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Title: Statement on Rojava
Author: Anarchist Federation
Date: 1st December 2014
Language: en
Topics: Rojava
Source: Retrieved on 6th March 2021 from https://libcom.org/news/anarchist-federation-statement-rojava-december-2014-02122014

Anarchist Federation

Statement on Rojava

The following statement addresses the situation in which Devrimci

Anarşist Faaliyet (DAF), Revolutionary Anarchist Action, are involved on

the Turkish/Syrian border in opposition to IS. This is a struggle which,

if lost, will probably result in far greater repression and tyranny than

workers in the region already face, in towns and on the land. It is also

one in which class-consciousness and the class struggle must remain at

the forefront of anarchist responses. Anarchists on the ground are

fighting in a less-than-ideal situation, not least given that the state

forces of Syria, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and the US, also claim to combat IS.

We continue to offer practical solidarity through the International of

Anarchist Federations (IFA/IAF). We also offer our own evaluation of the

situation.

The Anarchist Federation is only too aware of the support that many

anarchists, including those who describe themselves as anarchist

communists, anarcho-syndicalists and class struggle anarchists, are

offering the “Rojava Revolution”. This includes lauding the PKK

(Kurdistan Workers Party) as a party that has somehow morphed from being

an authoritarian nationalist party into being a near-anarchist catalyst

for social revolution in the region, and describing the situation in

Rojava as similar to the revolutionary situation in Spain in 1936 (David

Graeber, as well as Derek Wall of the Green Party left).

Those who wish to hold on to their principles and to keep a clear head,

need to examine the facts. The PKK at its birth adopted a leftist

nationalist stance. This leftism was very much of the Stalinist variety.

In 1984 it began an armed struggle against the Turkish state. With the

capture of Abdullah Ocalan, its leader, by the Turkish state, a new

period in the evolution of the PKK began. In line with leaders of other

parties of the same ilk, Ocalan was and is seen as a charismatic figure

to which the leadership elements and the base of the party pay

obedience. Ocalan is described as “the sun” around which the various

political and military organisations revolve. This situation has not

changed with his apparent adoption of Bookchinite confederal

municipalism. Ocalan deliberately modelled himself on Stalin right down

to the personality cult. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and its

satellites, Ocalan and the PKK began to manouevre, to change positions,

no longer being able to look towards a discredited state capitalism.

When the PKK military forces were compelled to move over the border to

Syria, they met problems with the Kurdish peasantry there, many of whom

still held to Muslim religious beliefs at odds with PKK leftism. This

impelled Ocalan to talk about Kurdistan as “the cradle of international

Islam”. At the same time the PKK entered into a tacit alliance with

Syria’s Assad regime, an enemy of the Turkish state.

Ocalan then completed another turn and talked about becoming Turkey’s

“most powerful ally” and that “the war on behalf of borders and classes

has come to an end”. When this failed to impress his captors, Ocalan

then took another turn, recommending that Bookchin must be read and his

ideas practised. This initiated an intensive marketing campaign by the

PKK towards Western leftists and anarchists in order to look for support

and allies.

Apart from the strange occurrence of the PKK, after decades of

Stalinised nationalism, apparently turning overnight into some sort of

organisation advocating Bookchinite libertarian municipalism, it should

be pointed out that this came not from the grassroots of the PKK but was

handed down by Ocalan through the PKK command structure. In fact, whilst

Ocalan and the PKK might be posing as born again libertarians, it should

be remembered that the PKK, whilst facing towards the West as advocates

of direct democracy and of secularism, at the same time advocates the

setting up of Democratic Islam Congresses to accommodate the Islamists

and to religiously legitimise the PKK. This was also at the instigation

of Ocalan. In a letter that Ocalan sent to the Democratic Islam Congress

he referred to his “brother believers” and goes on to say that “we

cannot be defined by western concepts such as communism and atheism”.

Further he then talks favourably about the Islamisation of Kurdistan. So

much for secularism!

As to any change in the structure of the PKK from an extremely

centralised structure with Ocalan at the tip of the pyramid into a

libertarian federalist organisation controlled by the membership, there

is no evidence whatsoever that this has happened. The PKK’s “Democratic

Confederalism” is described by Ocalan as “a system which takes into

consideration the religious, ethnic and class differences in society”,

in other words the class system is not being questioned at all. The Koma

Civakên Kurdistan (KCK) (Group of Communities in Kurdistan) an

organization founded by the PKK to implement the Democratic

Confederalism programme, defends private property in its Contract (the

key document in the aforesaid programme). This is under Article 8,

“Personal, Political Rights and Freedoms”. Section C of article 10,

“Basic Responsibilities” defines the constitutional basis of mandatory

military service:“In the case of a war of legitimate defense, as a

requirement of patriotism, there is the responsibility to actively join

the defense of the homeland and basic rights and freedoms”.

Zafer Onat, a libertarian communist in the region remarks “While the

Contract states that the aim is not political power, we also understand

that the destruction of the state apparatus is also not aimed [at],

meaning the goal is autonomy within existing nation states. When the

Contract is viewed in its entirety, the goal that is presented is not to

be seen beyond a bourgeois democratic system that is called democratic

confederalism”.

Anarchists can remember Gaddafi’s Green Book, which in rhetoric had far

more radical language, where it says: “All that the masses need do now

is to struggle to put an end to all forms of dictatorial rule in the

world today, to all forms of what is falsely called democracy — from

parliaments to the sect, the tribe, the class and to the one-party, the

two-party and the multi-party systems.... No democracy without popular

congresses and committees everywhere.... Democracy is the supervision of

the people by the people.” But did anyone seriously believe that this

was actually being implemented under the repressive regime of Gaddafi?

The uprising against the Assad regime meant that in the course of

events, that regime ceased hostilities against the Syrian branch of the

PKK, the PYD (Democratic Union Party). This was in order to concentrate

on fighting its other opponents, the Free Syrian Army, etc. How

seriously should we take the claims about the Rojava Revolution in the

Kurdish part of Syria?

We should be clear that the PYD has set up a parliament structure, the

Auto-Administration, which it controls with allied parties. It passed a

conscription law in July compelling families in the region to send one

of their 18–30 year-old members to serve in the defence corps of the

PYD, for a period of six months, either continuously or intermittently

over a one year period. “Non-adherence” to this law was subject to

punishment as stipulated in the law. This law was passed without

consulting with other political formations in Rojava and explicitly

drafts Kurds into armed groups completely under the control of the PYD.

At the same time the PYD is treating other Kurdish political formations

in Rojava in an authoritarian totalitarian way, backed up by its use of

armed force. It marginalises them and refuses entry into any decision

making.

The so-called cantonal assemblies and grassroots bodies are themselves

under the sway of the PYD and the Auto-Administration can either approve

or block any decisions by these bodies. There is no real direct

democracy here, workers and peasants do not control these bodies. At the

same time no genuine workers and peasants militias have developed, all

of the armed groups are under the control of the PYD. Furthermore, there

is no socialisation and collectivisation of the land and the workplaces,

as happened, for example, in Spain in 1936. The PKK/PYD marketing

campaign has presented the situation in Rojava as one of progressive

revolution, but the working class and the peasantry have no autonomous

organisation. Whilst there is a quota of 40% representation of women

within these local councils/communes/committees, it can be seen from the

above that the local structures are in fact not much different from

municipal councils in the West, where they act in their role as the

local state as support for and in connection with the central state and

parliament. Indeed, while some compare the “Rojava Revolution” to Spain

1936 perhaps a better analogy would be the Bolsheviks in 1917 which many

anarchists, both internationally and inside Russia, mistakenly supported

initially as a truly revolutionary force.

As regards the women’s armed groups, whilst there are signs of feminist

influences within them, it should be remembered that the women’s

fighting groups are segregated from male units, with no mixed fighting

groups. Gaddafi and Saddam both had women’s military brigades, but that

did not mean that there was women’s liberation in Libya and Iraq.

Similarly women’s military brigades exist in Iran with no sign of

emancipation of women. For that matter, ISIS has all-female brigades

called al-Khansaa and Umm al-Rayan.

As Zafer Onat remarks: ”First of all we must identify that the Rojava

process has progressive features such as an important leap in the

direction of women’s liberation, that a secular, pro-social justice,

pluralist democratic structure is attempting to be constructed and that

other ethnic and religious groups are given a part in the

administration. However, the fact that the newly emerging structure does

not aim at the elimination of private property, that is the abolition of

classes, that the tribal system remains and that tribal leaders partake

in the administration shows that the aim is not the removal of feudal or

capitalist relations of production but is instead in their own words

‘the construction of a democratic nation”.”

As Syrian-Kurdish anarchist Shiar Neyo comments: “From the PYD’s point

of view, this was a golden opportunity to impose its authority and

expand its sphere of influence in the Kurdish areas in Syria. This

political pragmatism and thirst for power are two important factors in

understanding the party’s dealings with the regime, the revolution, the

FSA, and even the Kurds themselves. They also help explain many

phenomena that seem to bewilder some commentators and analysts, such as

the suppression by PYD forces of independent activists and those

critical of the party’s policies, in much the same vein as the Baathist

regime did. By way of example, one can cite in this regard the Amuda

massacre in July 2013, in which the People’s Protection Units (YPG)

opened fire on unarmed demonstrators, or the closure of the new

independent radio station Arta in February 2014, under the pretext that

it was not ‘licensed’. The PYD’s forces have also assaulted members of

other Kurdish political parties and arrested some of them under a

variety of excuses; they have been controlling food and financial

resources in the Kurdish areas and distributing them in an unjust manner

on the basis of partisan favouritism, and so on and so forth. Such

practices remind people, rightly, of the oppressive practices of the

Assad regime.”

What we are saying might not be popular at the moment, but we feel that

our analysis will be borne out by unfolding events.

Our proposed actions

Argue for fully open borders for refugees and aid to these refugees.

Highlight the conditions in the refugee camps and of Syrian refugees in

Turkish cities forced to beg or to turn to petty criminal activities in

order to live.

Provide humanitarian aid to Rojava via IFA, which has direct contact

with DAF.

Encourage and support any independent action of workers and peasants

in the Rojava region. Argue against any nationalist agitation and for

the unity of Kurdish, Arab, Muslim, Christian and Yezidi workers and

peasants. Any such independent initiatives must free themselves from

PKK/PYD control, and equally from aid by the Western allies, from their

clients like the Free Syrian Army, Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party,

and the Turkish state.