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Title: Anarchism
Author: Andrew Fiala
Date: Spring 2018
Language: en
Topics: Philosophical Anarchism, introductory
Source: Fiala, Andrew, “Anarchism”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .
Notes: First published Tue Oct 3, 2017; substantive revision Fri Nov 3, 2017

Andrew Fiala

Anarchism

Anarchism is a political theory, which is skeptical of the justification

of authority and power, especially political power. Anarchism is usually

grounded in moral claims about the importance of individual liberty.

Anarchists also offer a positive theory of human flourishing, based upon

an ideal of non-coercive consensus building. Anarchism has inspired

practical efforts at establishing utopian communities, radical and

revolutionary political agendas, and various forms of direct action.

This entry primarily describes “philosophical anarchism”: it focuses on

anarchism as a theoretical idea and not as a form of political activism.

While philosophical anarchism describes a skeptical theory of political

legitimation, anarchism is also a concept that has been employed in

philosophical and literary theory to describe a sort of

anti-foundationalism. Philosophical anarchism can mean either a theory

of political life that is skeptical of attempts to justify state

authority or a philosophical theory that is skeptical of the attempt to

assert firm foundations for knowledge.

1. Varieties of Anarchism

There are various forms of anarchism. Uniting this variety is the

general critique of centralized, hierarchical power and authority. Given

that authority, centralization, and hierarchy show up in various ways

and in different discourses, institutions, and practices, it is not

surprising that the anarchist critique has been applied in diverse ways.

1.1 Political Anarchism

Anarchism is primarily understood as a skeptical theory of political

legitimation. The term anarchism is derived from the negation of the

Greek term arché, which means first principle, foundation, or ruling

power. Anarchy is thus rule by no one or non-rule. Some argue that

non-ruling occurs when there is rule by all—with consensus or unanimity

providing an optimistic goal (see Depuis-Déri 2010).

Political anarchists focus their critique on state power, viewing

centralized, monopolistic coercive power as illegitimate. Anarchists

thus criticize “the state”. Bakunin provides a paradigm historical

example, saying:

If there is a State, there must be domination of one class by another

and, as a result, slavery; the State without slavery is unthinkable—and

this is why we are the enemies of the State. (Bakunin 1873 [1990: 178])

A more recent example comes from Gerard Casey who writes, “states are

criminal organizations. All states, not just the obviously totalitarian

or repressive ones” (Casey 2012: 1).

Such sweeping generalizations are difficult to support. Thus anarchism

as political philosophy faces the challenge of specificity. States have

been organized in various ways. Political power is not monolithic.

Sovereignty is a complicated matter that includes divisions and

distributions of power (see Fiala 2015). Moreover, the historical and

ideological context of a given anarchist’s critique makes a difference

in the content of the political anarchist’s critique. Bakunin was

responding primarily to a Marxist and Hegelian view of the state,

offering his critique from within the global socialist movement; Casey

is writing in the Twenty-First Century in the era of liberalism and

globalization, offering his critique from within the movement of

contemporary libertarianism. Some anarchists engage in broad

generalizations, aiming for a total critique of political power. Others

will present a localized critique of a given political entity. An

ongoing challenge for those who would seek to understand anarchism is to

realize how historically and ideologically diverse approaches fit under

the general anarchist umbrella. We look at political anarchism in detail

below.

1.2 Religious Anarchism

The anarchist critique has been extended toward the rejection of

non-political centralization and authority. Bakunin extended his

critique to include religion, arguing against both God and the State.

Bakunin rejected God as the absolute master, saying famously, “if God

really existed, it would be necessary to abolish him” (Bakunin 1882

[1970: 28]).

There are, however, religious versions of anarchism, which critique

political authority from a standpoint that takes religion seriously.

Rapp (2012) has shown how anarchism can be found in Taoism. And Ramnath

(2011) has identified anarchist threads in Islamic Sufism, in Hindu

bhakti movements, in Sikhism’s anti-caste efforts, and in Buddhism. We

consider anarchism in connection with Gandhi below. But we focus here on

Christian anarchism.

Christian anarchist theology views the kingdom of God as lying beyond

any human principle of structure or order. Christian anarchists offer an

anti-clerical critique of ecclesiastical and political power. Tolstoy

provides an influential example. Tolstoy claims that Christians have a

duty not to obey political power and to refuse to swear allegiance to

political authority (see Tolstoy 1894). Tolstoy was also a pacifist.

Christian anarcho-pacifism views the state as immoral and unsupportable

because of its connection with military power (see Christoyannopoulos

2011). But there are also non-pacifist Christian anarchists. Berdyaev,

for example, builds upon Tolstoy and in his own interpretation of

Christian theology. Berdyaev concludes: “The Kingdom of God is anarchy”

(Berdyaev 1940 [1944: 148]).

Christian anarchists have gone so far as to found separatist communities

where they live apart from the structures of the state. Notable examples

include New England transcendentalists such as William Garrison and Adin

Ballou. These transcendentalists had an influence on Tolstoy (see Perry

1973 [1995]).

Other notable Christians with anarchist sympathies include Peter Maurin

and Dorothy Day of the Catholic Worker movement. In more recent years,

Christian anarchism has been defended by Jacques Ellul who links

Christian anarchism to a broad social critique. In addition to being

pacifistic, Ellul says, Christian anarchism should also be

“antinationalist, anticapitalist, moral, and antidemocratic” (Ellul 1988

[1991: 13]). The Christian anarchist ought to be committed to “a true

overturning of authorities of all kinds” (Ellul 1988 [1991: 14]). When

asked whether a Christian anarchist should vote, Ellul says no. He

states, “anarchy first implies conscientious objection” (Ellul 1988

[1991: 15]).

1.3 Theoretical Anarchism

Anarchist rejection of authority has application in epistemology and in

philosophical and literary theory. One significant usage of the term

shows up in American pragmatism. William James described his pragmatist

philosophical theory as a kind of anarchism: “A radical pragmatist is a

happy-go-lucky anarchistic sort of creature” (James 1907 [1981: 116]).

James had anarchist sympathies, connected to a general critique of

systematic philosophy (see Fiala 2013b). Pragmatism, like other

anti-systematic and post-Hegelian philosophies, gives up on the search

for an arché or foundation.

Anarchism thus shows up as a general critique of prevailing methods. An

influential example is found in the work of Paul Feyerabend, whose

Against Method provides an example of “theoretical anarchism” in

epistemology and philosophy of science (Feyerabend 1975 [1993]).

Feyerabend explains:

Science is an essentially anarchic enterprise: theoretical anarchism is

more humanitarian and more likely to encourage progress than its

law-and-order alternatives. (Feyerabend 1975 [1993: 9])

His point is that science ought not be constrained by hierarchically

imposed principles and strict rule following.

Post-structuralism and trends in post-modernism and Continental

philosophy can also be anarchistic (see May 1994). So-called

“post-anarchism” is a decentered and free-flowing discourse that

deconstructs power, questions essentialism, and undermines systems of

authority. Following upon the deconstructive and critical work of

authors such as Derrida, Deleuze, Foucault, and others, this critique of

the arché goes all the way down. If there is no arché or foundation,

then we are left with a proliferation of possibilities. Emerging trends

in globalization, cyber-space, and post-humanism make the anarchist

critique of “the state” more complicated, since anarchism’s traditional

celebration of liberty and autonomy can be critically scrutinized and

deconstructed (see Newman 2016).

Traditional anarchists were primarily interested in sustained and

focused political activism that led toward the abolition of the state.

The difference between free-flowing post-anarchism and traditional

anarchism can be seen in the realm of morality. Anarchism has

traditionally been critical of centralized moral authority—but this

critique was often based upon fundamental principles and traditional

values, such as autonomy or liberty. But post-structuralism—along with

critiques articulated by some feminists, critical race theorists, and

critics of Eurocentrism—calls these values and principles into question.

1.4 Applied Anarchisms

The broad critical framework provided by the anarchist critique of

authority provides a useful theory or methodology for social critique.

In more recent iterations, anarchism has been used to critique gender

hierarchies, racial hierarchies, and the like—also including a critique

of human domination over nature. Thus anarchism also includes, to name a

few varieties: anarcha-feminism or feminist anarchism (see Kornegger

1975), queer anarchism or anarchist queer theory (see Daring et al.

2010), green anarchism or eco-anarchism also associated with anarchist

social ecology (see Bookchin 1971 [1986]), and even anarcho-veganism or

“veganarchism” (see Nocella, White, & Cudworth 2015). In the

anarcho-vegan literature we find the following description of a broad

and inclusive anarchism:

Anarchism is a socio-political theory which opposes all systems of

domination and oppression such as racism, ableism, sexism,

anti-LGBTTQIA, ageism, sizeism, government, competition, capitalism,

colonialism, imperialism and punitive justice, and promotes direct

democracy, collaboration, interdependence, mutual aid, diversity, peace,

transformative justice and equity. (Nocella et al. 2015: 7)

A thorough-going anarchism would thus offer a critique of anything and

everything that smacks of hierarchy, domination, centralization, and

unjustified authority.

Anarchists who share these various commitments often act upon their

critique of authority by engaging in nonconformist practices (free love,

nudism, gender disruption, and so on) or by forming intentional

communities that live “off the grid” and outside of the norms of

mainstream culture. In extreme forms this becomes anarcho-primitivism or

anti-civilizational anarchism (see Zerzan 2008, 2010; Jensen 2006).

Alternative anarchist societies have existed in religious communes in

post-Reformation Europe and in the early United States, in Nineteenth

Century American utopian communities, the hippy communes of the

Twentieth Century, anarchist squats, temporary autonomous zones (see Bey

1985), and occasional gatherings of like-minded people.

Given this sort of antinomianism and non-conformism it is easy to see

that anarchism also often includes a radical critique of traditional

ethical norms and principles. Thus radical ethical anarchism can be

contrasted with what we might call bourgeois anarchism (with radical

anarchism seeking to disrupt traditional social norms and bourgeois

anarchism seeking freedom from the state that does not seek such

disruption). And although some argue that anarchists are deeply

ethical—committed to liberty and solidarity—others will argue that

anarchists are moral nihilists who reject morality entirely or who at

least reject the idea that there could be a single source of moral

authority (see essays in Franks & Wilson 2010).

2. Anarchism in Political Philosophy

Anarchism in political philosophy maintains that there is no legitimate

political or governmental authority. In political philosophy anarchy is

an important topic for consideration—even for those who are not

anarchists—as the a-political background condition against which various

forms of political organization are arrayed, compared, and justified.

Anarchy is often viewed by non-anarchists as the unhappy or unstable

condition in which there is no legitimate authority. Anarchism as a

philosophical idea is not necessarily connected to practical activism.

There are political anarchists who take action in order to destroy what

they see as illegitimate states. The popular imagination often views

anarchists as bomb-throwing nihilists. But philosophical anarchism is a

theoretical standpoint. In order to decide who (and whether) one should

act upon anarchist insight, we require a further theory of political

action, obligation, and obedience grounded in further ethical

reflection. Simmons explains that philosophical anarchists “do not take

the illegitimacy of states to entail a strong moral imperative to oppose

or eliminate states” (Simmons 2001: 104). Some anarchists remain

obedient to ruling authorities; others revolt or resist in various ways.

The question of action depends upon a theory of what sort of political

obligation follows from our philosophical, moral, political, religious,

and aesthetic commitments.

2.1 Anarchism in the History of Political Philosophy

There is a long history of political anarchism. In the ancient world,

anarchism of a sort can be found in the ideas of the Epicureans and

Cynics. Kropotkin makes this point in his 1910 encyclopedia article.

Although they did not employ the term anarchism, the Epicureans and

Cynics avoided political activity, advising retreat from political life

in pursuit of tranquility (ataraxia) and self-control (autarkeai). The

Cynics are also known for advocating cosmopolitanism: living without

allegiance to any particular state or legal system, while associating

with human beings based upon moral principle outside of traditional

state structures. Diogenes the Cynic had little respect for political or

religious authority. One of his guiding ideas was to “deface the

currency”. This meant not only devaluing or destroying monetary currency

but also a general rejection of the norms of civilized society (see

Marshall 2010: 69). Diogenes often mocked political authorities and

failed to offer signs of respect. While Diogenes actively disrespected

established norms, Epicurus counseled retreat. He advised living

unnoticed and avoiding political life (under the phrase me

politeuesthai—which can be understood as an anti-political admonition).

The assumption that anarchy would be unhappy or unstable leads to

justifications of political power. In Hobbes’ famous phrase, in the

stateless—anarchic—condition of “the state nature” human life would be

solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. Hobbes’ social contract—as

well as other versions of the social contract theory as found for

example in Locke or Rousseau—are attempts to explain how and why the

political state emerges from out of the anarchic state of nature.

Anarchists respond by claiming that the state tends to produce its own

sort of unhappiness: as oppressive, violent, corrupt, and inimical to

liberty. Discussions about the social contract thus revolve around the

question of whether the state is better than anarchy—or whether states

and state-like entities naturally and inevitably emerge from out of the

original condition of anarchy. One version of this argument about the

inevitable emergence of states (by way of something like an “invisible

hand”) is found in Nozick’s influential Anarchy, State, Utopia (1974).

While Nozick and other political philosophers take anarchy seriously as

a starting point, anarchists will argue that invisible hand arguments of

this sort ignore the historical actuality of states, which develop out

of a long history of domination, inequality, and oppression. Murray

Rothbard has argued against Nozick and social contract theory, saying,

“no existing state has been immaculately conceived” (Rothbard 1977: 46).

Different versions of the social contract theory, such as we find in

John Rawls’s work, view the contract situation as a heuristic device

allowing us to consider justice from under “the veil of ignorance”. But

anarchists will argue that the idea of the original position does not

necessarily lead to the justification of the state—especially given

background knowledge about the tendency of states to be oppressive.

Crispin Sartwell concludes:

Even accepting more or less all of the assumptions Rawls packs into the

original position, it is not clear that the contractors would not choose

anarchy. (Sartwell 2008: 83)

The author of the present essay has described anarchism that results

from a critique of the social contract tradition as “liberal social

contract anarchism” (Fiala 2013a).

An important historical touchstone is William Godwin. Unlike Locke and

Hobbes who turned to the social contract to lead us out of the anarchic

state of nature, Godwin argued that the resulting governmental power was

not necessarily better than anarchy. Locke, of course, allows for

revolution when the state becomes despotic. Godwin builds upon that

insight. He explained, “we must not hastily conclude that the mischiefs

of anarchy are worse than those which government is qualified to

produce” (Godwin 1793: bk VII, chap. V, p. 736). He claimed,

It is earnestly to be desired that each man should be wise enough to

govern himself, without the intervention of any compulsory restraint;

and, since government, even in its best state, is an evil, the object

principally to be aimed at is that we should have as little of it as the

general peace of human society will permit. (Godwin 1793: bk III, chap.

VII, p. 185–6)

Like Rousseau, who praised the noble savage, who was free from social

chains until forced into society, Godwin imagined original anarchy

developing into the political state, which tended on his view to become

despotic. Once the state comes into being, Godwin suggests that

despotism is the primary problem since “despotism is as perennial as

anarchy is transitory” (Godwin 1793: bk VII, chap. V, p. 736).

Anarchism is often taken to mean that individuals ought to be left alone

without any unifying principle or governing power. In some cases

anarchism is related to libertarianism (or what is sometimes called

“anarcho-capitalism”). But non-rule may also occur when there is

unanimity or consensus—and hence no need for external authority or a

governing structure of command and obedience. If there were unanimity

among individuals, there would be no need for “ruling”, authority, or

government. The ideas of unanimity and consensus are associated with the

positive conception of anarchism as a voluntary association of

autonomous human beings, which promotes communal values. One version of

the anarchist ideal imagines the devolution of centralized political

authority, leaving us with communes whose organizational structure is

open-ended and consensual.

Given this emphasis on communal organization it is not surprising that

political anarchism has a close historical association with communism,

despite the connection mentioned above with free market capitalism.

Authors such as Bakunin, Kropotkin, and Goldman developed their

anarchism as a response to Marx and Marxism. One of the first authors to

explicitly affirm anarchism, Pierre Proudhon, defended a kind of

“communism”, which he understood as being grounded in decentralized

associations, communes, and mutual-aid societies. Proudhon thought that

private property created despotism. He argued that liberty required

anarchy, concluding,

The government of man by man (under whatever name it be disguised) is

oppression. Society finds its highest perfection in the union of order

with anarchy. (Proudhon 1840 [1876: 286])

Following Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, and the other so-called

“classical anarchists”, anarchism comes to be seen as a focal point for

political philosophy and activism.

Let’s turn to a conceptual analysis of different arguments made in

defense of anarchism.

2.2 Absolute, Deontological, and a priori Anarchism

Anarchists often make categorical claims to the effect that no state is

legitimate or that there can no such thing as a justifiable political

state. As an absolute or a priori claim, anarchism holds that all states

always and everywhere are illegitimate and unjust. The term “a priori

anarchism” is found in Simmons 2001; but it is employed already by

Kropotkin in his influential 1910 article on anarchism, where he claims

that anarchists are not utopians who argue against the state in a priori

fashion (Kropotkin 1927 [2002: 285]). Despite Kropotkin’s claim, some

anarchists do offer a priori arguments against the state. This sort of

claim rests upon an account of the justification of authority that is

usually grounded in some form of deontological moral claim about the

importance of individual liberty and a logical claim about the nature of

state authority.

One typical and well-known example of this argument is found in the work

of Robert Paul Wolff. Wolff indicates that legitimate authority rests

upon a claim about the right to command obedience (Wolff 1970).

Correlative to this is a duty to obey: one has a duty to obey legitimate

authority. As Wolff explains, by appealing to ideas found in Kant and

Rousseau, the duty to obey is linked to notions about autonomy,

responsibility, and rationality. But for Wolff and other anarchists, the

problem is that the state does not have legitimate authority. As Wolff

says of the anarchist, “he will never view the commands of the state as

legitimate, as having a binding moral force” (Wolff 1970: 16). The

categorical nature of this claim indicates a version of absolute

anarchism. If the state’s commands are never legitimate and create no

moral duty of obedience, then there can never be a legitimate state.

Wolff imagines that there could be a legitimate state grounded in

“unanimous direct democracy”—but he indicates that unanimous direct

democracy would be “so restricted in its application that it offers no

serious hope of ever being embodied in an actual state” (Wolff 1970:

55). Wolff concludes:

If all men have a continuing obligation to achieve the highest degree of

autonomy possible, then there would appear to be no state whose subjects

have a moral obligation to obey its commands. Hence, the concept of a de

jure legitimate state would appear to be vacuous, and philosophical

anarchism would seem to be the only reasonable political belief for an

enlightened man. (Wolff 1970: 17)

As Wolff puts it here, there appears to be “no state” that is

legitimate. This claim is stated in absolute and a priori fashion, a

point made by Reiman in his critique of Wolff (Reiman 1972). Wolff does

not deny, by the way, that there are de facto legitimate states:

governments often do have the approval and support of the people they

govern. But this approval and support is merely conventional and not

grounded in a moral duty; and approval and support are manufactured and

manipulated by the coercive power and propaganda and ideology of the

state.

We noted here that Wolff’s anarchism is connected to Kant. But Kant is

no anarchist: he defended the idea of enlightened republican government

in which autonomy would be preserved. Rousseau may be closer to

espousing anarchism in some of his remarks—although these are far from

systematic (see McLaughlin 2007). Some authors view Rousseau as

espousing something close to “a posteriori philosophical anarchism” (see

Bertram 2010 [2017])—which we will define in the next section. Among

classical political philosophers, we might also consider Locke in

connection with “libertarian anarchism” (see Varden 2015) or Locke as

offering a theory “on the edge of anarchism”, as Simmons has put it

(Simmons 1993). But despite his strong defense of individual rights, the

stringent way he describes voluntary consent, and his advocacy of

revolution, Locke believes that states can be defended based upon the

social contract theory.

Leaving the canonical authors of Western political philosophy aside, the

most likely place to find deontological and a priori anarchism is among

the Christian anarchists. Of course, most Christians are not anarchists.

But those Christians who espouse anarchism usually do so with the

absolute, deontological, and a priori claims of the sort made by

Tolstoy, Berdyaev, and Ellul—as noted above.

2.3 Contingent, Consequentialist, and a posteriori Anarchism

A less stringent form of anarchism will argue that states could be

justified in theory—even though, in practice, no state or very few

states are actually legitimate. Contingent anarchism will hold that

states in the present configuration of things fail to live up to the

standards of their own justification. This is an a posteriori argument

(see Simmons 2001) based both in a theoretical account of the

justification of the state (for example, the social contract theory of

liberal-democratic theory) and in an empirical account of how and why

concrete states fail to be justified based upon this theory. The author

of the present article has offered a version of this argument based upon

the social contract theory, holding that the liberal-democratic social

contract theory provides the best theory of the justification of the

state, while arguing that very few states actually live up to the

promise of the social contract theory (Fiala 2013a).

One version of the contingent anarchist argument focuses on the question

of the burden of proof for accounts that would justify political

authority. This approach has been articulated by Noam Chomsky, who

explains:

[This] is what I have always understood to be the essence of anarchism:

the conviction that the burden of proof has to be placed on authority,

and that it should be dismantled if that burden cannot be met. Sometimes

the burden can be met. (Chomsky 2005: 178)

Chomsky accepts legitimate authority based in ordinary experience: for

example, when a grandfather prevents a child from darting out into the

street. But state authority is a much more complicated affair. Political

relationships are attenuated; there is the likelihood of corruption and

self-interest infecting political reality; there are levels and degrees

of mediation, which alienate us from the source of political authority;

and the rational autonomy of adults is important and fundamental. By

focusing on the burden of proof, Chomsky acknowledges that there may be

ways to meet the burden of proof for the justification of the state. But

he points out that there is a prima facie argument against the

state—which is based in a complex historical and empirical account of

the role of power, economics, and historical inertia in creating

political institutions. He explains:

Such institutions face a heavy burden of proof: it must be shown that

under existing conditions, perhaps because of some overriding

consideration of deprivation or threat, some form of authority,

hierarchy, and domination is justified, despite the prima facie case

against it—a burden that can rarely be met. (Chomsky 2005: 174)

Chomsky does not deny that the burden of proof could be met. Rather, his

point is that there is a prima facie case against the state, since the

burden of proof for the justification of the state is rarely met.

Contingent anarchism is based in consequentialist reasoning, focused on

details of historical actuality. Consequentialist anarchism will appeal

to utilitarian considerations, arguing that states generally fail to

deliver in terms of promoting the happiness of the greater number of

people—and more strongly that state power tends to produce unhappiness.

The actuality of inequality, classism, elitism, racism, sexism, and

other forms of oppression can be used to support an anarchist argument,

holding that even though a few people benefit from state power, a larger

majority suffers under it.

There is a significant difference between anarchism that is offered in

pursuit of utilitarianism’s greater happiness ideal and anarchism that

is offered in defense of the minority against the tyranny of the

majority. As we shall see in the next section, individualist anarchists

are primarily concerned with the tendency of utilitarian politics to

sacrifice the rights of individuals in the name of the greater good.

Before turning to that conception of anarchism, let’s note two classical

authors who offer insight into utilitarian anarchism. Godwin articulated

a form of anarchism that is connected to a utilitarian concern. Godwin’s

general moral thought is utilitarian in basic conception, even though he

also argues based upon fundamental principles such as the importance of

liberty. But Godwin’s arguments are a posteriori, based upon

generalizations from history and with an eye toward the future

development of happiness and liberty. He writes:

Above all we should not forget, that government is an evil, an

usurpation upon the private judgment and individual conscience of

mankind; and that, however we may be obliged to admit it as a necessary

evil for the present. (Godwin 1793: bk V, ch. I, p. 380)

This claim is similar to Chomsky’s insofar as it recognizes the

complicated nature of the historical dialectic. The goal of political

development should be in a direction that goes beyond the state (and

toward the development of individual reason and morality). But in our

present condition, some form of government may be “a necessary evil”,

which we ought to strive to overcome. The point here is that our

judgments about the justification of the state are contingent: they

depend upon present circumstances and our current form of development.

And while states may be necessary features of the current human world,

as human beings develop further, it is possible that the state might

outlive its usefulness.

We should note that utilitarian arguments are often used to support

state structures in the name of the greater good. Utilitarian anarchists

will argue that states fail to do this. But utilitarian conclusions are

not usually based upon a fundamental appeal to moral principles such as

liberty or the rights of the individual. Thus Bentham described claims

about human rights as “anarchical fallacies” because they tended to lead

toward anarchy, which he rejected. Bentham described the difference

between a moderate utilitarian effort at reform and the anarchist’s

revolutionary doctrine of human rights, saying that

the anarchist setting up his will and fancy for a law before which all

mankind are called upon to bow down at the first word—the anarchist,

trampling on truth and decency, denies the validity of the law in

question,—denies the existence of it in the character of a law, and

calls upon all mankind to rise up in a mass, and resist the execution of

it. (Bentham 1843: 498)

More principled deontological anarchism will maintain that states

violate fundamental rights and so are not justified. But utilitarian

anarchism will not primarily be worried about the violation of a few

people’s rights (although that is obviously a relevant consideration).

Rather, the complaint for a utilitarian anarchist is that state

structures tend to produce disadvantages for the greater number of

people. Furthermore what Oren Ben-Dor calls “utilitarian-based

anarchism” is based upon the idea that there is no a priori

justification of the state (Ben-Dor 2000: 101–2). For the utilitarian,

this all depends upon the circumstances and conditions. Ben-Dor calls

this anarchism because it rejects any a priori notion of state

justification. In other words, the utilitarian anarchist does not

presume that states are justifiable; rather a utilitarian anarchist will

hold that the burden of proof rests upon the defender of states to show

that state authority is justifiable on utilitarian grounds, by bringing

in historical and empirical data about human nature, human flourishing,

and successful social organization.

2.4 Individualism, Libertarianism, and Socialist Anarchism

Forms of anarchism also differ in terms of the content of the theory,

the focal point of the anarchist critique, and the imagined practical

impact of anarchism. Socialist forms of anarchism include communist

anarchism associated with Kropotkin and communitarian anarchism (see

Clark 2013). The socialist approach focuses on the development of social

and communal groups, which are supposed to thrive outside of

hierarchical and centralized political structures. Individualist forms

of anarchism include some forms of libertarianism or anarcho-capitalism

as well as egoistically oriented antinomianism and non-conformism. The

individualistic focus rejects group identity and ideas about

social/communal good, while remaining firmly rooted in moral claims

about the autonomy of the individual (see Casey 2012).

Individualistic anarchism is historically associated with ideas found in

Stirner who said, “every state is a despotism” (Stirner 1844 [1995:

175]). He argued that there was no duty to obey the state and the law

because the law and the state impair self-development and self-will. The

state seeks to tame our desires and along with the church it undermines

self-enjoyment and the development of unique individuality. Stirner is

even critical of social organizations and political parties. While not

denying that an individual could affiliate with such organizations, he

maintains that the individual retains rights and identity against the

party or social organization: he embraces the party; but he ought not

allow himself to be “embraced and taken up by the party” (Stirner 1844

[1995: 211]). Individualist anarchism has often been attributed to a

variety of thinkers including Josiah Warren, Benjamin Tucker, and

Thoreau.

Individualist anarchism also seems to have something in common with

egoism of the sort associated with Ayn Rand. But Rand dismissed

anarchism as “a naïve floating abstraction” that could not exist in

reality; and she argued that governments properly existed to defend

people’s rights (Rand 1964). A more robust sort of pro-capitalist

anarchism has been defended by Murray Rothbard, who rejects “left-wing

anarchism” of the sort he associates with communism, while applauding

the individualist anarchism of Tucker (Rothbard 2008). Rothbard

continues to explain that since anarchism has usually been considered as

being primarily a left-wing communist phenomenon, libertarianism should

be distinguished from anarchism by calling it “non-archism” (Rothbard

2008). A related term has been employed in the literature,

“min-archism”, which has been used to describe the minimal state that

libertarians allow (see Machan 2002). Libertarians are still

individualists, who emphasize the importance of individual liberty, even

though they disagree with full-blown anarchists about the degree to

which state power can be justified.

In some cases, individualistic anarchism is merely a matter of

“lifestyle” (criticized in Bookchin 1995), which focuses on dress,

behavior, and other individualistic choices and preferences. Bookchin

and other critics of lifestyle individualism will argue that mere

non-conformism does very little to change the status quo and overturn

structures of domination and authority. But defenders of lifestyle

non-conformism will argue that there is value in opting out of cultural

norms and demonstrating contempt for conformity through individual

lifestyle choices.

A more robust form of individualist anarchism will focus on key values

such as autonomy and self-determination, asserting the primacy of the

individual over and against social groups. Individualist anarchists can

admit that collective action is important and that voluntary cooperation

among individuals can result in beneficial and autonomy preserving

community. Remaining disputes will consider whether what results from

individual cooperation is a form of capitalism or a form of social

sharing or communism. Libertarian anarchists or anarcho-capitalists will

defend free market ideas based upon individual choices in trading and

producing goods for market.

On the other hand, socialist or communistically oriented anarchism will

focus more on a sharing economy. This could be a large form of mutualism

or something local and concrete like the sharing of family life or the

traditional potlatch. But these ideas remain anarchist to the extent

that they want to avoid centralized control and the development of

hierarchical structures of domination. Unlike state-centered communism

of the sort developed by Marxists, anarchist communism advocates

decentralization. The motto of this approach comes from Kropotkin: “all

for all”. In The Conquest of Bread (1892) Kropotkin criticizes

monopolistic centralization that prevents people from gaining access to

socially generated wealth. The solution is “all for all”: “What we

proclaim is the Right to Well-Being: Well-Being for All!” (Kropotkin

1892 [1995: 20]). The communist idea that all humans should enjoy the

fruits of the collective human product shares something with the Marxist

idea of “to each according to his need” (Marx 1875). But Kropotkin

argues for the need to evolve beyond centralized communist control—what

he criticizes as mere “collectivism”—and toward anarchist communism:

Anarchy leads to communism, and communism to anarchy, both alike being

expressions of the predominant tendency in modern societies, the pursuit

of equality. (Kropotkin 1892 [1995: 31])

Kropotkin argues that the communal impulse already exists and that the

advances in social wealth made possible by the development of

individualistic capitalism make it likely that we will develop in the

direction of communal sharing. He argues that the tendency of history is

away from centralized power and toward equality and liberty—and toward

the abolition of the state. Kropotkin’s communist anarchism is based

upon some historical and empirical claims: about whether things can

actually be arranged more satisfactorily without state intervention; and

about whether states really do personify injustice and oppression.

Libertarianism and anarcho-capitalism also think that the free market

will work to adequately maximize human well-being and help individuals

to realize their own autonomy. But for the socialist and communist

anarchists, the question of individual self-realization is less

important than the idea of social development. Kropotkin’s “all for all”

indicates a moral and ontological focus that is different from what we

find among the individualists.

Socialist and communally focused forms of anarchism emphasize the

importance of social groups. For example, families can be viewed as

anarchic structures of social cooperation and solidarity. A social

anarchist would be critical of hierarchical and domineering forms of

family organization (for example, patriarchal family structure). But

social anarchists will emphasize the point that human identity and

flourishing occur within extended social structures—so long as it

remains a free and self-determining community.

The tension between individualist and socialist anarchism comes to a

head when considering the question of the degree to which an individual

ought to be subordinated to the community. One problem for so-called

“communitarian” theories of social and political life is that they can

result in the submergence of individuals into the communal identity.

Individualists will want to struggle against this assault upon autonomy

and individual identity. Communalists may respond, as Clark does, by

claiming that the ideal of a genuine community of autonomous individuals

remains a hoped for dream of an “impossible community” (Clark 2013). On

the other hand communally focused theorists will point out that

individual human beings cannot exist outside of communal structures: we

are social animals who flourish and survive in communities. Thus radical

individualism also remains a dream—and as more politically oriented

anarchists will point out, individualism undermines the possibility of

organized political action, which implies that individualist anarchists

will be unable to successfully resist political structures of

domination.

3. Anarchism and Political Activity

Anarchism forces us to re-evaluate political activity. Ancient Greek

philosophers such as Aristotle and Plato held that human beings

flourished within just political communities and that there was a virtue

in serving the polis. Modern political philosophy tended to hold, as

well, that political action—including obedience to the law and the ideal

of a rule of law—was noble and enlightened. In Hegelian political

philosophy, these ideas combine in a way that celebrates citizenship and

service to the state. And in contemporary liberal political philosophy,

it is often presumed that obedience to the law is required as a prima

facie duty (see Reiman 1972; Gans 1992). Anarchists, of course, call

this all into question.

The crucial question for anarchists is thus whether one ought to

disengage from political life, whether one ought to submit to political

authority and obey the law, or whether one ought to engage in active

efforts to actively abolish the state. Those who opt to work actively

for the abolition of the state often understand this as a form of

“direct action” or “propaganda of the deed”. The idea of direct action

is often viewed as typical of anarchists, who believe that something

ought to be done to actively abolish the state including: graffiti,

street theater, organized occupations, boycotts, and even violence.

There are disputes among anarchists about what ought to be done, with an

important dividing line occurring with regard to the question of

violence and criminal behavior.

Before turning to that discussion, let’s note one further important

theoretical distinction with regard to the question of taking action,

connected to the typology offered above: whether action should be

justified in consequentialist or non-consequentialist terms. Franks has

argued that anarchist direct action ought to exemplify a unity of means

and ends (Franks 2003). On this view, if liberation and autonomy are

what anarchists are pursuing, then the methods used to obtain these

goods must be liberationist and celebrate autonomy—and embody this

within direct action. Franks argues that the idea that “the end

justifies the means” is more typical of state-centered movements, such

as Bolshevism—and of right-wing movements. While some may think that

anarchists are willing to engage in action “by any means necessary”,

that phraseology and the crass consequentialism underlying it is more

typical of radical movements which are not anarchist. Coercive

imposition of the anarchist ideal re-inscribes the problem of

domination, hierarchy, centralization, and monopolistic power that the

anarchist was originally opposed to.

3.1 Nonviolence, Violence, and Criminality

One significant philosophical and ethical problem for politically

engaged anarchists is the question of how to avoid ongoing cycles of

power and violence that are likely to erupt in the absence of

centralized political power. One suggestion, mentioned above, is that

anarchists will often want to emphasize the unity of means and ends.

This idea shows why there is some substantial overlap and conjunction

between anarchism and pacifism. Pacifist typically emphasize the unity

of means and ends. But not all pacifists are anarchists. However, we

mentioned above that there is a connection between anarchism and

Christian pacifism, as found in Tolstoy, for example. Gandhi was

influenced by Tolstoy and the anarchists. Although Gandhi is better

known as an anti-colonial activist, Marshall includes Gandhi among the

anarchists (Marshall 2010: chapter 26). It is possible to reconstruct

anti-colonial movements and arguments about self-determination and home

rule as a kind of anarchism (aimed at destroying colonial power and

imperial states). Gandhi noted that there were many anarchists working

in India in his time. In saying this, Gandhi uses the term anarchism to

characterize bomb-throwing advocates of violence. He says: “I myself am

an anarchist, but of another type” (Gandhi 1916 [1956: 134]). Gandhian

anarchism, if there is such a thing, embraces nonviolence. In general

nonviolent resistance as developed in the Tolstoy-Gandhi-King tradition

fits with an approach that turns away from political power and views the

state as a purveyor of war and an impediment to equality and human

development.

Objecting to this anarcho-pacifist approach are more militant activists

who advocate direct action that can include sabotage and other forms of

political violence including terrorism. Emma Goldman explains, for

example, that anti-capitalist sabotage undermines the idea of private

possession. While the legal system considers this to be criminal,

Goldman contends it is not. She explains,

it is ethical in the best sense, since it helps society to get rid of

its worst foe, the most detrimental factor of social life. Sabotage is

mainly concerned with obstructing, by every possible method, the regular

process of production, thereby demonstrating the determination of the

workers to give according to what they receive, and no more. (Goldman

1913 [1998: 94])

Goldman struggled with the question of violence through the course of

her career. Early on she was a more vocal proponent of revolutionary

violence. She began to rethink this later. Nonetheless, like other

anarchists of her generation, she attributed violence to the state,

which she opposed. She writes:

I believe that Anarchism is the only philosophy of peace, the only

theory of the social relationship that values human life above

everything else. I know that some Anarchists have committed acts of

violence, but it is the terrible economic inequality and great political

injustice that prompt such acts, not Anarchism. Every institution today

rests on violence; our very atmosphere is saturated with it. (Goldman

1913 [1998: 59])

Goldman views anarchist violence as merely reactive. In response to

state violence, the anarchists often argued that they were merely using

violence in self-defense. Another defender of violence is Malatesta who

wrote that the revolution against the violence of the ruling class must

be violent. He explained:

I think that a regime which is born of violence and which continues to

exist by violence cannot be overthrown except by a corresponding and

proportionate violence. (Malatesta 1925 [2015: 48])

Like Goldman, Malatesta warned against violence becoming an end in

itself and giving way to brutality and ferocity for its own sake. He

also described anarchists as preachers of love and advocates of peace.

He said,

what distinguishes the anarchists from all others is in fact their

horror of violence, their desire and intention to eliminate physical

violence from human relations. (Malatesta 1924 [2015: 46])

But despite this rejection of violence, Malatesta advocates violence as

a necessary evil.

Anarchist violence appears as the violence of an individual against the

state. It is easy to see why such violence would be characterized as

terroristic and criminal. For an individual to declare war against the

state and take action to disrupt the state is criminal. And thus

anarchists have also been interested in a critique of crime and

criminality—arguing that it is the law and the legal system that creates

and produces crime and criminality. This critique was advanced by

Kropotkin as early as the 1870s, when he called prisons “schools for

crime”. Similar ideas are found in Foucault and in more recent

criticisms of mass incarceration. Contemporary anarchists will argue

that mass incarceration is an example of state power run amok.

3.2 Disobedience, Revolution, and Reform

The question of violence leads us to a further issue: the question of

obedience, disobedience, resistance, and political obligation. Much

could be said here about the nature of political obligation and

obedience: including whether obedience is merely pragmatic and strategic

or based upon notions about loyalty and claims about identification with

the nation and its laws. But it is clear that anarchists have no

principled reason for political obedience. If the anarchist views the

state as illegitimate, then obedience and participation are merely a

matter of choice, preference, and pragmatism—and not a matter of loyalty

or duty.

Christian anarchists will look, for example, to the case of Jesus and

his idea of rendering unto Caesar what is due to Caesar (Matthew

22:15–22). The anarchist interpretation of this passage claims that this

is an indication both of Jesus’s disaffection with the state and with

his grudging acquiescence to political authority. Christoyannopoulos

argues, “Jesus’ political subversion is carried out through submission

rather than revolt” (Christoyannopoulos 2010: 156). The crucifixion, on

this interpretation, is a subversive event, which “unmasks” political

power as “demonic” and illegitimate. Jesus does not recognize the

ultimate moral and religious authority of Caesar or Pilate. But he goes

along with the political regime. Thus some anarchists may simply be

compliant and submissive.

But politically motivated anarchists encourage resistance to state

power, including strategic and principled disobedience. Such

disobedience could involve symbolic actions—graffiti and the like—or

acts of civil resistance, protests, tax resistance and so on—up to, and

possibly including, sabotage, property crime, and outright violence.

Again, there is overlap with the discussion of violence here, but let’s

set that question aside and focus on the notion of civil disobedience.

One important example is found in Thoreau, who famously explained his

act of disobedience by tax resistance as follows:

In fact, I quietly declare war with the State, after my fashion, though

I will still make what use and get what advantage of her I can, as is

usual in such cases. (Thoreau 1849 [1937: 687])

Thoreau’s disobedience is principled. He recognizes that a declaration

of war against the state is a criminal act. He willingly goes to jail.

But he also admits that he will cooperate with the state in other

cases—since there is something advantageous about cooperation. This

indicates the complexity of the question of cooperation, protest, and

disobedience. Thoreau’s essay, “Civil Disobedience” (1849), is often

viewed as an anarchist manifesto. Kropotkin discussed him as an

anarchist (Kropotkin 1927 [2002]). And Tolstoy admired his act of civil

disobedience—as did Gandhi.

Anarchists continue to discuss strategies and tactics of disobedience.

One problem throughout this discussion is the degree to which

disobedience is effective. If there were to be successful anarchist

campaigns of disobedience they would have to be organized and

widespread. Whether such campaigns would actually work to disassemble

the state apparatus remains an open question.

Until their dreamed-of revolution comes, anarchist must consider the

degree to which cooperation with the state involves “selling out” to the

political status quo. Perhaps there are reforms and short-term gains

that can be obtained through traditional political means: voting,

lobbying legislators, etc. But anarchists have often held to an

all-or-nothing kind of approach to political participation. We noted

above that the Christian anarchist Jacques Ellul has said that he does

not vote because anarchy implies conscientious objection. But herein

lies a strategic conundrum. If progressively minded anarchists opt out

of the political system, this means that less enlightened policies will

prevail. By not voting or otherwise engaging in ordinary politics, the

anarchist ends up with a system that he or she will be even less happy

with than if he or she had actively participated in the system.

This is, really, a problem of revolution versus reform. The

revolutionary wants revolution now, believing that it will occur by way

of direct action of various sorts. Perhaps the revolutionary is also

thinking that the psychological, cultural, and spiritual evolution

toward revolutionary consciousness can only occur when direct action is

taken: in order for anarchism to emerge, the anarchist may think, one

ought to behave and think like an anarchist. But without a concerted and

nation-wide revolution, revolutionary action begins to look like mere

selfishness, Epicurean opting out, or what Bookchin criticized as

“lifestyle anarchism”. Meanwhile those reform-minded folks who work

within the system of political power and legality can end up supporting

a system that they have doubts about. This philosophical problem of

reform vs. revolution exists for all radical political agendas. But the

problem is especially acute for anarchists, since anarchism is often an

all-or-none proposition: if the state is justified then gradualism and

reformism make sense; but if no state can be justified, then what is

sometimes called “reformist anarchism” is a non-starter (see L. Davis

2012).

3.3. Utopian Communities and Non-Revolutionary Anarchism

Many anarchists are revolutionaries who want change to be created

through direct action. But given our preceding discussion of violence,

disobedience, and the potential for success of revolutionary activity,

the question arises about opting-out of political life. The Epicureans

and Cynics pointed in this direction. The history of anarchism is

replete with efforts to construct anarchist communes that are

independent and separated from the rest of state centered political

life.

We might pick up the history here with the Christian anarchists and

pacifists of the Reformation: the Mennonites, for example; or the

Quakers who refused to doff their hats for political authorities and who

sought a refuge in Pennsylvania. Indeed, there is an anarchist thread to

the colonization of North America, as those who were disgruntled with

European political and religious hierarchy left for the “new world” or

were forced out by the European authorities. In the Seventeenth Century,

Anne Hutchinson was cast out of the Massachusetts Bay Colony and forced

to found a new community, when she concluded that the idea of government

was flawed. Hutchinson is considered as one of the first anarchists of

North America (see Stringham 2007). Separatist communities were founded

by the New England abolitionists and transcendentalists, by Josiah

Warren, and by others.

Anarchist communes were formed in Europe during the Nineteenth Century

and in Spain during the 1930s. There have been ongoing movements and

organizations of indigenous peoples and others who inhabit the margins

of mainstream political life. In the 1960s and 70s, anarchist separatism

was reiterated in the Hippy communes and attempts to live off the grid

and get back to nature. Alternative communes, squats, and spontaneous

gatherings continue to occur.

Separatist communities have to consider: the degree to which they give

up on anarchist direct action against dominant political forces, the

extent to which they have to accommodate themselves to political

reality, and the risk that customary hierarchies will be reinstated

within the commune. For the revolutionary anarchist, separatism is a

strategy of avoidance that impedes political action. Separatist communes

must often obey the rules of the dominant political organization in

order to trade and get connected to the rest of the world. Finally, a

complaint made about separatist communes is that they can end up being

structured by sexist, classist, and other hierarchical organizing

principles. One might argue that until the dominant culture is

revolutionized, separatism will only be a pale reflection of the

anarchist ideal. And yet, on the other hand, advocates of separatism

will argue that the best way for anarchist ideals to take hold is to

demonstrate that they work and to provide an inspiration and

experimental proving ground for anarchism.

If revolutionary activity is taken off the table, then anarchists are

left with various forms of gradualism and reformism. One way this might

occur is through the creation of “temporary autonomous zones” such as

those described by Bey. Along these lines David Graeber provides a

description of the cultural and spiritual work that would be required in

order to prepare the way for anarchist revolution. Graeber says that

this would require “liberation in the imaginary”, by which he means that

through activism, utopian communities, and the like there can be a

gradual change in the way political power is imagined and understood

(Graeber 2004). Revolutionary anarchists will respond to this by arguing

that liberation in the imaginary is simply imaginary liberation: without

actual change in the status quo, oppression and inequality continue to

be a problem.

4. Objections and Replies

Let’s conclude by considering some standard objections to anarchism and

typical replies.

4.1 Anarchism is Nihilistic and Destructive

Objection: This objection holds that anarchism is merely another name

for chaos and for a rejection of order. This objection holds that

anarchists are violent and destructive and that they are intent on

destroying everything, including morality itself.

Reply: This objection does not seem to recognize that anarchists come in

many varieties. Many anarchists are also pacifists—and so do not

advocate violent revolution. Many other anarchists are firmly committed

to moral principles such as autonomy, liberty, solidarity, and equality.

Some anarchists do take their critique of arché in a nihilistic

direction that denies ethical principles. But one can be committed to

anarchism, while advocating for caring communities. Indeed, many of the

main authors in the anarchist tradition believed that the state and the

other hierarchical and authoritarian structures of contemporary society

prevented human flourishing.

4.2 Anarchy Will Always Evolve Back into the State

Objection: This objection holds that anarchism is inherently unstable.

Hobbes and other early modern social contract theories maintain that the

state emerges as a necessary response to natural anarchy which keeps

order and protects our interests. A different theory comes from Nozick,

who argues that the “night-watchman state” would emerge out of anarchy

by an invisible hand process: as people will exercise their liberty and

purchase protection from a protection agency, which would eventually

evolve into something like a minimal state.

Reply: Anarchists may argue that the state of nature is simply not a

state of war and so that Hobbes’s description is false. Some

anarcho-primitivists will argue that things were much better for human

beings in the original state of nature in small communities living close

to the land. Other anarchists might argue that the disadvantages of

state organizations—the creation of hierarchies, monopolies,

inequalities, and the like—simply outweigh the benefits of state

structures; and that rational agents would choose to remain in anarchy

rather than allow the state to evolve. Some anarchists may argue that

each time a state emerges, it would have to be destroyed. But others

will argue that education and human development (including technological

development) would prevent the reemergence of the state.

4.3 Anarchism is Utopian

Objection: This objection holds that there simply is no way to destroy

or deconstruct the state. So exercises in anarchist political theory are

fruitless. It would be better, from this point of view to focus on

critiques of hierarchy, inequality, and threats to liberty from within

liberal or libertarian political theory—and to engage in reforms that

occur within the status quo and mainstream political organization.

Reply: Ideal theory is always in opposition to non-ideal theory. But

utopian speculation can be useful for clarifying values. Thus

philosophical anarchism may be a useful exercise that helps us

understand our values and commitment, even though political anarchism

has no hope of succeeding. Furthermore, there are examples of successful

anarchist communities on a small local scale (for example, in the

separatist communities discussed above). These concrete examples can be

viewed as experiments in anarchist theory and practice.

4.4 Anarchism is Incoherent

Objection: This objection holds that a political theory that abolishes

political structures makes no sense. A related concern arises when

anarchism is taken to be a critique of authority in every case and in

all senses. If anarchists deny then that there can be any arché

whatsoever, then the claim contradicts itself: we would have a ruling

theory that states that there is no ruling theory. This sort of

criticism is related to standard criticisms of relativism and nihilism.

Related to this is a more concrete and mundane objection that holds that

there can be no anarchist movement or collective action, since anarchism

is constitutionally opposed to the idea of a movement or collective

(since under anarchism there can be no authoritative ruler or set of

rules).

Reply: This objection only holds if anarchism is taken to be an

all-or-nothing theory of the absolutist variety. Political anarchists do

not necessarily agree with the skeptical post-foundationalist critique

which holds that there can be no ruling principle or authority

whatsoever. Rather, political anarchists hold that there are legitimate

authorities but that political power quickly loses its authoritativeness

and legitimacy. Furthermore, anarchists tend to advocate for a principle

and procedure for organization based upon voluntarism and mutual aid, as

well as unanimity and/or consensus. From this point of view anarchist

communities can work very well, provided that they avoid coercive

authority. To support this point anarchists will point to historical

examples of successful anarchist communes. They will also point to

ordinary human relations—in families and civil society

relationship—which operate quite well apart form coercive and

hierarchical political authority

4.5 Philosophical Anarchism is “Toothless”

Objection: One objection to philosophical anarchism of the sort

discussed throughout this essay is that it remains merely theoretical.

Some political anarchists have little patience for abstract discourses

that do not engage in direct action. One worry about philosophical

anarchism is that in failing to act—and in failing to take

responsibility for the actions that ought to follow from

thought—philosophical anarchism remains a bourgeois convenience that

actually serves the status quo. Thus when philosophical anarchists

remain uncommitted in terms of the concrete questions raised by

anarchism—whether they should obey the law, whether they should vote,

and so on—they tend to support the interests of defenders of the status

quo.

Reply: In response to this objection, one might defend the importance of

philosophical reflection. It is important to be clear about principles

and ideas before taking action. And with anarchism the stakes are quite

high. The puzzles created by philosophical anarchism are profound. They

lead us to question traditional notions of sovereignty, political

obligation, and so on. They lead us to wonder about cultural and ethical

conventions, including also our first principles regarding the theory

and organization of social life. Given the difficulty of resolving many

of these questions, the philosophical anarchist may hold that caution is

in order. Moreover, the philosophical anarchist might also defend the

importance of wonder. The anarchist critique gives us reason to wonder

about much that we take for granted. Wonder may not change the world in

immediate ways or lead to direct action. But wonder is an important step

in the direction of thoughtful, ethical action.

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