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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Miller
Request for Comments: 7711 Cisco Systems, Inc.
Category: Standards Track P. Saint-Andre
ISSN: 2070-1721 &yet
November 2015
PKIX over Secure HTTP (POSH)
Abstract
Experience has shown that it is difficult to deploy proper PKIX
certificates for Transport Layer Security (TLS) in multi-tenanted
environments. As a result, domains hosted in such environments often
deploy applications using certificates that identify the hosting
service, not the hosted domain. Such deployments force end users and
peer services to accept a certificate with an improper identifier,
resulting in degraded security. This document defines methods that
make it easier to deploy certificates for proper server identity
checking in non-HTTP application protocols. Although these methods
were developed for use in the Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP) as a Domain Name Association (DNA) prooftype, they
might also be usable in other non-HTTP application protocols.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7711.
Miller & Saint-Andre Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 7711 POSH November 2015
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................3
2. Terminology .....................................................4
3. Obtaining Verification Material .................................5
3.1. Source Domain Possesses PKIX Certificate Information .......6
3.2. Source Domain References PKIX Certificate ..................8
3.3. Performing Verification ....................................9
4. Secure Delegation ...............................................9
5. Order of Operations ............................................10
6. Caching Results ................................................11
7. Guidance for Server Operators ..................................12
8. Guidance for Protocol Authors ..................................12
9. IANA Considerations ............................................13
9.1. Well-Known URI ............................................13
9.2. POSH Service Names ........................................13
10. Security Considerations .......................................14
11. References ....................................................15
11.1. Normative References .....................................15
11.2. Informative References ...................................16
Acknowledgements ..................................................18
Authors' Addresses ................................................18
Miller & Saint-Andre Standards Track [Page 2]
RFC 7711 POSH November 2015
1. Introduction
We begin with a thought experiment.
Imagine that you work on the operations team of a hosting company
that provides instances of the hypothetical "Secure Protocol for
Internet Content Exchange" (SPICE) service for ten thousand different
customer organizations. Each customer wants their instance to be
identified by the customer's domain name (e.g., bar.example.com), not
the hosting company's domain name (e.g., hosting.example.net).
In order to properly secure each customer's SPICE instance via
Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246], you need to obtain and
deploy PKIX certificates [RFC5280] containing identifiers such as
bar.example.com, as explained in the "CertID" specification
[RFC6125]. Unfortunately, you can't obtain and deploy such
certificates because:
o Certification authorities won't issue such certificates to you
because you work for the hosting company, not the customer
organization.
o Customers won't obtain such certificates and then give them (plus
the associated private keys) to you because their legal department
is worried about liability.
o You don't want to install such certificates (plus the associated
private keys) on your servers because your legal department is
worried about liability, too.
o Even if your legal department is happy, this still means managing
one certificate for each customer across the infrastructure,
contributing to a large administrative load.
Given your inability to obtain and deploy public keys / certificates
containing the right identifiers, your back-up approach has always
been to use a certificate containing hosting.example.net as the
identifier. However, more and more customers and end users are
complaining about warning messages in user agents and the inherent
security issues involved with taking a "leap of faith" to accept the
identity mismatch between the source domain (bar.example.com) and the
delegated domain (hosting.example.net) [RFC6125].
This situation is both insecure and unsustainable. You have
investigated the possibility of using DNS Security [RFC4033] and
DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) [RFC6698] to solve
the problem. However, your customers and your operations team have
told you that it will be several years before they will be able to
Miller & Saint-Andre Standards Track [Page 3]
RFC 7711 POSH November 2015
deploy DNSSEC and DANE for all of your customers (because of tooling
updates, slow deployment of DNSSEC at some top-level domains, etc.).
The product managers in your company are pushing you to find a method
that can be deployed more quickly to overcome the lack of proper
server identity checking for your hosted customers.
One possible approach that your team has investigated is to ask each
customer to provide the public key / certificate for its SPICE
service at a special HTTPS URI on their website
("https://bar.example.com/.well-known/posh/spice.json" is one
possibility). This could be a public key that you generate for the
customer, but because the customer hosts it via HTTPS, any user agent
can find that public key and check it against the public key you
provide during TLS negotiation for the SPICE service (as one added
benefit, the customer never needs to hand you a private key).
Alternatively, the customer can redirect requests for that special
HTTPS URI to an HTTPS URI at your own website, thus making it
explicit that they have delegated the SPICE service to you.
The approach sketched out above, called POSH ("PKIX over Secure
HTTP"), is explained in the remainder of this document. Although
this approach was developed for use in the Extensible Messaging and
Presence Protocol (XMPP) as a prooftype for Domain Name Associations
(DNA) [RFC7712], it might be usable by any non-HTTP application
protocol.
2. Terminology
This document inherits security terminology from [RFC5280]. The
terms "source domain", "delegated domain", "derived domain", and
"reference identifier" are used as defined in the "CertID"
specification [RFC6125].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119].
Additionally, this document uses the following terms:
POSH client: A client that uses the application service and that
uses POSH to obtain material for verifying the service's identity.
POSH server: A server that hosts the application service and that
uses POSH to provide material for verifying its identity.
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3. Obtaining Verification Material
Server identity checking (see [RFC6125]) involves three different
aspects:
1. A proof of the POSH server's identity (in PKIX, this takes the
form of a PKIX end-entity certificate [RFC5280]).
2. Rules for checking the certificate (which vary by application
protocol, although [RFC6125] attempts to harmonize those rules).
3. The material that a POSH client uses to verify the POSH server's
identity or check the POSH server's proof (in PKIX, this takes
the form of chaining the end-entity certificate back to a trusted
root and performing all validity checks as described in
[RFC5280], [RFC6125], and the relevant application protocol
specification).
When POSH is used, the first two aspects remain the same: the POSH
server proves its identity by presenting a PKIX certificate
[RFC5280], and the certificate is checked according to the rules
defined in the appropriate application protocol specification (such
as [RFC6120] for XMPP). However, the POSH client obtains the
material it will use to verify the server's proof by retrieving a
JSON document [RFC7159] containing hashes of the PKIX certificate
over HTTPS ([RFC7230] and [RFC2818]) from a well-known URI [RFC5785]
at the source domain. POSH servers MUST use HTTPS. This means that
the POSH client MUST verify the certificate of the HTTPS service at
the source domain in order to securely "bootstrap" into the use of
POSH; specifically, the rules of [RFC2818] apply to this
"bootstrapping" step to provide a secure basis for all subsequent
POSH operations.
A PKIX certificate is retrieved over secure HTTP in the
following way:
1. The POSH client performs an HTTPS GET request at the source
domain to the path "/.well-known/posh/{servicedesc}.json". The
value of "{servicedesc}" is application-specific; see Section 8
of this document for more details. For example, if the
application protocol is the hypothetical SPICE service, then
"{servicedesc}" could be "spice"; thus, if an application client
were to use POSH to verify an application server for the source
domain "bar.example.com", the HTTPS GET request would be as
follows:
GET /.well-known/posh/spice.json HTTP/1.1
Host: bar.example.com
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2. The source domain HTTPS server responds in one of three ways:
* If it possesses PKIX certificate information for the requested
path, it responds as detailed in Section 3.1.
* If it has a reference to where the PKIX certificate
information can be obtained, it responds as detailed in
Section 3.2.
* If it does not have any PKIX certificate information or a
reference to such information for the requested path, it
responds with an HTTP 404 Not Found status code [RFC7231].
3.1. Source Domain Possesses PKIX Certificate Information
If the source domain HTTPS server possesses the certificate
information, it responds to the HTTPS GET request with a success
status code and the message body set to a JSON document [RFC7159];
the document is a "fingerprints document", i.e., a JSON object with
the following members:
o A "fingerprints" member whose value is a JSON array of fingerprint
descriptors (the member MUST include at least one fingerprint
descriptor).
o An "expires" member whose value is a JSON number specifying the
number of seconds after which the POSH client ought to consider
the keying material to be stale (further explained under
Section 6).
The JSON document returned MUST NOT contain a "url" member, as
described in Section 3.2.
Each included fingerprint descriptor is a JSON object, where each
member name is the textual name of a hash function (as listed in
[HASH-NAMES]) and its associated value is the base64-encoded
fingerprint hash generated using the named hash function (where the
encoding adheres to the definition in Section 4 of [RFC4648] and
where the padding bits are set to zero).
The fingerprint hash for a given hash algorithm is generated by
performing the named hash function over the DER encoding of the PKIX
X.509 certificate. (This implies that if the certificate expires or
is revoked, the fingerprint value will be out of date.)
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RFC 7711 POSH November 2015
As an example of the fingerprint format, the "sha-256" and "sha-512"
fingerprints are generated by performing the SHA-256 and SHA-512 hash
functions, respectively, over the DER encoding of the PKIX
certificate, as illustrated below. Note that for readability
whitespace has been added to the content portion of the HTTP response
shown below but is not reflected in the Content-Length.
Example Fingerprints Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 195
{
"fingerprints": [
{
"sha-256": "4/mggdlVx8A3pvHAWW5sD+qJyMtUHgiRuPjVC48N0XQ=",
"sha-512": "25N+1hB2Vo42l9lSGqw+n3BKFhDHsyork8ou+D9B43TXeJ
1J81mdQEDqm39oR/EHkPBDDG1y5+AG94Kec0xVqA=="
}
],
"expires": 604800
}
The "expires" value is a hint regarding the expiration of the keying
material. It MUST be a non-negative integer. If the "expires"
member has a value of 0 (zero), a POSH client MUST consider the
verification material to be invalid. See Section 6 for how to
reconcile this "expires" member with the reference's "expires"
member.
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RFC 7711 POSH November 2015
To indicate alternate PKIX certificates (such as when an existing
certificate will soon expire), the returned fingerprints member MAY
contain multiple fingerprint descriptors. The fingerprints SHOULD be
ordered with the most relevant certificate first as determined by the
application service operator (e.g., the renewed certificate),
followed by the next most relevant certificate (e.g., the certificate
soonest to expire). Here is an example (note that whitespace is
added for readability):
{
"fingerprints": [
{
"sha-256": "4/mggdlVx8A3pvHAWW5sD+qJyMtUHgiRuPjVC48N0XQ",
"sha-512": "25N+1hB2Vo42l9lSGqw+n3BKFhDHsyork8ou+D9B43TXe
J1J81mdQEDqm39oR/EHkPBDDG1y5+AG94Kec0xVqA=="
},
{
"sha-256": "otyLADSKjRDjVpj8X7/hmCAD5C7Qe+PedcmYV7cUncE=",
"sha-512": "MbBD+ausTGJisEXKSynROWrMfHP2xvBnmI79Pr/KXnDyLN
+13Jof8/Uq9fj5HZG8Rk1E2fclcivpGdijUsvHRg=="
}
],
"expires": 806400
}
Matching on any of these fingerprints is acceptable.
Rolling over from one hosting provider to another is best handled by
updating the relevant SRV records, not primarily by updating the POSH
documents themselves.
3.2. Source Domain References PKIX Certificate
If the source domain HTTPS server has a reference to the certificate
information, it responds to the HTTPS GET request with a success
status code and message body set to a JSON document. The document is
a "reference document", i.e., a JSON object with the following
members:
o A "url" member whose value is a JSON string specifying the HTTPS
URI where POSH clients can obtain the actual certificate
information. The URI can be a well-known POSH URI as described in
Section 8, but it need not be. (For historical reasons, the
member name is "url", not "uri".)
o An "expires" member whose value is a JSON number specifying the
number of seconds after which the POSH client ought to consider
the delegation to be stale (further explained under Section 6).
Miller & Saint-Andre Standards Track [Page 8]
RFC 7711 POSH November 2015
Example Reference Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 82
{
"url":"https://hosting.example.net/.well-known/posh/spice.json",
"expires":86400
}
In order to process a reference response, the client performs an
HTTPS GET request for the URI specified in the "url" member value.
The HTTPS server for the URI to which the client has been referred
responds to the request with a JSON document containing fingerprints
as described in Section 3.1. The document retrieved from the
location specified by the "url" member MUST NOT itself be a reference
document (i.e., containing a "url" member instead of a "fingerprints"
member), in order to prevent circular delegations.
Note: See Section 10 for discussion about HTTPS redirects.
The "expires" value is a hint regarding the expiration of the source
domain's delegation of service to the delegated domain. It MUST be a
non-negative integer. If the "expires" member has a value of 0
(zero), a POSH client MUST consider the delegation invalid. See
Section 6 for guidelines about reconciling this "expires" member with
the "expires" member of the fingerprints document.
3.3. Performing Verification
The POSH client compares the PKIX information presented by the POSH
server against each fingerprint descriptor object in the POSH
fingerprints document, until a match is found using the hash
functions that the client supports, or until the collection of POSH
verification material is exhausted. If none of the fingerprint
descriptor objects match the POSH server PKIX information, the POSH
client SHOULD reject the connection (however, the POSH client might
still accept the connection if other verification methods are
successful, such as DANE [RFC6698]).
4. Secure Delegation
The delegation from the source domain to the delegated domain can be
considered secure if the credentials offered by the POSH server match
the verification material obtained by the client, regardless of how
the material was obtained.
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RFC 7711 POSH November 2015
5. Order of Operations
In order for the POSH client to perform verification of reference
identifiers without potentially compromising data, POSH operations
MUST be complete before any application-layer data is exchanged for
the source domain. In cases where the POSH client initiates an
application-layer connection, the client SHOULD perform all POSH
retrievals before initiating a connection (naturally, this is not
possible in cases where the POSH client receives instead of initiates
an application-layer connection). For application protocols that use
DNS SRV (including queries for TLSA records in concert with SRV
records as described in [RFC7673]), the POSH operations ideally ought
to be done in parallel with resolving the SRV records and the
addresses of any targets, similar to the "Happy Eyeballs" approach
for IPv4 and IPv6 [RFC6555].
The following diagram illustrates the possession flow:
POSH Source POSH
Client Domain Server
------ ------ ------
| | |
| POSH Request | |
|------------------------->| |
| | |
| Return POSH fingerprints | |
|<-------------------------| |
| |
| Service TLS Handshake |
|<===================================================>|
| |
| Service Data |
|<===================================================>|
| |
Figure 1: Order of Events for Possession Flow
Miller & Saint-Andre Standards Track [Page 10]
RFC 7711 POSH November 2015
While the following diagram illustrates the reference flow:
POSH Source Delegated POSH
Client Domain Domain Server
------ ------ ------ ------
| | | |
| POSH Request | | |
|----------------->| | |
| | | |
| Return POSH url | | |
|<-----------------| | |
| | |
| POSH Request | |
|-------------------------------->| |
| | |
| Return POSH fingerprints | |
|<--------------------------------| |
| |
| Service TLS Handshake |
|<===================================================>|
| |
| Service Data |
|<===================================================>|
| |
Figure 2: Order of Events for Reference Flow
6. Caching Results
The POSH client MUST NOT cache results (reference or fingerprints)
indefinitely. If the source domain returns a reference, the POSH
client MUST use the lower of the two "expires" values when
determining how long to cache results (i.e., if the reference
"expires" value is lower than the fingerprints "expires" value, honor
the reference "expires" value). Once the POSH client considers the
results stale, it needs to perform the entire POSH operation again,
starting with the HTTPS GET request to the source domain. The POSH
client MAY use a lower value than any provided in the "expires"
member(s), or not cache results at all.
The foregoing considerations apply to the handling of the "expires"
values in POSH documents; naturally, a POSH client MUST NOT consider
an expired PKIX certificate to be valid, in accordance with
[RFC5280].
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RFC 7711 POSH November 2015
The POSH client SHOULD NOT rely on HTTP caching mechanisms, instead
using the expiration hints provided in the POSH reference document or
fingerprints document. To that end, the HTTPS servers for source
domains and derived domains SHOULD specify a 'Cache-Control' header
indicating a very short duration (e.g., max-age=60) or "no-cache" to
indicate that the response (redirect, reference, or fingerprints) is
not appropriate to cache at the HTTP layer.
7. Guidance for Server Operators
POSH is intended to ease the operational burden of securing
application services, especially in multi-tenanted environments. It
does so by obviating the need to obtain certificates for hosted
domains, so that an operator can obtain a certificate only for its
hosting service (naturally, this certificate needs to be valid
according to [RFC5280] and contain the proper identifier(s) in
accordance with [RFC6125] and the relevant application protocol
specification).
However, in order to use POSH, an operator does need to coordinate
with its customers so that the appropriate POSH documents are
provided via HTTPS at a well-known URI at each customer's domain
(i.e., at the source domain), thus ensuring delegation to the
operator's hosting service (i.e., the delegated domain). Because
correct hosting of the POSH document at the source domain is
essential for successful functioning of the POSH "chain", errors at
the source domain will result in authentication problems, certificate
warnings, and other operational issues.
Furthermore, if the POSH document is a reference document instead of
a fingerprints document, the operational burden is further decreased
because the operator does not need to provision its customers with
updated POSH documents when the certificate for the delegated domain
expires or is replaced.
8. Guidance for Protocol Authors
Protocols that use POSH are expected to register with the "POSH
Service Names" registry defined under Section 9.2.
For POSH-using protocols that rely on DNS SRV records [RFC2782], the
service name SHOULD be the same as the DNS SRV "Service". As an
example, the POSH service name for XMPP server-to-server connections
would be "xmpp-server" because [RFC6120] registers a DNS SRV
"Service" of "xmpp-server". One example of the resulting well-known
URI would be "https://example.com/.well-known/posh/xmpp-server.json".
Miller & Saint-Andre Standards Track [Page 12]
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For other POSH-using protocols, the service name MAY be any unique
string or identifier for the protocol; for example, it might be a
service name registered with the IANA in accordance with [RFC6335],
or it might be an unregistered name. As an example, the well-known
URI for the hypothetical SPICE application might be "spice".
9. IANA Considerations
9.1. Well-Known URI
IANA has registered "posh" in the "Well-Known URIs" registry as
defined by [RFC5785]. The completed template follows.
URI suffix: posh
Change controller: IETF
Specification: RFC 7711 (this document)
Related information: The suffix "posh" is expected to be followed by
an additional path component consisting of a service name (say,
"spice") and a file extension of ".json", resulting in a full path
of, for instance, "/.well-known/posh/spice.json". Registration of
service names shall be requested by developers of the relevant
application protocols.
9.2. POSH Service Names
IANA has established the "POSH Service Names" registry within the
"Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) Schemes" group of registries.
The IANA registration policy [RFC5226] is Expert Review or IETF
Review (this was chosen instead of the more liberal policy of First
Come First Served to help ensure that POSH services are defined in
ways that are consistent with this specification). One or more
Designated Experts are to be appointed by the IESG or their delegate.
Registration requests are to be sent to the posh@ietf.org mailing
list for review and comment, with an appropriate subject (e.g.,
"Request for POSH service name: example").
Before a period of 14 days has passed, the Designated Expert(s) will
either approve or deny the registration request, communicating this
decision both to the review list and to IANA. Denials should include
an explanation and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the
request successful. Registration requests that are undetermined for
a period longer than 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention
(using the iesg@iesg.org mailing list) for resolution.
Miller & Saint-Andre Standards Track [Page 13]
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9.2.1. Registration Template
Service name: The name requested, relative to "/.well-known/posh/";
e.g., a service name of "example" would result in a well-known URI
such as "https://example.com/.well-known/posh/example.json".
Change controller: For Standards Track RFCs, state "IETF". In all
other cases, provide the name and email address of the responsible
party. Other details (e.g., postal address or website URI) may
also be included.
Definition and usage: A brief description that defines the service
name and mentions where and how it is used (e.g., in the context
of a particular application protocol).
Specification: Optionally, reference to a document that specifies
the service or application protocol that uses the service name,
preferably including a URI that can be used to retrieve a copy of
the document. An indication of the relevant sections may also be
included but is not required.
10. Security Considerations
This document supplements but does not supersede the security
considerations provided in specifications for application protocols
that decide to use POSH (e.g., [RFC6120] and [RFC6125] for XMPP).
Specifically, the security of requests and responses sent via HTTPS
depends on checking the identity of the HTTP server in accordance
with [RFC2818] as well as following the most modern best practices
for TLS as specified in [RFC7525]. Additionally, the security of
POSH can benefit from other HTTP-hardening protocols, such as HTTP
Strict Transport Security (HSTS) [RFC6797] and key pinning [RFC7469],
especially if the POSH client shares some information with a common
HTTPS implementation (e.g., a platform-default web browser).
Note well that POSH is used by a POSH client to obtain the public key
of a POSH server to which it might connect for a particular
application protocol such as IMAP or XMPP. POSH does not enable a
hosted domain to transfer private keys to a hosting service via
HTTPS. POSH also does not enable a POSH server to engage in
certificate enrollment with a certification authority via HTTPS, as
is done in Enrollment over Secure Transport [RFC7030].
A web server at the source domain might redirect an HTTPS request to
another HTTPS URI. The location provided in the redirect response
MUST specify an HTTPS URI. Source domains SHOULD use only temporary
redirect mechanisms, such as HTTP status codes 302 (Found) and 307
(Temporary Redirect) [RFC7231]. Clients MAY treat any redirect as
Miller & Saint-Andre Standards Track [Page 14]
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temporary, ignoring the specific semantics for 301 (Moved
Permanently) [RFC7231] and 308 (Permanent Redirect) [RFC7538]. To
protect against circular references, it is RECOMMENDED that POSH
clients follow no more than 10 redirects, although applications or
implementations can require that fewer redirects be followed.
Hash function agility is an important quality to ensure secure
operations in the face of attacks against the fingerprints obtained
within verification material. Because POSH verification material is
relatively short-lived compared to long-lived credentials such as
PKIX end-entity certificates (at least as typically deployed),
entities that deploy POSH are advised to swap out POSH documents if
the hash functions are found to be subject to practical attacks
[RFC4270].
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5785] Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-Known
Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 5785,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5785, April 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5785>.
Miller & Saint-Andre Standards Track [Page 15]
RFC 7711 POSH November 2015
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125,
March 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159,
March 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
[RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content",
RFC 7231, DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525,
May 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
11.2. Informative References
[HASH-NAMES]
"Hash Function Textual Names",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/
hash-function-text-names>.
[RFC2782] Gulbrandsen, A., Vixie, P., and L. Esibov, "A DNS RR for
specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)", RFC 2782,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2782, February 2000,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2782>.
[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033>.
[RFC4270] Hoffman, P. and B. Schneier, "Attacks on Cryptographic
Hashes in Internet Protocols", RFC 4270,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4270, November 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4270>.
Miller & Saint-Andre Standards Track [Page 16]
RFC 7711 POSH November 2015
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
[RFC6120] Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP): Core", RFC 6120, DOI 10.17487/RFC6120,
March 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6120>.
[RFC6335] Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S.
Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and
Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165,
RFC 6335, DOI 10.17487/RFC6335, August 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6335>.
[RFC6555] Wing, D. and A. Yourtchenko, "Happy Eyeballs: Success with
Dual-Stack Hosts", RFC 6555, DOI 10.17487/RFC6555,
April 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6555>.
[RFC6698] Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698,
August 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6698>.
[RFC6797] Hodges, J., Jackson, C., and A. Barth, "HTTP Strict
Transport Security (HSTS)", RFC 6797,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6797, November 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6797>.
[RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
"Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.
[RFC7469] Evans, C., Palmer, C., and R. Sleevi, "Public Key Pinning
Extension for HTTP", RFC 7469, DOI 10.17487/RFC7469,
April 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7469>.
[RFC7538] Reschke, J., "The Hypertext Transfer Protocol Status
Code 308 (Permanent Redirect)", RFC 7538,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7538, April 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7538>.
Miller & Saint-Andre Standards Track [Page 17]
RFC 7711 POSH November 2015
[RFC7673] Finch, T., Miller, M., and P. Saint-Andre, "Using
DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) TLSA
Records with SRV Records", RFC 7673, DOI 10.17487/RFC7673,
October 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7673>.
[RFC7712] Saint-Andre, P., Miller, M., and P. Hancke, "Domain Name
Associations (DNA) in the Extensible Messaging and
Presence Protocol (XMPP)", RFC 7712, DOI 10.17487/RFC7712,
November 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7712>.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Thijs Alkemade, Philipp Hancke, Joe Hildebrand, and Tobias
Markmann for their implementation feedback, and to Dave Cridland,
Chris Newton, Max Pritikin, and Joe Salowey for their input on the
specification.
During IESG review, Stephen Farrell, Barry Leiba, and Kathleen
Moriarty provided helpful input that resulted in improvements in the
document.
Thanks also to Dave Cridland as document shepherd, Joe Hildebrand as
working group chair, and Ben Campbell as area director.
Peter Saint-Andre wishes to acknowledge Cisco Systems, Inc., for
employing him during his work on earlier draft versions of this
document.
Authors' Addresses
Matthew Miller
Cisco Systems, Inc.
1899 Wynkoop Street, Suite 600
Denver, CO 80202
United States
Email: mamille2@cisco.com
Peter Saint-Andre
&yet
Email: peter@andyet.com
URI: https://andyet.com/
Miller & Saint-Andre Standards Track [Page 18]