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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) W. George
Request for Comments: 8206 Neustar
Updates: 8205 S. Murphy
Category: Standards Track PARSONS, Inc.
ISSN: 2070-1721 September 2017
BGPsec Considerations for Autonomous System (AS) Migration
Abstract
This document discusses considerations and methods for supporting and
securing a common method for Autonomous System (AS) migration within
the BGPsec protocol.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8206.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
George & Murphy Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 8206 BGPsec AS Migration September 2017
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2. Documentation Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. General Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. RPKI Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Origin Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.1. Outbound Announcements (PE-->CE) . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.2. Inbound Announcements (CE-->PE) . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Outbound (PE-->CE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. Inbound (CE-->PE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.3. Other Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.4. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Introduction
A method of managing a BGP Autonomous System Number (ASN) migration
is described in RFC 7705 [RFC7705]. Since it concerns the handling
of AS_PATH attributes, it is necessary to ensure that the process and
features are properly supported in BGPsec [RFC8205] because BGPsec is
explicitly designed to protect against changes in the BGP AS_PATH,
whether by choice, by misconfiguration, or by malicious intent. It
is critical that the BGPsec protocol framework be able to support
this operationally necessary tool without creating an unacceptable
security risk or exploit in the process.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
George & Murphy Standards Track [Page 2]
RFC 8206 BGPsec AS Migration September 2017
1.2. Documentation Note
This document uses ASNs from the range reserved for documentation as
described in RFC 5398 [RFC5398]. In the examples used here, they are
intended to represent Globally Unique ASNs, not ASNs reserved for
private use as documented in Section 10 of RFC 1930 [RFC1930].
2. General Scenario
This document assumes that the reader has read and understood the ASN
migration method discussed in RFC 7705 [RFC7705] including its
examples (see Section 2 of the referenced document), as they will be
heavily referenced here. The use case being discussed in RFC 7705
[RFC7705] is as follows: For whatever the reason, a provider is in
the process of merging two or more ASes, where eventually one
subsumes the other(s). BGP AS confederations [RFC5065] are not
enabled between the ASes, but a mechanism is being used to modify
BGP's default behavior and allow the migrating Provider Edge (PE)
router to masquerade as the old ASN for the Provider-Edge-to-
Customer-Edge (PE-CE) eBGP (external BGP) session, or to manipulate
the AS_PATH, or both. While BGPsec [RFC8205] does have a method to
handle standard confederation implementations, it is not applicable
in this exact case. This migration requires a slightly different
solution in BGPsec than for a standard confederation because unlike
in a confederation, eBGP peers may not be peering with the "correct"
external ASN, and the forward-signed updates are for a public ASN,
rather than a private one; so, there is no expectation that the BGP
speaker would strip the affected signatures before propagating the
route to its eBGP neighbors.
In the examples in Section 5.4, AS64510 is being subsumed by AS64500,
and both ASNs represent a Service Provider (SP) network (see Figures
1 and 2 in RFC 7705 [RFC7705]). AS64496 and 64499 represent
end-customer networks. References to PE, CE, and P routers mirror
the diagrams and references in RFC 7705.
3. RPKI Considerations
The methods and implementation discussed in RFC 7705 [RFC7705] are
widely used during network integrations resulting from mergers and
acquisitions, as well as network redesigns; therefore, it is
necessary to support this capability on any BGPsec-enabled routers/
ASNs. What follows is a discussion of the potential issues to be
considered regarding how ASN migration and BGPsec [RFC8205]
validation might interact.
One of the primary considerations for this document and migration is
that service providers (SPs) rarely stop after one
George & Murphy Standards Track [Page 3]
RFC 8206 BGPsec AS Migration September 2017
merger/acquisition/divestiture; they end up accumulating several
legacy ASNs over time. Since SPs are using migration methods that
are transparent to customers and therefore do not require
coordination with customers, they do not have as much control over
the length of the transition period as they might with something
completely under their administrative control (e.g., a key roll).
Because they are not forcing a simultaneous migration (i.e., both
ends switch to the new ASN at an agreed-upon time), there is no
incentive for a given customer to complete the move from the old ASN
to the new one. This leaves many SPs with multiple legacy ASNs that
don't go away very quickly, if at all. As solutions were being
proposed for Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
implementations to solve this transition case, the WG carefully
considered operational complexity and hardware scaling issues
associated with maintaining multiple legacy ASN keys on routers
throughout the combined network. While SPs who choose to remain in
this transition phase indefinitely invite added risks because of the
operational complexity and scaling considerations associated with
maintaining multiple legacy ASN keys on routers throughout the
combined network, saying "don't do this" is of limited utility as a
solution. As a result, this solution attempts to minimize the
additional complexity during the transition period, on the assumption
that it will likely be protracted. Note that while this document
primarily discusses service provider considerations, it is not solely
applicable to SPs, as enterprises often migrate between ASNs using
the same functionality. What follows is a discussion of origin and
path validation functions and how they interact with ASN migrations.
3.1. Origin Validation
Route Origin Validation as defined by RFC 6480 [RFC6480] does not
require modification to enable AS migration, as the existing protocol
and procedure allow for a solution. In the scenario discussed in RFC
7705 [RFC7705], AS64510 is being replaced by AS64500. If there are
any existing routes originated by AS64510 on the router being moved
into the new ASN, new Route Origination Authorizations (ROAs) for the
routes with the new ASN should be generated, and they should be
treated as new routes to be added to AS64500. However, we also need
to consider the situation where one or more other PEs are still in
AS64510 and are originating one or more routes that may be distinct
from any that the router under migration is originating. PE1 (which
is now a part of AS64500 and instructed to use "Replace Old AS" as
defined in [RFC7705] to remove AS64510 from the path) needs to be
able to properly handle routes originated from AS64510. If the route
now shows up as originating from AS64500, any downstream peers'
validation check will fail unless a ROA is *also* available for
AS64500 as the origin ASN. In addition to generating a ROA for 65400
for any prefixes originated by the router being moved, it may be
George & Murphy Standards Track [Page 4]
RFC 8206 BGPsec AS Migration September 2017
necessary to generate ROAs for 65400 for prefixes that are
originating on routers still in 65410, since the AS replacement
function will change the origin AS in some cases. This means that
there will be multiple ROAs showing different ASes authorized to
originate the same prefixes until all routers originating prefixes
from AS64510 are migrated to AS64500. Multiple ROAs of this type are
permissible per Section 3.2 of RFC 6480 [RFC6480] so managing origin
validation during a migration like this is merely applying the
defined case where a set of prefixes are originated from more than
one ASN. Therefore, for each ROA that authorizes the old ASN (e.g.,
AS64510) to originate a prefix, a new ROA MUST also be created that
authorizes the replacing ASN (e.g., AS64500) to originate the same
prefix.
3.2. Path Validation
BGPsec path validation requires that each router in the AS path
cryptographically sign its update to assert that "every Autonomous
System (AS) on the path of ASes listed in the UPDATE message has
explicitly authorized the advertisement of the route to the
subsequent AS in the path" (see Section 1 of RFC 8205 [RFC8205]).
Since the referenced AS-migration technique explicitly modifies the
AS_PATH between two eBGP peers who are not coordinating with one
another (are not in the same administrative domain), no level of
trust can be assumed; therefore, it may be difficult to identify
legitimate manipulation of the AS_PATH for migration activities when
compared to manipulation due to misconfiguration or malicious intent.
3.2.1. Outbound Announcements (PE-->CE)
When PE1 is moved from AS64510 to AS64500, it will be provisioned
with the appropriate keys for AS64500 to allow it to forward-sign
routes using AS64500. However, there is no guidance in the BGPsec
protocol specification [RFC8205] on whether or not the forward-signed
ASN value is required to match the configured remote AS to validate
properly. That is, if CE1's BGP session is configured as "remote AS
64510", the presence of "local AS 64510" on PE1 will ensure that
there is no ASN mismatch on the BGP session itself, but if CE1
receives updates from its remote neighbor (PE1) forward-signed from
AS64500, there is no guidance as to whether the BGPsec validator on
CE1 still considers those valid by default. Section 6.3 of RFC 4271
[RFC4271] mentions this match between the ASN of the peer and the
AS_PATH data, but it is listed as an optional validation, rather than
a requirement. We cannot assume that this mismatch will be allowed
by vendor implementations, so using it as a means to solve this
migration case is likely to be problematic.
George & Murphy Standards Track [Page 5]
RFC 8206 BGPsec AS Migration September 2017
3.2.2. Inbound Announcements (CE-->PE)
Inbound is more complicated, because the CE doesn't know that PE1 has
changed ASNs, so it is forward-signing all of its routes with
AS64510, not AS64500. The BGPsec speaker cannot manipulate previous
signatures and therefore cannot manipulate the previous AS path
without causing a mismatch that will invalidate the route. If the
updates are simply left intact, the ISP would still need to publish
and maintain valid and active public keys for AS 64510 if it is to
appear in the BGPsec_PATH signature so that receivers can validate
that the BGPsec_PATH signature arrived intact/whole. However, if the
updates are left intact, this will cause the AS path length to be
increased, which is unacceptable as discussed in RFC 7705 [RFC7705].
4. Requirements
In order to be deployable, any solution to the described problem
needs to consider the following requirements, listed in no particular
order. BGPsec:
o MUST support AS migration for both inbound and outbound route
announcements (see Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2), without reducing
BGPsec's protections for route path.
o MUST NOT require any reconfiguration on the remote eBGP neighbor
(CE).
o SHOULD NOT require global (i.e., network-wide) configuration
changes to support migration. The goal is to limit required
configuration changes to the devices (PEs) being migrated.
o MUST NOT lengthen the AS path during migration.
o MUST operate within existing trust boundaries, e.g., can't expect
remote side to accept pCount=0 (see Section 4.2 of RFC 8205
[RFC8205]) from untrusted/non-confederation neighbor.
5. Solution
As noted in Section 4.2 of RFC 8205 [RFC8205], BGPsec already has a
solution for hiding ASNs where increasing the AS path length is
undesirable. So a simple solution would be to retain the keys for
AS64510 on PE1 and forward-sign towards CE1 with AS64510 and
pCount=0. However, this would mean passing a pCount=0 between two
ASNs that are in different administrative and trust domains such that
it could represent a significant attack vector to manipulate BGPsec-
signed paths. The expectation for legitimate instances of pCount=0
(to make a route server that is not part of the transit path
George & Murphy Standards Track [Page 6]
RFC 8206 BGPsec AS Migration September 2017
invisible) is that there is some sort of existing trust relationship
between the operators of the route server and the downstream peers
such that the peers could be explicitly configured by policy to
accept pCount=0 announcements only on the sessions where they are
expected. For the same reason that things like "Local AS" [RFC7705]
are used for ASN migration without end-customer coordination, it is
unrealistic to assume any sort of coordination between the SP and the
administrators of CE1 to ensure that they will by policy accept
pCount=0 signatures during the transition period; therefore, this is
not a workable solution.
A better solution presents itself when considering how to handle
routes coming from the CE toward the PE, where the routes are
forward-signed to AS64510, but will eventually need to show AS64500
in the outbound route announcement. Because both AS64500 and AS64510
are in the same administrative domain, a signature from AS64510
forward-signed to AS64500 with pCount=0 would be acceptable as it
would be within the appropriate trust boundary so that each BGP
speaker could be explicitly configured to accept pCount=0 where
appropriate between the two ASNs. At the very simplest, this could
potentially be used at the eBGP boundary between the two ASNs during
migration. Since the AS_PATH manipulation described above usually
happens at the PE router on a per-session basis and does not happen
network-wide simultaneously, it is not generally appropriate to apply
this AS-hiding technique across all routes exchanged between the two
ASNs, as it may result in routing loops and other undesirable
behavior. Therefore, the most appropriate place to implement this is
on the local PE that still has eBGP sessions with peers expecting to
peer with AS64510 (using the transition mechanisms detailed in RFC
7705 [RFC7705]). Since that PE has been moved to AS64500, it is not
possible for it to forward-sign AS64510 with pCount=0 without some
minor changes to the BGPsec behavior to address this use case.
AS migration is using AS_PATH and remote AS manipulation to act as if
a PE under migration exists simultaneously in both ASNs even though
it is only configured with one global ASN. This document describes
applying a similar technique to the BGPsec signatures generated for
routing updates processed through this migration machinery. Each
routing update that is received from or destined to an eBGP neighbor
that is still using the old ASN (64510) will be signed twice, once
with the ASN to be hidden and once with the ASN that will remain
visible. In essence, we are treating the update as if the PE had an
internal BGP hop and the update was passed across an eBGP session
between AS64500 and AS64510, configured to use and accept pCount=0,
while eliminating the processing and storage overhead of creating an
actual eBGP session between the two ASNs within the PE router. This
will result in a properly secured AS path in the affected route
updates, because the PE router will be provisioned with valid keys
George & Murphy Standards Track [Page 7]
RFC 8206 BGPsec AS Migration September 2017
for both AS64500 and AS64510. An important distinction here is that
while AS migration under standard BGP4 is manipulating the AS_PATH
attribute, BGPsec uses an attribute called the "Secure_Path" (see
Section 3.1 of RFC 8205 [RFC8205]) and BGPsec-capable neighbors do
not exchange AS_PATH information in their route announcements.
However, a BGPsec neighbor peering with a non-BGPsec-capable neighbor
will use the information found in the Secure_Path to reconstruct a
standard AS_PATH for updates sent to that neighbor. Unlike in the
Secure_Path where the ASN to be hidden is still present but ignored
when considering the AS path (due to pCount=0), when reconstructing
an AS_PATH for a non-BGPsec neighbor, the pCount=0 ASNs will not
appear in the AS_PATH at all (see Section 4.4 of RFC 8205 [RFC8205]).
This document is not changing existing AS_PATH reconstruction
behavior, merely highlighting it for clarity.
The procedure to support AS migration in BGPsec is slightly different
depending on whether the PE under migration is receiving the routes
from one of its eBGP peers ("inbound" as in Section 3.2.2) or
destined toward the eBGP peers ("outbound" as in Section 3.2.1).
5.1. Outbound (PE-->CE)
When a PE router receives an update destined for an eBGP neighbor
that is locally configured with AS-migration mechanisms as discussed
in RFC 7705 [RFC7705], it MUST generate a valid BGPsec signature as
defined in RFC 8205 [RFC8205] for _both_ configured ASNs. It MUST
generate a signature from the new (global) ASN forward-signing to the
old (local) ASN with pCount=0, and then it MUST generate a forward
signature from the old (local) ASN to the target eBGP ASN with
pCount=1 as normal.
5.2. Inbound (CE-->PE)
When a PE router receives an update from an eBGP neighbor that is
locally configured with AS-migration mechanisms (i.e., the opposite
direction of the previous route flow), it MUST generate a signature
from the old (local) ASN forward-signing to the new (global) ASN with
pCount=0. It is not necessary to generate the second signature from
the new (global) ASN because the Autonomous System Border Router
(ASBR) will generate that when it forward-signs towards its eBGP
peers as defined in normal BGPsec operation. Note that a signature
is not normally added when a routing update is sent across an iBGP
(internal BGP) session. The requirement to sign updates in iBGP
represents a change to the normal behavior for this specific
AS-migration scenario only.
George & Murphy Standards Track [Page 8]
RFC 8206 BGPsec AS Migration September 2017
5.3. Other Considerations
In the inbound case discussed in Section 5.2, the PE is adding BGPsec
attributes to routes received from or destined to an iBGP neighbor
and using pCount=0 to mask them. While this is not prohibited by
BGPsec [RFC8205], BGPsec-capable routers that receive updates from
BGPsec-enabled iBGP neighbors MUST accept updates with new (properly
formed) BGPsec attributes, including the presence of pCount=0 on a
previous signature, or they will interfere with this method. In a
similar fashion, any BGPsec-capable route-reflectors in the path of
these updates MUST reflect them transparently to their BGPsec-capable
clients.
In order to secure this set of signatures, the PE router MUST be
provisioned with valid keys for _both_ configured ASNs (old and new),
and the key for the old ASN MUST be kept valid until all eBGP
sessions are migrated to the new ASN. Downstream neighbors will see
this as a valid BGPsec path, as they will simply trust that their
upstream neighbor accepted pCount=0 because it was explicitly
configured to do so based on a trust relationship and business
relationship between the upstream and its neighbor (the old and new
ASNs).
Additionally, Section 4 of RFC 7705 [RFC7705] discusses methods in
which AS migrations can be completed for iBGP peers such that a
session between two routers will be treated as iBGP even if the
neighbor ASN is not the same ASN on each peer's global configuration.
As far as BGPsec is concerned, this requires the same procedure as
when the routers migrating are applying AS-migration mechanisms to
eBGP peers, but the router functioning as the "ASBR" between old and
new ASN is different. In eBGP, the router being migrated has direct
eBGP sessions to the old ASN and signs from old ASN to new with
pCount=0 before passing the update along to additional routers in its
global (new) ASN. In iBGP, the router being migrated is receiving
updates (that may have originated either from eBGP neighbors or other
iBGP neighbors) from its downstream neighbors in the old ASN and MUST
sign those updates from old ASN to new with pCount=0 before sending
them on to other peers.
5.4. Example
The following example will illustrate the method being used above.
As with previous examples, PE1 is the router being migrated, AS64510
is the old ASN, which is being subsumed by AS64500, the ASN to be
permanently retained. 64505 is another external peer, used to
demonstrate what the announcements will look like to a third-party
peer that is not part of the migration. Some additional notation is
used to delineate the details of each signature as follows:
George & Murphy Standards Track [Page 9]
RFC 8206 BGPsec AS Migration September 2017
The origin BGPsec Signature Segment takes the form:
sig(Target ASN, (pCount,...,Origin ASN), NLRI) key.
Intermediate BGPsec Signature Segments take the form:
sig(Target ASN,...,(pCount,...,Signer ASN),...,NLRI) key.
(pCount,...,ASN) refers to the new Secure_Path Segment added to the
BGPsec_PATH attribute by the ASN (Origin ASN or Signer ASN).
"Equivalent AS_PATH" refers to what the AS_PATH would look like if it
was reconstructed to be sent to a non-BGPsec peer, while the
Securedpath shows the AS path as represented between BGPsec peers.
Note: The representation of Signature Segment generation is being
simplified here somewhat for the sake of brevity; the actual details
of the signing process are as described in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 of
[RFC8205]. For example, what is covered by the signature also
includes Flags, Algorithm Suite Identifier, NLRI length, etc. Also,
the key is not carried in the update; instead, the Subject Key
Identifier (SKI) is carried.
George & Murphy Standards Track [Page 10]
RFC 8206 BGPsec AS Migration September 2017
Before Merger
64505
|
ISP B ISP A
CE-1 <--- PE-1 <------------------- PE-2 <--- CE-2
64496 Old_ASN: 64510 Old_ASN: 64500 64499
CE-2 to PE-2: sig(64500, (pCount=1,...,64499), N)K_64499-CE2
Equivalent AS_PATH=(64499)
Securedpath=(64499)
length=sum(pCount)=1
PE-2 to 64505: sig(64505,...,(pCount=1,...,64500),...,N)K_64500-PE2
sig(64500, (pCount=1,...,64499), N)K_64499-CE2
Equivalent AS_PATH=(64500,64499)
Securedpath=(64500,64499)
length=sum(pCount)=2
PE-2 to PE-1: sig(64510,...,(pCount=1,...,64500),...,N)K_64500-PE2
sig(64500, (pCount=1,...,64499), N)K_64499-CE2
Equivalent AS_PATH=(64500,64499)
Securedpath=(64500,64499)
length=sum(pCount)=2
PE-1 to CE-1: sig(64496,...,(pCount=1,...,64510),...,N)K_64510-PE1
sig(64510,...,(pCount=1,...,64500),...,N)K_64500-PE2
sig(64500, (pCount=1,...,64499), N)K_64499-CE2
Equivalent AS_PATH= (64510,64500,64499)
Securedpath=(64510,64500,64499)
length=sum(pCount)=3
George & Murphy Standards Track [Page 11]
RFC 8206 BGPsec AS Migration September 2017
Migrating, route flow outbound PE-1 to CE-1
64505
|
ISP A' ISP A'
CE-1 <--- PE-1 <------------------- PE-2 <--- CE-2
64496 Old_ASN: 64510 Old_ASN: 64500 64499
New_ASN: 64500 New_ASN: 64500
CE-2 to PE-2: sig(64500, (pCount=1,...,64499), N)K_64499-CE2
Equivalent AS_PATH=(64499)
Securedpath=(64499)
length=sum(pCount)=1
PE-2 to 64505: sig(64505,...,(pCount=1,...,64500),...,N)K_64500-PE2
sig(64500, (pCount=1,...,64499), N)K_64499-CE2
Equivalent AS_PATH=(64500,64499)
Securedpath=(64500,64499)
length=sum(pCount)=2
PE-2 to PE-1: sig(64500, (pCount=1,...,64499), N)K_64499-CE2
Equivalent AS_PATH=(64499)
Securedpath=(64499)
length=sum(pCount)=1
#PE-2 sends to PE-1 (in iBGP) the exact same update
#as it received from AS64499.
PE-1 to CE-1: sig(64496,...,(pCount=1,...,64510),...,N)K_64510-PE1
sig(64510,...,(pCount=0,...,64500),...,N)K_64500-PE2 (*)
sig(64500, (pCount=1,...,64499), N)K_64499-CE2
Equivalent AS_PATH=(64510,64499)
Securedpath=(64510, 64500 (pCount=0),64499)
length=sum(pCount)=2 (length is NOT 3)
#PE-1 adds the Secure_Path Segment in (*) acting as AS64500
#PE-1 accepts (*) with pCount=0 acting as AS64510,
#as it would if it received (*) from an eBGP peer
George & Murphy Standards Track [Page 12]
RFC 8206 BGPsec AS Migration September 2017
Migrating, route flow inbound CE-1 to PE-1
64505
|
ISP A' ISP A'
CE-1 ---> PE-1 -------------------> PE-2 ---> CE-2
64496 Old_ASN: 64510 Old_ASN: 64500 64499
New_ASN: 64500 New_ASN: 64500
CE-1 to PE-1: sig(64510, (pCount=1,...,64496), N)K_64496-CE1
Equivalent AS_PATH=(64496)
Securedpath=(64496)
length=sum(pCount)=1
PE-1 to PE-2: sig(64500,...,(pCount=0,...,64510),...,N)K_64510-PE1 (**)
sig(64510, (pCount=1,...,64496), N)K_64496-CE1
Equivalent AS_PATH=(64496)
Securedpath=(64510 (pCount=0),64496)
length=sum(pCount)=1 (length is NOT 2)
#PE-1 adds the Secure_Path Segment in (**) acting as AS64510
#PE-1 accepts (**) with pCount=0 acting as AS64500,
#as it would if it received (**) from an eBGP peer
#PE-1, as AS64500, sends the update including (**) to PE-2 (in iBGP)
PE-2 to 64505: sig(64505,...,(pCount=1,...,64500),...,N)K_64500-PE2
sig(64500,...,(pCount=0,...,64510),...,N)K_64510-PE1
sig(64510, (pCount=1,...,64496), N)K_64496-CE1
Equivalent AS_PATH=(64500,64496)
Securedpath=(64500,64510 (pCount=0), 64496)
length=sum(pCount)=2 (length is NOT 3)
PE-2 to CE-2: sig(64499,...,(pCount=1,...,64500),...,N)K_64500-PE2
sig(64500,...,(pCount=0,...,64510),...,N)K_64510-PE1
sig(64510, (pCount=1,...,64496), N)K_64496-CE1
Equivalent AS_PATH=(64500,64496)
Securedpath=(64500, 64510 (pCount=0), 64496)
length=sum(pCount)=2 (length is NOT 3)
6. IANA Considerations
This document does not require any IANA actions.
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7. Security Considerations
RFC 7705 [RFC7705] discusses a process by which one ASN is migrated
into and subsumed by another. Because this process involves
manipulating the AS_Path in a BGP route to make it deviate from the
actual path that it took through the network, this migration process
is attempting to do exactly what BGPsec is working to prevent.
BGPsec MUST be able to manage this legitimate use of AS_Path
manipulation without generating a vulnerability in the RPKI route
security infrastructure, and this document was written to define the
method by which the protocol can meet this need.
The solution discussed above is considered to be reasonably secure
from exploitation by a malicious actor because it requires both
signatures to be secured as if they were forward-signed between two
eBGP neighbors. This requires any router using this solution to be
provisioned with valid keys for both the migrated and subsumed ASN so
that it can generate valid signatures for each of the two ASNs it is
adding to the path. If the AS's keys are compromised, or zero-length
keys are permitted, this does potentially enable an AS_PATH
shortening attack, but these are existing security risks for BGPsec.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC7705] George, W. and S. Amante, "Autonomous System Migration
Mechanisms and Their Effects on the BGP AS_PATH
Attribute", RFC 7705, DOI 10.17487/RFC7705, November 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7705>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205,
September 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8105>.
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8.2. Informative References
[RFC1930] Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation,
selection, and registration of an Autonomous System (AS)",
BCP 6, RFC 1930, DOI 10.17487/RFC1930, March 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1930>.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC5065] Traina, P., McPherson, D., and J. Scudder, "Autonomous
System Confederations for BGP", RFC 5065,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5065, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5065>.
[RFC5398] Huston, G., "Autonomous System (AS) Number Reservation for
Documentation Use", RFC 5398, DOI 10.17487/RFC5398,
December 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5398>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Kotikalapudi Sriram, Shane Amante, Warren Kumari, Terry
Manderson, Keyur Patel, Alia Atlas, and Alvaro Retana for their
review comments.
The authors particularly wish to acknowledge Kotikalapudi Sriram,
Oliver Borchert, and Michael Baer for their review and suggestions
for the examples in Section 5.4, which made an important contribution
to the quality of the text.
Additionally, the solution presented in this document is an amalgam
of several Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) interim meeting
discussions plus a discussion at IETF 85, collected and articulated
thanks to Sandy Murphy.
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Authors' Addresses
Wesley George
Neustar
45980 Center Oak Plaza
Sterling, VA 20166
United States of America
Email: wesgeorge@puck.nether.net
Sandy Murphy
PARSONS, Inc.
7110 Samuel Morse Drive
Columbia, MD 21046
United States of America
Phone: +1 443-430-8000
Email: sandy@tislabs.com
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