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INTRODUCTION

MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS was born on April 26, A.D. 121. His real name

was M. Annius Verus, and he was sprung of a noble family which claimed

descent from Numa, second King of Rome. Thus the most religious of

emperors came of the blood of the most pious of early kings. His father,

Annius Verus, had held high office in Rome, and his grandfather, of

the same name, had been thrice Consul. Both his parents died young, but

Marcus held them in loving remembrance. On his father's death Marcus

was adopted by his grandfather, the consular Annius Verus, and there was

deep love between these two. On the very first page of his book Marcus

gratefully declares how of his grandfather he had learned to be gentle

and meek, and to refrain from all anger and passion. The Emperor Hadrian

divined the fine character of the lad, whom he used to call not Verus

but Verissimus, more Truthful than his own name. He advanced Marcus to

equestrian rank when six years of age, and at the age of eight made him

a member of the ancient Salian priesthood. The boy's aunt, Annia Galeria

Faustina, was married to Antoninus Pius, afterwards emperor. Hence it

came about that Antoninus, having no son, adopted Marcus, changing his

name to that which he is known by, and betrothed him to his daughter

Faustina. His education was conducted with all care. The ablest teachers

were engaged for him, and he was trained in the strict doctrine of the

Stoic philosophy, which was his great delight. He was taught to dress

plainly and to live simply, to avoid all softness and luxury. His body

was trained to hardihood by wrestling, hunting, and outdoor games; and

though his constitution was weak, he showed great personal courage to

encounter the fiercest boars. At the same time he was kept from the

extravagancies of his day. The great excitement in Rome was the strife

of the Factions, as they were called, in the circus. The racing drivers

used to adopt one of four colours--red, blue, white, or green--and their

partisans showed an eagerness in supporting them which nothing could

surpass. Riot and corruption went in the train of the racing chariots;

and from all these things Marcus held severely aloof.

In 140 Marcus was raised to the consulship, and in 145 his betrothal

was consummated by marriage. Two years later Faustina brought him a

daughter; and soon after the tribunate and other imperial honours were

conferred upon him.

Antoninus Pius died in 161, and Marcus assumed the imperial state. He

at once associated with himself L. Ceionius Commodus, whom Antoninus had

adopted as a younger son at the same time with Marcus, giving him the

name of Lucius Aurelius Verus. Henceforth the two are colleagues in the

empire, the junior being trained as it were to succeed. No sooner was

Marcus settled upon the throne than wars broke out on all sides. In

the east, Vologeses III. of Parthia began a long-meditated revolt by

destroying a whole Roman Legion and invading Syria (162). Verus was sent

off in hot haste to quell this rising; and he fulfilled his trust by

plunging into drunkenness and debauchery, while the war was left to his

officers. Soon after Marcus had to face a more serious danger at home in

the coalition of several powerful tribes on the northern frontier. Chief

among those were the Marcomanni or Marchmen, the Quadi (mentioned in

this book), the Sarmatians, the Catti, the Jazyges. In Rome itself there

was pestilence and starvation, the one brought from the east by Verus's

legions, the other caused by floods which had destroyed vast quantities

of grain. After all had been done possible to allay famine and to supply

pressing needs--Marcus being forced even to sell the imperial jewels to

find money--both emperors set forth to a struggle which was to continue

more or less during the rest of Marcus's reign. During these wars, in

169, Verus died. We have no means of following the campaigns in detail;

but thus much is certain, that in the end the Romans succeeded in

crushing the barbarian tribes, and effecting a settlement which made the

empire more secure. Marcus was himself commander-in-chief, and victory

was due no less to his own ability than to his wisdom in choice of

lieutenants, shown conspicuously in the case of Pertinax. There were

several important battles fought in these campaigns; and one of them has

become celebrated for the legend of the Thundering Legion. In a battle

against the Quadi in 174, the day seemed to be going in favour of

the foe, when on a sudden arose a great storm of thunder and rain the

lightning struck the barbarians with terror, and they turned to rout.

In later days this storm was said to have been sent in answer to the

prayers of a legion which contained many Christians, and the name

Thundering Legion should be given to it on this account. The title of

Thundering Legion is known at an earlier date, so this part of the story

at least cannot be true; but the aid of the storm is acknowledged by one

of the scenes carved on Antonine's Column at Rome, which commemorates

these wars.

The settlement made after these troubles might have been more

satisfactory but for an unexpected rising in the east. Avidius Cassius,

an able captain who had won renown in the Parthian wars, was at this

time chief governor of the eastern provinces. By whatever means induced,

he had conceived the project of proclaiming himself emperor as soon as

Marcus, who was then in feeble health, should die; and a report having

been conveyed to him that Marcus was dead, Cassius did as he had

planned. Marcus, on hearing the news, immediately patched up a peace and

returned home to meet this new peril. The emperors great grief was that

he must needs engage in the horrors of civil strife. He praised the

qualities of Cassius, and expressed a heartfelt wish that Cassius might

not be driven to do himself a hurt before he should have the opportunity

to grant a free pardon. But before he could come to the east news had

come to Cassius that the emperor still lived; his followers fell away

from him, and he was assassinated. Marcus now went to the east, and

while there the murderers brought the head of Cassius to him; but the

emperor indignantly refused their gift, nor would he admit the men to

his presence.

On this journey his wife, Faustina, died. At his return the emperor

celebrated a triumph (176). Immediately afterwards he repaired to

Germany, and took up once more the burden of war. His operations were

followed by complete success; but the troubles of late years had been

too much for his constitution, at no time robust, and on March 17, 180,

he died in Pannonia.

The good emperor was not spared domestic troubles. Faustina had borne

him several children, of whom he was passionately fond. Their innocent

faces may still be seen in many a sculpture gallery, recalling with odd

effect the dreamy countenance of their father. But they died one by

one, and when Marcus came to his own end only one of his sons still

lived--the weak and worthless Commodus. On his father's death Commodus,

who succeeded him, undid the work of many campaigns by a hasty and

unwise peace; and his reign of twelve years proved him to be a ferocious

and bloodthirsty tyrant. Scandal has made free with the name of Faustina

herself, who is accused not only of unfaithfulness, but of intriguing

with Cassius and egging him on to his fatal rebellion, it must be

admitted that these charges rest on no sure evidence; and the emperor,

at all events, loved her dearly, nor ever felt the slightest qualm of

suspicion.

As a soldier we have seen that Marcus was both capable and successful;

as an administrator he was prudent and conscientious. Although steeped

in the teachings of philosophy, he did not attempt to remodel the world

on any preconceived plan. He trod the path beaten by his predecessors,

seeking only to do his duty as well as he could, and to keep out

corruption. He did some unwise things, it is true. To create a compeer

in empire, as he did with Verus, was a dangerous innovation which could

only succeed if one of the two effaced himself; and under Diocletian

this very precedent caused the Roman Empire to split into halves. He

erred in his civil administration by too much centralising. But the

strong point of his reign was the administration of justice. Marcus

sought by-laws to protect the weak, to make the lot of the slaves

less hard, to stand in place of father to the fatherless. Charitable

foundations were endowed for rearing and educating poor children. The

provinces were protected against oppression, and public help was given

to cities or districts which might be visited by calamity. The great

blot on his name, and one hard indeed to explain, is his treatment

of the Christians. In his reign Justin at Rome became a martyr to

his faith, and Polycarp at Smyrna, and we know of many outbreaks of

fanaticism in the provinces which caused the death of the faithful. It

is no excuse to plead that he knew nothing about the atrocities done in

his name: it was his duty to know, and if he did not he would have been

the first to confess that he had failed in his duty. But from his own

tone in speaking of the Christians it is clear he knew them only from

calumny; and we hear of no measures taken even to secure that they

should have a fair hearing. In this respect Trajan was better than he.

To a thoughtful mind such a religion as that of Rome would give small

satisfaction. Its legends were often childish or impossible; its

teaching had little to do with morality. The Roman religion was in fact

of the nature of a bargain: men paid certain sacrifices and rites, and

the gods granted their favour, irrespective of right or wrong. In this

case all devout souls were thrown back upon philosophy, as they had

been, though to a less extent, in Greece. There were under the early

empire two rival schools which practically divided the field between

them, Stoicism and Epicureanism. The ideal set before each was

nominally much the same. The Stoics aspired to ἁπάθεια, the repression

of all emotion, and the Epicureans to ἀταραξία, freedom from all

disturbance; yet in the upshot the one has become a synonym of stubborn

endurance, the other for unbridled licence. With Epicureanism we have

nothing to do now; but it will be worth while to sketch the history and

tenets of the Stoic sect.

Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, was born in Cyprus at some date unknown,

but his life may be said roughly to be between the years 350 and 250

B.C. Cyprus has been from time immemorial a meeting-place of the East

and West, and although we cannot grant any importance to a possible

strain of Phoenician blood in him (for the Phœnicians were no

philosophers), yet it is quite likely that through Asia Minor he may

have come in touch with the Far East. He studied under the cynic

Crates, but he did not neglect other philosophical systems. After many

years' study he opened his own school in a colonnade in Athens called

the Painted Porch, or Stoa, which gave the Stoics their name. Next to

Zeno, the School of the Porch owes most to Chrysippus (280--207 b.c.),

who organised Stoicism into a system. Of him it was said,

'But for Chrysippus, there had been no Porch.'

The Stoics regarded speculation as a means to an end and that end was,

as Zeno put it, to live consistently (ὁμολογουμένος ζῆν), or as it was

later explained, to live in conformity with nature (ὁμολογουμένος τῇ

φύσει ζῆν). This conforming of the life to nature was the Stoic idea of

Virtue. This dictum might easily be taken to mean that virtue consists

in yielding to each natural impulse; but that was very far from the

Stoic meaning. In order to live in accord with nature, it is necessary

to know what nature is; and to this end a threefold division of

philosophy is made—into _Physics_, dealing with the universe and its

laws, the problems of divine government and teleology; _Logic_, which

trains the mind to discern true from false; and _Ethics_, which applies

the knowledge thus gained and tested to practical life.

The Stoic system of physics was materialism with an infusion of

pantheism. In contradiction to Plato's view that the Ideas, or

Prototypes, of phenomena alone really exist, the Stoics held that

material objects alone existed; but immanent in the material universe

was a spiritual force which acted through them, manifesting itself

under many forms, as fire, æther, spirit, soul, reason, the ruling

principle.

The universe, then, is God, of whom the popular gods are manifestations;

while legends and myths are allegorical. The soul of man is thus an

emanation from the godhead, into whom it will eventually be re-absorbed.

The divine ruling principle makes all things work together for good,

but for the good of the whole. The highest good of man is consciously

to work with God for the common good, and this is the sense in which

the Stoic tried to live in accord with nature. In the individual it

is virtue alone which enables him to do this; as Providence rules the

universe, so virtue in the soul must rule man.

In Logic, the Stoic system is noteworthy for their theory as to the

test of truth, the _Criterion_. They compared the new-born soul to a

sheet of paper ready for writing. Upon this the senses write their

impressions (φαντασίαι), and by experience of a number of these the

soul unconsciously conceives general notions (κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι) or

anticipations (προλήψεις). When the impression was such as to be

irresistible it was called (καταληπτικὴ φαντασία) one that holds fast,

or as they explained it, one proceeding from truth. Ideas and

inferences artificially produced by deduction or the like were tested

by this 'holding perception.' Of the Ethical application I have already

spoken. The highest good was the virtuous life. Virtue alone is

happiness, and vice is unhappiness. Carrying this theory to its

extreme, the Stoic said that there could be no gradations between

virtue and vice, though of course each has its special manifestations.

Moreover, nothing is good but virtue, and nothing but vice is bad.

Those outside things which are commonly called good or bad, such as

health and sickness, wealth and poverty, pleasure and pain, are to him

indifferent (ἀδιάφορα). All these things are merely the sphere in which

virtue may act. The ideal Wise Man is sufficient unto himself in all

things (αὐταρκής); and knowing these truths, he will be happy even when

stretched upon the rack. It is probable that no Stoic claimed for

himself that he was this Wise Man, but that each strove after it as an

ideal much as the Christian strives after a likeness to Christ. The

exaggeration in this statement was, however, so obvious, that the later

Stoics were driven to make a further subdivision of things indifferent

into what is preferable (προηγμένα) and what is undesirable

(ἀποπροηγμένα). They also held that for him who had not attained to the

perfect wisdom, certain actions were proper. (καθήκοντα) These were

neither virtuous nor vicious, but, like the indifferent things, held a

middle place.

Two points in the Stoic system deserve special mention. One is a

careful distinction between things which are in our power and things

which are not. Desire and dislike, opinion and affection, are within

the power of the will; whereas health, wealth, honour, and other such

are generally not so. The Stoic was called upon to control his desires

and affections, and to guide his opinion; to bring his whole being

under the sway of the will or leading principle, just as the universe

is guided and governed by divine Providence. This is a special

application of the favourite Greek virtue of moderation, (σωφροσύνη)

and has also its parallel in Christian ethics. The second point is a

strong insistence on the unity of the universe, and on man's duty as

part of a great whole. Public spirit was the most splendid political

virtue of the ancient world, and it is here made cosmopolitan. It is

again instructive to note that Christian sages insisted on the same

thing. Christians are taught that they are members of a worldwide

brotherhood, where is neither Greek nor Hebrew, bond nor free and that

they live their lives as fellow-workers with God.

Such is the system which underlies the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius.

Some knowledge of it is necessary to the right understanding of the

book, but for us the chief interest lies elsewhere. We do not come to

Marcus Aurelius for a treatise on Stoicism. He is no head of a school to

lay down a body of doctrine for students; he does not even contemplate

that others should read what he writes. His philosophy is not an eager

intellectual inquiry, but more what we should call religious feeling.

The uncompromising stiffness of Zeno or Chrysippus is softened and

transformed by passing through a nature reverent and tolerant, gentle

and free from guile; the grim resignation which made life possible to

the Stoic sage becomes in him almost a mood of aspiration. His book

records the innermost thoughts of his heart, set down to ease it, with

such moral maxims and reflections as may help him to bear the burden of

duty and the countless annoyances of a busy life.

It is instructive to compare the _Meditations_ with another famous book,

the _Imitation of Christ_. There is the same ideal of self-control in

both. It should be a man's task, says the _Imitation_, 'to overcome

himself, and every day to be stronger than himself.' 'In withstanding of

the passions standeth very peace of heart.' 'Let us set the axe to the

root, that we being purged of our passions may have a peaceable mind.'

To this end there must be continual self-examination. 'If thou may not

continually gather thyself together, namely sometimes do it, at least

once a day, the morning or the evening. In the morning purpose, in the

evening discuss the manner, what thou hast been this day, in word, work,

and thought.' But while the Roman's temper is a modest self-reliance,

the Christian aims at a more passive mood, humbleness and meekness,

and reliance on the presence and personal friendship of God. The Roman

scrutinises his faults with severity, but without the self-contempt

which makes the Christian 'vile in his own sight.' The Christian, like

the Roman, bids 'study to withdraw thine heart from the love of things

visible'; but it is not the busy life of duty he has in mind so much as

the contempt of all worldly things, and the 'cutting away of all

lower delectations.' Both rate men's praise or blame at their real

worthlessness; 'Let not thy peace,' says the Christian, 'be in the

mouths of men.' But it is to God's censure the Christian appeals, the

Roman to his own soul. The petty annoyances of injustice or unkindness

are looked on by each with the same magnanimity. 'Why doth a little

thing said or done against thee make thee sorry? It is no new thing; it

is not the first, nor shall it be the last, if thou live long. At best

suffer patiently, if thou canst not suffer joyously.' The Christian

should sorrow more for other men's malice than for our own wrongs; but

the Roman is inclined to wash his hands of the offender. 'Study to be

patient in suffering and bearing other men's defaults and all manner

infirmities,' says the Christian; but the Roman would never have thought

to add, 'If all men were perfect, what had we then to suffer of other

men for God?' The virtue of suffering in itself is an idea which does

not meet us in the _Meditations_. Both alike realise that man is one of a

great community. 'No man is sufficient to himself,' says the Christian;

'we must bear together, help together, comfort together.' But while

he sees a chief importance in zeal, in exalted emotion that is, and

avoidance of lukewarmness, the Roman thought mainly of the duty to be

done as well as might be, and less of the feeling which should go with

the doing of it. To the saint as to the emperor, the world is a poor

thing at best. 'Verily it is a misery to live upon the earth,' says the

Christian; few and evil are the days of man's life, which passeth away

suddenly as a shadow.

But there is one great difference between the two books we are

considering. The _Imitation_ is addressed to others, the _Meditations_

by the writer to himself. We learn nothing from the _Imitation_ of

the author's own life, except in so far as he may be assumed to have

practised his own preachings; the _Meditations_ reflect mood by mood the

mind of him who wrote them. In their intimacy and frankness lies their

great charm. These notes are not sermons; they are not even confessions.

There is always an air of self-consciousness in confessions; in such

revelations there is always a danger of unctuousness or of vulgarity for

the best of men. St. Augus-tine is not always clear of offence, and John

Bunyan himself exaggerates venial peccadilloes into heinous sins. But

Marcus Aurelius is neither vulgar nor unctuous; he extenuates nothing,

but nothing sets down in malice. He never poses before an audience; he

may not be profound, he is always sincere. And it is a lofty and serene

soul which is here disclosed before us. Vulgar vices seem to have no

temptation for him; this is not one tied and bound with chains which

he strives to break. The faults he detects in himself are often such as

most men would have no eyes to see. To serve the divine spirit which

is implanted within him, a man must 'keep himself pure from all violent

passion and evil affection, from all rashness and vanity, and from all

manner of discontent, either in regard of the gods or men': or, as he

says elsewhere, 'unspotted by pleasure, undaunted by pain.' Unwavering

courtesy and consideration are his aims. 'Whatsoever any man either

doth or saith, thou must be good;' 'doth any man offend? It is against

himself that he doth offend: why should it trouble thee?' The offender

needs pity, not wrath; those who must needs be corrected, should be

treated with tact and gentleness; and one must be always ready to learn

better. 'The best kind of revenge is, not to become like unto them.'

There are so many hints of offence forgiven, that we may believe the

notes followed sharp on the facts. Perhaps he has fallen short of his

aim, and thus seeks to call his principles to mind, and to strengthen

himself for the future. That these sayings are not mere talk is plain

from the story of Avidius Cassius, who would have usurped his imperial

throne. Thus the emperor faithfully carries out his own principle, that

evil must be overcome with good. For each fault in others, Nature (says

he) has given us a counteracting virtue; 'as, for example, against the

unthankful, it hath given goodness and meekness, as an antidote.'

One so gentle towards a foe was sure to be a good friend; and indeed his

pages are full of generous gratitude to those who had served him. In his

First Book he sets down to account all the debts due to his kinsfolk

and teachers. To his grandfather he owed his own gentle spirit, to

his father shamefastness and courage; he learnt of his mother to be

religious and bountiful and single-minded. Rusticus did not work in

vain, if he showed his pupil that his life needed amending. Apollonius

taught him simplicity, reasonableness, gratitude, a love of true

liberty. So the list runs on; every one he had dealings with seems

to have given him something good, a sure proof of the goodness of his

nature, which thought no evil.

If his was that honest and true heart which is the Christian ideal, this

is the more wonderful in that he lacked the faith which makes Christians

strong. He could say, it is true, 'either there is a God, and then all

is well; or if all things go by chance and fortune, yet mayest thou use

thine own providence in those things that concern thee properly; and

then art thou well.' Or again, 'We must needs grant that there is a

nature that doth govern the universe.' But his own part in the scheme

of things is so small, that he does not hope for any personal happiness

beyond what a serene soul may win in this mortal life. 'O my soul, the

time I trust will be, when thou shalt be good, simple, more open and

visible, than that body by which it is enclosed;' but this is said of

the calm contentment with human lot which he hopes to attain, not of a

time when the trammels of the body shall be cast off. For the rest, the

world and its fame and wealth, 'all is vanity.' The gods may perhaps

have a particular care for him, but their especial care is for the

universe at large: thus much should suffice. His gods are better than

the Stoic gods, who sit aloof from all human things, untroubled and

uncaring, but his personal hope is hardly stronger. On this point he

says little, though there are many allusions to death as the natural

end; doubtless he expected his soul one day to be absorbed into the

universal soul, since nothing comes out of nothing, and nothing can be

annihilated. His mood is one of strenuous weariness; he does his duty as

a good soldier, waiting for the sound of the trumpet which shall sound

the retreat; he has not that cheerful confidence which led Socrates

through a life no less noble, to a death which was to bring him into the

company of gods he had worshipped and men whom he had revered.

But although Marcus Aurelius may have held intellectually that his soul

was destined to be absorbed, and to lose consciousness of itself, there

were times when he felt, as all who hold it must sometimes feel, how

unsatisfying is such a creed. Then he gropes blindly after something

less empty and vain. 'Thou hast taken ship,' he says, 'thou hast sailed,

thou art come to land, go out, if to another life, there also shalt

thou find gods, who are everywhere.' There is more in this than the

assumption of a rival theory for argument's sake. If worldly things

'be but as a dream, the thought is not far off that there may be an

awakening to what is real. When he speaks of death as a necessary

change, and points out that nothing useful and profitable can be brought

about without change, did he perhaps think of the change in a corn of

wheat, which is not quickened except it die? Nature's marvellous power

of recreating out of Corruption is surely not confined to bodily things.

Many of his thoughts sound like far-off echoes of St. Paul; and it is

strange indeed that this most Christian of emperors has nothing good

to say of the Christians. To him they are only sectaries 'violently and

passionately set upon opposition.

Profound as philosophy these _Meditations_ certainly are not; but Marcus

Aurelius was too sincere not to see the essence of such things as

came within his experience. Ancient religions were for the most

part concerned with outward things. Do the necessary rites, and you

propitiate the gods; and these rites were often trivial, sometimes

violated right feeling or even morality. Even when the gods stood on the

side of righteousness, they were concerned with the act more than with

the intent. But Marcus Aurelius knows that what the heart is full of,

the man will do. 'Such as thy thoughts and ordinary cogitations are,' he

says, 'such will thy mind be in time.' And every page of the book shows

us that he knew thought was sure to issue in act. He drills his soul, as

it were, in right principles, that when the time comes, it may be guided

by them. To wait until the emergency is to be too late.

He sees also the true essence of happiness. 'If happiness did consist

in pleasure, how came notorious robbers, impure abominable livers,

parricides, and tyrants, in so large a measure to have their part of

pleasures?' He who had all the world's pleasures at command can write

thus 'A happy lot and portion is, good inclinations of the soul, good

desires, good actions.'

By the irony of fate this man, so gentle and good, so desirous of quiet

joys and a mind free from care, was set at the head of the Roman Empire

when great dangers threatened from east and west. For several years he

himself commanded his armies in chief. In camp before the Quadi he dates

the first book of his _Meditations_, and shows how he could retire within

himself amid the coarse clangour of arms. The pomps and glories which

he despised were all his; what to most men is an ambition or a dream, to

him was a round of weary tasks which nothing but the stern sense of duty

could carry him through. And he did his work well. His wars were slow

and tedious, but successful. With a statesman's wisdom he foresaw the

danger to Rome of the barbarian hordes from the north, and took measures

to meet it. As it was, his settlement gave two centuries of respite

to the Roman Empire; had he fulfilled the plan of pushing the imperial

frontiers to the Elbe, which seems to have been in his mind, much more

might have been accomplished. But death cut short his designs.

Truly a rare opportunity was given to Marcus Aurelius of showing what

the mind can do in despite of circumstances. Most peaceful of warriors,

a magnificent monarch whose ideal was quiet happiness in home life, bent

to obscurity yet born to greatness, the loving father of children who

died young or turned out hateful, his life was one paradox. That nothing

might lack, it was in camp before the face of the enemy that he passed

away and went to his own place.

The following is a list of the chief English translations of Marcus

Aurelius: (1) By Meric Casaubon, 1634; (2) Jeremy Collier, 1701; (3)

James Thomson, 1747; (4) R. Graves, 1792; (5) H. McCormac, 1844; (6)

George Long, 1862; (7) G. H. Rendall, 1898; and (8) J. Jackson, 1906.

Renan’s “Marc-Aurèle”—in his “History of the Origins of Christianity,”

which appeared in 1882—is the most vital and original book to be had

relating to the time of Marcus Aurelius. Pater’s “Marius the Epicurean”

forms another outside commentary, which is of service in the

imaginative attempt to create again the period.

HIS FIRST BOOK

concerning HIMSELF:

Wherein Antoninus recordeth, What and of whom, whether Parents, Friends,

or Masters; by their good examples, or good advice and counsel, he had

learned:

Divided into Numbers or Sections.

ANTONINUS Book vi. Num. xlviii. Whensoever thou wilt rejoice thyself,

think and meditate upon those good parts and especial gifts, which thou

hast observed in any of them that live with thee:

as industry in one, in another modesty, in another bountifulness, in

another some other thing. For nothing can so much rejoice thee, as

the resemblances and parallels of several virtues, eminent in the

dispositions of them that live with thee, especially when all at once,

as it were, they represent themselves unto thee. See therefore, that

thou have them always in a readiness.

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