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I began my philosophy of dialectical naturalism by being very inspired
by the philosophy of mind that John McDowell developed in his John
Locke Lectures in the 90s, and published in book form in Mind and
World.
McDowell is first a Wittgensteinian quietist, and a Hegelian second. I
am a Hegelian, and in no way a Wittgensteinian. So the message that I
lifted from *Mind and World* is one that is at odds with McDowell's
philosophy.
McDowell only figures concepts that humans understand and possess to
inhabit the Fregean level of 'sense'. I take it to mean that concepts
are situated in the level of 'reference'. So when McDowell takes it to
mean that concepts are, fundamentally, ephemeral human constructions
that do not actually inhabit the objective world, I disagree. I am a
strong conceptual realist. I hold that concepts are objects that exist
in the world whether or not humans existed, and whether or not humans
are aware about them.
I also differ from McDowell in my characterisation of what a concept
is. McDowell accepts some of Kant's story, only some of Hegel's story,
and parts of Aristotle when dealing with concepts. On the whole,
McDowell is a Kantian about conceptsâhe pictures them to be
mentalistic relationships that help humans make judgements. I do not
agree with this either. I take a concept to be an Aristotelian
Hegelian concept. That is, it is the objective or actual expression of
some essence. It is something's formal-final cause. In this way, I do
not admit of concepts as mentalistic objects. This has an important
effect on the theory of truth that this philosophy espouses. Truth and
reality are not foundationalist. Truths and facts are not atomic,
static blocks that are either 'all' or 'nothing' about their validity
and soundness.
In this way, foundationalism treats 'truth' and 'reality' as
interchangeable labels. I make a distinction between truth and
realness. I admit that everything is real, or, as McDowell says, a
fact is something that is the case, and that the world is a totality
of facts, but, I say some things are more true that others.
What makes something more true than something else? The more perfectly
is expresses its essence. Something with totally expresses its essence
is perfectly true. So, for me, as it does not for McDowell, a concept
is also teleological: hence it is a formal-final cause of an object.
But, apart from these differences, I am very inspired by the story
that McDowell tells in *Mind and World*: The mind is divided into two
sorts of processes when judgements about the world. These sorts of
relationships explain how we are perfectly in touch with the
world. This is a direct realist theory of mind. Elsewhere, people have
labelled this theory of mind as a âconduit theory of experienceâ. To
my mind, this moniker is accurate. This is not a representationalist
theory of experienceâit is an 'identity' theory of experience.
An 'identity' theory of experience does not picture the mind as
mirroring or copying the content about the world when it is
experiencing. This is normally how theories of mind are
expounded. Instead, the content of the world directly figures directly
in the mind.
The first process that the mind possesses in order to be perfectly in
touch with the world is the faculty of sensibility, and the second the
faculty of spontaneity.
Sensibility takes the content of the world that it experiences and
delivers it up to spontaneity. Sensibility is completely uncritical
and passive with respect to the content of the world. It is the
faculty of spontaneity which forms (what Kant would call) judgements
about the world.
So, I admit of the Kantian philosophy of mind: I view the mind as
being divided into Receptivity and Spontaneity.
However, unlike McDowell, I do not leave any ambiguities about whether
or not this explanation is dualistic. I take it that what the
Sellarsian philosophers call the 'space of reasons' to extend all the
way down to the level of sensibility.
This, for me, means that the world is enchanted with meaning and value
in the sense that McDowell derides in *Mind and World*: there is meaning
in the fall of a sparrow as there is in a book.
Let me pause for a moment, and explain why I take this to be true,
before discussing its highly attractive political implications.
McDowell seems to be happy saying that the 'space of concepts' extends
into sensibility, but not the space of reasons. Only the faculty of
spontaneity inhabits the space of reasons.
I think this explanation, which has to be gleaned from a close textual
interpretation and logical reconstruction of McDowell's ideas in Mind
and World, means McDowell's philosophy is ultimately dualist, and if
we are to keep what we like about McDowell's theory of mindâwhich is
that the world is imbued with meaning.
McDowell is seated somewhere between a Humean and a Kantian on the
question of what it exactly means to have a disenchanted experience of
the world at the level of sense-data, and an enchanted and rational
one at the level of conceptual articulation.
A Humean fully accepts what McDowell calls the 'Myth of the
Given'. This is that human experience of the world is deterministic
and completely disenchanted. Humeans structure the logical categories
of the Sellarsians in this way:
First, the space of nature, which is identical with the realm of
scientific intelligibility. Then, the space of reasons is a
subcategory of scientific intelligibility. So, Humeans are
naturalists.
Kantians are anti-naturalists. They accept that the space of nature is
indeed vacated of any meaning, but that there is more that is real
than just the space of nature. Kantians are dualists about truth. We
might image that they speak of the 'space of the real', of which the
space of reasons and the realm of scientific intelligibility are
cohabitants.
I do not like either of these stories, and I do not like McDowell's
either. McDowell pictures the 'space of concepts' as a superset of the
space of reasons. So, if we understand McDowell correctly, there are
meaningful concepts, and concepts which are devoid of meaning. In this
way, the space of nature is the home to both the realm of natural
scientific intelligibility, and the space of reasons as well.
I take this to still be a dualism. The picture that I prefer is that
the space of reasons is identical with the space of nature.
The political implications of (what I call) this philosophy of
dialectical naturalism is that humans can perceive moral facts in the
same way as they can experience epistemic facts. If it is true that
there are moral facts with the same alethic properties as epistemic
facts, then it follows that there must be a good or a right way for
humans to live.
Ultimately, I am, with this above metaphysics, interested in
constructing a philosophy of objective morality. This account of
morality is a virtue ethical account. The broad aim of my project is
to produce a list of virtues about how the social ecology of humans
should be structured. The list of virtues I will produce apply to
humans both individually and collectively. The social system that my
philosophy outlines is a communist one. I aim to demonstrate that the
organisation of human life around the âneeds principleâ is the morally
objectively correct way to live.
I argue that organising the totality of human life around âfrom each
according to their ability, to each according to their needâ provides
the best way for humans to flourish.