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Title: Empire in Central Asia Author: Terry Clancy Date: March 2002 Language: en Topics: imperialism, Afghanistan, Russia, Iran, US foreign interventions Source: Retrieved on 16th December 2021 from http://struggle.ws/issues/war/afghan/pamwt/wt2/pipelines.html Notes: Terry Clancy lives in Ireland and writes for the Free Earth website. He is a member of the Anarchist Federation.
In the early 1990’s the last 19^(th) Century European empire crumbled.
The longest lasting, although ironically originally one of the weakest.
Just as other powers moved into the vacuum left by the relative
weakening of the old West European ones, so too today this is happening
with the decline of the Russian Empire.
The weakening of Russian power in what was it’s southern colonial empire
is opening up the way for other imperialisms. Central Asia and the
Caucasus, or the Caspian Region as it is also known, is a largely
forgotten corner of the world, but with all the ingredients of a new
Middle East, it may not be for much longer. Imperialist competition in
the region is centred around the exploitation of it’s considerable
resources of oil and gas, principally centred on the different costs and
benefits accruing to different factions of the ruling class from various
pipeline projects.
Firstly I’m going to look at those, before turning to look at the
interests and goals of three different players in the carve up of
Central Asia: Iran, the United States and Russia (others include Turkey,
the E.U. and China but restrictions of time and space work against a
full exploration).
The principal energy resources in the Caspian Region are to be found in
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. All three states are
essentially landlocked, the Caspian sea being an inland sea with no
connection to the oceans. As a result, a major aspect of the
international competition over the exploitation of these resources is
the struggle over which route to take to the sea and the global market.
There are a number of options, each with their own advocates and each
reflecting rival agendas.
The Northern Route (via Russia): The Northern route would consist of an
upgrading of the existing Kazak and Russian pipeline systems, plus a new
one linking Baku in Azerbaijan with the Russian port of Novorossisk on
the Black Sea. Obviously this is the option favoured by the Russian
rulers, as it maintains their dominance of Central Asia and provides a
source of revenue to them.
The Southern Route (via Iran): From a purely practical point of view
this is the most sensible option, with the shortest distance as it is
able to plug into the Iranian pipeline system and it provides access to
the growing South Asian market. Opposed by the United States, both
because of that state’s hostility to Iran and because it doesn’t
represent a diversification of energy sources — which is a U.S. goal we
will be returning to. Nonetheless this is the only one of the new routes
which is actually up and running.
The Eastern Route (via China): The longest and most expensive route but
favoured by the Chinese government, and being developed by them, it also
allows them to exploit the resources in their western provinces.
The Western Route (via Turkey): This is favoured by Turkey, the United
States and Israel. There are three options here; firstly a pipeline to
the port of Suspa in Georgia and then through the Bosporus straits to
Europe. The Turkish claim is that the straits will not be able to handle
the increased amount of shipping and propose instead a pipeline from
Azerbaijan to Ceyhan on Turkey’s Mediterranean coast. The high costs of
this proposal have promoted an alternative American plan to bypass the
Bosporus straits with a pipeline going through Bulgaria and Greece.
The South Eastern Route (via Afghanistan): This is the reason why in
years past Taliban hierarchs popped up in Texas and other unlikely
places. It has been argued that this proposal was a reason behind both
Osama Bin Laden’s war on the U.S. and the U.S. action in Afghanistan.
With the fall of the Taliban this route has again entered the running.
Note that it avoids Iran while delivering to the South Asian market,
which is much more promising than the European one.
Readers, not even with long memories, will notice the amount of armed
conflicts which have been found along these routes in recent years.
Russia, China and Turkey have been engaged in suppressing revolt along
their favoured routes, as well as of course the American intervention in
Afghanistan, and the Afghan civil war prior to that.
The Californian based UNOCAL energy corporation began it’s efforts to
establish pipelines transporting oil and gas through Afghanistan in
October 1995, the original idea was that of it’s Argentinean competitor
Bridas. Lack of financing, the decline in world oil prices in 1998, the
continuing civil strife in Afghanistan and the early phase of the
U.S.-Bin Laden conflict, all these came together and blocked the Afghan
pipeline project. However, the victory of American arms has changed the
situation.
U.S. based business magazine Forbes reports that with “the collapse of
the Taliban, oil executives are suddenly talking again about building
it.”
“It is absolutely essential that the U.S. make the pipeline the
centerpiece of rebuilding Afghanistan,’ says S. Rob Sobhani, a professor
of foreign relations at Georgetown University and the head of Caspian
Energy Consulting.”
“The State Department thinks it’s a great idea, too. Routing the gas
through Iran would be avoided, and Central Asian republics wouldn’t have
to ship through Russian pipelines” [1]
Furthermore on the 9^(th) of February the Irish Times carried an agency
story outlining a pipeline co-operation deal between the Pakistani
military dictatorship and the new Afghan government:
“Pakistani President, Gen Pervez Musharraf, and the Afghan interim
leader, Mr Hamid Karzai, agreed yesterday that their two countries
should develop “mutual brotherly relations” and co-operate “in all
spheres of activity” — including a proposed gas pipeline from Central
Asia to Pakistan via Afghanistan.” [2]
“Iran’s interests are briefly to getting the Caspian and Central Asian
oil to the Gulf and establish close political and economic ties with the
region. First, Iran has a desperate need for foreign exchange and would
benefit from oil and gas transit fees.
Second, with oil and gas transit, Iran would be in a better position to
develop trade with the region. Central Asia could eventually become an
important market for Iranian manufactured goods. In turn the combination
of oil and gas transit and trade could establish Iran as regional power
in Central Asia.
Third, with oil transiting from Central Asia to Iranian Gulf ports, Iran
would strengthen its position in the Gulf, essentially in relation to
Saudi-Arabia, potentially also in relation to Iraq. Emerging as a
Central Asian power would also reinforce Iran’s position in relation to
the Gulf neighbours.” [3]
American opposition to the Iranian route is based on a number of
factors. Principally and most importantly; the Iranian revolution of
1979 was a challenge and remains such from the point of view that it is
the so-called ‘Threat of a Good Example’. What this means is essentially
it is an ever present reminder that it is possible to break out of
neo-colonial domination, or at least try to, such states must be
isolated, obstructed, and attacked whenever possible. [4]
This is in the long term collective interests of the American ruling
class for the simple reason that if it tolerated Iran, given the popular
alienation from the ruling authorities in the Middle East, and given the
region’s long history of nationalist and quasi-nationalist revolt, it
would only be an encouragement for others to follow the Iranian example.
Such a course would, in the long run, be possibly fatal for the profits
of the American banks and arms companies who do so much business with
the Arab elite. Nationalist regimes would be more concerned with
developing a native industrial base.
Also, in the particular case of the Middle East, loss of American
influence would also mean a loss of some American influence over Japan
and Europe (the places which actually are dependant on Middle Eastern
oil — unlike the U.S.). Thus in the last twenty odd years Iran has been
both directly attacked by the United States and as well as by Iraq with
U.S. support.
The problem is that it is in the short term, individual interests of
U.S. companies (not to mention French ones, Japanese etc..) to trade
with Iran and indeed use the opportunity offered by the Iranian route to
export Central Asian energy resources to South Asia. Furthermore it is
in the interests of the governments of the Central Asian republics to do
so. The Iranian option simply makes the best economic sense, all the
more so because it already exists. Unless an alternative is developed,
market forces will compel companies to develop the resources of Central
Asia via Iran. Thus it is imperative for the U.S. Government to
facilitate an alternative pipeline to the Indian and Pakistani markets.
Fortunately for them they have just radically altered the political
landscape of Afghanistan. For the civil war in Afghanistan was a major
barrier to constructing the only possible pipeline which could deliver
straight to the South Asian market while avoiding Iran.
However as we have seen, the potential for proxy war very much remains
in Afghanistan, as does the potential for limited insurgency by Taliban
remnants. The potential for the former is underscored by the opportunity
presented to the rulers of Iran by the oil and gas of the Caspian
region. Not to mention the threat presented to them by what would amount
to, if reported American plans for Iraq go ahead and are successful, an
American encirclement, with a client regime to the east in Afghanistan
and to the west in Iraq.
So we have seen Iran exploiting the power vacuum in post-Taliban
Afghanistan and possible American missile strikes on Iran’s Afghan
proxies. Expect in the very least to hear much more ranting like “The
Axis of Evil” and “The Great Satan”.
“when the Afghan conflict is over we will not leave Central Asia. We
have long term plans and interests in this region.” [5]
— U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Elizabeth Jones.
The central objectives of American Imperialism in this region include:
diversify global energy production and thereby reduce the power of oil
states.
corporations.
The document “U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central
Asia” outlines these goals and was published by the Strategic Studies
Institute of the U.S. Army War College. Some extracts from it serve to
illustrate the U.S. interests and activities in the area:
“The 1998 National Security Strategy states why this region is important
to the United States. It has estimated reserves of 160 billion barrels
of oil, comparably large natural gas reserves, and will play an
increasingly important role in satisfying the world’s future energy
demands.”
“U.S. officials publicly maintain that this region’s energy sources
could be a back up to the unstable Persian Gulf and allow us and our
allies to reduce our dependence on its energy supplies. In pursuit of
this goal we have worked to establish governments with open markets,
i.e., openness to U.S. firms (and not only those associated with energy)
and democracy.
We have also moved to check any possibility of their one-sided military
dependence upon Russia. The determination to prevent either Moscow or
Tehran from dominating the area, either in energy, or through
penetration and control of their defence structures goes back at least
to 1994.”
A few pages later and the rhetoric of promoting democracy is admitted to
be rhetoric:
“In practise, energy and security have dominated the agenda as the means
to achieve this broader Westernisation to the point that evidently
little pressure is being directed towards democratisation of local
governments.”
In fact foreign imperialism, be it Russian or American, is marching hand
in hand with local despotism, as is always the case. The document then
turns to the military aspects of these policies:
“the oil producing states are now members of the PfP [Partnership for
“Peace” — N.A.T.O. front organisation — FE], and Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
and Georgia overtly seek NATO’s direct participation in the area, the
U.S. or Western contest with Russia and Iran has assumed a more openly
military aspect.”
“This stimulates an equal and opposing reaction. Armenian officials
proclaim the vital importance of joint exercises with Russia to defend
Armenia’s security and talk of an ‘axis’ with Russia and Iran.
Consequently and due to the spiralling strategic stakes in the
Transcaspian, NATO’s collective engagement, as well as the specifically
U.S. engagement, with the region is likely to grow.”
“In September 1995, U.S. experts on Central Asia met at NATO
headquarters and cited the extensive U.S. interests in Caspian energy
deposits as a reason why Washington might have to extend its Persian
Gulf security guarantees to this region. [6]
U.S. involvement has only taken off since then. While U.S. officials
intone visions of a win-win situation for everyone, where everyone has
shared interests in developing these energy markets, they have really
aimed to deny and break Russia’s monopoly over the energy producing
states.”
“Russia could sabotage many if not all of the forthcoming energy
projects by relatively simple and tested means and there is not much we
could do absent a strong and lasting regional commitment. Therefore, for
a win-win situation to come about, some external factor must be
permanently engaged and willing to commit even military forces, if need
be, to ensure stability and peace.
This does not necessarily mean a unilateral commitment, but more likely
a multilateral one, e.g., under the U.N.‘s auspices but actually under
U.S. leadership. Without such a permanent presence, and it is highly
unlikely that the United States can afford or will choose to make such a
presence felt, other than through economic investment, Russia will be
able to exclude all other rivals and regain hegemony over the area.” [7]
Well that was published in June 2000, a year and a half later and the
United States does have military bases in Central Asia, and has just
moved into Georgia in the Caucasus — also on a potential pipeline route
(The Western, via Turkey one). September 11^(th) has spectacularly
increased the potency of the American military by effectively defusing
the American public’s long standing opposition to foreign military
adventures.
Yes the last two decades has seen lots of those, but always in forms
calculated to minimise a public opinion backlash at home. Some examples,
covert action (Nicaragua), military support to proxies (El Salvador,
Columbia), overwhelming force in ideal territory (Iraq), air war
(Serbia) or simply actions against opponents without the slightest
chance of putting up effective resistance (Granada). We should not doubt
that American militarism has moved up a gear or two.
These areas were incorporated into the Russian Empire in the 19^(th)
Century, with the intent of protecting trade routes and using them as a
bargaining chip with the British Empire. Under both Tsarism and
Bolshevism a classically colonial pattern of development was put into
place. While Azerbaijan was an oil producer [8] the Central Asian
republics were generally under a mono-culture/cash crop system of cotton
production, and in both cases had unequal trade relations with the
metropolis. The exception is the northern part of Kazakhstan, adjoining
Russia, which was industrialised, with a workforce largely of Slavic
origins.
This colonial dependence persisted following the break up of the
“Soviet” Union, while Kazakhstan’s trade with Russia accounts for 42.5%
of the G.D.P. of that country — trade with Kazakhstan is a mere 1.7% of
that of Russia. Kazakhstan is actually dependant on Russia for it’s
energy supplies, as all the infrastructure was developed in the “Soviet”
period running north-south, rather than west-east from Kazakhstan’s oil
fields to it’s urban centres. [9]
The fact that exports must go through Russia provides a further
stranglehold. As with economy so with security and a number of these
states — Armenia and Tajikistan in particular, have been forced to lean
on Russia for military support, for the lack of an alternative power.
However Kremlin influence is not what it once was, due to the Russian
economic situation, and because of, the, generally speaking,
post-independence eagerness for real independence on the part of local
elites. There is insufficient capital in Russia for investments in and
loans to the new States on a level with that of outside interests. Thus
there are now American, Chinese, Turkish, South Korean, European,
Iranian interests in the region. The arrival of multinational
corporations is actually to the Russian benefit as these provide the
investments necessary to develop the exploitation of resources, which
can then provide revenues to the Russian “elite” due to their control of
the export routes. Plus that control can be used as leverage for Russian
companies to muscle their way into the energy consortiums developing the
region.
Since the U.S. turned against the Taliban there has been a community of
interest between the two powers in regard to the destruction of the
Taliban. The Russian esablishment has long feared the ‘Talibanisation’
of Central Asia as it’s border with Kazakhstan is porous, there are
considerable ethnic Russian populations in these states, as well as
Muslim minorities in Russia itself.
Nevertheless Putin’s U.S. friendly policy is not without it’s detractors
in Moscow. On February 21^(st) a group of former military chieftains,
including a former defence minister, launched a literary attack on the
Russian president, claiming that:
“With your blessing, the United States has received military bases in
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Stan, and, maybe, Kazakhstan.
“In the long run, these bases are for dealing a strike against Russia,
not Bin Laden ...We would not be surprised if tomorrow they call you the
best American, European or NATO official.” [10]
Since the break up of the “Soviet” Union there have been a number of
Russian military interventions in the region. The Russian army has
popped up in Georgia and Armenia and still has a presence in Tajikistan,
but have been removed from Turkmenistan and Kyrgyz Stan. Furthermore in
the early 1990’s Russia backed Armenia in it’s dispute with Turkish
backed Azerbaijan. Not to forget the long running conflict in Chechnya
(it self on the Russian favoured pipeline route from Azerbaijan).
The American military presence is something of a new development. The
interests of the Russian ‘elite’ in the area are in maintaining it’s
influence over economic development, so it can have it’s cut. Along with
this, in the future Russian energy needs are likely to expand and so the
Caspian region, as it stands now, could provide a cheap source.
They have formed a body for maintaining co-operative relations with
China, which like the U.S. is a new player in the region, called the
Shanghai Co-Operation Council and have forged a relationship with Iran,
particularly in regard to disputes over territorial rights in the
Caspian sea, the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict, and in supporting the
Northern Alliance against the Taliban. This has lead “Some observers to
warn” of a “growing similarity of interests among Russia, Iran and China
in countering the West and attempting to increase their own
influence”.[11]
Those are the words of a briefing paper produced by American civil
servants for Congressmen. However the Russian establishment is divided.
According to New Delhi based research group the Institute for Defence
Study and Analysis:
“It is believed that a difference of opinion exists in present day
Russia regarding its future course in response to the US geo-political
challenge. The “imperialists” and the “traditionalists” would like
Russia to dig in its heels in defence of its historical positions in the
region.
The “pragmatists” or the “realists”, who include Russia’s major oil and
gas companies, would like to adjust to the changing geo-political
realities in return for a share in the region’s lucrative oil and gas
deals. It appears that the country’s policy-making establishment, in the
pursuit of perceived national interests, is constantly synthesising the
differing views among the Russian political class and strategic
community.
Despite its current weakness, Russia still has the requisite force
projection capability in the region. Moreover, the proposed pipeline
by-passing Russia is likely to pass through conflict-ridden areas in the
former Soviet republics where Russia has established itself in the role
of a peace-keeper.
There are also reports that Russia has of late stepped up support to the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) which is behind the Kurdish insurgency in
eastern Turkey from where the proposed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline would pass.
Russian geo-politicians feels that as a consequence of its victory in
the Cold War, the USA has driven to the minimum Russian influence in the
Baltic and Black Seas.
It has forced Russia out of the zone of the warm seasthe Indian
Oceanwith the loss of Central Asia and Transcaucasus. Making use of the
CARs’[Central Asian Republics] desire to assert their independence from
Moscow, it is seeking to irrevocably change the geo-political equations
in the region. It seems to them that Russia can protect its vital
interests in Central Asia in partnership with Iran and China against
Western machinations and designs.” [12]
Just as within Afghanistan rival warlords compete for control over road
tolls, smuggling, and heroin production, so to on a world level is the
same process at work, on a larger scale. State power is the
representative of economic power, and rival states carve up resources
and markets in perpetual competition, in doing so representing the long
term collective interests of their national ruling class (rather than
short term interests of individual corporations).
While the buying of influence and individuals moving from political
office to the corporate boardroom (and back again) may show us aspects
of this process at work it is not it’s source. Rather the source is the
division of society into classes, with a ruling class based on control
over production. The state is the mechanism by which the ruling class
advances it’s interests both at home and overseas. At home against it’s
subjects, overseas against rival rulers.
It has been amply shown how imperialist competition fuelled the Northern
Alliance-Taliban war, and this is true of the earlier Afghan conflicts
also [13]. The Afghanistan situation then is not one of a “failed state”
but one of successful states (Russia, Iran, Pakistan, the United States)
and rather being an aberration is the by-product of the competition
between hierarchies intrinsic to the world capitalist system.
[1]
[2] ‘Irish Times’ 09/02/02
[3] ‘Oil in the Caspian Region and Central Asia — the Political Risk of
the Great Game Continued’ By Øystein Noreng
[4] This phraseThreat of a Good Example was coined in the 80s to
describe the Sandinista Government in Nicaragua. I do not use it as a
gesture of “anti-imperialist” support to the murderous (and Imperialist)
regime in Iran, but rather in recognition that it’s existence as a state
born from the downfall of a American backed government is an example to
people who would like to do the same to other American clients in the
region and expel Western influence altogether. I think this is the case
irrespective of sectarian disputes within Islam and that it shapes the
American Imperialist attitude to Iran.
[5] Quoted in The Guardian 12/02/02
[6] “Persian Gulf security guarantees” would presumably, given the
situation in the Persian Gulf, involve a great deal of American military
intervention and a permanent military presence plus an attempt to
exclude/contain all other powers.
[7] ‘U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia’
[8] Abridged History of Central Asia by William M. Brinton
[9] Quoted in ‘The Guardian’ 22/02/02
[10] ‘CRS Issue Brief for Congress: Central Asia’s New States and
Implications for U.S. Interests’
[11] ‘Russian Policy Towards Central Asia, part 2’
[12] See the Human Rights Watch report ‘Afghanistan The Crisis of
Impunity’ for the Northern Alliance-Taliban war —
or ‘Silent Soldier: The Man behind the Afghan Jehad’ for the Pakistani
involvement in the ‘Soviet’-Islamist conflict of the 1980’s —
[13] Missing footnote.