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Keywords: [--------], Next Steps in Signaling, gist, General Internet Signaling Transport
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Manner
Request for Comments: 5981 Aalto University
Category: Experimental M. Stiemerling
ISSN: 2070-1721 NEC
H. Tschofenig
Nokia Siemens Networks
R. Bless, Ed.
KIT
February 2011
Authorization for NSIS Signaling Layer Protocols
Abstract
Signaling layer protocols specified within the Next Steps in
Signaling (NSIS) framework may rely on the General Internet Signaling
Transport (GIST) protocol to handle authorization. Still, the
signaling layer protocol above GIST itself may require separate
authorization to be performed when a node receives a request for a
certain kind of service or resources. This document presents a
generic model and object formats for session authorization within the
NSIS signaling layer protocols. The goal of session authorization is
to allow the exchange of information between network elements in
order to authorize the use of resources for a service and to
coordinate actions between the signaling and transport planes.
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for examination, experimental implementation, and
evaluation.
This document defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet
community. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF
community. It has received public review and has been approved for
publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not
all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of
Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5981.
Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 1]
RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Session Authorization Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Session Authorization Object format . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Session Authorization Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.1. Authorizing Entity Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.2. Session Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2.3. Source Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2.4. Destination Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.5. Start Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2.6. End Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.2.7. NSLP Object List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.2.8. Authentication Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4. Integrity of the SESSION_AUTH Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.1. Shared Symmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.1.1. Operational Setting Using Shared Symmetric Keys . . . 16
4.2. Kerberos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.3. Public Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.3.1. Operational Setting for Public-Key-Based
Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.4. HMAC Signed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5. Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.1. The Coupled Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.2. The Associated Model with One Policy Server . . . . . . . 23
5.3. The Associated Model with Two Policy Servers . . . . . . . 24
5.4. The Non-Associated Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6. Message Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6.1. Generation of the SESSION_AUTH by an Authorizing Entity . 25
6.2. Processing within the QoS NSLP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6.2.1. Message Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6.2.2. Message Reception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 2]
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6.2.3. Authorization (QNE or PDP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6.2.4. Error Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6.3. Processing with the NATFW NSLP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6.3.1. Message Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.3.2. Message Reception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.3.3. Authorization (Router/PDP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.3.4. Error Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.4. Integrity Protection of NSLP Messages . . . . . . . . . . 29
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1. Introduction
The Next Steps in Signaling (NSIS) framework [RFC4080] defines a
suite of protocols for the next generation in Internet signaling.
The design is based on a generalized transport protocol for signaling
applications, the General Internet Signaling Transport (GIST)
[RFC5971], and various kinds of signaling applications. Two
signaling applications and their NSIS Signaling Layer Protocol (NSLP)
have been designed, a Quality of Service application (QoS NSLP)
[RFC5974] and a NAT/firewall application (NATFW NSLP) [RFC5973].
The basic security architecture for NSIS is based on a chain-of-trust
model, where each GIST hop may choose the appropriate security
protocol, taking into account the signaling application requirements.
For instance, communication between two directly adjacent GIST peers
may be secured via TCP/TLS. On the one hand, this model is
appropriate for a number of different use cases and allows the
signaling applications to leave the handling of security to GIST. On
the other hand, several sessions of different signaling applications
are then multiplexed onto the same GIST TLS connection.
Yet, in order to allow for finer-grain per-session or per-user
admission control, it is necessary to provide a mechanism for
ensuring that the use of resources by a host has been properly
authorized before allowing the signaling application to commit the
resource request, e.g., a QoS reservation or mappings for NAT
traversal. In order to meet this requirement, there must be
information in the NSLP message that may be used to verify the
validity of the request. This can be done by providing the host with
a Session Authorization Object that is inserted into the message and
verified by the respective network elements.
Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 3]
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This document describes a generic NSLP-layer Session Authorization
Object (SESSION_AUTH) used to convey authorization information for
the request. "Generic" in this context means that it is usable by
all NSLPs. The scheme is based on third-party tokens. A trusted
third party provides authentication tokens to clients and allows
verification of the information by the network elements. The
requesting host inserts the authorization information (e.g., a policy
object) acquired from the trusted third party into the NSLP message
to allow verification of the network resource request. Network
elements verify the request and then process it based on admission
policy (e.g., they perform a resource reservation or change bindings
or firewall filter). This work is based on RFC 3520 [RFC3520] and
RFC 3521 [RFC3521].
The default operation when using NSLP-layer session authorization is
to add one authorization policy object. Yet, in order to support
end-to-end signaling and request authorization from different
networks, a host initiating an NSLP signaling session may add more
than one SESSION_AUTH object in the message. The identifier of the
authorizing entity can be used by the network elements to use the
third party they trust to verify the request.
2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119
[RFC2119].
The term "NSLP node" (NN) is used to refer to an NSIS node running an
NSLP protocol that can make use of the authorization object discussed
in this document. Currently, this node would run either the QoS NSLP
[RFC5974] or the NAT/Firewall NSLP [RFC5973] service.
3. Session Authorization Object
This section presents a new NSLP-layer object called session
authorization (SESSION_AUTH). The SESSION_AUTH object can be used in
the currently specified and future NSLP protocols.
The authorization attributes follow the format and specification
given in RFC3520 [RFC3520].
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RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011
3.1. Session Authorization Object format
The SESSION_AUTH object contains a list of fields that describe the
session, along with other attributes. The object header follows the
generic NSLP object header; therefore, it can be used together with
any NSLP.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|A|B|r|r| Type |r|r|r|r| Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ +
// Session Authorization Attribute List //
+ +
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
The value for the Type field comes from shared NSLP object type
space. The Length field is given in units of 32-bit words and
measures the length of the Value component of the TLV object (i.e.,
it does not include the standard header).
The bits marked 'A' and 'B' are extensibility flags and are used to
signal the desired treatment for objects whose treatment has not been
defined in the protocol specification (i.e., whose Type field is
unknown at the receiver). The following four categories of object
have been identified, and are described here for informational
purposes only (for normative behavior, refer to the particular NSLP
documents, e.g., [RFC5974] [RFC5973]).
AB=00 ("Mandatory"): If the object is not understood, the entire
message containing it MUST be rejected, and an error message sent
back (usually of class/code "Protocol Error/Unknown object
present").
AB=01 ("Ignore"): If the object is not understood, it MUST be
deleted, and the rest of the message processed as usual.
AB=10 ("Forward"): If the object is not understood, it MUST be
retained unchanged in any message forwarded as a result of message
processing, but not stored locally.
AB=11 ("Refresh"): If the object is not understood, it should be
incorporated into the locally stored signaling application state
for this flow/session, forwarded in any resulting message, and
also used in any refresh or repair message which is generated
locally. This flag combination is not used by all NSLPs, e.g., it
is not used in the NATFW NSLP.
Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 5]
RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011
The remaining bits marked 'r' are reserved. The extensibility flags
follow the definition in the GIST specification. The SESSION_AUTH
object defined in this specification MUST have the AB bits set to
"10". An NSLP Node (NN) may use the authorization information if it
is configured to do so, but may also just skip the object.
Type: SESSION_AUTH_OBJECT (0x016)
Length: Variable, contains length of session authorization object
list in units of 32-bit words.
Session Authorization Attribute List: variable length
The session authorization attribute list is a collection of
objects that describes the session and provides other information
necessary to verify resource request (e.g., a resource
reservation, binding, or firewall filter change request). An
initial set of valid objects is described in Section 3.2.
3.2. Session Authorization Attributes
A session authorization attribute may contain a variety of
information and has both an attribute type and sub-type. The
attribute itself MUST be a multiple of 4 octets in length, and any
attributes that are not a multiple of 4 octets long MUST be padded to
a 4-octet boundary. All padding bytes MUST have a value of zero.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | X-Type | SubType |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
// Value ... //
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
Length: 16 bits
The Length field is two octets and indicates the actual length of
the attribute (including Length, X-Type, and SubType fields) in
number of octets. The length does NOT include any padding of the
value field to make the attribute's length a multiple of 4 octets.
X-Type: 8 bits
Session authorization attribute type (X-Type) field is one octet.
IANA acts as a registry for X-Types as described in Section 8,
IANA Considerations. This specification uses the following
X-Types:
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RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011
1. AUTH_ENT_ID: The unique identifier of the entity that
authorized the session.
2. SESSION_ID: The unique identifier for this session, usually
created locally at the authorizing entity. See also RFC 3520
[RFC3520]; not to be confused with the SESSION-ID of GIST/
NSIS.
3. SOURCE_ADDR: The address specification for the signaling
session initiator, i.e., the source address of the signaling
message originator.
4. DEST_ADDR: The address specification for the signaling session
endpoint.
5. START_TIME: The starting time for the session.
6. END_TIME: The end time for the session.
7. AUTHENTICATION_DATA: The authentication data of the Session
Authorization Object.
SubType: 8 bits
Session authorization attribute sub-type is one octet in length.
The value of the SubType depends on the X-Type.
Value: variable length
The attribute-specific information.
3.2.1. Authorizing Entity Identifier
The AUTH_ENT_ID is used to identify the entity that authorized the
initial service request and generated the Session Authorization
Object. The AUTH_ENT_ID may be represented in various formats, and
the SubType is used to define the format for the ID. The format for
AUTH_ENT_ID is as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | X-Type | SubType |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
// OctetString ... //
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
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RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011
Length: Length of the attribute, which MUST be > 4.
X-Type: AUTH_ENT_ID
SubType:
The following sub-types for AUTH_ENT_ID are defined. IANA acts as
a registry for AUTH_ENT_ID SubTypes as described in Section 8,
IANA Considerations. Initially, the registry contains the
following SubTypes of AUTH_ENT_ID:
1. IPV4_ADDRESS: IPv4 address represented in 32 bits.
2. IPV6_ADDRESS: IPv6 address represented in 128 bits.
3. FQDN: Fully Qualified Domain Name as defined in [RFC1034] as
an ASCII string.
4. ASCII_DN: X.500 Distinguished name as defined in [RFC4514] as
an ASCII string.
5. UNICODE_DN: X.500 Distinguished name as defined in [RFC4514]
as a UTF-8 string.
6. URI: Universal Resource Identifier, as defined in [RFC3986].
7. KRB_PRINCIPAL: Fully Qualified Kerberos Principal name
represented by the ASCII string of a principal, followed by
the @ realm name as defined in [RFC4120] (e.g.,
johndoe@nowhere).
8. X509_V3_CERT: The Distinguished Name of the subject of the
certificate as defined in [RFC4514] as a UTF-8 string.
9. PGP_CERT: The OpenPGP certificate of the authorizing entity
as defined as Public-Key Packet in [RFC4880].
10. HMAC_SIGNED: Indicates that the AUTHENTICATION_DATA attribute
contains a self-signed HMAC signature [RFC2104] that ensures
the integrity of the NSLP message. The HMAC is calculated
over all NSLP objects given in the NSLP_OBJECT_LIST attribute
that MUST also be present. The object specifies the hash
algorithm that is used for calculation of the HMAC as
Transform ID from Transform Type 3 of the IKEv2 registry
[RFC5996].
OctetString: Contains the authorizing entity identifier.
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3.2.2. Session Identifier
SESSION_ID is a unique identifier used by the authorizing entity to
identify the request. It may be used for a number of purposes,
including replay detection, or to correlate this request to a policy
decision entry made by the authorizing entity. For example, the
SESSION_ID can be based on simple sequence numbers or on a standard
NTP timestamp.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | X-Type | SubType |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
// OctetString ... //
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
Length: Length of the attribute, which MUST be > 4.
X-Type: SESSION_ID
SubType:
No sub-types for SESSION_ID are currently defined; this field MUST be
set to zero. The authorizing entity is the only network entity that
needs to interpret the contents of the SESSION_ID; therefore, the
contents and format are implementation dependent.
OctetString: The OctetString contains the session identifier.
3.2.3. Source Address
SOURCE_ADDR is used to identify the source address specification of
the authorized session. This X-Type may be useful in some scenarios
to make sure the resource request has been authorized for that
particular source address and/or port. Usually, it corresponds to
the signaling source, e.g., the IP source address of the GIST packet,
or flow source or flow destination address, respectively, which are
contained in the GIST MRI (Message Routing Information) object.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | X-Type | SubType |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
// OctetString ... //
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
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RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011
Length: Length of the attribute, which MUST be > 4.
X-Type: SOURCE_ADDR
SubType:
The following sub-types for SOURCE_ADDR are defined. IANA acts as
a registry for SOURCE_ADDR SubTypes as described in Section 8,
IANA Considerations. Initially, the registry contains the
following SubTypes for SOURCE_ADDR:
1. IPV4_ADDRESS: IPv4 address represented in 32 bits.
2. IPV6_ADDRESS: IPv6 address represented in 128 bits.
3. UDP_PORT_LIST: list of UDP port specifications, represented as
16 bits per list entry.
4. TCP_PORT_LIST: list of TCP port specifications, represented as
16 bits per list entry.
5. SPI: Security Parameter Index, represented in 32 bits.
OctetString: The OctetString contains the source address information.
In scenarios where a source address is required (see Section 5), at
least one of the sub-types 1 or 2 MUST be included in every Session
Authorization Object. Multiple SOURCE_ADDR attributes MAY be
included if multiple addresses have been authorized. The source
address of the request (e.g., a QoS NSLP RESERVE) MUST match one of
the SOURCE_ADDR attributes contained in this Session Authorization
Object.
At most, one instance of sub-type 3 MAY be included in every Session
Authorization Object. At most, one instance of sub-type 4 MAY be
included in every Session Authorization Object. Inclusion of a sub-
type 3 attribute does not prevent inclusion of a sub-type 4 attribute
(i.e., both UDP and TCP ports may be authorized).
If no PORT attributes are specified, then all ports are considered
valid; otherwise, only the specified ports are authorized for use.
Every source address and port list must be included in a separate
SOURCE_ADDR attribute.
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3.2.4. Destination Address
DEST_ADDR is used to identify the destination address of the
authorized session. This X-Type may be useful in some scenarios to
make sure the resource request has been authorized for that
particular destination address and/or port.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | X-Type | SubType |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
// OctetString ... //
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
Length: Length of the attribute in number of octets, which MUST be >
4.
X-Type: DEST_ADDR
SubType:
The following sub-types for DEST_ADDR are defined. IANA acts as a
registry for DEST_ADDR SubTypes as described in Section 8, IANA
Considerations. Initially, the registry contains the following
SubTypes for DEST_ADDR:
1. IPV4_ADDRESS: IPv4 address represented in 32 bits.
2. IPV6_ADDRESS: IPv6 address represented in 128 bits.
3. UDP_PORT_LIST: list of UDP port specifications, represented as
16 bits per list entry.
4. TCP_PORT_LIST: list of TCP port specifications, represented as
16 bits per list entry.
5. SPI: Security Parameter Index, represented in 32 bits.
OctetString: The OctetString contains the destination address
specification.
In scenarios where a destination address is required (see Section 5),
at least one of the sub-types 1 or 2 MUST be included in every
Session Authorization Object. Multiple DEST_ADDR attributes MAY be
included if multiple addresses have been authorized. The destination
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RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011
address field of the resource reservation datagram (e.g., QoS NSLP
Reserve) MUST match one of the DEST_ADDR attributes contained in this
Session Authorization Object.
At most, one instance of sub-type 3 MAY be included in every Session
Authorization Object. At most, one instance of sub-type 4 MAY be
included in every Session Authorization Object. Inclusion of a sub-
type 3 attribute does not prevent inclusion of a sub-type 4 attribute
(i.e., both UDP and TCP ports may be authorized).
If no PORT attributes are specified, then all ports are considered
valid; otherwise, only the specified ports are authorized for use.
Every destination address and port list must be included in a
separate DEST_ADDR attribute.
3.2.5. Start Time
START_TIME is used to identify the start time of the authorized
session and can be used to prevent replay attacks. If the
SESSION_AUTH object is presented in a resource request, the network
SHOULD reject the request if it is not received within a few seconds
of the start time specified.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | X-Type | SubType |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
// OctetString ... //
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
Length: Length of the attribute, which MUST be > 4.
X-Type: START_TIME
SubType:
The following sub-type for START_TIME is defined. IANA acts as a
registry for START_TIME SubTypes as described in Section 8, IANA
Considerations. Initially, the registry contains the following
SubType for START_TIME:
1 NTP_TIMESTAMP: NTP Timestamp Format as defined in RFC 5905
[RFC5905].
OctetString: The OctetString contains the start time.
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3.2.6. End Time
END_TIME is used to identify the end time of the authorized session
and can be used to limit the amount of time that resources are
authorized for use (e.g., in prepaid session scenarios).
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | X-Type | SubType |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
// OctetString ... //
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
Length: Length of the attribute, which MUST be > 4.
X-Type: END_TIME
SubType:
The following sub-type for END_TIME is defined. IANA acts as a
registry for END_TIME SubTypes as described in Section 8, IANA
Considerations. Initially, the registry contains the following
SubType for END_TIME:
1 NTP_TIMESTAMP: NTP Timestamp Format as defined in RFC 5905
[RFC5905].
OctetString: The OctetString contains the end time.
3.2.7. NSLP Object List
The NSLP_OBJECT_LIST attribute contains a list of NSLP object types
that are used in the keyed-hash computation whose result is given in
the AUTHENTICATION_DATA attribute. This allows for an integrity
protection of NSLP PDUs. If an NSLP_OBJECT_LIST attribute has been
included in the SESSION_AUTH object, an AUTHENTICATION_DATA attribute
MUST also be present.
The creator of this attribute lists every NSLP object type whose NSLP
PDU object was included in the computation of the hash. The hash
computation has to follow the order of the NSLP object types as
specified by the list. The receiver can verify the integrity of the
NSLP PDU by computing a hash over all NSLP objects that are listed in
this attribute (in the given order), including all the attributes of
the authorization object. Since all NSLP object types are unique
over all different NSLPs, this will work for any NSLP.
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RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011
Basic NSIS Transport Layer Protocol (NTLP) / NSLP objects like the
session ID, the NSLPID, and the MRI MUST be always included in the
HMAC. Since they are not carried within the NSLP itself, but only
within GIST, they have to be provided for HMAC calculation, e.g.,
they can be delivered via the GIST API. They MUST be normalized to
their network representation from [RFC5971] again before calculating
the hash. These values MUST be hashed first (in the order session
ID, NSLPID, MRI), before any other NSLP object values that are
included in the hash computation.
A summary of the NSLP_OBJECT_LIST attribute format is described
below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Length | NSLP_OBJ_LIST | zero |
+---------------+---------------+-------+-------+---------------+
| # of signed NSLP objects = n | rsv | NSLP object type (1) |
+-------+-------+---------------+-------+-------+---------------+
| rsv | NSLP object type (2) | ..... //
+-------+-------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| rsv | NSLP object type (n) | (padding if required) |
+--------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+
Length: Length of the attribute, which MUST be > 4.
X-Type: NSLP_OBJECT_LIST
SubType: No sub-types for NSLP_OBJECT_LIST are currently defined.
This field MUST be set to 0 and ignored upon reception.
# of signed NSLP objects: The number n of NSLP object types that
follow. n=0 is allowed; in that case, only a padding field is
contained.
rsv: reserved bits; MUST be set to 0 and ignored upon reception.
NSLP object type: the NSLP 12-bit object type identifier of the
object that was included in the hash calculation. The NSLP object
type values comprise only 12 bits, so four bits per type value are
currently not used within the list. Depending on the number of
signed objects, a corresponding padding word of 16 bits must be
supplied.
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padding: padding MUST be added if the number of NSLP objects is even
and MUST NOT be added if the number of NSLP objects is odd. If
padding has to be applied, the padding field MUST be 16 bits set to
0, and its contents MUST be ignored upon reception.
3.2.8. Authentication Data
The AUTHENTICATION_DATA attribute contains the authentication data of
the SESSION_AUTH object and signs all the data in the object up to
the AUTHENTICATION_DATA. If the AUTHENTICATION_DATA attribute has
been included in the SESSION_AUTH object, it MUST be the last
attribute in the list. The algorithm used to compute the
authentication data depends on the AUTH_ENT_ID SubType field. See
Section 4 entitled "Integrity of the SESSION_AUTH Object".
A summary of the AUTHENTICATION_DATA attribute format is described
below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | X-Type | SubType |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
// OctetString ... //
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
Length: Length of the attribute, which MUST be > 4.
X-Type: AUTHENTICATION_DATA
SubType: No sub-types for AUTHENTICATION_DATA are currently defined.
This field MUST be set to 0 and ignored upon reception.
OctetString: The OctetString contains the authentication data of the
SESSION_AUTH.
4. Integrity of the SESSION_AUTH Object
This section describes how to ensure that the integrity of the
SESSION_AUTH object is preserved.
4.1. Shared Symmetric Keys
In shared symmetric key environments, the AUTH_ENT_ID MUST be of sub-
types: IPV4_ADDRESS, IPV6_ADDRESS, FQDN, ASCII_DN, UNICODE_DN, or
URI. An example SESSION_AUTH object is shown below.
Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 15]
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|1|0|0|0| Type = SESSION_AUTH |0|0|0|0| Object Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | AUTH_ENT_ID | IPV4_ADDRESS |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OctetString ... (The authorizing entity's Identifier) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | AUTH_DATA | zero |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Key-ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OctetString ... (Authentication data) |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 1: Example of a SESSION_AUTH Object
4.1.1. Operational Setting Using Shared Symmetric Keys
This assumes both the Authorizing Entity and the network router/PDP
(Policy Decision Point) are provisioned with shared symmetric keys,
policies detailing which algorithm to be used for computing the
authentication data, and the expected length of the authentication
data for that particular algorithm.
Key maintenance is outside the scope of this document, but
SESSION_AUTH implementations MUST at least provide the ability to
manually configure keys and their parameters. The key used to
produce the authentication data is identified by the AUTH_ENT_ID
field. Since multiple keys may be configured for a particular
AUTH_ENT_ID value, the first 32 bits of the AUTHENTICATION_DATA field
MUST be a Key-ID to be used to identify the appropriate key. Each
key must also be configured with lifetime parameters for the time
period within which it is valid as well as an associated
cryptographic algorithm parameter specifying the algorithm to be used
with the key. At a minimum, all SESSION_AUTH implementations MUST
support the HMAC-SHA2-256 [RFC4868] [RFC2104] cryptographic algorithm
for computing the authentication data.
It is good practice to regularly change keys. Keys MUST be
configurable such that their lifetimes overlap, thereby allowing
smooth transitions between keys. At the midpoint of the lifetime
overlap between two keys, senders should transition from using the
current key to the next/longer-lived key. Meanwhile, receivers
simply accept any identified key received within its configured
lifetime and reject those that are not.
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4.2. Kerberos
Since Kerberos [RFC4120] is widely used for end-user authorization,
e.g., in Windows domains, it is well suited for being used in the
context of user-based authorization for NSIS sessions. For instance,
a user may request a ticket for authorization to install rules in an
NATFW-capable router.
In a Kerberos environment, it is assumed that the user of the NSLP
requesting host requests a ticket from the Kerberos Key Distribution
Center (KDC) for using the NSLP node (router) as a resource (target
service). The NSLP requesting host (client) can present the ticket
to the NSLP node via Kerberos by sending a KRB_CRED message to the
NSLP node independently but prior to the NSLP exchange. Thus, the
principal name of the service must be known at the client in advance,
though the exact IP address may not be known in advance. How the
name is assigned and made available to the client is implementation
specific. The extracted common session key can subsequently be used
to employ the HMAC_SIGNED variant of the SESSION_AUTH object.
Another option is to encapsulate the credentials in the
AUTHENTICATION_DATA portion of the SESSION_AUTH object. In this
case, the AUTH_ENT_ID MUST be of the sub-type KRB_PRINCIPAL. The
KRB_PRINCIPAL field is defined as the Fully Qualified Kerberos
Principal name of the authorizing entity. The AUTHENTICATION_DATA
portion of the SESSION_AUTH object contains the KRB_CRED message that
the receiving NSLP node has to extract and verify. A second
SESSION_AUTH object of type HMAC_SIGNED SHOULD protect the integrity
of the NSLP message, including the prior SESSION_AUTH object. The
session key included in the first SESSION_AUTH object has to be used
for HMAC calculation.
An example of the Kerberos AUTHENTICATION_DATA object is shown below
in Figure 2.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|1|0|0|0| Type = SESSION_AUTH |0|0|0|0| Object Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | AUTH_ENT_ID | KERB_P. |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OctetString ... (The principal@realm name) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | AUTH_DATA | zero |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OctetString ... (KRB_CRED Data) |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 2: Example of a Kerberos AUTHENTICATION_DATA Object
4.3. Public Key
In a public key environment, the AUTH_ENT_ID MUST be of the sub-
types: X509_V3_CERT or PGP_CERT. The authentication data is used for
authenticating the authorizing entity. Two examples of the public
key SESSION_AUTH object are shown in Figures 3 and 4.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|1|0|0|0| Type = SESSION_AUTH |0|0|0|0| Object Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | AUTH_ENT_ID | PGP_CERT |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OctetString ... (Authorizing entity Digital Certificate) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | AUTH_DATA | zero |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OctetString ... (Authentication data) |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 3: Example of a SESSION_AUTH_OBJECT Using a PGP Certificate
Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 18]
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|1|0|0|0| Type = SESSION_AUTH |0|0|0|0| Object Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | AUTH_ENT_ID | X509_V3_CERT |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OctetString ... (Authorizing entity Digital Certificate) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | AUTH_DATA | zero |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OctetString ... (Authentication data) |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 4: Example of a SESSION_AUTH_OBJECT Using an X509_V3_CERT
Certificate
4.3.1. Operational Setting for Public-Key-Based Authentication
Public-key-based authentication assumes the following:
o Authorizing entities have a pair of keys (private key and public
key).
o The private key is secured with the authorizing entity.
o Public keys are stored in digital certificates; a trusted party,
the certificate authority (CA), issues these digital certificates.
o The verifier (PDP or router) has the ability to verify the digital
certificate.
The authorizing entity uses its private key to generate
AUTHENTICATION_DATA. Authenticators (router, PDP) use the
authorizing entity's public key (stored in the digital certificate)
to verify and authenticate the object.
4.3.1.1. X.509 V3 Digital Certificates
When the AUTH_ENT_ID is of type X509_V3_CERT, AUTHENTICATION_DATA
MUST be generated by the authorizing entity following these steps:
o A signed-data is constructed as defined in RFC 5652 [RFC5652]. A
digest is computed on the content (as specified in Section 6.1)
with a signer-specific message-digest algorithm. The certificates
field contains the chain of X.509 V3 digital certificates from
each authorizing entity. The certificate revocation list is
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RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011
defined in the crls field. The digest output is digitally signed
following Section 8 of RFC 3447 [RFC3447], using the signer's
private key.
When the AUTH_ENT_ID is of type X509_V3_CERT, verification at the
verifying network element (PDP or router) MUST be done following
these steps:
o Parse the X.509 V3 certificate to extract the distinguished name
of the issuer of the certificate.
o Certification Path Validation is performed as defined in Section 6
of RFC 5280 [RFC5280].
o Parse through the Certificate Revocation list to verify that the
received certificate is not listed.
o Once the X.509 V3 certificate is validated, the public key of the
authorizing entity can be extracted from the certificate.
o Extract the digest algorithm and the length of the digested data
by parsing the CMS (Cryptographic Message Syntax) signed-data.
o The recipient independently computes the message digest. This
message digest and the signer's public key are used to verify the
signature value.
This verification ensures integrity, non-repudiation, and data
origin.
4.3.1.2. PGP Digital Certificates
When the AUTH_ENT_ID is of type PGP_CERT, AUTHENTICATION_DATA MUST be
generated by the authorizing entity following these steps:
AUTHENTICATION_DATA contains a Signature Packet as defined in Section
5.2.3 of RFC 4880 [RFC4880]. In summary:
o Compute the hash of all data in the SESSION_AUTH object up to the
AUTHENTICATION_DATA.
o The hash output is digitally signed following Section 8 of RFC
3447, using the signer's private key.
When the AUTH_ENT_ID is of type PGP_CERT, verification MUST be done
by the verifying network element (PDP or router) following these
steps:
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o Validate the certificate.
o Once the PGP certificate is validated, the public key of the
authorizing entity can be extracted from the certificate.
o Extract the hash algorithm and the length of the hashed data by
parsing the PGP signature packet.
o The recipient independently computes the message digest. This
message digest and the signer's public key are used to verify the
signature value.
This verification ensures integrity, non-repudiation, and data
origin.
4.4. HMAC Signed
A SESSION_AUTH object that carries an AUTH_ENT_ID of HMAC_SIGNED is
used as integrity protection for NSLP messages. The SESSION_AUTH
object MUST contain the following attributes:
o SOURCE_ADDR: the source address of the entity that created the
HMAC
o START_TIME: the timestamp when the HMAC signature was calculated.
This MUST be different for any two messages in sequence in order
to prevent replay attacks. The NTP timestamp currently provides a
resolution of 200 picoseconds, which should be sufficient.
o NSLP_OBJECT_LIST: this attribute lists all NSLP objects that are
included in HMAC calculation.
o AUTHENTICATION_DATA: this attribute contains the Key-ID that is
used for HMAC calculation as well as the HMAC data itself
[RFC2104].
The key used for HMAC calculation must be exchanged securely by some
other means, e.g., a Kerberos Ticket or pre-shared manual
installation etc. The Key-ID in the AUTHENTICATION_DATA allows the
reference to the appropriate key and also to periodically change
signing keys within a session. The key length MUST be at least 64
bits, but it is ideally longer in order to defend against brute-force
attacks during the key validity period. For scalability reasons it
is suggested to use a per-user key for signing NSLP messages, but
using a per-session key is possible, too, at the cost of a per-
session key exchange. A per-user key allows for verification of the
authenticity of the message and thus provides a basis for a session-
based per-user authorization. It is RECOMMENDED to periodically
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change the shared key in order to prevent eavesdroppers from
performing brute-force off-line attacks on the shared key. The
actual hash algorithm used in the HMAC computation is specified by
the "Transform ID" field (given as Transform Type 3 of the IKEv2
registry [RFC5996]). The hash algorithm MUST be chosen consistently
between the object creator and the NN verifying the HMAC; this can be
accomplished by out-of-band mechanisms when the shared key is
exchanged.
Figure 5 shows an example of an object that is used for integrity
protection of NSLP messages.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|1|0|0|0| Type = SESSION_AUTH |0|0|0|0| Object Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | AUTH_ENT_ID | HMAC_SIGNED |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| reserved | Transform ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | SOURCE_ADDR | IPV4_ADDRESS |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| IPv4 Source Address of NSLP sender |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | START_TIME | NTP_TIME_STAMP|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| NTP Time Stamp (1) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| NTP Time Stamp (2) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | NSLP_OBJ_LIST | zero |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|No. of signed NSLP objects = n | rsv | NSLP object type (1) |
+-------+-------+---------------+-------+-------+---------------+
| rsv | NSLP object type (2) | ..... //
+-------+-------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| rsv | NSLP object type (n) | (padding if required) |
+--------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+
| Length | AUTH_DATA | zero |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Key-ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Message Authentication Code HMAC Data |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 5: Example of a SESSION_AUTH_OBJECT That Provides Integrity
Protection for NSLP Messages
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5. Framework
RFC 3521 [RFC3521] describes a framework in which the SESSION_AUTH
object may be utilized to transport information required for
authorizing resource reservation for data flows (e.g., media flows).
RFC 3521 introduces four different models:
1. The coupled model
2. The associated model with one policy server
3. The associated model with two policy servers
4. The non-associated model
The fields that are required in a SESSION_AUTH object depend on which
of the models is used.
5.1. The Coupled Model
In the coupled model, the only information that MUST be included in
the SESSION_AUTH object is the SESSION_ID; it is used by the
Authorizing Entity to correlate the resource reservation request with
the media authorized during session setup. Since the End Host is
assumed to be untrusted, the Policy Server SHOULD take measures to
ensure that the integrity of the SESSION_ID is preserved in transit;
the exact mechanisms to be used and the format of the SESSION_ID are
implementation dependent.
5.2. The Associated Model with One Policy Server
In this model, the contents of the SESSION_AUTH object MUST include:
o A session identifier - SESSION_ID. This is information that the
authorizing entity can use to correlate the resource request with
the data flows authorized during session setup.
o The identity of the authorizing entity - AUTH_ENT_ID. This
information is used by an NN to determine which authorizing entity
(Policy Server) should be used to solicit resource policy
decisions.
In some environments, an NN may have no means for determining if the
identity refers to a legitimate Policy Server within its domain. In
order to protect against redirection of authorization requests to a
bogus authorizing entity, the SESSION_AUTH MUST also include:
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AUTHENTICATION_DATA. This authentication data is calculated over
all other fields of the SESSION_AUTH object.
5.3. The Associated Model with Two Policy Servers
The content of the SESSION_AUTH object is identical to the associated
model with one policy server.
5.4. The Non-Associated Model
In this model, the SESSION_AUTH object MUST contain sufficient
information to allow the Policy Server to make resource policy
decisions autonomously from the authorizing entity. The object is
created using information about the session by the authorizing
entity. The information in the SESSION_AUTH object MUST include:
o Initiating party's IP address or Identity (e.g., FQDN) -
SOURCE_ADDR X-Type
o Responding party's IP address or Identity (e.g., FQDN) - DEST_ADDR
X-Type
o The authorization lifetime - START_TIME X-Type
o The identity of the authorizing entity to allow for validation of
the token in shared symmetric key and Kerberos schemes -
AUTH_ENT_ID X-Type
o The credentials of the authorizing entity in a public-key scheme -
AUTH_ENT_ID X-Type
o Authentication data used to prevent tampering with the
SESSION_AUTH object - AUTHENTICATION_DATA X-Type
Furthermore, the SESSION_AUTH object MAY contain:
o The lifetime of (each of) the media stream(s) - END_TIME X-Type
o Initiating party's port number - SOURCE_ADDR X-Type
o Responding party's port number - DEST_ADDR X-Type
All SESSION_AUTH fields MUST match with the resource request. If a
field does not match, the request SHOULD be denied.
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6. Message Processing Rules
This section discusses the message processing related to the
SESSION_AUTH object. Details of the processing of the SESSION_AUTH
object within QoS NSLP and NATFW NSLP are described. New NSLP
protocols should use the same logic in making use of the SESSION_AUTH
object.
6.1. Generation of the SESSION_AUTH by an Authorizing Entity
1. Generate the SESSION_AUTH object with the appropriate contents as
specified in Section 3.
2. If authentication is needed, the entire SESSION_AUTH object is
constructed, excluding the length, type, and SubType fields of
the SESSION_AUTH field. Note that the message MUST include a
START_TIME to prevent replay attacks. The output of the
authentication algorithm, plus appropriate header information, is
appended as the AUTHENTICATION_DATA attribute to the SESSION_AUTH
object.
6.2. Processing within the QoS NSLP
The SESSION_AUTH object may be used with QoS NSLP QUERY and RESERVE
messages to authorize the query operation for network resources, and
a resource reservation request, respectively.
Moreover, the SESSION_AUTH object may also be used with RESPONSE
messages in order to indicate that the authorizing entity changed the
original request. For example, the session start or end times may
have been modified, or the client may have requested authorization
for all ports, but the authorizing entity only allowed the use of
certain ports.
If the QoS NSIS Initiator (QNI) receives a RESPONSE message with a
SESSION_AUTH object, the QNI MUST inspect the SESSION_AUTH object to
see which authentication attribute was changed by an authorizing
entity. The QNI SHOULD also silently accept SESSION_AUTH objects in
the RESPONSE message that do not indicate any change to the original
authorization request.
6.2.1. Message Generation
A QoS NSLP message is created as specified in [RFC5974].
1. The policy element received from the authorizing entity MUST be
copied without modification into the SESSION_AUTH object.
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2. The SESSION_AUTH object (containing the policy element) is
inserted in the NSLP message in the appropriate place.
6.2.2. Message Reception
The QoS NSLP message is processed as specified in [RFC5974] with the
following modifications.
1. If the QoS NSIS Entity (QNE) is policy aware then it SHOULD use
the Diameter QoS application or the RADIUS QoS protocol to
communicate with the PDP. To construct the AAA message it is
necessary to extract the SESSION_AUTH object and the QoS-related
objects from the QoS NSLP message and to craft the respective
RADIUS or Diameter message. The message processing and object
format are described in the respective RADIUS or Diameter QoS
protocol, respectively. If the QNE is policy unaware, then it
ignores the policy data objects and continues processing the NSLP
message.
2. If the response from the PDP is negative, the request must be
rejected. A negative response in RADIUS is an Access-Reject, and
in Diameter is based on the 'DIAMETER_SUCCESS' value in the
Result-Code AVP of the QoS-Authz-Answer (QAA) message. The QNE
must construct and send a RESPONSE message with the status of the
authorization failure as specified in [RFC5974].
3. Continue processing the NSIS message.
6.2.3. Authorization (QNE or PDP)
1. Retrieve the policy element from the SESSION_AUTH object. Check
the AUTH_ENT_ID type and SubType fields and return an error if
the identity type is not supported.
2. Verify the message integrity.
* Shared symmetric key authentication: The QNE or PDP uses the
AUTH_ENT_ID field to consult a table keyed by that field. The
table should identify the cryptographic authentication
algorithm to be used along with the expected length of the
authentication data and the shared symmetric key for the
authorizing entity. Verify that the indicated length of the
authentication data is consistent with the configured table
entry and validate the authentication data.
* Public Key: Validate the certificate chain against the trusted
Certificate Authority (CA) and validate the message signature
using the public key.
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* HMAC signed: The QNE or PDP uses the Key-ID field of the
AUTHENTICATION_DATA attribute to consult a table keyed by that
field. The table should identify the cryptographic
authentication algorithm to be used along with the expected
length of the authentication data and the shared symmetric key
for the authorizing entity. Verify that the indicated length
of the authentication data is consistent with the configured
table entry and validate the integrity of the parts of the
NSLP message, i.e., session ID, MRI, NSLPID, and all other
NSLP elements listed in the NSLP_OBJECT_LIST authentication
data as well as the SESSION_AUTH object contents (cf.
Section 6.4).
* Kerberos: If AUTHENTICATION_DATA contains an encapsulated
KRB_CRED message (cf. Section 4.2), the integrity of the
KRB_CRED message can be verified within Kerberos itself.
Moreover, if the same NSLP message contains another
SESSION_AUTH object using HMAC_SIGNED, the latter can be used
to verify the message integrity as described above.
3. Once the identity of the authorizing entity and the validity of
the service request have been established, the authorizing
router/PDP MUST then consult its authorization policy in order to
determine whether or not the specific request is finally
authorized (e.g., based on available credits and on information
in the subscriber's database). To the extent to which these
access control decisions require supplementary information,
routers/PDPs MUST ensure that supplementary information is
obtained securely.
4. Verify that the requested resources do not exceed the authorized
QoS.
6.2.4. Error Signaling
When the PDP (e.g., a RADIUS or Diameter server) fails to verify the
policy element, the appropriate actions described in the respective
AAA document need to be taken.
The QNE node MUST return a RESPONSE message with the INFO_SPEC error
code 'Authorization failure' as defined in the QoS NSLP specification
[RFC5974]. The QNE MAY include an INFO_SPEC Object Value Info to
indicate which SESSION_AUTH attribute created the error.
6.3. Processing with the NATFW NSLP
This section presents processing rules for the NATFW NSLP [RFC5973].
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6.3.1. Message Generation
A NATFW NSLP message is created as specified in [RFC5973].
1. The policy element received from the authorizing entity MUST be
copied without modification into the SESSION_AUTH object.
2. The SESSION_AUTH object (containing the policy element) is
inserted in the NATFW NSLP message in the appropriate place.
6.3.2. Message Reception
The NATFW NSLP message is processed as specified in [RFC5973] with
the following modifications.
1. If the router is policy aware, then it SHOULD use the Diameter
application or the RADIUS protocol to communicate with the PDP.
To construct the AAA message, it is necessary to extract the
SESSION_AUTH object and the objects related to NATFW policy rules
from the NSLP message and to craft the respective RADIUS or
Diameter message. The message processing and object format is
described in the respective RADIUS or Diameter protocols. If the
router is policy unaware, then it ignores the policy data objects
and continues processing the NSLP message.
2. Reject the message if the response from the PDP is negative. A
negative response in RADIUS is an Access-Reject, and in Diameter
is based on the 'DIAMETER_SUCCESS' value in the Result-Code AVP.
3. Continue processing the NSIS message.
6.3.3. Authorization (Router/PDP)
1. Retrieve the policy element from the SESSION_AUTH object. Check
the AUTH_ENT_ID type and SubType fields and return an error if
the identity type is not supported.
2. Verify the message integrity.
* Shared symmetric key authentication: The network router/PDP
uses the AUTH_ENT_ID field to consult a table keyed by that
field. The table should identify the cryptographic
authentication algorithm to be used, along with the expected
length of the authentication data and the shared symmetric key
for the authorizing entity. Verify that the indicated length
of the authentication data is consistent with the configured
table entry and validate the authentication data.
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RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011
* Public Key: Validate the certificate chain against the trusted
Certificate Authority (CA) and validate the message signature
using the public key.
* HMAC signed: The QNE or PDP uses the Key-ID field of the
AUTHENTICATION_DATA attribute to consult a table keyed by that
field. The table should identify the cryptographic
authentication algorithm to be used along with the expected
length of the authentication data and the shared symmetric key
for the authorizing entity. Verify that the indicated length
of the authentication data is consistent with the configured
table entry and validate the integrity of parts of the NSLP
message, i.e., session ID, MRI, NSLPID, and all other NSLP
elements listed in the NSLP_OBJECT_LIST authentication data as
well as the SESSION_AUTH object contents (cf. Section 6.4).
* Kerberos: If AUTHENTICATION_DATA contains an encapsulated
KRB_CRED message (cf. Section 4.2), the integrity of the
KRB_CRED message can be verified within Kerberos itself.
Moreover, an if the same NSLP message contains another
SESSION_AUTH object using HMAC_SIGNED, the latter can be used
to verify the message integrity as described above.
3. Once the identity of the authorizing entity and the validity of
the service request have been established, the authorizing
router/PDP MUST then consult its authorization policy in order to
determine whether or not the specific request is authorized. To
the extent to which these access control decisions require
supplementary information, routers/PDPs MUST ensure that
supplementary information is obtained securely.
6.3.4. Error Signaling
When the PDP (e.g., a RADIUS or Diameter server) fails to verify the
SESSION_AUTH object, the appropriate actions described in the
respective AAA document need to be taken. The NATFW NSLP node MUST
return an error message of class 'Permanent failure' (0x5) with error
code 'Authorization failed' (0x02).
6.4. Integrity Protection of NSLP Messages
The SESSION_AUTH object can also be used to provide an integrity
protection for every NSLP signaling message, thereby also
authenticating requests or responses. Assume that a user has
deposited a shared key at some NN. This NN can then verify the
integrity of every NSLP message sent by the user to the NN. Based on
this authentication, the NN can apply authorization policies to
actions like resource reservations or opening of firewall pinholes.
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The sender of an NSLP message creates a SESSION_AUTH object that
contains the AUTH_ENT_ID attribute set to HMAC_SIGNED (cf.
Section 4.4) and hashes with the shared key over all NSLP objects
that need to be protected and lists them in the NSLP_OBJECT_LIST.
The SESSION_AUTH object itself is also protected by the HMAC. By
inclusion of the SESSION_AUTH object into the NSLP message, the
receiver of this NSLP message can verify its integrity if it has the
suitable shared key for the HMAC. Any response to the sender should
also be protected by inclusion of a SESSION_AUTH object in order to
prevent attackers from sending unauthorized responses on behalf of
the real NN.
If a SESSION_AUTH object is present that has an AUTH_ENT_ID attribute
set to HMAC_SIGNED, the integrity of all NSLP elements listed in the
NSLP_OBJECT_LIST has to be checked, including the SESSION_AUTH object
contents itself. Furthermore, session ID, MRI, and NSLPID have to be
included into the HMAC calculation, too, as specified in
Section 3.2.7. The key that is used to calculate the HMAC is
referred to by the Key-ID included in the AUTHENTICATION_DATA
attribute. If the provided timestamp in START_TIME is not recent
enough or the calculated HMAC differs from the one provided in
AUTHENTICATION_DATA, the message must be discarded silently and an
error should be logged locally.
7. Security Considerations
This document describes a mechanism for session authorization to
prevent theft of service. There are three types of security issues
to consider: protection against replay attacks, integrity of the
SESSION_AUTH object, and the choice of the authentication algorithms
and keys.
The first issue, replay attacks, MUST be prevented. In the non-
associated model, the SESSION_AUTH object MUST include a START_TIME
field, and the NNs as well as Policy Servers MUST support NTP to
ensure proper clock synchronization. Failure to ensure proper clock
synchronization will allow replay attacks since the clocks of the
different network entities may not be in sync. The start time is
used to verify that the request is not being replayed at a later
time. In all other models, the SESSION_ID is used by the Policy
Server to ensure that the resource request successfully correlates
with records of an authorized session. If a SESSION_AUTH object is
replayed, it MUST be detected by the policy server (using internal
algorithms), and the request MUST be rejected.
The second issue, the integrity of the SESSION_AUTH object, is
preserved in untrusted environments by including the
AUTHENTICATION_DATA attribute in such environments.
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In environments where shared symmetric keys are possible, they should
be used in order to keep the SESSION_AUTH object size to a strict
minimum, e.g., when wireless links are used. A secondary option
would be Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) authentication, which
provides a high level of security and good scalability. However, PKI
authentication requires the presence of credentials in the
SESSION_AUTH object, thus impacting its size.
The SESSION_AUTH object can also serve to protect the integrity of
NSLP message parts by using the HMAC_SIGNED Authentication Data as
described in Section 6.4.
When shared keys are used, e.g., in AUTHENTICATION_DATA (cf.
Section 4.1) or in conjunction with HMAC_SIGNED (cf. Section 4.4), it
is important that the keys are kept secret, i.e., they must be
exchanged, stored, and managed in a secure and confidential manner,
so that no unauthorized party gets access to the key material. If
the key material is disclosed to an unauthorized party,
authentication and integrity protection are ineffective.
Furthermore, security considerations for public-key mechanisms using
the X.509 certificate mechanisms described in [RFC5280] apply.
Similarly, security considerations for PGP (Pretty Good Privacy)
described in [RFC4880] apply.
Further security issues are outlined in RFC 4081 [RFC4081].
8. IANA Considerations
The SESSION_AUTH_OBJECT NSLP Message Object type is specified as
0x016.
This document specifies an 8-bit Session authorization attribute type
(X-Type) field as well as 8-bit SubType fields per X-Type, for which
IANA has created and will maintain corresponding sub-registries for
the NSLP Session Authorization Object.
Initial values for the X-Type registry and the registration
procedures according to [RFC5226] are as follows:
Registration Procedure:
Specification Required
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X-Type Description
-------- -------------------
0 Reserved
1 AUTH_ENT_ID
2 SESSION_ID
3 SOURCE_ADDR
4 DEST_ADDR
5 START_TIME
6 END_TIME
7 NSLP_OBJECT_LIST
8 AUTHENTICATION_DATA
9-127 Unassigned
128-255 Reserved for Private or Experimental Use
In the following, registration procedures and initial values for the
SubType registries are specified.
Sub-registry: AUTH_ENT_ID (X-Type 1) SubType values
Registration Procedure:
Specification Required
Registry:
SubType Description
-------- -------------
0 Reserved
1 IPV4_ADDRESS
2 IPV6_ADDRESS
3 FQDN
4 ASCII_DN
5 UNICODE_DN
6 URI
7 KRB_PRINCIPAL
8 X509_V3_CERT
9 PGP_CERT
10 HMAC_SIGNED
11-127 Unassigned
128-255 Reserved for Private or Experimental Use
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RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011
Sub-registry: SOURCE_ADDR (X-Type 3) SubType values
Registration Procedure:
Specification Required
Registry:
SubType Description
-------- -------------
0 Reserved
1 IPV4_ADDRESS
2 IPV6_ADDRESS
3 UDP_PORT_LIST
4 TCP_PORT_LIST
5 SPI
6-127 Unassigned
128-255 Reserved for Private or Experimental Use
Sub-registry: DEST_ADDR (X-Type 4) SubType values
Registration Procedure:
Specification Required
Registry:
0 Reserved
1 IPV4_ADDRESS
2 IPV6_ADDRESS
3 UDP_PORT_LIST
4 TCP_PORT_LIST
5 SPI
6-127 Unassigned
128-255 Reserved for Private or Experimental Use
Sub-registry: START_TIME (X-Type 5) SubType values
Registration Procedure:
Specification Required
Registry:
SubType Description
-------- -------------
0 Reserved
1 NTP_TIMESTAMP
2-127 Unassigned
128-255 Reserved for Private or Experimental Use
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RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011
Sub-registry: END_TIME (X-Type 6) SubType values
Registration Procedure:
Specification Required
Registry:
SubType Description
-------- -------------
0 Reserved
1 NTP_TIMESTAMP
2-127 Unassigned
128-255 Reserved for Private or Experimental Use
9. Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Xioaming Fu and Lars Eggert for providing
reviews and comments. Helpful comments were also provided by Gen-ART
reviewer Ben Campbell, as well as Sean Turner and Tim Polk from the
Security Area. This document is largely based on the RFC 3520
[RFC3520] and credit therefore goes to the authors of RFC 3520 --
namely, Louis-Nicolas Hamer, Brett Kosinski, Bill Gage, and Hugh
Shieh. Part of this work was funded by Deutsche Telekom Laboratories
within the context of the BMBF-funded ScaleNet project.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.
[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network
Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010.
[RFC5971] Schulzrinne, H. and R. Hancock, "GIST: General Internet
Signalling Transport", RFC 5971, October 2010.
[RFC5973] Stiemerling, M., Tschofenig, H., Aoun, C., and E. Davies,
"NAT/Firewall NSIS Signaling Layer Protocol (NSLP)",
RFC 5973, October 2010.
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RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011
[RFC5974] Manner, J., Karagiannis, G., and A. McDonald, "NSIS
Signaling Layer Protocol (NSLP) for Quality-of-Service
Signaling", RFC 5974, October 2010.
[RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",
RFC 5996, September 2010.
10.2. Informative References
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
February 1997.
[RFC3520] Hamer, L-N., Gage, B., Kosinski, B., and H. Shieh,
"Session Authorization Policy Element", RFC 3520,
April 2003.
[RFC3521] Hamer, L-N., Gage, B., and H. Shieh, "Framework for
Session Set-up with Media Authorization", RFC 3521,
April 2003.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, January 2005.
[RFC4080] Hancock, R., Karagiannis, G., Loughney, J., and S. Van den
Bosch, "Next Steps in Signaling (NSIS): Framework",
RFC 4080, June 2005.
[RFC4081] Tschofenig, H. and D. Kroeselberg, "Security Threats for
Next Steps in Signaling (NSIS)", RFC 4081, June 2005.
[RFC4120] Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The
Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120,
July 2005.
[RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names",
RFC 4514, June 2006.
[RFC4868] Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-
384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec", RFC 4868, May 2007.
Manner, et al. Experimental [Page 35]
RFC 5981 NSLP AUTH February 2011
[RFC4880] Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., Shaw, D., and R.
Thayer, "OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 4880, November 2007.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, September 2009.
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Authors' Addresses
Jukka Manner
Aalto University
Department of Communications and Networking (Comnet)
P.O. Box 13000
Aalto FI-00076
Finland
Phone: +358 9 470 22481
EMail: jukka.manner@tkk.fi
Martin Stiemerling
Network Laboratories, NEC Europe Ltd.
Kurfuersten-Anlage 36
Heidelberg 69115
Germany
Phone: +49 (0) 6221 4342 113
EMail: martin.stiemerling@neclab.eu
URI: http://www.stiemerling.org
Hannes Tschofenig
Nokia Siemens Networks
Linnoitustie 6
Espoo 02600
Finland
Phone: +358 (50) 4871445
EMail: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at
Roland Bless (editor)
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
Institute of Telematics
Zirkel 2, Building 20.20
P.O. Box 6980
Karlsruhe 76049
Germany
Phone: +49 721 608 46413
EMail: roland.bless@kit.edu
URI: http://tm.kit.edu/~bless
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