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H. KEITH HENSON
1794 Cardel Way
San Jose, CA  95124
(408) 978-7616
 
THOMAS K. DONALDSON
1410 Norman Dr.
Sunnyvale, CA  94087
(408) 732-4234
 
ROGER E. GREGORY
2040 Columbia St.
Palo Alto, CA  94306
(415) 493-7582
 
                      U. S. DISTRICT COURT
                 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
 
H. KEITH HENSON, THOMAS K.           )
DONALDSON, and ROGER E. GREGORY,     )
on behalf of themselves and as       )
representatives of others            )     COMPLAINT FOR
similarly affected,                  )     DECLARATORY
                                     )     JUDGEMENT
Plaintiffs,                          )
                                     )
vs.                                  )     No.
                                     )
                                     )
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,     )     ENFORCEMENT OF
RON HELLER, U. S. ATTORNEY OFFICE    )     PROVISIONS OF THE
Los Angeles, MICHAEL EMICK, and      )     ELECTRONIC
DOES 1 TO 100, inclusive,            )     COMMUNICATION
                                     )     PRIVACY ACT.
                                     )
Defendants.                          )     CLASS ACTION
                                     )
 
                    INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
 
     1.  On or about January 12, 1988 law enforcement officials
 
of Riverside County obtained plaintiffs' electronic
 
communications (electronic mail, email).  From that date to
 
present plaintiffs have been prevented authorized access to
 
their electronic communications.  Plaintiff Henson contacted
 
the FBI by phone in March 1988 and requested the FBI to
 
investigate this apparent violation of Federal law (Title 18,
 
Section 2701 et seq.) in a letter to Supervisor of Riverside
 
 
COMPLAINT                      1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FBI Office Ron Heller April 5, 1988.  (Attachment A).  Request
 
was referred by the FBI without field investigation to the
 
U. S. Attorney's Office in Los Angeles.  This office, following
 
the disinclination of the FBI to investigate, professed
 
disinterest.  Plaintiff Henson was informed of "declined to
 
prosecute" decision of U. S. Attorney's office via telephone by
 
Mr. Heller.  With advice from the other plaintiffs, Henson
 
responded to Mr. Heller (Attachment B) and also wrote Michael
 
Emick, Chief of Criminal Complaints, U. S. Attorney's Office,
 
Los Angeles, California on April 25. (Attachment C).
 
      In a subsequent telephone call, Mr. Emick's assistant Mr.
 
Medrano promised a letter would be sent to Plaintiff Henson
 
supporting claim by U.S. Attorney's office that provisions of
 
the Electronic Communication Privacy Act were not violated, or
 
providing other reason(s) for declining prosecution.  In spite
 
of attempts through Representative Norman M. Mineta and Senator
 
Pete Wilson (Attachments D, E, & F), and follow-up phone calls,
 
no substantive response to plaintiff's complaint re the
 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 has been received
 
to the date of filing, from an FBI or Justice Department
 
representative (Attachments G, H, & I).
 
                         JURISDICTION
 
      2.  This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant
 
to U.S.C. 28, Sections 2201, 1331, and 1346.
 
                            PARTIES
 
      3.  Plaintiffs H. KEITH HENSON, THOMAS K. DONALDSON and
 
ROGER E. GREGORY are citizens of the United States, residents
 
of Santa Clara County, and were current users of electronic
 
 
COMPLAINT                      2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
mail service provided by Alcor Life Extension Foundation on
 
January 12, 1988.
 
      4.  Named defendants are agencies and employees of the
 
Government of the United States.
 
                  CLASS ACTIONS ALLEGATIONS
 
      5.  Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action
 
pursuant to Rule 23 (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
 
Procedure on behalf of themselves and the other users of
 
electronic mail who had their correspondence stored in this
 
computer.  There are between 50 and 100 people in this class.
 
Some of them are not California residents, and at least one of
 
them is a citizen of another country.  All are entitled to
 
protection under the provisions of the Electronic Communication
 
Privacy Act.  A comprehensive list of the members of this class
 
cannot be obtained until the computer in which the list resides
 
has been returned.
 
      An additional class is all users of electronic mail
 
in the United States who are entitled to privacy and Fourth
 
Amendment protection via the enforcement of the provisions of
 
this Act.  This last class is so numerous as to make the
 
joinder of all members of the class completely impracticable.
 
However, due to the unique nature of the class, notification
 
of, and email replies from, a substantial fraction of this
 
class could be accomplished economically by posting notice
 
on the computer networks.  Eleven thousand people are reported
 
to read the Usenet news group "misc.legal."  Plaintiffs will
 
offer the widespread members of this class an opportunity to
 
join the action if instructed to do so by the Court.
 
 
COMPLAINT                      3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                             FACTS
 
      6.  On or about January 12, 1988 certain law enforcement
 
agents (coroner's deputies) obtained and executed a warrant to
 
remove computers and related equipment from Alcor Life
 
Extension Foundation at 12327 Doherty St., Riverside, CA 92503.
 
(Attachment J)
 
      7.  One of these computers and a small number of
 
removable disks contained plaintiffs' electronic communications
 
as they are defined in the Electronic Communication Privacy
 
Act.
 
      8.  Law enforcement agencies in Riverside have prevented
 
authorized access to plaintiffs' electronic mail.  An unknown
 
number of law enforcement personnel from the Coroner's Office,
 
the District Attorney's Office, and the Riverside City Police
 
have obtained plaintiffs' electronic communications in
 
electronic storage, and have prevented authorized access to
 
these communications, without Court orders or warrants which
 
would exempt them from the punitive provisions of Title 18,
 
Section 2701(b).
 
      9.  The warrant used to remove the computer and prevent
 
authorized access to Plaintiff's electronic mail did not meet
 
the provisions of Title 18, Section 2703.  In particular, no
 
warrants were issued which provide for the disclosure or
 
sequestering of plaintiffs' (or any other) electronic mail.
 
      10.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Justice
 
Department have refused to either investigate or provide an
 
explanation for why the provisions of the Electronic
 
Communications Privacy Act do not apply.  Oral communications
 
 
COMPLAINT                      4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
with these agencies have produced the verbal argument that a
 
search warrant issued against a computer used for electronic
 
mail is equivalent to a search warrant issued against a post
 
office, where all mail within the walls of a post office could
 
be opened and read.  Plaintiffs' counter arguments that such a
 
warrant would be similar to a "writ of assistance," and that
 
the Fourth Amendment requires "particularly describing" were
 
dismissed as frivolous.
 
      11.  Repeated efforts to resolve these issues through
 
administrative channels have failed.  This matter has been
 
brought to the attention of this Court only after numerous
 
attempts have been made to obtain a substantive reply as to why
 
clear provisions of the law were deemed not applicable by the
 
FBI and Justice Department.
 
                          DISCUSSION
 
      12.  A substantial part of the reason Congress enacted
 
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 was to
 
balance Fourth Amendment protection for users of electronic
 
mail with the needs of law enforcement agents to access this
 
rapidly growing new form of communications.  The Justice
 
Department testified at length to avoid the cumbersome
 
provisions of Court orders needed for telephone taps.  Congress
 
went along with the Justice Department and made the seizing of
 
electronic mail by law enforcement agents similar in procedure
 
to that required for seizing first class mail, that is,
 
dependent on a Rule 41 search warrant, or similar State
 
warrant.  (See quotes of James Knapp, then Deputy Assistant
 
Attorney General, in Attachment C.)
 
 
COMPLAINT                      5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Testimony before the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil
 
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice makes it clear
 
that Congress was concerned about law enforcement agencies
 
abusing the Fourth Amendment rights of people who use
 
electronic mail.  This is evidenced by testimony about the
 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act by Senator Leahy before
 
the House Subcommittee on September 26, 1985:
 
    "There is no adequate legal protection against the
 
unauthorized access of electronic communications system
 
computers to obtain or alter the communications contained in
 
those computers.
 
   . . . .
 
     "Our bill . . . will help protect private communications
 
from interception by an eavesdropper, whether the eavesdropper
 
is a corporate spy, a police officer without probable cause, or
 
just a plain snoop."
 
     The House and Senate Subcommittees wrote into the law only
 
a few exceptions from punishing someone who:
 
    ". . . intentionally accesses without authorization a
 
facility through which electronic communication service is
 
provided; or intentionally exceeds an authorization to access
 
that facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents
 
authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while
 
it is in electronic storage . . . ."
 
     In the case at hand, plaintiffs argue that the coroner's
 
deputies either had no authorization, or exceeded what they
 
had.  It is certain that they obtained the email of a number of
 
people, including plaintiffs, uncertain as to their altering
 
 
COMPLAINT                      6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
it, and certain that authorized access to plaintiffs' email has
 
been prevented for the past 11 months.
 
     Exceptions are provided by the Act in Section 2703 for law
 
enforcement agencies to access electronic communications in
 
situations where they obtain a warrant.  To quote the relevant
 
section:
 
     "Requirements for governmental access
 
      (a) Contents of electronic communications in electronic
 
storage--A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a
 
provider of electronic communications services of the contents
 
of an electronic communication that is in electronic storage
 
for one hundred eighty days or less, only pursuant to a
 
warrant issued under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or
 
equivalent State warrant" (emphasis added).
 
     The requirements for such a warrant were spelled out by
 
James Knapp in his testimony:  "The affidavit and judicial
 
authorization should sufficiently specify the people
 
involved, . . ." (emphasis added).
 
     The requirement to name "the people involved" places no
 
burden on the law enforcement agency seeking a warrant.  In
 
situations (such as this one) where the names of the people
 
with stored electronic communications are not known to the law
 
enforcement agency prior to executing the search warrant and
 
examining the computer files, John Does 1-1000 could be named
 
and an amended warrant filed after the names were extracted
 
from the computer.
 
     The plaintiffs are not aware of any warrants, even John
 
Doe warrants, which have been issued against their electronic
 
 
COMPLAINT                      7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
communications; it seems clear that our private electronic
 
communications were seized and the provider of electronic
 
communication services (Alcor) was forced to disclose the
 
contents of private email without a warrant.
 
     Law enforcement agencies, in particular the FBI, have
 
orally supported two lines of reasoning for legally seizing and
 
denying access to our electronic communications without a
 
warrant.
 
     1)  The law enforcement agents who seized the computer on
 
which our electronic communications were stored did not know
 
that there was contained email--despite the fact that the
 
agents had to unhook the computer from the phone lines.
 
     2)  A warrant against the provider of the electronic
 
communication service to seize the computer on which our email
 
was stored is sufficient to seize and examine any electronic
 
communications stored within that computer.
 
       If this were the case, Congress would have provided an
 
exemption for seizing the computers on which electronic mail is
 
stored.  Since they did not, such an exemption will have to be
 
provided by the Courts, or found to be an error in the FBI's
 
interpretation of the law.
 
      It is easy to understand the reluctance of one law
 
enforcement agency to investigate another, especially in the
 
small-town, close working conditions of Riverside.  But if the
 
FBI will not protect the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens
 
from over-zealous local officials who violate the privacy of
 
electronic communications, who will?
 
 
 
 
COMPLAINT                      8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                            PRAYER
 
      WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs and the classes they seek to
 
represent in this action respectfully pray that this Court
 
enter judgment against defendants:
 
       a) That the FBI be ordered by this Court to investigate
 
fully the circumstances herein described involving electronic
 
mail sequestered by law enforcement agents in Riverside County;
 
      b) That the U. S. Attorney's office be ordered to either
 
file charges based on the results of the FBI determination of
 
the facts involved, or forthwith provide legal argument
 
acceptable to this Court as to the non-applicability of Title
 
18, Section 2701 et seq. to this case;
 
     c) Plaintiffs' expenses;
 
     d) Other relief such as the Court may deem appropriate.
 
Dated:  December 9, 1988                H. KEITH HENSON
 
 
 
 
                                        THOMAS K. DONALDSON
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         ROGER E. GREGORY
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMPLAINT                      9
 
 
 
 


(Attachments to Henson, Donaldson, and Gregory lawsuit)



                                    H. Keith Henson     

                                  1794 Cardel Way     

                                  San Jose, CA  95124     

                                  408-978-7616    

 

April 5, 1988     



Ron Heller, Supervisor      

Federal Bureau of Investigation     

P.O. Box 2317     

Riverside, CA  92516     



Dear Mr. Heller:     



Please excuse the delay in getting this material to you per our telephone
conversation of last month.  My background is in engineering, and, though I
have had experience in space law and international human rights, it took
some time for me to acquire sufficient understanding of the law in this
area to make a clear statement.     

      

I believe a serious Federal crime has been committed against me and     

several others by certain members of the Riverside County Coroner's
Office.  The statute involved is Title 18, Section 2701, otherwise
referenced as Chapter 121, "Stored Wire and Electronic Communications
and Transactional Records Access." (1986)  The criminal act was the
removing of a computer (specifically a Toshiba T300 with a green screen
monitor, a Xebec 10 Mbyte hard disk and a modem) used for electronic mail
from the Alcor Life Extension Foundation at 12327 Doherty St., in
Riverside on January 12 of this year, subsequently preventing authorized
access, and (probably) accessing stored electronic mail files on that
computer, all without a warrant.  I have apprised various members of the
coroner's office of the use and content of this particular computer and of
the Federal law involved.  They seem to have no concern about the legality
of their activities.     



Subsection (a) of 2701, except as provided in subsection (c), details the
offence: intentionally accessing an electronic mail facility without
authorization, or intentionally exceeding an authorization to access that
facility and thereby obtaining or preventing authorized access to a wire or
electronic communication.     



Subsection (c) provides three exceptions for authorized access.  Points 1
and 2 under that sub-subsection do not apply, as the coroner's office
neither provides electronic communication service, nor are they the
intended recipient of the electronic mail in question.  Point 3 list three
statutes under which law enforcement officials can obtain authorization
to access stored electronic mail.  Of these, section 2518 is the standard      



Ron Heller                                      Page 2                         
April 5, 1988     



wire tap regulations.  As far as I know, the coroner's office has not
obtained a court order which would allow wire tapping or access to my
electronic mail.     



Section 2704 provides for forcing service providers to make backups of
electronic mail, (with a warrant) and does not seem applicable either.     

       

Section 2703 provides for only one way for law enforcement agencies to
access electronic mail stored less than 180 days: a warrant issued under
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or an equivalent State warrant.  I
do not believe that warrants of any kind have been issued which would
permit the coroner or his deputies access to my electronic mail on the
Alcor computer system.  If warrants to this effect have been issued, I have
not been informed of them.     

      

While the coroner's office has been engaged in an investigation, this is no
excuse for a law enforcement agency to break laws by failing to obtain a
valid warrant.  My reading of the law, and the legislative history behind it,
leads me to believe that this particular episode of Fourth Amendment
abuse is exactly what Congress had in mind to prevent when it passed
Chapter 121.      

      

The loss of this computer and our other computers has cause Alcor a great
deal of difficulty.  (This may have been the primary reason they were
taken.)  Alcor and its members need the computer in question to be
returned to us and put back in service if this is possible.  I would like the
computer and related equipment returned to Alcor rather than the FBI
holding it as evidence.  Alcor could make printed copies of the directories
and "userlist" to be preserved as evidence.     



Please let me know if I have made errors in either my reasoning or the
events I have described.  I will be happy to provide your office with
background on any aspects of this matter about which I have knowledge.      



Sincerely,     

      

H. Keith Henson     



cc C. Ashworth     



PS  I hear the investigation has been turned over to the Riverside Police
Department.  You might warn them so *they* don't run afoul of Federal
Law.     



Enc.  Title 18 USC Sections 2701-2710     



                              ATTACHMENT A    

--------------------------------------

                                    H. Keith Henson     

                                  1794 Cardel Way     

                                  San Jose, CA  95124     

                                  408-978-7616     

    

April 22, 1988   

    

Ron Heller   

Federal Bureau of Investigation   

P.O. Box 2317   

Riverside, CA  92516   

    

Dear Mr. Heller:   

    

I was astounded at the refusal of the FBI to even make minimal   

inquiry into a citizen`s complaint of a clear violation of a   

Federal law. Your advice that I take my complaints to Riverside   

County is hard to fathom; to the best of my knowledge, the county   

has no laws regarding intercepting electronic mail.   

    

Your argument that having an unrelated warrant to take a computer   

permits interception of the electronic mail of all people who   

were using that computer would (I think) generate great concern   

among the staff and members of the House Committee on the Judi-   

ciary which held extensive hearing on this law only two years   

ago.   

    

Your reluctance to investigate another law enforcement agency is   

understandable, but if the federal government won`t protect citi-   

zens from local officials who break Federal laws and violate our   

Fourth Amendment rights, who will?   

    

Sincerely,   

    

H. Keith Henson   

    

HKH:al   

    

cc:  John R. Bolton, Asst. Attorney General   

     Rep. George Brown   

     Michael Emick, U. S. Attorney   

     Rep. Hamilton Fish, Jr.   

     Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier   

     James Knapp, Asst. Attorney General   

     Rep. N. Mineta   

     Rep. Carlos J. Moorhead   

     Sen. Pete Wilson   

    

                               ATTACHMENT B   

    

   ----------------------------------



(KH Letterhead)



April 25, 1988  

   

Michael Emick  

Chief of Criminal Complaints  

U.S. Attorney's Office  

312 N. Spring St.  

Los Angeles, CA  90012  

   

Dear Mr. Emick:  

   

This letter is to complain about the refusal of the FBI office in  

Riverside to investigate a clear violation of Federal law.  

   

Mr. Heller did not pass on the enclosed letter to Alka Sagar of  

your office, and she had no recollection Monday of his verbal  

arguments for the FBI's inaction.  

   

I looked into the legislative history of the particular House  

Bill which eventually became law and found that James Knapp (who  

was then Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,  

and has since moved to a higher position in the Justice Depart-  

ment) had a number of things to say about the impending legisla-  

tion. He was particularly interested in forstalling the need for  

court orders to obtain access to stored electronic communica-  

tions. I quote from his written testimony of March 5, 1986  

before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the  

Administration of Justice:  

   

  "The authorization to intercept the communications should be  

accomplished by a statute mandating a judicial authorization  

based on probable cause akin to that which can now be secured  

with a Fourth Amendment search warrant pursuant to Rule 41 of the  

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This procedure is based on  

the premise that the interception of electronic mail generally  

should be accorded no more protection than that accorded to  

regular mail. At the present time regular mail can be seized  

with a Rule 41 search warrant. . . .  

   

  "The search warrant . . . should be based on a sworn affidavit  

establishing probable cause to believe that a crime has been, is  

being or is about to be committed. The affidavit and judicial  

authorization should sufficiently specify the people involved,  

the facility in question, the specific offenses involved, and the  

type of information sought to be intercepted. . . ."  

   

Congress went along with the Justice Department in requiring  

search warrants rather than the more cumbersome court orders,  

with the understanding that they would watch for abuse.  

   

   

Michael Emick             -2-                    April 25, 1988  

   

   

Now in the case at hand, there was a search warrant, but it was  

clearly inadaquate to seize electronic mail since it was directed  

to the computer rather than its contents and the people who put  

the contents into it.  

   

The correct analogy according to Mr. Knapp's testimony would be a  

search warrant obtained against a private postal service in which  

all mail in private boxes was confiscated, opened, and read.  

   

The search warrant under which the computer was taken was based  

on incredible half-truth distortions, and simply irrelevent  

information. For example, the prime item presented under oath to  

the judge who issued the warrant was verbal testimony about a  

copy of a receipt for equipment sold to UCLA, shipped to a  

Florida address, and authorized by an Alcor officer who works at  

UCLA. In the first place, the coroner's office has no business  

investigating theft. If they found something suspicious in the  

course of other investigation, they should have turned it over to  

the police. In the second place, *taped to the front of that  

invoice was a canceled check on the officer's account for the  

full amount on the invoice.* If this isn't perjury, it skates  

within a hair of it.  

   

This may seem to be an unpopular cause to the FBI, but this is  

the first time (to my knowledge) that a law enforcement agency  

has violated the provisions of this law. As a result, there is a  

great deal of interest by a number of people in the electronic  

mail industry. If local law enforcement officials demonstrate  

that they can get away with ignoring this law, there may be  

considerable pressure on Congress to require more stringent  

provisions for law enforcement agencies to obtain access to  

electronic communications.  

   

If you have any questions, please give me a call.  

   

   

Sincerely,  

   

   

H. Keith Henson  

   

HKH:al  

   

cc:  Christopher Ashworth, Esq.  

   

                                ATTACHMENT C  



------------------------------

   

 (KH  Lettterhead)  



 April 25, 1988  

   

Representative Norman Mineta  

13th District  

1245 S. Winchester Blvd., Suite 310  

San Jose, Ca 95128  

   

Attention:  Dorene Giacopini  

   

Dear Representative Mineta:  

   

I am writing to ask you to intercede with the FBI on behalf of  

myself and two other San Jose constituents, Thomas K. Donaldson  

and Roger Gregory. We believe a Federal Law, Section 2701, et  

seq. of Title 18, was broken by local law enforcement officials in  

Southern California. We would like you to make a request of the  

FBI that they determine if this is true, and if it is, ask the  

U.S. Attorney to file charges.  

   

All of us used (and paid for through membership fees) an elec-  

tronic mail facility owned by the Alcor Life Extension Founda-  

tion. On January 12 of this year, the computer containing our  

confidential personal communications was seized by the coroner`s  

office in Riverside under a warrant issued against Alcor and  

obtained on the basis of gross distortions. Regardless of the  

validity of this warrant, <2703 requires a warrant naming the  

individual whose mail is to be seized, and stating probable cause  

as to the need to invade the individual`s privacy. No warrants  

have been issued which would permit these officials to access or  

deny us access to our electronic mail.  

   

The FBI is understandably reluctant to investigate a fellow law  

enforcement agency. In my first telephone conversation with Ron  

Heller he strongly discouraged me from complaining. While it may  

have been inadvertent, his office lost my first letter (sent by  

Express Mail), did not pass on the enclosed letter to the U.S.  

Attorney`s office, and suggested (when he called after 5PM last  

Friday) that my only recourse is to the same local officials who  

have violated the law.  

   

The cited section of law, the Electronic Communications Privacy  

Act of 1986, and the cases which develop from it are of great  

interest in Silicon Valley, where the local volume of electronic  

mail may be approaching that of First Class mail. There is a  

considerable interest expressed by several computer publications  

in the case. I can direct the reporters who are calling me to  

your office if you wish.  

   

Sincerely,  

   

   

H. Keith Henson  

   

HKH:al  

   

                                ATTACHMENT D  



---------------------------------



(KH letterhead)  



April 25, 1988  



Senator Pet Wilson  

2040 Ferry Building  

San Francisco, CA  94111  



Attention: Lisa Nauman  



Dear Senator Wilson:  



(body same as Attachment D)  



                  ATTACHMENT E  



---------------------------------



(KH  Letterhead)  



July 31, 1988  

   

Representative Norman Mineta  

13th District  

1245 S. Winchester Blvd., Suite 310  

San Jose, Ca 95128  

   

Dear Representative Mineta:  

   

Thank you for pursuing an inquiry for me into the FBI's disinter-  

est in an apparent violation of the Electronic Communication Pri-  

vacy Act, and for forwarding a copy of Mr. Floyd Clark's letter.  

   

In that letter of June 3, the FBI excused their unwillingness to  

investigate because the US Attorney declined prosecution. Alka  

Sagar, the US Attorney in Los Angeles who Mr. Heller told me had  

made the decision to decline prosecution, based her decision  

entirely on a short telephone conversation with FBI represen-  

tative Mr. Heller. When I contacted her on the Monday after Mr.  

Heller told me that no investigation was going to be made, she  

told me that my letter to the FBI had not been forwarded.  She  

could not remember either the subject or the reason for declining  

prosecution. If I could speculate on the conversation, Mr. Heller  

may have told her he had a case he did not want to work on, and  

her response may have been something like "Well, if you don't  

want to work on it, the U.S. Attorney isn't interested." This is  

hardly an independent evaluation of the merits of my complaint.  

   

I then wrote to Michael Emick,  Ms. Sagar's boss. He is Chief  of  

Criminal  Complaints  for  the  U.S.  Attorney's  Office  in  Los  

Angeles. One  of Mr.  Emick's  assistants called  a week  or  two  

later  and told me that virtually no cases except those involving  

large amounts  of cocaine  are  being accepted  for  prosecution,  

regardless of the merits.  I have received no written response to  

my letter of April 25 to date (copy enclosed).  

   

There may be a need  for remedial legislation on electronic  pri-  

vacy.  Mr. Heller, a San Jose  FBI agent, and two representatives  

of the District Attorney's office  in Riverside all believe  that  

the requirements for obtaining warrants against individuals found  

in 1986 law can  be safely ignored if  a warrant can be  obtained  

against  the  computer on  which the  electronic mail  is stored.  

They use the analogy  that if they obtained  a warrant against  a  

Post  Office, they could open and read any mail they found within  

the walls of  the Post  Office. I doubt  this was  the intent  of  



Representative Norman Mineta   -2-                 July 31, 1988  

   

Congress, but if it was, the fact would be of great interest in  

this area.  

   

In his closing sentence, Mr.  Clark recommends that I contact  an  

attorney  to see what civil remedies  are available to me. I have  

already contacted  several.  I find  that  while there  are  pro-  

visions  (Section 2707) for  civil actions at  law, they are use-  

less. If a  jury found  that my  privacy rights  had indeed  been  

violated,  I  could  be  awarded  $1,000.  The  attorneys  I have  

contacted tell me that  the case could be  made, and likely  won,  

but  the cost to do so would  start at $100,000 and range upwards  

of $500,000.  

   

If this  were an  isolated incident,  I would  feel better  about  

ignoring  the decay  of civil rights  in this  area. But recently  

Riverside county officials  used a search  warrant to  confiscate  

television news tapes in violation of federal and state laws pro-  

tecting freedom of the  press.  Limits on law enforcement activi-  

ties  are as important  as limits on criminals.  Although it is a  

lot of trouble for a citizen  to oppose high handed law  enforce-  

ment agents, it has to be done to prevent the loss of our rights.  

   

I  would appreciate your inquiring of the Justice Department what  

reasoning they used  to decline enforcing  the law Congress  made  

regarding  electronic communications. Perhaps  they would respond  

to a letter from you  in less than three  months. I know you  are  

sensitive  to  shortcuts in due process, and I could use your ad-  

vice on what, if anything, I should do.  

   

Sincerely,  

   

H. Keith Henson  

   

HKH:al  

   

                              ATTACHMENT F  

  

-----------------------------------

  

U.S. Department of Justice 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Wahsington, DC  20535 

  

June 27, 1988 

  

Honorable Pete Wilson 

United States Senator 

2040 Ferry Building 

San Francisco, California  94111 

  

Dear Senator Wilson: 

  

     Your May 18th inquiry of the Department of Justice on behalf 

of Mr. H. Keith Henson has been referred to FBI Headquarters. 

  

     Mr. Henson's concerns have been reviewed both here and by 

our Los Angeles Office.  The facts have been presented to the 

United States Attorney's Office and prosecution was declined. 

Mr. Henson has been advised of the declination and that our 

investigation is closed. 

  

     It has been suggested to Mr. Henson that he contact an 

attorney of his choice to pursue possible civil remedies 

available to him. 

  

                              Sincerely yours, 

  

                              (signed) 

  

                              Floyd I. Clarke 

                              Assistant Director 

                              Criminal Investigative Division 

  

                          ATTACHMENT G 

  

--------------------------------



U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of Legislative Affairs 

Office of the Assistant Attorney General 

Washington, DC  20530 

  

04 NOV 1988  (stamped date) 

  

Honorable Norman Y. Mineta 

U.S. House of Representatives 

1245 South Winchester Blvd., Suite 310 

San Jose, California  95128 

  

ATTN:  Dorene M. Giacopini 

       Field Representative 

  

Dear Congressman Mineta: 

  

     This is in response to your letter dated September 22, 1988, 

on behalf of your constituent H. Keith Henson. 

  

     The Unites States Attorney's office for the Central District 

of California considered twice whether prosecution was warranted, 

taking into account the information provided by Mr. Henson. 

However, there is no competent evidence upon which to base a 

federal prosecution. 

  

     Since Mr. Henson's letter addresses a matter courrently 

being prosecuted by the State of California, this office 

recommends that you refer Mr. Henson's inquiry to the District 

Attorney's office, Los Angeles, California. 

  

  

                                    Sincerely, 

  

                                    (signed) 

  

                                    Thomas M. Boyd 

                             (for)  Assistant Attorney General 

  

                          ATTACHMENT H 

  

------------------------------



(KH  Letterhead)  

  

November 9, 1988 

  

Thomas M. Boyd 

Assistant Attorney General 

Office of the Assistant Attorney General 

Washington, DC  20530 

  

Dear Mr. Boyd: 

  

Representative Norman Mineta passed on your undated letter to me 

responding to his letter of September 22, 1988. 

  

It is a violation of federal law (Title 18, Section 2701 et seq.) 

to seize a person's electronic mail without a warrant against the 

person's mail. My  electronic mail was  seized without a  warrant 

being  sought against it. Could you  tell me how these simple-to- 

determine facts fail to provide  "competent evidence on which  to 

base  a federal prosecution." Could  you tell me what constitutes 

"competent evidence" or provide a reference? 

  

Could you clarify the last paragraph of your letter.  To the best 

of  my knowledge  there is nothing  related to any  letter I have 

written which  is "currently  being prosecuted  by the  State  of 

California" by the District Attorney's office in Los Angeles.  If 

there is, this would be of intense concern. 

  

Sincerely 

  

H. Keith Henson 

  

HKH:al 

  

cc Representative Norman Y. Mineta 



           ATTACHMENT I 

  

-----------------------------



COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

  

SEARCH WARRANT 

  

          (boilerplate, description of place to be searched) 

  

 . . . for the following property: 

  

1.  All electronic storage devices, capable of storing, 

electronic data regarding the above records, including magnetic 

tapes, disc (floppy or hard), and the complete hardware necessary 

to retrieve electronic data including CPU (Central Processing 

Unit), CRT (viewing screen, disc or tape drive(s), printer, 

software and service manuals for operation of the said computer, 

together with all handwritten notes or printed material 

describing the operation of the computers.  (See Exhibit A - 

Search Warrant No. 1, property to be seized #1) 

  

2   Human body parts identifiable as belonging to the deceased, 

Dora Kent. 

  

3   Narcotics, controlled substances and other drugs subject to 

regulation by the Drug Enforcement Administration. 

  

  

(more boilerplate, signiture of Judge) 

  

  

           ATTACHMENT J