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Title: Mutualism and the State
Author: Kevin Carson
Date: March 1, 2005
Language: en
Topics: mutualism, the State
Source: Retrieved on 3rd September 2021 from https://mutualist.blogspot.com/2005/03/mutualism-and-state.html

Kevin Carson

Mutualism and the State

Pierre Ducasse has some kind words for mutualism as a form of social and

economic organization. He goes on to add:

However, I still believe that all trends of anarchism underestimate the

necessary roles of the State. Even in a grass-root, cooperative economy,

we would still need to offer public services like health and education,

redistribute some income, regulate the market, protect common good like

the environment, apply macroeconomic policies. Nothing can convince me

that these aspects can be held by any other organization than the State.

Unless anybody could provide historical examples...

Unfortunately, historical examples are pretty thin on the ground. Since

the rise of the state five thousand (give or take) years ago, that

portion of humankind organized on the basis of city life, division of

labor, and complex forms of production has, for all intents and

purposes, lived universally under the government of territorial states.

Of course, that same portion of humanity has also lived in exploitative

class societies. Think there could be a connection? Anyone who points to

the lack of historical precedents for an advanced society living without

a state as evidence of its impracticality, it seems, is hoist on his own

petard. One can argue on identical grounds that, because it has never

existed hitherto, a complex society cannot exist in which the producing

classes are not milked like cattle for the support of parasitic ruling

classes.

To take Ducasse’s objections individually, however, there is no logical

reason that any of the functions he mentions requires a state. The

supposed necessity for a state to remedy diverse evils, indeed, is to a

large extent the direct result of conditions created by the state in the

first place. Without the state’s current redistribution of income from

producers to landlords, capitalists and bureaucrats, the polarization of

income that prompts calls for “progressive” redistribution wouldn’t have

arisen to begin with. And in a society without extremes of wealth and

destitution, the vast majority of people would have the means to

organize their own health and education services. Besides that, in a

society where producers kept their full product and lived in

decentralized, organic communities and extended families, social

networks would likely exist to provide charitably for those few who were

genuinely incapable of producing for themselves. As Joe Peacott argued

in “Individualism and Inequality,”

...economic inequality would not have the same significance in a

non-capitalist anarchist society that it does in today’s societies.

The differences in wealth that arise in an individualist community would

likely be relatively small. Without the ability to profit from the labor

of others, generate interest from providing credit, or extort rent from

letting out land or property, individuals would not be capable of

generating the huge quantities of assets that people can in a capitalist

system. Furthermore, the anarchist with more things does not have them

at the expense of another, since they are the result of the ownerÂąs own

effort. If someone with less wealth wishes to have more, they can work

more, harder, or better. There is no injustice in one person working 12

hours a day and six days a week in order to buy a boat, while another

chooses to work three eight hour days a week and is content with a less

extravagant lifestyle. If one can generate income only by hard work,

there is an upper limit to the number and kind of things one can buy and

own.

More important, though, than the actual amount of economic inequality

between individuals is whether the person who has more wealth thereby

acquires more power or advantage over others. In a statist world, one

can buy political favors with oneÂąs money and influence government

action affecting oneself and others. This would not be an option in an

anarchist society since there would be no government or other political

structure through which individuals or groups could coerce others and

use their greater wealth to further aggrandize themselves through

political means, as happens in a society of rulers and subjects....

As for those who produce little or nothing because of some disability,

there are other means of providing for the less fortunate than communal

economic arrangements. There is a long tradition of groups of

individuals taking care of sick, injured, and otherwise incapacitated

people through voluntary organizations from friendly societies to

cooperatives of various sorts to trade unions. People who value private

property are no less benevolent than those who favor free collectives,

and would figure out any number of ways to care for those in need of

assistance from others.

Although there is no example of a stateless society in historic times,

there are many examples of exploited and impoverished workers, even left

with only a fraction of their labor-product, nevertheless managing to

carry out mutual aid on a monumental scale through voluntary

associations of various sorts. The working classes’ self-organized

“welfare state” has been described, variously, by Kropotkin, Colin Ward,

E.P. Thompson, and David Beito. Imagine what they could do in a society

where labor kept its full product!

The same principle goes for regulation of the market. The evils that

call for regulation are mainly creations of the state itself. The state,

by subsidizing the centralization of the economy in large corporations,

has promoted demographic mobility and social atomization to pathological

levels. Without such centralizing tendencies, a much larger portion of

production and exchange would take place in decentralized markets

regulated by custom and face-to-face relations. The boom-bust cycle that

macroeconomic policy is adopted to regulate, likewise, results from the

state’s policies. The smaller and more decentralized the market, the

more stable and predictable it is from the standpoint of those

participating in it; as commodity markets become larger and more

anonymous, the harder it is for producers to tie their output to the

stable consumption patterns of a market known to them personally. And

the pattern of overproduction- underconsumption that causes the business

cycle, likewise, is a result of the divorce of labor from consumption.

Because the state transfers a part of labor’s product to parasitic

classes, as J.A. Hobson described it a century ago, levels of output are

divorced from consumption. When labor fully internalizes both the costs

and benefits of production, its output will reflect its judgment of its

own consumption needs.

As for the environment, most pollution takes place at present because

the state protects polluters from internalizing the cost of their own

malfeasance. Much (if not most) pollution is committed either by the

government itself, or on government land by politically connected

corporations given preferential access to that land with minimal

oversight. In addition, the power of local juries to enforce the common

law of public and private nuisances has been preempted and supplanted by

a much weaker regulatory state. Those corporate hog farms might find it

much harder to operate if the residents of a county, acting through the

free jury of their local defense association, could impose heavy civil

damages on it for fouling their wells and stinking up the surrounding

area. I expect that such damages would be much more severe than the

fines imposed by the EPA.

To sum up: in virtually every case Ducasse mentions, the problem is

currently made worse by the state. So we can say, perhaps

half-facetiously, that even if abolishing the state would not solve

income inequality, pollution, the healthcare and education crises, it is

at least a step in the right direction.

In the comment thread, Larry Gambone adds that the abolition of the

state is a long-term goal, and a direction in which to move:

...few, if any anarchists these days believe the state will be abolished

in one go. In fact, the complete abolition of the state is an ideal and

is therefore something that might not ever come about – the anarchist is

someone who seeks to minimize statism and maximize voluntary,

cooperative, self-managed and communitarian efforts and doesn’t really

worry too much about the distant ideal.

As Gustav Landauer argued (see Larry’s article on him), the gradual

abolition of the state and its replacement by voluntary associations is

something to be done one step at a time, as it becomes feasible.

Martin Buber, using Landauer’s conceptions, explains how the State

“overdetermines” the amount of coercion in a society. People living

together at a given time and in a given space are only to a certain

degree capable, of their own free will, of living together rightly;

...the degree of incapacity for a voluntary right order determines the

degree of legitimate compulsion. Nevertheless the de facto extent of the

State always exceeds more or less — and mostly very much exceeds — the

sort of State that would emerge from the degree of legitimate

compulsion. This constant difference (which results in what I call “the

excessive State”) between the State in principle and the State in fact

is explained by the historical circumstance that accumulated power does

not abdicate except under necessity. It resists any adaptation to the

increasing capacity for voluntary order so long as this increase fails

to exert sufficiently vigorous pressure on the power accumulated....

As voluntary associations take over the work of the state, workers have

an ever-greater portion of their labor-product available for their own

cooperative social services, and the populace recovers habits of

voluntary cooperation and mutual aid atrophied under centuries of social

atomization at the hands of the state, it will be possible to scale back

the state’s functions incrementally.

Pierre Ducasse, in response, denied that the abolition of the state

could be even an ultimate goal or an ideal. “In any society, we need

central institutions of power: and I’m still waiting to be convinced

otherwise. The question is what kind of State we want, not if we want a

State at all.”

I’m not sure how Pierre defines the state, or whether his definition

coincides with that common among individualist anarchists: an

organization which claims the sole right of defining and regulating

legitimate force in a particular territory, and of initiating force

against non-aggressors for the purpose of promoting the general welfare.

(Or, as Poul Anderson described it, an organization that reserves the

right to kill you if you disobey its commands.)

But we should be careful to distinguish the state from voluntary

associations for mutual defense. The state, uniquely, is characterized

by its claimed legal authority to initiate force on behalf of “society.”

But it is the inalienable right of every individual to take necessary

action to defend himself against aggression; and whatever is morally

legitimate for the individual acting alone is likewise legitimate for

any number of individuals, cooperating voluntarily. The only thing that

such associations may not do legitimately is initiate force against

third parties “for their own good,” or force them to pay for services

they did not request. The individual, in the last resort, is the final

judge of his own needs for self-defense. He has the right to take use

whatever defensive force is necessary, for example, to prevent negligent

or dangerous behavior on the part of his neighbor that puts him at risk.

For example, the individual has the right to intervene to prevent a

neighbor from polluting his groundwater, or using noxious chemicals that

drift across their common property line. And since such intervention is

legitimate for the individual, it is legitimate for individuals

associated for mutual defense to act in concert to prohibit pollution by

third parties that presents a genuine threat to their safety and

welfare.

Such voluntary associations, as Benjamin Tucker envisioned them, would

be successor organizations that remained when the state lost its

defining characteristics. The state would cease to impose its services

on unwilling consumers, or to assess taxes on those not willingly

relying on its services; and it would cease to prevent non-members from

establishing their own voluntary arrangements to provide the same

services. But aside from its loss of the power to initiate force for the

“general welfare” of the community, and to collect taxes from the

populace at large, the successor organizations might well perform their

functions in ways reminiscent of the old state. Mutual defense

associations might continue to serve a majority of the community who

willingly purchased their services, even operating on the basis of a

jury system and posse comitatus, and to enforce libertarian law and

safety codes against those whose actions threatened or harmed the

membership. They would coexist with smaller protection agencies

organized in competition with them, with neighborhood watch groups, and

individuals who preferred to rely entirely on their own ability to

defend their homes. The only cases in which they could act against

non-members would be when their membership was harmed or genuinely

threatened.

There is, therefore, no reason that a libertarian law code, enforced by

the juries of a local defense association, could not prohibit and punish

pollution or other harmful acts, without taking on the nature of a

“state.”