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March 1990                                                       
                                                                  
     PERSONAL LIABILITY:  THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DEFENSE               
                                                                 
                              By

                  Daniel L. Schofield, S.J.D.                             
                         Special Agent
                              and
              Chief of the Legal Instruction Unit            
                          FBI Academy                                        
                      Quantico, Virginia                                      
                                                                  
     Law enforcement officers face many stressful situations 
inherent in their profession, including the threat of being sued 
and held personally liable for money damages because of their 
actions.  Since officers are often placed in fast-breaking 
situations, they must decide whether to arrest or search with 
little opportunity to obtain prior legal advice.  By its very 
nature, law enforcement inevitably places officers in situations 
where they must make difficult judgments, balancing the extent of 
the authority they exercise with the constitutional rights of the 
citizens they serve.  Citizens rightly expect officers to 
understand the constitutional principles that govern their 
conduct.  At the same time, law enforcement effectiveness often 
depends on officers' confidence and willingness to act swiftly 
and decisively to combat crime and protect the public.            

    However, the fear of personal liability can seriously erode 
this necessary confidence and willingness to act.  Even  worse,  
law enforcement officers who have an unrealistic or exaggerated 
fear of personal liability may become overly timid or indecisive 
and fail to arrest or search  to the detriment of the public's 
interest in effective and aggressive law enforcement.  In order 
to accurately assess their potential exposure to personal 
liability, law enforcement officials must understand the 
constitutional law that governs their conduct.  They must also 
understand the protection of qualified immunity that shields 
officers from personal liability for unconstitutional law 
enforcement activity that is deemed objectively reasonable.       

     This article discusses recent court decisions that clarify 
the extent of protection from personal liability offered by the 
qualified immunity defense.  The article's primary purpose is to 
allay officers' unrealistic concerns for personal liability that 
can inhibit law enforcement effectiveness and undermine morale. 
It discusses the following aspects of the immunity
defense--immunity rationale and scope, the ``objective legal
reasonableness'' test, the ``clearly established law''
requirement, applicability to unconstitutional law enforcement
conduct, and procedural considerations in asserting the defense.

IMMUNITY RATIONALE AND SCOPE                                      

     Immunity is a legally recognized exemption from liability.  
Recently, in the case of Forrester v. White, (1) the Supreme Court 
described the rationale for immunity as follows:                  

	``Suits for monetary damages are meant to compensate the 
	victims of wrongful actions and to discourage conduct that may 
	result in liability.  Special problems arise, however, when 
	government officials are exposed to liability for damages.  To 
	the extent that the threat of liability encourages these 
	officials to carry out their duties in a lawful and appropriate 
	manner, and to pay their victims when they do not, it 
	accomplishes exactly what it should.  By its nature, however, 
	the threat of liability can create perverse incentives that 
	operate to inhibit officials in the proper performance of their 
	duties.  In many contexts, government officials are expected to 
	make decisions that are impartial or imaginative, and that above 
	all are informed by considerations other than the personal 
	interests of the decisionmaker.  Because government officials are 
	engaged by definition in governing, their decisions will often 
	have adverse effects on other persons.  When officials
	are threatened with personal liability for acts taken pursuant
	to their official duties, they may well be induced to act with
	an excess of caution or otherwise to skew their decisions in
	ways that result in less than full fidelity to the objective and
	independent criteria that ought to guide their conduct.  In this
	way, exposing government officials to the same legal hazards
	faced by other citizens may detract from the rule of law instead
	of contributing to it.'' (2)

     These considerations have led courts to create both absolute 
and qualified immunity defenses.  The Supreme Court has been 
``...quite sparing in its recognition of claims to absolute 
official immunity,'' (3) which is limited to officials whose 
special functions demand total protection from suit, such as 
judges and prosecutors, ``...intimately associated with the 
judicial phase of the criminal process.'' (4)  While law 
enforcement officers do not receive absolute immunity protection, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit held that law 
enforcement officers charged with the duty of executing facially 
valid court orders do enjoy absolute immunity from liability for 
damages resulting from conduct prescribed by that order. (5)  The 
court found that enforcing a court order is intrinsically 
associated with a judicial proceeding.  Also, it determined that 
the public interest in the enforcement of court orders essential 
to the effective function of the judicial process far outweighs 
the benefit to be gained by making law enforcement officers 
liable for decisions they are powerless to control. (6)              

     Courts generally agree, however, that most law enforcement 
functions do not require absolute immunity protection.  For 
example, in Malley v. Briggs, (7) the Supreme Court refused to 
expand the scope of absolute immunity to the decision of a Rhode 
Island State trooper to apply for an arrest warrant.  In this 
case, the Court decided that a rule of qualified rather than 
absolute immunity would give police ``ample room for mistaken 
judgments,'' and yet not ``deter an officer from submitting an 
affidavit when probable cause to make an arrest is present.'' (8)    

     The Court noted that a damages remedy for an arrest 
following an objectively unreasonable request for a warrant 
imposes a cost directly on the officer responsible for the 
unreasonable request and directly benefits the victim of the 
police misconduct.  The Court commented on the trooper's 
expansive qualified immunity protection by noting, ``[O]nly where 
the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable 
cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable 
will the shield of immunity be lost.'' (9)                           

     Qualified immunity is designed to insulate responsible law 
enforcement officers ``from undue interference with their duties 
and from the potentially disabling threat of liability,'' and it 
shields from civil liability ``all but the plainly incompetent or 
those who knowingly violate the law.'' (10)                   

IMMUNITY BASED ON ``OBJECTIVE LEGAL REASONABLENESS''              

     In 1982, the Supreme Court adopted an objective standard for 
courts to use in determining whether immunity shields official 
action.  The Court described the parameters of qualified immunity 
defense as follows:                                               

     ``[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions 
     generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar 
     as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory 
     or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
     known.'' (11)                                                        

     That standard was further clarified 5 years later when the 
Court defined ``objective legal reasonableness'' as the 
touchstone for a qualified immunity defense.  That decision in 
Anderson v. Creighton (12) involved a suit against a Special Agent 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation alleging an 
unconstitutional warrantless search.  The U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit had rejected the Agent's claim for 
qualified immunity, concluding that the law was clearly 
established that persons are protected from warrantless searches 
of their homes unless the searching officers have probable cause 
and exigent circumstances. (13)  The Agent sought review of that 
court of appeals decision in the Supreme Court.  He argued that 
he was entitled to qualified immunity if he could establish as a 
matter of law that a reasonable officer could have believed the 
search to be lawful.                                              

     The Supreme Court agreed with the Agent that the court of 
appeals had erroneously refused to consider whether it was 
clearly established that the circumstances confronting the Agent 
did not constitute probable cause and exigent circumstances.  The 
Court made clear that the availability of the qualified immunity 
defense generally turns on the ``objective legal reasonableness'' 
of the action in question assessed in light of the legal rules 
that were clearly established at the time that action was 
taken. (14)                                                          

     Law enforcement officers do not lose their qualified 
immunity simply because it is shown that they violated a 
generalized right, such as the right of citizens to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  Instead, it must be shown 
that the law was clearly established in a ``particularized'' 
sense, so that ``the contours of the right'' are clear enough for 
any reasonable officer to know that what he or she is doing 
violates that right. (15)  This particularity requirement does not 
mean that law enforcement officers will always be protected by 
qualified immunity unless the very action in question has been 
held unlawful.  Rather, it means that the illegality must be 
apparent in light of preexisting law before officers lose their 
immunity protection. (16)  The Court held that law enforcement 
officials should not be held personally liable when they 
``...reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is 
present.'' (17)  The ``objective legal reasonableness'' test 
applied to an allegedly unlawful search requires an examination 
of the information possessed by the searching officials.  The 
relevant question to be resolved is whether a reasonable officer 
could have believed the Agent's warrantless search to be lawful 
in light of clearly established law and the information that the 
searching Agent possessed.                                     

THE ``CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW'' REQUIREMENT                       

     The unlawfulness of the challenged conduct must be apparent 
in light of preexisting law. (18)  The Supreme Court has instructed 
that the actions of a reasonably competent officer should be 
assessed in the light of the legal rules that were ``clearly 
established'' at the time the action was taken. (19)  A legal 
right is ``clearly established'' if the contours of that right 
are sufficiently clear that reasonable law enforcement officials 
would understand that what they are doing violates that right. 
Therefore, a qualified immunity defense will generally fail if 
the plaintiff proves that the law which an officer allegedly 
violated was ``clearly established'' at the time the challenged 
conduct occurred and that a reasonably competent officer should 
have known of that law.                                           

     The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said that a determination 
of whether a legal right was ``clearly established'' requires 
courts to survey the legal landscape that existed at the time of 
the challenged conduct. (20)  First, in the absence of binding 
precedent, courts should look to available decisional law from 
courts in other jurisdictions. (21)  Second, comparisons to 
previously settled cases should not be limited to ``...looking 
for a repetition of the very action in question.'' (22)  Third, 
courts should determine the likelihood that the Supreme Court or 
courts in the relevant jurisdiction would have reached the same 
result as the nonbinding precedent. (23)  Fourth, courts should 
determine whether at the time of the incident there was a wide 
diversity of cases arriving at differing results, or any cases 
rejecting a similar claim. (24)                                      

     The court said that law enforcement officers are charged 
with knowledge of constitutional enforcement developments and 
should not be allowed ``...to interpose lawyerly distinctions 
that defy common sense in order to distinguish away clearly 
established law.'' (25)  However, courts agree that officers 
``...are not required to predict the future course of 
constitutional law.'' (26)                                           

     The lack of binding precedent or the existence of 
conflicting decisions usually results in a finding that a law was 
not ``clearly established.''(27)  For example, the 11th Circuit 
Court of Appeals ruled that two deputy sheriffs were protected 
from personal liability by qualified immunity for an allegedly 
unlawful seizure because their conduct did not violate clearly 
established law. (28)  The court concluded the plaintiff had the 
burden of proving that the law allegedly violated by the 
deputies was ``clearly established'' at the time the detention 
occurred and that this burden was not met ``...simply by making 
general, conclusory allegations of some constitutional violation 
or by stating broad legal truisms.'' (29)  Instead, the court said 
that ``plaintiffs must prove the existence of a clear, 
factually-defined, well-recognized right of which a reasonable 
police officer should have known.'' (30)  The right allegedly 
violated must have been sufficiently particularized and clear so 
that reasonable officers in the deputies' position would 
understand that their particular seizure violated that right. (31)   

     In that regard, the court held that the case authorities 
cited by the plaintiff failed to establish that the law was 
``clearly established'' because they involved seizures that were 
factually distinguishable from the  deputies'.  Moreover, other 
court decisions had actually determined that such seizures were 
constitutionally reasonable.  Since the ``...line between the 
lawful and the unlawful is often vague, making it difficult for 
officers to know precisely which seizures are constitutional,'' 
the court said qualified immunity protection should only be lost 
when a law enforcement officer engages in unconstitutional 
conduct that crosses a bright line. (32)  The court then cautioned 
that this bright line is not to be found in legal abstractions, 
such as the general requirement that seizures be reasonable, but 
rather in specific prior cases involving concrete circumstances 
and facts similar to the case at issue.                           

APPLICABILITY OF IMMUNITY DEFENSE TO UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT CONDUCT

     The Supreme Court in Anderson v. Creighton made it clear 
that qualified immunity will protect a law enforcement officer 
from personal liability if unconstitutional conduct meets the 
test of ``objective legal reasonableness.''  The Court held that 
extending qualified immunity to constitutional violations is a 
reasonable accommodation between governmental need and 
individual freedom, and is necessary to give conscientious law 
enforcement officers the assurance of protection that is the 
object of the immunity doctrine. (33)  The Court stated that law 
enforcement officers should ``...know that they will not be held 
personally liable as long as their actions are reasonable in 
light of current American law.'' (34)                                

     Applying this ``objective legal reasonableness'' standard, 
Federal appellate courts have recently upheld immunity defenses 
for allegedly unconstitutional law enforcement conduct.  For 
example, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a qualified 
immunity defense for a deputy sheriff who allegedly made an 
arrest without probable cause. (35)  The court noted that ``even in 
the absence of probable cause for an arrest, qualified immunity 
provides officers with an additional layer of protection against 
civil liability.'' (36)  A fourth amendment violation, although by 
definition unreasonable, does not foreclose an additional 
reasonableness inquiry for purposes of qualified immunity. (37)      

     The court agreed that the right to freedom from arrest 
without probable cause is beyond a doubt clearly established. 
However, it also concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in 
Anderson ``mandates an inquiry into the facts surrounding the 
officer's action in order to determine whether in the light of 
preexisting law the unlawfulness was apparent.'' (38)  Similarly, 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the defense of 
qualified immunity protects law enforcement officers in cases 
where they mistakenly conclude that probable cause to arrest is 
present. (39)  Since actual probable cause is not necessary for an 
arrest to be objectively reasonable, the court said the issue is 
``not probable cause in fact but arguable probable cause.'' (40)     

     Of course, unconstitutional police conduct that fails to 
meet the test of ``objective legal reasonableness'' is not 
entitled to immunity protection.  In that regard, the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that immunity is lost where it is 
objectively determined that no reasonable law enforcement officer 
could have believed that the action was constitutionally 
justified in light of clearly established law. (41)              

PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS IN ASSERTING THE IMMUNITY DEFENSE       

     In many cases, the ``objective legal reasonableness'' test, 
as clarified by the Supreme Court in Anderson v. Creighton, will 
allow law enforcement officers to successfully assert their 
qualified immunity from personal liability in a motion for 
summary judgment, thereby avoiding the protracted and 
time-consuming processes of litigation. (42)  The Supreme Court has 
stated that a law enforcement officer's entitlement to qualified 
immunity is not a mere defense to liability, but an immunity from 
suit itself and the concomitant burdens of discovery. (43)  
Accordingly, a trial court's denial of an officer's motion for 
summary judgment based on qualified immunity raises a question of 
law that can be immediately appealed by the officer. (44)  However, 
the defense of qualified immunity is not waived if an officer 
chooses not to take an immediate appeal; officers retain the 
right to assert at trial their qualified immunity based on 
``objective legal reasonableness.''(45)                             

     The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals described the two-step 
process that courts should follow in deciding whether to grant 
qualified immunity on a motion for summary judgment prior to 
allowing a plaintiff the opportunity to conduct discovery:       

     ``...the trial court must first determine whether the
     law prohibiting the alleged police conduct was clearly
     established at the time it occurred....Second, a trial court
     must determine whether the police conduct, as alleged by the
     plaintiff, constituted actions that a reasonable officer could
     have believed lawful.'' (46)

     A law enforcement officer is entitled to dismissal of a suit 
prior to discovery where the trial court determines either:  1) 
That the relevant law was not clearly established, or 2) that 
another reasonable officer possessing the specific information 
available to the officer in question could have reasonably 
believed the actions taken were lawful.  The court observed that 
when the litigants disagree as to the actions taken, some 
discovery may be necessary before a motion for summary judgment 
can be granted. (47)  However, such discovery should only occur if 
there is a substantial factual disagreement as to what actions 
the law enforcement officers actually took, and should be 
limited to determining the applicability of the qualified 
immunity defense. (48)                                     

CONCLUSION                                                        

     The threat of personal liability is one of many risks 
associated with the law enforcement profession.  An officer's 
discretionary decision to arrest or search inevitably increases 
the risk of a subsequent lawsuit.  While this risk can be 
minimized by comprehensive departmental policies, thorough 
training, and attentive managerial controls, officers ultimately 
have a personal responsibility to insure that their conduct 
conforms to constitutional requirements.  The qualified immunity 
defense does not excuse clearly unconstitutional or offensive 
police misconduct.  It does, however, offer generous protection 
to conscientious officers who make objectively reasonable 
mistakes.  The availability of a qualified immunity defense 
should be encouragement to responsible officers that they can 
perform their vital law enforcement functions without a constant 
fear of personal liability.                                       

FOOTNOTES

(1) 108 S.Ct. 538 (1988).                                       

(2) Id. at 542.                                                 

(3) Id.                                                         

(4) Imbler v. Pachtman, 96 S.Ct. 984, 995 (1976).               

(5) Valdez v. City and County of Denver, 878 F.2d 1285, 1288 
(10th Cir. 1989).  In Geter v. Fortenberry, 882 F.2d 167 (5th 
Cir. 1989), a police officer's testimony on the witness stand was 
afforded absolute immunity.                                       

(6) Id. at 1289.  In Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787, 805 
(10th Cir. 1989), officers were afforded absolute immunity for 
their actions in assisting prosecutors in serving grand jury 
subpoenas.                                                        
    
(7) 106 S.Ct. 1092 (1986).                                      
    
(8) Id. at 1097.                                                
    
(9) Id. at  1098 (citations omitted).                           
    
(10) Id. at 1096.                                               
     
(11) Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982).  For a 
comprehensive analysis of the Harlow decision, see Higginbotham, 
``Defending Law Enforcement Officers Against Personal Liability 
in Constitutional Tort Litigations,'' FBI Law Enforcement 
Bulletin, vol. 54, Nos. 4-5, April and May 1985.                  
     
(12) 107 S.Ct. 3034 (1987).                                    
     
(13) See, Creighton v. City of St. Paul, 766 F.2d 1269 (8th 
Cir. 1985).                                                       
     
(14) 107 S.Ct. at 3038.                                        
    
(15) Id. at 3039.                                               
     
(16) Id.                                                        
     
(17) Id.                                                        
     
(18) Id. at 3038.                                               
     
(19) Id. at 3039.                                               
     
(20) Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989).           
     
(21) Id. at 591.                                                
     
(22) Id. at 592.                                                
     
(23) Id. at 593.                                                
     
(24) Id. at 595.                                                
     
(25) Id. at 593.                                                
     
(26) See, Lum v. Jensen, 876 F.2d 1385, 1389 (9th Cir. 1989).   
     
(27) Id.                                                        
     
(28) Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187 (11th Cir. 1989).           
     
(29) Id. at 1190.                                               
     
(30) Id.                                                        
     
(31) Id.                                                        
     
(32) Id. at 1194.                                               
     
(33) 107 S.Ct. at 3040-1.                                       
     
(34) Id. at 3042.                                               
     
(35) Hughes v. Meyer, 880 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1989).             
     
(36) Id. at 970.                                                
     
(37) Id. (citations omitted).                                   
     
(38) Id.                                                        
     
(39) Gorra v. Hanson, 880 F. 2d 95 (8th Cir. 1989).             
     
(40) Id. at 97.                                                 
     
(41) Melear v. Spears, 862 F.2d 1117, 1185 (5th Cir. 1989).  
See also, Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248 (6th Cir. 1989).       
     
(42) The trial judge may determine that a factual dispute 
exists that precludes summary judgment.  Id. at 1183.             
     
(43) See, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (1985).           
     
(44) In Apostol v. Gallion, 970 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1989), the 
court held that absent a finding of frivolity, trial is 
automatically put off pending an appeal of the district court's 
denial of an officer's claim of qualified immunity.               
     
(45) Hamm v. Powell, 874 F.2d 766, 770 (11th Cir. 1989).        
     
(46) Ginter v. Stallcup, 869 F.2d 384, 387 (8th Cir. 1989).     
     
(47) Id. at 387-88.                                             
     
(48) Id. at 388.                                                
     
----------
     Law enforcement officers of other than Federal jurisdiction 
who are interested in any legal issue discussed in this article 
should consult their legal adviser.  Some police procedures ruled 
permissible under Federal constitutional law are of questionable 
legality under State law or are not permitted at all.