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non serviam #10
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Contents: Editor's Word
Sidney Parker: The Egoism of Max Stirner
Ken Knudson: A Critique of Communism and
The Individualist Alternative (serial: 10)
- **********************************************************************
Editor's Word:
_____________
Stirner is a philosopher who is easy to misunderstand, as Sidney
Parker shows in his article "The Egoism of Max Stirner" below. Ones
first attention to Stirner very often comes from political or
ideological motivations. And so, with the expectation of finding
an author whose idea is a flaming insurrective rhetoric, one finds
- just that. And if one is a critic, like Camus mentioned by Parker,
or even a contemporary like Moses Hess [1], one is easily led to
believe that Stirner is just advocating a new _idea_ for which to
live and breathe, a new Object which is supposed to be the new centre
of ones attention, a new idea which is to be universalized and put in
the service of a political ideology - the Ego.
But if we read what he has written, we find, like in "The False
Principle of Our Education" that his main focus is the discovery of
the self as truly Subject, and not just an Object. In the False
Principle Stirner makes the distinction between learning as an Object
into whom knowledge is stuffed from without, and learning as
a Subject acquiring knowledge for itself. In "Art and Religion" we
find him speaking of the conception of [future] self set up as an
Ideal: "Here lie all the sufferings and struggles of the centuries,
for it is fearful to be _outside_of_oneself_, having yourself as an
Object set over and against oneself able to annihilate itself and so
oneself."
Further clues can be given in that Stirner speaks of himself as
No-thing [2], "In the Unique One the owner himself returns to his
creative nothing, of which he is born." No thing, neither as some
kind of thought, nor as a percept, am I. [3] So, we conclude that
Stirner's unnameable Unique One is the Subject.
Looking at the consequences of this, one sees that indeed we all
are Subjects, actors who pursue this and that by our own creation. In
this, we are egoists already. However, unless this is a condition of
which we are conscious, it will do us little good, and we might as
well follow this Ideal as that, in that we do not know ourselves from
within, but only as "intimate objects".
The famous formula from Gal. 2.29, "Not I live, but Christ lives in
me" is quoted and paraphrased by Stirner as the basic teaching of the
possessed: "Not I live, but X lives in me." This is where Stirner's
philosophy is of interest. For while Luther may say "Here I stand, I
can do naught else!", Stirner teaches the liberation from fixed ideas
in creating oneself each day anew.
As the quote at the end of this edition of the newsletter shows,
this is also the way to finding a well of love that can be consumed
with all ones selfish desire without ever going dry.
Svein Olav
[1] Hess criticism of Stirner boils down to "Ego[ism] is empty." But
as is evident, Hess' criticism is of Ego as object, and he has
not grasped the subtlety in Stirner's description of the Subject
as no-thing. Thus Hess simply shows his lack of understanding.
[2] I am taking the liberty of utilizing the English language here.
[3] Notice the affinity with some of Buddhism's teachings. In the
teaching of Buddha you are told to seek through the phenomena to
see if you find the Self there, a search that will ultimately
end in failure. Stirner provides the positive side of this coin
by providing the I as he who fails in this search.
____________________________________________________________________
Sidney Parker:
The Egoism of Max Stirner
-------------------------
(The following extracts are taken from my booklet entitled THE
EGOISM OF MAX STIRNER: SOME CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES to be
published by the Mackay Society of New York)
Albert Camus
Camus devotes a section of THE REBEL to Stirner. Despite a fairly
accurate summarization of some of Stirner's ideas he nonetheless
consigns him to dwelling in a desert of isolation and negation
"drunk with destruction". Camus accuses Stirner of going "as far as
he can in blasphemy" as if in some strange way an atheist like
Stirner can "blaspheme" against something he does not believe in. He
proclaims that Stirner is "intoxicated" with the "perspective" of
"justifying" crime without mentioning that Stirner carefully
distinguishes between the ordinary criminal and the "criminal" as
violator of the "sacred". He brands Stirner as the direct ancestor
of "terrorist anarchy" when in fact Stirner regards political
terrorists as acting under the possession of a "spook". He
furthermore misquotes Stirner by asserting that he "specifies" in
relation to other human beings "kill them, do not martyr them" when
in fact he writes "I can kill them, not torture them" - and this in
relation to the moralist who both kills and tortures to serve the
"concept of the 'good'".
Although throughout his book Camus is concerned to present "the
rebel" as a preferred alternative to "the revolutionary" he nowhere
acknowledges that this distinction is taken from the one that
Stirner makes between "the revolutionary" and "the insurrectionist".
That this should occur in a work whose purpose is a somewhat frantic
attempt at rehabilitating "ethics" well illustrates Stirner's ironic
statement that "the hard fist of morality treats the noble nature of
egoism altogether without compassion."
Eugene Fleischmann
Academic treatment of Stirner is often obfuscating even when it is
not downright hostile. A marked contrast is Fleischmann's essay
STIRNER, MARX AND HEGEL which is included in the symposium HEGEL'S
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. Clearly preferring Stirner to Marx,
Fleischmann presents a straightforward account of his ideas
unencumbered by "psychiatric" interpretations and _ad_hominem_
arguments. He correctly points out that the "human self" signifies
for Stirner "the individual in all his indefinable, empirical
concreteness. The word 'unique' [einzig] means for Stirner man as he
is in his irreducible individuality, always different from his
fellows, and always thrown back on himself in his dealings with
them. Thus, when he talks of 'egoism' as the ultimate definition os
the human 'essence' it is not at all a question of a moral category
. . . . but of a simple existential fact."
Fleischmann contends that "Marx and Engels' critique of Stirner is
notoriously misleading. It is not just that ridicule of a man's
person is not equivalent to refutation of his ideas, for the reader
is also aware that the authors are not reacting at all to the
problems raised by their adversary." Stirner is not simply "just
another doctrinaire ideologue". His "reality is the world of his
immediate experience" and he wants "to come into his own power now,
not after some remote and hypothetical 'proletarian revolution'.
Marx and Engels had nothing to offer the individual in the present:
Stirner has."
In his conclusion Fleischmann states that Stirner's view that the
individual "must find his entire satisfaction in his own life" is a
reversion "to the resigned attitude of a simple mortal". This is not
a serious criticism. If I cannot find satisfaction in my own life,
where can I find it? Even if it is _my_ satisfaction that I
experience, any satisfaction that the other may have being something
that he or she experiences - not _me_. If this constitutes being a
"simple mortal" then so be it, but that it is a "resigned attitude"
is another matter.
Benedict Lachmann and Herbert Stourzh
Lachmann's and Stourzh's TWO ESSAYS ON EGOISM provide a
stimulating and instructive introduction to Stirner's ideas.
Although both authors give a good summary of his egoism they differ
sufficiently in their approach to allow the reader to enjoy
adjudicating between them.
Lachmann's essay PROTAGORAS - NIETZSCHE - STIRNER traces the
development of relativist thinking as exemplified in the three
philosophers of its title. Protagoras is the originator of
relativism with his dictum "Man (the individual) is the measure of
all things". This in turn is taken up by Stirner and Nietzsche. Of
the two, however, Stirner is by far the most consistent and for this
reason Lachmann places him after Nietzsche in his account. For him
Stirner surpasses Nietzsche by bringing Protagorean relativism to
its logical conclusion in conscious egoism - the fulfilment of one's
own will.
In fact, he views Nietzsche as markedly inferior to Stirner both
in respect to his style and the clarity of his thinking. "In
contrast to Nietzsche's work," he writes, THE EGO AND ITS OWN "is
written in a clear, precise form and language, though it avoids the
pitfalls of a dry academic style. Its sharpness, clarity and passion
make the book truly shattering and overwhelming." Unlike
Nietzsche's, Stirner's philosophy does not lead to the replacement
of one religious "spook" by another, the substitution of the
"Superman" for the Christian "God". On the contrary, it makes "the
individual's interests the centre of the world."
Intelligent, lucid and well-conceived, Lachmann's essay throws new
light on Stirner's ideas.
Its companion essay, Stourzh's MAX STIRNER'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE EGO
is evidently the work of a theist, but it is nonetheless sympathetic
to Stirnerian egoism. Stourzh states that one of his aims in writing
it "is beyond the categories of master and slave to foster an
intellectual and spiritual stand-point different from the
stand-point prescribed by the prophets of mass thinking, the
dogmatists of socialism, who conceive of the individual only as an
insignificant part of the whole, as a number or mere addenda of the
group."
Stourzh draws a valuable distinction between the "imperative"
approach of the moralist and the "indicative" approach of Stirner
towards human behaviour. He also gives an informative outline of the
critical reaction to Stirner of such philosophers as Ludwig
Feuerbach, Kuno Fischer and Eduard von Hartman. Stourzh mars his
interpretation, however, by making the nonsensical claim that
Stirner's egoism "need in no sense mean the destruction of the
divine mystery itself." And in line with his desire to preserve the
"sacredness" of this "divine mystery" he at times patently seeks to
"sweeten" Stirner by avoiding certain of his most challenging
remarks.
References:
Camus, Albert: THE REBEL: AN ESSAY ON MAN IN REVOLT. Knopf, New
York. 1961
Fleischmann, Eugene: THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY
SOCIETY: STIRNER, MARX AND HEGEL in HEGEL'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.
Cambridge University Press, London. 1971
Lachmann, Benedict and Stourzh, Herbert: TWO ESSAYS ON EGOISM. To be
published by The Mackay Society, New York.
____________________________________________________________________
Ken Knudson:
A Critique of Communism
and
The Individualist Alternative
(continued)
MUTUALISM: THE ECONOMICS OF FREEDOM
"There is perhaps no business which yields a profit so
certain and liberal as the business of banking and
exchange, and it is proper that it should be open
as far as practicable to the most free competition
and its advantages shared by all classes of people."
- Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, 1837
When it comes to economics, most anarchists reveal an
ignorance verging on the indecent. For example, in the first
piece of the first issue of the new "Anarchy" the California
Libertarian Alliance talks in all seriousness of "Marx's
`labour theory of value,' which causes communist governments
to repress homosexuals." [98] Now, passing over the fact
that Adam Smith developed the principles of this theory long
before Marx was even born, I can't for the life of me see
what the labour theory of value has to do with the
repression of homosexuals - be they communist, capitalist,
or mercantilist. Kropotkin was no better; in his "Conquest
of Bread" he shows a total lack of any economic sense, as he
amply demonstrates by his rejection of the very foundation
of any rational economic system: the division of labour. "A
society that will satisfy the needs of all, and which will
know how to organise production, will also have to make a
clean sweep of several prejudices concerning industry, and
first of all of the theory often preached by economists -
The Division of Labour Theory - which we are going to
discuss in the next chapter....It is this horrible
principle, so noxious to society, so brutalising to the
individual, source of so much harm, that we propose to
discuss in its divers manifestations." [99] He then fills
the next two pages of perhaps the shortest chapter in
history with a discussion of this theory "in its divers
manifestations." In these few paragraphs he fancies himself
as having overturned the economic thought of centuries and
to have struck "a crushing blow at the theory of the
division of labour which was supposed to be so sound." [100]
Let's see just how sound it is.
Primitive man discovered two great advantages to social
life. The first was man's ability to gain knowledge, not
only through personal experience, but also through the
experience of others. By learning from others, man was able
to acquire knowledge which he could never have gained alone.
- 47 -
This knowledge was handed down from generation to generation
- growing with each passing year, until today every
individual has at his fingertips a wealth of information
which took thousands of years to acquire. The second great
advantage of social life was man's discovery of trade. By
being able to exchange goods, man discovered that he was
able to concentrate his efforts on a particular task at
which he was especially good and/or which he especially
liked. He could then trade the products of his labour for
the products of the labour of others who specialised in
other fields. This was found to be mutually beneficial to
all concerned.
That the division of labour is beneficial when A
produces one thing better than B and when B produces another
thing better than A was obvious even to the caveman. Each
produces that which he does best and trades with the other
to their mutual advantage. But what happens when A produces
BOTH things better than B? David Ricardo answered this
question when he expounded his law of association over 150
years ago. This law is best illustrated by a concrete
example. Let us say that Jones can produce one pair of shoes
in 3 hours compared to Smith's 5 hours. Also let us say
that Jones can produce one bushel of wheat in 2 hours
compared to Smith's 4 hours (cf. Table I). If each man is to
work 120 hours, what is the most advantageous way of
dividing up the work? Table II shows three cases: the two
extremes where one man does only one job while the other man
does the other, and the middle road where each man divides
his time equally between jobs. It is clear from Table III
that it is to the advantage of BOTH men that the most
productive man should devote ALL of his energies to the job
which he does best (relative to the other) while the least
productive man concentrates his energies on the other job
(case 3). It is interesting to note that in the reverse
situation (case 1) - which is also the least productive case
- the drop in productivity is only 6% for Jones (the best
worker), while for Smith it's a whopping 11%. So the
division of labour, while helping both men, tends to help
the least productive worker more than his more efficient
workmate - a fact which opponents of this idea should note
well.
These figures show something which is pretty obvious
intuitively. A skilled surgeon, after many years invested
in schooling, internship, practice, etc., may find his time
more productively spent in actually performing operations
than in washing his surgical instruments in preparation for
these operations. It would seem natural, then, for him to
hire a medical student (say for 1 pound per hour) to do the
washing up job while he does the operating (for say 3 pounds
- 48 -
PRODUCTIVITY RATES
------------------
Time Necessary to Produce Time Necessary to Produce
One Pair of Shoes (Hours) One Bushel of Wheat (Hours)
------------------------------------------------------------
Jones: 3 2
Smith: 5 4
------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE I
* * * * * *
PRODUCTIVITY UNDER DIVISION OF LABOUR
-------------------------------------
Hours of Hours of Shoes Bushels
Shoemaking Farming Produced of Wheat
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jones 120 0 40 0
Case 1 Smith 0 120 0 30
Total 120 120 40 30
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jones 60 60 20 30
Case 2 Smith 60 60 12 15
Total 120 120 32 45
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jones 0 120 0 60
Case 3 Smith 120 0 24 0
Total 120 120 24 60
--------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE II
* * * * * *
TIME NECESSARY TO PRODUCE THE SAME AMOUNT
OF GOODS WHILE WORKING ALONE (HOURS)
-----------------------------------------
Jones Smith
--------------------------------------------------------------
Case 1: 120 + 60 = 180 200 + 120 = 320
Case 2: 96 + 90 = 186 160 + 180 = 340
Case 3: 72 + 120 = 192 120 + 240 = 360
--------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE III
- 49 -
per hour). Even if the surgeon could wash his own
instruments twice as fast as the student, this division of
labour would be profitable for all concerned.
If the earth were a homogeneous sphere, equally endowed
with natural resources at each and every point of its
surface, and if each man were equally capable of performing
every task as well as his neighbour, then the division of
labour would have no ECONOMIC meaning. There would be no
material advantage to letting someone else do for you what
you could do equally well yourself. But the division of
labour would have arisen just the same because of the
variety of human tastes. It is a fact of human nature that
not all people like doing the same things. Kropotkin may
think this unfortunate, but I'm afraid that's the way human
beings are built. And as long as this is the case, people
are going to WANT to specialise their labour and trade their
products with one another.
* * * * * *
-----
REFERENCES
98. "Libertarian Message to Gay Liberation," "Anarchy,"
February, 1971, p. 2.
99. Kropotkin, "Conquest of Bread," pp. 245 & 248.
100. Ibid., p. 250.
p. 184.
____________________________________________________________________
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- *
- "A marriage is only assured of a steady love *
- when the couple discover themselves anew each *
- day, and when each recognizes in the other an *
- inexhaustible spring of life, that is, a mystery, *
- unfathomed and incomprehensible. If they find *
- nothing new in one another, so love dissolves *
- inexorably into boredom and indifference." *
- *
- -- Max Stirner, "Art and Religion" *
- *
- ********************************************************************