Что: a51af292b9189b78a6b3a8341a525176b5c4b3ba
Когда: 2021-08-03 22:03:49+03:00
Темы: crypto dns fun
CA Честного Ахмеда
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=647959
Из https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/53117/what-trusted-root-certification-authorities-should-i-trust
узнал про про такой замечательный, но отвергнутый Mozilla удостоверяющий
центр Честного Ахмеда. I like it! (C) Borat Sagdiev
1. Name
Honest Achmed's Used Cars and Certificates
2. Website URL
www.honestachmed.dyndns.org
3. Organizational type
Individual (Achmed, and possibly his cousin Mustafa, who knows a bit about computers).
4. Primary market / customer base
Absolutely anyone who'll give us money.
5. Impact to Mozilla Users
Achmed's business plan is to sell a sufficiently large number of
certificates as quickly as possible in order to become too big to
fail (see "regulatory capture"), at which point most of the rest of
this application will become irrelevant.
6. CA Contact Information
achmed@honestachmed.dyndns.org
Technical information about each root certificate
1. Certificate Name
Honest Achmed's Used Cars and Certificates
2. Certificate Issuer Field
Honest Achmed's Used Cars and Certificates
3. Certificate Summary
The purpose of this certificate is to allow Honest Achmed to sell
bucketloads of other certificates and make a lot of money.
4. Root Certificate URL
www.honestachmed.dyndns.org/cert.der
5. SHA1 fingerprint to 10. Signing key parameters
See the certificates.
11. Test website URL - 14. OCSP (OCSP is required for EV enablement)
https://www.honestachmed.dyndns.org /
www.honestachmed.dyndns.org/chain.p7s /
www.honestachmed.dyndns.org/crl.der /
www.honestachmed.dyndns.org/ocsp.asp
15. Requested Trust Bits
All of them of course. The more trust bits we get, the more certificates we can sell.
16. SSL Validation Type
All of them. The more types, the more certificates we can sell.
CA Hierarchy information for each root certificate
1. CA Hierarchy
Honest Achmed plans to authorise certificate issuance by at least,
but not limited to, his cousin Osman, his uncles Mehmet and
Iskender, and possibly his cousin's friend Emin.
2. Sub CAs Operated by 3rd Parties
Honest Achmed's uncles may invite some of their friends to issue
certificates as well, in particular their cousins Refik and Abdi or
"RA" as they're known. Honest Achmed's uncles assure us that their
RA can be trusted, apart from that one time when they lent them the
keys to the car, but that was a one-off that won't happen again.
Verification Policies and Practices
1. Documentation: CP, CPS, and Relying Party Agreements
Honest Achmed promises to studiously verify that payment from anyone
requesting a certificate clears before issuing it (except for his
uncles, who are good for credit). Achmed guarantees that no
certificate will be issued without payment having been received, as
per the old latin proverb "nil certificati sine lucre".
2. Audits
Achmed's uncles all vouch for the fact that he's honest. In any
case by the time he's issued enough certificates he'll be regarded
as too big to fail by the browser vendors, so an expensive audit
doesn't really matter.
3. SSL Verification Procedures
4. Email Address Verification Procedures
5. Code Signing Subscriber Verification Procedures
See (1).
Response to Mozilla's CA Recommended Practices
Honest Achmed promises to abide by these practices. If he's found
not to abide by them, he'll claim it was a one-off slip-up in
procedures and that policies have been changed to ensure that it
doesn't happen again. If it does happen again, he'll blame it on
one of his uncles or maybe his cousin, who still owes him some money
for getting the car fixed.
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