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Network Working Group R. Housley
Request for Comments: 3560 Vigil Security
Category: Standards Track July 2003
Use of the RSAES-OAEP Key Transport Algorithm in
the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Status of this Memo
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This document describes the conventions for using the RSAES-OAEP key
transport algorithm with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). The
CMS specifies the enveloped-data content type, which consists of an
encrypted content and encrypted content-encryption keys for one or
more recipients. The RSAES-OAEP key transport algorithm can be used
to encrypt content-encryption keys for intended recipients.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Enveloped-data Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. EnvelopedData Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. KeyTransRecipientInfo Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. RSAES-OAEP Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters. . . . . . . . 4
4. Certificate Conventions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. SMIMECapabilities Attribute Conventions. . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Security Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. IANA Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Intellectual Property Rights Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
10.1. Normative References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
10.2. Informative References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Housley Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 3560 RSAES-OAEP in CMS July 2003
1. Introduction
PKCS #1 Version 1.5 [PKCS#1v1.5] specifies a widely deployed variant
of the RSA key transport algorithm. PKCS #1 Version 1.5 key
transport is vulnerable to adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks,
especially when it is used to for key management in interactive
applications. This attack is often referred to as the "Million
Message Attack," and it explained in [RSALABS] and [CRYPTO98].
Exploitation of this vulnerability, which reveals the result of a
particular RSA decryption, requires access to an oracle which will
respond to hundreds of thousands of ciphertexts, which are
constructed adaptively in response to previously received replies
that provide information on the successes or failures of attempted
decryption operations.
The attack is significantly less feasible in store-and-forward
environments, such as S/MIME. RFC 3218 [MMA] discussed the
countermeasures to this attack that are available when PKCS #1
Version 1.5 key transport is used in conjunction with the
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [CMS].
When PKCS #1 Version 1.5 key transport is applied as an intermediate
encryption layer within an interactive request-response
communications environment, exploitation could be more feasible.
However, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) [SSL] and Transport Layer
Security (TLS) [TLS] protocol implementations could include
countermeasures that detect and prevent the Million Message Attack
and other chosen-ciphertext attacks. These countermeasures are
performed within the protocol level.
In the interest of long-term security assurance, it is prudent to
adopt an improved cryptographic technique rather than embedding
countermeasures within protocols. To this end, an updated version of
PKCS #1 has been published. PKCS #1 Version 2.1 [PKCS#1v2.1]
supersedes RFC 2313. It preserves support for the PKCS #1 Version
1.5 encryption padding format, and it also defines a new one. To
resolve the adaptive chosen ciphertext vulnerability, the PKCS #1
Version 2.1 specifies and recommends use of Optimal Asymmetric
Encryption Padding (OAEP) for RSA key transport.
This document specifies the use of RSAES-OAEP key transport algorithm
in the CMS. The CMS can be used in either a store-and-forward or an
interactive request-response environment.
Housley Standards Track [Page 2]
RFC 3560 RSAES-OAEP in CMS July 2003
The CMS supports variety of architectures for certificate-based key
management, particularly the one defined by the PKIX working group
[PROFILE]. PKCS #1 Version 1.5 and PKCS #1 Version 2.1 require the
same RSA public key information. Thus, a certified RSA public key
may be used with either RSA key transport technique.
The CMS uses ASN.1 [X.208-88], the Basic Encoding Rules (BER)
[X.209-88], and the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X.509-88].
Throughout this document, when the terms "MUST", "MUST NOT",
"SHOULD", and "MAY" are used in capital letters, their use conforms
to the definitions in RFC 2119 [STDWORDS]. These key word
definitions help make the intent of standards documents as clear as
possible. These key words are used in this document to help
implementers achieve interoperability.
2. Enveloped-data Conventions
The CMS enveloped-data content type consists of an encrypted content
and wrapped content-encryption keys for one or more recipients. The
RSAES-OAEP key transport algorithm is used to wrap the
content-encryption key for one recipient.
Compliant software MUST meet the requirements for constructing an
enveloped-data content type stated in [CMS] Section 6,
"Enveloped-data Content Type".
A content-encryption key MUST be randomly generated for each instance
of an enveloped-data content type. The content-encryption key is
used to encipher the content.
2.1. EnvelopedData Fields
The enveloped-data content type is ASN.1 encoded using the
EnvelopedData syntax. The fields of the EnvelopedData syntax MUST be
populated as described in this section when RSAES-OAEP key transport
is employed for one or more recipients.
The EnvelopedData version MUST be 0, 2, or 3.
The EnvelopedData originatorInfo field is not used for the RSAES-OAEP
key transport algorithm. However, this field MAY be present to
support recipients using other key management algorithms.
The EnvelopedData recipientInfos CHOICE MUST be
KeyTransRecipientInfo. See section 2.2 for further discussion of
KeyTransRecipientInfo.
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RFC 3560 RSAES-OAEP in CMS July 2003
The EnvelopedData encryptedContentInfo contentEncryptionAlgorithm
field MUST be a symmetric encryption algorithm identifier.
The EnvelopedData unprotectedAttrs MAY be present.
2.2. KeyTransRecipientInfo Fields
The fields of the KeyTransRecipientInfo syntax MUST be populated as
described in this section when RSAES-OAEP key transport is employed
for one or more recipients.
The KeyTransRecipientInfo version MUST be 0 or 2. If the
RecipientIdentifier uses the issuerAndSerialNumber alternative, then
the version MUST be 0. If the RecipientIdentifier uses the
subjectKeyIdentifier alternative, then the version MUST be 2.
The KeyTransRecipientInfo RecipientIdentifier provides two
alternatives for specifying the recipient's certificate, and thereby
the recipient's public key. The recipient's certificate MUST contain
a RSA public key. The content-encryption key is encrypted with the
recipient's RSA public key. The issuerAndSerialNumber alternative
identifies the recipient's certificate by the issuer's distinguished
name and the certificate serial number; the subjectKeyIdentifier
identifies the recipient's certificate by the X.509
subjectKeyIdentifier extension value.
The KeyTransRecipientInfo keyEncryptionAlgorithm specifies use of the
RSAES-OAEP algorithm, and its associated parameters, to encrypt the
content-encryption key for the recipient. The key-encryption process
is described in [PKCS#1v2.1]. See section 3 of this document for the
algorithm identifier and the parameter syntax.
The KeyTransRecipientInfo encryptedKey is the result of encrypting
the content-encryption key in the recipient's RSA public key using
the RSAES-OAEP algorithm. The RSA public key MUST be at least 1024
bits in length. When using a Triple-DES [3DES] content-encryption
key, implementations MUST adjust the parity bits to ensure odd parity
for each octet of each DES key comprising the Triple-DES key prior to
RSAES-OAEP encryption.
3. RSAES-OAEP Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters
The RSAES-OAEP key transport algorithm is the RSA encryption scheme
defined in RFC 3447 [PKCS#1v2.1], where the message to be encrypted
is the content-encryption key. The algorithm identifier for
RSAES-OAEP is:
Housley Standards Track [Page 4]
RFC 3560 RSAES-OAEP in CMS July 2003
id-RSAES-OAEP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 7 }
The AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field MUST be present, and the
parameters field MUST contain RSAES-OAEP-params. RSAES-OAEP-params
has the following syntax:
RSAES-OAEP-params ::= SEQUENCE {
hashFunc [0] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT sha1Identifier,
maskGenFunc [1] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT mgf1SHA1Identifier,
pSourceFunc [2] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT
pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier }
sha1Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= { id-sha1, NULL }
mgf1SHA1Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
{ id-mgf1, sha1Identifier }
pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
{ id-pSpecified, nullOctetString }
nullOctetString OCTET STRING (SIZE (0)) ::= { ''H }
id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) oiw(14)
secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 }
pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) }
id-mgf1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 8 }
id-pSpecified OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 9 }
The fields within RSAES-OAEP-params have the following meanings:
hashFunc identifies the one-way hash function. Implementations MUST
support SHA-1 [SHA1], and implementations MAY support other one-way
hash functions. The SHA-1 algorithm identifier is comprised of the
id-sha1 object identifier and a parameter of NULL. Implementations
that perform encryption MUST omit the hashFunc field when SHA-1 is
used, indicating that the default algorithm was used.
Implementations that perform decryption MUST recognize both the
id-sha1 object identifier and an absent hashFunc field as an
indication that SHA-1 was used.
Housley Standards Track [Page 5]
RFC 3560 RSAES-OAEP in CMS July 2003
maskGenFunc identifies the mask generation function. Implementations
MUST support MFG1 [PKCS#1v2.1]. MFG1 requires a one-way hash
function, and it is identified in the parameter field of the MFG1
algorithm identifier. Implementations MUST support SHA-1 [SHA1], and
implementations MAY support other one-way hash functions. The MFG1
algorithm identifier is comprised of the id-mgf1 object identifier
and a parameter that contains the algorithm identifier of the one-way
hash function employed with MFG1. The SHA-1 algorithm identifier is
comprised of the id-sha1 object identifier and a parameter of NULL.
Implementations that perform encryption MUST omit the maskGenFunc
field when MFG1 with SHA-1 is used, indicating that the default
algorithm was used. Implementations that perform decryption MUST
recognize both the id-mgf1 and id-sha1 object identifiers as well as
an absent maskGenFunc field as an indication that MFG1 with SHA-1 was
used.
pSourceFunc identifies the source (and possibly the value) of the
encoding parameters, commonly called P. Implementations MUST
represent P by the algorithm identifier, id-pSpecified, indicating
that P is explicitly provided as an OCTET STRING in the parameters.
The default value for P is an empty string. In this case, pHash in
EME-OAEP contains the hash of a zero length string. Implementations
MUST support a zero length P value. Implementations that perform
encryption MUST omit the pSourceFunc field when a zero length P value
is used, indicating that the default value was used. Implementations
that perform decryption MUST recognize both the id-pSpecified object
identifier and an absent pSourceFunc field as an indication that a
zero length P value was used.
4. Certificate Conventions
RFC 3280 [PROFILE] specifies the profile for using X.509 Certificates
in Internet applications. When a RSA public key will be used for
RSAES-OAEP key transport, the conventions specified in this section
augment RFC 3280.
Traditionally, the rsaEncryption object identifier is used to
identify RSA public keys. However, to implement all of the
recommendations described in the Security Considerations section of
this document (see section 6), the certificate user needs to be able
to determine the form of key transport that the RSA private key owner
associates with the public key.
The rsaEncryption object identifier continues to identify the subject
public key when the RSA private key owner does not wish to limit the
use of the public key exclusively to RSAES-OAEP. In this case, the
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RFC 3560 RSAES-OAEP in CMS July 2003
rsaEncryption object identifier MUST be used in the algorithm field
within the subject public key information, and the parameters field
MUST contain NULL.
rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1 }
Further discussion of the conventions associated with use of the
rsaEncryption object identifier can be found in RFC 3279 (see
[CERTALGS], section 2.3.1).
When the RSA private key owner wishes to limit the use of the public
key exclusively to RSAES-OAEP, then the id-RSAES-OAEP object
identifier MUST be used in the algorithm field within the subject
public key information, and the parameters field MUST contain
RSAES-OAEP-params. The id-RSAES-OAEP object identifier value and the
RSAES-OAEP-params syntax are fully described in section 3 of this
document.
Regardless of the object identifier used, the RSA public key is
encoded in the same manner in the subject public key information.
The RSA public key MUST be encoded using the type RSAPublicKey type:
RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
modulus INTEGER, -- n
publicExponent INTEGER } -- e
Here, the modulus is the modulus n, and publicExponent is the public
exponent e. The DER encoded RSAPublicKey is carried in the
subjectPublicKey BIT STRING within the subject public key
information.
The intended application for the key MAY be indicated in the key
usage certificate extension (see [PROFILE], section 4.2.1.3). If the
keyUsage extension is present in a certificate that conveys an RSA
public key with the id-RSAES-OAEP object identifier, then the key
usage extension MUST contain a combination of the following values:
keyEncipherment; and
dataEncipherment.
However, both keyEncipherment and dataEncipherment SHOULD NOT be
present.
When a certificate that conveys an RSA public key with the
id-RSAES-OAEP object identifier, the certificate user MUST only use
the certified RSA public key for RSAES-OAEP operations, and the
certificate user MUST perform those operations using the parameters
identified in the certificate.
Housley Standards Track [Page 7]
RFC 3560 RSAES-OAEP in CMS July 2003
5. SMIMECapabilities Attribute Conventions
RFC 2633 [MSG], Section 2.5.2 defines the SMIMECapabilities signed
attribute (defined as a SEQUENCE of SMIMECapability SEQUENCEs) to be
used to specify a partial list of algorithms that the software
announcing the SMIMECapabilities can support. When constructing a
signedData object, compliant software MAY include the
SMIMECapabilities signed attribute announcing that it supports the
RSAES-OAEP algorithm.
When all of the default settings are selected, the SMIMECapability
SEQUENCE representing RSAES-OAEP MUST include the id-RSAES-OAEP
object identifier in the capabilityID field and MUST include an empty
SEQUENCE in the parameters field. In this case, RSAES-OAEP is
represented by the rSAES-OAEP-Default-Identifier:
rSAES-OAEP-Default-Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
{ id-RSAES-OAEP,
{ sha1Identifier,
mgf1SHA1Identifier,
pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier } }
The SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing rSAES-OAEP-Default-
Identifier MUST be DER-encoded as the following hexadecimal string:
30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 07 30 00
When settings other than the defaults are selected, the
SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing RSAES-OAEP MUST include the
id-RSAES-OAEP object identifier in the capabilityID field and MUST
include the RSAES-OAEP-params SEQUENCE that identifies the
non-default settings in the parameters field.
When SHA-256 is used in the hashFunc and SHA-256 is used with MGF1 in
the maskGenFunc, the SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing RSAES-OAEP
is the rSAES-OAEP-SHA256-Identifier, as specified in Appendix A. The
SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing rSAES-OAEP-SHA256-Identifier
MUST be DER-encoded as the following hexadecimal string:
30 38 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 07 30 2B 30
0D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 05 00 30 1A
06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 08 30 0D 06 09 60
86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 05 00
When SHA-384 is used in the hashFunc and SHA-384 is used with MGF1 in
the maskGenFunc, the SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing RSAES-OAEP
is the rSAES-OAEP-SHA384-Identifier, as specified in Appendix A. The
Housley Standards Track [Page 8]
RFC 3560 RSAES-OAEP in CMS July 2003
SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing rSAES-OAEP-SHA384-Identifier
MUST be DER-encoded as the following hexadecimal string:
30 38 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 07 30 2B 30
0D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 02 05 00 30 1A
06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 08 30 0D 06 09 60
86 48 01 65 03 04 02 02 05 00
When SHA-512 is used in the hashFunc and SHA-512 is used with MGF1 in
the maskGenFunc, the SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing RSAES-OAEP
is the rSAES-OAEP-SHA512-Identifier, as specified in Appendix A. The
SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing rSAES-OAEP-SHA512-Identifier
MUST be DER-encoded as the following hexadecimal string:
30 38 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 07 30 2B 30
0D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 03 05 00 30 1A
06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 08 30 0D 06 09 60
86 48 01 65 03 04 02 03 05 00
6. Security Considerations
Implementations must protect the RSA private key and the
content-encryption key. Compromise of the RSA private key may result
in the disclosure of all messages protected with that key.
Compromise of the content-encryption key may result in disclosure of
the associated encrypted content.
The generation of RSA public/private key pairs relies on a random
numbers. The use of inadequate pseudo-random number generators
(PRNGs) to generate cryptographic keys can result in little or no
security. An attacker may find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG
environment that produced the keys, searching the resulting small set
of possibilities, rather than brute force searching the whole key
space. The generation of quality random numbers is difficult. RFC
1750 [RANDOM] offers important guidance in this area.
Generally, good cryptographic practice employs a given RSA key pair
in only one scheme. This practice avoids the risk that vulnerability
in one scheme may compromise the security of the other, and may be
essential to maintain provable security. While PKCS #1 Version 1.5
[PKCS#1v1.5] has been employed for both key transport and digital
signature without any known bad interactions, such a combined use of
an RSA key pair is not recommended in the future. Therefore, an RSA
key pair used for RSAES-OAEP key transport should not also be used
for other purposes. For similar reasons, one RSA key pair should
always be used with the same RSAES-OAEP parameters.
Housley Standards Track [Page 9]
RFC 3560 RSAES-OAEP in CMS July 2003
This specification requires implementation to support the SHA-1
one-way hash function for interoperability, but support for other
one-way hash function is permitted. At the time of this writing, the
best (known) collision attacks against SHA-1 are generic attacks with
complexity 2^80, where 80 is one-half the bit length of the hash
value. When a one-way hash function is used with a digital signature
scheme, a collision attack is easily translated into a signature
forgery. Therefore, the use of SHA-1 in a digital signature scheme
provides a security level of no more than 80 bits. If a greater
level of security is desired, then a secure one-way hash function
with a longer hash value is needed. SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512
are likely candidates [SHA2].
The metrics for choosing a one-way hash function for use in digital
signatures do not directly apply to the RSAES-OAEP key transport
algorithm, since a collision attack on the one-way hash function does
not directly translate into an attack on the key transport algorithm,
unless the encoding parameters P varies (in which case a collision
the hash value for different encoding parameters might be exploited).
Nevertheless, for consistency with the practice for digital signature
schemes, and in case the encoding parameters P is not the empty
string, it is recommended that the same rule of thumb be applied to
selection of a one-way hash function for use with RSAES-OAEP. That
is, the one-way hash function should be selected so that the bit
length of the hash value is at least twice as long as the desired
security level in bits.
A 1024-bit RSA public key and SHA-1 both provide a security level of
about 80 bits. In [NISTGUIDE], the National Institute of Standards
and Technology suggests that a security level of 80 bits is adequate
for most applications until 2015. If a security level greater than
80 bits is needed, then a longer RSA public key and a secure one-way
hash function with a longer hash value are needed. Again, SHA-256,
SHA-384, and SHA-512 are likely candidates for such a one-way hash
function. For this reason, the algorithm identifiers for these
one-way hash functions are included in the ASN.1 module in Appendix
A.
The same one-way hash function should be employed for the hashFunc
and the maskGenFunc, but it is not required. Using the same one-way
hash function reduces the potential for implementation errors.
Housley Standards Track [Page 10]
RFC 3560 RSAES-OAEP in CMS July 2003
7. IANA Considerations
Within the CMS, algorithms are identified by object identifiers
(OIDs). All of the OIDs used in this document were assigned in
Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) documents or by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). No further action by
the IANA is necessary for this document or any anticipated updates.
8. Intellectual Property Rights Statement
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the
IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of
claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of
licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to
obtain a general license or permission for the use of such
proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can
be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive
Director.
9. Acknowledgments
This document is the result of contributions from many professionals.
I appreciate the hard work of all members of the IETF S/MIME Working
Group. Further, I extend a special thanks to Burt Kaliski, Jakob
Jonsson, Francois Rousseau, and Jim Schaad.
10. References
This section provides normative and informative references.
10.1. Normative References
[3DES] American National Standards Institute. ANSI X9.52-
1998, Triple Data Encryption Algorithm Modes of
Operation. 1998.
Housley Standards Track [Page 11]
RFC 3560 RSAES-OAEP in CMS July 2003
[CMS] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC
3369, August 2002.
[MSG] Ramsdell, B., "S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification",
RFC 2633, June 1999.
[PKCS#1v2.1] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications,
Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.
[PROFILE] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W. and D. Solo, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
April 2002.
[SHA1] National Institute of Standards and Technology. FIPS
Pub 180-1: "Secure Hash Standard." April 1995.
[STDWORDS] Bradner, S., "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[X.208-88] CCITT. Recommendation X.208: Specification of Abstract
Syntax Notation One (ASN.1). 1988.
[X.209-88] CCITT. Recommendation X.209: Specification of Basic
Encoding Rules for Abstract Syntax Notation One
(ASN.1). 1988.
[X.509-88] CCITT. Recommendation X.509: The Directory -
Authentication Framework. 1988.
10.2. Informative References
[CERTALGS] Bassham, L., Polk, W. and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, April 2002.
[CRYPTO98] Bleichenbacher, D. "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against
Protocols Based on the RSA Encryption Standard PKCS
#1", in H. Krawczyk (editor), Advances in Cryptology -
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science 1462 (1998), Springer-Verlag, pp. 1-12.
[MMA] Rescorla, E., "Preventing the Million Message Attack on
Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 3218, January 2002.
Housley Standards Track [Page 12]
RFC 3560 RSAES-OAEP in CMS July 2003
[NISTGUIDE] National Institute of Standards and Technology. Second
Draft: "Key Management Guideline, Part 1: General
Guidance." June 2002.
[http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/kms/guideline-1.pdf]
[PKCS#1v1.5] Kaliski, B., "PKCS #1: RSA Encryption, Version 1.5",
RFC 2313, March 1998.
[RANDOM] Eastlake, D., Crocker, S. and J. Schiller, "Randomness
Recommendations for Security", RFC 1750, December 1994.
[RSALABS] Bleichenbacher, D., B. Kaliski, and J. Staddon. Recent
Results on PKCS #1: RSA Encryption Standard. RSA
Laboratories' Bulletin No. 7, June 26, 1998.
[http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/bulletins]
[SHA2] National Institute of Standards and Technology. Draft
FIPS Pub 180-2: "Specifications for the Secure Hash
Standard." May 2001.
[http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/shs/dfips-180-2.pdf]
[SSL] Freier, A., P. Karlton, and P. Kocher. The SSL
Protocol, Version 3.0. Netscape Communications.
November 1996.
[http://wp.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/draft302.txt]
[TLS] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version
1.0", RFC 2246, January 1999.
Housley Standards Track [Page 13]
RFC 3560 RSAES-OAEP in CMS July 2003
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
CMS-RSAES-OAEP
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) cms-rsaes-oaep(20) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL --
IMPORTS
AlgorithmIdentifier
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 -- RFC 3280
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-explicit(18) };
pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) }
rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1 }
id-RSAES-OAEP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 7 }
RSAES-OAEP-params ::= SEQUENCE {
hashFunc [0] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT sha1Identifier,
maskGenFunc [1] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT mgf1SHA1Identifier,
pSourceFunc [2] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT
pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier }
sha1Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= { id-sha1, NULL }
sha256Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= { id-sha256, NULL }
sha384Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= { id-sha384, NULL }
sha512Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= { id-sha512, NULL }
mgf1SHA1Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
{ id-mgf1, sha1Identifier }
mgf1SHA256Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
{ id-mgf1, sha256Identifier }
mgf1SHA384Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
{ id-mgf1, sha384Identifier }
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RFC 3560 RSAES-OAEP in CMS July 2003
mgf1SHA512Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
{ id-mgf1, sha512Identifier }
pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
{ id-pSpecified, nullOctetString }
nullOctetString OCTET STRING (SIZE (0)) ::= { ''H }
id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) oiw(14)
secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 }
id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 1 }
id-sha384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 2 }
id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 3 }
id-mgf1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 8 }
id-pSpecified OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 9 }
rSAES-OAEP-Default-Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
{ id-RSAES-OAEP,
{ sha1Identifier,
mgf1SHA1Identifier,
pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier } }
rSAES-OAEP-SHA256-Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
{ id-RSAES-OAEP,
{ sha256Identifier,
mgf1SHA256Identifier,
pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier } }
rSAES-OAEP-SHA384-Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
{ id-RSAES-OAEP,
{ sha384Identifier,
mgf1SHA384Identifier,
pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier } }
rSAES-OAEP-SHA512-Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
{ id-RSAES-OAEP,
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RFC 3560 RSAES-OAEP in CMS July 2003
{ sha512Identifier,
mgf1SHA512Identifier,
pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier } }
END
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RFC 3560 RSAES-OAEP in CMS July 2003
Author's Address
Russell Housley
Vigil Security, LLC
918 Spring Knoll Drive
Herndon, VA 20170
USA
EMail: housley@vigilsec.com
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RFC 3560 RSAES-OAEP in CMS July 2003
Full Copyright Statement
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or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
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Acknowledgement
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Internet Society.
Housley Standards Track [Page 18]