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From: pierce@lanai.cs.ucla.edu (Brad Pierce) Newsgroups: alt.conspiracy,alt.save.the.earth,alt.individualism Subject: A plutonium economy vs. a free democracy Message-ID: <1992Nov20.020820.1559@cs.ucla.edu> Date: Fri, 20 Nov 92 02:08:20 GMT Organization: UCLA, Computer Science Department Lines: 269 [From "The Russian Threat, Its Myths and Realities" (c) 1983, Gateway Books, London, by Jim Garrison and Pyrae Shivpuri, pp 231-236.] The growing erosion of civil liberties in Western Europe and the United States is closely linked with the nuclear energy-nuclear weapons complex, which mandates a psyche all its own. This complex creates the necessity for secrecy on the one hand and greater protection of investment on the other. Not only are there high financial and environmental risks but also potential ramifications beyond national boundaries. Because of the `plutonium culture' generated by the nuclear complex, the age old dilemma of striking a balance between state authority and the rights of the individual is being forced to opt for increasing state control, and diminishing individual freedom. The plutonium culture allows for no other choice. Each operating nuclear reactor produces between 400 to 600 pounds of plutonium waste each year. Less than one millionth of a gram, if ingested, can cause cancer and/or genetic mutation. Twenty pounds, if properly fashioned, can be made into a nuclear bomb. Because of this, *the different aspects of the plutonium economy must be as tightly guarded as nuclear weapons themselves*. Nuclear weapons are kept at military facilities generally away from population centres and specifically under guard in a military system predicated upon discipline, hierarchy and authoritarian leadership. Similar protection for the `atoms for peace' programme will have a devastating impact upon the democratic freedoms and civil liberties of the citizens. The potential problem with the plutonium economy and its relation to human freedom has been succinctly expressed by a statement made by Dr. Bernard Feld, Chairperson of the Atomic and High Energy Physics Department of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Let me tell you about a nightmare I have. The Mayor of Boston sends for me for an urgent consultation. He has received a note from a terrorist group telling him that they have planted a nuclear bomb somewhere in central Boston. The Mayor has confirmed that 20 pounds of plutonium is missing from Government stocks. He shows me the crude diagram and a set of the terrorists outrageous demands. I know--as one of those who participated in the assembly of the first atomic bomb--that the device would work. Not efficiently, but nevertheless with devastating effect. What should I do? Surrender to blackmail or risk destroying my home town?[9] The dangers are real, so real that government planners in every country with nuclear programmes have undertaken steps to be prepared for Dr. Feld's scenario. In 1975, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) commissioned a specific study of the problem. One of the participants, Professor John Barton, Professor of Jurisprudence at Stanford University Law School, prepared a paper entitled `Intensified Nuclear Safeguards and Civil Liberties.' The document began by stating that: Increased public concern with nuclear terrorism, coupled with the possibility of greatly increased use of plutonium in civilian power reactors, are leading the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to consider various forms of intensified safeguards against theft or loss of nuclear materials and against *sabotage*. The intensified safeguards could include expansion of personnel clearance programs, a nationwide guard force, *greater surveillance of dissenting political groups,* area searches in the event of a loss of materials, and creation of *new barriers of secrecy* around parts of the nuclear program.[10] It is important to be clear what the above statement implies. The governments supporting nuclear power are attempting to protect the plutonium economy from two perceived enemies: first, those who would use the nuclear materials to terrorise the country through some type of nuclear sabotage; and second, those who seek to stop nuclear power, meaning anti-nuclear `dissenting political groups'. This requires a nationwide guard force to be created specifically to deal with any terrorism and the erection of new barriers of secrecy around the nuclear programmes to keep public knowledge and participation at a minimum. Both sets of enemies would be subject to greater surveillance through electronic listening devices such as phone taps. In Britain, for instance, it is accepted as a matter of course that anyone working for the Atomic Energy Authority be `positively vetted' before being appointed. The Official Secrets Act, moreover, allows the government and the atomic industry to keep the nuclear installations cloaked in secrecy and the employees forbidden to communicate anything about their work. In 1976, Britain also became the first country to establish by law a nationwide guard force of constables under the direct control of the atomic authorities in order to guard nuclear facilities and specifically the plutonium stores. This guard force has privileges in relation to carrying weapons not granted to any other British police unit. Indeed, so sensitive are these privileges that under the Official Secrets Act, information about them has not been made available to the public. This force is mandated not only to guard against possible terrorism but to keep tabs on `dissenting political groups.' Jonathan Rosenhead, of the London School of Economics, points out that this type of political control is very easily overlooked by the general populace because it is specifically designed and intended to be used as inconspicuously as possible. In America, political scientists refer to this technique as the "politics of the iron fist in the velvet glove." "What the ruling groups prefer", he says, is to produce a situation in which no one dares oppose their plans. Their favourite methods are therefore to exploit people's dependence on consumer goods and on their jobs and exercising prevention controls by means of intensive surveillance. In the event of open conflict breaking out in spite of that, they would hope at least to contain it by `limited operations.'[11] What needs to be remembered in assessing this state of affairs is that plutonium, if it is to be used, must be protected by police state methods. We just cannot have something that can be used for nuclear bombs and can damage and mutate human life with the lethalness of millions of cancer doses per pound floating about in a free society. *A plutonium economy and a free democracy are a contradiction in terms.* This is a fact that has been recognised by leading legal experts and politicians alike. Writing in the "Harvard Law Review," Russell Ayres states flatly that `plutonium provides the first rational justification for widespread intelligence gathering against the civilian population.'[12] The reason for this is that the threat of nuclear terrorism justifies such encroachments on civil liberties for `national security' reasons. It is inevitable, therefore, says Ayres, that "plutonium use would create pressures for infiltration into civic, political, environmental and professional groups to a far greater extent than previously encountered and with a greater impact on speech and associated rights". Sir Brian Flowers, in Britain, has come to similar conclusions. At the end of his environmental impact statement for the plutonium economy in the United Kingdom, known as the Flowers Report, he made it quite clear that Britain could not have both plutonium and civil liberties. Rather, he said, to adopt the plutonium economy would make `inevitable' the erosion of the freedoms that British people had fought for over the centuries and have come to assume and accept as inalienable rights. What is happening to Western Europe and the US should not be seen as an abnormal occurrence; rather, it should be viewed as the