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Title: Of History and Romance
Author: William Godwin
Date: 1797
Language: en
Topics: history, love
Source: Retrieved on 25th September 2020 from http://www.english.upenn.edu/~mgamer/Etexts/godwin.history.html
Notes: Godwin wrote this piece, according to a note in the manuscript, “while the Enquirer [1797] was in the press, under the impression that the favour of the public might have demanded another volume.”

William Godwin

Of History and Romance

The study of history may well be ranked among those pursuits which are

most worthy to be chosen by a rational being.

The study of history divides itself into two principal branches; the

study of mankind in a mass, of the progress the fluctuations, the

interests and the vices of society; and the study of the individual.

The history of a nation might be written in the first of these senses,

entirely in terms of abstraction, and without descending so much as to

name one of those individuals to which the nation is composed.

It is curious, and it is important, to trace the progress of mankind

from the savage to the civilised state; to observe the points of

similitude between the savages of America and the savages of ancient

Italy or Greece; to investigate the rise of property moveable to

immoveable; and thus to ascertain the causes that operate universally

upon masses of men under given circumstances, without being turned aside

in their operation by the varying character of individuals.

The fundamental article in this branch of historical investigation, is

the progress and varieties of civilisation. But there are many

subordinate channels into which it has formed itself. We may study the

history of eloquence or the history of philosophy. We may apply

ourselves to the consideration and the arts of life, and the arts of

refinement and pleasure. There lie before us the history of wealth and

the history of commerce. We may study the progress of revenue and the

arts of taxation. We may follow the varieties of climates, and trace

their effects on the human body and the human mind. Nay, we may descend

still lower; we may have our attention engrossed by the succession of

archons [1] and the adjustment of olympiads [2]; or may apply ourselves

entirely to the examination of medals and coins.

There are those who conceive that history, in one or all the kinds here

enumerated, is the only species of history deserving a serious

attention. They disdain the records of individuals. To interest our

passions, or employ our thoughts about personal events, be they of

patriots, of authors, of heroes or kinds, they regard as a symptom of

effeminacy. Their mighty minds cannot descend to be busied about

anything less than the condition of nations, and the collation and

comparison of successive ages. Whatever would disturb by exciting our

feelings the torpid tranquility of the soul, they have in unspeakable

abhorrence.

It is to be feared that one of the causes that have dictated the

panegyric which has so often been pronounced upon this series of

history, is its dry and repulsive nature. Men who by persevering

exertions have conquered this subject in defiance of innumerable

obstacles, will almost always be able to ascribe to it a

disproportionate value. Men who have not done this, often imagine they

shall acquire at a cheap rate among the ignorant the reputation of

profound, by praising, in the style of an adept, that which few men

venture so much as to approach. Difficulty has a tendency to magnify to

almost all eyes the excellence of that which only through difficulty can

be attained.

The mind of man does not love abstractions. Its genuine and native

taste, as it discovers itself in children and uneducated persons, rests

entirely in individualities. It is only by perseverance and custom that

we are brought to have a relish for philosophy, mathematical, natural or

moral. There was a time when the man, now most eagerly attached to them,

shrunk with terror from their thorny path.

But the abstractions of philosophy, when we are grown familiar with

them, often present to our minds a simplicity and precision, that may

well supply the place of entire individuality. The abstractions of

history are more cumbrous and unwieldy. In their own nature perhaps they

are capable of simplicity. But this species is yet in its infancy. He

who would study the history of nations abstracted from individuals whose

passions and peculiarities are interesting to our minds, will find it a

dry and frigid science. It will supply him with no clear ideas. The

mass, as fast as he endeavours to cement and unite it, crumbles from his

grasp, like a lump of sand. Those who study revenue or almost any other

of the complex subjects above enumerated are ordinarily found, with

immense pains to have compiled a species of knowledge which is no sooner

accumulated than it perishes, and rather to have confounded themselves

with a labyrinth of particulars, than to have risen to the dignity of

principles.

Let us proceed to the consideration of the second great branch of the

study of society. In doing so we shall be insensibly led to assign to

the first branch its proper rank.

The study of individual men can never fail to be an object of the

highest importance. It is only by comparison that we come to know any

thing of mind or ourselves. We go forth into the world; we see what man

is; we enquire what he was; and when we return home to engage in the

solemn act of self-investigation, our most useful employment is to

produce the materials we have collected abroad, and, by a sort of

magnetism, cause those particulars to start our to view in ourselves,

which might otherwise have laid for ever undetected.

But the study of individual history has a higher use than merely as it

conduces to the elucidation of science. It is the most fruitful source

of activity and motive. If a man were condemned to perfect solitude, he

would probably sink into the deepest and most invariable lethargy of

soul. If he only associate, as most individuals are destined to do, with

ordinary men, he will be in danger of becoming such as they are. It is

the contemplation of illustrious men, such as we find scattered through

the long succession of ages, that kindles into flame the hidden fire

within us. The excellence indeed of sages, of patriots and poets, as we

find it exhibited at the end of their maturity, is too apt to overwhelm

and discourage us with its lustre. But history takes away the cause of

our depression. It enables us to view minutely and in detail what to the

uninstructed eye was too powerful to be gazed at; and, by tracing the

progress of the virtuous and the wise from its first dawn to its

meridian lustre, shows us that they were composed of materials merely

human. It was the sight of the trophies of Mithrades [3], that recurred

to break the infant slumbers of his more illustrious successor. While we

admire the poet and the hero, and sympathize with his generous ambition

or his ardent expressions, we insensibly imbibe the same spirit, and

burn with kindred fires.

But let us suppose that the genuine purpose of history, was to enable us

to understand the machine of society, and to direct it to its best

purposes. Even here individual history will perhaps be found in point of

importance to take the lead of general. General history will furnish us

with precedents in abundance, will show us how that which happened in

one country has been repeated in another, and may perhaps even instruct

us how that which has occurred in the annals of mankind, may under

similar circumstances be produced again. But, if the energy of our minds

should lead us to aspire to something more animated and noble than dull

repetition, if we love the happiness of mankind enough to feel ourselves

impelled to explore new and untrodden paths, we must then not rest

contented with considering society in a mass, but must analyze the

materials from which it is composed. It will be necessary for us to

scrutinize the nature of man, before we can pronounce what it is of

which social man is capable. Laying aside the generalities of historical

abstraction, we must mark the operation of human passions; must observe

the empire of motives whether grovelling or elevated; and must note the

influence that one human being exercises over another, and the

ascendancy of the daring and the wise over the vulgar multitude. It is

thus, and thus only, that we shall be enabled to add, to the knowledge

of the past, a sagacity that can penetrate into the depths of futurity.

We shall not only understand those events as they arise which are no

better than old incidents under new names, but shall judge truly of such

conjunctures and combinations, their sources and effects, as, thought

they have never yet occurred, are within the capacities of our nature.

He that would prove the liberal and spirited benefactor of his species,

must connect the two branches of history together, and regard the

knowledge of the individual, as that which can alone give energy and

utility to the records of our social existence.

From these considerations one inference may be deduced, which

constitutes perhaps the most important rule that can be laid down

respecting the study of history. This is, the wisdom of studying the

detail, and not in abridgement. The prolixity of dullness is indeed

contemptible. To read a history which, expanding itself through several

volumes, treats only of a short period, is true economy. To read

historical abridgements, in which each point of the subject is touched

upon only, and immediately dismissed, is a wanton prodigality of time

worthy only of folly or of madness.

The figures which present themselves in such a history, are like the

groups that we sometimes see placed in the distance of a landscape, that

are just sufficiently marked to distinguish the man from the brute, or

the male from the female, but are totally unsusceptible of

discrimination of form or expression of sentiment. The men I would study

upon the canvas of history, are men worth the becoming intimately

acquainted with.

It is in history, as it is in life. Superficial acquaintance is nothing.

A scene incessantly floating, cannot instruct us; it can scarcely become

a source of amusement to a cultivated mind. I would stop the flying

figures, that I may mark them more clearly. There must be an exchange of

real sentiments, or an investigation of subtle peculiarities, before

improvement can be the result. There is a magnetical virtue in man, but

there must be friction and heat, before the virtue will operate.

Pretenders indeed to universal science, who examine nothing, but imagine

they understand everything, are ready from the slightest glance to

decipher the whole character. Not so the genuine scholar. His curiosity

is never satiated. He is ever upon the watch for further and still

further particulars. Trembling for his own fallibility and frailty, he

employs every precaution to guard himself against them.

There are characters in history that may almost be said to be worth an

eternal study. They are epitomes of the [?] of its best and most exalted

features, purified from their grossness. I am not contented to observe

such a man upon the public stage, I would follow him into his closet.[4]

I would see the friend and the father of a family, as well as the

patriot. I would read his works and his letters, if any remain to us. I

would observe the turn of his thoughts and the character of his

phraseology. I would study his public orations. I would collate his

behaviour in prosperity with his behaviour in adversity. I should be

glad to know the course of his studies, and the arrangement of his time.

I should rejoice to have, or to be enabled to make, if that were

possible, a journal of his ordinary and minutest actions. I believe I

should be better employed in studying one man, than in perusing the

abridgement of Universal History in sixty volumes. I would rather be

acquainted with a few trivial particulars of the actions and disposition

of Virgil and Horace, than with the lives of many men, and the history

of many nations.

This leads us to a second rule respecting the study of history. Those

historians alone are worthy of attention and persevering study that

treat the development of great genius, or the exhibition of bold and

masculine virtues. Modern history indeed we ought to peruse, because all

they we wish must be connected with all that we are, and because it is

incumbent upon us to explore the means by which the latter may be made,

as it were, to slide into the former. But modern history, for the most

part, is not to be perused for its own sake.

The ancients were giants, but we, their degenerate successors, are

pygmies. There was something in the nature of the Greek and Roman

republics that expanded and fired the soul. He that sees not this, if he

have had an adequate opportunity to see it, must be destitute of some of

the first principles of discrimination. He that feels not the

comparative magnitude of their views, must be himself the partaker of a

slow-working and unelevated soul.

To convince us of this, we need do no more than look into the

biographical collection of Plutarch.[5] Plutarch is neither lucid in his

arrangement, eloquent in his manner, nor powerful in his conceptions.

The effect he produces upon us, is the effect of his subject, and is

scarcely in any respect aided by the skill of the writer.

From Plutarch let us turn to the collections in English, French and

Italian, relative to the persons who in modern times have reflected most

honour upon any of these nations. We sometimes no doubt admire,

occasionally we sympathise. But the greatest personages there upon

record, appear in the comparison encumbered with their rank. Their march

is slow, weighed down as they are on every side with prejudices and

precedents. They are disciplines to dull monotony. They are cast

together in one characteristic mould. There is something in the nature

of modern governments and institutions that seems to blight in the bud

every grander and more ample development of the soul. When we attempt to

display the agility or the grace, the capacity for which inheres in our

nature, we resemble a vaulter or figurante that should undertake to

dance in fetters.

The ancients on the other hand are men of a free and undaunted spirit.

There is a conscious dignity in their mien that impresses us with awe.

Whatever they undertake they undertake with a full and undivided soul.

They proceed to their object with an unerring aim, and do not lose

themselves in dark, inexplicable windings. He that shall study their

history with an unbiassed spirit, will almost imagine that he is reading

of a different species. He will not be blind to their mistakes, their

abuses and their crimes, but he will confess that their minds are of a

more decisive character, and their virtues more attractive and sublime.

We are sometimes told that the remoteness of the object in this case

misleads us, and that we admire the ancients for this reason merely,

because they are ancients. But this solution will not account for the

phenomenon. Read on the one hand Thucydides and Livy,[6] and on the

other Hume and Voltaire and Robertson.[7] When we admire the personages

of the former, we simply enter into the feelings with which these

authors recorded them. The latter neither experience such emotions nor

excite them. The ancients were not ancients to their contemporaries,

pourtant appris a les admires. Assurement si la posterite jamais admire

les notres, elle ne l’ausa pas appris de nous.

Rousseau: Nouvelle Heloise, Lettre XII

[The ancients were contemporary with their historians, but they have

taught us to admire them. Assuredly, if posterity should admire our own

men, it will do so not because of us]

No: the difference is intrinsic, and the emotions will be generated as

long as history endures.

What sort of an object is the history of England? Till the extinction of

the wars of York and Lancaster, it is one scene of barbarism and

cruelty. Superstition rides triumphant upon the subject neck of princes

and of people, intestine war of noble with noble, or of one pretender to

the crown against another, is almost incessant. The gallant champion is

no sooner ousted, than he is led without form to the scaffold, or

massacred in cold blood upon the field. In all these mighty struggles,

scarcely a trace is to be found of a sense of the rights of men. They

are combinations among the oppressors against him that would usurp their

tyranny, or they are the result of an infatuated predilection for one

despotic monster in preference to another. The period of the Tudors is a

period of base and universal slavery. The reign of Elizabeth is

splendid, but its far-famed worthies are in reality supple and servile

courtiers, treacherous, undermining and unprincipled. The period of the

Stuarts is the only portion of our history interesting to the heart of

man. Yet its noblest virtues are obscured by the vile jargon of

fanaticism and hypocrisy. From the moment that the grant contest excited

under the Stuarts was quieted by the Revolution,[8] our history assumes

its most insipid and insufferable form. It is the history of

negotiations and tricks, it is the history of revenues and debts, it is

the history of corruption and political profligacy, but it is not the

history of genuine independent man.

Some persons, endowed with too much discernment and taste not to

perceive the extreme disparity that subsists between the character of

ancient and modern times, have observed that ancient history carries no

other impression to their minds than that of exaggeration and fable.

It is not necessary here to enter into a detail of the evidence upon

which our belief of ancient history is founded. Let us take it for

granted that it is a fable. Are all fables unworthy of regard? Ancient

history, says Rousseau, is a tissue of such fables, as have a moral

perfectly adapted to the human heart. I ask not, as a principal point,

whether it be true or false? My first enquiry is, “Can I derive

instruction from it? Is it a genuine praxis upon the nature of man? Is

it pregnant with the most generous motives and examples? If so, I had

rather be profoundly versed in this fable, than in all the genuine

histories that ever existed.”

It must be admitted indeed that all history bears too near a resemblance

to fable. Nothing is more uncertain, more contradictory, more

unsatisfactory than the evidence of facts. If this be the case in courts

of justice, where truth is sometimes sifted with tenacious perseverance,

how much more will it hold true of the historian? He can administer no

oath, he cannot issue his precept, and summon his witnesses from distant

provinces, he cannot arraign his personages and compel them to put in

their answer. He must take what they choose to tell, the broken

fragments, and the scattered ruins of evidence.

That history which comes nearest to truth, is the mere chronicle of

facts, places and dates. But this is in reality no history. He that

knows only what day the Bastille was taken and on what spot Louis XVI

perished, knows nothing. He professes the mere skeleton of history. The

muscles, the articulations, every thing in which the life emphatically

resides, is absent.

Read Sallust.[9] To every action he assigns a motive. Rarely an

uncertainty diversifies his page. He describes his characters with

preciseness and decision. He seems to enter into the hearts of his

personages, and unfolds their secret thought. Considered as fable,

nothing can be more perfect. But neither is this history.

There is but one further mode of writing history, and this is the mode

principally prevalent in modern times. In this mode, the narrative is

sunk in the critic. The main body of the composition consists of a

logical deduction and calculation of probabilities. This species of

writing may be of use as a whetstone upon which to sharpen our faculty

of discrimination, but it answers none of the legitimate purposes of

history.

From these considerations it follows that the noblest and most excellent

species of history, may be decided to be a composition in which, with a

scanty substratum of facts and dates, the writer interweaves a number of

happy, ingenious and instructive inventions, blending them into one

continuous and indiscernible mass. It sufficiently corresponds with the

denomination, under which Abbe Prevost [10] acquired considerable

applause, of historical romance. Abbe Prevost differs from Sallust,

inasmuch as he made freer use of what may be styled, the licentia

historica.

If then history be little better than romance under a graver name, it

may not be foreign to the subject here treated, to enquire into the

credit due to that species of literature, which bears the express stamp

of invention, and calls itself romance or novel.

This sort of writing has been exposed to more obloquy and censure than

any other.

The principal cause of this obloquy is sufficiently humorous and

singular.

Novels, as an object of trade among booksellers, are of a peculiar cast.

There are few by which immense sums of money can be expected to be

gained. There is scarcely one by which some money is not gained. A class

of readers, consisting of women and boys, and which is considerably

numerous, requires a continual supply of books of this sort. The

circulating libraries therefore must be furnished; while, in consequence

of the discredit which has fallen upon romance, such works are rarely

found to obtain a place in the collection of the gentleman or the

scholar. An ingenious bookseller of the metropolis, speculating upon

this circumstance, was accustomed to paste an advertisement in his

window, to attract the eye of the curious passenger, and to fire his

ambition, by informing him of a “want of novels for the ensuing season”.

The critic and the moralist, in their estimate of romances, have

borrowed the principle that regulates the speculations of trade. They

have weighed novels by the great and taken into their view the whole

scum and surcharge of the press. But surely this is not the way in which

literature would teach us to consider the subject.

When we speak of poetry, we do not fear to commend this species of

composition, regardless of the miserable trash that from month to month

finds its way from the press under the appellation of poetry. The like

may be said of history, or of books of philosophy, natural and

intellectual. There is no species of literature that would stand this

ordeal.

If I would estimate truly any head of composition, nothing can be more

unreasonable, than for me to take into account every pretender to

literature that has started in it. In poetry I do not consider those

persons who merely know how to count their syllables and tag a rhyme;

still less those who print their effusion in the form of verse without

being adequate to either of these. I recollect those authors only who

are endowed with some of the essentials of poetry, with its imagery, its

enthusiasm, or its empire over the soul of man. Just so in the cause

before us, I should consider only those persons who had really written

romance, not those who had vainly attempted it.

Romance, then, strictly considered, may be pronounced to be one of the

species of history. The difference between romance and what ordinarily

bears the denomination history, is this. The historian is confined to

individual incident and individual man, and must hang upon that his

invention or conjecture as he can. The writer collects his materials

from all sources, experience, report, and the records of human affairs;

then generalises them; and finally selects, from their elements and the

various combinations they afford, those instances which he is best

qualified to portray, and which he judges most calculated to impress the

hear and improve the faculties of his reader. In this point of view we

should be apt to pronounce that romance was a bolder species of

composition than history.

It has been affirmed by the critics that the species of composition

which Abbe Prevost and others have attempted, and according to which,

upon a slight substratum of fact, all the license of romantic invention

is to be engrafted, is contrary to the principles of a just taste.

History is by this means debauched and corrupted. Real characters are

wantonly misrepresented. The reader, who has been interested by a

romance of this sort, scarcely knows how to dismiss it from his mind

when he comes to consider the genuine annals of the period of which it

relates. The reality and the fiction, like two substances of disagreeing

natures, will never adequately blend with each other. The invention of

the writer is much too wanton not to discolour and confound the facts

with which he is concerned; while on the other hand, his imagination is

fettered and checked at every turn by facts that will not wholly

accommodate themselves to the colour of his piece, or the moral he would

adduce from it.”

These observations, which have been directed against the production of

historical romance, will be found not wholly inapplicable to those which

assume the graver and more authentic name of history. The reader will be

miserably deluded if, while he reads history, he suffers himself to

imagine that he is reading facts. Profound scholars are so well aware of

this, that, when they would study the history of any country, they pass

over the historians that have adorned and decorated the facts, and

proceed at once to the naked and scattered materials, out of which the

historian constructed his work. This they do, that they may investigate

the story for themselves; or, more accurately speaking, that each man,

instead of resting in the inventions of another, may invest his history

for himself, and possess his creed as he possesses his property, single

and incommunicable.

Philosophers, we are told, have been accustomed by old prescription to

blunder in the dark; but there is perhaps no darkness, if we consider

the case maturely, so complete as that of the historian. It is a trite

observation, to say that the true history of a public transaction is

never known till many years after the event. The places, the dates,

those things which immediately meet the eye of the spectator, are indeed

as well known as they are ever likely to be. But the comments of the

actors come out afterwards; to what are we the wiser? Whitlock and

Clarendon,[11] who lived upon the spot, differ as much in their view of

the transactions, as Hume and the whig historians have since done. Yet

all are probably honest. If you be a superficial thinker, you will take

up with one or another of their representations, as best suits your

prejudices. But, if you are a profound one, you will see so many

incongruities and absurdities in all, as deeply to impress you with the

scepticism of history.

The man of taste and discrimination, who has properly weighed these

causes, will be apt to exclaim, “Dismiss me from the falsehood and

impossibility of history, and deliver me over to the reality of

romance.”

The conjectures of the historian must be built upon a knowledge of the

characters of his personages. But we never know any man’s character. My

most intimate and sagacious friend continually misapprehends my motives.

He is in most cases a little worse judge of them than myself and I am

perpetually mistaken. The materials are abundant for the history of

Alexander, Caesar, Cicero and Queen Elizabeth. Yet how widely do the

best informed persons differ respecting them? Perhaps by all their

character is misrepresented. The conjectures therefore respecting their

motives in each particular transaction must be eternally fallacious. The

writer of romance stands in this respect upon higher ground. He must be

permitted, we should naturally suppose, to understand the character

which is the creature of his own fancy.

The writer of romance is to be considered as the writer of real history;

while he who was formerly called the historian, must be contented to

step down into the place of his rival, with this disadvantage, that he

is a romance writer, without the arduous, the enthusiastic and the

sublime licence of imagination, that belong to that species of

composition. True history consists in a delineation of consistent, human

character, in a display of the manner in which such a character acts

under successive circumstances, in showing how character increases and

assimilates new substances to its own, and how it decays, together with

the catastrophe into which by its own gravity it naturally declines.

There is however, after all, a deduction to be made from this eulogium

of the romance writer. To write romance is a task too great for the

powers of man, and under which he must be expected to totter. No man can

hold the rod so even, but that it will tremble and vary from its course.

To sketch a few bold outlines of character is no desperate undertaking;

but to tell precisely how such a person would act in a given situation,

requires a sagacity scarcely less than divine. We never conceive a

situation, or those minute shades in a character that would modify its

conduct. Naturalists tell us that a single grain of sand more or less on

the surface of the earth, would have altered its motion, and, in the

process of ages, have diversified its events. We have no reason to

suppose in this respect, that what is true in matter, it false in

morals.

Here then the historian in some degree, though imperfectly, seems to

recover his advantage upon the writer of romance. He indeed does not

understand the character he exhibits, but the events are taken out of

his hands and determined by the system of the universe, and therefore,

as far as his information extends, must be true. The romance writer, on

the other hand, is continually straining at a foresight to which his

faculties are incompetent, and continually fails. This is ludicrously

illustrated in those few romances which attempt to exhibit the

fictitious history of nations. That principle only which holds the

planets in their course, is competent to produce that majestic series of

events which characterises flux, and successive multitudes.

The result of the whole, is that the sciences and the arts of man are

alike imperfect, and almost infantine. He that will not examine the

collections and the efforts of man, till absurdity and folly are

extirpated among them, must be contented to remain in ignorance, and

wait for the state, where he expects that faith will give place to

sight, and conjecture be swallowed up in knowledge.

[1] Archon: The Gnostic religion held that the cosmos were created by a

hierarchy of archons, or angelic powers subordinate to the Deity. The

archons were also the nine chief magistrates of ancient Athens.

[2] Olympiad: The period of four years measured between one Olympic

Games and the next, by which the ancient Greeks computed time, taking

776 BC as the first year of the first olympiad. (OED)

[3] Mithrades V, murdered in 123 BC and succeeded by his eleven-year-old

son Mithrades VI, later known as Mithrades “the Great” for his military

conquests.

[4] Joanna Baillie makes a very similar statement in the “Introductory

Discourse” of her Series of Plays...on the Passions (1798): ““Let us

understand, from observation or report, that any person harbours in his

breast, concealed from the world’s eye, some powerful rankling passion

of what kind soever it may be, we will observe every word, every motion,

every look, even the distant gait of such a man, with a constancy and

attention bestowed upon no other. Nay, should we meet him unexpectedly

on our way, a feeling will pass across our minds as though we found

ourselves in the neighborhood of some secret and fearful thing. If

invisible, would we not follow him into his lonely haunts, into his

closet, into the midnight silence of his chamber?” (11)

[5] Plutarch (46–120 AD): Biographer and philosopher, most famously

author of Parallel Lives.

[6] Thucydides (460–395 BC): Greek historian, most famously author of

History of the Peloponnesian War. Livy (59 BC — AD 17): Roman historian

noted for his history of Rome.

[7] David Hume (1711–76): Scottish philosopher and historian, noted for

A Treatise on Human Nature and his History of England, as well as other

books and essays. Voltaire (1694–1778): French philosopher of the

Enlightenment, author of Lettres Philosophiques and Candide. William

Robertson: Scottish historian, friend of Hume, Adam Smith, and prominent

member of Edinburgh group of thinkers usually gathered under the term

“the Scottish Enlightenment.”

[8] The so-called “Glorious” or “Bloodless” Revolution of 1688, which

set up a balance of power between the Crown and Parliament, effectively

setting up an oligarchy.

[9] Sallust (86–34 BC): Roman historian and statesman, author of

histories of the Catiline conspiracy and the Jugurtha War.

[10] Abbe Prevost (1697–1763): French novelist most famous for writing

historical romances.

[11] Bulstrode Whitelocke (1605–75): author of Memorials of the English

Affairs from the Beginning of the Reign of Charles I to the Happy

Restoration of Charles II (1682). Clarendon (Edward Hyde, 1609–74):

1^(st) Earl of Clarendon, chief advisor to Charles II and author of True

Historical Narrative of the Rebellion and Civil Wars of England

(1702–4).