💾 Archived View for library.inu.red › file › david-graeber-the-new-anarchists.gmi captured on 2023-01-29 at 09:08:27. Gemini links have been rewritten to link to archived content

View Raw

More Information

➡️ Next capture (2024-06-20)

-=-=-=-=-=-=-

Title: The New Anarchists
Author: David Graeber
Date: 2002
Language: en
Source: Retrieved on May 14th, 2009 from http://www.newleftreview.org/A2368
Notes: Originally published in “New Left Review”, 13 — January-February 2002.

David Graeber

The New Anarchists

It’s hard to think of another time when there has been such a gulf

between intellectuals and activists; between theorists of revolution and

its practitioners. Writers who for years have been publishing essays

that sound like position papers for vast social movements that do not in

fact exist seem seized with confusion or worse, dismissive contempt, now

that real ones are everywhere emerging. It’s particularly scandalous in

the case of what’s still, for no particularly good reason, referred to

as the ‘anti-globalization’ movement, one that has in a mere two or

three years managed to transform completely the sense of historical

possibilities for millions across the planet. This may be the result of

sheer ignorance, or of relying on what might be gleaned from such

overtly hostile sources as the New York Times; then again, most of

what’s written even in progressive outlets seems largely to miss the

point — or at least, rarely focuses on what participants in the movement

really think is most important about it.

As an anthropologist and active participant — particularly in the more

radical, direct-action end of the movement — I may be able to clear up

some common points of misunderstanding; but the news may not be

gratefully received. Much of the hesitation, I suspect, lies in the

reluctance of those who have long fancied themselves radicals of some

sort to come to terms with the fact that they are really liberals:

interested in expanding individual freedoms and pursuing social justice,

but not in ways that would seriously challenge the existence of reigning

institutions like capital or state. And even many of those who would

like to see revolutionary change might not feel entirely happy about

having to accept that most of the creative energy for radical politics

is now coming from anarchism — a tradition that they have hitherto

mostly dismissed — and that taking this movement seriously will

necessarily also mean a respectful engagement with it.

I am writing as an anarchist; but in a sense, counting how many people

involved in the movement actually call themselves ‘anarchists’, and in

what contexts, is a bit beside the point.[1] The very notion of direct

action, with its rejection of a politics which appeals to governments to

modify their behaviour, in favour of physical intervention against state

power in a form that itself prefigures an alternative — all of this

emerges directly from the libertarian tradition. Anarchism is the heart

of the movement, its soul; the source of most of what’s new and hopeful

about it. In what follows, then, I will try to clear up what seem to be

the three most common misconceptions about the movement — our supposed

opposition to something called ‘globalization’, our supposed ‘violence’,

and our supposed lack of a coherent ideology — and then suggest how

radical intellectuals might think about reimagining their own

theoretical practice in the light of all of this.

A globalization movement?

The phrase ‘anti-globalization movement’ is a coinage of the US media

and activists have never felt comfortable with it. Insofar as this is a

movement against anything, it’s against neoliberalism, which can be

defined as a kind of market fundamentalism — or, better, market

Stalinism — that holds there is only one possible direction for human

historical development. The map is held by an elite of economists and

corporate flacks, to whom must be ceded all power once held by

institutions with any shred of democratic accountability; from now on it

will be wielded largely through unelected treaty organizations like the

IMF, WTO or NAFTA. In Argentina, or Estonia, or Taiwan, it would be

possible to say this straight out: ‘We are a movement against

neoliberalism’. But in the US, language is always a problem. The

corporate media here is probably the most politically monolithic on the

planet: neoliberalism is all there is to see — the background reality;

as a result, the word itself cannot be used. The issues involved can

only be addressed using propaganda terms like ‘free trade’ or ‘the free

market’. So American activists find themselves in a quandary: if one

suggests putting ‘the N word’ (as it’s often called) in a pamphlet or

press release, alarm bells immediately go off: one is being

exclusionary, playing only to an educated elite. There have been all

sorts of attempts to frame alternative expressions — we’re a ‘global

justice movement’, we’re a movement ‘against corporate globalization’.

None are especially elegant or quite satisfying and, as a result, it is

common in meetings to hear the speakers using ‘globalization movement’

and ‘anti-globalization movement’ pretty much interchangeably.

The phrase ‘globalization movement’, though, is really quite apropos. If

one takes globalization to mean the effacement of borders and the free

movement of people, possessions and ideas, then it’s pretty clear that

not only is the movement itself a product of globalization, but the

majority of groups involved in it — the most radical ones in particular

— are far more supportive of globalization in general than are the IMF

or WTO. It was an international network called People’s Global Action,

for example, that put out the first summons for planet-wide days of

action such as J18 and N30 — the latter the original call for protest

against the 1999 WTO meetings in Seattle. And PGA in turn owes its

origins to the famous International Encounter for Humanity and Against

Neoliberalism, which took place knee-deep in the jungle mud of

rainy-season Chiapas, in August 1996; and was itself initiated, as

Subcomandante Marcos put it, ‘by all the rebels around the world’.

People from over 50 countries came streaming into the Zapatista-held

village of La Realidad. The vision for an ‘intercontinental network of

resistance’ was laid out in the Second Declaration of La Realidad: ‘We

declare that we will make a collective network of all our particular

struggles and resistances, an intercontinental network of resistance

against neoliberalism, an intercontinental network of resistance for

humanity’:

Let it be a network of voices that resist the war Power wages on them.

A network of voices that not only speak, but also struggle and resist

for humanity and against neoliberalism.

A network that covers the five continents and helps to resist the death

that Power promises us.[2]

This, the Declaration made clear, was ‘not an organizing structure; it

has no central head or decision maker; it has no central command or

hierarchies. We are the network, all of us who resist.’

The following year, European Zapatista supporters in the Ya Basta!

groups organized a second encuentro in Spain, where the idea of the

network process was taken forward: PGA was born at a meeting in Geneva

in February 1998. From the start, it included not only anarchist groups

and radical trade unions in Spain, Britain and Germany, but a Gandhian

socialist farmers’ league in India (the KRRS), associations of

Indonesian and Sri Lankan fisherfolk, the Argentinian teachers’ union,

indigenous groups such as the Maori of New Zealand and Kuna of Ecuador,

the Brazilian Landless Workers’ Movement, a network made up of

communities founded by escaped slaves in South and Central America — and

any number of others. For a long time, North America was scarcely

represented, save for the Canadian Postal Workers’ Union — which acted

as PGA’s main communications hub, until it was largely replaced by the

internet — and a Montreal-based anarchist group called CLAC.

If the movement’s origins are internationalist, so are its demands. The

three-plank programme of Ya Basta! in Italy, for instance, calls for a

universally guaranteed ‘basic income’, global citizenship, guaranteeing

free movement of people across borders, and free access to new

technology — which in practice would mean extreme limits on patent

rights (themselves a very insidious form of protectionism). The noborder

network — their slogan: ‘No One is Illegal’ — has organized week-long

campsites, laboratories for creative resistance, on the Polish — German

and Ukrainian borders, in Sicily and at Tarifa in Spain. Activists have

dressed up as border guards, built boat-bridges across the River Oder

and blockaded Frankfurt Airport with a full classical orchestra to

protest against the deportation of immigrants (deportees have died of

suffocation on Lufthansa and KLM flights). This summer’s camp is planned

for Strasbourg, home of the Schengen Information System, a

search-and-control database with tens of thousands of terminals across

Europe, targeting the movements of migrants, activists, anyone they

like.

More and more, activists have been trying to draw attention to the fact

that the neoliberal vision of ‘globalization’ is pretty much limited to

the movement of capital and commodities, and actually increases barriers

against the free flow of people, information and ideas — the size of the

US border guard has almost tripled since the signing of NAFTA. Hardly

surprising: if it were not possible to effectively imprison the majority

of people in the world in impoverished enclaves, there would be no

incentive for Nike or The Gap to move production there to begin with.

Given a free movement of people, the whole neoliberal project would

collapse. This is another thing to bear in mind when people talk about

the decline of ‘sovereignty’ in the contemporary world: the main

achievement of the nation-state in the last century has been the

establishment of a uniform grid of heavily policed barriers across the

world. It is precisely this international system of control that we are

fighting against, in the name of genuine globalization.

These connexions — and the broader links between neoliberal policies and

mechanisms of state coercion (police, prisons, militarism) — have played

a more and more salient role in our analyses as we ourselves have

confronted escalating levels of state repression. Borders became a major

issue in Europe during the IMF meetings at Prague, and later EU meetings

in Nice. At the FTAA summit in Quebec City last summer, invisible lines

that had previously been treated as if they didn’t exist (at least for

white people) were converted overnight into fortifications against the

movement of would-be global citizens, demanding the right to petition

their rulers. The three-kilometre ‘wall’ constructed through the center

of Quebec City, to shield the heads of state junketing inside from any

contact with the populace, became the perfect symbol for what

neoliberalism actually means in human terms. The spectacle of the Black

Bloc, armed with wire cutters and grappling hooks, joined by everyone

from Steelworkers to Mohawk warriors to tear down the wall, became — for

that very reason — one of the most powerful moments in the movement’s

history.[3]

There is one striking contrast between this and earlier

internationalisms, however. The former usually ended up exporting

Western organizational models to the rest of the world; in this, the

flow has if anything been the other way around. Many, perhaps most, of

the movement’s signature techniques — including mass nonviolent civil

disobedience itself — were first developed in the global South. In the

long run, this may well prove the single most radical thing about it.

Billionaires and clowns

In the corporate media, the word ‘violent’ is invoked as a kind of

mantra — invariably, repeatedly — whenever a large action takes place:

‘violent protests’, ‘violent clashes’, ‘police raid headquarters of

violent protesters’, even ‘violent riots’ (there are other kinds?). Such

expressions are typically invoked when a simple, plain-English

description of what took place (people throwing paint-bombs, breaking

windows of empty storefronts, holding hands as they blockaded

intersections, cops beating them with sticks) might give the impression

that the only truly violent parties were the police. The US media is

probably the biggest offender here — and this despite the fact that,

after two years of increasingly militant direct action, it is still

impossible to produce a single example of anyone to whom a US activist

has caused physical injury. I would say that what really disturbs the

powers-that-be is not the ‘violence’ of the movement but its relative

lack of it; governments simply do not know how to deal with an overtly

revolutionary movement that refuses to fall into familiar patterns of

armed resistance.

The effort to destroy existing paradigms is usually quite

self-conscious. Where once it seemed that the only alternatives to

marching along with signs were either Gandhian non-violent civil

disobedience or outright insurrection, groups like the Direct Action

Network, Reclaim the Streets, Black Blocs or Tute Bianche have all, in

their own ways, been trying to map out a completely new territory in

between. They’re attempting to invent what many call a ‘new language’ of

civil disobedience, combining elements of street theatre, festival and

what can only be called non-violent warfare — non-violent in the sense

adopted by, say, Black Bloc anarchists, in that it eschews any direct

physical harm to human beings. Ya Basta! for example is famous for its

tute bianche or white-overalls tactics: men and women dressed in

elaborate forms of padding, ranging from foam armour to inner tubes to

rubber-ducky flotation devices, helmets and chemical-proof white

jumpsuits (their British cousins are well-clad Wombles). As this mock

army pushes its way through police barricades, all the while protecting

each other against injury or arrest, the ridiculous gear seems to reduce

human beings to cartoon characters — misshapen, ungainly, foolish,

largely indestructible. The effect is only increased when lines of

costumed figures attack police with balloons and water pistols or, like

the ‘Pink Bloc’ at Prague and elsewhere, dress as fairies and tickle

them with feather dusters.

At the American Party Conventions, Billionaires for Bush (or Gore)

dressed in high-camp tuxedos and evening gowns and tried to press wads

of fake money into the cops’ pockets, thanking them for repressing the

dissent. None were even slightly hurt — perhaps police are given

aversion therapy against hitting anyone in a tuxedo. The Revolutionary

Anarchist Clown Bloc, with their high bicycles, rainbow wigs and squeaky

mallets, confused the cops by attacking each other (or the

billionaires). They had all the best chants: ‘Democracy? Ha Ha Ha!’,

‘The pizza united can never be defeated’, ‘Hey ho, hey ho — ha ha, hee

hee!’, as well as meta-chants like ‘Call! Response! Call! Response!’ and

— everyone’s favourite — ‘Three Word Chant! Three Word Chant!’

In Quebec City, a giant catapult built along mediaeval lines (with help

from the left caucus of the Society for Creative Anachronism) lobbed

soft toys at the FTAA. Ancient-warfare techniques have been studied to

adopt for non-violent but very militant forms of confrontation: there

were peltasts and hoplites (the former mainly from the Prince Edwards

Islands, the latter from Montreal) at Quebec City, and research

continues into Roman-style shield walls. Blockading has become an art

form: if you make a huge web of strands of yarn across an intersection,

it’s actually impossible to cross; motorcycle cops get trapped like

flies. The Liberation Puppet with its arms fully extended can block a

four-lane highway, while snake-dances can be a form of mobile blockade.

Rebels in London last Mayday planned Monopoly Board actions — Building

Hotels on Mayfair for the homeless, Sale of the Century in Oxford

Street, Guerrilla Gardening — only partly disrupted by heavy policing

and torrential rain. But even the most militant of the militant —

eco-saboteurs like the Earth Liberation Front — scrupulously avoid doing

anything that would cause harm to human beings (or animals, for that

matter). It’s this scrambling of conventional categories that so throws

the forces of order and makes them desperate to bring things back to

familiar territory (simple violence): even to the point, as in Genoa, of

encouraging fascist hooligans to run riot as an excuse to use

overwhelming force against everybody else.

One could trace these forms of action back to the stunts and guerrilla

theater of the Yippies or Italian ‘metropolitan Indians’ in the sixties,

the squatter battles in Germany or Italy in the seventies and eighties,

even the peasant resistance to the expansion of Tokyo airport. But it

seems to me that here, too, the really crucial origins lie with the

Zapatistas, and other movements in the global South. In many ways, the

Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) represents an attempt by

people who have always been denied the right to non-violent, civil

resistance to seize it; essentially, to call the bluff of neoliberalism

and its pretenses to democratization and yielding power to ‘civil

society’. It is, as its commanders say, an army which aspires not to be

an army any more (it’s something of an open secret that, for the last

five years at least, they have not even been carrying real guns). As

Marcos explains their conversion from standard tactics of guerrilla war:

We thought the people would either not pay attention to us, or come

together with us to fight. But they did not react in either of these two

ways. It turned out that all these people, who were thousands, tens of

thousands, hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, did not want to rise

up with us but ... neither did they want us to be annihilated. They

wanted us to dialogue. This completely broke our scheme and ended up

defining zapatismo, the neo-zapatismo.[4]

Now the EZLN is the sort of army that organizes ‘invasions’ of Mexican

military bases in which hundreds of rebels sweep in entirely unarmed to

yell at and try to shame the resident soldiers. Similarly, mass actions

by the Landless Workers’ Movement gain an enormous moral authority in

Brazil by reoccupying unused lands entirely non-violently. In either

case, it’s pretty clear that if the same people had tried the same thing

twenty years ago, they would simply have been shot.

Anarchy and peace

However you choose to trace their origins, these new tactics are

perfectly in accord with the general anarchistic inspiration of the

movement, which is less about seizing state power than about exposing,

delegitimizing and dismantling mechanisms of rule while winning

ever-larger spaces of autonomy from it. The critical thing, though, is

that all this is only possible in a general atmosphere of peace. In

fact, it seems to me that these are the ultimate stakes of struggle at

the moment: one that may well determine the overall direction of the

twenty-first century. We should remember that during the late nineteenth

and early twentieth century, when most Marxist parties were rapidly

becoming reformist social democrats, anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism

were the centre of the revolutionary left.[5] The situation only really

changed with World War I and the Russian Revolution. It was the

Bolsheviks’ success, we are usually told, that led to the decline of

anarchism — with the glorious exception of Spain — and catapulted

Communism to the fore. But it seems to me one could look at this another

way.

In the late nineteenth century most people honestly believed that war

between industrialized powers was becoming obsolete; colonial adventures

were a constant, but a war between France and England, on French or

English soil, seemed as unthinkable as it would today. By 1900, even the

use of passports was considered an antiquated barbarism. The ‘short

twentieth century’ was, by contrast, probably the most violent in human

history, almost entirely preoccupied with either waging world wars or

preparing for them. Hardly surprising, then, that anarchism quickly came

to seem unrealistic, if the ultimate measure of political effectiveness

became the ability to maintain huge mechanized killing machines. This is

one thing that anarchists, by definition, can never be very good at.

Neither is it surprising that Marxist parties — who have been only too

good at it — seemed eminently practical and realistic in comparison.

Whereas the moment the Cold War ended, and war between industrialized

powers once again seemed unthinkable, anarchism reappeared just where it

had been at the end of the nineteenth century, as an international

movement at the very centre of the revolutionary left.

If this is right, it becomes clearer what the ultimate stakes of the

current ‘anti-terrorist’ mobilization are. In the short run, things do

look very frightening. Governments who were desperately scrambling for

some way to convince the public we were terrorists even before September

11 now feel they’ve been given carteblanche; there is little doubt that

a lot of good people are about to suffer terrible repression. But in the

long run, a return to twentieth-century levels of violence is simply

impossible. The September 11 attacks were clearly something of a fluke

(the first wildly ambitious terrorist scheme in history that actually

worked); the spread of nuclear weapons is ensuring that larger and

larger portions of the globe will be for all practical purposes

off-limits to conventional warfare. And if war is the health of the

state, the prospects for anarchist-style organizing can only be

improving.

Practising direct democracy

A constant complaint about the globalization movement in the progressive

press is that, while tactically brilliant, it lacks any central theme or

coherent ideology. (This seems to be the left equivalent of the

corporate media’s claims that we are a bunch of dumb kids touting a

bundle of completely unrelated causes — free Mumia, dump the debt, save

the old-growth forests.) Another line of attack is that the movement is

plagued by a generic opposition to all forms of structure or

organization. It’s distressing that, two years after Seattle, I should

have to write this, but someone obviously should: in North America

especially, this is a movement about reinventing democracy. It is not

opposed to organization. It is about creating new forms of organization.

It is not lacking in ideology. Those new forms of organization are its

ideology. It is about creating and enacting horizontal networks instead

of top-down structures like states, parties or corporations; networks

based on principles of decentralized, non-hierarchical consensus

democracy. Ultimately, it aspires to be much more than that, because

ultimately it aspires to reinvent daily life as whole. But unlike many

other forms of radicalism, it has first organized itself in the

political sphere — mainly because this was a territory that the powers

that be (who have shifted all their heavy artillery into the economic)

have largely abandoned.

Over the past decade, activists in North America have been putting

enormous creative energy into reinventing their groups’ own internal

processes, to create viable models of what functioning direct democracy

could actually look like. In this we’ve drawn particularly, as I’ve

noted, on examples from outside the Western tradition, which almost

invariably rely on some process of consensus finding, rather than

majority vote. The result is a rich and growing panoply of

organizational instruments — spokescouncils, affinity groups,

facilitation tools, break-outs, fishbowls, blocking concerns,

vibe-watchers and so on — all aimed at creating forms of democratic

process that allow initiatives to rise from below and attain maximum

effective solidarity, without stifling dissenting voices, creating

leadership positions or compelling anyone to do anything which they have

not freely agreed to do.

The basic idea of consensus process is that, rather than voting, you try

to come up with proposals acceptable to everyone — or at least, not

highly objectionable to anyone: first state the proposal, then ask for

‘concerns’ and try to address them. Often, at this point, people in the

group will propose ‘friendly amendments’ to add to the original

proposal, or otherwise alter it, to ensure concerns are addressed. Then,

finally, when you call for consensus, you ask if anyone wishes to

‘block’ or ‘stand aside’. Standing aside is just saying, ‘I would not

myself be willing to take part in this action, but I wouldn’t stop

anyone else from doing it’. Blocking is a way of saying ‘I think this

violates the fundamental principles or purposes of being in the group’.

It functions as a veto: any one person can kill a proposal completely by

blocking it — although there are ways to challenge whether a block is

genuinely principled.

There are different sorts of groups. Spokescouncils, for example, are

large assemblies that coordinate between smaller ‘affinity groups’. They

are most often held before, and during, large-scale direct actions like

Seattle or Quebec. Each affinity group (which might have between 4 and

20 people) selects a ‘spoke’, who is empowered to speak for them in the

larger group. Only the spokes can take part in the actual process of

finding consensus at the council, but before major decisions they break

out into affinity groups again and each group comes to consensus on what

position they want their spoke to take (not as unwieldy as it might

sound). Break-outs, on the other hand, are when a large meeting

temporarily splits up into smaller ones that will focus on making

decisions or generating proposals, which can then be presented for

approval before the whole group when it reassembles. Facilitation tools

are used to resolve problems or move things along if they seem to be

bogging down. You can ask for a brainstorming session, in which people

are only allowed to present ideas but not to criticize other people’s;

or for a non-binding straw poll, where people raise their hands just to

see how everyone feels about a proposal, rather than to make a decision.

A fishbowl would only be used if there is a profound difference of

opinion: you can take two representatives for each side — one man and

one woman — and have the four of them sit in the middle, everyone else

surrounding them silently, and see if the four can’t work out a

synthesis or compromise together, which they can then present as a

proposal to the whole group.

Prefigurative politics

This is very much a work in progress, and creating a culture of

democracy among people who have little experience of such things is

necessarily a painful and uneven business, full of all sorts of

stumblings and false starts, but — as almost any police chief who has

faced us on the streets can attest — direct democracy of this sort can

be astoundingly effective. And it is difficult to find anyone who has

fully participated in such an action whose sense of human possibilities

has not been profoundly transformed as a result. It’s one thing to say,

‘Another world is possible’. It’s another to experience it, however

momentarily. Perhaps the best way to start thinking about these

organizations — the Direct Action Network, for example — is to see them

as the diametrical opposite of the sectarian Marxist groups; or, for

that matter, of the sectarian Anarchist groups.[6] Where the

democratic-centralist ‘party’ puts its emphasis on achieving a complete

and correct theoretical analysis, demands ideological uniformity and

tends to juxtapose the vision of an egalitarian future with extremely

authoritarian forms of organization in the present, these openly seek

diversity. Debate always focuses on particular courses of action; it’s

taken for granted that no one will ever convert anyone else entirely to

their point of view. The motto might be, ‘If you are willing to act like

an anarchist now, your long-term vision is pretty much your own

business’. Which seems only sensible: none of us know how far these

principles can actually take us, or what a complex society based on them

would end up looking like. Their ideology, then, is immanent in the

anti-authoritarian principles that underlie their practice, and one of

their more explicit principles is that things should stay this way.

Finally, I’d like to tease out some of the questions the direct-action

networks raise about alienation, and its broader implications for

political practice. For example: why is it that, even when there is next

to no other constituency for revolutionary politics in a capitalist

society, the one group most likely to be sympathetic to its project

consists of artists, musicians, writers, and others involved in some

form of non-alienated production? Surely there must be a link between

the actual experience of first imagining things and then bringing them

into being, individually or collectively, and the ability to envision

social alternatives — particularly, the possibility of a society itself

premised on less alienated forms of creativity? One might even suggest

that revolutionary coalitions always tend to rely on a kind of alliance

between a society’s least alienated and its most oppressed; actual

revolutions, one could then say, have tended to happen when these two

categories most broadly overlap.

This would, at least, help explain why it almost always seems to be

peasants and craftsmen — or even more, newly proletarianized former

peasants and craftsmen — who actually overthrow capitalist regimes; and

not those inured to generations of wage labour. It would also help

explain the extraordinary importance of indigenous people’s struggles in

the new movement: such people tend to be simultaneously the very least

alienated and most oppressed people on earth. Now that new communication

technologies have made it possible to include them in global

revolutionary alliances, as well as local resistance and revolt, it is

well-nigh inevitable that they should play a profoundly inspirational

role.

Previous texts in this series have been Naomi Klein, ‘Reclaiming the

Commons’ (NLR 9), Subcomandante Marcos, ‘The Punch Card and the

Hourglass’ (NLR 9), John Sellers, ‘Raising a Ruckus’ (NLR 10) and José

Bové, ‘A Farmers’ International?’ (NLR 12).

 

[1] There are some who take anarchist principles of anti-sectarianism

and open-endedness so seriously that they are sometimes reluctant to

call themselves ‘anarchists’ for that very reason.

[2] Read by Subcomandante Marcos during the closing session of the First

Intercontinental Encuentro, 3 August 1996: Our Word is Our Weapon:

Selected Writings, Juana Ponce de León, ed., New York 2001.

[3] Helping tear it down was certainly one of the more exhilarating

experiences of this author’s life.

[4] Interviewed by Yvon LeBot, Subcomandante Marcos: El Sueño Zapatista,

Barcelona 1997, pp. 214 — 5; Bill Weinberg, Homage to Chiapas, London

2000, p. 188.

[5] ‘In 1905 — 1914 the Marxist left had in most countries been on the

fringe of the revolutionary movement, the main body of Marxists had been

identified with a de facto non-revolutionary social democracy, while the

bulk of the revolutionary left was anarcho-syndicalist, or at least much

closer to the ideas and the mood of anarcho-syndicalism than to that of

classical Marxism.’ Eric Hobsbawm, ‘Bolshevism and the Anarchists’,

Revolutionaries, New York 1973, p. 61.

[6] What one might call capital-A anarchist groups, such as, say, the

North East Federation of Anarchist Communists — whose members must

accept the Platform of the Anarchist Communists set down in 1926 by

Nestor Makhno — do still exist, of course. But the small-a anarchists

are the real locus of historical dynamism right now.