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Discussion on Radical Strategy, Sabotage, and the Weathermen The following was written by Michael Albert, the editor of _Z Magazine_ and sysop of Zbbs. He is responding to someone who posted a message on Zbbs about sabotage and its use as a tactic/strategy for social change. I think his response is fairly representative of an evolved radical approach to social change, and dispells many of the myths (perpetuated by the corporate media) that "radicals" are reactionary extremists. Here it is... ------------- The issue, as I see it, isn't militance versus passive resistence, or violence vs non violence, but organized informed collective resistance suited to circumstances vs unorganized and uninformed resistance unsuited to circumstances. There are two goals to activism, or should be: (1) winning something, like a reform or rollback, etc. (2) preparing the way to winning more. Winning something is easy to understand. The resistance/activism raises a social cost for those in position to affect the change that they succomb to. That is it. To end a war, raise the social cost to the warmakers so high that it exceeds their desire to continue it. To install a new stoplight at a dangerous street corner, raise the social cost above the retisense to make the change. What raises cost? Well thats one thing we might discuss, I think. I think we'll find that in cases that matter a lot, the critical factor is the threat of continued growth of resistance...thus connecting points one and two. As to preparing the ground for further victories, it seems to me that this means increasing the number of dissidents, increasing the understanding dissidents have and their committment, and/or increasing their organizational capabilities and the means of opposition at their disposal---and/or weakening those who defend the status quo. What accomplishes these ends. This seems like another thing we can discuss. But it certainly includes winning reforms that provide a better starting place for further battles, again joining one and two. Different tactics and strategies likely fit different contexts. You don't use nonviolent marches in the rice paddies in Vietnam to win the war against the U.S. there. You don't assault police caravans in the deltas in Mississippi during the Civil Rights movement. To argue either for or against some approach as universally, or nearly universally superior or inferior to another, one would have to show that it inevitably has certain really good or really bad effects. This is possible, of course. I use this approach to argue against Leninist organization and inner movement deception, for example, by arguing that the effect of these on movement capacities to reach out to larger constituencies (in the U.S. for example), or to win anything desireable (here and elsewhere too) is so negative as to offset any possible advantages. Likewise, one might argue against incorporating class divisions, or race hierarchies, or sexism, within the movement. I would do this too. Advocates of non-violence use this approach to argue that violent tactics should be avoided always because the cost to the movement in reduced capability to gain anything worthwhile in the future is greater than any momentary accomplishments. I think they have a very strong point, but one that isn't always valid. Any change within the bounds of the system, that isn't a revolution, certainly leaves the system intact. True. But that doesn't mean that such a change can't be part of a revolutionary process and can't have very important and necessary effects for constituencies that deserve better circumstances. Reforms can be won against the opposition of elites and by dissident, disenfranchised and otherwise badly off constituencies and can (a) improve their conditions and circumstances and (b) leave them in a better position to win still more gains and develop a still more powerful movement, either because of gains in consciousness, organization, rights, etc. etc. So if you think that oppressed constituencies can go from a position of little power and cohesion to revolution in one swooooop, and any lesser shortterm aim is a waste of time, I guess you come up with your view. But if you understand that the process of developing social movements and oppositional infrastructure and dissident consciousness takes time, and people need improvements in their lives now, and if you understand that improvements can facilitate the whole process, then you come up with a perspective that distinguishes between what a fellow named Andre Gorz used to term reformist reforms (which are system reinforcing, do not increase the power of dissidents, etc.) and revolutionary reforms (which are part of a larger on-going process). Imagine workers winning, sequentially, the right to have shop floor and firm wide workers councils. The right for those to meet some amount of time weekly. The right of access to all information bearing on production, pricing, and other workplace decisions. The right to veto price hikes, in consultation with consumer groups. The right to determine shop floor working conditions. And so on, and so forth, till workers councils, with other popular institutions, culminate their activities in a revolution that changes society's basic defining institutions. Imagine workers without having ever won anything, having consistently either ignored shortterm struggle or, if more conscious, disdained it, suddenly rise up and take over the economy, transforming its basic institutions. I guess, I find the first scenario infinitely more plausible and infinitely more likely to yield a new system that isn't, as the song says, the same (in essence) as the old one. -------------------------------------------------- The following is a continuation of the discussion of sabotage on Zbbs. There are three articles I am posting here. This one is by Michael Albert, the editor of _Z Magazine_ and sysop of Zbbs. It goes into liberal reform politics versus direct action politics (and the good/bad things about both). He brings up his experiences (negative) with the Weathermen, the 60s underground organization who used to blow things up. I find this topic very interesting and relevent to some threads on this forum, and so I am posting here for others to read. I am interested in discussing these ideas with anyone. Thanks. ---------- [Previous to the following was a post from someone advocating direct action politics, not necessarily sabotage, which he agreed is oftentimes counter-productive. He was very critical of liberal/reform politics] Michael Albert's reply: I share your frustration with liberalism, etc. And while I sometimes encounter serious people arguing for such positions, with dignity, I often also encounter people who are, I think, being quite dense or hypocritical. But there are also dense, or hypocritical, or self serving people who propose, enact, follow direct action approaches. So the issue isn't merely who is doing it, but should people who know what they are doing and are commited do it. I think we probably agree. I could go on forever, I suppose, with stories about not only the weathermen, but just about every constituency and group active in the 60s, etc. As you say, I was there, and indeed, involved in many many aspects. At one point, I and a close friend, Peter Bohmer--who is also active on this board--were, I suppose you could say, rushed by the local Boston chapter of Weatherman. As in most cities, the folks who started Weatherman were, I think I would have to say, very much in tune with the sentiments you voice--quite intelligently. They were generally among the best informed and most committed activists in each community. They were tired of liberal and 30s influenced bullshit. They saw, rather more clearly than many, the dimensions of the "enemy." And they were impatient to win. So they formed an organization designed to "bring the war home" as in provoke conflict and hostility here in the U.S. so that all those of good heart and courage would take up on the left side, and the rest would be clearly evident on the right side, and the hostilities would tie up the monster's resources, and the people of the third world would be free to liberate themselves as their enemy was tied up at home. In fact, they had virtually no good effects and contributed mightily, I think, to the dissolution of the left, which had serious prospects but for this and other internal problems. Anyhow, because these Weather folks were quite smart and seemed quite serious and committed and so on, and, at that stage, had not lost touch with reality, Peter and I paid attention. These folks were not saddled by reticense of any kind, least of all silly notions of obedience, prospects for liberal politicians, etc. I can't remember the order of events that led to us saying no to recruitment--I stayed friends with these folks, despite our strong and steadily growing disagreements. The events were, however, the following. First, I went to Chomsky and asked his thoughts on it. He was loathe then, and remains loathe now, to comment on strategy. He feels it is not something he has much to say on, much knowledge about. But, we talked and he said, and I am not abridging for want of space--"It is a shame. Some very good people are going to die. Nothing of value will come of their sacrifice." This, in fact, is precisely what happened. Still, we want on a kind of "see how we operate" action with the local weather folks. First we hopped a subway car. On it, one of the weatherpeople was scheduled to get up and give a provocative speech, to separate those who were part of the problem from those who might become part of the solution, on the train--their usual aim. So he stood up on a chair, rather nervous, and he gave his speech. Again, no brevity from me. Here is the whole, unedited thing. I will not likely ever forget it. "Country sucks, kick ass." He may have said it twice. The action we went on was these folks going to a mixer (that was a type of dance where college folks went to meet others) and circulating on the floor, breaking up couples (bourgeois behavior) and generally creating infantile mayhem. We didn't join. After much maturing of the organization -- remember these folks were, truly as opposed to Kennedy rhetoric -- among the best (most ethically motivated) and brightest (most knowledgeable and confident) in each locale where they emerged -- and many actions (such as going to a working class beach and planting an NLF flag to provoke pitched fighting to find tough folks to recruit and convince others of their sincerety, or stealing clothes and food, individually [the leader in Boston, a brilliant guy, was once arrested for shoplifting underwear], or going to demonstrations, provoking cops, and then running while others stayed to help those who had no experience and didn't know what to do, etc.) -- one night a bunch of weatherfolks showed up at my apartment. They knocked and asked if they could stay the night. They needed a place to hide and crash. I let them in. They told me they were hiding out. They said "We are the Vietcong, and they are after us." They were delusional and paranoid. The final result of a trajectory that was at least as destructive as writing idiotic letters to a Congressperson. Their experience doesn't rule out direct action as a viable tactic. It rules out uninformed stupidity as a framework able to sustain worthwhile direct action. Likewise, the experiences you have had with some advocates of marching or holding teach-ins or even writing letters, certainly doesn't rule out these activities as possibly important tactics, it rules out liberalism (uniformed stupidity and/or hypocrisy) as a framework able to sustain worthwhile reform struggle. Enough for now --- though if you would like more reports on the period, and whatever lessons I and others took from it, I am happy to comply. Indeed, I guess that could be one rather valuable contribution a bbs like this could make. And I want to apologize for something, though I am not sure it makes sense to act any differently. Whenever I write a reply to a post on zbbs, I write for a potentially broad audience of readers. I thus try to pay attention to what I am responding to, but I also try to make points that may be of more general interest, and may even recross territory the original poster needs no comment on. The gap that continues in our discussion, I think, is that while I freely acknowledge that what you call reform type tactics and aims can be counter productive, or at least not particularly advantageous to real social change--you haven't, I think, at any time indicated a similar feeling about direct action, particularly certain types of it, having in-built attributes which can be quite counter productive at certain times and in certain contexts. I get the feeling, and maybe I am just reading it in, that for you direct action is somehow like -- say, truth. There is a tremendous burden of proof to do anything else. -------------- This is a repost from a discussion going on currently on Zbbs. It is a reply to Michael Albert's post appearing above. The post after this is Albert's counter-reply. You may want to read the three in order, or again, you may not. It is mostly about the Weathermen. --------------- Your talk about the Weathermen spurred me to take a look at the top of my bookshelf, where I have several copies of Osawatamie, the official paper of the Weather Underground (I wonder if they are collector's items now?). Blowing off the dust, I spent an hour or so remembering them and their political effort. I agree that the Weather Underground's efforts turned out badly for most of the Left, but we may differ on why this happened. To the establishment, the Weathermen were their worst nightmare come true. Armed revolutionaries, intelligent (for the most part), organized (for the most part), with an ability to be effective. That is, the bombings carried out by the Weathermen were not against individuals, and in fact, I believe that the only people ever killed by Weathermen bombings were their own due to mistakes. To hear the government describe Weathermen activities, you would believe that they were the worst kind of terrorists, but this was not the case. Every bombing had a purpose and a message. These were not random acts of violence. This fact was, of course, obscured through the establishment press of the time. Similar to the press treatment of the Red Brigade (their "knee-cappings" were 100% restricted to individuals with ties to the Nazi SS). Take for example, this excerpt from Osawatomie (Autumn 1975 No. 3): Weather Underground Organization Bombs Kennecott Corporation Salt Lake City, Utah September 4, 1975 On the second anniversary of the fascist coup in Chile, we attacked the national headquarters of Kennecott Corporation in Salt Lake City, Utah, in solidarity with the heroic resistance of the Chilean people. We attacked Kennecott for all the years it has robbed the Chilean people of their copper, and wealth, for its role in the overthrow of the Popular Unity government and the murder of Salvador Allende, and for its oppression and exploitation of working people in the US. Kennecott, Anaconda and ITT share responsibility with Kissinger and the CIA for the overthrow of the democratically-elected Popular Unity government. Kennecott and Anaconda organized for an international boycott of Chile's copper and simultaneously forced the undermining of the economy. Kennecott continues to drain wealth from the Chilean people. Kennecott is now receiving $68 million from the military dictatorship in "compensation" for the nationalization of its mines. This on top of more than $4 billion in copper profits which Kennecott and Anaconda together mined out over a 40-year period....