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Title: Contract Feudalism Author: Kevin Carson Date: 2006 Language: en Topics: contract feudalism Source: Retrieved 07/20/2022 from https://c4ss.org/content/12614 Notes: Originally published in the 2006 issue of Economic Notes No. 105 by the Libertarian Alliance.
Elizabeth Anderson recently coined the term âcontract feudalismâ to
describe the increasing power of employers over employeesâ lives outside
the workplace.
According to Anderson, one of the benefits that the worker traditionally
received in return for his submission to the bossesâ authority on the
job was sovereignty over the rest of his life in the âreal worldâ
outside of work. Under the terms of this Taylorist bargain, the worker
surrendered his sense of craftsmanship and control over his own work in
return for the right to express his ârealâ personality through
consumption in the part of his life that still belonged to him. This
bargain assumed,
the separation of work from the home. However arbitrary and abusive the
boss may have been on the factory floor, when work was over the workers
could at least escape his tyranny⊠[T]he separation of work from home
made a big difference to workersâ liberty from their employersâ
wills.[1]
Wage labor, traditionally, has involved a devilâs bargain in which you
âsell your life in order to liveâ: you cut off the eight or twelve hours
you spend at work and flush them down the toilet, in order to get the
money you need to support your real life in the real world, where youâre
treated like an adult human being. And out in the real world, where your
judgment and values actually matter, you try to pretend that that other
hellhole doesnât exist.
At the same time, Anderson points out, this separation of work from home
depends entirely on the relative bargaining power of labor for its
enforcement. (Iâll return to this, the central issue, later on.)
But itâs apparent that the bargaining power of labor is shifting
radically away from workers. For all too many employers, the traditional
devilâs bargain is no longer good enough. Employers (especially in the
service sector) are coming to view not only the employeeâs laborpower
during work hours, but the employee himself as their property. White
collar and service workers are expected to live on-call 24 hours a day:
that thing they used to call âhomeâ is just the shelf theyâre stored on
when their owner isnât using them at the moment. And the boss has a
claim on what they do even during the time theyâre not on the clock: the
political meetings you attend, whether you smoke, the things you write
on your blog â nothing is really yours. Most people who blog on
political or social issues, probably, fear what might turn up if the
Human Resources Gestapo do a Google on them. As for the job search
itself â good God! Youâve got to account for every week youâve ever
spent unemployed, and justify what use you made of your time without a
master. If you were ever self-employed, you might be considered
âoverqualifiedâ: That is, thereâs a danger you might not quite have your
mind right, because you donât need the job badly enough. Not to mention
the questions about why you left your past job, the personality
profiling to determine if youâre concealing any non-Stepford Wife
opinions behind a facade of obedience, etc⊠Itâs probably a lot like the
tests of âpolitical reliabilityâ to join the old Soviet Communist Party.
Examples of contract feudalism have been especially prominent in the
news lately. The example Anderson herself provided was of Michigan-based
Weyco, whose president forbade his workers to smoke ânot just at work
but anywhere else.â The policy, taken in response to rising cost of
health coverage, required workers to submit to nicotine tests.[2]
Another recent example of âcontract feudalismâ is the saga of Joe
Gordon, owner of the Woolamaloo Gazette blog, who was fired from the
Waterstoneâs bookstore chain when it came to his bossesâ attention that
heâd made the occasional venting post after a particularly bad day at
work.[3]
Yet another is a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ruling that
allowed employers to prohibit employees from hanging out off the job.
Here is the gist of it, from a Harold Meyerson piece at the Washington
Post:
On June 7 the three Republican appointees on the five-member board that
regulates employer/employee relations in the United States handed down a
remarkable ruling that expands the rights of employers to muck around in
their workersâ lives when theyâre off the job. They upheld the legality
of a regulation for uniformed employees at Guardsmark, a security guard
company, that reads, â[Y]ou must NOT⊠fraternize on duty or off duty,
date or become overly friendly with the clientâs employees or with
co-employees.â[4]
Many free market libertarians instinctively respond to complaints about
such policies by rallying around the employer. One commenter, for
example, said this in response to Elizabeth Andersonâs post at
Left2Right blog: âItâs a free market. If you donât like your employerâs
rules, then work somewhere else.â One of the most common libertarian
defenses of sweatshops, likewise, is that they must be better than the
available alternatives, since nobody is forced to work there.
Well, yes and no. The question is, who sets the range of available
alternatives? If the state limits the range of alternatives available to
labor and weakens its bargaining power in the labor market, and it acts
in collusion with employers in doing so, then the âfree marketâ defense
of employers is somewhat disingenuous.
I use the term âvulgar libertarianâ to describe this âWhatâs good for
General Motorsâ understanding of âfree marketâ principles, which
identifies the free market with the interests of employers against
workers, big business against small, and the producer against the
consumer. As I described it in Studies in Mutualist Political
Economy:[5]
Vulgar libertarian apologists for capitalism use the term âfree marketâ
in an equivocal sense: they seem to have trouble remembering, from one
moment to the next, whether theyâre defending actually existing
capitalism or free market principles. So we get [a] standard boilerplate
article⊠arguing that the rich canât get rich at the expense of the
poor, because âthatâs not how the free market worksâ â implicitly
assuming that this is a free market. When prodded, theyâll grudgingly
admit that the present system is not a free market, and that it includes
a lot of state intervention on behalf of the rich. But as soon as they
think they can get away with it, they go right back to defending the
wealth of existing corporations on the basis of âfree market
principles.â
The fact is, this is not a free market. Itâs a state capitalist system
in which (as Murray Rothbard put it in âThe Student Revolutionâ) âour
corporate state uses the coercive taxing power either to accumulate
corporate capital or to lower corporate costs.â[6] As Benjamin Tucker
wrote over a century ago:
⊠It is not enough, however true, to say that, âif a man has labor to
sell, he must find some one with money to buy itâ; it is necessary to
add the much more important truth that, if a man has labor to sell, he
has a right to a free market in which to sell it, â a market in which no
one shall be prevented by restrictive laws from honestly obtaining the
money to buy it. If the man with labor to sell has not this free market,
then his liberty is violated and his property virtually taken from him.
Now, such a market has constantly been denied, not only to the laborers
at Homestead, but to the laborers of the entire civilized world. And the
men who have denied it are the Andrew Carnegies. Capitalists of whom
this Pittsburgh forgemaster is a typical representative have placed and
kept upon the statute-books all sorts of prohibitions and taxes (of
which the customs tariff is among the least harmful) designed to limit
and effective in limiting the number of bidders for the labor of those
who have labor to sellâŠ
⊠Let Carnegie, Dana & Co. first see to it that every law in violation
of equal liberty is removed from the statute-books. If, after that, any
laborers shall interfere with the rights of their employers, or shall
use force upon inoffensive âscabs,â or shall attack their employersâ
watchmen, whether these be Pinkerton detectives, sheriffâs deputies, or
the State militia, I pledge myself that, as an Anarchist and in
consequence of my Anarchistic faith, I will be among the first to
volunteer as a member of a force to repress these disturbers of order
and, if necessary, sweep them from the earth. But while these invasive
laws remain, I must view every forcible conflict that arises as the
consequence of an original violation of liberty on the part of the
employing classes, and, if any sweeping is done, may the laborers hold
the broom! Still, while my sympathies thus go with the under dog, I
shall never cease to proclaim my conviction that the annihilation of
neither party can secure justice, and that the only effective sweeping
will be that which clears from the statute-book every restriction of the
freedom of the marketâŠ[7]
But whatever restrictions could he possibly have been talking about? To
read mainstream âfree marketâ defenses of existing employment relations,
youâd get the idea that the only restrictions on the freedom of the
market are those that hurt the owning classes and big business (you
know, the âlast persecuted minorityâ).
In fact, such vulgar libertarian apologetics share a very artificial set
of assumptions: see, laborers just happen to be stuck with this poor set
of options â the employing classes have absolutely nothing to do with
it. And the owning classes just happen to have all these means of
production on their hands, and the laboring classes just happen to be
propertyless proletarians who are forced to sell their labor on the
ownersâ terms. The possibility that the employing classes might be
directly implicated in state policies that reduced the available options
of laborers is too ludicrous even to consider.
Itâs the old nursery-tale of primitive accumulation. â Leninâ of Leninâs
Tomb blog recalls being exposed to it in the government schools:
The illusion of a free and equal contract between employee and employer
is one that exerts considerable hold, particularly given the paucity of
industrial conflict over the last fifteen years. The thought that the
situation might be rigged in advance, by virtue of the capitalists
control of the means of production, is so obvious that it eludes many
people who otherwise place themselves on the Left.
In part, this is because people are prepared from an early age to expect
and accept this state of affairs. In high school Business Studies class,
I was shown along with my class mates a video sponsored by some bank
which purported to demonstrate how the division of labour came about. It
all took place, it seemed, in a relatively benign and peaceful fashion,
with no intruding political questions or economic phases. From the
cavemen to cashcards, it was really all about work being broken down
into separate tasks which would be undertaken by those most able to do
them. Then, finding contact with nearby villages, they would trade
things that they were good at making for the things that the other
villages were good at making⊠The only interesting thing about this
propaganda video is that it raised not a single eyebrow â as how could
it? One is led to expect to work for a capitalist without seeing
anything necessarily unjust about it, and one has nothing to compare it
to. The worker is taught to sell herself (all those job interview
training schemes) without perceiving herself as a commodity.[8]
I had a similar reaction to all those passages on time-preference in
Bohm-Bawerk and Mises that just accepted, as a matter of course, that
one person was in a position to âcontributeâ capital to the production
process, while another for some mysterious reason needed the means of
production and the labor-fund that were so graciously âprovided.â
The most famous critic of this nursery-tale, of course, was the state
socialist Karl Marx:
In times long gone-by there were two sorts of people; one, the diligent,
intelligent, and, above all, frugal elite; the other, lazy rascals,
spending their substance, and more, in riotous living. The legend of
theological original sin tells us certainly how man came to be condemned
to eat his bread in the sweat of his brow; but the history of economic
original sin reveals to us that there are people to whom this is by no
means essential. Never mind! Thus it came to pass that the former sort
accumulated wealth, and the latter sort had at last nothing to sell
except their own skins. And from this original sin dates the poverty of
the great majority that, despite all its labour, has up to now nothing
to sell but itself, and the wealth of the few that increases constantly
although they have long ceased to work.[9]
But the criticism was by no means limited to statists. The free market
advocate Franz Oppenheimer wrote:
According to Adam Smith, the classes in a society are the results of
ânaturalâ development. From an original state of equality, these arose
from no other cause than the exercise of the economic virtues of
industry, frugality and providenceâŠ
[C]lass domination, on this theory, is the result of a gradual
differentiation from an original state of general equality and freedom,
with no implication in it of any extra-economic powerâŠ
This assumed proof is based upon the concept of a âprimitive
accumulation,â or an original store of wealth, in lands and in movable
property, brought about by means of purely economic forces; a doctrine
justly derided by Karl Marx as a âfairy tale.â Its scheme of reasoning
approximates this:
Somewhere, in some far-stretching, fertile country, a number of free
men, of equal status, form a union for mutual protection. Gradually they
differentiate into property classes. Those best endowed with strength,
wisdom, capacity for saving, industry and caution, slowly acquire a
basic amount of real or movable property; while the stupid and less
efficient, and those given to carelessness and waste, remain without
possessions. The well-to-do lend their productive property to the less
well-off in return for tribute, either ground-rent or profit, and become
thereby continually richer, while the others always remain poor. These
differences in possession gradually develop social class distinctions;
since everywhere the rich have preference, while they alone have the
time and the means to devote to public affairs and to turn the laws
administered by them to their own advantage. Thus, in time, there
develops a ruling and property-owning estate, and a proletariat, a class
without property. The primitive state of free and equal fellows becomes
a class-state, by an inherent law of development, because in every
conceivable mass of men there are, as may readily be seen, strong and
weak, clever and foolish, cautious and wasteful ones.[10]
In the real world, of course, things are a little less rosy. The means
of production, during the centuries of the capitalist epoch, have been
concentrated in a few hands by one of the greatest robberies in human
history. The peasants of Britain were deprived of customary property
rights in the land, by enclosures and other state sanctioned theft, and
driven into the factories like cattle. And the factory owners benefited,
in addition, from near-totalitarian social controls on the movement and
free association of labor; this legal regime included the Combination
Acts, the Riot Act, and the law of settlements (the latter amounting to
an internal passport system).
By the way: if you think the above passages are just Marxoid rhetoric,
bear in mind that the ruling class literature of the early industrial
revolution was full of complaints about just how hard it was to get
workers into the factories: not only were the lower classes not flocking
into the factories of their own free will, but the owning classes used a
great deal of energy thinking up ways to force them to do so. Employers
of the day engaged in very frank talk, as frank as that of any Marxist,
on the need to keep working people destitute and deprive them of
independent access to the means of production, in order to get them to
work hard enough and cheaply enough.
Albert Nock, surely nobodyâs idea of a Marxist, dismissed the bourgeois
nursery-tale with typical Nockian contempt:
The horrors of Englandâs industrial life in the last century furnish a
standing brief for addicts of positive intervention. Child-labour and
woman-labour in the mills and mines; Coketown and Mr. Bounderby;
starvation wages; killing hours; vile and hazardous conditions of
labour; coffin ships officered by ruffians â all these are glibly
charged off by reformers and publicists to a regime of rugged
individualism, unrestrained competition, and laissez-faire. This is an
absurdity on its face, for no such regime ever existed in England. They
were due to the Stateâs primary intervention whereby the population of
England was expropriated from the land; due to the Stateâs removal of
the land from competition with industry for labour. Nor did the factory
system and the âindustrial revolutionâ have the least thing to do with
creating those hordes of miserable beings. When the factory system came
in, those hordes were already there, expropriated, and they went into
the mills for whatever Mr. Gradgrind and Mr. Plugson of Undershot would
give them, because they had no choice but to beg, steal or starve. Their
misery and degradation did not lie at the door of individualism; they
lay nowhere but at the door of the State. Adam Smithâs economics are not
the economics of individualism; they are the economics of landowners and
mill-owners. Our zealots of positive intervention would do well to read
the history of the Enclosures Acts and the work of the Hammonds, and see
what they can make of them.[11]
Even in the so-called âfree marketâ that supposedly ensued by the
mid-19^(th) century, the owners of capital and land were able to exact
tribute from labor, thanks to a general legal framework that (among
other things) restricted workersâ access to their own cheap,
self-organized capital through mutual banks. As a result of this âmoney
monopoly,â workers had to sell their labor in a âbuyerâs marketâ on
terms set by the owning classes, and thus pay tribute (in the form of a
wage less than their labor-product) for access to the means of
production. Thus the worker has been robbed doubly: by the stateâs
initial use of force to forestall a producer-owned market economy; and
by the stateâs ongoing intervention that forces him to sell his labor
for less than his product. The vast majority of accumulated capital
today is the result, not of the capitalistâs past labor and abstention,
but of robbery.
So even in the so-called âlaissez-faireâ 19^(th) century, as Tucker
described the situation, the level of statist intervention on behalf of
the owning and employing classes was already warping the wage system in
all sorts of authoritarian directions. The phenomenon of wage labor
existed to the extent that it did only as a result of the process of
primitive accumulation by which the producing classes had, in previous
centuries, been robbed of their property in the means of production and
forced to sell their labor on the bossesâ terms. And thanks to the
stateâs restriction of self-organized credit and of access to unoccupied
land, which enabled the owners of artificially scarce land and capital
to charge tribute for access to them, workers faced an ongoing necessity
of selling their labor on still more disadvantageous terms.
The problem was exacerbated during the state capitalist revolution of
the 20^(th) century, by still higher levels of corporatist intervention,
and the resulting centralization of the economy. The effect of
government subsidies and regulatory cartelization was to conceal or
transfer the inefficiency costs of large-scale organization, and to
promote a state capitalist model of business organization that was far
larger, and far more hierarchical and bureaucratic, than could possibly
have survived in a free market.
The stateâs subsidies to the development of capital-intensive
production, as the century wore on, promoted deskilling and ever-steeper
internal hierarchies, and reduced the bargaining power that came with
laborâs control of the production process. Many of the most powerfully
deskilling forms of production technology were created as a result of
the stateâs subsidies to research and development. As David Montgomery
wrote in Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial
Automation,
[I]nvestigation of the actual design and use of capital-intensive,
labor-saving, skill-reducing technology has begun to indicate that cost
reduction was not a prime motivation, nor was it achieved. Rather than
any such economic stimulus, the overriding impulse behind the
development of the American system of manufacture was military; the
principal promoter of the new methods was not the self-adjusting market
but the extra-market U.S. Army Ordnance Department⊠The drive to
automate has been from its inception the drive to reduce dependence upon
skilled labor, to deskill necessary labor and reduce rather than raise
wages.[12]
Finally, the decision of neoliberal elites in the 1970s to freeze real
wages and transfer all productivity increases into reinvestment,
dividends, or senior management salaries, led to a still more
disgruntled work force, and the need for internal systems of
surveillance and control far beyond anything that had existed before.
David M. Gordonâs Fat and Mean[13] refers, in its subtitle, to the âMyth
of Managerial Downsizing.â Gordon demonstrates that, contrary to public
misperception, most companies employ even more middle management than
they used to; and a major function of these new overseers is enforcing
management control over an increasingly overworked, insecure, and
embittered workforce. The professional culture in Human Resources
departments is geared, more and more, to detecting and forestalling
sabotage and other expressions of employee disgruntlement, through
elaborate internal surveillance mechanisms, and to spotting potentially
dangerous attitudes toward authority through intensive psychological
profiling.
The state capitalists, since adopting their new neoliberal consensus of
the Seventies, have been hell-bent on creating a society in which the
average worker is so desperate for work that heâll gratefully take any
job offered, and do whatever is necessary to cling to it like grim
death.
⊠things didnât just âgetâ this way. They had help. The reduced
bargaining power of labor, the resulting erosion of the traditional
boundaries between work and private life, and increasing management
control even of time off the clock, are all the result of concerted
political efforts.
The fact that we accept as natural a state of affairs in which one class
has âjobsâ to âgiveâ and another class is forced to take them, for want
of independent access to the means of productions, is the result of
generations of ideological hegemony by the owning classes and their
vulgar libertarian apologists.
Nothing in the present situation is a natural implication of free market
principles. As Albert Nock wrote,
Our natural resources, while much depleted, are still great; our
population is very thin, running something like twenty or twenty-five to
the square mile; and some millions of this population are at the moment
âunemployed,â and likely to remain so because no one will or can âgive
them work.â The point is not that men generally submit to this state of
things, or that they accept it as inevitable, but that they see nothing
irregular or anomalous about it because of their fixed idea that work is
something to be given.[14]
Claire Wolfe pointed out, in her brilliant article âDark Satanic
Cubicles,â that thereâs nothing libertarian about the existing culture
of job relations:
In a healthy human community, jobs are neither necessary nor desirable.
Productive work is necessary â for economic, social, and even spiritual
reasons. Free markets are also an amazing thing, almost magical in their
ability to satisfy billions of diverse needs. Entrepreneurship? Great!
But jobs â going off on a fixed schedule to perform fixed functions for
somebody else day after day at a wage â arenât good for body, soul,
family, or society.
Intuitively, wordlessly, people knew it in 1955. They knew it in 1946.
They really knew it when Ned Ludd and friends were smashing the machines
of the early Industrial Revolution (though the Luddites may not have
understood exactly why they needed to do what they did).
Jobs suck. Corporate employment sucks. A life crammed into 9-to-5 boxes
sucks. Gray cubicles are nothing but an update on William Blakeâs âdark
satanic mills.â Granted, the cubicles are more bright and airy; but
theyâre different in degree rather than in kind from the mills of the
Industrial Revolution. Both cubicles and dark mills signify working on
other peopleâs terms, for other peopleâs goals, at other peopleâs
sufferance. Neither type of work usually results in us owning the fruits
of our labors or having the satisfaction of creating something from
start to finish with our own hands. Neither allows us to work at our own
pace, or the pace of the seasons. Neither allows us access to our
families, friends, or communities when we need them or they need us.
Both isolate work from every other part of our lifeâŠ
Weâve made wage-slavery so much a part of our culture that it probably
doesnât even occur to most people that thereâs something unnatural about
separating work from the rest of our lives. Or about spending our entire
working lives producing things in which we can often take only minimal
personal pride â or no pride at allâŠ
Take a job and youâve sold part of yourself to a master. Youâve cut
yourself off from the real fruits of your own efforts.
When you own your own work, you own your own life. Itâs a goal worthy of
a lot of sacrifice. And a lot of deep thought.
[A]nybody who begins to come up with a serious plan that starts cutting
the underpinnings from the state-corporate power structure can expect to
be treated as Public Enemy Number One.[15]
The chief obstacle to the latter process, she wrote, was âgovernment and
its heavily favored and subsidized corporations and financial marketsâŠâ
Now before we go on, as a market anarchist, I have to stipulate that
thereâs nothing inherently wrong with wage labor. And in a free market,
employers would be within their rights to make the kinds of demands
associated with contract feudalism.
The problem, from my standpoint, is that the reduced bargaining power of
labor in the present labor market lets employers get away with it. What
deserves comment is not the legal issue of whether the state should
âallowâ employers to exercise this kind of control, but the question of
what kind of allegedly free marketplace would allow it.
The question is, just how godawful do the other âoptionsâ have to be
before somebodyâs desperate enough to take a job under such conditions?
How do things get to the point where people are lined up to compete for
jobs where they can be forbidden to associate with coworkers away from
work, where even squalid, low-paying retail jobs can involve being
on-call 24/7, where employees canât attend political meetings without
keeping an eye out for an informer, or canât blog under their own names
without living in fear that theyâre a web-search away from termination?
Iâm not a friend of federal labor regulations. We shouldnât need federal
regulations to stop this sort of thing from happening. In a free market
where land and capital werenât artificially scarce and expensive
compared to labor, jobs should be competing for workers. Whatâs
remarkable is not that contract feudalism is technically â legal,â but
that the job market is so abysmal that it could become an issue in the
first place.
As Elizabeth Anderson already suggested in the quote above, the key to
contract feudalism is the reduced bargaining power of labor. Timothy
Carter puts the alternatives in very stark terms:
where the real power to gain a lionâs share of the mutual benefit lies:
with the power to walk away. If one side can walk away from the table
and the other side cannot, the party that can leave can get almost
anything they want as long as they leave the other party only slightly
better off than if there was no deal at allâŠ
What creates an imbalance in the power to walk away? One situation is
need. If one side has to make the exchange, their power to walk away is
gone.
⊠For most people, a job is the ultimate need. It from the earnings of
job that all other needs are satisfied.
So how can we make the exchange more fair?⊠The liberal answer is to
have the government meddle in the labor-capital exchangeâŠ
There is another way. The need for government meddling could end if the
balance of negotiating power between labor and capital were equalized.
Currently, the imbalance exists because capital can walk away, but labor
cannot.[16]
Contrast the present monstrous situation with what would exist in a
genuine free market: jobs competing for workers, instead of the other
way around. Hereâs how Tucker envisioned the worker-friendly effects of
such a free market:
For, say Proudhon and Warren, if the business of banking were made free
to all, more and more persons would enter into it until the competition
should become sharp enough to reduce the price of lending money to the
labor cost, which statistics show to be less than three-fourths of once
per cent. In that case the thousands of people who are now deterred from
going into business by the ruinously high rates which they must pay for
capital with which to start and carry on business will find their
difficulties removed⊠Then will be seen an exemplification of the words
of Richard Cobden that, when two laborers are after one employer, wages
fall, but when two employers are after one laborer, wages rise. Labor
will then be in a position to dictate its wages, and will thus secure
its natural wage, its entire productâŠ[17]
The authors of the Anarchist FAQ described the libertarian socialist
consequences of Tuckerâs free market, in even more expansive terms, in
this passage:
Itâs important to note that because of Tuckerâs proposal to increase the
bargaining power of workers through access to mutual credit, his
individualist anarchism is not only compatible with workersâ control but
would in fact promote it (as well as logically requiring it). For if
access to mutual credit were to increase the bargaining power of workers
to the extent that Tucker claimed it would, they would then be able to:
(1) demand and get workplace democracy; and (2) pool their credit to buy
and own companies collectively. This would eliminate the top-down
structure of the firm and the ability of owners to pay themselves
unfairly large salaries as well as reducing capitalist profits to zero
by ensuring that workers received the full value of their labour. Tucker
himself pointed this out when he argued that Proudhon (like himself)
âwould individualise and associateâ workplaces by mutualism, which would
âplace the means of production within the reach of all.â[18]
So instead of workers living in fear that bosses might discover
something âbadâ about them (like the fact that they have publicly spoken
their minds in the past, like free men and women), bosses would live in
fear lest workers think badly enough of them to take their labor
elsewhere. Instead of workers being so desperate to hold onto a job as
to allow their private lives to be regulated as an extension of work,
management would be so desperate to hold onto workers as to change
conditions on the job to suit them. Instead of workers taking more and
more indignities to avoid bankruptcy and homelessness, bosses would give
up more and more control over the workplace to retain a workforce. In
such an economy, associated labor might hire capital instead of the
other way around, and the natural state of the free market be
cooperative production under the control of the producers.
[1] Elizabeth Anderson, âAdventures in Contract Feudalismâ, Left2Right,
February 10 2005,
http://left2right.typepad.com/main/2005/02/adventures_in_c.html
[2] âCompanyâs Smoking Ban Means Off-Hours, Tooâ, New York Times,
February 8 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/08/business/08smoking.html
[3] Patrick Barkham, âBlogger Sacked for Sounding Offâ, The Guardian,
January 12 2005, http://www.g u a r d i a n . c o . u k / o n l i n e /
w e b l o g s /story/0,14024,1388466,00.html;
http://cyber-junky.co.uk/joe/
[4] Harold Meyerson, âBig Brother On and Off the Jobâ, Washington Post,
August 10 2005, http://www.w a s h i n g t o n p o s t . c om/wp- d y n
/ c o n t e n t /article/2005/08/09/AR2005080901162.html
[5] Self-published. Fayetteville, Ark., 2004,
http://www.mutualist.org/id47.html
[6] The Libertarian, May 1 1969,
http://www.mises.org/journals/lf/1969/1969_05_01.pdf
[7] âThe Lesson of Homesteadâ, Liberty, July 23 1892, in Instead of a
Book (Gordon Press facsimile of Second Edition, 1897, 1972), pp. 453â54.
[8] âCapitalism & Unfreedomâ, Leninâs Tomb, April 1 2005,
http://leninology.blogspot.com/2005/04/capitalism-unfreedom.html
[9] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Capital vol. 1, vol. 35 of Marx and
Engels Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1996) pp.
704â5.
[10] Franz Oppenheimer, The State, trans. by John Gitterman (San
Francisco: Fox & Wilkes, 1997), pp. 5â6.
[11] Albert Nock, Our Enemy, the State (Delavan, Wisc. Hallberg
Publishing Company, 1983), p. 106n.
[12] (Knopf, 1984)
[13] (Free Press, 1996)
[14] Our Enemy, The State, p. 82.
[15] Claire Wolfe, âDark Satanic Cubiclesâ, Loompanics Unlimited 2005
Main Catalog,
http://www.loompanics.com/cgi-local/SoftCart.exe/Articles/darksatanic.html?L+scstore+ckrd3585ff813181+1108492644
[16] Timothy Carter, Alternatives to the Minimum Wageâ, Free Liberal,
April 11 2005, http://www.freeliberal.com/archives/000988.html
[17] âState Socialism and Anarchism,â Instead of a Book, p. 11.
[18] âG.5 âBenjamin Tucker: Capitalist or Anarchist?ââ Anarchist FAQ,
http://www.infoshop.org/faq/secG5.html