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The worst CEOs of 2014

Sydney Finkelstein

The worst CEOs of 2014

The toughest thing for any business is to stay on top.

Past success at any stage is never a guarantee of continuing success. In

fact, my research has shown time and again that great success is almost always

a warning sign for failure.

And so it is with the worst CEOs of 2014. In virtually each instance, the seeds

of failure were sown in earlier success. These five chief executives were

celebrated for their genius at one time, but all have fallen, sometimes in

spectacular ways.

Before revealing this year s list, a little background. For the last 15 years I

ve been studying great, and far-from-great, leaders. My book, Why Smart

Executives Fail, was the culmination of an extensive research process that

uncovered the most common drivers of failure in organisational life. While the

specifics often varied, in the end it was always about human nature.

For the last five years I ve been publishing my annual list of the worst CEOs

of the year (and starting last year an accompanying list of the best CEOs of

the year). My research team analyses hundreds of companies to identify the very

few that not only reported exceptionally poor financial results, but were also

led by a CEO whose actions, or inactions, directly affected those results.

To make sure we have it right, we compare our worst CEO picks to other leaders

in the same industry, to gauge relative performance. And while my list is a

2014 list, inevitably some of the decisions and actions of CEOs that earned

them their spot can be attributed to previous years, as well.

Number 5: Dick Costolo, Twitter

It pains me to include the CEO of Twitter on my worst list, as I m a big fan of

the app (or is it a website, or maybe a digital newspaper?).

But the numbers don t lie. In contrast to Facebook, Twitter has grown more

slowly, more fitfully, and with more question marks about the basic business

model. Shares have dropped this year by 42%. Facebook, in comparison, popped

42%-plus over the same period. There are plenty of metrics to evaluate Twitter,

but the best is monthly active users (MAU), and Twitter s rate of growth has

slowed despite having 284 million MAU (Facebook has 1.4 billion).

Costolo is far from a disaster as CEO. In fact, he has a big-time track record

with start-ups. But when the upside (and market valuation) is as big as it is

for Twitter, you ve got to have a CEO who can fulfil that potential.

Part of the problem is the revolving door at the top. Numerous senior

executives have arrived with fanfare, only to leave after a surprisingly short

tenure. The strategy Costolo uses keeps changing. That s common for start-ups

looking to pivot to a winning formula, but tough to stomach in a company that

went public on 15 November, 2013, with a first day closing valuation of $31bn

(versus $23.2bn at the end of last week).

Again, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg provides the contrast, proving adept at

change (to mobile after a slow start), and building world-class team (eg,

Sheryl Sandberg). When the core product has this potential, and it s not being

reached, blame rightly goes to the CEO.

The red flags are out in force. Big investors have been questioning Costolo s

leadership. PayPal co-founder Peter Thiel, for one, an early investor in

Facebook, even called Twitter a horribly mismanaged company . Costolo has also

been criticised for selling a big chunk of his shares in November, just one

week after going on TV to talk about how confident he was about the strategy

and the team.

In 2013 Dick Costolo was named CEO of the Year at the tech industry awards

event organised by the Silicon Valley media group TechCrunch. Perhaps that s as

good an example of past success being a warning sign for failure as you can

find.

Number 4: Eddie Lampert, Sears Holdings

Eddie Lampert is an expert hedge fund investor. Somewhere along the way he

decided he was also an expert CEO, acquiring both Sears and Kmart and embarking

on a seemingly never-ending turnaround strategy of the iconic old-line

retailers, whose time have most assuredly passed. One thing we can credit

Lampert with is persistence, as his failed strategy, arrogant leadership and

free-falling stock price earned him a spot on my 2013 worst CEOs list.

And now he s back for a second helping.

This year Sears has continued to book half-billion-dollar quarterly losses

($548m in the quarter ending 1 November). That makes nine straight quarters of

red ink. Sales are down, continuing a streak that goes back seven consecutive

years. Suppliers who want to sell to Sears can no longer buy top insurance

coverage for non-payment, leading to onerous credit terms. That is inline with

Moody s rating of Sears debt as CC ( speculative ).

The careers website Glassdoor reports Lampert has the CEO lowest approval

rating among employees of any company in their database (18%). And the company

s stock is down in 2014 by 34%. That s quite a feat on top of the 70% decline

from its peak in 2007. In contrast, retailer Macy s is up 17%, and even

discount retailer Kohl s is flat.

One of the most fascinating parts of this story is how Lampert is positioning

himself for an apparent exit. His hedge fund loaned Sears a desperately needed

$400m in September, taking as collateral 25 stores, implying a valuation of

$16m a store. Leaving aside the fact that Sears has been selling stores at $20m

to $50m, the deal is an apparent conflict of interest because Lampert has

bought himself a hedge to lessen the blow from a Sears default at terms

potentially that are more favourable to him than to other shareholders.

Of course it hardly makes sense for Lampert to root for a default, since his

investment in Sears is greater than $400m, but the terms of this deal do raise

questions.

Great investors do not necessarily make great CEOs.

Number 3: Philip Clarke, Tesco (with honourable mention to his predecessor,

Terry Leahy)

Tesco is another old-line powerhouse retailer that may have wished 2014 had

never happened. And while CEO Philip Clarke was responsible for what can only

be called a disastrous year, some attention should be paid to the particularly

bad hand he inherited from his predecessor, long-time CEO Terry Leahy.

Here s the Tesco shopping list: Aggressive international expansion to ensure

out-sized risk to strategy; casual response to cut-throat discount competitors

from Germany; management culture designed not to rock the boat, complete with a

scolding CEO, surrounded by yes-men.

Each element contributed to the mess Tesco is now in. Leahy s US venture of

Fresh & Easy was anything but, costing the company 1.7bn ($2.7bn), in part

because Clarke took his time closing down a business that never got going. The

grocery discounters Aldi and Lidl keep eating market share while Clarke

spearheads the classic stuck-in-the-middle strategy, with prices not quite

low enough and a brand not quite strong enough. Add to that a pressure cooker

environment that could never produce and an ongoing investigation into alleged

overstating of profits.

Sales and profits have been tanking throughout most of Clarke s tenure, yet he

seemed to be almost surprised by the depth of the problem, forced to issue

profit warnings on three different occasions.

Even legendary investor Warren Buffet called his investment in Tesco,

originally 5% of equity, a huge mistake .

Clarke only made it to 21 July before stepping down, although he stayed on

until 1 September. It was perhaps his biggest value creation move of the year.

Shares were initially up 500m ($781.8m) on the news, although that was not

enough to make up for a 31% decrease in share price up to that point in the

year. It will be up to outsider Dave Lewis to right the ship.

Number 2: Dov Charney, American Apparel

There are plenty of examples of company founders failing once a company has

been established. But there are few better examples of the perils of doing so

than Dov Charney.

Charney built American Apparel into a thriving, and profitable business only to

see it descend in recent years to become a scandal-plagued company that has

lost money for four years straight. The stock price is down 80% in five years,

including 53% in 2014. Same-stores sales are down. Debt is up, some coming with

a 15% interest rate. Call it the Charney risk premium.

It's not just the numbers. Charney had no chief financial officer at the

company until he was required to appoint one as part of American Apparel's IPO

in 2007. Key jobs such as chief operating officer, chief technology officer and

even official designers have gone missing. He pushed out other top executives,

including the general counsel in May of this year, and the seasoned fashion

retail executive Marty Staff in 2011 (after only six months on the job).

Entrepreneurs who never give up any control, or fail to bring in professional

managers, tend to blow up at some point. Hubris never wins.

Charney practically wrote the book on poor judgment, much of it just emerging

due to long overdue board investigations that began in 2014.

Among the allegations the board has levelled against Charney:

usually in exchange for higher salaries or bonuses. *Charney gave severance

packages to former employees to avoid personal liability for unprofessional

conduct, and never told the board. *Charney used corporate assets for personal

purposes.

To top it off, an arbitrator found Charney guilty of defamation for failing to

stop the creation of a fake blog and the publication of naked photographs of a

former employee who had sued him for sexual harassment.

For all this, Charney was fired by the board on 18 June (feted by the market

with a 20% increase in share price), only to be reinstated as a "consultant" by

a hedge fund that swooped in to buy up shares on the cheap. And on Tuesday the

board announced that Charney will lose his consultancy gig when new CEO Paula

Schneider takes over on 5 January.

A CEO should be the strategic, cultural and moral leader of an organisation.

While a company can flounder on for a bit when it's helmed by someone who

struggles with some, or all of these qualities, at some point they become too

much. Almost like a fault line in a geological zone, a company whose foundation

is shaky - or not firmly ensconced to core values - falls down.

In 2014, American Apparel and Dov Charney represent the perfect example of a

fall from grace.

Number 1: Ricardo Espirito Santo Silva Salgado, Banco Espirito Santo (BES)

The worst CEO of the year goes to the head of the Salgado family of Portugal,

the kingpin of an interlocking and complex set of entities that controlled the

second-biggest bank in Portugal and brought it to bankruptcy.

The bank s first half loss this year was 3.6bn euros ($4.5bn), forcing the

Portuguese government to inject 4.9bn euros ($6.1bn) into the bank as part of a

restructuring that leaves Salgado, and many investors that went along with him,

out in the cold.

BES was partially owned by Espirito Santo International (ESI), a

family-controlled corporation consisting of dozens of nonfinancial businesses

that relied on bank profits for start-up cash and ongoing working capital. When

the financial crisis hit, the bank s ability to generate cash slowed, forcing

Salgado to institute a variety of complex lending arrangements to prop up the

empire.

Debt at Rioforte, the privately-held company that controls family interests,

ballooned to 2.9bn euros ($3.6bn). Its unaudited net assets as of 30 June were

about 173.2m euros, according to reports. Rioforte filed for bankruptcy in

October.

Putting 250 family members into management and leadership jobs might make for

grand family reunions, but it can hardly be justified on the basis of sound

managerial practice and judgment. Salgado, and some other family members, lived

like kings in large estates, unhindered by even the most rudimentary oversight

of the bank.

There are multiple ongoing investigations that are pinning the blame squarely

on Salgado, who was forced out on 14 July. The question of fraud has been

raised. Salgado, testifying at a parliamentary hearing earlier in December,

blamed the Bank of Portugal for forcing BES into bankruptcy, asserting that the

family hadn t appropriated a single penny .

It may be that there was no intent to defraud, and that Salgado, when faced

with bad investments in a tough economy, was trying to keep it all afloat.

However, the fact that ESI expanded so aggressively, relying on leverage so

extensively, in a challenging economic environment, must be seen for what it

is: bad management. These high-risk strategies could only work if all sorts of

things went right, and it s the job of a CEO to use sound judgment in managing

the enterprise. That was not the case here.

The record indicates a series of bad judgment calls:

companies afloat, transactions that were not disclosed to investors.

$2.7bn, when its market value at the time was $565m.

guaranteeing the safety of their $365m bond investment in ESI, an act contrary

to a central bank directive to not mix bank and family business (the guarantees

were also not recorded in the bank s account at the time, as required by law).

In testimony to parliament earlier in December, Salgado blamed an accountant

for hiding liabilities, but the CEO of Semapa, a company to which ESI was

trying to sell bonds, told the same commission that "nothing was ever done

without Salgado knowing".

In the end, and in a remarkably similar fashion to the worst CEO of 2013, Eike

Batista of Brazil, this remains a cautionary tale of the incredible power of

hubris to destroy empires, and the reputations of those that created them.