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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Kanno
Request for Comments: 6367 NTT Software Corporation
Category: Informational M. Kanda
ISSN: 2070-1721 NTT
September 2011
Addition of the Camellia Cipher Suites to
Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Abstract
This document specifies forty-two cipher suites for the Transport
Security Layer (TLS) protocol to support the Camellia encryption
algorithm as a block cipher.
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for informational purposes.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6367.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
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RFC 6367 Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS September 2011
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Proposed Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. HMAC-Based Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. GCM-Based Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.3. PSK-Based Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Cipher Suite Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Cipher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. PRFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4. PSK Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. Introduction
The Camellia cipher suites are already specified in RFC 5932 [15]
with SHA-256-based Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) using
asymmetric key encryption. This document proposes the addition of
new cipher suites to the Transport Layer Security (TLS) [8] protocol
to support the Camellia [4] cipher algorithm as a block cipher
algorithm. The proposed cipher suites include variants using the
SHA-2 family of cryptographic hash functions [13] and Galois Counter
Mode (GCM) [14]. Elliptic curve cipher suites and pre-shared key
(PSK) [5] cipher suites are also included.
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [3].
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RFC 6367 Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS September 2011
2. Proposed Cipher Suites
2.1. HMAC-Based Cipher Suites
The eight cipher suites use Camellia [4] in Cipher Block Chaining
(CBC) [4] mode with a SHA-2 family HMAC using the elliptic curve
cryptosystem:
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x72};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x73};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x74};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x75};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x76};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x77};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x78};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x79};
2.2. GCM-Based Cipher Suites
The twenty cipher suites use the same asymmetric key algorithms as
those in the previous section but use the authenticated encryption
modes defined in TLS 1.2 [8] with Camellia in GCM [14].
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x7A};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x7B};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x7C};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x7D};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x7E};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x7F};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x80};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x81};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x82};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x83};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x84};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x85};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x86};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x87};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x88};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x89};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x8A};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x8B};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x8C};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x8D};
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RFC 6367 Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS September 2011
2.3. PSK-Based Cipher Suites
The fourteen cipher suites describe PSK cipher suites. The first six
cipher suites use Camellia with GCM, and the next eight cipher suites
use Camellia with SHA-2 family HMAC using asymmetric key encryption
or the elliptic curve cryptosystem.
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x8D};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x8F};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x90};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x91};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x92};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x93};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x94};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x95};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x96};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x97};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x98};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x99};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x9A};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x9B};
3. Cipher Suite Definitions
3.1. Key Exchange
The RSA, DHE_RSA, DH_RSA, DHE_DSS, DH_DSS, ECDH, DH_anon, and ECDHE
key exchanges are performed as defined in RFC 5246 [8].
3.2. Cipher
This document describes cipher suites based on Camellia cipher using
CBC mode and GCM. The details are as follows.
The CAMELLIA_128_CBC cipher suites use Camellia [4] in CBC mode with
a 128-bit key and 128-bit Initialization Vector (IV); the
CAMELLIA_256_CBC cipher suites use a 256-bit key and 128-bit IV.
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [19] authenticated encryption with
additional data algorithms, AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM,
are described in RFC 5116 [7]. AES GCM cipher suites for TLS are
described in RFC 5288 [9]. AES and Camellia share common
characteristics including key sizes and block length.
CAMELLIA_128_GCM and CAMELLIA_256_GCM are defined according to those
of AES.
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RFC 6367 Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS September 2011
3.3. PRFs
The hash algorithms and pseudorandom function (PRF) algorithms for
TLS 1.2 [8] SHALL be as follows:
a. The cipher suites ending with _SHA256 use HMAC-SHA-256 [1] as the
MAC algorithm. The PRF is the TLS PRF [8] with SHA-256 [13] as
the hash function.
b. The cipher suites ending with _SHA384 use HMAC-SHA-384 [1] as the
MAC algorithm. The PRF is the TLS PRF [8] with SHA-384 [13] as
the hash function.
When used with TLS versions prior to 1.2 (TLS 1.0 [2] and TLS 1.1
[6]), the PRF is calculated as specified in the appropriate version
of the TLS specification.
3.4. PSK Cipher Suites
PSK cipher suites for TLS are described in RFC 5487 [11] as to SHA-
256/384 and RFC 5489 [12] as to ECDHE_PSK.
4. Security Considerations
At the time of writing this document, there are no known weak keys
for Camellia. Additionally, no security problems with Camellia have
been found (see NESSIE [16], CRYPTREC [17], and LNCS 5867[18]).
The security considerations in previous RFCs (RFC 5116 [7], RFC 5289
[10], and RFC 5487 [11]) apply to this document as well.
5. IANA Considerations
IANA allocated the following numbers in the TLS Cipher Suite
Registry:
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x72};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x73};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x74};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x75};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x76};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x77};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x78};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x79};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x7A};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x7B};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x7C};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x7D};
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RFC 6367 Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS September 2011
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x7E};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x7F};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x80};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x81};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x82};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x83};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x84};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x85};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x86};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x87};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x88};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x89};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x8A};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x8B};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x8C};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x8D};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x8E};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x8F};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x90};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x91};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x92};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x93};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x94};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x95};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x96};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x97};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x98};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x99};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x9A};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x9B};
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[1] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing
for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997.
[2] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
RFC 2246, January 1999.
[3] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[4] Matsui, M., Nakajima, J., and S. Moriai, "A Description of the
Camellia Encryption Algorithm", RFC 3713, April 2004.
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RFC 6367 Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS September 2011
[5] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4279, December 2005.
[6] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April 2006.
[7] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", RFC 5116, January 2008.
[8] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[9] Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, "AES Galois Counter
Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS", RFC 5288, August 2008.
[10] Rescorla, E., "TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/
384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)", RFC 5289, August 2008.
[11] Badra, M., "Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/
384 and AES Galois Counter Mode", RFC 5487, March 2009.
[12] Badra, M. and I. Hajjeh, "ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites for Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5489, March 2009.
[13] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure Hash
Standard (SHS)", FIPS PUB 180, October 2008,
<http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-3/
fips180-3_final.pdf>.
[14] Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for Confidentiality and
Authentication", Special Publication 800-38D, April 2006,
<http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/
SP-800-38D.pdf>.
6.2. Informative References
[15] Kato, A., Kanda, M., and S. Kanno, "Camellia Cipher Suites for
TLS", RFC 5932, June 2010.
[16] "The NESSIE Project (New European Schemes for Signatures,
Integrity and Encryption)",
<http://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/nessie/>.
[17] "CRYPTREC (Cryptography Research and Evaluation Committees)",
<http://www.cryptrec.go.jp/english/estimation.html>.
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RFC 6367 Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS September 2011
[18] Mala, H., Shakiba, M., Dakhilalian, M., and G. Bagherikaram,
"New Results on Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of
Reduced Round Camellia-128", LNCS 5867, November 2009,
<http://www.springerlink.com/content/e55783u422436g77/>.
[19] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS PUB 197, November 2001,
<http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf>.
Authors' Addresses
Satoru Kanno
NTT Software Corporation
Phone: +81-45-212-9803
Fax: +81-45-212-9800
EMail: kanno.satoru@po.ntts.co.jp
Masayuki Kanda
NTT
Phone: +81-422-59-3456
Fax: +81-422-59-4015
EMail: kanda.masayuki@lab.ntt.co.jp
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