on Critique of Violence,
in which he links law-making and law-preserving violence and says that
âthe distinction between law-making violence and law-preserving violence
is however deconstructed in the body of the police and in capital
punishment. Whereby the rotten core of the law is revealed. Namely that
law as a manifestation of violent domination for its own sake.â
Walter Benjamin in writing Critique of Violence was influenced directly
by Georges Sorel and by his theory of the proletarian general strike,
which as opposed to a specific kind of strike with a demand for more
wages or shorter hours, was instead a total general strike with only the
end of work as its aim. In Sorelâs general strike, or Benjaminâs divine
violence, or Agambenâs destitution the workers abandon the factory not
in order to pressure the owners for change nor even to take over the
factories and seize the means of production, but in order to end the
world of factories and work altogether. Likewise a destitution of state
power does not result in a new state or a new constitution, not even a
federated egalitarian one, but in a desertion or abandonment of the
constituent and constituted power dialectic altogether.
The question of destitution is not how to lay claim to power and make it
more democratic, but how to become powerful in a different senseâto
abandon the logic of sovereignty entirely and to render it inoperable
and powerless. This has some immediate strategic or political
consequences for us. It means first of all that political movements and
revolutions that seek to seize the state cannot help but fail. At the
most basic level this is because any revolution immediately concerns
itself with the counter-revolution. The question of securing the
revolution enters the equation and down that path leads exception,
terror, and sovereignty. and so the revolts of The Movement of the
Squares and the left parties that were swept into power in Greece and in
Spain subsequently could not help but fail, especially when faced with
the disciplining power of a global economy.
By contrast The Invisible Committee says of destitution that âits
characteristic gesture is exiting just as the constituent gesture is
taking by storm.â Thereâs an additional insight here which realizes that
real power no longer even exists within the palaces or the centers of
governance that past revolutions once sought to take by storm. Real
power exists in the infrastructure of the built environment and the
flows of commodities and the flows of capital and this is another
insight that helps to explain why Greek and Spanish left parties like
Podemos or Syriza failed. They were able to seize power but they were
immediately faced with the disciplining power of the European Union and
IMF which made it impossible for them to actually implement reforms and
turned them into a machine for implementing austerity instead.
Going back to our etymology, the closest words we have in English that
give a real sense of destitution are abandonment or desertion. I would
add a third hereâdrawing from a different traditionâfugitivity.
Destitution does not entrench symmetrical conflicts with power. It does
not kill the king in order to put a democratically elected sovereign or
assembly on the throne. It simply walks away leaving the king, the
police, and the economy to govern an empty house.
Destitution asks how do we rob the power structures that exist of their
power over us? Certainly there are times that violence does this. Iâm
not making a pacifist argument in any way. Riots and looting are often
destituent. The police lose their ability to enforce the law. People
play with the materials of the city. A liquor store becomes a communal
free bar, a limousine becomes a barricade and a source of heat. A
supermarket becomes a kitchen. But,riots are temporary and they can just
as easily turn into a legitimizing factor for a security force, or
become so focused on an antagonism with the police that the forms of
life created within them are lost. This is the danger of fetishizing
militancy, of delinking the war-machine from the care-machine.
Desertion has a long and proud history. The earliest states in
Mesopotamia failed over and over again through desertion, not through
revolution. In many ways the longevity of the modern state and the
economy has been achieved through the eradication of zones to flee to,
the destruction of refuges, the elimination of ways of life that allow
people to live on their own terms.
We are in a hostage situation and you donât resolve a hostage situation
by frontal combat with an enemy. You resolve it by sneaking the hostages
out the back door.
George Jackson summed up this approach in his letter to Fay Stender from
Soledad prison saying âI may run but all the time that I am Iâll be
looking for a stick! a defensible position.â Deleuze and Guattari
famously paraphrased Jackson when elaborating their concept of lines of
flight and escape rather than confrontation, saying âI may take flight
but all the while Iâm fleeing I will be looking for a weapon.â Within
those very short phrases there is this paired idea of fleeing and
militancy, of building a life and continuing to fight, and linking the
two together constantly, rather than separating them into different
functions.
And so I think that the destituent approach here shares a logic with the
history of fugitivityâof Maroons in the Caribbean and Florida, in the
great dismal swampâof rebel communities fleeing slavery and disappearing
into illegible terrain. I think that thereâs a great deal of power in
allowing these two trajectories to speak to each other and realizing
that both of these ideas from very different traditions and contexts are
pointing towards similar strategies and tactics.
But thereâs no longer a swamp to flee to there are no longer stateless
lands and they never really could hold all those who wanted to flee
anyway. The beauty of what Fred Moten has termed the undercommons, and
the beauty of destitution, is the realization that we have to build the
commune. We have to build the escape hatch, but we donât have to build
it from nothing. There is always an undercommons. There are always
practices of sharing. There are already resources put in common and
there may be co-conspirators and unsuspecting places.
To destitute the world is not to build a brand new world and the ashes
of the old. Nor is it to seize the means of production and continue
producing the exact same world simply minus capitalism. To destitute, in
the words of The Invisible Committee, is not primarily to attack the
institution, but to attack the need we have of it.
Destitution has another sense which is to deactivate or to render
inoperative. To remove somethingâs ability to function without
destroying it. So, inclusive exclusion is the norm in Western ontology.
As Agamben describes the process, he says âsomething is divided excluded
and pushed to the bottom and precisely through this exclusion is
included as a foundation.â And so anarchy is the excluded foundation of
sovereignty as both a justification and an internal logic. Constituent
power is the excluded foundation of constituted power. The lives of
migrants or detainees are the excluded foundation of citizenship.
Domestic labor and the home is the excluded foundation of the political
sphere or the factory and so on.
Attempting to invert these exclusions will only perpetuate them. We
cannot valorize labor over capital, anarchy over sovereignty, because
they co-constitute one another. The destituent gesture asks instead how
do we deactivate the apparatuses that control our lives and open them up
to new and common use? How do we liberate a building, a relationship, a
communityâhalve it from its single function and instead play with it in
common?
Unfortunately it is often at this point that philosophy fails us as
revolutionaries or as destituents. The examples that Agamben gives us of
destitution are centered on poetry, dance, Sabbath, and feasting. Poetry
renders inoperative the communicative function of language, combining
sounds and images for the sake of play but not toward any end. Dance
destitutes the functions of the body, creating movement with no
particular productive purpose. The Sabbath renders all activity
inoperative, forbidding work that is aimed toward a productive end.
These are all beautiful examples and certainly any destituent process
should be full of poetry and dancing and feasting but it often feels
hard to translate from the world of literary examples to the world of
real struggles that we find ourselves embedded in.
A better example might be found in the streets of Santiago, where amidst
ongoing anti-austerity protests and riots people began to loot grocery
stores and set up communal kitchens, sharing their immediate needs and
sustaining their everyday lives. Distinct from the efforts to establish
a constituent assembly, these neighborhood assemblies sought to feed one
another and share their lives together in the present.
To destitute the courts might not be to burn them to the ground, but to
become powerful enough that we can be indifferent to them. To show up to
hearings and carry on our own conversations and laugh at the
performances of the judges when they attempt to discipline us.
Destituting the police might not always look like attacking them, but
like attacking their credibility and legitimacy. A riot might do that in
the right situation but it may also increase their legitimacy.
Destitution asks us to consider in each moment what action will give us
the most power and minimize the power of the police or the economy or
whatever apparatus weâre trying to escape. Destitution has an affinity
for fleeing, but it also has an affinity for mockery. As some friends
said âThe destituent gesture does not oppose the institution. It doesnât
even mount a frontal fight. It neutralizes it. Empties it of substance.
And then steps to the side and watches it expire.â
Growing a destituent power is challenging because it demands
illegibility towards the state and towards reform, but at the same time
it must demonstrate its common sense and its potential to those who
arenât already militants or converts.
I want to end obliquely with a sharp turn toward a different history of
scholarship and ideas that I think is complementary. In James C. Scottâs
History of Agriculture and States he describes the rise of the earliest
states in Mesopotamia as a process of simplification and control. Early
states drained marshes, destroyed diverse ecosystems, and replaced them
with monoculture crops that could be easily counted harvested and taxed.
Draining the wetlands serves two functions the creation of fertile
ground and irrigation systems that could grow crops and the destruction
of zones of fugitivityâthe closing down of escape routes to which people
constantly fled. Scott describes wetland societies as follows, âThere
was no single dominant resource that could be monopolized or controlled
from the center let alone easily taxed. Subsistence in these zones was
so diverse variable and dependent on such a multitude of tempos as to
defy any simple central accounting. A state, even a small proto-state,
requires a subsistence environment that is far simpler than the wetland
ecologies we have examined.â
Another way of imagining destitution or the undercommons is through the
idea of fugitive biodiversity. I would like to suggest that building
lives of complexity, that being situated where we are, that expanding
our ability to exist on our own terms requires a proliferation of
complexity, diversity, and entanglement. We are already deeply entangled
with the world in ways that we cannot count or calculate. Destitution
refuses to attempt to count or calculate those entanglements and instead
celebrates their existence for their own sake. James C. Scott also
suggests that the work of the state is at its most basic consists in the
elimination of mud, and its replacement by its pure constituents: land
and water. To destitute would not be to celebrate water over land, to
celebrate labor or capital, to celebrate the domestic over the
political, but to make the distinctions muddy, to make the ground soggy,
to turn lakes and parking lots into wetlands and estuaries, to spread
complexity and biodiversity, to make our daily lives dependent on such a
myriad of different relations and worlds and practices that our lives
could never again be separated from their specific forms