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Summary: In the first book of "De Legibus", Cicero argues that morals, laws and truths can not be based on mere opinions, whims or "will of the people", because it will eventually lead to chaos. Instead, those must be based on laws of nature & reason.
— You may well describe these topics as grand, which we are now briefly discussing. For of all
the questions on which our philosophers argue, there is none which it is more important
thoroughly to understand than this, that man is born for justice, and that law and equity are
not a mere establishment of opinion, but an institution of nature. This truth will become still
more apparent if we investigate the nature of human association and society.
There is no one thing more like to another, more homogeneous and analogous, than man is to
man. And if the corruption of customs, and the variation of opinions, had not induced an
imbecility of minds, and turned them aside from the course of nature, no one would more
nearly resemble himself than all men would resemble all men. Therefore whatever definition we
give of man, it must include the whole human race. And this is a good argument, that no give of man, it must include the whole human race. And this is a good argument, that no portion of mankind can be heterogeneous or dissimilar from the rest; because, if this were the case, one definition could not include all men.
In fact, reason, which alone gives us so many advantages over beasts, by means of which we
conjecture, argue, refute, discourse, and accomplish and conclude our designs, is assuredly
common to all men; for the faculty of acquiring knowledge is similar in all human minds,
though the knowledge itself may be endlessly diversified. By the same senses we all perceive
the same objects, and that which strikes the sensibilities of the few, cannot be indifferent to
those of the many. Those first rude elements of intelligence which, as I before observed, are
the earliest developments of thought, are similarly exhibited by all men; and that faculty of
speech which is the soul’s interpreter, agrees in the ideas it conveys, though it may differ in the
syllables that express them. And therefore there exists not a man in any nation, who, adopting
his true nature for his true guide, may not improve in virtue.
Nor is this resemblance which all men bear to each other remarkable in those things only which
accord to right reason. For it is scarcely less conspicuous in those corrupt practices by which
right reason is most cruelly violated. For all men alike are captivated by voluptuousness, which
is in reality no better than disgraceful vice, though it may seem to bear some natural relations
to goodness; for by its delicious delicacy and luxury it insinuates error into the mind, and leads
us to cultivate it as something salutary, forgetful of its poisonous qualities.
An error, scarcely less universal, induces us to shun death, as if it were annihilation; and to
cling to life, because it keeps us in our present stage of existence, which is perhaps rather a
misfortune than a desideratum. Thus, likewise, we erroneously consider pain as one of the
greatest evils, not only on account of its present asperity, but also because it seems the
precursor of mortality. Another common delusion obtains, which induces all mankind to
associate renown with honesty, as if we are necessarily happy when we are renowned, and
miserable when we happen to be inglorious.
In short, our minds are all similarly susceptible of inquietudes, joys, desires and fears; and if
opinions are not the same in all men, it does not follow, for example, that the people of Egypt
who deify dogs and cats, do not labour under superstition in the same way as other nations,
though they may differ from them in the forms of its manifestation.
But in nothing is the uniformity of human nature more conspicuous than in its respect for
virtue. What nation is there, in which kindness, benignity, gratitude, and mindfulness of
benefits are not recommended? What nation in which arrogance, malice, cruelty, and
unthankfulness, are not reprobated and detested! This uniformity of opinions, invincibly
demonstrates that mankind was intended to compose one fraternal association. And to affect
this, the faculty of reason must be improved till it instructs us in all the arts of well–living. If
what I have said meets your approbation, I will proceed; or if any of my argument appears
defective, I will endeavour to explain it.
[...]
It is therefore an absurd extravagance in some philosophers to assert that all things are
necessarily just, which are established by the civil laws and the institutions of the people. Are
then the laws of tyrants just, simply because they are laws? If the thirty tyrants of Athens
imposed certain laws on the Athenians, and if these Athenians were delighted with these
tyrannical laws, are we therefore bound to consider these laws as just? For my own part, I do
not think such laws deserve any greater estimation than that past during our own interregnum,
which ordained, that the dictator should be empowered to put to death with impunity, whatever
citizens he pleased, without hearing them in their own defence.
There can be but one essential justice, which cements society, and one law which establishes
this justice. This law is right reason, which is the true rule of all commandments and
prohibitions. Whoever neglects this law, whether written or unwritten, is necessarily unjust and
wicked.
[...]
If the will of the people, the decrees of the senate, the adjudications of magistrates, were
sufficient to establish justice, the only question would be how to gain suffrages, and to win over
the votes of the majority, in order that corruption and spoliation, and the falsification of wills,
should become lawful. But if the opinions and suffrages of foolish men had sufficient weight to
outbalance the nature of things, might they not determine among them, that what is essentially
bad and pernicious should henceforth pass for good and beneficial? Or why should not a law
able to enforce injustice, take the place of equity? Would not this same law be able to change
evil into good, and good into evil?
As far as we are concerned, we have no other rule capable of distinguishing between a good or
a bad law, than our natural conscience and reason. These, however, enable us to separate
justice from injustice, and to discriminate between the honest and the scandalous. For common
sense has impressed in our minds the first principles of things, and has given us a general
acquaintance with them, by which we connect with Virtue every honourable and excellent
quality, and with Vice all that is abominable and disgraceful.
Now we must entirely take leave of our senses, ere we can suppose that law and justice have
no foundation in nature, and rely merely on the transient opinions of men. We should not
venture to praise the virtue of a tree or a horse, in which expression there is an abuse of
terms, were we not convinced that this virtue was in their nature, rather than in our opinion.
For a stronger reason, it is mainly with respect to the moral nature of things, that we ought to
speak of honour and shame among men.
If opinion could determine respecting the character of universal virtue, it might also decide
respecting particular or partial virtues. But who will dare to determine that a man is prudent
and cautious in his moral disposition, from any external appearances. For virtue evidently lies in
perfect rationality, and this resides in the inmost depths of our nature. The same remark
applies to all honour and honesty, for we judge of true and false, creditable and discreditable,
rather by their essential qualities, than their external relations. Thus we judge according to
their intrinsic nature, that rationality of life, which is virtue, must be ever constant and
perpetual, and that inconstancy must necessarily be vicious.
We form an estimate of the opinions of youths, but not by their opinions. Those virtues and
vices which reside in their moral natures, must not be measured by opinions. And so of all
moral qualities, we must discriminate between honourable and dishonourable by reference to
the essential nature of the things themselves.
The good we commend, must needs contain in itself something commendable. For as I before
stated, goodness is not a mode of opinion: it is what it is, by the force of its very essence. If it
were otherwise, opinion alone might constitute virtue and happiness, which is the most absurd
of suppositions. And since we judge of good and evil by their nature, and since good and evil
are the true constituents of honour and shame, we should judge in the same manner all
honourable and all shameful qualities, testing them by the law of nature, without prejudice or
passion. But our steady attention to this moral law of nature is often too much disturbed by the
dissention of men and the variation of opinions. We might perhaps obey this law of nature more
exactly, if we attended more accurately to the evidence of our senses, which being absolutely
natural, are less likely to be deceived by artificial objects. Those objects, indeed, which
sometimes present to us one appearance, sometimes another, we term fictions of the senses;
but it is far otherwise. For neither parent, nor nurse, nor master, nor poet, nor drama, deceive
our senses; nor do popular prejudices seduce them. But our delusions are connected with
corruption of our mental opinions. And this corruption is either superinduced by those causes of
error I have enumerated, which, taking possession of the young and uneducated, betray them
into a thousand perversities, or by that voluptuousness which is the mimic of goodness, implicated and interfused through all our senses—the prolific mother of all human disasters. For
she so corrupts us by her bewitching blandishments that we no longer perceive that things may
be essentially excellent, though they have none of this deliciousness and pruriency. (Quæ
natura bona sunt quia, dulcedine hac et scabie carent.)
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