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Title: Nestor Ivanovich Makhno Author: Aleksandr Shubin Language: en Topics: Nestor Makhno, biography Source: Retrieved on 30th July 2020 from http://www.nestormakhno.info/english/nim.htm Notes: Translation, glossary and notes by Mark Harris
Nestor Ivanovich Makhno thought that he was born on 27 October 1889. The
birth registry says that on 26 October 1888 a son, Nestor, was born to
the family of Ivan Rodionovich Mikhno and his legal wife Evdokia
Matveevna. On the next day he was christened. His parents distorted the
year of birth of their son, in order to put off giving him up to the
Army for longer. Although the young Nestor never entered the Czarist
army, his parents’ invention saved his life, when his death penalty was
changed to imprisonment with hard labor because of his minority.
After receiving a basic education, Makhno became a laborer at the Kerner
iron foundry.
Makhno’s life before 1906 reminds one of the story of the shoemaker who
according to his ability was the most outstanding military commander in
the world, but who never encountered war in his life. However, in 1906
he joined the terrorist “Peasant group of anarchist communists” – a
group of “Robin Hoods” in Gulyai-Polye, attacking landowners and the
police. Makhno took part in exchanges of gunfire, and was frequently
arrested, but only in 1908 could sufficient evidence to convict him be
found.
Nestor awaited the execution of his sentence. He did not know that the
bureaucratic organs were still deciding his fate. The forged date of his
birth played a deciding role – Makhno was still a minor. This permitted
the authorities to take into account that his crimes did not involve
anyone’s death. With this consideration, Stolypin[1] himself personally
authorized the commutation of his sentence to life imprisonment at hard
labor.
On 2 August 1911, Makhno was sent to the Moscow central transit prison
(Butyrki), where he “settled”. At the prison his mutiny continued, and
he argued with the jail officials, for which he was frequently sent to
an isolation cell. This resulted in tuberculosis, the disease which led
to Nestor Ivanovich’s death in 1934. During this time the world view of
the young revolutionary was still being formed. Destiny again
strengthened Makhno’s anarchist views, when P[iotr] Arshinov became his
cellmate. Arshinov had formerly been a Bolshevik, but after 1904 was an
anarchist-communist and a follower of Kropotkin. Arshinov laid out for
Makhno the basic ideology of anarchism, as he understood it.
The collapse of the empire in February of 1917 led to a political
amnesty. Makhno returned to Gulyai-Polye. He was supported in his
activities by the re-formed Group of Anarcho-Communists (which became
the GAK – Group of Anarchist Communists). The group was composed of his
comrades from the pre-revolutionary period. Makhno appeared before the
group immediately on arriving in Gulyai-Polye. He determined that the
most important goals were “the break up of governmental institutions and
the proscription in our region of any right whatsoever to personal
property in land, factories, plants or other forms of social
undertakings.”
Makhno and the GAK quickly established a system of social organizations
under their control: a peasant union (later a Soviet), trade unions,
factory committees, committees of the poor, and cooperatives. Soon the
Soviet became the single power in these places. Makhno was the chair of
the Soviet. At the same time he headed the local trade unions.
On 7 October, 1917 a conflict at the Kerner metallurgical factory
(“Bogatyr”) was discussed. The administration thought it was possible to
raise the wages of all categories of workers by 50%, but the workers
themselves insisted on a differential model, under which wages would be
raised by 35–70% in different categories in order to approach level
rates. After negotiations with the representatives of the trade union,
M. Kerner agreed to the union’s terms.
Makhno’s union gained great influence in the region. In October, the
workers of the “Trishchenko & Company” mill, who had not joined the
union, applied to the organization with a request “to compel the owners”
to raise wages. It is probable that Makhno, who combined direction of
the union with leadership of the strongest local political group (an
armed group at that), used the method of “compulsion” of the
entrepreneurs to observe the rights of the workers under conditions of
escalating inflation. However, it was not Makhno’s intent to use such
“American” methods to benefit workers who had not joined the union. The
“union boss” considered the interests of his organization, and
demonstratively refused the request of the workers at the Trishchenko
mill, on the grounds that they had not joined the union. In this way
Makhno stimulated growth of the membership: In order to make use of his
protection, the workers had to join the organization. The case of the
workers at the Trishchenko mill nudged Makhno to make membership in the
union obligatory, while transforming the union into an organ that could
give orders to the administration in the social sphere. On 25 October,
1917 (the day of the Bolshevik revolution in Petrograd), corresponding
to a decision of the assembly of works of 5 October, the union board
resolved: “To require the owners of the named mill to carry out work in
three shifts of 8 hours, and to accept needed workers from the union.
Workers who did not belong to the union are charged with the obligation
to immediately join the union, failing which they risk losing the
support of the union.” This syndicalist reform nearly eliminated
unemployment in the region and strengthened the organizational support
of the Gulyai-Polye regime. A course was set for the general
introduction of an 8-hour working day.
Peasants were drawn to Gulyai-Polye for advice and help from the
neighboring volosts (administrative districts). The peasantry wanted to
seize the land of the large landowners and the kulaks (rich peasants).
Makhno presented this demand at the first sessions of the regional
Soviet, which were held in Gulyai-Polye. The additional proposal of the
anarcho-communists to unite in communes was unsuccessful, although
Makhno himself and his young wife Anna worked on a commune. The agrarian
program of the movement proposed the liquidation of the property of the
landowners and kulaks “in land and in those luxurious estates, which
they could not work with their own labor.” The landowners and kulaks
retained the right to manage, but only with their own labor.
By June the peasants had stopped paying rent, violating thereby the
directives of the government officials. The immediate introduction of
the agrarian transformation, however, did not succeed. At first they
were held up by the sharp conflict with the Uyezd commissar of the
Provisional government B. Mikhno, and then by the harvest. They put off
their fundamental reforms until spring in order not to disrupt
production. In August Makhno implemented the elimination of land titles.
According to Makhno’s memoirs “at this time they limited themselves to
refusing to pay the rent, taking land under the authority of the land
committees, and placing livestock and equipment under guard in the face
of the managers, so that the owners could not sell off the inventory.”
Even this reform had rapid results. The peasant worked on the former
landowner’s land not out of fear, but conscientiously, collecting the
biggest harvest in the Gubernia. On 25 September the congress of Soviets
and peasant organizations in Gulyai-Polye proclaimed the confiscation of
the landowners land and its transformation into social property.
In the spring of 1918, the German attack on Ukraine began. Makhno
prepared for resistance, but in his absence from Gulyai-Polye a
nationalist revolution took place. He had to leave Ukraine. Makhno
traveled around Russia, and even visited the Kremlin, where he met with
Lenin. The Bolshevik leader made a big impression on Makhno, but their
views did not coincide.
On 4 July 1918, Makhno, assisted by the Bolsheviks returned to his
native land and drew together a small partisan detachment, which on 22
September began military operations against the Germans. The first
battle of Makhno’s detachment was in the village of Dibrivka (formerly
Mikhailovka) on 30 September. Makhno’s forces united with a small
detachment under Shchus, which had been earlier engaged in partisan
struggle. With a troop of 30 fighters Makhno managed to defeat the
superior forces of the Germans. The authority of the new detachment grew
in the area, and Makhno himself was given the honorific “batko”
(father). When the German revolution broke out in November of 1918, the
Germans left Ukraine and a broad region of Priazovya came under Makhno’s
control. For a short time the “batko” even took one of the greatest
cities of Ukraine, Yekaterinoslav, but because of differences with his
Bolshevik partners he could not hold the city from the attacking
Petlyurovists[2].
At this time Makhno took steps to convert the movement from a
destructive peasant uprising to an organization that would become the
supreme authority in the territory controlled by it. Conflicts
intensified between Makhno and some of his commanders. In response to
recurring savagery of the semi-independent commander Shchus against
German colonists, Makhno arrested him and promised to shoot him. Shchus,
who until recently had demonstrated his independence from Makhno, could
no longer resist the “batko” whose power in the region at this time
rested not only on military force: “Shchus gave his word not to repeat
the murders and swore his loyalty to Makhno” remembers Chubenko. In
consequence, Makhno was able to maintain firm discipline within the
command structure. Thus, one of the colleagues of Kamenev remembered
Makhno’s style of leadership in command debates, at the time of a visit
of the president of the Council of Labor and Defense (STO, whose
president was Kamenev) to Gulyai-Polye: “Making little noise he
threatened them: ‘I will expel!’” The first social-political
organization implementing the policies of Makhno and influencing them
was the Union of Anarchists, which originated on the basis of the GAK
and a number of other anarchist groups. Many Makhnovist commanders
joined the group, as well as anarchists who arrived in the region.
Having taken a relatively stable territory, Makhno decided that the time
had come to return to the social-political system of 1917, and to change
the accidental anarchist-military circle into a reliable democratic
institution – the Military-Revolutionary Council (VRS). Towards this
end, the first congress of regional soviets was called for 23 January in
greater Mikhailovka (the numbering of the conferences in 1919 ignored
the forums of 1917).
As in 1917, the congress considered the Makhnovist movement as the
ultimate authority. Their decisions came into effect in this or that
region after acceptance by the village assemblies. In 1919 there were
three such congresses (23 January, 8–12 February, 10–29 April). Their
resolutions, which were accepted after heated discussion, were in
harmony with anarchist ideas: “In our struggle of rebellion we need a
single fraternal family, which will defend land, truth and freedom. The
second regional congress of front line soldiers emphatically calls our
peasant and worker comrades, that they, as they stand at their posts,
and without compulsive orders and decrees, build a new, free society
against the tyrants and oppressors of the entire world, without rules,
without oppressed slaves, without rich and without poor”. The delegates
of the congress strongly denounced the “parasitical officials” who were
seen as the source of the “orders of compulsion”.
The most important organ of power was Makhno’s staff, which involved
itself even in educational work, but all of its civil activity (formal
and military) fell under the control of the executive organ of the
congress – the Military Revolutionary Council (VRS).
The Bolshevik V. Antonov-Ovseenko, who visited the region in may of
1919, reported: “Juvenile communes and schools have been set up.
Gulyai-Polye is one of the most cultured centers of the New Russia.
There are three middle educational facilities, etc. Makhno’s efforts
opened 10 hospitals for children, organized workshops for the repair of
weapons and supplied bolts for guns.” Children learned reading and
writing, practiced military exercises, predominantly in the form of war
games (sometimes very fierce ones). But the basic educational work was
conducted not with children, but with adults. The cultural-educational
work of the VRS, comprising education and agitation of the population,
was staffed by anarchists who came into the region and by left SRs.
Freedom of agitation was preserved for all of the other left parties,
but the anarchists dominated ideologically in the region.
The ideology of the movement was determined by the views of Makhno, and
those of Arshinov, who had come to him. Makhno called his views
anarchist-communist in the “Bakuninist-Kropotkinist sense”. Later Makhno
proposed the following State-Society structure: “The sort of system I
have conceived is only in the form of a free soviet system, under which
the entire county is covered by local, totally free and independent
social self-governance of the toilers”. At the end of 1918 a delegation
of railroad workers came to Makhno. The workers, according to Chubenko’s
account, “asked how they would relate to the organizations of power.
Makhno answered, that they needed to organize a Soviet, which should not
be dependent on anyone, that is, a free Soviet, not dependant on any
party. They then applied to him for money, since they were absolutely
without any funds, and they needed money to pay the wages of the
workers, who had gone unpaid for several weeks. Without saying a word to
them in reply, Makhno ordered that 20,000 be given to them, and this was
done.” On 8 February 1919, in his proclamation, Makhno advanced his goal
along these lines. “The construction of a true Soviet system, under
which the Soviets, elected by the workers, will be a servant of the
people, executing those laws and those orders which the workers
themselves have written at a Ukrainian national congress of workers...”
A voluntary mobilization, announced at the second congress, led to a
change of the semi-independent troops of the “batko” to an organized
militia with a single command. The troops were maintained by the region
itself. On Makhnovist territory only a single instance of a pogrom, with
which the history of the civil war[3] is replete, occurred. The guilty
were apprehended and shot.
Corresponding to the decision of the third congress of soviets, each
settlement had to furnish a regiment (80–300 men), which then would
supply itself with arms, elect command, and march off to the front.
People who had long known one another fought together and trusted the
commander. The countryside, which had furnished the regiment, was glad
to provision it – after all, the regiment consisted of the relatives of
the peasants. The soldiers, for their part, knew that to retreat 100
kilometers meant to place their own huts under threat.
Meanwhile, the Makhnovists, who had by the beginning of November taken a
few thousand poorly-armed Priazov insurgents into the ranks, were
suffering from a shortage of ammunition and rifles. After a few days of
battle with the Whites their ammunition was exhausted. They were driven
back to Gulyai-Polye. They did not want to surrender their ‘capital’.
From 24 January to 4 February they waged a bitter fight with variable
result.
Despite conflicts with the Bolsheviks, the Makhnovists were doomed,
under the developing circumstances, to a union with them. The only
possibility of ammunition and weapons was provided by the Red Army. By
the beginning of January, Makhno had ordered A. Chubenko: “A unification
with the Red Army might work. Rumor has it that the Red Army has taken
Belgorod and gone on the offensive along the entire Ukrainian front.
Arrange a meeting with them and conclude a military alliance.” Makhno
did not give Chubenko the authority to conduct any sort of political
negotiations with the Reds, and the emissary of the “batko” limited
himself to the declaration that “we are all marching for Soviet power.”
After negotiations with Dybenko on 26 January, cartridges were provided
to the Makhnovists, which permitted them on the 4^(th) to go back on the
offensive. Orekhov and Pologa were taken, and 17 February the
Makhnovists took Bamut. The Makhnovists joined the first Zadneprovski
Division as the Third Brigade, under the command of Dybenko.
The Bolshevik rifles permitted the arming of those peasant
reinforcements who were waiting their turn. As a result, the Third
Brigade of the First Zadneprovski Division began to grow by leaps and
bounds, and outstripped in numbers even the Second Ukrainian Army, in
the ranks of which the Third Brigade had most recently fought. If Makhno
had about 400 fighters in January, in the beginning of March he had
1,000, in the middle of March 5,000, and in April 15–20,000. Reinforced
as a result of the “voluntary mobilization”, the Makhnovist brigade
launched an offensive in the South and East. Initially the Red
commanders were skeptical towards the Makhnovist formation. “At
Berdyanska the matter was tobacco. Makhno shed tears and screamed about
support”. A week later, having covered 100 km in battle over a month and
a half, the Makhnovists flooded into Berdyanska. Denikin’s western
bulwark was liquidated.
At the same time, other Makhnovist units fell back a similar distance to
the eastern front, and entered Volnovakha. The Makhnovists seized about
90,000 puds of bread from the White echelons, and distributed it to the
starving workers of Petrograd and Moscow.
The Makhnovist Army was a foreign body in the RKKA[4], and it is not
surprising that in February L. Trotsky demanded that it be transformed
to the model of the other Red units. Makhno answered: “The Autocrat[5]
Trotsky commanded that the Insurgent Army of Ukraine, created by the
peasants themselves, be disarmed, since he well understands that while
the peasants have their own army which defends their interests, it will
not be possible for anyone to force the Ukrainian working people to
dance to his tune. The Insurgent Army does not want to spill fraternal
blood and has avoided clashes with the Red Army. It is, however, subject
only to the will of the toilers, and will stand on guard for the
toilers, and will only lay down its arms on the orders of the free
Ukrainian Workers Congress, in which the toilers’ will is expressed.
The conflicts between the Makhnovists and the Bolsheviks grew. The
Makhnovist congress criticized the politics of the Bolsheviks, and the
communist leaders demanded an end be put to the autonomous movement.
They stopped supplying the Makhnovists, which created a threat to the
front. Bolshevik propaganda reported a low military capacity of the
Makhnovists, but later Army Commander Antonov-Ovseenko wrote: “first of
all the facts will testify that the assertion about a weakness of the
most infectious place – the region of Gulyai-Polye, Berdyanska, is
untrue. On the contrary, just this corner was the most vital in the
entire Southern Front (report for April – May). And this was not, of
course, because we were better organized and educated in the military
regard, but because the forces there were defending their own hearths
and homes.”
In order to solve the problem of supply, Makhno decided to transform his
excessively extended brigade into a division. This was perceived by the
Bolsheviks as a breach of discipline, and the Southern Front Command
decided to crush the Makhnovists. The Bolsheviks clearly overestimated
their strength, especially since it was just at this moment that the
attack by Denikin’s forces was beginning. It was impossible to resist
pressure on two sides at once.
On 6 June 1919, Makhno sent a telegram to Lenin, Trotsky, Kamenev and
Voroshilov in which he said: “While I feel myself to be a revolutionary,
I consider it my duty to the cause we have in common, despite such
injustices as accusing me of dishonesty[6], to propose that you
immediately send a good military leader, who is familiar with me and the
tasks at hand, to take over command of the division. I think that I must
do this as a revolutionary, responsible for every unfortunate step
concerning the revolution and the people, when he is accused of calling
congresses and preparing some sort of attack against the Soviet
Republic.” On 9 June, Makhno telegraphed Lenin: “I will send you an
account of the central state power in relation to me. I am absolutely
convinced that the central state power considers the entire Insurgency
inconsistent with its State activity. Incidentally, the central power
considers the Insurgency to be connected to me and all hostility to the
insurgents is transferred to me...I consider this hostile. The recent
conduct of the central power towards the Insurgency will lead to the
fatal inevitability of the creation of a special internal front, on both
sides of which will be the working masses who believe in the revolution.
I believe this to be the greatest crime ever committed against the
working people, and I consider myself obligated to do everything
possible to avert this crime...The most credible means to avert this
impending crime on the part of the authorities is my resignation from
the post I now hold.”
The Bolsheviks tried to arrest Makhno, but he went into the forest with
a small band. The Chekists then shot his staff, including even the chief
of staff, whom they had sent, Ozerov. When he found out about the
destruction of his staff, Makhno began a partisan war in the rear of the
Red lines. He tried to hold back a distance from the rear of the
front-line fighters, so that he would not interfere too much at that
time with the defense against Denikin. The views of the “batko” at that
time are reported by the Red Army soldier P. S. Kudlo. His evidence
should be taken with some correction for language: “The Soviet power [he
means the central Soviet power – A.Sh.] is not just, with its Chekists,
commissars. I despise all of this...The Soviet power allowed the state
of affairs in which there were no cartridges, no mortar shells, and as a
result of this, we had to retreat”. Makhno accused the Communists of
deliberate withdrawal of munitions “to the Soviet of Deputies” and of
handing them over to the Whites. Makhno’s strategic plans foresaw the
establishment of control over a large territory, in which it would be
possible to create a more orderly economic system than had existed to
that time. In the report of the soldier this is said thus: “Citizens,
when we have the Donetz Basin, we will have manufacturing and in general
everything that is needed for the subsistence of the peasant. When we
conquer Asia Minor, we will have cotton, when we conquer Baku, we will
have oil”. These plans, at first glance Napoleonic, are not military
projects (Makhno did not like to lose touch with home), but rather hopes
for the world revolution, when the toilers would conquer their countries
and establish connections with the Ukrainian peasantry. Makhno hoped for
a restoration of a temporary union with the Bolsheviks. According to the
memoirs of V. Voline, who had been in his Army (he headed the cultural
educational commission of the VRS), the “batko” said: “Our chief enemy,
peasant comrades, is Denikin. The Communists – they are all the same
revolutionaries.”. He added: “We will settle with them later.” On 27
July, the Makhnovists killed the famous enemy of the Bolsheviks, the
nationalist ataman Grigoriev.
Under pressure from Denikin, the Bolsheviks were forced to leave
Ukraine. The soldiers did not want to go to Russia. On 5 August, Makhno
was joined by his units, who had been under Bolshevik command. The
“batko” again had an army of some thousands.
The superior forces of the whites pushed the Makhnovists back to western
Ukraine, near Uman. But an unexpected blow, inflicted by the Makhnovists
near Peregonovka on 26–27 September was crushing. One enemy regiment was
taken prisoner, and two others were completely cut down. The Makhnovist
army broke through the rear of Denikin’s forces and moved across all
Ukraine in three columns, towards the region of Gulyai-Polye.
“Operations against Makhno were extremely difficult. His cavalry
operated extremely well. Although at first they were imperceptible, more
recently they frequently attacked our convoys and appeared at the rear,
etc. In general, the Makhnovist ‘forces’ were distinguished from the
Bolsheviks by their capacity for battle and by steadfastness”, reported
the chief of staff of the Fourth Division Colonel Dubego. Denikin’s
headquarters in Taganrog was under threat. The infrastructure of the
volunteer army (of the Whites) was fairly in tatters, which impeded
Denikin’s attack on the north, towards Moscow. Shkuro’s unit had to be
urgently moved from the front, in order to localize quickly the
expanding zone that the Makhnovists controlled.
Recovering from the first attack, the Denikin forces took the cities
along the river and deployed at Gulyai-Polye. But at this moment Makhno
prepared an unbelievably audacious move. “In Yekaterinoslav, 25 October
was a market day”, remembered one of the members of the Yekaterinoslav
Regional Committee of the RKP(b). “From the steppe rolled many wagons
into town, loaded with vegetables, and especially cabbages. At 4 in the
morning from the upper bazaar, a deafening machine gun battle began. It
happened that under the cabbages on the wagons there were machine guns,
and the vegetable sellers were actually the vanguard of the Makhnovists.
Behind them followed the entire army, coming from the steppe, from which
direction the Denikin forces did not expect an attack”. His assault was
repulsed by the Denikin forces, but their defense was weakened. On 11
November, Yekaterinoslav came under control of the Makhnovists for a
month (almost until 19 December). At this time there were 40,000 men
under the command of Makhno.
In the liberated region multiparty congresses of peasants and workers
were held. All businesses were turned over to those who worked in them.
The beneficiaries of this system of “market socialism” were the peasant
producers of foodstuffs, and those workers who found a market for their
products (bakers, shoemakers, railroad workers and others). The workers
in heavy industry were dissatisfied with the Makhnovists and supported
the Mensheviks. The Makhnovists set up benefits for the needy, which
distributed the inflated Soviet currency to almost all who wanted them,
without unnecessary red tape. With the more secure currency, taken in
battle, the Makhnovists purchased weapons and issued literature and
anarchist newspapers.
The residents of Yekaterinoslav in the main considered each of the
Armies that entered the city to be robbers. Against the general
background of the Civil War the measures of Makhno against robbery can
be considered successful. According to the evidence of one of the
residents of the town “such mass robbery as occurred among the
volunteers, did not occur among the Makhnovists. Makhno made a great
impression on the population by his personal reprisals with certain
robbers who were apprehended at the bazaar. He shot them there with his
revolver”.
A more serious problem was presented by the Makhnovist counter-espionage
unit, an uncontrolled organ that permitted arbitrary rule against
peaceful citizens. The leader of the VRS, the anarchist V. Voline
stated: “...an entire line of people came to me with demands requiring
me to constantly interfere in the affairs of the counter-espionage and
to report to Makhno and the counter-espionage. The battle conditions and
the goals of the cultural-educational work prevented me from really
understanding the misdeeds, in the words of the complainants, of the
counter-espionage.” The officials of the counter-espionage shot some
tens of individuals, which is considerably fewer than the corresponding
units of the Whites and Reds. However, among those executed were not
only White spies, but also political opponents of the Makhnovists, for
example the Communist commander Polonsky, who according to the
counter-espionage was preparing a conspiracy. Later Makhno recognized:
“In the course of the activity of the counter-espionage the organs of
the Makhnovist army committed occasional errors, which caused me to feel
pain, to blush, and to apologize to the injured.”
In December 1919, the Makhnovist army was “hit” with an epidemic of
typhus. Thousands of fighters at the center, including their commanders,
lost the capacity for battle. This permitted the Whites to take
Yekaterinoslav for a short time, but the Red Army had already entered
the area of Makhnovist movement activity.
Despite the fact that Makhno’s real military strength was significantly
weakened (the army being hit with typhus), the Red command continued to
fear the batko and decided to use “military cunning” to appear as though
Makhno’s staff had not been shot by the Cheka and to give orders of his
judgement by military tribunal, “the Polonsky Case”. The Bolsheviks
ordered Makhno to abandon his region (where the insurgents were
supporting the local population) and move to the Polish front. They
planned to disarm the Makhnovists on the road. On 9 January, without
waiting for Makhno’s answer, the Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee
declared him an outlaw. On 14 January came the demand to disarm. On the
22^(nd), Makhno declared his readiness to “go arm in arm” with the RKKA,
while maintaining autonomy. At this time more than two divisions of Reds
had developed battle operations against the Makhnovists, among whom
hardly any maintained battle capacity after the epidemic. “It was
decided to grant the insurgents a month’s leave of absence”, recalled
the Makhnovist chief of staff Belash. “From Yekaterinoslav towards
Nikopol came a Soviet regiment, which took the town, and began to disarm
the typhus-infected Makhnovists...In fact there were some 15,000
typhus-infected insurgents. Our commanders were subject to execution,
whether they were well or ill.” An exhaustive partisan war against the
Reds began. The Makhnovists attacked small troops, workers of the
Bolshevik apparatus, warehouses. They instituted “reverse
appropriation”, distributing bread taken from the Bolsheviks to the
peasants. Soon Makhno’s army was nearly 20,000 soldiers. In the area of
his activity the Bolsheviks were obliged to go underground, appearing in
the open only when accompanied by large military detachments.
The activity of Makhno so disrupted the Reds’ rear, that it permitted
successes of the White army of Wrangel. Makhno did not want to “play
into the hand of the landowners”, and on 1 October 1920, he concluded a
new union with the Bolsheviks in Starobelsk. His army and the
Gulyai-Polye region maintained complete autonomy, anarchists in Ukraine
received freedom of agitation and were released from prison. Peaceful
life returned to Gulyai-Polye. There were about 100 anarchists in the
region, occupied in cultural-educational work.
On 7 November the assembly of workers and employees of Gulyai-Polye were
deciding the questions of social regulation. They decided: “enterprises
should provide part of their production to the cooperatives for
distribution among all members of the cooperative.” On 15 November they
considered the prospects of “the constructive work of anarchy” in the
region. However, they also expressed the skeptical opinion: “The
Bolsheviks will never permit us autonomy, and will not permit that there
be a place infected by anarchy in the state organism.” Meanwhile the
cream of the Makhnovist forces (2400 Sabres, 1900 Rifles, 460 Machine
Guns and 32 field guns) under the command of Karetnikov (Makhno himself
was wounded in the foot) were sent to the front. At the same time an
auxiliary mobilization began in the RKKA, to which the peasants were
more benevolently inclined, in light of the union between Makhno and the
Reds. The peasant militia took part in the storming of Perekop, while
the Karetnikov’s cavalry and machine gun detachments took part in
Sivash’s forced march, which also passed four Red divisions.
The victory over the White forces brought new ordeals for Makhno and the
Makhnovists. On 26 November, “without a declaration of war”, the Reds
attacked them. In the morning, Karetnikov and his staff had been
summoned to Frunze[7] for consultations, arrested, and then shot. But
with Karetnikov’s units things were not so simple – they scattered the
Red forces surrounding them, and with great losses broke out of the
Crimea. To the North from Perekop, the group clashed with the superior
Red forces, and only about 700 cavalry and 1,500 rifles remained.
In Gulyai-Polye there was more cause for discomfort. In the afternoon,
the arrest of the Makhnovist representatives in Kharkov became known
(the members would later be shot in 1921). On the evening of the 25^(th)
and into the 26^(th) about 350 anarchists were also arrested, among them
Voline and Mrachny, the instigators of strikes in Kharkov. Units of the
42^(nd) Division and two brigades attacked Gulyai-Polye from 3 sides. A
cavalry brigade appeared to the rear of the Makhnovists. After shooting
at the Red units that were attacking from the South, the Makhnovists
left Gulyai-Polye and went east. Units suspected by no one, pressing
from the south attacked the cavalry that was holding the town. A heated
battle among the Reds began, which allowed the Makhnovists to break out
of encirclement. On 7 December, Makhno was united with the cavalry
detachment of Marchenko, which had broken out of the Crimea.
At this time, Frunze launched units of three armies (including two
mounted units), against Makhno. Nearly the entire Southern front fell
upon the insurgents, wiping out small groups on the road, who had been
unable to join Makhno. Some small units on the road remained intact
after the initial attacks by the partisan units. Red Army soldiers of
RKKA units that had been beaten by the Makhnovists also joined. After a
few unsuccessful attempts to surround the insurgents, a great mass of
Red Army troops pressed them against the shore of the Sea of Azov in the
region of Andreevka. On 15 December the red command reported to the
Sovnarkom: “Continuing our attack from the south, west and north on
Andreevka, our units, after a battle, overcame the Makhnovists on the
outskirts of this place. The Makhnovists were pressed from all sides,
and consolidated themselves in population centers, where they continued
a stubborn defense.” It seemed that the Makhnovist epic had come to a
close.
However, Frunze did not take into account the absolutely unique
abilities of the Makhnovist army. After explaining the goal, Makhno was
able to dismiss his Army to the four corners in complete confidence that
it would gather itself at the indicated place to the rear of the enemy,
and would strike him. In addition, the Makhnovist Army was “motorized” –
it was able to move almost completely on horseback and in gun-carts, and
had developed a speed of up to 80 versts[8] per day. All of this enabled
the Makhnovists to slip out of Frunze’s trap on 16 December. “Small
groups of Makhnovists at this time, at the time of the battle, avoided
our units and slipped out to the north-east. The Makhnovists approached
the village, and opened a disorderly line of fire in the darkness, which
created a fortuitous panic among the Red Army units. This forced them to
scatter”, remembered one of the Red commanders. Loading into the wagons,
the Makhnovists went along the operational line, destroying the Red
units that they met along the way, which could not imagine that the
Makhnovists would be able to break out of their encirclement.
The inability to defeat the Makhnovists by military means pushed the
Bolsheviks to an increase of terror. On 5 December, an order was given
to the Armies of the Southern Front to carry out general searches, and
to shoot any peasants who did not surrender their arms. Additionally,
indemnities were imposed on villages from whose precincts attacks on the
Red units originated. “Uprooting” Makhnovism affected even those who
went over to the side of the Communist Party. At the end of December,
the “Revolutionary Troika” arrested the entire Revolutionary Committee
in Pologa and shot part of the members, on the basis of their service
with Makhno in 1918 (that is, during the period of the war with
Germany).
In order not to subject his compatriots to unnecessary danger, Makhno
crossed the Dniepr in December and went deep into the right shore of
Ukraine. The movement to the right shore seriously weakened the
Makhnovists – they were not known there, the territory was unfamiliar,
and the sympathies of the peasantry inclined to the Petlyurovists, with
whom the Makhnovists had cool relations. At the same time, parts of 3
cavalry divisions moved against the Makhnovists. A bloody battle ensued
in the area of the river Gorny Tikich. The Makhnovists moved so rapidly
that they were able to take the Commander of one of the divisions, A.
Parkhomenko, unawares. He was killed on the spot. But the Makhnovists
could not resist the pressure of superior forces of the enemy on foreign
territory. Suffering great losses at Gorny Tikich, they went north and
crossed the Dnepr at Kanev. Afterwards, a raid was made across the
Poltavsky and Chernigovsky gubernias and onward to Belovodsk.
In the middle of February, Makhno returned home. He was possessed by a
new idea – to extend the breadth of the movement, gradually involving
more and more land, creating bases of support everywhere. Only in this
way could Makhno break up the circle of Reds around his army. Despite
the fact that in April under the general command of Makhno there were up
to 13,000 fighters, in May he was able to concentrate for a decisive
strike in Poltavshchina only about 2,000 fighters under the command of
Kozhin and Kurilenko. At the end of June/beginning of July, in a battle
at Sula, Frunze did considerable damage to the Makhnovist shock troops.
At this time almost 3,000 Makhnovists voluntarily surrendered. The
movement was visibly wasting. After the declaration of the NEP, the
peasants did not want to be at war. However, Makhno was not ready to be
taken prisoner. With a small unit of a few dozen men he broke across
Ukraine to the Romanian border. Some cavalry divisions tried to find his
unit, but on 28 August 1921 he crossed the Dnestr into Bessarabia.
When they appeared in Romania, the Makhnovists were disarmed by the
authorities. Nestor and his wife were settled in Budapest. The
Bolsheviks demanded his extradition, and in April 1922 Makhno decided to
take himself to Poland. The Soviet diplomatic service there procured his
extradition as a common criminal. Besides, Makhno did not hide his
views. He agitated for Soviet power and the Polish administration in any
case sent the group of anarchists from Russia to a camp for displaced
persons. In June 1922, Makhno applied to the authorities to help him
immigrate to Czechoslovakia, a more democratic country. But the batko
was refused. The Poles suspected him more or less of attempting to raise
a rebellion in Western Galicia in favor of the Ukrainian Soviet
Republic. The prosecutor of the district court of Warsaw clearly did not
wish to inject himself into a disagreement between Russian
revolutionaries, and in his own way interpreted Makhno’s statement as
supporting Soviets, revolution, communism and free self-determination
for the Ukrainians in Western Galicia. On 23 May 1922, a criminal
prosecution was brought against Makhno. On 25 September, his second
wife, Kuzmenko and two of their comrades in arms, I. Khmar and Ya.
Doroshenko, were arrested and sent to the Warsaw prison.
On 27 November, Makhno stood before a court for the second time in his
life. They accused him of contacts with the mission of the Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic in Warsaw, and preparing an uprising. After
this, as the absurdity of the charges became apparent, the prosecutor
began to claim that Makhno was not a political immigrant, but a bandit.
The suspicion arose that Poland was using the captives as small change
in the diplomatic game, and would hand them over to the Bolsheviks.
The criminal accusations were not proved, and on 30 November Makhno was
acquitted. He moved to Torun where he began to publish his memoirs and
prepare for new battles. At the same time in Berlin, P. Arshinov was
publishing the first “History of the Makhnovist Movement.” After open
declarations by Makhno of his intention to continue the armed struggle
with the Bolsheviks, the Polish government expelled him from the country
in January 1924. It then became clear that any attempt to raise a
rebellion on the territory of the USSR in the near future would not
succeed. Makhno got across Germany to Paris, where he lived out the rest
of his days.
His last years were not as turbulent as those preceding, yet all the
same they were not a quiet dying down, like the life of many émigrés.
Makhno appeared at the very center of Parisian political discussions.
Here he was again “in the saddle”. The French anarchist I[da] Mett
remembered that Makhno “was a great artist, transformed beyond all
recognition in the presence of a crowd. In small company he could only
explain himself with difficulty, and his habit of loud speech in
intimate surroundings seemed humorous and out of place. But put him
before a large audience, then you saw the dazzling, eloquent,
self-confident orator. Once I was present in a public meeting in Paris,
where the question of anti-semitism in the Makhnovist movement was
discussed. I was deeply astonished then by surprising power of
transformation of which this Ukrainian peasant seemed capable.” Makhno
became one of the authors of the draft platform of the Union of
Anarchists[9], around which in 1926–1931 keen arguments boiled among
anarchists internationally.
In the grim conditions of emigration the batko held himself with
dignity: “I very often met with him over the course of three years in
Paris, and I never saw him drunk. A few times, I accompanied Makhno, in
the capacity of interpreter, to dinners given in his honor by the
Western anarchists. Nestor drank from the first glass of wine, his eyes
began to sparkle, he became more eloquent, but, I repeat, I never saw
him drunk. I was told that in his last years he starved...”, I. Mett
remembered. Makhno spent his last years in a one-room apartment in the
Parisian suburb of Vincennes. He suffered greatly from tuberculosis, and
was much bothered by the wound in his foot. His wife fed the family by
working in a boarding house as a laundress. All week he remained alone.
He occasionally strolled along the streets. These were turbulent times
in the history of France. The ultra-right hungered for power. The
left-wing organizations held meetings against fascism, which sometimes
ended in clashes. Knowing the character of Makhno, it is not possible to
avoid the conclusion that he took part in some of these. For a man
greatly suffering from tuberculosis this was a mortal danger.
“In the winter he got worse,” remembered G Kuzmenko, “and around March
1934 we visited him in a French hospital in Paris. On Sundays I often
visited him there. I met with many of his numerous comrades there, both
Russian and French.” Nestor Ivanovich’s health continued to worsen, and
was not helped by an operation in June. G. Kuzmenko remembers the last
day of Makhno’s life as follows: “The man lay on a pale bed with
half-closed eyes and arms exposed, separated from the others by a large
screen. There were some comrades with him, who, in spite of the late
hour, were permitted to visit him. I kissed Nestor on the cheek. He
opened his eyes and, turning to his daughter said in a weak voice,
‘Daughter, stay healthy and happy.’ Then he closed his eyes and said,
‘Excuse me, friends, I’m very tired, I want to sleep...’ The day nurse
came in and asked him ‘How do you feel’. He answered: ‘Bring me the
oxygen bag...’ He fell asleep and never woke up.”
It is hard to imagine how the history of Russia, and perhaps that of the
world, might have developed if Nestor Makhno had been executed in 1910.
Historical forks in the road sometimes depend on such circumstances.
Without a talented leader, there could be no revolutionary army. No
Makhnovist “republic” would have been set up at Denikin’s rear, the
communications would not have been destroyed, the military forces would
not have stretched themselves out. The White army would have broken
through to Moscow. The Bolshevik regime would have fallen. But would
that other power, the dictatorship built on the revenge of the
aristocrats, have been better? The perpetual problem of European history
in the 20^(th) Century is the choice between communism and fascism.
Without Makhno the forced march of Sivash in 1920 might not have been
successful. Without Makhno the military-communist machine of the
Bolsheviks would have functioned in a more orderly manner, and who
knows, might have broken through to Central Europe in 1919. What of the
New Economic Policy of 1921–1929, which taught peace to many? The
Bolsheviks might never have come to that, without the successes of
Makhno and Antonov, without the Kronstadt uprising, which itself was
partly inspired by the Makhnovist experience. A significant part of the
antifascist fighters at the time of the Civil War in Spain remembered
the name of Makhno, and spoke it on attack. Makhno died, but his model
inspired people to resist Red and Brown totalitarianism as it spread
across Europe.
[1] Peter Arkadevich Stolypin, Minister of the Interior for Nicholas II
(1906 – 1911), charged with countering the revolutionary movement.
[2] Followers of the Nationalist anti-semite Petlyurov.
[3] Civil War – ‘The Whites’ organized counter-revolutionary armies
under Kolchak, Wrangel and Deniken, which invaded Russia from the North,
South and East.
[4] The Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, under the leadership of L.D.
Trotsky.
[5] Makhno uses the term “Самодержавец” here, an official title of the
Czar, and doubtless intended to evoke the memory of Czarist excess.
[6] The transcript of the telegram is somewhat unclear on this word.
[7] Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze, commander of the 4^(th) Army of the
Eastern Front.
[8] Berst – Russian distance measure of about 1.06 km.
[9] Platform of the Union of Anarchists, also known as the
Organisational Platform of the Libertarian Communists, drafted by the
Dyelo Truda group of which Makhno, Mett and Arshinov were members.