💾 Archived View for gemini.bortzmeyer.org › rfc-mirror › rfc5932.txt captured on 2022-06-11 at 22:56:42.

View Raw

More Information

⬅️ Previous capture (2021-11-30)

-=-=-=-=-=-=-







Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                           A. Kato
Request for Comments: 5932                      NTT Software Corporation
Obsoletes: 4132                                                 M. Kanda
Category: Standards Track                                            NTT
ISSN: 2070-1721                                                 S. Kanno
                                                NTT Software Corporation
                                                               June 2010


                     Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS

Abstract

   This document specifies a set of cipher suites for the Transport
   Security Layer (TLS) protocol to support the Camellia encryption
   algorithm as a block cipher.  It amends the cipher suites originally
   specified in RFC 4132 by introducing counterparts using the newer
   cryptographic hash algorithms from the SHA-2 family.  This document
   obsoletes RFC 4132.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5932.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.



Kato, et al.                 Standards Track                    [Page 1]

RFC 5932             Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS            June 2010


   This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
   Contributions published or made publicly available before November
   10, 2008.  The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
   material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
   modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
   Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
   the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
   outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
   not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
   it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
   than English.

1.  Introduction

   This document proposes the addition of new cipher suites to the
   Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246] protocol to support the
   Camellia [RFC3713] encryption algorithm as a block cipher algorithm,
   adding variants using the SHA-2 family of cryptographic hash
   algorithms [FIPS180-3] to the TLS cipher suite portfolio originally
   specified in RFC 4132 [RFC4132].  This document obsoletes RFC 4132.

   The Camellia algorithm and its properties are described in [RFC3713].

1.1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  Proposed Cipher Suites

   The cipher suites defined here have the following identifiers:

  CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA         = { 0x00,0x41 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA      = { 0x00,0x42 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA      = { 0x00,0x43 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA     = { 0x00,0x44 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA     = { 0x00,0x45 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA     = { 0x00,0x46 };

  CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA         = { 0x00,0x84 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA      = { 0x00,0x85 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA      = { 0x00,0x86 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA     = { 0x00,0x87 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA     = { 0x00,0x88 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA     = { 0x00,0x89 };





Kato, et al.                 Standards Track                    [Page 2]

RFC 5932             Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS            June 2010


  CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256      = { 0x00,0xBA };
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256   = { 0x00,0xBB };
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256   = { 0x00,0xBC };
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256  = { 0x00,0xBD };
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256  = { 0x00,0xBE };
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256  = { 0x00,0xBF };

  CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256      = { 0x00,0xC0 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256   = { 0x00,0xC1 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256   = { 0x00,0xC2 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256  = { 0x00,0xC3 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256  = { 0x00,0xC4 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256  = { 0x00,0xC5 };

3.  Cipher Suite Definitions

3.1.  Key Exchange

   The RSA, DHE_RSA, DH_RSA, DHE_DSS, DH_DSS, and DH_anon key exchanges
   are performed as defined in [RFC5246].

3.2.  Cipher

   The CAMELLIA_128_CBC cipher suites use Camellia [RFC3713] in Cipher
   Block Chaining (CBC) mode with a 128-bit key and 128-bit IV; the
   CAMELLIA_256_CBC cipher suites use a 256-bit key and 128-bit IV.

3.3.  Hash and Pseudorandom Function

3.3.1.  Hash and Pseudorandom Function for TLS 1.1

   The cipher suites ending with _SHA use HMAC-SHA1 as the MAC
   algorithm.

   When used with TLS versions prior to 1.2, the pseudorandom function
   (PRF) is calculated as specified in the appropriate version of the
   TLS specification.

3.3.2.  Hash and Pseudorandom Function for TLS 1.2

   The cipher suites ending with _SHA256 use HMAC-SHA-256 as the MAC
   algorithm.  The PRF is the TLS PRF [RFC5246] with SHA-256 as the hash
   function.  These cipher suites MUST NOT be negotiated by TLS 1.1 or
   earlier versions.  Clients MUST NOT offer these cipher suites if they
   do not offer TLS 1.2 or later.  Servers that select an earlier
   version of TLS MUST NOT select one of these cipher suites.





Kato, et al.                 Standards Track                    [Page 3]

RFC 5932             Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS            June 2010


4.  IANA Considerations

   IANA has updated the entries for the following numbers that were
   allocated in RFC 4132 to reference this document:

  CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA         = { 0x00,0x41 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA      = { 0x00,0x42 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA      = { 0x00,0x43 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA     = { 0x00,0x44 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA     = { 0x00,0x45 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA     = { 0x00,0x46 };

  CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA         = { 0x00,0x84 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA      = { 0x00,0x85 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA      = { 0x00,0x86 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA     = { 0x00,0x87 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA     = { 0x00,0x88 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA     = { 0x00,0x89 };

   IANA has allocated the following numbers in the TLS Cipher Suite
   Registry:

  CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256      = { 0x00,0xBA };
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256   = { 0x00,0xBB };
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256   = { 0x00,0xBC };
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256  = { 0x00,0xBD };
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256  = { 0x00,0xBE };
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256  = { 0x00,0xBF };

  CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256      = { 0x00,0xC0 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256   = { 0x00,0xC1 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256   = { 0x00,0xC2 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256  = { 0x00,0xC3 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256  = { 0x00,0xC4 };
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256  = { 0x00,0xC5 };
















Kato, et al.                 Standards Track                    [Page 4]

RFC 5932             Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS            June 2010


5.  Security Considerations

   At the time of writing this document, there are no known weak keys
   for Camellia, and no security problem has been found on Camellia (see
   [NESSIE], [CRYPTREC], and [LNCS]).

   Also, security issues are discussed throughout RFC 5246 [RFC5246],
   especially in Appendices D, E, and F.

6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

   [FIPS180-3]  National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
                Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS PUB 180, October 2008,
                <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-3/
                fips180-3_final.pdf>.

   [RFC2119]    Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
                Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3713]    Matsui, M., Nakajima, J., and S. Moriai, "A Description
                of the Camellia Encryption Algorithm", RFC 3713,
                April 2004.

   [RFC5246]    Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer
                Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
                August 2008.

6.2.  Informative References

   [CRYPTREC]   Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA),
                "Cryptography Research and Evaluation Committees",
                <http://www.ipa.go.jp/security/enc/CRYPTREC/
                index-e.html>.

   [LNCS]       Mala, H., Shakiba, M., and M. Dakhil-alian, "New Results
                on Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced
                Round Camellia-128", LNCS 5867, November 2009,
                <http://www.springerlink.com/content/e55783u422436g77/>.

   [NESSIE]     "The NESSIE project (New European Schemes for
                Signatures, Integrity and Encryption)",
                <http://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/nessie/>.

   [RFC4132]    Moriai, S., Kato, A., and M. Kanda, "Addition of
                Camellia Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security
                (TLS)", RFC 4132, July 2005.



Kato, et al.                 Standards Track                    [Page 5]

RFC 5932             Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS            June 2010


Authors' Addresses

   Akihiro Kato
   NTT Software Corporation

   Phone: +81-45-212-9803
   Fax:   +81-45-212-9800
   EMail: kato.akihiro@po.ntts.co.jp


   Masayuki Kanda
   NTT

   Phone: +81-422-59-3456
   Fax:   +81-422-59-4015
   EMail: kanda.masayuki@lab.ntt.co.jp


   Satoru Kanno
   NTT Software Corporation

   Phone: +81-45-212-9803
   Fax:   +81-45-212-9800
   EMail: kanno.satoru@po.ntts.co.jp



























Kato, et al.                 Standards Track                    [Page 6]