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Title: The Anti-Caliph
Author: Peter Lamborn Wilson
Language: en
Topics: islam
Source: Retrieved on 17th May 2021 from https://hermetic.com/bey/anticaliph

Peter Lamborn Wilson

The Anti-Caliph

I.

and Khezr, the Hidden Prophet, the Green Man, King of Hyperborea, wily

servant of Moses, trickster-cook of Alexander, Khezr who drank from the

fountain of life in the Land of Darkness. Flowers and herbs spring trp

in his footsteps, and he strolls across the water, walking toward Ibn

‘Arabi’s ship, coming closer; his green robe trailing on green waves —

or perhaps woven of waves. Or Khezr appears in the desert with water and

initiation for the masterless ones, the mad and blameworthy, the unique

ones… ‘And three things of this life are worthy of the glance: water,

green things, and a beautiful face…’

and the Hidden Imam who vanished into a cave, perhaps in Samarra,

perhaps in Yemen, who lives beyond the Isthmus of Similitudes in the

midst of the sea of Images, on an island all of emerald, with trees of’

emerald and flowers of green beryl, palaces of jasper and jade — the

young man dressed in black, who appears in dreams to alchemists, who

initiates in dreams…

and Ovays al-Qarani, hermit of the Yemen who met the Prophet — but only

in dreams — who upheld the Household of All — who appears to the

masterless ones in dreams and initiates them into the Order of the

Ovaysiyya.

II. The Silsilah

Sohrawardi al Magtul, who was executed for heresy, established for

himself a silsilah or Initiatic Chain, consisting of teachers whom he

met in visions or dreams — that is, in the Imaginal Realm. Here then

follows a list in no particular order, of names each of which

constitutes a link in such a chain — Imaginal or imaginary…

Truth’, defender of Satan as ‘the perfect lover and unitarian’,

supporter of the Zinjarite Black Slave Rebellion, condemned to the

gibbet on a warrant signed by his own sufi master;

wine’;

would be idol-worshippers’;

poets of Witness Play or ‘contemplation of the Beardless’;

dervishes and hasheesheen;

Assassins; and his descendant Hassan II ‘On Whose Mention Be Peace’, who

declared that ‘the Chains of the Law have been broken’;

alchemy and ordered that day be turned to night and night to day in

Cairo, who vanished into the desert;

Wayang Kulit Shadow Puppet play, based on the Hindu epics;

for playing the call to Prayer on his sehtar;

writing love poems to a fourteen-year-old girl, founder of the School of

the Oneness of Being.

By invoking each of these figures to bestow a particular baraka on the

present undertaking, enough will have been said to those who are

familiar with their names, that what follows will be almost superfluous.

One meets these shaykhs by pilgrimages to their tombs, or to their books

(for cenotaphs and divans are both square dead objects which may seem to

hold living spirits) — or in visions, or dreams — and virtually

everything we might say here is already swallowed up by their presence.

‘Catastrophe Theory’ in science deals with sudden and drastic changes in

some feature of a system, such as the earth’s crust, or human society.

In popular usage the word catastrophe has ‘bad’ connotations, but some

sudden changes may well be experienced as positive. Revelation itself

might be called a catastrophe. Mystical insight or Wisdom (hikmah) can

also work catastrophically on the system known as human consciousness.

Scholars generally limit themselves to descriptions of change while

mystics and poets prefer to participate in or even to precipitate

catastrophes of consciousness. What follows can be classified neither as

scholarship nor mystical poetry; it is rather a prolegomena to a study

of certain catastrophic potentialities in the teachings of Ibn ‘Arabi

and the heretical tradition. Here we are concerned neither with facts

nor with poetry per se, but with poetic facts - bits of information

which, at a certain density, may cause a sudden breakthrough or

catastrophic breakdown of the border between ordinary consciousness and

the alam-i khyyal or World of Imagination.

What follows is almost more story than scholarly text — the idea of

‘fiction’ will help provide an appropriate bezel for our shadowy

confusion, hyperbole and rhetoric, palpable orientalismo, scandalous and

unfounded assertions. This text may push itself toward the edge of

discourse, in danger of a Humpty-Dumpty-like crash into totally

arbitrary semantics (‘words mean what I want them to mean!’). As one of

the Persian poets (Salman Savaji) said:

Who does not know my bad reputation? like a bath-tub fallen off the

roof!

III. Ibn ‘Arabi and the Heretics

In the long and beautiful introduction to his Creative Imagination in

the Sufism of Ibn ‘Arabi, the late Henry Corbin summarized, in effect,

an idiosyncratic philosophy of ‘Oriental Wisdom’ which illuminated all

his writing. This essay presents itself as rooted in a tradition: Corbin

mentions all his favourite figures (many of the same listed in the

‘silsilah’ of the present text as well). Corbin’s essay focusses on

certain events in the biography of the Shaykh al-Akbar, but Corbin’s

sub-text is in fact his own spiritual autobiography. As he says, he has

lived certain events, temporal and a- temporal, historical and

spiritual. The ta’vil in this context serves as more than a tool of the

intellect or even of the Imagination: like a bathysphere, it offers to

plunge the entire self, body included, into the depths — a Catastrophe

Machine!

One of these events, Ibn ‘Arabi’s birthday, provokes in Corbin an

indulgence in sheer occult synchronicity, the celebration of a

coincidence which assumed for him an archetypal importance. According to

the lunar calendar, this birthday (17 Ramazan 560/July 28, 1165) marked

the first anniversary of the proclamation of the Great Resurrection at

Alamut (17 Ramazan 559/August 8, 1164). Corbin’s exquisite hagiography

invites us to meditate on this double anniversary, this holiday, but

does not stop to explain why. A clue has been offered, or perhaps one of

Corbin’s obsessions has briefly and rather mysteriously surfaced. What

was the Great Resurrection and what connection might it have with lbn

‘Arabi beside a happenstance of dating?

Corbin himself had plenty to say on the subject in other books, which

cannot be too highly recommended. Here however a somewhat different

slant is proposed, one based on the literal significance of the Great

Resurrection of Ruz-i Qiyamat. In brief, Hassan 11, the Ismaili Pir of

Alamut, proclaimed on this day a general esoteric abrogation of the

Shariah. The veil of dissimulation (tagiyya) was lifted from the letter

of the Law, and its outer form was shattered. ‘The Chains of the Law

have been broken.’ The uncovering of the inner meaning of Revelation

results in a benign reversal of its outward symbolism; those who

participate in this gnosis are freed from both the, literal meaning and

the legal stipulations of organized religion. In both senses of the word

they have broken the code. The Ismailis (or ‘Assassins’) of Alamut

signalled this general amnesty from the tyranny of Exoteric Authority by

drinking wine for lunch in the middle of Ramazan: thus they broke their

Fast forever.

Outward Islam must of necessity view the Qiyamat as antinomian,

heretical and revolutionary — and indeed it did so, with good reason. No

doubt, as Corbin emphasizes, Ismailism was primarily gnosis, Oriental

Wisdom — but it also acted with overt militancy and stealthy terror to

propagandize itself. In Islamdom, where politics and religion form parts

of a seamless life and culture, ‘heresy’ works as both critique and

polemic, as discourse and as war. Heresy speaks the same language as its

surrounding culture but insists that certain words possess a

catastrophic significance: hidden meanings capable of transforming an

entire world suddenly from within itself, like a self-resurrecting

phoenix.

The Qiyamat, then, represents a radical break with institutional, ritual

and traditional Islam — a rupture which cannot be attributed to lbn

‘Arabi. His autobiographical writings bear witness to a classical sufi

intention to intensify the ritual aspect of Islam as part of his

practical path. Nevertheless, the hyper-orthodox have always looked on

the Shaykh as somehow risky, if not downright suspect.

For example, while living in Egypt he published his Interpreter of

Desires, a book of poems celebrating his love for a young girl he met

while circumambulating the Kaaba in Mecca. The local ulema smelled

blasphemy; lbn ‘Arabi hastily removed himself to Syria — and we can

thank the outraged mullahs for inspiring his next work, the Interpreter

of the Interpreter, in which he defends his erotic-mystical ambiguities

with dazzling scholasticism. Centuries later (a few years ago) Ibn

‘Arabi was again in trouble in Egypt: the Muslim Brotherhood and other

reactionaries inspired a law banning publication of his Meccan

Revelations. And scholars like Fazlur Rahman still blame him for the

ruination of orthodox sufism.

Ibn ‘Arabi’s continental mass, so to speak, covers too much territory to

fit on any single map. His writings have been used to bolster up the

most impeccably orthodox mysticism — as in the North African sufi

orders, for example — as well as many other types of Islamic

esotericism, some not so orthodox. Treatises such as the R. al-ahadiyya

(on the hadith ‘Whoso knoweth his Lord’), which present a pure and

radical monism, might well serve the outlaw purposes of Ismaili

metaphysicians. Indeed, Corbin shows that Ismailis did make such use of

Ibn ‘Arabi’s teachings on ta’vil, the Perfect Man, the Oneness of Being,

etc. The Nizaris of Alamut experienced the Great Resurrection as an

historical moment and as a mythic or Imaginal Archetype; what Ibn ‘Arabi

gave them was a new vocabulary with which to expand their exegesis of

the Qiyamat and its radical ramifications.

“I o the Persian poets the Shaykh bequeathed still another map, one

which begins its cartomantic project with texts like The Interpreter of

Desires, and the 28^(th) chapter of the Fusus al-hikam (on the hadith

“Three things of this world are made worthy of love to tile: women,

perfume and prayer’). Here Love is declared the equivalent or perhaps

superior of religion; the human beloved becomes a Witness (shahed), a

Theophany of the Real. Again, the poets received from Ibn ‘Arabi a

language of discourse with which to expand their comprehension of a

complex already central to their very being: eros, desire, and the

borderland between erotic and mystical consciousness.

Out of such speculation arose a spiritual practice, the ‘Witness Game’,

which uses Imaginal Yoga to transmute erotic desire into spiritual

consciousness. The means include poetic and musical improvisation,

dance, and ‘gazing’ chastely at beautiful boys (whence the practice was

also known as ‘Contemplation of the heartless’),

This teaching was perfected in the centuries after Ibn ‘Arabi’s death by

a series of gifted poets closely associated with his School — Fakhroddin

Iraqi, Awhadoddin Kermani and Abdul Rahman Jami, to name three of the

best-known. Without specific reference to the Witness Game, other poets

such as Mahmud Shabistari and Shah Nematollah Vali synthesized Ibn

‘Arabi’s metaphysics with a general poetic and romantic symbolism. All

this together constitutes what can be called a Persian ‘School of Love’

within the general context of a School of wahdat al-wujud.

Needless to say, although the poets of the Witness Game followed the

letter of the Shariah and its sexual code, their dangerous game of

Sublimation was condemned as rank heresy by such as Ibn Taymiyya, who

complained, ‘They kiss a slave boy and claim to have seen God!’ However

orthodox (or not) the sufis might have been in their private lives,

their poetry has given much aid and comfort to ‘real heretics’ like the

Ismailis, who would of course take quite literally such lines as

Iraqi’s:

Forget the Kaaba:

The vintner’s gates are open!

Despite the protests of scholars like lvanov and even Corbin, the later

(post-Alamut) lsmailis did not adopt Persian dervishi sufism simply as a

mask. They incorporated such poets as Shabastari and Shah Nematollah

wholesale into their grand synthesis, just as they did with Ibn ‘Arabi’s

more austere metaphysics.

In mapping Ibn ‘Arabi’s influence on the heretical tradition, we see his

language (or landmarks) taken up by erudite cosmopolitan

philosopher-rebels and erudite aesthetical/emotional sufi poets. But as

this synthesis moves Eastward from Andalusia through Egypt and Persia,

it begins to acquire a more popular and cultic aspect as well. Shi’ite

sectarians such as the Qizilbashi, Hurufi, Alevi, Bektashi, Ahl-i Haqq,,

Ali Hahi, Kakhsari, Ovaysi — and the Shi’ite alchemists — all inherit

something of the basic mix. In Afghanistan and North India the tradition

includes the so-called Lawless (bi-shahr) dervish orders such as the

Qalandars, the transvestite dancers and hashish-maulangs, heterodox sufi

orders such as the Shattariyya (‘Rapid Way’) and certain offshoots of

the Sohrawardiyya; also syncretistic sects such as the Emperor Akbar’s

Din-i Hahi, as well as various folkish combinations of Ismailism,

Tantrik Hinduism, Bakhti yoga, millenarian Shi’ism and dervish madness.

All these names are dropped not merely to disturb the mystico-academic

dust but to point toward a project; a tradition has been invoked, but

only in order to ask of it whether it still lives, whether it still

possesses a practical and soteriological (or ‘salvific’) vitality. Let

us imagine that this tradition, which is no longer to be identified only

with lbn ‘Arabi, might be somehow personified or poeticized. Call it

‘The Anti-Caliph’, with reference to its heretical antecedents and in

honour of the Fatimid Ismaili ‘Anti-Caliphs’ of Egypt such as Hakim

Billah the alchemist whose name, ‘the Wise’, echoes the theme of our

conference. This fictional character, the Anti-Caliph, who is also a

text, will stand for our Imaginal reliving of the tradition it evokes.

The Anti-Caliph will exist only within the confines of this text, where

it will act as an oracle, answering certain questions about the past,

present and future. The Anti-Caliph may well be antinomian, heretical,

mad, ‘blameworthy’ — but it demands recognition for its own ‘traditional

authority’, and phrases all its answer$ in reference to its own

authentic and coherent past.

We want to know the meaning of that past, but even more — if we can

perform a little hermeneutic phenomenology and live at least for an hour

within the Anti-Caliph’s world — we will demand to know what it can

teach us here on this most mysterious of planes (‘everyday life’) at

this most precious of moments, the present. When the text is read, we

can allow it to slip back into the Imaginal World again — and perhaps

retain from it a few poetic facts.

IV. Cyclic Time

For lsmailism, history takes place in cycles. This is a way of valuating

Time, of symbolizing the way in which meaning penetrates Time. But

Ismailis do not emphasize decline (as in the myth of the Ages of Gold,

Silver, Bronze and Lead) so much as simply change itself. For the

conservative mind things always get worse: perfection lies in the Golden

past. The radical views matters in a more complex way: the past englobes

a certain primordiality, origins and revelations, but time can also

present certain unfoldings, processes or progressions. The modern notion

of ‘progress’ has nothing to do with this unfolding; a cyclic conception

of time admits no omega points, no ultimate perfections either in the

past or future.

Each sub-cycle in Ismaili gnosis is ‘ruled’ by a prophet, who represents

the outward aspect of revelation, and a saint (or asas, whence

‘assassins’), who represents the inner. Moses, for example, brought the

Law — Aaron taught its esoteric significance. Jesus spoke in parables —

John the Baptist (or some other gnostic figure) unveiled their hidden

meaning to the Elect. Mohammed brought the Koran and Shariah; Ali

embodied their secret significance.

Orthodox Islam claims — like all established religions — to be the final

cycle of revelation. To recognise a prophet after Mohammed is therefore

to cease to be a moslem. Ismailis accept this, but they maintain that

the cycle of prophecy has been replaced by the cycle of esoteric

interpreters: All and the Household. In one sense, this represents not a

decline in the spiritual quality of time, but rather an advance, or at

least a wonderful chance: the inner meaning of revelation formerly

taught only to the Elect will become the outer path accessible to all.

Time turns inside out, Revelation and Law disgorge meanings so hidden

they seem to turn the very words and ordinances on their heads, to make

them their opposites — ‘benign inversion’.

For the Ismailis this unfolding begins with Ali, passes on to the first

six Shi’ite Imams, then from Jafar al-Sadeq to his son Ismail, the

seventh Imam — thence to the Egyptian ‘Anti-Caliphs’, the Fatimid

dynasty.

The Fatimids believed their caliphs to be blood descendants of Ali and

the Prophet through Fatima’s line: these were the Imams, rulers of the

secular world and simultaneously of the spiritual world: king/saints.

The higher-ranking initiates were taught the esoteric secrets of

Ismailism but outwardly the Shariah was still followed. For the inner

circle, this outward conformity was called tagiyya or ‘permissible

dissimulation’; the Fatimid dais or missionaries (such as Nasir-i

Khusraw) were also permitted to practice tagiyya, pretending to be Sunni

or Orthodox Shi’ite when necessary.

The Persian or Nizari Ismailis, the so-called Assassins, split away from

the Fatimids originally over a question of legitimacy — i.e. of

succession to the Caliphate/Imamate. Here looms up a confusing issue:

the present day Aga Khan, head of the Nizari Ismailis, claims actual

blood-descent from the Fatimid Pretender Nizar, who in turn claimed

blood-descent from Ali. The Nizaris maintain that their founder, the

notorious Hassan-i Sabbah, secretly spirited out of Cairo the infant son

of Nizar, took him to Alamut and raised him in secrecy. This very hidden

Imam married and had a son who married and had a son (a secret process

involving various cradle-substitutions and devious strategems of

byzantine complexity) who was Hassan II ‘ala dhikrihi’s-salam, ‘Upon

Whose Mention Be Peace’, the proclaimer of the Qiyamat in 1164.

According to the Aga Khans, the abrogation of the Shariah thus coincided

with the open manifestation of the blood-legitimate Imam. This claim,

incidentally, was upheld by a 19^(th) century British court in Bombay.

Since the Mongols burned the great library at Alamut, Ismaili history

yawns with lacunae. No real evidence exists to support the story of

Nizar’s infant son. Some historians believe these claims of legitimacy

to be later fabrications. But who would have fomented such a hoax?

Hassan-i Sabbah? Apparently he preached only in the name of the murdered

Pretender Nizar, and never mentioned any rescued infant. Was the hoaxer

then Hassan II, Master of the Qiyamat? No. In the earliest descriptions

of the Qiyamat, he presents himself as speaking on behalf of the Imam.

Apparently only after- his violent death — a few years after the Qiyamat

— was he openly proclaimed Imam.

These vexing historical problems must be addressed if the true nature of

the Qiyamat is to be uncovered. Corbin believed, with justification,

that the Qiyamat was a purely esoteric event, and had nothing whatsoever

to do with legitimacy. He felt that the later blood-line claims

constituted in effect a betrayal of the Qiyamat’s deepest sense, an

attempt to force pure free spirit into the forms of dogma, cult and

history.

In opposition to the concept of blood-legitimacy Corbin emphasizes that

of adoption on the spiritual plane, the initiatic vision which can link

two souls as kin, even though they be separated in time, space and

genetics. Moreover, Corbin introduces the typically Ismaili concept of

‘the Imam -of-one’s-own-being’: whoever has gnosis of self has gnosis of

the archetypal Imam and in effect ‘becomes’ the Imam.. In Corbin’s

hypothesis, such a theophanic vision allowed Hassan II to speak ‘on

behalf of’ the Imam, to lift the veil of tagiyya forever and for all

gnostics, to abrogate the Shariah and proclaim its hidden meanings.

Indeed, even if the Qa’im or Saheb-i Qiyamat had spoken of himself as

the Imam, he could have done so with perfect right according to the

doctrines of spiritual adoption and the realization of the inner Imam.

An event such as the Qiyamat consists of an intersection between history

and the timeless ‘Nowever’; to drag it down to the level of blood again

is to ruin it. In a sense, anyone can be the Imam; in a sense, everyone

already is the Imam.

With all respect to the Aga Khans (especially the third, that bon vivant

and gambler who gave away his weight in diamonds, and wrote a gem-like

treatise on Hafez) the present text prefers to follow the Corbinian

version of the Qiyamat: a total opening-up of esoteric truth which

liberated its celebrants from all outward forms of authority, whether of

Revelation, Law — or blood.

Each adherent of the Qiyamat does not suddenly and miraculously become a

perfect saint. But the chains of Law have been broken for all who adhere

and hear, for all who know. A new Cycle has been inaugurated; those who

realize it are in it; time has a different value for them. Within this

Cycle of course different seekers attain different degrees of

realization. However, for each one the path now begins with esoteric

interpretation (ta’vil). The meanings of. Koran and Shariah are now

interiorized as a first step.

Prayer becomes any process or act which serves to open the conscious

self to the Imam-of-one’s-own-being;

Fasting becomes the avoidance of anything which impedes this enlargement

of awareness;

Pilgrimage signifies major efforts to unify individual consciousness

with its ultimate manifestation as the Self;

Belief in Allah, Prophets and Angels means the esoteric understanding of

theology as symbolic;

Almsgiving means generosity of self, the open interdependence and mutual

realization of all life (especially consciousness, which can be given

and shared);

Justice (the ‘Sixth Pillar’ of Shi’ism) means the simultaneous

realisation of the Self in oneself and in others, in all life, and

giving it its due in every situation;

The Last Judgement means Resurrection Day as taught by Pir Hassan II.

Hell and Heaven are seen as present and interior states; eschatology in

its literal sense is either denied or ignored.

This new Cycle portends upheavals in politics as well as theology. If

every person is potentially the Imam, and partakes through the Qiyamat

directly in the Imam’s authority, then each individual is his or her own

ruler — a system which might be called paradoxical anarcho-monarchism!

We can scarcely imagine what this might have meant to the people of

Alamut, who in any case enjoyed no more than a few years of total

revolution. Hassan 11 was probably murdered by conservative elements

within the Ismaili community, unable to share his utopian vision.

But for this text — The Anti-Caliph - the Qiyamat signals the beginning

of a Cycle which is still in the process of unfolding. Following Corbin,

we can experience the Qiyamat in the alam-i mithal or Imaginal Plane,

and receive its gnosis direct and unmediated. The Qiyamat survives, and

we can participate in it.

Through it, the ‘Nowever’ remains always accessible; moreover, history

itself is now defined for us by our Qiyamat-consciousness. Thus we

appear as authentic interpreters of the Qiyamat, able to explain its

past and present unfolding, its ever-changing strategies, its

perpetually revolutionary energies.

For example: what would the Qiyamat today ‘say’ about… sexual

liberation? about the social revolution? about an authentic contemporary

spiritual path? Using these questions as examples, let us treat The

Anti-Caliph as a crystal ball, and entrance ourselves with Imaginings,

flashes of prismatic light.

V. Sexuality and Hermeneutics

Most antinomian sects have been accused of sexual license, polymorphous

and perverse, and many such cults have indeed practiced variations of

‘free love’. The Adamites and Families of Love took ‘no marriage in

heaven’ to mean no marriage here on earth, since for them the Millennium

had arrived. For Alamut also a Millennium had arrived, and although we

know almost nothing about love amongst the Assassins, we can easily

extrapolate. The Qiyamat philosophy leads logically to a contemporary

position outwardly similar to that held by the most radical of sexual

liberationists.

One of the commonest misapprehensions about antinomianism claims that it

causes (or is synonymous with) libertinism — doing ‘whatever you want’

regardless of other peoples’ values or lives. Luckily Nietzsche (that

Islamophile) settled this point once and for all for everyone, no matter

what their sect or belief: ‘beyond good and evil’ means nothing without

that ‘self-overcoming’ or ‘sublimation’ which utterly rules out the

banality of a pointless and self-defeating ‘evil’. The antinomian may

commit crimes in the eyes of society or the Law, but only out of a

personal ethics which reaches unimaginably higher than any moral code.

Antinomian ethics does this precisely because it is Imaginal, ‘made up’

by the individual, personal and central.

Islam begins as one of the very few pro-sexual-pleasure religions known

to civilized humanity. Paul may say it is better to marry than burn, but

the Prophet advises a follower to ‘marry a young woman so that you may

enjoy life’ — and says, ‘Three things of this world I love, women,

perfume and prayer.’ He married eleven times, allowed his followers each

four wives and countless concubines; at one time he instituted

‘temporary marriage’, which is still practiced, by the Shi’ites. He

permitted birth control (but not abortion). This high valuation of

sexual pleasure has led to a ‘tantrik’ aspect in Islamic spirituality,

exemplified by Ibn ‘Arabi’s exposition (in the Bezels of Wisdom) of

sexual intercourse as the supreme form of contemplation:

But as tile (Divine) Reality is inaccessible in respect (of the

Essence), and there is contemplation only in a substance, the

contemplation of God in women is the most intense and the most perfect;

and the union which is the most intense… is the conjugal act.

… God causes the forms of the world to blossom by the projection of His

Will and by the Divine Command… which manifests itself as the sexual act

in the world of forms constituted by the elements, as the spiritual will

(al-himmah) in the world of the spirits of light, and as logical

conclusion in the discursive order, the whole thing being but an act of

love of the primordial ternary reflecting itself in each and all its

aspects.

People know well that I am in love; Only they do not know with whom…

This applies well to he who loves only voluptuousness, that is to say he

who loves the support of voluptuousness, the woman, but remains

unconscious in the spiritual sense of that which is really in question.

If he knew it, he would know by virtue of what he enjoyed it, and who

(really) enjoys the voluptuousness; then, he would be (spiritually)

perfect.

(Burckhardt trans.)

Revolutionary as this may be, Ibn ‘Arabi still writes from the

essentially masculinist point of view which permeates the Koran and

hadith. Women are seen in themselves as individuals with souls, but as

virtual property in relation to men. The ‘Feminist Principle’ is

notoriously hard to locate in Islam. True, on the mystical or popular

and syncretistic level, all sorts of hints and echoes of the Anima are

found: the cult of Buraq, the cult of the Beloved in Persian poetry. The

veiled and secluded woman becomes the symbol of all that is esoteric and

hidden. But, outwardly, in contemporary terms — women are simply

suppressed. Examples of this bias are already well-known and constitute

a major charge against orthodox Islam. How would a contemporary

Qiyamat-mystic deal with this problem?

A freedom or pleasure that rests on someone else’s slavery or misery

cannot finally satisfy the self because it is a limitation or narrowing

of the self, an admission of impotence, an offense against generosity

and justice. Our freedom depends on other people’s freedom, for our

fates are inextricably interwoven with others’, especially with those we

love. Our text — The Anti-Caliph - would doubtless recommend (along with

the abrogation of the Shariah) the abolition of all forms of marriage,

temporary marriage, concubinage and slavery, all human relations

expressed in terms of owner/property (including the parent/child

relation). Now, according to orthodox Islam, the result of this

liberation would be simply a state of unbridled sin and disorder. But,

by reversing the Shariah, the esotericists have in fact interiorized its

meaning, not simply discarded it. They no longer wish to take refuge in

empty form when the essence of a relation (love, friendship, mutual

advantage) has been poisoned by enmity and possessiveness. The spiritual

meaning of sexual pleasure precludes for them all uncaring or selfish

attitudes, all violence, all brackish resentment and cold fetishism — in

short, all libertinage.

Moreover, the polarity masculine/feminine can now be seen and

experienced as reversed; the Anima now gains a certain ascendancy (and

this is the meaning of Islamic syncretist sects in Bengal and Java which

worship goddesses like Kali or Loro Kidul. It is said that at one time

the Prophet contemplated allowing two pagan goddesses to survive as

Allah’s ‘consorts’ — so perhaps this ‘feminine’ Islam could be viewed as

authentic and even ‘pre-Koranic’!). In practice, this feminization of

Islam or reversal of polarities must involve a code of sexual behavior

both highly ethical and highly humane, including a strong valuation of

both pleasure and conviviality (‘living together’) as spiritual

practice, as the ‘good life’, virtually as purposes in themselves.

‘The Shariah bestows many privileges on the adult heterosexual male, but

few on anyone else. Homosexuality for example is strictly forbidden. The

devotees of Witness Play in theory remained chaste, arguing that desire

for a boy was permitted even if sexual union were forbidden. Certain

hadith seem to support this point of view; for instance it is said that

those who love but remain chaste and die as a result of frustration,

must be considered holy martyrs. Iraqi and Kermani believed also in the

yogic or alchemical efficacy of chastity — but clearly from a

psychological perspective their path must indeed have seemed a sort of

martyrdom… and their poetry does contain elements of repression and

melancholy.

Such poetry, however, often attains the opacity of code; moreover, many

heretical texts have vanished. Did any mystic ever hit upon the idea of

combining the Witness Game with the Qiyamat, the abrogation of the

Shariah? Some dervishes boasted of enjoying far more than ‘glances’, or

even kisses. Why should they not have enjoyed a philosophy — a spiritual

hermeneutics of sex — with which to understand their practice and

construct their apologia?

Such a philosophy might of course interest all believers in sexual

freedom, not merely a few mystical boy-lovers. If we combine Ibn

‘Arabi’s ‘tantrik’ teachings with the actual practice of the Witness

Game (the yoga of music, poetry, dance, wine and love) under the sign of

the Qiyamat, we arrive at a new valuation of all and every variety of

sexuality — both as ‘permissible voluptuousness’ and as spiritual

practice.

This valuation uproots all orthodox morality — but even from the usual

modern ‘Sexual Liberation’ standpoint it appears highly radical as well.

Religious morality condemns non-ordinary sex as sinful and criminal, but

vulgar materialism condemns sexuality itself to joyless commodification,

the fetishization of desire, the proliferation of a pornography of

violence and advertising. Without a ‘spiritual dimension’, the sexual

revolution can only betray itself into libertinage and other

distortions.

The Anti-Caliph dares to assert that its new valuation of sexuality

transcends both religious morality and vulgar materialism. It affirms

the reality and centrality of physical love, and at the same time

identifies this love with the highest form of spiritual experience. It

frees every amorous individual from the myriad varieties of repression,

whether chains of the Law or numbness of alienation. Its touchstone is

joy, and the agreement of two sovereign monarchs to share it. Body and

soul are one — the erotic constitutes the essence of spirituality.

VI. Social Justice

With the exception of the Caliphate of Ali (and certain other brief

periods in Islamic history) the Shi’ites have generally existed as a

powerless minority within Islam, and consequently have elaborated a

particularly interesting teaching on Social Justice, even going so far

as to call it the Sixth Pillar of Islam. In political terms (although

one can never wholly separate theological from political terms in Islam)

Shi’ism begins as a form of mystical monarchism, a line of deposed

Pretenders to the Caliphate who claimed not only bloodline legitimacy

but also spiritual preeminence. Socially Shi’ism consisted of Hashemite

aristocrats and marginalized groups such as the Aryan Persians, pockets

of the rural poor, ‘primitive communists’ (such as the Qarmatians, who

at one point managed to steal the Black Stone from the Kaaba in Mecca);,

unofficial mystics and dissident intellectuals (such as the alchemist

Jabir ibn Hayyan or the secretive sect of scientists called the Brethren

of Purity, Ikhwan al-Safa). Revolution, or at least the hope of

revolution, became a Shi’ite principle. After Ali, none of the orthodox

twelve Imams ever ruled — but the black banners of Shi’ism were carried

by the Abbasids in their successful uprising against the Ommayids, by

the Fatimids who conquered Egypt and built Cairo, by the victorious

Safavids in Iran, by innumerable less successful rebels in North Africa,

Syria, Persia and India.

The Assassins established a revolutionary Shi’ite ‘state’ which

consisted not of a single land ruled by a king but a network of

autonomous castles and mountain strongholds, separated by thousands of

miles, defended not by armies but by fedayeen-terrorists, by bribery,

secret propaganda; dedicated to science and learning, and ruled by a

hierarchy based on spiritual attainment. With the total abrogation of

the Shariah and the teaching of the Imam-of-one’s-own-being under the

Qiyamat, this ‘state’ or web of armed communes must have attained a

height of libertarianism unknown elsewhere or elsewhen in Islamdom. The

Caliphs of Baghdad failed to destroy them — only the Mongol avalanche

succeeded in burying Alamut and its scattered allies.

In the 20^(th) century Sunni modernists and reformers have tended to

look toward such Western models as Protestantism and Democracy for

inspiration. Shi’ite thinkers however have shown an interest in more

revolutionary philosophies. Dr Ali Shariati, who is said to have been

murdered by SAVAK, attempted a brilliant if somewhat tendentious

rapprochement between Shi’ism and Socialism which inspired many Iranians

to revolution: the Mujaheddin or Holy Warriors, despised equally by the

Shah, the Ayatollah and the U.S. State Department. Khomeini’s revolution

demands ‘pure’ Shi’ism, unmixed with foreign influence or heretical

Ismaili-like extremism. Khomeini himself was considered something of a

wild-eyed mystic (he wrote a treatise on Ibn ‘Arabi) and rebel in his

youth and exile, but in power he has enforced the Shariah with public

executions of loose women, dissidents, Mujaheddin, homosexuals, drug

addicts, Bahais, sufis, Jews, Ismailis, Christians, Kurds, monarchists,

communists… an almost endless list of scapegoats. Most traces of utopian

Shi’ite social experimentation have been outlawed or ‘postponed’ due to

endless war in Kurdestan and Iraq, which now consumes thirteen-year-old

children like a demented Moloch. Theater, music, painting, dancing and

subversive poetry are banned. Shi’ism in triumph has turned out as

dismal and terrifying as if Cotton Mather and Dr Mengele had cooked it

up to torment a conquered foe.

What other forces in the Islamic world might attract an esotericist

interested in social justice? Pakistan and the Reformist movement? Saudi

‘Arabia, with its oil and Wahhabiism? Qaddafi? Perhaps the Afghan

rebels?

Some mystics may perhaps even feel a twinge of nostalgia for old-time

corrupt venal dim monarchs like Farouk of Egypt or Zahir Shah of

Afghanistan or Idris of Libya or the Persian Qajars — bad as they were,

at least they had no ideology to push and no urge to ‘purify the Faith’!

Indeed, traditional monarchism still finds favour with certain mystics

such as the Guenonian sufis or the Javanese adherents of the ‘Just King’

— but even granting them sincerity and humane intentions, their ideas

are impractical, and repugnant to the libertarian spirit of the Qiyamat.

One might derive a great deal of enjoyment from contemplating —

imagining — a contemporary version of the concept of social justice

propagated at Alamut. The abolition of Law characterizes only one other

‘political system’: anarchism. Moreover, the idea of the

Imam-of-one’s-own-being implies the idea of self-rule, autarky: each

human being a potential ‘king’, and human relations carried out as a

mutuality of ‘free lords’. Of course, Alamut retained a hierarchy — but

so did Nestor Makhno’s anarchist army. Moreover, the economic

‘communism’ and the cooperation between autonomous strongholds which

characterized Nizari society somewhat resembled certain ideas such as

syndicalism and ‘council communism’. Altogether, a curious blend of

individualist anarchism, Bakuninism and antinomian mysticism sums up

Alamut in modern political language.

In ‘up-dating’ the Alamut revolution we might also try to imagine a

workable contemporary version of the Alamut-concept itself — the

protected autonomous enclave of free spirits, warriors and scholars. In

an age of airplanes, bombs and universal state control of land and

resources, the notion seems quite impossible. Gold and daggers no longer

entice or terrify a world grown numb with endless commodities and

megadeaths; deserts and mountains all are mapped, not one remote valley

or island remains unguarded or untaxed. What about survivalist

hide-outs? artificial islands? underground computer networks?

Antarctica? submarines? orbital L-5’s? the asteroid belt?

Outside of a Science Fiction story and short of some catastrophic change

in the general world order, none of these versions of Alamut seems

practical or feasible. However, some shards of praxis do survive amid

the rubble of utopian fancies. One may always attempt as much insight,

love, freedom of thought and expression, justice and tolerance as

possible for oneself and the very few people who share one’s truest

life. To be a ‘free lord’ in secret is better than being a public slave,

a willing accomplice of repression and injustice. As for a more general

struggle, Ismaili history provides an answer to the question of

revolutionary tactics in times of outward powerlessness: propaganda.

According to the doctrine of tagiyya or Concealment, Ismailis are

allowed to pretend or disguise themselves at will in order to propagate

the message to keep it alive. In such a situation the attentat or

political assassination, terrorism and propaganda of the deed may be

deemed tragically counterproductive. What counts is action on the

personal and cultural level — ‘poetic terrorism’ if you like — but also

simply bearing witness.

Above all, the latterday devotee of Alamut might feel almost an

obligation (if a free spirit may admit of any duty whatsoever) to

experience joy, and not postpone it to an afterlife or some utopian

future. In this ‘imperative’ lies the need of doing justice to oneself,

for those who cheat themselves can scarcely expect to know how to deal

fairly (i.e. beautifully) with others. Here again the esotericist is

capable of imagining an ethics much more demanding than any moral or

civil law, precisely because it is based on expansion of self to include

others rather than denial of self, resentment and hopeless longing. The

practice of this sort of politics-of-eros cannot be totally suppressed

even by our present technarchies, mandarins of snoop or commissars of

hysterical greed.

To liberate ‘everyday life’, to seize back our own history from the

society of the Spectacle — the Empire of Lies — this project begins with

the individual and

spirals outward in love to embrace others. From the ruins of Alamut The

AntiCaliph creates a catastrophic archaeology of desire — and out of

this, our insurrection creates itself.

VII. Taste

Here, words like ritual, mysticism and religion cannot be taken in their

usual exoteric meanings of obligatory sacrifice, unreasoning piety and

organized endarkenment’. The Anti-Caliph esotericizes these terms, turns

them inside-out, wreaks upon them a benign inversion. It models itself

on some Paleolithic language which has not yet differentiated between

ritual and art, between mysticism and personal awareness, between

religion and the harmonious life of the tribe. Only such

no-longer-extant ur-words would really fit our precise needs. (And only

poetry can hope to re-create them.)

In a society which used such a language, the artist (as A.K.

Coomaraswamy pointed out) would not be a special sort of person, but

every person would be a special sort of artist. In effect, as a Javanese

pamong or teacher of the Sumarah sect exhorted me with permissible

hyperbole, ‘Everyone must be an artist!’ In Javanese and Balinese

society, this maxim amounts to a cultural axiom. Tremendous prestige

attaches to the arts of shadow-puppetry, dance, gamelan, batik, etc. —

to participation in these arts. The kebatinan or ‘pure esoteric’ cults

(which have cut themselves off from orthodox Islam and Hinduism alike)

often teach their devotees nothing more than meditation techniques and

art-appreciation. The trance-dance epitomizes this path: complete

identification of self with aesthetic action. “I he Javanese or Balinese

who lacks talent is like a Lakota Sioux without a vision-quest, or a

Malaysian Senoi who cannot dream, or an African pygmy deaf to the music

the forest makes. In Java this ideal has survived since Independence as

at least a partial reality thanks to the renaissance-like efforts of

esotericists to keep the culture alive, comprehensible and accessible to

all. Rather than aping the West, many young Indonesian artists

experiment with elegant new syncretisms of traditional and modern (the

Balinese ‘Monkey Dance’ for example was introduced in the 1930’s); the

pure Classical forms are seen as sources of inspiration which must be

fostered rather than dead weight to be tossed aside.

Such paleolithic culture-remnants were long ago buried among us

occidentals by Church, Empire and Machine. Our cliche of the artist is

the alien and isolated individual, who continually betrays or exposes

our cultural ideals as sham, or else kowtows to them by producing

expensive pap and elitist rubbish. With the Romantics — the first

completely marginalized artistic group — we can begin to trace the idea

of the artist as revolutionary (whether progressive or reactionary), the

voice saying No to that society whose vision the artist no longer

embodies or creates. By our century all art, for whatever reason, stands

against modern society — in fact, this very movement constitutes what is

called Modernism. Even the Futurists who loved machines wanted a

revolution — as for the others, each tried to heap up a few shards of

something or other, whether from the past or the future, against the

present ruin. With Dadaism, art is pronounced dead and simultaneously

announced as the only possible revolution. The Surrealists picked up

this idea but then sold it for a mess of Vienno-Moscovian pottage. In

the 50’s and 60’s the Lettrists and Situationists unearthed the notion

again and polished it into a statement of the artist as a model of

revolutionary consciousness — still a close relation to Shelly’s

‘unacknowledged legislator’. To say that our Consensus Art is dead — and

this school of thought says so — means that now everyone must be an

artist. The paleolithic credo reborn. Modernism and tradition like an

ouroboros.

Once again (as with Alamuti utopianism) our era seems particularly

unsuited to this dream, which appears as yet another hopeless desire to

add to our list of miseries. How can we turn our cities into Java and

Bali? Not even Bali is Bali anymore, but is now polluted with Kentucky

Fried Chicken and mass tourism. After all, artists do not choose

alienation — they want to add to the tribal image-hoard — that is their

vocation. But modern society itself decrees this alienation by teaching

its children that play and work are mutually exclusive and hostile

realities, that vision and practice are forever at odds. Where can one

see hope (outside the legendary past or the exotic orient or the Future

Perfect) for a society of artist-visionaries, a world with no separate

words for work and play?

As with questions of social justice, each era creates some possibilities

and destroys others, offers certain tactics and withdraws others. The

chances for action here are exactly the same as in the field of justice:

work on the self — and propaganda.

Art-work on the self includes art as meditation and meditation as art;

it includes shaping the personal environment; it. includes direct and

beautiful communication with close comrades or chosen collaborators as a

deep primary purpose in life; it includes both visible and invisible

artifacts as expressions of spiritual states, as ‘self-expression’; it

includes adopting the code of the artist, which has about it something

of the antique ludicrousness of a code of honor or a code of duelling,

but also bestows experience and grace in all the unconventional

freedoms.

This new art involves a certain ‘spiritual childliness’, what the Zen

dramatist Zeami called the ‘First Flower’ — the ‘Beginner’s Mind‘ - the

ability to see and act with spontaneous directness; all(] thus it holds

out the promise of a genuine maturity, rather than the sort of deadly

adulthood that now prepares the world for robotic mindlessness and/or

hellish war.

At this level, art has little to do with made things, but rather

concerns a state of mind, a way of being, a gesture that cannot be

betrayed, a life.

When we consider art as made things however, the possibility of a

teleology arises — the possibility of a purpose, a usefulness of the

artwork. For the paleolithic tribe this purpose remains transparent and

unquestioned: all made things have purpose, all made things are art.

Such a culture possesses neither useless ugly commodities nor useless

beautiful commodities, nor does it possess the concepts ‘utilitarianism’

or ‘art for art’s sake’. We however have lived with all this clutter to

the point of suffocation and claustrophobia, weighed down with

excremental monuments and mausoleoid museums, crushed with separated

alienated isolated immobile chunks of dead art. Aside then from the

charming personal esoteric cult of the artist outlined in the last few

paragraphs, what purpose can be served now by our art? Why are we making

it? and for whom?

If we fall back now on the word ‘propaganda’ it should be obvious that

we intend to freight the term with more than its usual load of meaning.

In totalitarian nations censorship works by fiat; in democratic nations

the Market accomplishes the same end, since anything which fails as a

commodity cannot conceivably damage the Empire. The avant-garde and the

‘folk’ have both been reduced to suppliers of imagery for advertizing;

the lag-time between the birth of a new artform and its appropriation by

the Consensus Media has almost ceased to exist. In, such a situation,

any art which manages to slip between the cracks of the monolith or eke

out an existence on the margin can only have one purpose: propaganda,

insurrectionist propaganda.

This does not mean ‘art in the service of the revolution’ — an

impossible tyranny — nor ‘Social Realism’, nor any recognizable form of

‘political art’. Garbage is garbage, no matter how pure its intentions.

No, for The Anti-Caliph art is politics, art is the revolution, art is

religion. Art which succeeds in beauty and cannot be absorbed by the

Machine is already propaganda for the truth, no matter what its style

and content, because it is already a manifestation of the truth in

cognizable and ordered form. Please do riot take these words in their

platonic sense: by ‘truth’ we do not mean an abstract and bodiless

Ideal, nor even an unspeakable mystical sentiment. This is something

much simpler and yet more difficult to explain or define, something for

which we might use the ‘Arabic/Persian word zawq and the

Sanskrit/Javanese term rasa:

TASTE — INTUITION — FELLING — AESTHETIC CATEGORY — the interiorization

of a perception (‘becoming the bamboo’ as The Mustard Seed Garden puts

it) — hence a kind of mystical/aesthetic state of consciousness — a

sense of what ‘fits’ — the faculty of choice or discrimination, choosing

this color or note or word and not that one — artistic appreciation,

‘good taste’ — the quality of a performance or artwork — ‘tasting’ as

direct experience, experiential certainty…

Here we reach the keynote of this entire exercise in esoteric

propaganda, the key term of the text and the closest approximation to an

actual spiritual path ‘recommended’ by The Anti-Caliph: the cultivation

of taste both as work-on-the-self and as propaganda for the esoteric

‘cause’. To awaken in others the desire for that which can scarcely be

spoken at all except in booming cliches or divine names — the desire for

desire, for Eros son of Chaos — the taste for life itself and none of

its cheap representations or lying substitutes: the desire to be art,

spontaneously and absolutely.

For the future, then, The Anti-Caliph recommends that everyone be an

artist. First, certain traditional arts might be taken up, such as

Persian and North Indian classical music, poetry, Far Eastern martial

arts, Javanese dance, music and puppetry, calligraphy, illumination.

Such traditions do not deserve preservation for any inherent goodliness

or godliness, but as living possibilities. Like speaking another

language they help us get outside our own cultural skins — and they

provide ground for powerful new cross-fertilizations and syncretisms.

All of Oriental Wisdom has been made accessible to our century; the

rootless cosmopolitan culture of the future will create endless mosaics

and mandalas out of ten thousand tribes and civilizations.

Adab, which means both good manners and aesthetic cultivation as well as

literature and also the spiritual path, is a quality which seems

appropriate to the artist and the anarchist as well. Emma Goldman once

said that in an anarchist society everyone would be an aristocrat:

‘Radical Aristocratism’ as Nietzsche put it.

The art of love as adjunct of the other arts and also their chief

‘Muse’: the sufi sama’ interpreted as an aesthetic-erotic love feast;

the intoxication of music, poetry, dance, the presence of the beloved.

Hospitality as an artform. The Javanese give so-called ‘Peace Banquets’

(slametan) to appease spirits, celebrate luck or rites de passage, any

excuse for good food and entertainment, but with a spiritual slant.

Neighbours and passersby invited in a spirit of conviviality and

openness.

Salons, musicales, symposia, pilgrimages to spots of geomantic beauty or

baroque and eccentric spiritual potency; public celebrations of great

works of art or exquisite folly — finally the creation of shrines

dedicated to moments of aesthetic breakthrough and mystical ‘taste’.

‘Poetic Terrorism’ — art as propaganda of the deed —

aesthetico-Assassinism. Powerful propagandistic art should produce

powerful emotion or rasa - as powerful as terror or joy — forcibly

ripping aside the veils of inattention, anaesthetized dullness,

self-betraying egotism and forgetfulness by acts of unexpected art - a

sort of ‘theatre of Cruelty’ without walls.

And as a final suggestion (before The Anti-Caliph slips back into the

World of Archetypes): the creation of holidays, pure acts of

celebration. For example, the 17^(th) of Ramazan, Ibn ‘Arabi’s birthday

and the Anniversary of the Qiyamat — a banquet to proclaim the Oneness

of Being, the Inner Wisdom, the breaking of the chains of the Law.