💾 Archived View for gmi.noulin.net › rfc › rfc8020.gmi captured on 2022-07-16 at 23:57:09. Gemini links have been rewritten to link to archived content
⬅️ Previous capture (2022-01-08)
-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Updates:
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Bortzmeyer
Request for Comments: 8020 AFNIC
Updates: 1034, 2308 S. Huque
Category: Standards Track Verisign Labs
ISSN: 2070-1721 November 2016
NXDOMAIN: There Really Is Nothing Underneath
Abstract
This document states clearly that when a DNS resolver receives a
response with a response code of NXDOMAIN, it means that the domain
name which is thus denied AND ALL THE NAMES UNDER IT do not exist.
This document clarifies RFC 1034 and modifies a portion of RFC 2308:
it updates both of them.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Bortzmeyer & Huque Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 8020 NXDOMAIN Cut November 2016
Table of Contents
1. Introduction and Background .....................................2
1.1. Terminology ................................................3
2. Rules ...........................................................3
3. Updates to RFCs .................................................5
3.1. Updates to RFC 1034 ........................................5
3.2. Updates to RFC 2308 ........................................5
4. Benefits ........................................................5
5. Possible Issues .................................................6
6. Implementation Considerations ...................................6
7. Security Considerations .........................................7
8. References ......................................................7
8.1. Normative References .......................................7
8.2. Informative References .....................................8
Appendix A. Why can't we just use the owner name of the returned
SOA? ...................................................9
Appendix B. Related Approaches .....................................9
Acknowledgments ....................................................9
Authors' Addresses ................................................10
1. Introduction and Background
The DNS protocol [RFC1035] defines response code 3 as "Name Error",
or "NXDOMAIN" [RFC2308], which means that the queried domain name
does not exist in the DNS. Since domain names are represented as a
tree of labels ([RFC1034], Section 3.1), nonexistence of a node
implies nonexistence of the entire subtree rooted at this node.
The DNS iterative resolution algorithm precisely interprets the
NXDOMAIN signal in this manner. If it encounters an NXDOMAIN
response code from an authoritative server, it immediately stops
iteration and returns the NXDOMAIN response to the querier.
However, in most known existing resolvers today, a cached
nonexistence for a domain is not considered "proof" that there can be
no child domains underneath. This is due to an ambiguity in
[RFC1034] that failed to distinguish Empty Non-Terminal (ENT) names
([RFC7719]) from nonexistent names (Section 3.1). The distinction
became especially important for the development of DNSSEC, which
provides proof of nonexistence. [RFC4035], Section 3.1.3.2,
describes how security-aware authoritative name servers make the
distinction, but no existing RFCs describe the behavior for recursive
name servers.
Bortzmeyer & Huque Standards Track [Page 2]
RFC 8020 NXDOMAIN Cut November 2016
This document specifies that an NXDOMAIN response for a domain name
means that no child domains underneath the queried name exist either;
furthermore, it means that DNS resolvers should interpret cached
nonexistence in this manner. Since the domain names are organized in
a tree, it is a simple consequence of the tree structure:
nonexistence of a node implies nonexistence of the entire subtree
rooted at this node.
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
"QNAME": defined in [RFC1034] and in [RFC1035], Section 4.1.2, but,
because [RFC2308] provides a different definition, we repeat the
original one here: the QNAME is the domain name in the question
section.
"Denied name": the domain name whose existence has been denied by a
response RCODE of NXDOMAIN. In most cases, it is the QNAME but,
because of [RFC6604], it is not always the case.
Other terms are defined in [RFC1034], [RFC1035], and (like NXDOMAIN
itself) in the more recent [RFC7719].
The domain name space is conceptually defined in terms of a tree
structure. The implementation of a DNS resolver/cache MAY use a tree
or other data structures. The cache being a subset of the data in
the domain name space, it is much easier to reason about it in terms
of that tree structure and to describe things in those terms (names
under/above, descendant names, subtrees, etc.). In fact, the DNS
algorithm description in [RFC1034] even states an assumption that the
cache is a tree structure, so the precedent is already well
established: see its Section 4.3.2, which says "The following
algorithm assumes that the RRs are organized in several tree
structures, one for each zone, and another for the cache..." So, in
this document, each time we talk about a tree or tree operations,
we're referring to the model, not to the actual implementation.
2. Rules
When an iterative caching DNS resolver receives an NXDOMAIN response,
it SHOULD store it in its cache and then all names and resource
record sets (RRsets) at or below that node SHOULD be considered
unreachable. Subsequent queries for such names SHOULD elicit an
NXDOMAIN response.
Bortzmeyer & Huque Standards Track [Page 3]
RFC 8020 NXDOMAIN Cut November 2016
But, if a resolver has cached data under the NXDOMAIN cut, it MAY
continue to send it as a reply (until the TTL of this cached data
expires), since this may avoid additional processing when a query is
received. Section 6 provides more information about this.
Another exception is that a validating resolver MAY decide to
implement the "NXDOMAIN cut" behavior (described in the first
paragraph of this section) only when the NXDOMAIN response has been
validated with DNSSEC. See Section 7 for the rationale.
The fact that a subtree does not exist is not forever: [RFC2308],
Section 3, already describes the amount of time that an NXDOMAIN
response may be cached (the "negative TTL").
If the NXDOMAIN response due to a cached nonexistence is from a
DNSSEC-signed zone, then it will have accompanying NSEC or NSEC3
records that authenticate the nonexistence of the name. For a
descendant name of the original NXDOMAIN name, the same set of NSEC
or NSEC3 records proves the nonexistence of the descendant name. The
iterative, caching resolver MUST return these NSEC or NSEC3 records
in the response to the triggering query if the query had the DNSSEC
OK (DO) bit set.
Warning: if there is a chain of CNAME (or DNAME), the name that does
not exist is the last of the chain ([RFC6604]) and not the QNAME.
The NXDOMAIN stored in the cache is for the denied name, not always
for the QNAME.
As an example of the consequence of these rules, consider two
successive queries to a resolver with a nonexisting domain
'foo.example': the first is for 'foo.example' (which results in an
NXDOMAIN) and the second for 'bar.foo.example' (which also results in
an NXDOMAIN). Many resolvers today will forward both queries.
However, following the rules in this document ("NXDOMAIN cut"), a
resolver would cache the first NXDOMAIN response, as a sign of
nonexistence, and then immediately return an NXDOMAIN response for
the second query, without transmitting it to an authoritative server.
If the first request is for 'bar.foo.example' and the second for
'baz.foo.example', then the first NXDOMAIN response won't tell
anything about 'baz.foo.example'; therefore, the second query will be
transmitted as it was before the use of "NXDOMAIN cut" optimization
(see Appendix A).
Bortzmeyer & Huque Standards Track [Page 4]
RFC 8020 NXDOMAIN Cut November 2016
3. Updates to RFCs
3.1. Updates to RFC 1034
This document clarifies possible ambiguities in [RFC1034] that did
not clearly distinguish Empty Non-Terminal (ENT) names ([RFC7719])
from nonexistent names, and it refers to subsequent documents that
do. ENTs are nodes in the DNS that do not have resource record sets
associated with them but have descendant nodes that do. The correct
response to ENTs is NODATA (i.e., a response code of NOERROR and an
empty answer section). Additional clarifying language on these
points is provided in Section 7.16 of [RFC2136] and in Sections 2.2.2
and 2.2.3 of [RFC4592].
3.2. Updates to RFC 2308
The second paragraph of Section 5 in [RFC2308] states the following:
A negative answer that resulted from a name error (NXDOMAIN)
should be cached such that it can be retrieved and returned in
response to another query for the same <QNAME, QCLASS> that
resulted in the cached negative response.
This document revises that paragraph to the following:
A negative answer that resulted from a name error (NXDOMAIN)
should be cached such that it can be retrieved and returned in
response to another query for the same <QNAME, QCLASS> that
resulted in the cached negative response, or where the QNAME is a
descendant of the original QNAME and the QCLASS is the same.
Section 2 above elaborates on the revised rule and specifies when it
may be reasonable to relax or ignore it.
4. Benefits
The main benefit is a better efficiency of the caches. In the
example above, the resolver sends only one query instead of two, the
second one being answered from the cache. This will benefit the
entire DNS ecosystem, since the authoritative name servers will have
less unnecessary traffic to process.
The correct behavior (in [RFC1034] and made clearer in this document)
is especially useful when combined with QNAME minimization [RFC7816]
since it will allow a resolver to stop searching as soon as an
NXDOMAIN is encountered.
Bortzmeyer & Huque Standards Track [Page 5]
RFC 8020 NXDOMAIN Cut November 2016
"NXDOMAIN cut" may also help mitigate certain types of random QNAME
attacks [joost-dnsterror] and [balakrichenan-dafa888], where there is
a fixed suffix that does not exist. In these attacks against the
authoritative name server, queries are sent to resolvers for a QNAME
composed of a fixed suffix ("dafa888.wf" in one of the articles
above), which is typically nonexistent, and a random prefix,
different for each request. A resolver receiving these requests has
to forward them to the authoritative servers. With "NXDOMAIN cut", a
system administrator would just have to send to the resolver a query
for the fixed suffix, the resolver would get a NXDOMAIN and then
would stop forwarding the queries. (It would be better if the SOA
record in the NXDOMAIN response were sufficient to find the
nonexisting domain, but this is not the case, see Appendix A.)
5. Possible Issues
Let's assume that the Top-Level Domain (TLD) example exists, but
foobar.example is not delegated (so the example's name servers will
reply NXDOMAIN for a query about anything.foobar.example). A system
administrator decides to name the internal machines of his
organization under office.foobar.example and uses a trick of his
resolver to forward requests about this zone to his local
authoritative name servers. "NXDOMAIN cut" would create problems
here; depending on the order of requests to the resolver, it may have
cached the nonexistence from example and therefore "deleted"
everything under it. This document assumes that such a setup is rare
and does not need to be supported.
Today, another possible issue exists; we see authoritative name
servers that reply to ENT ([RFC7719], Section 6) with NXDOMAIN
instead of the normal NODATA ([RFC7719], Section 3).
Such name servers are definitely wrong and have always been. Their
behaviour is incompatible with DNSSEC. Given the advantages of
"NXDOMAIN cut", there is little reason to support this behavior.
6. Implementation Considerations
This section is non-normative and is composed only of various things
that may be useful for implementors. A recursive resolver may
implement its cache in many ways. The most obvious one is a tree
data structure, because it fits the data model of domain names. But,
in practice, other implementations are possible, as well as various
optimizations (such as a tree, augmented by an index of some common
domain names).
Bortzmeyer & Huque Standards Track [Page 6]
RFC 8020 NXDOMAIN Cut November 2016
If a resolver implements its cache as a tree (without any
optimization), one way to follow the rules in Section 2 is as
follows: when receiving the NXDOMAIN, prune the subtree of positive
cache entries at that node or delete all individual cache entries for
names below that node. Then, when searching downward in its cache,
this iterative caching DNS resolver will stop searching if it
encounters a cached nonexistence.
Some resolvers may have a cache that is NOT organized as a tree (but,
for instance, as a dictionary); therefore, they have a reason to
ignore the rules of Section 2. So these rules use SHOULD and not
MUST.
7. Security Considerations
The technique described in this document may help against a denial-
of-service attack named "random qnames" described in Section 4.
If a resolver does not validate the answers with DNSSEC, or if the
zone is not signed, the resolver can of course be poisoned with a
false NXDOMAIN, thus, "deleting" a part of the domain name tree.
This denial-of-service attack is already possible without the rules
of this document (but "NXDOMAIN cut" may increase its effects). The
only solution is to use DNSSEC.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
November 1987, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2136] Vixie, P., Ed., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., and J. Bound,
"Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)",
RFC 2136, DOI 10.17487/RFC2136, April 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2136>.
Bortzmeyer & Huque Standards Track [Page 7]
RFC 8020 NXDOMAIN Cut November 2016
[RFC2308] Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS
NCACHE)", RFC 2308, DOI 10.17487/RFC2308, March 1998,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2308>.
[RFC4592] Lewis, E., "The Role of Wildcards in the Domain Name
System", RFC 4592, DOI 10.17487/RFC4592, July 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4592>.
[RFC6604] Eastlake 3rd, D., "xNAME RCODE and Status Bits
Clarification", RFC 6604, DOI 10.17487/RFC6604, April
2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6604>.
8.2. Informative References
[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4035>.
[RFC7719] Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
Terminology", RFC 7719, DOI 10.17487/RFC7719, December
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7719>.
[RFC7816] Bortzmeyer, S., "DNS Query Name Minimisation to Improve
Privacy", RFC 7816, DOI 10.17487/RFC7816, March 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7816>.
[DNSRRR] Vixie, P., Joffe, R., and F. Neves, "Improvements to DNS
Resolvers for Resiliency, Robustness, and Responsiveness",
Work in Progress, draft-vixie-dnsext-resimprove-00, June
2010.
[NSEC] Fujiwara, K., Kato, A., and W. Kumari, "Aggressive use of
NSEC/NSEC3", Work in Progress, draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-
aggressiveuse-04, September 2016.
[joost-dnsterror]
Joost, M., "About DNS Attacks and ICMP Destination
Unreachable Reports", December 2014,
<http://www.michael-joost.de/dnsterror.html>.
[balakrichenan-dafa888]
Balakrichenan, S., "Disturbance in the DNS - "Random
qnames", the dafa888 DoS attack"", October 2014,
<https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/20/session/3/
contribution/3>.
Bortzmeyer & Huque Standards Track [Page 8]
RFC 8020 NXDOMAIN Cut November 2016
Appendix A. Why can't we just use the owner name of the returned SOA?
In this document, we deduce the nonexistence of a domain only for
NXDOMAIN answers where the denied name was the exact domain. If a
resolver sends a query to the name servers of the TLD example, asking
for the mail exchange (MX) record for www.foobar.example, and
subsequently receives a NXDOMAIN, it can only register the fact that
www.foobar.example (and everything underneath) does not exist. This
is true regardless of whether or not the accompanying SOA record is
for the domain example only. One cannot infer that foobar.example is
nonexistent. The accompanying SOA record indicates the apex of the
zone, not the closest existing domain name. So, using the owner name
of the SOA record in the authority section to deduce "NXDOMAIN cuts"
is currently definitely not OK.
Deducing the nonexistence of a node from the SOA in the NXDOMAIN
reply may certainly help with random qnames attacks, but this is out-
of-scope for this document. It would require addressing the problems
mentioned in the first paragraph of this section. A possible
solution is, when receiving a NXDOMAIN with a SOA that is more than
one label up in the tree, to send requests for the domains that are
between the QNAME and the owner name of the SOA. (A resolver that
does DNSSEC validation or QNAME minimization will need to do it
anyway.)
Appendix B. Related Approaches
The document [NSEC] describes another way to address some of the same
concerns (decreasing the traffic for nonexisting domain names).
Unlike "NXDOMAIN cut", it requires DNSSEC, but it is more powerful
since it can synthesize NXDOMAINs for domains that were not queried.
Acknowledgments
The main idea in this document is taken from [DNSRRR], Section 3,
"Stopping Downward Cache Search on NXDOMAIN". Thanks to its authors,
Paul Vixie, Rodney Joffe, and Frederico Neves. Additionally, Tony
Finch, Ted Lemon, John Levine, Jinmei Tatuya, Bob Harold, and Duane
Wessels provided valuable feedback and suggestions.
Bortzmeyer & Huque Standards Track [Page 9]
RFC 8020 NXDOMAIN Cut November 2016
Authors' Addresses
Stephane Bortzmeyer
AFNIC
1, rue Stephenson
Montigny-le-Bretonneux 78180
France
Phone: +33 1 39 30 83 46
Email: bortzmeyer+ietf@nic.fr
URI: https://www.afnic.fr/
Shumon Huque
Verisign Labs
12061 Bluemont Way
Reston, VA 20190
United States of America
Email: shuque@verisign.com
URI: http://www.verisignlabs.com/
Bortzmeyer & Huque Standards Track [Page 10]