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title: 'What the Empirical Evidence Says About Nuclear ''Deterrence'''
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2020-03-07T07:59:40Z
Rational deterrence theory developed alongside the advent of nuclear
weapons. The intersection of the two events yielded the concept of
'nuclear deterrence', an idea that has become popular. It asserts that a
real or perceived threat of catastrophic nuclear attack from one state
to another allows that first state to deter the second from certain
causes of action, namely military confrontations. An extended version of
this idea holds that the world is now somehow more peaceful as a result
of interlocking looming threats of nuclear attack.
Nuclear deterrence is largely a deductive theory, and has been
criticised for, among other things, being ahistorical and lacking in
empirical validity. Deterrence proponents have responded by saying that
empirical deterrence scholarship such as comparative case studies have
failed to persuasively challenge the assumptions behind the theory
(Achen & Snidal 1989). This paper will argue that the empirical work
that has been done on deterrence theory, criticising its assumptions and
conclusions, is largely correct. In particular it will be argued that
the conceptual and methodological limitations of the empirical
criticisms of nuclear deterrence theory are not too great to be
overcome---that is, that it is perfectly valid to build social
scientific theories and concepts from empirical observation.
I - Description of The Idea of Nuclear Deterrence
=================================================
Nuclear deterrence will be described before discussing the validity of
the various empirical criticisms that have been levelled against it. The
reason why it must be described is because its use has entered common
parlance, and as such has suffered from great variation and diffusion in
meaning. A fairly rigorous approximation of nuclear deterrence will be
set out in order to provide some terms of reference, so that the
deterrence criticisms coming later will fit into some form of coherent
dialogue.
Nuclear deterrence proceeds from rational choice analyses. When nuclear
deterrence is invoked, the following assumptions are usually implicit:
1. Rational actor assumption. Actors have exogenously given preferences
and choice options, and they seek to optimise preferences in light
of other actors' preferences and options.
2. Principle explanatory assumption. Variation in outcomes is to be
explained by differences in actors' opportunities. (Appeals to
exogenous changes in preferences, or to norms, roles, or culture,
are temporarily or analytically suspended.)
3. Principle substantive assumption. The state acts as if it were a
unitary rational actor. (Changes in personnel, in decision-making
patterns, or in bureaucratic politics are not the explanatory focus
(Achen & Snidal 1989, p. 150).
It follows that a relationship of deterrence is established when a
threat of retaliatory nuclear attack from one state alters the
preference optimisation calculus of another that is attempting to alter
the balance of power in a system. The relationship of deterrence is
meant to be established in the following manner. Let us say that there
are two states in a system and a state of affairs between them such that
there is a stable power 'status quo' in the system before any kind of
relationship of deterrence comes into being. One state is a defender of
the status quo, and the other is an initiator of change of power
relations. Pursuant to the assumptions above, both states exist in
competition and seek to better their position in the system. Both states
perform a calculation of the best decisions to make at any particular
time, and let us say that, given the initiator is savvy to the
preferences and options of the defender (this is important, preferences
being close to 'desires' and options being close to real courses of
action related to capabilities), it has the preference to attack the
defender and alter the status quo. Whether or not it acts on that
preference is based on a calculation that involves weighing up the costs
and benefits of making that act. One of the costs involved in attacking
the defending state is the future threat of it making a retaliatory
attack, as 'punishment'. If the cost of a retaliatory attack from a
defending state is too great, an initiator will be deterred from
challenging the status quo. Hence a relationship of deterrence is
obtained.
A - Credibility
---------------
The problem-solving capacity of deterrence theory concerns the process
by which a defending state actively and purposively influences the
cost/benefit calculation of an initiator's decision to attack and change
the status quo. The focus which most have placed on the ability of
deterrence theory to solve security problems comes from the fact that a
significant portion of the initiator's cost/benefit calculation revolves
around an indeterminacy, something that the initiator cannot work out
with certainty. Relaxing the assumption above that the initiator is
fully aware of preferences and options of the defender, the analyst
encounters the problem that initiator cannot know for sure whether the
defender will have the ability and commitment to fight back after an
attack (Achen & Snidal 1989, p. 151).
The concept that is used to measure the probability by which an
initiator estimates the cost of a defender's ability and commitment to
have a war or some other kind of conflict over the alteration of the
status quo is called deterrence credibility. Working backwards in the
initiator's decision-making process, suppose that a defender's threat to
retaliate is credible. This means that the initiator believes that the
defender has the option to retaliate (not just the desire, but the
capacity exists: the defender has the military means to retaliate after
an attack and is politically free to do so), and that the defender would
find retaliation in its interest if the prize is threatened. Then, if
the threatened retaliatory punishment from the defender exceeds the
gains of the initiator from attacking, the initiator will believe the
attack will make it worse off than by practicing restraint, and will be
deterrable, or deterred from attacking.
B - Reassurance
---------------
By dint of history there is a corresponding nuclear deterrence concept
which is related to nuclear deterrence credibility but is somewhat
different. The concept is called nuclear deterrence stability, and it
comes from extending the idea of credibility by replacing the system of
one initiator and one defender with one which features two actors that
are simultaneous initiators and defenders. Because both actors exist in
the same competitive environment as the credibility model, where both
actors are seeking to satisfy their preferences as much as possible, and
both powers have nuclear weapons, there exists the risk that one actor
may pre-empt the other's nuclear deterrence threats, and totally wipe it
out, yielding a zero-sum win for the pre-empting actor. Stability is, in
this context, a very narrow indicator. It is meant to measure the
'second strike' (or 'strike second') nuclear capacity of either actor in
this system. If both actors have a second strike capacity, they still
have the capacity to form the option of a credible deterrence threat
after they have been attacked with a nuclear arsenal. The trouble with
this---and this introduces some impurities into the rational choice
description of nuclear deterrence---is that there is always the
incentive for both actors strive to build nuclear weapons systems that
deprive their competitor of a second strike capacity, eradicating the
effect of nuclear deterrence entirely. Here the indeterminacy problem of
deterrence credibility becomes transmuted into nuclear reassurance.
Instead of there being some uncertainty to be explained as to the desire
and capacity of a state to attack for the purpose of deterrence, the
problem-solving function of the rational choice schema is set towards
working out whether either actor believes that its competitor won't
attack. The active and purposive component of reassurance is that,
instead of issuing threats, each side seeks to reassure the other that
it won't commit to plans that will see the other side wiped out,
destroying the effectiveness of its deterrence. Reassurance is more or
less the same as deterrence credibility because a state protects its own
deterrence credibility by promising not to harm its competitor's
credibility.
Deterrence and reassurance here turn on the credibility of a retaliatory
attack by a defender which alters the cost/benefit calculation of the
initiator. It is important to note that credibility turns
correspondingly on the perception either generated passively or created
actively (and there is some controversy here to be sure) inside the
initiator about (a) the nature of the defender, and (b) the defender's
interests and intentions. It should be noted that the empirical
literature has much to say about this. For the sake of the current
discussion however, it is important to point out how nuclear deterrence
theory gets around the perception issues inherent in its operation. The
way it gets around the issue of how a defender changes the behaviour of
an initiator is that it tightly controls how either actor thinks. First,
as per the first assumption above, it makes state preferences (the
things they desire) exogenous to the rational choice games through which
it puts them. This means that the things that states want are assumed
beforehand, and held constant so that games can be constructed in a
sensible manner. Second, it makes sure that the behaviour that states
exhibit is related to the choice of those assumed preferences, and not
anything else. Forces such as mistakes, the role of communication and
language, or complex cognitive processes are not the explanatory focus
of the theory.
The reason why it is important to point out the way in which nuclear
deterrence theory gets around the problems of state communication and
interaction is that many of the empirical studies on nuclear deterrence
have raised questions about the validity of these rational choice
assumptions. The big problem with the empirical criticisms of nuclear
deterrence theory, however, is that they proceed from a very different
conceptual and methodological paradigm than that of rational choice
analyses. The fundamental difference between nuclear deterrence theory
and the empirical work that has been done on it is the order in which
theory and evidence is used. This has a real effect on the empirical
approach's ability to verify the descriptive and prescriptive claims
that nuclear deterrence theory makes. Whereas nuclear deterrence theory
is deductive, which abstracts from reality for the purpose of building a
theory which is meant to be conceptually coherent and simple in its
explanatory import, empirical attempts to engage with deterrence are
inductive: observations come first, and typologies and generalisations
come second. Methodologically speaking, nuclear deterrence advocates are
probably less concerned with individual case explanations than analysts
who are attempting to empirically verify the theory. This is significant
because the only way that an empirical study of the validity of nuclear
deterrence can proceed is by conducting case studies. For instance Achen
& Snidal's complaint that empirical case studies don't really address
the concerns behind the method of deductive theories:
\[f\]or theoretical purposes, the difficulty with explaining
individual cases is that there are so many details in every case that
no single theory can reproduce them all, and some evidence can be
found for too wide an array of variables and propositions (Achen &
Snidal 1989, p. 157).
While this is probably an overstatement of the limits of conducting case
studies, there are indeed difficulties with making generalisations with
an empirical inquiry when looking at such a deductive and conceptually
'pure' theory such as nuclear deterrence. As Jervis (1989, p. 195)
notes, when conducting empirical studies,
\[i\]diosyncrasies are many and powerful; similar outcomes can be
reached by many different paths and apparently similar initial
conditions do not always yield the same results. Partly for this
reason and partly because of the limitations of existing research,
what we have no is more a list than a tight theory.
So there is a real divide between the conceptual and methodological
fundamentals of deductive and inductive theories. The typologies between
empirical case studies of nuclear deterrence theory can be incredibly
fluid and varied, and may not rigorously address every facet of the
single deductive theory to which they might be aimed. But the
disadvantages outlined above should come with a qualification. What we
know from the evidence on nuclear deterrence
is not without structure and coherence. Many of the generalisations
produced by the case studies are linked; the inferred processes can
generate additional propositions; and the arguments apply to a wide
range of problems in addition to deterrence and deterrence failures
(Jervis 1989, p. 196).
It is important to discuss all this because treating the empirical
criticisms of nuclear deterrence theory as if they apply directly to
nuclear deterrence's own analytical focus only tells half the story. As
will be shown below, the evidence on nuclear deterrence takes issue with
the way states interact and communicate to be sure, but it doesn't do so
in a way that starts from the same first principles as rational
deterrence theory. The evidence proceeds in a way that holds a lot of
other things constant, and not just the assumptions behind nuclear
deterrence. For instance, the evidence might investigate the possibility
of preference endogeneity with respect to deterrence, but in a way that
sees states as the product of bureaucratic and not unitary
decision-making processes. Despite the piecemeal and highly qualified
progress of empirical work of nuclear deterrence, it should be seen as
valid. The validity comes from its ability to make coherent and
persuasive generalisations that have strong and convincing prescriptive
and descriptive power.
II - Empirical Findings
=======================
Jervis (1979) provides a concrete summary of what the case study
literature finds about the 'reality' of nuclear deterrence. The findings
fall under several headings (or 'themes') and these are: (a) the reality
of state risk-taking behaviour; (b) the role of rewards and concessions
in deterrence; (c) mistakes, and the things that can go wrong; (d) the
limitations of state information-processing and cognition; and (e) the
nature of state interests and commitments---that is, the costs that
states impose on themselves for the purpose of bringing about nuclear
deterrence.
A - Risk-taking
---------------
The first of these themes, risk-taking, is relatively straightforward,
and it relates to the 'brinkmanship' aspect of nuclear deterrence.
Nuclear deterrence theory points towards the use of 'credible threats of
force'---a willingness and capacity to deploy threats of force in order
to deter--- that are meant to alter the cost/benefit analysis of an
initiator's thinking when that initiator wants to change the status quo
power relations. What the empirical evidence says about this process is
that states and state elites of a 'defending' state are often far more
prudent and risk-averse than nuclear deterrence theory would have one
believe. States are very often wary of foreclosing the policy options
that they have available to them, reducing possible courses of action
down to one single choice. The cognitive and information-processing
aspect of this preference-selection phenomenon will obviously discussed
later, but it is significant to note that the rational calculation
aspect of nuclear deterrence suggests that defending state elites should
have no trouble issuing grave threats and managing an incredibly risky
relationship with an initiator, when in reality this does not seem to be
the case at all. What the evidence suggests is that defending and
initiating state elites bargain with each other: defending state elites
prefer to 'trade an increment in their chance of prevailing for an
increment in the chances of maintaining peace' (Jervis 1979, p. 303).
Furthermore, there appear to be different risk-management behaviours for
different kinds of defenders and initiators. If the above were taken to
be a general rule, it would seem that states care less about long-run
strategic considerations than one would expect. This is not the case.
When it comes to great power (say USA versus USSR) deterrence
interactions, long-run considerations feature much more prominently in
state decision-making. This means that either side is much more likely
to retreat and give concessions instead of issuing new threats. This
evidence contradicts nuclear deterrence theory in two ways: first, not
all defenders and initiators are the same, and in certain cases,
defenders will more than not opt to retreat, trusting initiators to not
exploit their concessions.
B - Rewards
-----------
The second theme looks at the role of rewards, instead of threats and
disincentives, in a relationship of nuclear deterrence. The evidence on
this category refers to the way the defender's communication with the
initiator is meant to change that initiator's cost/benefit calculation
when it wants to attack. What nuclear deterrence theory says about the
deterrence relationship is that an initiator's decision calculus is
geared in such a way that only threats of violence from a status quo
defender will influence its operation, and cause it to back down. What
the evidence says on this matter is that threats of disincentives do not
necessarily, or even in most cases, alter an initiator's decision
calculus in a manner that establishes a relationship of deterrence. It
may be that a state has no other option---or thinks it has no other
option---but to be bellicose, and threats of nuclear violence might only
steel its resolve. In instances where things are no so dire, threats of
nuclear violence risk 'humiliating' an initiator state; on this point
the evidence suggests that frequently it is hard for a state to admit
total defeat. Threats of nuclear force may in these circumstances cause
initiator feelings of resentment, and may make deterrence far more
difficult in the future if not couples with some kind of reward or
concession---that is if total deterrence is possible at all.
C - Mistakes and Things That Can Go Wrong
-----------------------------------------
This third theme is a very substantive one, and deals directly with the
'perception issue' inherent in nuclear deterrence's rational choice
paradigm. Mistakes, and things that can go wrong when attempting to
purposively create a relationship of deterrence fall under another four
headings. Deterrence may fail where it is supposed to succeed because
the defender: (i) may fail to understand the other's values; (ii) may
misunderstand the way the initiator sees the world; (iii) may have
incorrect beliefs about the initiator's strength and options; and (iv)
may face extreme difficulty in correctly determining the initiator's
basic intentions.
Each of these four mistakes in judgment on the part of the defender
speaks to the second assumption behind rational deterrence theory. This
assumption causes states behaviour to be explained through their
'opportunities' only---that is, the opportunity that they have to act on
their exogenously given preferences---and not anything else. Not only
does this radically simplify the kinds of behaviours states can have,
but it also says something about the way states are meant to detect and
interpret the behaviours of their counterparts (or 'competitors'). If
the behaviour of states is meant to be tightly linked to their
preferences, per a rational choice paradigm, a defending state should be
able to safely estimate the preferences of an initiator by looking at
its behaviour. However all four of these different types of mistakes and
errors in judgment found in the empirical evidence suggest the opposite.
They suggest that in practice, states have a very difficult time
divining the desires and capabilities of their counterparts.
The explanation in the empirical literature for these difficulties
usually falls within a different analytical paradigm. For instance,
Jervis (1982) stresses the role of the concept of perceptions in
explaining the difficulties states seem to have in correctly working out
information about other states. Perceptions represent a significant
increase in complexity over exogenous preferences and behaviour in terms
of opportunity, because it adds an extra layer of cognitive grey matter
over state interaction. Perceptions depend on the attitudes and values
of the state that is doing the perceiving, and so when interacting with
other states, the perceiving state is heavily conditioned by its own
conscious and unconscious psychological elements. This says something
about the way states perform their supposed rational calculation under
rational choice analyses---this will be discussed next.
D - Information processing and Cognition
----------------------------------------
The fourth theme is not directly related to the three assumptions
outlined above, but nonetheless relates to them closely. Nuclear
deterrence theory asserts that states should be able to perform a
careful and precise rational appraisal of the costs and benefits of
choices when considering bringing about, or reacting to relationships of
deterrence. Typically, there should be very few limits in making
mistakes or errors of judgment when calculating the kinds of choices
involved in executing or reacting to a relationship of deterrence. Note
that this is different from the heading above. The theme above describes
the errors states makes about their counterparts, this theme covers the
expectations that states have about the probabilities of certain things
occurring in general.
The Jervis outlines three errors in rationality that states exhibit in
practice (Jervis 1979, pp. 310-311). The first of these is that states
usually focus on the payoffs involved in the decision-making process,
rather than what should be their true focus of calculation: changes in
event probabilities. The second is very straight forward, and that is
that there is evidence to indicate that even if states have a firm grasp
of the probabilities involved in attempting to engineer a relationship
of deterrence, they don't calculate as precisely as they should. The
third impairment of rationality is that states, even when they have good
estimates of event probabilities, fail to make proper explicit value
trade-offs.
Each of these three errors in cognition are again related to the first
assumption behind rational deterrence theory, that of preference
exogeneity. The theory assumes that states rank and order preferences in
a systematic and unbiased manner. What the evidences suggests about
state rationality is that states don't seem to draw up and scrutinise
policy preferences in such a clear and ordered manner. Some preferences
are more valued than others for cognitive, yet---if one was talking in a
strict sense---irrational reasons, whereas others may not suffer from
being under- or over-valued, but may not be compared and analysed
properly.
E - State Interests and Commitments
-----------------------------------
The fifth and final theme that Jervis describes as emerging from the
body of empirical literature about nuclear deterrence is that of the
nature of state interests and commitments when attempting to establish a
relationship of deterrence. Very briefly, this theme looks at the way
states formulate their perceptions of the costs and benefits that are
involved in establishing a relationship of nuclear deterrence, be they
defender or initiator. The empirical literature suggests that there
exist two factors that influence state rationality when they deal with
nuclear deterrence relationships, and these are either (i) a state's
interest in something; or (ii) a state's commitment with respect to
something. What is important about these two factors is that they are
measures of costs and benefits that states self-impose upon themselves.
This is of course against the grain when it comes to the precepts of
rational deterrence theory, which, again, returning to the matter of
preference exogeneity, says that states consider all options equally and
without bias.
III - Conclusion
================
This paper has made a very brief effort at outlining the operation of
rational deterrence theory, one of the many bases that exist for
substantiating nuclear deterrence theories, and in turn relating
rational deterrence theory to the criticisms that have been made of it
in empirical literature. The paper's attention has chiefly been
concerned with Robert Jervis's summary of the empirical work that has
been done on rational deterrence theory.
3 923.
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