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author: bootlicker
generator: pandoc
title: Bob Jessop and the Marxist Theory of the State
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---
bootlicker
2017-02-17T00:00:00+00:00
[I Introduction]{.smallcaps}
In this blog post I want to summarise and assess Bob Jessop's account of
the classical Marxist tradition's account of the capitalist state in the
first chapter of his 1982 book *The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories
and Methods*. You can find a PDF version of it on his Academia.edu
profile
[here.](https://www.academia.edu/30865549/The_capitalist_state_Marxist_theories_and_methods) Just
in case this link ever becomes broken, I have uploaded the PDF to the
blog database
[here](/wordpress-uploads/2017/02/The_capitalist_state_Marxist_theories_an.pdf).
I wanted to perform this brief critical analysis of this first chapter
of Jessop's book because I disagree with Jessop's assessment of the
classical Marxist tradition. Jessop argues that the original works of
Marx do not contain a coherent and general account of the capitalist
state. Jessop explains that the reason why Marxist scholars have failed
to grasp a coherent theoretical account of the state is because there is
no coherent theoretical account available in Marx's works. In order to
arrive at a successful Marxist account of the capitalist state, Jessop
argues that we will have to do extra work. We will have to reinterpret,
change, append and reconfigure elements of the existing corpus of Marx
in order to give a proper account of the state.
I want to disagree with this argument. As I read this first chapter
of *The Capitalist State*, I felt as if the various strands and
elaborations on the theme of the capitalist state by Marx in his
original works *did* amount to a sufficient account of the capitalist
state. As I said to my supervisor, I felt as if Jessop had failed to
grasp the essence of what Marx was trying to say, despite the fact that
Jessop performed an excellent summary and paraphrasing of Marx's
classical works.
This blog post will be broken up into two parts. The first part will be
a summary of Bob Jessop's reconstruction of the classical Marxist
account of the capitalist state. The second part will be a short
argument by myself as to why we can accept this classical Marxist work
as a successful account of the state, despite what Jessop says.
[II Summary of Jessop]{.smallcaps}
Jessop writes that Marx did not succeed in committing to paper an
account of the capitalist state that matched the analytical power and
rigor of his account of the capitalist mode of production. I think we
can certainly agree with this. Jessop feels that the fact that Marx
failed to do this means that the various discontinuous writings that
Marx *did* make on the state do not amount to any coherent or successful
theory of the state:
Instead his legacy in this respect comprises an uneven and
unsystematic collection of philosophical reflections, journalism,
contemporary history, political forecasts, and incidental remarks. It
was left to Engels to develop a more systematic account of the origins
and nature of the state and to discuss the general relations between
state power and economic development. However, while it was Engels
rather than Marx who first adumbrated a class theory of the state, the
'General' was no more successful than Marx himself in developing this
insight into a complete and coherent analysis of the capitalist state
(Jessop, 1982: 1).
Apparently this lack of complete and coherent analysis has lead many
scholars to many different contradictory accounts of the content and
philosophical legacy of Marx's account of the state. There are three
examples we can give of the competing interpretations of the classical
Marxist theory of the capitalist state.
The first is Shlomo Avineri, who develops a "Hegelian centered reading
of Marx" (1982: 2). Avineri
seeks to establish the deep-seated continuity of the social and
political thought of Marx by tracing the themes of his early work on
Hegel's political philosophy through the vicissitudes of Marx's
subsequent theoretical development (Avineri, 1968, *passim*).
The second is Lucio Colletti, who argues that the intellectual tradition
of Marx's account of the state comes from Machiavelli, Montesquieu, and
Rousseau. Colletti argues that Marx's theory of the state is only
original in the fields of social and economic analysis, instead of
politics (Colletii, 1975: 45-48). Jessop adds to this footnote: "For
Colletti's views on the theoretical importance of Marx's social and
economic analyses, idem, 1969: 3-44, 77-102). This interpretation of the
classical Marxist account of the state sees it as effectively completed.
Indeed Jessop describes Colletti's attitude to Marx's theory of the
state as considering it "near definitive" (1982: 2):
Colletti argues that Marx had already developed a near definitive
theory of state power before the 1844 manuscripts started him on the
long march to his most important theoretical discoveries. In
particular Colletti argues that the *Critique* *of Hegel's 'Philosophy
of Law' *(1843) and the *Introduction* to a proposed revision of that
critique (written in 1843-1844) embody a mature theory that neither
the older Marx, Engels, no Lenin would substantially improve upon in
the least. And he also argues that this so-called mature Marxist
theory was heavily indebted to Rousseau for its critique of
parliamentarism, the theory of popular delegation, and the need for
the ultimate suppression of the state itself (2).
The third competing interpretation of the classical Marxist theory of
the state is by Robin Blackburn. Blackburn argues that the classical
Marxist account of the state is very poor indeed. It took until the
Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917 until Marxists were able to
"substantially (albiet not finally)" (1982: 3) come up with an coherent
and complete picture of the capitalist state. This account of the
classical Marx holds that Marx's real innovation was *political* rather
than philosophical or economic. The theoretical concepts of historical
materialism such as "class, party, revolution, bureaucracy, state,
nation, etc" (3) were not to be found in any of the intellectual
predecessors of Marx and Engels. They were largely original.
As I said above, Jessop takes these competing interpretations of Marx on
the state to be evidence of the fact that the classical Marx does not
amount to a complete and coherent theory of the state. The rest of this
first chapter of *The Capitalist State* is an account of how this is
true. Let's have a look at Jessop's reconstruction of the classical
Marx.
A *The Early Marx*
1 *Critique of* *Hegel's 'Philosophy of Law'*
The first text we need to engage with in order to reconstruct the
classical Marx on the state is the *Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of
Law'*. Like Jessop says, it is the central piece of political theory
written by Marx in the period before he became a communist. In this
text, Marx shows that Hegel's idealistic method results in an apology
for the Prussian state. It is the specific metaphilosophy that Hegel
deploys, Marx argues, that leads Hegel to approve of, and justify, the
oppressive authoritarian political system of Prussia. Hegel comes into
the political system of Prussia from the outside with his theory of the
Absolute Idea, looking to confirm that it can be actualised in the
empirical matter of the concrete world. This is the first phase of his
criticism of Hegel's political philosophy.
The second phase is where Marx looks at the way the various organs of
the Prussian state are supposed to interrelate and build into a concrete
universality. The separate spheres of the state are the monarchy, the
executive, and the legislative assembly. These three different organs
represent the singular, the particular, and the universal, and there
interrelation achieves the mediated universality of the Absolute Idea.
Hegel writes that the successful organic relationship between these
three elements of the Prussian state allow the State and Civil Society
to be successfully integrated with one another. Marx disagrees. Because
of Hegel's method, he fails to grasp the truth of reality that these two
spheres of the modern human social system remain inimical. Marx argues
that
this separation cannot be resolved either through the rule of a
universal and neutral bureaucracy or the election of the legislative
assembly to govern in the interests of the people (Marx, 1843a:
20-149).
Jessop points out correctly that Marx agrees with Hegel that there are
two distinct spheres in modern society, and that Civil Society is the
location of egoism or self-interest. Marx disagrees with Hegel, however,
that this separation is inevitable. He also disagrees that the state has
the power to transcend the Hobbesian Civil Society, and unite modern
society organically in itself.
Marx argues that the state becomes differentiated within itself not
because of some transcendental logical Idea, but because of the real
historical process of capitalism. Landed property and free commerce are
what cause the state to particularise itself. Further, it is impossible
for the organs of the state to achieve the status of some impartial and
universal representation of all the competing factions within Civil
Society because Civil Society infects the state. Hegel elevates the
Prussian bureaucracy to the level of a 'universal class', which is able
to mediate between all the conflicting components of Civil Society. Marx
says that this is a pure abstraction, due to Hegel's idealistic method,
and the bureaucracy *itself* forms a particular interest within the
State, among others:
Indeed Marx notes that the various independent groups in Prussian
civil society struggle to maintain their interests against the
encroachments of the bureaucracy but also need the latter to act as
their guarantor of their interests against other groups. In turn the
officials tend to appropriate state power as their private property
and use it to further both their corporate and individual interests.
Moreover, since state power is used to protect the rights of property
(especially those of the Junker class), the Prussian state actually
functions to reproduce the war of each against all in civil society
(Marx, 1843a: 98-99 and 108; Jessop, 1982: 5).
Against Hegel's overtures about the Godliness of the Prussian state,
Marx insists that this society is in fact greatly alienated. The
universal interest that Hegel pictures as embodied within the state is
illusory, and the Hobbesian state of war against all persists even in
this social formation. Marx argues that neither the incorporation of
Civil Society into neo-feudal estates, or the transformation of the
Prussian state into a proper bourgeois democratic republic will solve
this problem of the State being infected with "crass materialism", as
Jessop puts it.
Only the abolishing of the state and of private property will lead to
the end of alienation and estrangement in modern life, because only then
will the Hobbesian war of all against all be ended. The most attractive
solution to the Prussian state, bourgeois democracy, will not end this
Hobbesian state of nature, but only reproduce it within the state.
Parliamentary representatives will merely "further private interests and
... dominate rather than represent the people" (Jessop 1982: 5; Marx
1843a: 122-123).
2 *On The Jewish Question*
This second piece of work, written in 1843 and published in 1844,
elaborates on the themes contained in the *Critique of 'Philosophy of
Law'*. Marx argues for the continued conceptual antagonism between
abstraction and concreteness in the State and Civil Society in this
text, and also the infection of the State with the crass materialism of
Civil Society with its Hobbesian state of nature:
Marx argues that the modern state abolished the political significance
of religion, birth, rank, education, and occupation through the
institution of formal equality among its citizens; but it could not
abolish their continuing social significance in the reproduction of
their substantive inequalities. Thus, although the modern state and
civil society are structurally distinct, it is the egoism of civil
society that shapes political activity (Marx, 1843b: 153 and 164).
Accordingly Marx concludes that the emancipation of man requires more
than the concession of formal political freedom. It can be completed
only when the individual activities of men are reorganised to give
full expression to their social and public nature (Marx 1843b:
167-168).
As Colletti says in his introduction to *Karl Marx: Early
Writings *(1974-1975):
Civil society, claims Marx, can acquire political meaning and efficacy
only by an act of 'thoroughgoing transubstantiation', an act by which
'civil society must completely renounce itself as civil society, as
a *private class* and must instead assert the validity of a part of
its being which not only has nothing in common with, but is directly
opposed to, its real civil existence' (36).
Those passages come from the *Critique*, but as Colletti says:
... both texts arrive at the same conclusion: the political
constitution of modern representative states is in reality the
'constitution of private property'. Marx sees this formula as summing
up the whole inverted logic of modern society. It signifies that the
universal, the 'general interest' of the community at large, not only
does not unite men together effectively but actually sanctifies and
legitimises their disunity. In the name of a universal principle (the
obligatory aspect of 'law' as a general expression of a general or
social will) it consecrates private property, or the right of
individuals to pursue their own exclusive interests independently of,
and sometimes *against*, society itself (36-37).
3 *Introduction to a Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's
'Philosophy of Law'*
[III My Response]{.smallcaps}