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Mexico: A Political Prognosis and Analysis Or The Once and Future EZLN By Matt Miscreant and Todd Prane The "armed" part of the rebellion in southern Mexico lasted just 10 days, but the stand off may last much longer. The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) needs a legitimate victory in the August 21st elections if they are to continue on their neo-liberal path; the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) could exploit the political turmoil around the elections, if they are still a political force in Mexico at that time. Against this backdrop, and with the August elections still wide-open (creating the possibility of the first new ruling party in six decades), it seems like a good time to take a quick look around. The Negotiations The EZLN and representatives of the PRI finally sat down at the Cathedral in San Crist=F3bal de las Casas on Feb. 21. The talks were mediated by Archbishop Samuel Ruiz Garc=EDa, and the chief negotiators were Manuel Camacho Sol=EDs for the PRI and members of the Clandestine Indigenous Revolutionary Committee-- General Command for the EZLN. The Zapatistas' demands were a mixture of revolution and reform, with some of the apparently reformist demands actually requiring revolutionary change. The government declared that it will meet parts of the demands, mostly in ways that only look like change This is consistent with the PRI's history of seeming to accept radical demands (thus the Institutional Revolutionary Party) though in reality co-opting them. The government has gone so far as to characterize the negotiations as agreements needing only a signature. The EZLN responded: "If the supreme government wants to present the documents of San Crist=F3bal as 'agreements,' then let's consider the EZLN's list of demands the 'agreement' and guarantee democracy in the next elections with the resignation of the federal president." The government's mis-characterization of the dialogue has threatened the talks and the chance for a peaceful solution with the Zapatistas. Indeed, it is doubtful that a peaceful solution is possible; the Zapatistas probably will not agree to any settlement that does not incorporate their more revolutionary demands, such as the resignation of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, which would likely spell the end of the PRI's hegemony and radically open up political space in Mexico. It is likely that the EZLN realizes that the PRI will not meet their more radical demands and is only buying time to increase their strength. Time is on the side of the Zapatistas, who have been quietly organizing for ten years, and not to fight for only ten days. As Sub-Commander Marcos said in a letter to the editor of Tiempo: "Taking power? No, something far more difficult. A new world." Time is not on the side of the PRI, whose power will be at stake in the August elections. Should the PRI win again they will likely be accused of election fraud yet again, which in the current political climate could lead to radical consequences; it is important to remember the uprisings that happened after the last elections were stolen from center-left candidate Cuahut=E9moc C=E1rdenas. Also, it is rumored that other radical-left armed groups will begin a war on the federal government in August, possibly providing the Zapatistas with armed allies in other parts of the country [see L&R vol. 5. no. 1]. The Assassination and the August Elections The entire negotiation process had the undesireable effect of increasing President Salinas' popularity (due to the perception that he "handled the situation" well.) The negotiations also increased the popularity of Manuel Camacho Sol=EDs. Camacho Sol=EDs, once a PRI presidential hopeful, was passed over in favor of Luis Donaldo Colosio Murrieta, but after the negotiations seemed likely for an independent candidacy. Such a candidacy would have floored the PRI by drawing away large amounts of their most solid support. Camacho, however coincidentally, announced that he would not seek national office the day before Colosio was shot. Colosio was assassinated on March 23, 1994, in Tijuana by Mario Aburto Mart=EDnez, a 23-year old Tijuana resident. This was big news, even in the US, for two reasons: the first is that no prominent Mexican politician had been assassinated since 1928 when President- elect General Alvaro Obreg=F3n was killed; the second is that Colosio's death throws an already uncertain election into complete disarray and raises all kinds of questions about the killer and his motivations. Both of those factors, in the context of the ongoing situation in Chiapas, add up to a fear on the part of American investors that Mexico is unable to maintain a capitalist democracy and will fall prey to the same difficulties as Guatemala, El Salvador, Per=FA, and so many other Latin American countries. The assassination gives more substance to a joke that was already circulating in Mexico: President Carlos Salinas went to sleep on New Year's Eve thinking that he would wake up in the First World and woke up on New Year's Day in the Third. However, with the assassination of Colosio, the PRI had an opportunity to change the political climate and nominate a new, more popular candidate. Instead, they have shown their commitment to business as usual, which means neo-liberal economics/class war on Mexico's poor, by selecting another faceless technocrat, Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Le=F3n, to run in Colosio's place. The line of faceless bureaucrats is long and the assassination of Colosio has not resulted in a real change in the PRI. What it has done, however, is two things: 1) At the same time reaffirm the PRI's committment to avoiding internal democracy (within the party) and further destabilize the PRI's position, increasing the chance for the need to steal the elections; 2) Raise all sorts of questions about who would have motives to shoot Colosio with speculations about everyone from the PRI to the Pope. All of this gets back to the question of the negotiations and how, exactly they shifted the political balance in Mexico. The EZLN quickly denied any involvement in the assassination, though it appeared they might be subject to an assault by the Federal Army in the wake of the killing. Immediately following the act, Federal Army troops appeared to be massing to attack, and government planes made aerial attacks near the highway between Comit=E1n and Altamirano. Although this signaled that the PRI might try to blame the assassination on the EZLN, the PRI has changed tactics. Now the PRI is not blaming the EZLN at all, but is using the assassination to build support for themselves in the elections, using rhetoric which identifies the PRI with Mexico, claiming that the assassin killed Mexico itself when he shot Colosio. Reports published in the capitalist press services just prior to L&R going to press indicate that a right-wing faction within the PRI may have been responsible for the assassination. This does not come as much of a surprise, but it does threaten the PRI's strategy of turning the assassination into an assault on all of Mexico into little more than the usual internal PRI maneuvering, stepped up a level. All of this raises questions about the viability of the PRI in the next elections. Solidarity with the EZLN Even as the EZLN faces questions of its long-term survival, North American solidarity groups face the difficult transition from the excitement- and communique-filled days of January to protracted, dependable activity. Most of the small groupings and even some of the larger coalitions will quickly fade as the communiques come more slowly and the standoff continues. Of central importance, though, is whether these groupings will be around in August for the elections. Solidarity work in Mexico has been frenetic. Demonstrations have been large and frequent, with activities building to a huge day of protest to be held April 10, the 75th anniversary of the assassination of Emiliano Zapata. Marchers from most states of the Republic, notably from Guerrero, have travelled by foot to the Capitol, shouting their support for the EZLN (and fetishizing Subcomandante Marcos) the whole way. The last leg of the march-- from the state of Mexico into the Federal District (from the outskirts into the city)--and the demonstration will be a good way to gauge ongoing Mexican public interest in and support for the EZLN. At the moment, North American solidarity work is concentrated around information- sharing, although material aid caravans are already being launched, notably by the Pomo Indians in Northern California, with the assistance of a broad-based coalition in the San Francisco Bay Area. If activists in North America are to be of more substantial aid to the Zapatista revolutionary movement, we need to expand our activities. We need to resist North American intervention--the US has already sent troops to Guatemala, just across the border from Chiapas, in a covert military operation--while protesting the already-enormous Mexican Army presence in the state. Our ability to stop the capitalist war machine from crushing the Mexican insurgency may be crucial to whether the movement brings about revolutionary change or is smashed. Resistance must be coordinated and groups working in solidarity with the Zapatistas must be in contact with each other and work together in a principled manner--across the border. We must be in contact with those we are in solidarity with and help them in achieving their liberation, including giving material aid. Their liberation and ours are inextricably linked. Freedom cannot exist within the confines of one country; we cannot separate the liberation of the Chiapanecos from our own. ______________________________________ Matt Miscreant is a member of Santa Cruz-based Zapatista Action Project. Todd Prane is a member of New York City- based Zapatista Solidarity Committee. Both are members of Love and Rage Revolutionary Anarchist Federation. sources include: Nicanet Weekly News Update/339Lafayette St./NY, NY 10012; New York Transfer News Service/nyt@blythe.org/(212)675-9690; Equipo Pueblo/pueblo@laneta.apc.org [add phone] Communique Packet #1 of the ZSC: Dec 31, 1993 through Feb 2, 1994 Info-Bulletin #2 of the ZSC: late Jan, 1993 - March 17, 1994 $1 and three stamps each to Love and Rage/NYC. _______________________________________ Fromthe Love and Rage New York News Bureau Love and Rage is a Revolutionary Anarchist Federation in Canada, the US and Mexico. For more information please write to lnr@blythe.org For an email subscription to our bimonthly publication please send $10 to POB 853 Stuyvesant Sta/ NY, NY 10009 _______________________________________