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Title: Anarchism in Greek philosophy Author: D. Ferraro Date: November 1964 Language: en Topics: Ancient Greece, cynicism, philosophy, proto-anarchism Source: Retrieved on 22nd September 2020 from https://libcom.org/library/anarchism-greek-philosophy Notes: First appeared in No. 1 of The Pluralist
AT FIRST SIGHT THE TITLE “Anarchism in Greek Philosophy” may seem
somewhat of a contradiction. Our attitudes towards Hellenism,
conditioned as they are by nineteenth century romanticism, have
accustomed us to regard Greek thought as the complete antithesis of
anarchism. This is the result of close study of Plato and Aristotle at
the expense of other philosophers; such study leads to the impression
that the beliefs of either of these two thinkers were typical of Greek
speculation. If we remember that over one thousand years separates the
Ionian physicists from the closing of the schools by Justinian and if we
do not lose sight of the fact that during that period philosophy ran the
gamut from scientific or quasi-scientific speculation to the esoteric
ritualism of the Hermetic Brotherhood, then we shall not find it so
surprising that some Greek thinkers evolved theories which led them to
adopt an anarchistic position.
Before proceeding to an account of these thinkers I should like to make
some preliminary points. Firstly, the purpose of this article is
historical, not critical. It is not my aim to give an analytical
discussion of anarchistic theories in Greek philosophy but rather to
give an account of one of the doctrines, chiefly that held by the
Cynics, which might be termed anarchistic. Secondly I am not in any way
concerned to give a comprehensive view of the growth of Greek philosophy
during the 4^(th) and 3^(rd) centuries B.C. Those who wish to pursue
this field of study may refer to the standard works of reference. My
intention is solely to bring to notice some aspects of this branch of
Greek philosophy which seems to have been overlooked by most modern
writers.
In order to gain an overall perspective of the period it will be
necessary to give a brief sketch of the course of Greek history up to
the 3^(rd) century B.C. Prior to the conquests of Phillip of Macedon,
the Greeks were city-state dwellers, owing allegiance to one or other of
the polis each of which was a political and social entity, autonomous
and economically self-sufficient. No matter how complex the
superstructure of government became, the basic nature of the polis
remained and when Athens, by her imperial ambitions, trespassed upon the
privileges of the polis, Greek sentiment was outraged to the extent of
declaring war. This is not, of course, the only reason for the
Peloponnesian War. It would be foolish to put forward such a
simplification. Nevertheless Athens, by annexing the members of the
Delian League, placed upon them a restraint which the military power of
Sparta hesitated to place on the members of her own federation: it was
this restraint and its implications for the autonomy of the polis which
may be said to be at the root of the ill-feeling among the non-Athenian
states. Ironically the subsequent conflict and the rise of Macedon led
to the destruction of the city-state as a political reality to a
philosophical ideal. The trend was to a world-state and Greek
philosophy, which had previously been conditioned to situations which
might arise in a city-state, was forced to adjust to meet the new
demands. As a result, world-systems such as Stoicism and Epicureanism
were evolved, systems which attempted to discover philosophical
positions which might explain or rationalise the new political and
social situations which the Alexandrian empire had created. The chief
characteristic of these two world systems was in their recognition of
one universal end for all men and in their acceptance of all men as
brothers within the bonds of the system. Unlike the theories of Plato
and Aristotle which were designed for the improvement of the few, Stoic
and Epicurean beliefs made no barrier to any man’s acceptance provided
that he followed the tenets of the faith.
A third system, Cynicism, suggested a position very similar to that
which we regard as classical anarchism in the form enunciated by Bakunin
and Kropotkin. It is, however, not possible to speak of a Cynic school
as we can speak of Stoics or Epicureans. There was never a connected
corpus of theoretical writings which might be described as Cynic nor was
there ever agreement among the Cynics themselves as to the correct
methods of interpreting their founders’ doctrines in practice. In this
refusal to elevate one particular formulation of belief into a Cynic
canon, the Cynics were quite atypical of 3^(rd) century philosophical
systems.
In order to understand the Cynic position it is essential to understand
the connotations of two Greek words Physis and Nomos. These may best be
translated as Nature and Custom, but their semantic developments are
most involved. Physis can means the natural form an object takes as a
result of normal growth, it can refer to a person’s nature or character,
it can be used of animals’ instinct and it can mean the natural order of
things, the regular order of nature. Nomos on the other hand means
usage, or law, or the established authority or body of ordinances which
govern a set of circumstances. It can be seen that some of the meanings
of these two words are widely contradictory while others reconcile these
two concepts. Ionian physics was concerned to perceive the order in
nature, the Sophists were concerned to unite Nature and Law in the ideal
man. Plato preached a life “according to Nature” a cry which was adopted
by the Cynics themselves, and Aristotle devoted a lifetime to the
imposing of order upon the natural occurrence of things. The important
thing for us to realise is that Greek philosophical systems except that
of the Cynics, attempted to reconcile the two concepts. The Cynics alone
rejected Nomos and sought a life which might be lived purely by the
dictates of Nature. It is illuminating to read such a work as
Kropotkin’s Mutual Aid in the light of Cynic doctrine. It is even more
instructive for our immediate purpose to examine the implications for
the Greeks of a rejection of Nomos.
One of the results of a political system which is based on a small unit
such as the city-state, is that appeals to a common interest are less
likely to deceive the people than they would in a large system such as
our own. In the polis the citizens would be acquainted with each other’s
prejudices and aspirations, and opportunities for the destruction of
one’s enemies or the elevation of one’s friends would be more readily
available. One result of this was that the Greeks never sought to
bolster their legal penalties by appeals to divine inspiration or
motivation; the notion of custom or usage was never quite submerged in
the notion of law. By rejecting the validity of Nomos, the Cynics were
not rejecting any theological system, but rather the rule of custom or
convention. However, because the Greeks saw through appeals to common
interest, once a particular nomos had become accepted as forming part of
the general body of Nomos, it was almost impossible to reject this
without undermining the whole basis of organised society. The strongest
appeal a Greek lawyer can make is to what is customary. Therefore in
rejecting Nomos the Cynics were rejecting organised society and denying
the right of established authority to prescribe the limits of their
actions. When Diogenes slept with prostitutes in the street he was
offending far more than the sensibilities of squeamish bystanders. His
action struck at the foundations of ordered social existence as Greeks
knew it.
This is not easy for twentieth-century man to understand. We are used to
the idea that laws are formulated in order to preserve a status quo
which is divinely commanded. The Greek might have said that the order of
the world pleased the Gods, but he would not have been likely to claim
that the order of the world was established and maintained by the Gods.
Disorder, chaos or anarchy was an offence against man’s reason and this
was a much more serious affair than irreligion. Of course religion was
supported by the state, but it is significant that while Socrates is
charged with atheism and impiety, the real sting of the accusation is
that he teaches the worse to appear the better case, that is, he
perverts what is the “natural order of things”.
We have seen therefore, that Greek philosophy as a whole was concerned
with uniting the forces of Nature and Custom, while Cynicism rejected
the latter out of hand and preached the life according to Nature. It is
now time to examine some of the individual doctrines which the Cynics
professed, and to discover what qualities in them may be termed
anarchistic.
D. R. Dudley points out that, despite the claims of antiquity that
Antithesis was the founder of Cynicism, Diogenes of Sinope must be
regarded as the true formulator of the Cynic way of life. I have no time
to discuss the numerous stories which connected themselves with
Diogenes’ eccentric way of practicing his doctrines. These stories come
mostly from later writers whose main aim is to denigrate Cynicism, and
may thus be discounted. Perhaps the most important gift which Diogenes
bequeathed to the Cynic brotherhood was his insistence on the practical
application of his beliefs. He was no armchair philosopher, no academic
theorist divorced from the exigencies of real life situations. The very
fact that so many stories grew up around his personality indicates the
degree to which he carried his preaching into practice. For the later
Cynics, Diogenes became a heroic figure only second in importance to
Hercules, their divine patron. In view of his importance it will be of
value to examine those opinions which can reasonably be assigned to him
from the mass of conflicting evidence.
One of the most famous paradoxes of Diogenes is his command “Deface the
Currency”. In order to understand fully the implications of this phrase
it is necessary to realise that the word for “currency” is nomisma, a
word derived from Nomos. The Greek system of currency was not
standardised and coins minted according to various standards were in
general circulation: Attic, Aeginitian and Euboic coin-standards were
all accepted as valid currency. However, this flux of currency standard
meant that counterfeitery or defacing the coinage was a much more
serious offence than it is today since its consequences were more
far-reaching. Therefore in commanding his followers to deface the
coinage, Diogenes was enjoining a wholesale attack on prevailing
conventions in all spheres of human activity. “The standard of value of
society is wrong”, proclaims Diogenes, and his solution is the complete
rejection of such a standard. Such a policy demands complete freedom of
speech and action, and these became the two qualities most associated
with the Cynics. Stories illustrating Diogenes’ possession of both these
qualities abound in the literature of antiquity, but the burden of all
of them is the same; without fear of any consequence Diogenes pursued
his policy of attacking conventional mores, no matter into what
apparently gross position this might lead him.
Moreover this freedom was didactic in purpose. The aim of Diogenes and
his fellow Cynic was to change the situation which seemed to them so
full of evil. They were, in other words, moralistic in their intent, and
they preached that if their precepts were to be followed, social
happiness would result.
This seems very close to the ideas of nineteenth-century anarchism as
practised by Kropotkin and is in sharp contrast to professed
Libertarian[1] principles, although Libertarian practice often comes
very close to proselytising and evangelising. The Cynics, in setting out
a programme for happy existence were following the tendency of the other
world systems. Greek philosophy was always concerned to find for mankind
a way in which the demands of society could be satisfactorily met. The
Cynics rejected these demands out of hand; they denied the competence of
courts to judge their actions and they propagated the doctrine that all
social laws, hierarchies and standards were invalid. If we read the
works of Malatesta or Bakunin, or examine the motives
of the Anarcho-syndicalist movements in the Spanish anti-fascist
conflict, a great many parallels will become apparent.
We have seen that in their insistence on absolute freedom of speech and
action, the Cynics formulated an idea which is characteristic of
anarchist thought. Another parallel idea was the relative concept of
law. As Sayne says, “Since laws were made by men and might have been
other than what they were, and since customs varied in different
countries, the Cynics held that laws and customs had no validity. They
did not consider that the mere fact that observances were required by
law and custom gave them a moral validity.”
Sayne’s book on Diogenes, written as it is from a condemnatory point or
view, is most instructive, for it shows up the parallels between
Cynicism and anarchism. Julian says in one place, speaking of the Cynic
Oenomaus, “This then is his aim, to do away with all reverence to the
gods, to bring dishonour on all human wisdom, to trample on all law that
can be identified with honour and justice, and more than this, to
trample on those laws which have been, as it were, engraved on our souls
by the gods … Robbers take cover in desert places, whereas the Cynics go
up and down in our midst subverting the institutions of society.” It is
clear that much of the Cynics’ purpose finds its counterpart in
anarchist theory.
In the course of what has been a most sketchy account of some aspects of
the subject, I have been concerned merely to show some similarities
between Cynic thought and anarchist theory. I have not assayed
completeness nor have I attempted criticism. Those who are interested to
pursue Cynicism further may find D. R. Dudley’s book A History of
Cynicism of value.
[1] In the sense in which the word is used by the Libertarian Society of
Sydney University—Ed.