510BV$spin 12-29-98 08:23:44 UNITED STATES REPORTS 510 OCT. TERM 1993 In Memoriam JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 510BV$titl 05-25-97 14:38:12 UNITED STATES REPORTS VOLUME 510 CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT AT OCTOBER TERM, 1993 Beginning of Term October 4, 1993, Through March 21, 1994 Together With Opinions of Individual Justices in Chambers FRANK D. WAGNER reporter of decisions WASHINGTON : 1997 Printed on Uncoated Permanent Printing Paper For sale by the U. S. Government Printing Office Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328 510BV$$iii 05-25-97 14:40:02 PGT * frt J USTICES of the SU PREM E COU RT during the time of these reports WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, Chief Justice. HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Associate Justice. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, Associate Justice. SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, Associate Justice. ANTONIN SCALIA, Associate Justice. ANTHONY M. KENNEDY, Associate Justice. DAVID H. SOUTER, Associate Justice. CLARENCE THOMAS, Associate Justice. RUTH BADER GINSBURG, Associate Justice. retired WARREN E. BURGER, Chief Justice. LEWIS F. POWELL, Jr., Associate Justice. WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, Jr., Associate Justice. BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice. officers of the court JANET RENO, Attorney General. DREW S. DAYS III, Solicitor General. WILLIAM K. SUTER, Clerk. FRANK D. WAGNER, Reporter of Decisions. ALFRED WONG, Marshal. SHELLEY L. DOWLING, Librarian. iii 510BV$$$IV 05-25-97 14:41:02 PGT * frt SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Allotment of Justices It is ordered that the following allotment be made of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of this Court among the circuits, pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 42, and that such allotment be entered of record, effective October 1, 1993, viz.: For the District of Columbia Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice. For the First Circuit, David H. Souter, Associate Justice. For the Second Circuit, Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice. For the Third Circuit, David H. Souter, Associate Justice. For the Fourth Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice. For the Fifth Circuit, Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice. For the Sixth Circuit, John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice. For the Seventh Circuit, John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice. For the Eighth Circuit, Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice. For the Ninth Circuit, Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice. For the Tenth Circuit, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate Justice. For the Eleventh Circuit, Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice. For the Federal Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice. October 1, 1993. (For next previous allotment, and modifications, see 502 U. S., p. vi, and 509 U. S., p. v.) iv 510us1uiii 05-22-97 21:27:21 PGT * frt PROCEEDINGS IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES IN MEMORY OF JUSTICE MARSHALL* MONDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1993 Present: Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter, Justice Thomas, and Justice Ginsburg. The Chief Justice said: The Court is in special session this afternoon to receive the Resolutions of the Bar of the Supreme Court in tribute to our former colleague and friend, the late Justice Thur- good Marshall. The Court recognizes the Solicitor General. Mr. Solicitor General Days addressed the Court as follows: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: At a meeting this afternoon, the members of the Bar of this Court unanimously adopted a Resolution memorializing our regard for the late Justice Thurgood Marshall and ex- pressing our profound sorrow at his death. With the Court's leave, I am honored to present this resolution to the Court. *Justice Marshall, who retired from the Court effective October 1, 1991 (502 U. S. vii), died in Bethesda, Maryland, on January 24, 1993 (506 U. S. vii). v 510us1uiii 05-22-97 21:27:21 PGT * frt vi JUSTICE MARSHALL RESOLUTION The members of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States met today to record our respect, admiration, and great affection for Thurgood Marshall, who served this Court as Associate Justice from 1967 to the time of his retire- ment in 1991. A lawyer and jurist of worldwide renown, Justice Marshall's legal career of almost 60 years embodied an unyielding commitment to equal justice under law. While many great figures participated in the American struggle for civil rights and civil liberties, none was more important than Thurgood Marshall. His dedication to the living Constitution and legal institutions of America kept him focused on the importance of individual rights and liber- ties, not only for African-Americans, but also for women, the poor, and other underrepresented people. During his life- time Thurgood Marshall dominated the legal landscape, tena- ciously pushing race relations along the path of equality in courtrooms, classrooms, and corporate boardrooms. A chronicle of the extraordinary life and contributions of this legal legend reveals the many facets of his character. As civil rights advocate, as Associate Justice of this Court, as mentor, as leader, as ambassador of good will, and as friend, he was a man of incredible vision and unquestioned commitment. We owe an enormous debt of gratitude to his devoted wife Cissy and his wonderful sons, Goody and John for sharing him with us and with the Nation. His inherent sense of fairness and his faith in the basic decency of the American people, inspired his advocacy, his writing, and his courage to imagine a better world and to make the imagined world real. Born on July 2, 1908, in Baltimore, Maryland, to William and Norma Williams Marshall, young Thurgood attended the local elementary and secondary schools for "colored" chil- dren. His childhood memories of this segregated city-the unfair treatment and discrimination he experienced first hand-etched indelible impressions in his mind. His father worked as a Pullman car waiter and later as head steward at the Gibson Country Club. His mother taught elementary 510us1uiii 05-22-97 21:27:21 PGT * frt JUSTICE MARSHALL vii school and made great sacrifices to send young Thurgood to college at Lincoln University in Chester County, Pennsylva- nia. She pawned her wedding and engagement rings to help pay his college expenses. Marshall also worked at nu- merous summer jobs to defray his expenses. Accepted one summer for the position as a helper on the Pullman trains, he inquired about obtaining a larger pair of trousers for his uniform to accommodate his long legs. The white conductor glared at him saying, "Look boy, don't you know that it is easier for me to get a new Negro than a new pair of pants!" Graduating with honors from Lincoln in 1929, Marshall knew that rejection by the all white University of Maryland Law School was certain. He then made the fortunate deci- sion to enroll at the Howard University School of Law in the District of Columbia. There he began his apprenticeship and with Dean Charles Hamilton Houston, a great constitu- tional scholar and creative genius who helped to develop the civil rights strategies. Thurgood and his Howard colleagues refined, defined, and implemented these strategies in the classrooms and eventually in the courts, leading to great victories in the 40's, 50's, and the 60's. Marshall graduated first in his class from Howard in 1933 and began private practice in Baltimore. But most of his time was spent in voluntary support of the local NAACP. One of his first cases was against the University of Maryland Law School to force it to admit black students. He suc- ceeded and was responsible for the first black law student's enrollment in 1935. In 1936 Houston called Marshall to join him at the New York headquarters of the NAACP national legal staff. He was appointed chief legal officer in 1938, following in the steps of Houston. In 1940, Marshall helped to establish "the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc." (popu- larly called the Inc. Fund or LDF) as a litigation and public education entity separate from the NAACP. He served with great distinction as its Director/Counsel until his ap- pointment to the Federal Bench. 510us1uiii 05-22-97 21:27:21 PGT * frt viii JUSTICE MARSHALL As the principal architect and exponent of the Inc. Fund's civil rights strategy, Marshall traveled constantly. He spent long hours, even days devoted to the civil rights strug- gle analyzing and arguing landmark cases. Even as he pre- pared for the ultimate civil rights battle in the 1954 school cases, Buster, his first wife, was struggling with her own fight against cancer. She never revealed how sick she was until after the Brown decision. Her personal struggle in- spired Marshall to continue his fight for equal justice. Thurgood Marshall waged extraordinary legal battles. For more than 30 years he fought discrimination wherever it arose-in education, in employment, in voting rights, and in the criminal law. As the lead LDF trial attorney, he worked closely with Charles Houston, William Hastie, Wil- liam Coleman, Jack Greenberg, Lou Pollak, and other bril- liant African-American and white lawyers who joined the civil rights vanguard. Together this distinguished team la- bored to implement a bold master plan for civil rights and litigate the cases that established the legal foundation for Brown and its progeny. Of Marshall's thirty-two civil rights cases before the Supreme Court, he won twenty-nine-an extraordinary record. Clearly, each victory broke new ground. However, none was more important in American jurisprudence and in the lives of millions of people than the watershed decisions in Brown v. Board of Education in Topeka, Kansas, 347 U. S. 483 (1954); 349 U. S. 294 (1955). In these unanimous deci- sions, the Supreme Court began the process of dismantling racial segregation in the Nation's public schools. The Court ruled that all children had the right to attend schools that were not segregated by race. The decision struck down racial discrimination in education and aban- doned forever the doctrine of "separate but equal." With the help of Dr. Kenneth Clark, a noted black psychologist, Marshall demonstrated the harm to children who were forced into all black classrooms. Marshall argued persua- sively and passionately for an end to this intolerable practice 510us1uiii 05-22-97 21:27:21 PGT * frt JUSTICE MARSHALL ix and to the insidious justification based on the inherent inferi- ority of the black man. Brown stands for the proposition that law can change the world and that the Supreme Court, as the interpreter of the law, can play a forceful role in fulfilling the highest human values. The importance of the Brown decision cannot be overstated. It repudiated the previous justifications for legally sanctioned discrimination in the public classrooms of America. Although elimination and erosion of the vestiges of discrimination moved very slowly, Marshall never gave up hope. He never despaired. He never stopped fighting for the elimination of inequality and injustice wherever it appeared. As important as Brown and its progeny were, they should not eclipse Marshall's accomplishment in fighting segrega- tion at the ballot box. As Marshall himself said: "I don't know whether the voting case or the desegregation case was more important. Without the ballot, you have no citizen- ship, no status, no power in this country. But, without the chance to get an education, you have no capacity to use the ballot effectively." 1 In winning the "white only" primary litigation, Smith v. Allwright,2 Marshall teamed with Bill Hastie, his friend and former Howard Professor, to win for African-Americans a more significant voice at the ballot box. While the impact of this decision was not the immediate en- largement of the voting power of blacks, "it lent legitimacy to the arguments of lawyers [such as Marshall] who contin- ued to complain to the United States Attorney General about discriminatory voting barriers in the South." 3 Ultimately, Marshall's efforts and those of his cooperating attorneys would forever change the face of city halls, state legislatures, governors' mansions, political parties, and political nominat- ing conventions. Eventually America came to accept black 1 Carl T. Rowan, "Dreammakers and Dreambreakers: The World of Justice Thurgood Marshall," Little Brown & Company (1993), p. 129. 2 321 U. S. 649 (1944). 3 J. Clay Smith, Jr., "Emancipation: The Making of the Black Lawyer, 1844­1944," University of Pennsylvania Press (1993), p. 18. 510us1uiii 05-22-97 21:27:22 PGT * frt x JUSTICE MARSHALL candidates for political office at the local, state and Federal levels. Marshall's work outside of the United States reflected the breadth of his concern for equity and fairness for people of color throughout the world. During the fifties and sixties the emerging independent nations of Africa turned to Amer- ican constitutional scholars for assistance in shaping the legal framework that would govern the new rights and responsi- bilities of their citizens. In 1961 Jomo Kenyatta, the great leader of Kenya, asked Thurgood Marshall for help. Marshall traveled to London and Kenya, working tirelessly for weeks with the Constitu- tional Conference of Kenya. He relied on the model of fun- damental rights in the American Declaration of Independ- ence and the Constitution. Marshall put into words a world in which Kenyatta's dream of an independent nation with a black majority population under the rule of law became a reality. Mindful of the hardships and inequities of black Americans struggling to end segregation and to become full participants in the democratic process, Marshall focused on the integrity of the electoral process, the legislative forum, and the role of the courts in interpreting the basic tenets of the law and in protecting the rights of the minority-in the case of Kenya a white minority. In 1951 Marshall traveled to Japan and Korea to inves- tigate the disproportionately high incidence of courts mar- tials and disciplinary actions against "colored" soldiers. He found blatant disparities in charges and punishment imposed on black soldiers when compared to white soldiers in similar circumstances, especially in the Army. He challenged the unfairness of treatment and the absence of any modicum of due process in the "frontier justice" of the military courts. With his customary candor and persuasive arguments, Mar- shall was able to document these practices, to bring this situation into public view, and to enlist congressional pres- sure to curtail these discriminatory practices against black soldiers. 510us1uiii 05-22-97 21:27:22 PGT * frt JUSTICE MARSHALL xi In 1961 President John F. Kennedy nominated Thurgood Marshall for appointment to the United States Court of Ap- peals for the Second Circuit. He was given a recess ap- pointment in October, 1961 and confirmed by the Senate in 1962. Unfortunately, his confirmation was stalled for a year by a group of segregationist Senators. Despite these tac- tics, Marshall served with distinction as an appellate jurist for several years. In 1965, President Lyndon Baines John- son named him Solicitor General of the United States, the first African-American to hold that position. As the Na- tion's top appellate lawyer, Thurgood Marshall successfully defended before the Supreme Court the constitutionality of numerous statutes, including the 1965 Voting Rights Act which secured equal voting privileges for all Americans. In 1967 President Johnson called Marshall to the White House and advised him of his intention to nominate Marshall to become an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. As the first African-American in the history of the United States so honored, Marshall's becoming part of the Court showed how much he had changed the world. Typically, Marshall asked LBJ for a moment to share his news with his devoted wife Cissy before the press was advised. Char- acteristically, he also said to LBJ in a more serious tone, that he would "call them as he saw them." LBJ responded that he would expect nothing less. Although a bitter Senate con- firmation fight erupted again, Marshall was confirmed and sworn in on August 20, 1967. During his twenty-four year tenure on the Court, Justice Marshall served as the conscience of the Court. With firm and unwavering conviction, he aggressively challenged his colleagues and counsel on issues of racism, bigotry, sexism, sexual preference, and prejudice with his sharp mind, candid speech and powerful pen. His questions at oral argument would unerringly uncover the fundamental issues of fairness that lay at the core of the cases facing the Court. Often in concert with his great friend and ally, William Brennan, Marshall argued against artificial barriers to human dignity and individual rights. On many occasions Marshall dis- 510us1uiii 05-22-97 21:27:22 PGT * frt xii JUSTICE MARSHALL sented vigorously from what he believed to be the Court's disregard for the rights of the elderly,4 of women,5 of un- popular political causes,6 minors,7 and native Americans.8 Justice Marshall's deep concern for protection of the Bill of Rights led him to denounce efforts to stifle free speech,9 to defend his unwavering belief that the imposition of the death penalty was unconstitutional,10 and to voice repeatedly his outrage about violations of the due process rights of criminal defendants.11 In powerful words Justice Marshall's opinions expressed the agony and the pain suffered those facing charges. His concerns about their rights were partic- ularly poignant because of his personal experiences as a young lawyer defending black citizens who had been unjustly accused and punished by the criminal justice system. His- torians will certainly chronicle his impact on American jurisprudence. Even with his extraordinary commitment of time and en- ergy to the critical legal issues of the twentieth century, Thurgood Marshall still found time to enjoy great personal contentment with his beloved wife, Cissy. Cissy brought him love, compassion, and understanding. They enjoyed the proud moments of parenthood with their sons, Thurgood, Jr. ("Goody") and John. Justice Marshall took great pleasure in 4 Public Employees Retirement System v. Betts, 492 U. S. 158, 182 (1989) (Marshall, J., Dissenting). 5 Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 281 (1979) (Marshall, J., Dissenting). 6 See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U. S. 189, 200 (1986) (Mar- shall, J., Dissenting). 7 See Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253, 281 (1984) (Marshall, J., Dissenting). 8 Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U. S. 584, 615 (1977) (Marshall, J., Dissenting). 9 See Police Department v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U. S. 308 (1968). 10 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 314 (1972) (Marshall, J., Concurring). 11 See U. S. v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739 (1987). 510us1uiii 05-22-97 21:27:22 PGT * frt JUSTICE MARSHALL xiii the fact that both his sons chose careers in the law-Goody as an attorney and counselor to Senator and now Vice Presi- dent of the United States, Albert Gore, Jr., and John as a Virginia State Trooper and instructor for a statewide special services division. Marshall's grandchildren brought him great joy in his later years. He often regaled clerks with the latest stories of young Will and the determination of little Cissy! Justice Marshall served as a beacon of hope for genera- tions of men and women, young and old, African-American, Asian, Hispanic and white who simply sought equal opportu- nities to live, to learn, to work, and to share in the rights and liberties enjoyed by the majority of our great Nation. As we pay tribute to this extraordinary man of the law today, we must never forget his extensive contribution to American society. Thurgood Marshall made our country a better place for all citizens-as leader, fighter, and defender of the underrepresented. A brilliant lawyer, constitutional scholar and jurist, Thur- good Marshall unselfishly dedicated himself to work for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and for equal justice at the bar of this Court, altering not only the course of race relations in America, but also the broader legal landscape for future generations. His advocacy and his leadership advanced so- cial and political understanding among all Americans. He virtually created the "public interest lawyer"-who fought for individuals and for a cause. Even as Thurgood Marshall and his loyal band of cooperating attorneys chipped away at the theory of "separate but equal," they painstakingly pre- pared the way for integration, weaving together the fabric of a just society born out of a dynamic melange of people from different ethnic, cultural, and racial backgrounds. Throughout the early years, Thurgood Marshall showed extraordinary inner strength and character that were the hallmarks of his life's work. Marshall willingly confronted both great physical risks and enormous personal sacrifices. His life was often in danger; death threats were common. In making trips to southern courthouses, there were many 510us1uiii 05-22-97 21:27:22 PGT * frt xiv JUSTICE MARSHALL close calls. Threats of lynching, assault, and murder were routine. Marshall's life and achievements continue to inspire young people to follow his example, to sustain the legacy of the civil rights movement, and to become advocates for equal rights under law. We must not forget, however, the powerful com- mitment that kept Marshall on a steadfast path. With lim- ited resources at the Fund, Thurgood Marshall had to piece his cases together, literally and figuratively. For example, at LDF he had one old typewriter and carbon paper that had been used and reused. His secretary, legal assistants, and even Marshall himself sometimes went without pay for weeks when money was needed for filing papers or paying train fare for an LDF lawyer to appear at a trial. Even under these adverse conditions, Marshall never wavered. His drive and commitment led him to do whatever was nec- essary to get a case heard, to win the argument. Funds to support his litigation effort were collected in churches, at rallies sponsored by the NAACP, and from several financial angels who believed in the man and his mission. Pennies, nickels and dimes-the collection was always small but large enough to keep him going. Contrast the Marshall experience with those of the thou- sands of black elected officials at the local, state and Federal levels today with multi-million dollar budgets, staffs, and support for the multifaceted work that they perform. Thur- good Marshall had no such resources. Today's governmen- tal leaders function in a very different world. But, it is a world that could not exist without the pivotal foundation cre- ated by Thurgood Marshall in the voting rights challenges, starting with Smith v. Allwright. Changes in the political process occurred in the United States not by magic, but by strategic planning, hard work, sacrifices, and risk-taking. As Paul Gewirtz, a former Marshall clerk, has observed, President Johnson's historic announcement captured the es- sence of Marshall: "Thurgood Marshall symbolizes the best 510us1uiii 05-22-97 21:27:22 PGT * frt JUSTICE MARSHALL xv about our American society, the belief that human rights must be satisfied through the orderly process of law." 12 Robert Carter, a former LDF lawyer and currently a federal judge, commented on his mentor's most enduring character- istic. He focused on "[Marshall's] vivid, almost religious faith in the effi- cacy of the National Constitution in protecting the indi- vidual against government discrimination and abuse. He believed that the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments to the United States Constitution were an updated Magna Carta, insuring equal citizen rights for blacks and that his mission was to see this concept of the Constitution become a firm facet of constitutional jurisprudence. He never faltered in this belief." 13 This fundamental belief in the Constitution was the stand- ard which Marshall held high as a civil rights lawyer and as a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. Justice Marshall brought to the Court a unique understanding of real life. Having spent most of his adult life working and living among "poor colored folks" Marshall "knew what po- lice stations were like, what indignities emanated from rural Southern life, what the streets of New York were like, what the corrupt trial courts were like, what death sentences were like, what being black in America was like and he knew what it felt like to be at risk as a human being." 14 From these experiences Marshall could explain in graphic human terms to his colleagues on the Court the difference the law could make. In a recent tribute, his colleague, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, poignantly captured his unique quality to demon- strate the impact of legal rules on human lives: 12 Paul Gewirtz, "Thurgood Marshall," 101 Yale L. J. 13, 14 (1991). 13 Robert L. Carter, Judge, U. S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, Journal of Supreme Court History 1992, Yearbook of the Supreme Court Historical Society, pp. 16­17. 14 Id. 510us1uiii 05-22-97 21:27:22 PGT * frt xvi JUSTICE MARSHALL "His was the eye of a lawyer who had seen the deepest wounds in the social fabric and used law to help heal them. His was the ear of a counselor who understood the vulnerabilities of the accused and established safe- guards for their protection. His was the mouth of a man who knew the anguish of the silenced and gave them a voice." 15 Whether in the majority or in dissent, Justice Marshall's faith in the Constitution encompassed more than the racial issues of his civil rights days. Indeed, he saw the pro- tection provided by the Constitution as extending beyond color and racial constraints to preventing official govern- mental abuse of any disadvantaged person. For example, Marshall staunchly believed that equal protection meant equal-regardless of color. In Peters v. Kiff 16 Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court upholding a white defendant's claim that the Constitution was violated by the exclusion of blacks from the petit and grand juries. "The existence of a constitutional violation does not depend on the circumstances of the person making the claim." 17 Rejecting the argument of his dissenting brethren that the white defendant was not harmed by the exclusion of blacks on the jury, Marshall wrote convincingly that the ex- clusion of any large segment of the community from juries "deprives the jury of a perspective on human events that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented." 18 Justice Marshall's belief that equal treatment transcended racial equity is evident in many of his opinions and dissents while a member of this Court. Even with the changing judicial philosophy that marked the majority opinions in his later years on the bench, he continued to write most often 15 Sandra Day O'Connor, "A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur," 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1217 (1992). 16 407 U. S. 493 (1972). 17 407 U. S. at 498. 18 407 U. S. at 503-504. 510us1uiii 05-22-97 21:27:22 PGT * frt JUSTICE MARSHALL xvii in dissent about the Court's neglect of the unfortunate in our society. Some have characterized Justice Marshall as "a story- teller" or "a curmudgeon." Neither description is accurate nor appropriate to capture the essence of the man. Marshall was indeed a raconteur. But he used his personal experi- ences with the indignities of the legal system as a means to help his colleagues better understand why such behavior and abuse should not be tolerated. His sometimes gruff de- meanor reflected his impatience with the slow pace of true integration in America. Although he had confronted the depths of bigotry, hatred, and selfishness, he never turned bitter but always aimed at "doing the best you can do with what you've got." Justice Marshall held fast to his fundamental belief in equality under the law. His position was never sugar-coated nor served up as a softball. During the bicentennial celebration of the Constitution, Marshall shocked many when he refused to speak in platitudes about the document. Instead, he reminded us that the Constitution did not con- demn slavery; rather the Constitution was defective at the start. Marshall observed that: ". . . the credit belonged not to the framers who wrote the Constitution in 1787, but to those in the ensuing 200 years who refused to acquiesce in outdated notions of liberty, justice and equality, and who strived to better them. The true miracle was not the birth of the Consti- tution, but its life. "I plan to celebrate the Bicentennial of the Constitution as a living document. . . including the Bill of Rights and the other amendments protecting individual freedoms and human rights." 19 In August 1992, for example, Marshall could not resist re- minding the leadership of the American Bar Association of 19 Thurgood Marshall, "Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution," 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2, 5 (1987). 510us1uiii 05-22-97 21:27:22 PGT * frt xviii JUSTICE MARSHALL the historical exclusion of black lawyers from the organiza- tion, even as it bestowed upon him its highest honors. His comments on that occasion were quintessential Marshall. "We've come a long way (pause), but we certainly know how far we have to go. I hope you will stick with me in fighting the fight for full civil rights and full civil liberties." 20 The legacy of Justice Marshall will live on in the men, women, and children whose lives and souls he touched and all of those who benefited from his legal triumphs. He dared to use the law as an instrument of social change, and history will record that he succeeded. He humanized legal theories and dared to challenge the morality of law that crushed the human spirit and denied black citizens the opportunity for a decent life. The Bar of the Supreme Court speaks for all the lawyers, judges, and citizens of this country when we say: Thank you, Mr. Justice Marshall, for opening our hearts and never letting us forget that our society can only succeed when the least among us have the same opportunity as the most privileged. Wherefore, it is accordingly RESOLVED, that we, the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, express our profound sorrow that Associ- ate Justice Thurgood Marshall is no longer with us; we ex- press our admiration for his deep understanding and commit- ment to equal justice under law, and our respect for his dedication to the rule of law in a just society; we repeat our sincere appreciation for his use of the law as an instrument of social change in the quest to eliminate the stigmatic injury of racial discrimination; and it is further RESOLVED, that the Solicitor General be asked to pre- sent these Resolutions to the Court and that the Attorney 20 Appleson, "ABA Supports the Right to Abortion," Reuters, Ltd., August 11, 1992. 510us1uiii 05-22-97 21:27:22 PGT * frt JUSTICE MARSHALL xix General be asked to move that they be inscribed upon the Court's permanent records. The Chief Justice said: Thank you, Mr. Solicitor General. I recognize the Attor- ney General of the United States. Attorney General Reno addressed the Court as follows: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Bar of this Court met today to honor the memory of Thurgood Marshall, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court from 1967 to 1991. From his birth in Baltimore, Thurgood Marshall's life was one of public service. He was raised by loving parents who instilled in him confidence in himself and pride in his herit- age, and the habits of mind, force of will, determination of character, and skill in advocacy that would serve him and his country so well in later years. Justice Marshall received his early education in the segre- gated public schools of Baltimore, beginning in the elemen- tary school where his mother taught. He went on to attend Lincoln University, and between his sophomore and junior years married his first wife, Vivien, who lent her patience and support to his struggles, defeats and triumphs for 25 years, until her untimely death in 1955. After college he was denied admission to study law at the University of Maryland because of his race-an injustice he would rectify five years later when, only two years out of law school him- self, he obtained an order from the Maryland Court of Ap- peals directing the University to enroll his client as its first black law student. That victory was made possible by the legal education Marshall received at Howard University, where he prospered under the tutelage of Charles Houston, William Hastie, and 510us1uiii 05-22-97 21:27:22 PGT * frt xx JUSTICE MARSHALL other members of the faculty, and graduated as valedictorian in 1933. It also marked the beginning of his association with the NAACP, which Marshall joined as a full-time staff lawyer in 1936. There, his law school mentors became col- leagues in the fight for equal rights for all Americans under the law. Justice Marshall's name first appeared on a brief in this Court in 1940, in the case of Chambers v. Florida. He pre- sented his first oral argument in this Court three years later in Adams v. United States, besting the United States on a technical point of federal jurisdiction over criminal conduct. From that year through his departure from the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in 1961, Marshall argued sixteen times before this Court, in cases whose names read today like a map of crossroads on the journey to equality: Smith v. All- wright, striking down "white primaries" that kept black Americans disenfranchised; Morgan v. Virginia, forbidding enforcement of state segregation laws on buses and trains travelling in interstate commerce; Patton v. Mississippi, invalidating convictions returned by juries from which African-Americans had been systematically excluded; Sipuel v. Board of Regents and Sweatt v. Painter, requiring the admission of qualified black students to previously all-white state law schools; McGhee v. Sipes, reported as Shelley v. Kraemer, forbidding state enforcement of restric- tive racial covenants in land deeds; Boynton v. Virginia, holding that refusing service to a black man at a public res- taurant in a bus terminal violated the Interstate Commerce Act; and, of course, Brown v. Board of Education and Cooper v. Aaron, in which this Court finally acknowledged that "separate" could not be "equal," and rejected the consti- tutional doctrine that had justified de jure segregation. After the triumph of the Brown victory, Marshall was forced to endure the heavy blow of the death from cancer of his first wife, known affectionately as "Buster." During the period of continued frenetic activity that followed, however, it was his good fortune to meet and marry Cecilia Suyat, his 510us1uiii 05-22-97 21:27:22 PGT * frt JUSTICE MARSHALL xxi partner and companion for the remainder of his life, and to have two fine sons, Thurgood Jr. and John William. In 1961 President Kennedy nominated Marshall to a seat on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir- cuit-only the second African-American to be named to the federal appellate bench. The Senate approved the nomina- tion almost a year later, after a bruising battle that reflected not upon the qualifications of the nominee, but rather upon the power and prejudices of his political opponents. In his relatively brief tenure on the Court of Appeals, Judge Mar- shall authored, by one count, 118 majority opinions-not one of which was reversed. Judge Marshall left the Court of Appeals in 1964, when President Johnson called upon him to put his formidable powers of advocacy to use before this Court once again, this time as Solicitor General of the United States. In his three years in that office, Solicitor General Marshall argued nine- teen additional cases before this Court. These cases re- flected the full range of the government's business, from the assessment of estate taxes, to the interrelationship between judicial and administrative authority, to the complexities of securities and antitrust law. Several, however, reflected his continuing passion for the protection and advancement of civil rights. In Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, for exam- ple, the United States as amicus curiae successfully urged the Court to invalidate poll taxes that burdened the right to vote. In United States v. Guest and United States v. Price, the government successfully urged reinstatement under the federal criminal civil rights statutes of indictments brought against state officers and private citizens who cooperated in the violation of other citizens' civil rights, including those accused of the abduction and murder of civil rights workers James Chaney, Michael Schwerner and Andrew Goodman. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Court upheld, at the Solicitor General's behest, the validity of the Voting Rights Act's pro- hibition on disenfranchisement, through an English literacy test, of voters educated in Puerto Rican schools; and in Reit- 510us1uiii 05-22-97 21:27:22 PGT * frt xxii JUSTICE MARSHALL man v. Mulkey, the Court ultimately accepted the position supported by the United States, as amicus curiae, that the voters of a State could not enshrine in their fundamental law a public endorsement of private discrimination. Finally, the Solicitor General argued the government's position in Westover v. United States, a companion case to Miranda v. Arizona-perhaps the only case of his career which the fu- ture Justice may not have been altogether sorry to see his client lose. On June 13, 1967, President Johnson nominated Thurgood Marshall to fill the vacancy on this Court created by the re- tirement of Justice Tom Clark. The first African-American to join this Court, Justice Marshall took his seat on October 2, 1967. In his 24 terms on the Court, the Justice delivered a total of 769 opinions, including 322 majority or plurality opinions, 84 concurrences, and 363 dissents. In every case, he could be counted on to combine a deep respect for the law and for the institutional role of the Court, with an equally deep appreciation of how both the law and the Court's deci- sions actually affected real people in an uncloistered world. Justice Marshall's first opinion for the Court reflected his abiding concern that criminal defendants be afforded the professional assistance and procedural protections that would assure that justice was being done in the courts. In Mempa v. Rhay, he spoke for a unanimous Court in holding that the Court's earlier decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, requiring appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in felony cases, applied at "every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be af- fected," including a post-probation sentencing proceeding. Similarly, his opinion for the Court in Bounds v. Smith con- firmed that prison authorities were required to make their prisoners' right of access to the courts meaningful-while reserving to those authorities appropriate discretion to de- termine whether they would do so by providing adequate law libraries, furnishing professional assistance, or through some other means. 510us1uiii 05-22-97 21:27:22 PGT * frt JUSTICE MARSHALL xxiii Even when he found himself in disagreement with the Court's holdings in criminal matters, Justice Marshall could write eloquently to remind us all that as eternal vigilance is the price of liberty, so vigilant protection of the rights of others is the price that we must be prepared to pay to pre- serve the rights we take for granted for ourselves. In United States v. Salerno, for example, he dissented from the Court's holding that Congress and the courts could constitu- tionally provide for the pre-trial detention of certain defend- ants deemed to present a threat to the public safety. What- ever our views on that particular issue, we can all recognize the wisdom of Justice Marshall's warning that: "Our Constitution, whose construction began two centu- ries ago, can shelter us forever from the evils of . . . unchecked power. . . . But it cannot protect us if we lack the courage, and the self-restraint, to protect ourselves." Although a believer in consensus, compromise, and prece- dent, Justice Marshall could be implacable when his con- science and his legal judgment led him to conclude that one of this Court's conclusions was in error. His long and schol- arly concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia set forth his carefully considered view that capital punishment was excessive, unnecessary, and morally unacceptable. Having reached that conclusion, he steadfastly refused to depart from it during the remainder of his tenure on the Court, consistently dissenting in cases where the Court upheld im- position of the death penalty, and from innumerable denials of certiorari in capital cases. Justice Marshall retained, of course, advocate Marshall's pressing interest in issues of equal protection of the laws and the safeguarding of fundamental rights. In his second term on the Court the new Justice delivered the opinion in Stanley v. Georgia, holding that a person could not be prose- cuted for mere possession of obscene material in his own home. Rejecting what he termed "the assertion that the State has the right to control the moral content of a person's thoughts," he made clear that 510us1uiii 05-22-97 21:27:22 PGT * frt xxiv JUSTICE MARSHALL "[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage re- bels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds." A few years later, Justice Marshall wrote for the Court in striking down more than minimal state residency require- ments imposed on a citizen's right to vote. He supported the enforcement of a constitutional right of privacy, and argued in dissent for a fundamental right to childhood edu- cation, and for close constitutional scrutiny of legislative schemes that he believed denied some citizens equal treat- ment or opportunity solely on the basis of their wealth. In his early years on the Court he lent his powerful voice and personal experience to its consideration of cases involving the continuing struggle for desegregation; and when he be- lieved that the Court had strayed from the correct path on those issues or in cases involving related questions of affirmative, race-conscious remedies for past discrimination, he did not hesitate to raise that voice in public dissent. Justice Marshall's contributions to the work of the Court extended, of course, far beyond cases dealing with criminal prosecutions and civil rights. During his time on the Court, he authored important opinions in areas as diverse as securi- ties law, federal environmental law, Indian law, and tax law. In all contexts, his fundamental concern for ensuring both fair procedures and substantial justice-and his sense of the law as functional and evolving, rather than static and formal- istic-remained steadfast. In Shaffer v. Heitner, for example, Justice Marshall led the Court in holding that defendants could not be held to answer to suit in Delaware merely because they owned stock and other intangible assets with a nominal legal situs in that State. His opinion carefully traced the historical develop- ment of limitations on state court jurisdiction, and concluded that the functional standard that had gradually evolved for purposes of in personam jurisdiction, focusing on "the rela- 510us1uiii 05-22-97 21:27:22 PGT * frt JUSTICE MARSHALL xxv tionship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation," should be applied to in rem jurisdiction as well. In adopting that standard, he wrote for the Court that: " `[T]raditional notions of fair play and substantial jus- tice' can be as readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms that are no longer justified as by the adop- tion of new procedures that are inconsistent with the basic values of our constitutional heritage. . . . The fic- tion that an assertion of jurisdiction over property is anything but an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the property supports an ancient form without sub- stantial modern justification. Its continued acceptance would serve only to allow state-court jurisdiction that is fundamentally unfair to the defendant." That willingness to regard legal history and traditions with a respectful but sharp eye, and to modify or reject them forthrightly if they no longer served their purposes in the modern context, was characteristic of Justice Marshall's jurisprudence. He believed deeply in the law; but he saw the law not as an impersonal abstraction, but as a living in- strument in the service of a living people. In reflecting on the bicentennial of the United States Constitution, Justice Marshall cautioned pointedly that: "We must be careful, when focusing on the events which took place in Philadelphia two centuries ago, that we not overlook the momentous events which followed, and thereby lose our proper sense of perspective. If we seek, instead, a sensitive understanding of the Constitu- tion's inherent defects, and its promising evolution through 200 years of history, [w]e will see that the true miracle was not the birth of the Constitution, but its life." Indeed, as the Justice again reminded us, while precarious and imperfect in its origins, "[o]ver 200 years [the Constitu- tion] has slowly, through our efforts, grown more durable, more expansive, and more just." 510us1uiii 05-22-97 21:27:22 PGT * frt xxvi JUSTICE MARSHALL Both at the Bar of this Court and on its bench, Thurgood Marshall played an uncommonly important and historic role in those efforts. Were he here now, he would, I think, ad- monish us to remember that the great work is not finished. His labors may be concluded, but he has left the living law, and the Constitution, in our care. Mr. Chief Justice, on behalf of the lawyers of this Na- tion and, in particular, of the Bar of this Court, I respectfully request that the resolutions presented to you in honor and celebration of the memory of Justice Thurgood Marshall be accepted by the Court, and that they, together with the chronicle of these proceedings, be ordered kept for all time in the records of this Court. The Chief Justice said: Ms. Reno and General Days, the Court thanks you on be- half of the Bar for your presentation today in memory of our late colleague and friend, Justice Marshall. We ask that you convey to Chairman Louis H. Pollak and the members of the Committee on Resolutions our profound appreciation for these Resolutions. Your motion that they be made part of the permanent record of the Court is hereby granted. Thurgood Marshall's service to the public spanned sixty years, twenty-four as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. For almost a quarter of a cen- tury he was an important voice in shaping the decisional law of the Supreme Court. His contributions to the Court, and especially to American Constitutional law, demonstrate his dedication, desire and insightful perspective on the key is- sues of our time. His legacy of decisions as a jurist speaks for itself. In his twenty-four years on the Supreme Court bench, Justice Marshall wrote 322 full opinions for the Court, 84 concurrences and 363 dissents. Although chiefly known for decisions championing the rights of indigent litigants and 510us1uiii 05-22-97 21:27:22 PGT * frt JUSTICE MARSHALL xxvii criminal defendants which both of you have adverted to in your presentations, his influence extended well beyond those issues. He authored, for example, in the opinion for the Court in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., and FCC v. Florida Power Corp., watershed decisions inter- preting the Constitution's prohibition against the govern- mental taking of private property without just compensa- tion. These cases show how Justice Marshall contributed across a wide range of constitutional law. The great majority of Supreme Court Justices are almost always remembered for their contributions to constitutional law as a member of this Court. Justice Marshall, however, is unique because of his contributions to constitutional law before becoming a member of the Court were so significant. Beginning with his solo practice in Baltimore in the early 1930s, and extending through his tenure as chief legal coun- sel for the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, he became a champion of minorities, the poor, and individual rights. He fought many rounds in the battle against school segregation, a battle which culminated with his victory in the case of Brown v. Board of Education. Justice Marshall argued 31 additional cases before this Court, thirteen as a private attorney and eighteen as Solici- tor General of the United States. He won twenty-eight of those cases. Included in those cases are some that both of you mentioned, Smith v. Allwright, Shelley v. Kraemer, and Sweatt v. Painter. These efforts alone would entitle him to a prominent place in American history had he never entered upon judicial service. We who sat with him during the time on the Court learned to value his wise counsel in Conference. We also looked for- ward to those occasions on which he would recount some of his experiences as a civil rights lawyer in often bitterly hos- tile towns and distinctly unfriendly courtrooms. He had the remarkable facility-not given to most storytellers-of not re-telling the same story to the same audience. Many of these stories had a humorous twist to them, but they also gave us a sense of what he had been up against in many of 510us1uiii 05-22-97 21:27:22 PGT * frt xxviii JUSTICE MARSHALL his cases. His forays to represent his clients required not only diligence and legal skill, but physical courage of a high order. As a result of his career as a lawyer and judge, Thurgood Marshall left an indelible mark not just upon the law but upon his country. Inscribed above the front entrance to this Court building are the words, "Equal Justice Under Law." Surely no individual did more to make these words a reality than Thurgood Marshall. 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:03 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Note: All undesignated references herein to the United States Code are to the 1988 edition. Cases reported before page 801 are those decided with opinions of the Court or decisions per curiam. Cases reported on page 801 et seq. are those in which orders were entered. Opinions reported on page 1301 et seq. are those written in chambers by individual Justices. Page A.; Kelly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Aaron v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Abadie; Louisiana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Abate v. Avenenti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999,1101 Abbott; Gonzalez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 ABC Enterprises, Inc.; Huff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,1005 Abdul-Khaliq v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Abdullah v. Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Abdullah v. Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829,1004 ABF Freight System, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . 317 Abidekun v. Commissioner of Social Service of N. Y. C. . . . . . . . . 1168 Abogado Lucero; California v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Abrams; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Abrams; Sassower v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Abramson Enterprises, Inc. v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Abreu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Abuan v. General Electric Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Abuchaibe Hnos. Ltda. v. Banco Atlantico S. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Abuchaibe Hnos. Ltda. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Accountants on Call; Swain v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884,1082 Acevedo; Sandoval v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Acevedo-Ramirez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 ACF Industries, Inc.; Department of Revenue of Ore. v. . . . . . . . 332 ACS Communications, Inc.; Americom Distributing Corp. v. . . . 867,985 Acton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.; Campbell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 569 Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.; Skyywalker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 569 Adams v. Evatt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Adams v. Federal Aviation Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 xxix 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:03 PGT*TCR xxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Adams v. Kerr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Adams v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874,889,1088,1198 Adams v. Walter Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Adams; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Adamski; Pudlo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Adanandus v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Adderson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Adeniji v. Social Security Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Adkins; Franklin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Adkins; Harmer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Adkins v. Ratelle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Administrator, Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv.; Elliott v. 867 Administrators of Tulane Ed. Fund v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Adolph v. Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Advance Chemical Co. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 AES Engineering Society, Inc.; Miloslavsky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.; Sandy River Nursing Care Center v. 818 Aetna Life & Casualty Co.; Hamilton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Aetna Life Ins. Co.; Dockter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Stuart Circle Hospital Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Afila v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Agan v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Agency for Health Care Administration v. Pittman . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Agrillo, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022,1161 Agron v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857,1005 Aguiar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Aguilar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Aguinaga; Food & Commercial Workers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Aguirre v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Agunbiade v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014,1160 Ahmad v. Leonard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866,1005 Ah Shu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Aiken v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Ailor v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Ainsworth, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Air Line Pilots; Crawford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Air Line Pilots; Hammond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Air Line Pilots; Rakestraw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Aispuro; Dirker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Aispuro; Hunter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Aispuro-Aispuro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Aitson v. Campbell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Akins v. Cotton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Akridge v. AMBAC Indemnity Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:03 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxi Page Alabama; Aultman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Alabama v. Browning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Alabama v. Caldwell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Alabama; Carroll v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Alabama; Childs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Alabama; Daniels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Alabama; Holladay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Alabama v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Alabama; Long v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862,932 Alabama; Pierce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Alabama v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Alabama; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Alabama; Waters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Alabama; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Alabama v. Yelder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Alaga v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Alameda County Social Services Agency; Sloan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Alaska; Bullwinkle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817,1004 Alaska; Garcia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Alaska; Jerrel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008,1100 Alaska v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Alaska Housing Finance Corp. v. Kurth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Alberto Culver (P. R.) Inc.; Payless Wholesale Distributor, Inc. v. 931 Albright v. Oliver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266,1215 Albuquerque Bd. of Ed.; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Albuquerque Public Schools; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Alcala v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877,1006 Aldridge v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Alduante; Foden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Alexander v. Armontrout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Alexander v. Black . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Alexander; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Alexander v. Maass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Alexander v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Alexander v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909,1025,1087 Alexander v. Whitley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Alexandria Hospital; Qureshi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Alford v. Huffman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Al Ghashiyah (Kahn) v. Kolb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Ali v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Aliff v. DiTrapano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Aliota v. Graham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Allard & Fish, P. C.; Creditors of Micro-Time Mgmt. Systems v. 906 Allard & Fish, P. C.; Micro-Time Mgmt. Systems, Inc. v. . . . . . . . 906 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:03 PGT*TCR xxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Allegheny Valley Hospital; Clowes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Allen v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Allen v. Cowley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Allen v. Duckworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Allen v. Gallagher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055,1216 Allen; Huntley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Allen v. New York Life Securities, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095,1160 Allen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874,886,1087 Allen v. U. S. Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Allen & Co. v. Pacific Dunlop Holdings Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . 806,1083,1160 Allentown; Walters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Allied Products Corp. v. Renkiewicz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Allied Products Corp. v. Vagenas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Alloyd Co.; Gustafson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085,1176 Allridge v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Karl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Linter Group Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Allstate Life Ins. Co. of N. Y.; Marsh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Allum v. Second Judicial District Court of Nev. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Allum v. Valley Bank of Nev. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Almon v. Breland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Alpine Land & Reservoir Co. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Alspach; Nagle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Altheimer & Gray; Sioux Mfg. Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Alto-Shaam, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Alvarado v. Stanislaus County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Alvarez v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Alvarez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849,1074,1122 Alvarez-Aguirre v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Alvarez-Sanchez; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Amanfo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Amann v. Stow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Amax Metals Recovery, Inc. v. Steelworkers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 AMBAC Indemnity Corp.; Akridge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Amcast Industrial Corp.; Detrex Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 AmClyde; McDermott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 American Airlines, Inc.; Renneisen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 American Airlines, Inc.; Statland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 American Bank of Conn.; Ivimey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 American Bar Assn.; Lawline v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 American Broadcasting Cos.; Brooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 American Career Training Corp.; O'Donnell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921,1006 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:03 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxiii Page American Central Gas Cos.; Everett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 American Council of Blind of Colo., Inc. v. Romer . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 American Dental Assn. v. Reich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 American Dredging Co. v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443 American Express Co.; Stokes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 American Home Products Corp. v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc. . . . . 1197 American Policyholders Ins. Co.; Keough v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 American President Lines, Ltd.; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 American Security Bank, N. A. v. Dempsey Supply Corp. . . . . . . 915 American Service Corp. of S. C.; Hickle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 American Sports Wire v. Associated Press . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 American S. S. Co.; Blainey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 American Tel. & Tel. Co.; MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. 989,1084,1107 American Tel. & Tel. Co.; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 989,1084,1107 Americom Distributing Corp. v. ACS Communications, Inc. . . . . 867,985 Amerson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Amoco Production Co. v. Vesta Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Amoco Rocmount Co.; Anschutz Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Amtrak; Rasch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Anago Inc. v. Tecnol Medical Products, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,985 Anders v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Anderson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809,973,1023,1038,1085,1108,1162 Anderson v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Anderson v. Buchanan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Anderson v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Anderson v. Douglas County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Anderson v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Anderson v. Steers, Sullivan, McNamar & Rogers . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Anderson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853,904,926,1007,1087,1089 Andhoga v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . 823 Andrade v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Andrello v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Andrews v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Andrisani v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Andrisani v. Superior Court of Cal., Appellate Dept., L. A. County 1115 Angelone; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Anguiano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Animashaun v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . 995 Ankrum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Annin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940,1034 Anolik v. Sunrise Bank of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Anschutz Corp. v. Amoco Rocmount Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Antares Aircraft, L. P. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria . . . . . . . . . 1071 Anthem Life Ins. Co.; Medina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:03 PGT*TCR xxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Anthony v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Antonelli v. Neville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Antonelli v. O'Malley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Appell v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Appleby v. Sepulveda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Applewhite v. U. S. Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Applied Risk Management; O'Diah v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Aquerre v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Aquino-Estrada v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 ARA Automotive Group, Div. of Reeves Bros., Inc. v. NLRB . . . 862 Arave; Wells v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033,1034 Arce v. Campbell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Arceneaux v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Arch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Archuleta v. Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Arditti, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036,1104 Ardoin v. Seacor Marine, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Area Interstate Trucking, Inc. v. Indiana Dept. of Revenue . . . . . 864 Arellanes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Arellano-Cardenas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 A. R. Fuels, Inc.; Sassower v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Argencourt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Argonne National Laboratory; Von Zuckerstein v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Arias Villanueva v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Arizona v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,987 Arizona; Gaffney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Arizona; Hale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Arizona; Herrera v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951,966 Arizona; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Arizona; Kiles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Arizona; Lambright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Arizona; Landrigan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Arizona; Lopez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Arizona; Molina de Hernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993,1082 Arizona; RunningEagle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Arizona; Schurz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Arizona; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Arizona; Spencer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Arizona; Walton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889,1006 Arkansas; Fox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Arkansas; Gunter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Arkansas; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911,1045 Arkansas; Pyle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Dow Chemical Co. . . . . . . 813 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:03 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxv Page Arlington Hospital Assn.; Edwards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Armando Rueda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Armitage; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Armontrout; Alexander v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Armontrout; Irvin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Armontrout; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875,973 Armontrout; McConnell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Armstrong v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Armstrong Rubber Co.; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Arnick v. Union Electric Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Arnold v. Leonard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866,1005 Arnold v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856,979,1062,1206 Arnpriester v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Arnzen; Idaho v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Arpaio; Tripati v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Arreola-Macias v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Arriaga v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Arrington v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Artwell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Arvida Realty Sales, Inc. v. Seaman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Arvonio; Favor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Arvonio; Watt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Asante v. Diller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Asgrow Seed Co. v. DeeBees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Ashcroft; Tyler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Ashelman v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Ashland Oil, Inc.; Jernigan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Ashley; Owens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853,973 Ashor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Ashraf v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Ashton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Askew v. DCH Health Care Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Asociacion Nacional de Pescadores a Pequena Escala o Artesa- nales de Colombia; Dow Chemical Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Associated Doctors Health & Life Ins. Co.; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Associated Industries of Mo. v. Lohman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Associated Press; American Sports Wire v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Associated Press; Kregos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Associate Justice, Superior Court of Mass.; Camoscio v. . . . . . . . . 992 Associates in Internal Medicine; Morrison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Association. For labor union, see name of trade. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co.; Kline v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Atchley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:03 PGT*TCR xxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Atherton v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886,1006 Atkins v. Dresser Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Atkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Atkinson Co.; Trandes Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Atlanta Journal & Constitution, Inc.; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Atlantic Healthcare Benefits Trust v. Foster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Atlantic Healthcare Benefits Trust v. Googins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Atlas Bonding Co.; Corethers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096,1173 Attea & Bros.; Dept. of Tax. and Fin. of N. Y. v. . . . 943,1107,1162,1175 AT&T Family Fed. Credit Union v. First Nat. Bank & Tr. Co. . . . 907 AT&T Information Systems; Woods v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907,1007 Attorney General; Appell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Attorney General; Jeffress v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1067 Attorney General; Sexstone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Attorney General; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Attorney General of Ark.; Griswold v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Attorney General of Cal.; Kimble v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Attorney General of Kan.; Haislip v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Attorney General of Md.; Thurman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Attorney General of Md.; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Attorney General of Minn.; Goulette v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936,1020 Attorney General of Miss. v. Dupree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068 Attorney General of N. J.; Watt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Attorney General of N. Y. v. Grumet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989,1107 Attorney General of N. Y.; Sassower v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Attorney General of Tenn.; Gonzalez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Attorney General of Tex.; Cato v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859,1005 Attorney General of Tex. v. Entz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Attorney General of Tex.; League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. 1071 Attorney General of Tex.; Wood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Attorney General of Tex.; Word of Faith World Outreach Ctr. Church v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Attorney General of Va.; Grimm v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Attorney General of Va.; Laws v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Aubry; Livadas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806,1083 Augborne v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 August v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Augustin v. Wigen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Aultman v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Austin v. Healy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Austin v. Linahan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Austin v. United Parcel Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Austin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888,904 Auto Club Ins. Assn. v. Pentwater Wire Products, Inc. . . . . . . . . 1194 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:03 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxvii Page Automobile Workers; DeLong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Autoskill, Inc.; National Educational Support Systems, Inc. v. . . . 916 Avant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Avenenti; Abate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999,1101 Avery v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Avila v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Avondale Shipyards, Inc.; Ciecierski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Avon Products, Inc.; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073,1216 Awofolu v. Public Storage Management, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Axelrod; Carr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Ayrs v. Yanik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Aziz v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921,1199 Aziz; Rafla v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Aziz v. Warden, Clinton Correctional Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 B v. Montgomery County Emergency Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 B. v. Pete F. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 B. v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Babbitt; Enron Oil & Gas Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Babbitt; Gore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Babbitt; Melluzzo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Babbitt; Wilkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Baber v. Commission on Retirement, Removal and Discipline . . . 826 Baby Boy Doe v. Mother Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032,1033,1168 Baby Boy J. v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803,938 Bachman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Bachsian v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Baer; Evans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Bagwell; Mine Workers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Bailey, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Bailey; Gower v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Bailey v. Henman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Bailey v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Bailey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086,1089,1179 Bain v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Baird v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Baity, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929,1034 Baker; Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Baker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840,956,1086 Bakin v. Cox Enterprises, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Balcor Film Investors v. Eckstein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Balderas v. Merit Systems Protection Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Baldwin; Kowalski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Balette; Eichelberger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991,1081 Balistrieri v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:03 PGT*TCR xxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Balkissoon v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Ball v. Carr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904,1020 Ball v. Morrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Ball; Osborne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Ballard v. Kaiser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Ballard; North Carolina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Ballard v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Ballentine v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Baltimore City Lodge No. 3, FOP v. Mayor and Council of Baltimore 1141 Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.; Hicks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Banco Atlantico S. A.; Abuchaibe Hnos. Ltda. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Banco Atlantico S. A.; Comercial Samora Ltda. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Banco Cooperativo de Puerto Rico v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. 1111 Banco de Credito Industrial, S. A.; Tesoreria General de la Seguri- dad Social de Espana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Bane; Tennessee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,1040 Banff, Ltd. v. Colberts, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Bankers First Federal Savings & Loan Assn.; Harrison v. . . . . . . 823 Bank of England; Henderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Bank of Jackson County v. Cherry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Bank of New England; Henderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Bank One, Tex., N. A.; Mercantile Employees' Beneficiary Assn. Trust v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Banks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Banuelos v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Banuelos v. Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Barakett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Baraza-Baraza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Barber v. Green . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Barber v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Barber v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Barcal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. . . . . . . . 942,1037,1107 Barge-Wagener Construction Co.; Morales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Barker v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922,1007 Barker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Barkley v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Barkley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Barnard v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Barnard v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Barnes v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Barnes v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Barnes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957,1053 Barnett; Battle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:03 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxix Page Barnett v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Barnett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850,996,1122,1137 Barnette v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Barnwell v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Barr; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Barr; Overmyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Barrera-Barron v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Barrett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Barringer; Griffes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Barrios v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881,973 Barron v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Barron-Diosdado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Barrows v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958 Barry v. Federal Land Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Barry; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Bartel v. Garrett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Barth v. Zimmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034 Bartlett v. Domovich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972,1067 Bartley v. Handelsman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Barton v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Barton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957 Bartsh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Bashir v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Bashir v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Bass v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Batchelor; De Vone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Bateman; Bolinder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Bates; Long Island R. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Bates; North Carolina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Battle v. Barnett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Battle v. Evans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Battles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Bauer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807,962 Baughman v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Bautista v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Baxley; Boros v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997,1101 Baxter v. Rosemeyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969,1066 Bay Colony Railroad Corp.; Polewsky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Bayer; Mason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Bayonne v. Seacaucus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Bazuaye v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 B. C. v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Beachem v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039,1124 Beals v. Thatcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:03 PGT*TCR xl TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Bear, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 Beard; French v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Beard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957 Beasley; Mershon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Beasley v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Beasley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Beauford v. Raba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Beaver v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Beavers v. Nevada Dept. of Motor Vehicles and Public Safety . . . 946 Beavers v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Beavers v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Becker, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 Becker v. Lockhart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Beckett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Beckford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Bedell; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Beecham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975,1009 Beer v. Continental Airlines Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Beeson v. Phillips, King & Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Behlke v. Sullivan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 Behm Funeral Homes, Inc.; Greene County Memorial Park v. . . . 866 Bekiempis; Day v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Bekins Van Lines Co.; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Bel Air; Biser v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Belgard-Krause v. United Airlines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Belize Trading, Ltd. v. El Pirata del Caribe, S. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Bell v. Continental Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Bell v. Deeds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Bell v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Bell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900,1079,1086,1090 Bellecourt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Belli & Sabih; Calvento v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915,1020 Bellman v. Chesney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Bello v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Bellrichard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 BellSouth Adv. & Pub. Corp. v. Donnelley Information Pub., Inc. 1101 BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. Stinnett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Belton Industries, Inc.; Royal Thai Government v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Benavides v. Bureau of Prisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Benavides v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Ben-Avraham v. Moses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Benfield; Brimelow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Benjamin v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,1159 Benn v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:03 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xli Page Bennet v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Bennett; Doe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Bennett v. Independence Blue Cross . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Bennett v. LSP Investment Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Benny v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Benson v. Hargett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Benson v. Helena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Benson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900,1139,1204 Bent v. Massachusetts General Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Benton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Bentsen; Brookman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Bentsen; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Bentsen; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Benzenhoefer; Christoffel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Berberena-Sierra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Berg v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Bergman; Brooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Bergman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Bergmann v. McCaughtry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028,1160 Berkheimer Associates; Siegel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893,1006 Berman Enterprises, Inc. v. Jorling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Bernadou v. Rollins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Bernard v. Santa Monica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Bernfeld v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Bernstein v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Berrios-Colon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Berrong; Spindle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980,1067 Berry; Ward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,973 Berthold v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Bertoli v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Bertram v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Besing v. Hawthorne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Besing v. Home Ins. Co. of Ind. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Bessemer & Lake Erie R. Co. v. Republic Steel Corp. . . . . . . . . . 1021 Bessemer & Lake Erie R. Co. v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023,1032,1091 Bethea v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983,1061 Bethel; Grace Community Church v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Bethlehem Area School Dist.; Steirer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Betke v. Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Beverly Hills Municipal Court; Boags v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Bewley v. Howell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012,1159 Bexar County Appraisal Review Bd. v. First Baptist Church of San Antonio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:03 PGT*TCR xlii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Bey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Beyer v. Cannon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Beyer; Choice v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Beyer; Hunt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953,979 Beyer; Shabazz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Beyer; Sheehan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Beynon; St. George "Dixie" Lodge #1743, B. P. O. Elks v. . . . . . . 869 Bi v. Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Bialen v. Mannesmann Demag Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924,1020 Bickels v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Bic Pen Corp.; Lindy Pen Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Bidlack; Wheelabrator Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Bieber v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Bieluch; Sullivan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Bieter Co.; Blomquist v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Biggs; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Bilal v. Lockhart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Billheimer v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Billish; Chicago v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Billue v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Binkley v. Long Beach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Bird v. Thigpen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Birdo v. Sawyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Birkdale Shipping Co., S. A.; Howlett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039,1175 Birth v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957 Biser v. Bel Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Bishop v. LeCureux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Bishop; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Bishop v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913,937 Bivens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Bivins v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Bivins v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Black; Alexander v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Black; Day v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Black v. Mann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Black v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889,1026 Blackburn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Blackledge v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Blackmon v. Sam's Wholesale Club . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Blackmon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Blackmon v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Blackshear v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Blackston v. Skarbnik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Blackwell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:03 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xliii Page Blainey v. American S. S. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Blair v. Cinnamond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Blair v. Graham Correctional Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Blair v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017,1087 Blais v. Broussard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Blake, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Blake v. Coughlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Blake v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Blake Construction Co. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Blakeman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Blakey v. USS Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Blanchard; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Blanchettec v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Blanco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Blank v. Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Blankenship v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Blankstyn v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Blankstyn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Blathers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Blaw Knox Retirement Income Plan; White Consol. Industries v. 1042 Blevins v. Shiplevy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Blodgett v. Jeffries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Blodgett; Lynch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Blomquist v. Bieter Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Blount v. Keane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Blount v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut. of Ohio v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. 819 Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Conn. v. Inter Valley Health Plan . . . . 1073 Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Md., Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . 914 B & M Management Co.; Southards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Boags v. Beverly Hills Municipal Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Boalbey v. Hawes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility; Charlton v. . . . . 918 Board of Ed. of DeKalb School Dist. No. 428; Whitmore v. . . . . . . 1113 Board of Ed. of Englewood; Board of Ed. of Englewood Cliffs v. 991 Board of Ed. of Englewood Cliffs v. Board of Ed. of Englewood . 991 Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet . . . 989,1107 Board of Ed. of Monroe-Woodbury School Dist. v. Grumet . . . . 989,1107 Board of Fire and Police Comm'rs of Calumet City; Larson v. . . . 1072 Board of Regents for Okla. Agriculture and Mechanical Colleges; Porter Testing Laboratory v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System; Reise v. . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Board of Regents of Univ. System of Ga.; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:03 PGT*TCR xliv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Board of Review; Tilli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871,973 Board of School Trustees, Mich. City Schools; Vukadinovich v. . . 844 Board of Supervisors, Hanover Cty.; Hanover Society for Deaf v. 1043 Board of Trustees, Teachers' Pension and Annuity Fd.; LePrince v. 1119 Bobo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Boca Grande Club, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co. . . . . . . . . . 1022 Bockes v. Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Bodie v. Huntsville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Boeing Co. v. United States ex rel. Kelly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Bohlen; Caspari v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383,806 Bohling v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Bohn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Boisoneau v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Bolduc v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Bolinder v. Bateman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Bolner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Bona v. Chavez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815,1004 Bona v. GNAC Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Bonace v. Mazurkiewicz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Bonapfel v. Nalley Motor Trucks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Bond v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Bonner Mall Partnership; U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. . . . . 1039,1175 Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Bontkowski v. First National Bank of Cicero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Booker; Epperly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Booker v. Merit Systems Protection Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Booker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Boots v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Boozer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Bordenave v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Borden, Inc.; Fleming v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Borg; Ellis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Borg; Galloway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Borg; Haley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886,1006 Borg; Huber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Borg; Payne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Borg; Rupe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Borg; Sullivan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Borg; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Borg v. Turk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Borg; Tyson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Borgert; Hart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Borgert; Kenny v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Borja v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:03 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xlv Page Borman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Boros v. Baxley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997,1101 Borough. See name of borough. Borowy v. Yeakel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Borromeo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Bortnick v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016,1160 Bost; Gumpl v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Bostic v. Hurst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Boston; Polyak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823,909 Boston Magazine, Inc.; Genninger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Boswell v. LaForest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Boswell; Schloegel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Boswell; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Boswell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Botello, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942,1067 Botello v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Bottone v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Bougere v. Ferrara . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Boughman v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Boulet v. Thibodeaux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Bounds v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845,1005 Bourexis v. Carroll County Narcotics Task Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Bourgeois; Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Bourne Co.; Hunter Country Club, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Bover v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Bowen v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Bowen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Bowers; Jolly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Bowers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087,1133 Bowers; Watkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Bowles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Bowling; Vose v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Bowman v. Oklahoma County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Boxx; Klein v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Boyd; Brazell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Boyd v. Cody . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Boyd v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Boydson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Boyea v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Boyenga v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Boyer v. DeClue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Boyer; Lehigh Valley Hospital Center, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Boykin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Boyle; Exxon Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:03 PGT*TCR xlvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Boyne, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008,1161 Boy Scouts of America; Welsh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 BP North America Petroleum, Inc. v. Robert E. Lee S. S. . . . . . . 1072 Braddy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Bradley v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Bradley; Hunt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Bradley v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Bradley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086,1089 Bradley v. University of Tex., M. D. Anderson Cancer Center . . . 1119 Brady v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Brady; Warfel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Brahm v. Brahm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Brainerd Area Civic Center v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue . . . 964 Branch v. Hennepin County Sheriff's Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061,1216 Brannigan; Wehringer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Brannon v. LaMaina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,1005 Brasfield v. Brasfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Bratton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Bravo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Bray v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Bray v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Bray v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Brayall v. Dart Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Brazell v. Boyd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Brazile v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Breaux v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Brecher; Fields v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Brechtel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Breck v. Pacifica Bay Village Associates, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Breland; Almon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Brennan; Farmer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811,941 Brennan; Flanagan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Brennen; Caldwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Brent v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Brewer v. Rocha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Brewer v. Strauss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Brewer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983,1079 Brewer v. Wilkinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Bribiesca v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Brick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Brickman-Abegglen; Lazirko v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Brigano; Love v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Brimelow v. Benfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Briscoe v. Devall Towing & Boat Service of Hackberry, Inc. . . . . 865 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:03 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xlvii Page Briscoe Enterprises, Ltd., II; Heartland Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. 992 Brison v. Burton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Broadmoor Place Investments; G­K Development Co. v. . . . . . . . 1071 Brock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Brock; Vitale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Brocksmith v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999,1159 Brokaw v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Bronson v. Zimmerman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Brooke v. Duckworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Brooke v. Duke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981,1159 Brookman v. Bentsen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Brooks, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975,1067 Brooks v. American Broadcasting Cos. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Brooks v. Bergman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Brooks v. Childs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Brooks v. Gramley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Brooks v. Greer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Brooks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853,1089,1137 Brooks v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Brooks v. Wombacher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Brookshire Grocery Co.; Cowthran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955,1066 Broome v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087,1088 Brotherhood. For labor union, see name of trade. Broughton Lumber Co. v. Columbia River Gorge Comm'n . . . . . . 813 Broussard; Blais v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Browder v. Marshall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Brown, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804,987 Brown; Benjamin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,1159 Brown v. Bentsen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Brown; Bray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Brown; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Brown v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Brown; Cruse v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Brown v. Department of Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Brown; Detroit v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Brown v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Brown v. Fire Fighters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872,1006 Brown v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Brown v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Brown; Grose v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Brown; Janosik v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Brown; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886,1020 Brown; Jossi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Brown v. Kincheloe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:03 PGT*TCR xlviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Brown v. Manuelian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Brown; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Brown; Mayer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Brown; National Assn. of Radiation Survivors v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Brown; Newell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Brown; Olson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Brown v. Penn Central Transportation Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Brown v. Pierce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Brown v. Sheffield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Brown; Talon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028,1082 Brown v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Brown; Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810,941,1037 Brown v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853, 854,856,873,876,882,883,898,935,995,1017,1086,1089 Brown v. Unknown Psychiatrist, U. S. Attorney Witness . . . . . . . 950 Brown; Van der Jagt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Browne v. Buck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Browning; Alabama v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Browning; Flojo Trading Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Browning; Holloway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Browning v. Marans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Browning; St. Elizabeth Medical Center v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Bruce v. California Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988,1070 Bruce v. Sutton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Bruce v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901,1090 Brunet v. Tucker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Brunswick Corp.; Los Angeles Land Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Brunswick Corp.; Pree v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Brunwasser v. Steiner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Bryant; Griswold v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Bryant v. Klein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Bryant v. Muth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Bryant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 B. S. v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Buchanan; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Buchbinder v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047,1185 Buchner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Buck; Browne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Buckeye Union Ins. Co.; Royal Food Products, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . 817 Buckhalter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Buckner v. Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842,1077 Budlong; Nadeau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Buell v. Security General Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Buffalo Center-Rake School Dist.; West v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:03 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xlix Page Buford Evans & Sons; Polyak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Bullard v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Bullwinkle v. Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817,1004 Bundick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Bunker; Jabe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Bunker v. Sauser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Bunnell; Cox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Bunnell; Elmore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Bunnell; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Bunnell; Pifer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057,1173 Bunnell; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Bunyan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Burd; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Burden v. Zant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 Bureau of ATF; Tucker Gun Speciality, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Bureau of Prisons; Benavides v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Burger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Burger v. Zant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847,1005,1020 Burgess v. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Burgess v. Stern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Burghart v. Landau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Burgo; Shimoda v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Burke, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Burke v. Deere & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Burke v. John Deere Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Burke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990,1055 Burks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Burley v. Ullrich Copper, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Burnaby; Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Burnley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Burns; Schoka v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Burns; Sicairos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Burns v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838,1005 Burrell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Burrillville Racing Assn., Inc.; Sterling Suffolk Racecourse Ltd. Partnership v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Burris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Burrows v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Burson; Gonzalez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Burt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Burtchell v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Burton; Brison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Burton; Copeny v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Burton; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:03 PGT*TCR l TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Burton v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Burton; Morton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Busby; Ervin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Busby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Busch v. Jeffes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098,1216 Buschbom v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Bush v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065,1173 Bustamante v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Bustillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Butcher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Butler, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974,1034 Butler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934,937,956,1204 Butler Machinery, Inc.; Haugen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Butts v. Moutray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Butts v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Butts; Ohio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Butz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Byars v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Bye v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Byfield v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Bynum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Byrd v. Carroll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Byrd; Collins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Byrd v. Cubbage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 C.; J. M. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 C. v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Cabal v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831,1065 Cabana; Nickens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961 Cadeau v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Cadle Co. II, Inc. v. Chasteen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 CAE-Link Corp.; Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. . . . . 907 Cahan, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Caicedo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Cain; Darby Borough v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Calderon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Caldwell; Alabama v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Caldwell v. Brennen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Caldwell v. Ivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Caldwell; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Calia v. Turnbow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 California v. Abogado Lucero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 California; Alcala v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877,1006 California; Alvarez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:03 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED li Page California; Andrisani v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 California; Arizona v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,987 California; Bivins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 California; Bribiesca v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 California; Camarena v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 California; Carr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969,1066 California; Carranza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 California; Carroll v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 California; Cedric Houston T. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 California; Chappell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 California; Clausen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 California; Coker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 California; Dowdy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 California; Felts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 California; Fields v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 California; Ford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 California; Gandotra v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 California; Garcia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 California; Gonzales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 California; Gonzalez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 California; Guardino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 California; Hawthorne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013,1159 California; Highland Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . 928 California; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 California; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836,988 California; Laan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 California; Lazenby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 California; Marciano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 California; Monroe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 California; Murtha v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 California; Ontiveros v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 California; Ortiz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 California; Payton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040,1173 California; Proctor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010,1038 California; Rabbitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 California; Rowland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 California; Russel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 California; Sandoval v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942,1008,1022 California; Saunders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 California; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 California; Sims v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 California; Stansbury v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943,1009 California; Tapia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 California; Thornton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:03 PGT*TCR lii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page California; Tomaz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 California; Tuilaepa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010,1038 California; Vaughn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 California; Weingarten v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 California; Westbrook v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 California; Wrest v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 California; Zapien v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 California Bd. of Equalization; Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. . . . 945 California Dept. of Corrections; Bruce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988,1070 California Dept. of Corrections; Camarena v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 924,953,967 California Dept. of Social Services; Steele v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,1005 California Dept. of Transp.; Desert Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. 933 California Dept. of Transp.; Karim-Panahi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 California Dept. of Transp.; Outdoor Media Group v. . . . . . . . . . . 932 California Div. of Safety of Dams; Sinaloa Lake Owners Assn. v. 977 California State Bd. of Equalization v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. 814 California State Bd. of Equalization; Mira Slovak Aerobatics, Inc. v. 866 California Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd.; Mikhail v. . . . . . 1092 California Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd.; O'Diah v. . . . . . . 951 Calise v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Callins v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Callins v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Calpin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Calvento v. Belli & Sabih . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915,1020 Calvert; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Camacho v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Camacho v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Camarena v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Camarena v. California Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . 924,953,967 Camarena v. Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles Cty., South Dist. 1015 Camelo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Camoscio v. Donahue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Camoscio v. Lawton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Camp; Montague v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Camp; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Campbell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912,1007 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 569 Campbell; Aitson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Campbell; Arce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Campbell; Estrella v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Campbell; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Campbell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906,954,1048,1132,1203,1206 Campbell v. Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Campos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:03 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED liii Page Canas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Canga-Renteria v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Cannon; Beyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Cannon; Joseph v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Cannon v. LeFleur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Cannon Beach; Stevens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Cano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Cantrell; Fite v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837,972,1055,1216 Canty v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Capellen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Capital Imaging Assoc., P. C. v. Mohawk Valley Medical Assoc., Inc. 947 Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette . . . . . . . . . . 1307 Caponetto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Capots; Corethers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098,1173 Carangelo v. Weicker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Carbajal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889,900 Carbondale Area School Dist.; Hunter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Carcaise v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Card v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Cardine v. McAnulty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097,1216 Carey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Carley v. Wheeled Coach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Carlisle; Consolidated Rail Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912,1008,1107,1162 Carlisle; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Carlisle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068 Carlson; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Carlton v. Fassbender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Carlton v. Pytell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Carlton; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810,962,1037 Carlucci v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Carmona v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Carney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Morton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Carpenter, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Carpenter Co.; Cutright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Carpenters; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873,1066 Carpenters Health and Welf. Tr. Fd. for Cal. v. Developers Ins. Co. 827 Carr v. Axelrod . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Carr; Ball v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904,1020 Carr v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969,1066 Carr v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Carranza v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Carraway v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Carrie Beverage Inc. v. Gilbert/Robinson, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:03 PGT*TCR liv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Carrillo-Rangel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Carroll v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Carroll; Byrd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Carroll v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Carroll v. Gross . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Carroll v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Carroll County Narcotics Task Force; Bourexis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Carrothers v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Carson v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Carson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Carter v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Carter; Cataldi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Carter v. Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825,1004 Carter v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125,1201 Carter; Florence County School Dist. Four v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Carter; Gonzales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Carter v. Honda Motor Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Carter; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Carter v. Martinez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Carter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870,934,1066,1124,1128 Carver, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Casalino, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Casas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Casel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Casey; Planned Parenthood of S. E. Pa. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1309 Cashin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Caspari v. Bohlen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383,806 Caspari v. McIntyre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Caspari; Overstreet v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Caspari; Stack v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Castaneda-Fernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Casteel v. Kolb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Casteel v. McCaughtry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Castellano; Say & Say v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978,1094,1116 Castillo v. Stainer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Castillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889,933 Castleberry v. Fremont County District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Castro v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Castro v. Tafoya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Castro v. Tofoya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Castro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897,999 Castro Rodriguez v. Godinez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Cataldi v. Carter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Caterpillar Inc.; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:03 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lv Page Cates v. Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Cato v. Morales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859,1005 Cato v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 Caton v. Maze . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Caudill; Corn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Caughron v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Cavanaugh v. Roller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Cavender v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Cavenham Forest Industries, Inc.; Harms v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Cazares v. Elsesser & Rader . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 CBS Inc. v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1315 Ceballos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Cedric Houston T. v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Celeotex Corp.; Employers of Wausau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Centeno v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Central Ariz. Water Conservation Dist. v. EPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Central Brass Mfg. Co.; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Central Quality; Steen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Central Soya Co.; McLeod v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Central States, S. E. & S. W. Areas Pension Fund v. NAVCO . . . 1115 Central States, S. E. & S. W. Areas Pension Fund; Taylor v. . . . . 978 Central States, S. E. & S. W. Areas Pension Fund v. Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Central States, S. E. & S. W. Areas Pension Fund; Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Century 21 Real Estate Corp.; Mohs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Cerna v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd.; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825,1004 Ceszyk v. Cuneo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Chabad Jewish Organization; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Chabot v. City National Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Chagra v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Chambers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,860 Chamness v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Champion; Johnston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Champion; Phillips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Chan; Chinese American Planning Council, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Chan; New York City v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Chanel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Changco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Channel Home Centers, Inc.; Legacy, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Channer v. Markowski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Chapdelaine v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Chapman; Finch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:03 PGT*TCR lvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Chapman v. Klemick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Chapman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Chapman Design & Construction Co.; Huff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Chappell v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Chapple v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Chargois v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Charles v. Scully . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Charles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Charlie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Charlottesville and Richmond v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Charlton v. Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility . . . . . 918 Chase v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Chase Manhattan Bank, N. A. v. Villa Marina Yacht Harbor, Inc. 818 Chasteen; Cadle Co. II, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Chatman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Chavez; Bona v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815,1004 Chavez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Chavez-Vernaza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Cheek v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Chenault v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Cheppa v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Cheramie v. Exxon Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Cherrey v. Diaz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Cherry; Bank of Jackson County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Cherry v. Ratelle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924,1007 Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Va.; Copeland v. . . . . . . 1181 Chesney; Bellman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Chevron, U. S. A., Inc.; Owen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Chevron, U. S. A., Inc.; Radford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Chew v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Cheyenne; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051,1173 Chica v. Lee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Chicago v. Billish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Chicago; Eason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961,1008 Chicago v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Chicago; Schmidling v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Chicago v. Willis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Chicago; Willis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. California Bd. of Equalization . . . . 945 Chicago Transit Authority; O'Connor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807,974 Chichy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lvii Page Chief Judge, District Court of Appeal of Fla., Third District; Kleinschmidt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849,1067 Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Conn.; Johl v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038 Childers v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Children and Youth Services of Pa.; R. S. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Childs v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Childs; Brooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Childs v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Childs v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Chiles; Lightbourne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967,1066 Chiles; Phillips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Chinese American Planning Council, Inc. v. Kam Shing Chan . . . 978 Chippas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Chisnell v. Pa. State Police Bur. of Liquor Control Enforcement 965 Chmiel v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Chocron v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Choice v. Beyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Chorney v. Weingarten . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Choy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Chrissy F. v. Dale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Christian Hospital; Morris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Christiansen v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Christianson v. Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Christie v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Christoffel v. Benzenhoefer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Christopher; Shieh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948,1094,1116 Christopher v. Wade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Chronopoulos v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Chrysler First Mortgage; Kemp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Chrysler Motors Corp.; Snelling v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Chubb v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Chuck's Bookstore v. National City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Chukwurah v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Churchill; Waters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911,961 Church of Scientology; Schwarz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920,1123 Church of Scientology International v. Daniels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Church of Scientology International; Schwarz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Wollersheim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Church of Scientology Western U. S. v. United States . . . . . . . . . 910 Church of Spiritual Technology v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Ciamaricone v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Cianca v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Ciba Corning Diagnostic Corp.; Das v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Ciecierski v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR lviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page CIGNA Corp.; Griffiths v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Cinnamond; Blair v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Circuit Court of First Circuit v. Dow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Circuit Judge, Seventh Jud. Circuit, Pennington Cty.; CBS Inc. v. 1315 Citicorp Mortgage, Inc.; D'Avanzo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Citizens Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla.; Sulcer v. . . . . . 870 City. See name of city. City National Bank; Chabot v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 C. J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc. v. Dana Marine Service, Inc. . . . . . 815 Clairol, Inc.; Follette v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Clark v. Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Clark v. Department of Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Clark v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Clark; Haugen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Clark v. Nagle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849,1005 Clark v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802,832,887,955,1057,1089 Clark County; Mosley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Clarke; Liggins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Clarke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845,1166,1177 Clarke v. University of North Tex. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Clarkson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Clarkstown; C & A Carbone, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961 Clausen v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Clay v. Murray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Clay v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Clayborn v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,1004 Clayton v. Killeen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Clayton v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Clayton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Cleary v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Cleary v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Cal., Inc. . . . . . . . . . 866 Cleary v. Robert Wasserwald, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Cleland; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Clements v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Clements Food Co.; Gibbs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Clemons v. Rightsell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Clemons v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050,1086 Cleveland; Feliciano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Cleveland; Piper Aircraft Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Cleveland; Willis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851,1065 Cleveland Clinic; Goldberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998,1101 Cleveland Surgi-Center, Inc. v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Climax Molybdenum Co.; Husman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Clinton; Agron v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857,1005 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lix Page Clinton; Christiansen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Clinton; Day v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Clinton; DiGian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Closner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Cloutier v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Clowes v. Allegheny Valley Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Coar v. Kazimir . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Coats; Penrod Drilling Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Cobb; Duncan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860,1005 Cobb County; Eldridge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Coble v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Elizabethtown, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co. . . 908 Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Houston; Theriot v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972,1067 Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co. . . . . . 908 Coca-Cola Co.; Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Elizabethtown, Inc. v. . . 908 Coca-Cola Co.; Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport, Inc. v. . . . . 908 Cody; Boyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Coe v. Kincheloe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Cofield, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Cofield v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Cohen, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070,1174 Cohn, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,1161 Cohron v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 Coker v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Coker v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Colbert, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Colberts, Inc.; Banff, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Coldwell, Banker & Co.; DeMauro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877,887,1006 Cole v. Houston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Cole v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 Cole; Wyatt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Coleman v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Coleman; Humphrey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954,1066 Coleman v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Coleman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950,1077,1184 Coleman v. Warner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Coleman v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. . . 806,943,1037,1107 Collagen Corp.; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Collagen Corp.; Stamps v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Collier v. Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin . . . 977,1196 Collings; Fish v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Collins; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Collins; Barker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922,1007 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR lx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Collins; Barnard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Collins; Barton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Collins; Bashir v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Collins; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Collins v. Byrd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Collins; Callins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Collins; Carson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Collins; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125,1201 Collins; Childs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Collins; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953,1066 Collins; DeAlbuquerque v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Collins; Delk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Collins; Dismukes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Collins; Drew v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Collins; Ervin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Collins; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Collins; Garcia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Collins; Gough v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Collins; Gray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Collins; Hector v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Collins; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Collins; Hodges v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Collins; Holloway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Collins; Hyder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970,1067 Collins; Jacobs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Collins; Knox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Collins; Long v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Collins; Lord v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Collins; Martinez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Collins v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Collins; McDonald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,936 Collins; McFarland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938,989,1175 Collins; Pemberton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Collins; Phillips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Collins; Powell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Collins; Reed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Collins; Reich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070,1109 Collins; Rose v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835,1005 Collins; Russell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Collins v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Collins; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Collins; Stribling v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Collins; Tanguma v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Collins; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxi Page Collins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Collins; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855,970 Collins; Webb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Collins; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Collins; Yarrito v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Colmenero-Perez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Colon v. McClellan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Colon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Colorado; Bieber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Colorado; Bradley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Colorado; Kailey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Colorado; Kansas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Colorado; Martinez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Colorado; Schroder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Colorado; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Colorado State Bd. of Agriculture v. Roberts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Colquitt v. Fratus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Columbia Gas Transmission Corp.; Official Committee of Unse- cured Creditors of Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. . . . . . . 1110 Columbiana Plastics v. National Kitchen Products . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Columbia Resource Co. v. Environmental Quality Comm'n of Ore. 962 Columbia River Gorge Comm'n; Broughton Lumber Co. v. . . . . . 813 Combs v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Comercial Samora Ltda. v. Banco Atlantico S. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Comercial Samora Ltda. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Commandant, U. S. Disciplinary Barracks; Lips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Commander v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Commercial State Bank of El Campo; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Commissioner; Balkinssoon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Commissioner; Bass v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Commissioner; Blankstyn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Commissioner; Buchbinder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047,1185 Commissioner; Chagra v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Commissioner; Continental Ill. Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Commissioner; Dodge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Commissioner; Dunning v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918,1006 Commissioner; Ferenc v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Commissioner; Ferguson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Commissioner; Kadunc v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Commissioner; Levin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Commissioner; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861,1005 Commissioner; Nuttle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Commissioner; Paul v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876,936,1007 Commissioner; Provizer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR lxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Commissioner; Rokke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Commissioner; Rollins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Commissioner; Rowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Commissioner; Washburn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Commissioner; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Commissioner, Me. Dept. of Human Services; Farley v. . . . . . . . . 820 Commissioner, Mass. Dept. of Mental Health; Dempsey v. . . . . . . 953 Commissioner of Internal Revenue. See Commissioner. Commissioner of Social Service of N. Y. C.; Abidekun v. . . . . . . . 1168 Commissioner of Social Services of N. Y. C.; Rashmi P. v. . . . . . . 1041 Commission on Judicial Fitness; Kowalski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Commission on Retirement, Removal and Discipline; Baber v. . . . 826 Commito v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Commonwealth. See also name of Commonwealth. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. Corman Construction, Inc. 817 Community Development Comm'n of Santa Fe Springs; Ohai v. . . 1073 Composite State Bd. of Medical Examiners; Hutchinson v. . . . . . . 947 Compression Polymers, Inc. v. Santana Products, Inc. . . . . . . . . . 1196 Computer Associates Int'l, Inc.; National Car Rental System, Inc. v. 861 Conard v. University of Wash. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Conaway, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Conboy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Conboy v. Montgomery County Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Concordia College Corp. v. W. R. Grace & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Condo v. Sysco Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Condo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Condosta v. Vermont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Conference of African Union First Colored Meth. Prot. Church v. Mother African Union First Colored Meth. Prot. Church . . . . . 1025 Conklin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Conley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Conn v. Kapture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Connecticut; Cleary v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Connecticut; Lawson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Connecticut; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Connecticut; Murray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Connecticut; Zarick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Connell v. Home Fed Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Conners' Estate; Kostrubala v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Connor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Conrod v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Conroy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Conroy; Tillman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Consolidated Chemical Works v. Marcus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxiii Page Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Del.; Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Carlisle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912,1008,1107,1162 Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912,1008,1107,1162 Consolidated Rail Corp.; Poole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Stowers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Consolidation Coal Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . 812 Construcciones Aeronauticas, S. A. v. Sherer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Construction Interior Systems v. Marriott Family Restaurants 869 Consulado General de Mexico; Gerritsen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Consumer Federation of America v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Continental Airlines Inc.; Beer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Continental Bank, N. A.; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Continental Eagle Corp.; Sparks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Continental Ill. Corp. v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Continental Potash Inc. v. Freeport-McMoRan Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Contreras-Aquino v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Control Data Corp.; Flagg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Cook; Hussmann Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Cook v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Cook; Tillman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Cooks v. Kenedy Independent School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Cooks v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Cookston v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Coones v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Cooney; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Cooper, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809,985,1036 Cooper v. Armstrong Rubber Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Cooper v. Gilpin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Cooper; Griffin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Cooper v. Parole and Probation Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053,1173 Cooper v. Salomon Brothers, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063,1160 Cooper v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Copeland v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Va. . . . . . . 1181 Copeny v. Burton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Copple; Schultz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Coppock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Corbin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125,1139 Cordero v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Cordoba-Zapata v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Cordova v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Cordova-Gonzalez, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992,1082 Corethers, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975,988,1039 Corethers v. Atlas Bonding Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096,1173 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR lxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Corethers v. Capots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098,1173 Corethers v. Kmiecik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Corethers v. Lakeside Univ. Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077,1216 Corethers v. State of Ohio Prosecutor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999,1082 Corey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892,1001 Corley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Corman Construction, Inc.; Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. 817 Corn v. Caudill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Cornett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Corporation of Lloyd's; Roby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Correa, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 Correa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019,1099 Correctional Health Care, Inc.; Swiney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Corrections Commissioner. See name of commissioner. Correia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Correll; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Corrigan v. Tompkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842,1005 Cortes Cruz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Cortez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Cory; Moulton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Cosey; Department of Transportation and Development of La. v. 905 Cosgriff v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Cosner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Cossett v. Federal Judiciary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Costa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Cote v. Donovan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Cote v. New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Cotton; Akins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Cotton v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Coughlin; Blake v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 County. See name of county. Court of Appeals. See U. S. Court of Appeals. Cowhig v. Stone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869,1006 Cowley; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Cowley; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Cowthran v. Brookshire Grocery Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955,1066 Cox v. Bunnell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Cox; Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Cox v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Cox Enterprises, Inc.; Bakin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Coyle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Coyne v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Crabtree v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Craft v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxv Page Craig v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Crancer v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Crane; Illinois v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Crane v. Logli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Crank v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Crawford v. Air Line Pilots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Crawford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832,848,1057,1173 Crawford Long Hospital of Emory Univ.; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Cray v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Crayton v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856,1005 Creaciones Viviana Ltda. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Credit Builders of America, Inc.; MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. 978 Creditors of Micro-Time Mgmt. Systems v. Allard & Fish, P. C. . 906 Crenshaw v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Crespo v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Criminal District Court #1 of Dallas County; Loyd v. . . . . . . . . . 841 Crisler v. Frank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Crisp v. Murray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Crites; Sassower v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Critsley v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Cross v. Eu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Cross; McGowan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909,985 Cross v. Slocum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Cross v. Vickrey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Crosthwait Equipment Co. v. John Deere Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Crouch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Crouse v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Crowell; Reserve National Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Crowell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Crowley Maritime Corp.; Villar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Crown Life Ins. Co.; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Crozier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Crumb v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Crump v. Department of Health and Human Services . . . . . . . . . 870 Cruse v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Crutchfield; Vernon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Cruz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835,858,897 Cruzot; Millard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 CSX Corp.; Safir v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 CSX Transportation, Inc.; Dixon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Cubbage; Byrd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Cubberly v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Cullen, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 Cullen v. Trainor, Robertson, Smits & Wade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR lxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Cullum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Cumber v. Morton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Cumbie; Singletary v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Cummings v. Hughes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Cuneo; Ceszyk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Cunningham; Davias v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Cunningham; Leeks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Cunningham v. Leonardo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Cupit v. McClanahan Contractors, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Cuppett v. Duckworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Cure v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Curl; Idaho v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Curran; Thurman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Curran; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Curry v. Ledger Publishing Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836,972 Curry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Curtis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862,891,898,1086,1090 Curtsinger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Custer v. Duncan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Custis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913,1038 Cuthbert; Parris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Cutright v. E. R. Carpenter Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Cutting v. Jerome Foods, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 C. W. Driver; Huntington Breakers Apartments, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . 820 D. v. Orange County Social Services Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951,1097 Dahl-Eimers; Mutual of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Dail v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Dailey; Goff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Dailey v. National Hockey League . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Dailey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 D'Albissin v. Shutts & Bowen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Dale; Chrissy F. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Dale v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Dallas; McCormick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Dallman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Dalton; Fass v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Dalton; Foxx v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Dalton; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Dalton; Rennie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Dalton v. Specter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,1022,1038,1084 Dalton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Damian, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Damiani, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940 Dana Marine Service, Inc.; C. J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc. v. . . . . 815 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxvii Page Dancy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Dandy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Dane County; Gleda K. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Danella Construction Corp.; MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. . . 863 Dang Minh Tran v. Maass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Daniel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900,1099,1130 Daniels v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Daniels; Church of Scientology International v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Daniels v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878,887,995,1013 Danielson v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Dann, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Dano Resource Recovery, Inc. v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . 931 Darby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Darby Borough v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Darnell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Dart Industries; Brayall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Darulis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Das v. Ciba Corning Diagnostic Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Dasch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 D'Avanzo v. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Davias v. Cunningham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Davidson; Guerrero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Davis v. Alexander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Davis; CBS Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1315 Davis v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953,1066 Davis v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Davis v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950,1066 Davis; Hope v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Davis v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Davis v. Leonardo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Davis v. McWherter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Davis; Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Davis; Perko v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Davis v. San Francisco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Davis v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842,1202 Davis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831, 855,897,942,1061,1089,1099,1127,1176,1179,1184,1203 Davis, Gillenwater & Lynch v. Turner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Dawn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Dawson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Day v. Bekiempis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Day v. Black . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Day v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Day v. Day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR lxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Day v. Deason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Day v. GAF Building Materials Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Day; Gracey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093,1216 Day v. Heinrich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Day v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Days, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987,1161 DCH Health Care Authority; Askew v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 DeAlbuquerque v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Dean v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Dean v. Redner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Dean v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Deason; Day v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 DeBardeleben v. Matthews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Debbs v. Mastagni, Holstedt, Chiurazzi & Curtis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Debevoise; Thakkar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 DeBlois v. Love . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 DeBolt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Debraine v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Decatur Federal Savings & Loan Assn.; Swain v. . . . . . . . . . . . 922,1082 Deccaid Services, Inc.; Fonar Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Decker v. Halpin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 DeClue; Boyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 DeeBees; Asgrow Seed Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Deeds; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Deere & Co.; Burke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Deere Co.; Crosthwait Equipment Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Deere Co.; Holland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Deere Industrial Equipment Co.; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 DeFazio v. Martinez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 De Freece; Texas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Degli v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 De la Beckwith v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 De la Cruz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 De la Garza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 De la Jara v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 De la Lastra; General Chemical Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985 Deland; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 De la Paz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Delaware v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,1022,1106 DeLay v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 De Leon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 DeLeonardis v. Koch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Delgado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Delk v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxix Page Delk v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Del Mar; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867,946 Delmore; Gillette v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Delo; Guinan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Delo; Noel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Delo; Schleeper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Delo; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 De Loach, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,1034 DeLong v. Automobile Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 DeLong Equipment Co.; Washington Mills Electro Minerals v. . . . . 1012 DeLorenzo, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 Delosantos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 De los Santos Ferrer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Delph v. International Paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Del Viscovo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Delzer v. United Bank of Bismarck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 DeMarco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955,1120 Demarin-Orrego v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 DeMartino v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 DeMauro v. Coldwell, Banker & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877,887,1006 Demere v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Democratic Central Comm. of District of Columbia v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Democratic Party of Cook County; Harold Washington Party v. . 825 Demosthenes; Ward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Dempsey v. Commissioner, Mass. Dept. of Mental Health . . . . . . 953 Dempsey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859,973 Dempsey Supply Corp.; American Security Bank, N. A. v. . . . . . . 915 Denet v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Denlinger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Denson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Dent v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Denune; Ohio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Denver; Snell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Deobler v. Kintzele . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873,1006 De Ochoa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 DeOvalle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Departmental Disciplinary Comm. for First Jud. Dept.; Ghobashy v. 1045 Department of Agriculture; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Department of Air Force; Glover v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Department of Air Force; Voinche v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Department of Army; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Department of Army; Geurin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR lxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Department of Army; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Department of Army; Lockard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Department of Army Corps of Engineers; Hardaway Co. v. . . . . . 820 Department of Commerce; Schwarz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Department of Corrections; Ward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Department of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Authority . . . 487 Department of Defense v. Meinhold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Department of Ed.; Rogers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Department of Env. Conservation; Simpson Paper (Vt.) Co. v. . . . 1032 Department of Env. Quality of Ore.; Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. 962 Department of HHS; Crump v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Department of HHS; Pennsylvania Office of Budget v. . . . . . . . . . 1010 Department of HHS; Reidt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Department of HHS; Rupp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912,995 Department of HUD; Resident Council of Allen Parkway Village v. 820 Department of Interior; Kidd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Department of Justice; Banuelos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Department of Justice; Cabal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831,1065 Department of Justice; Crancer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Department of Justice; Dickerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Department of Justice; Liggett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Department of Justice; Rollins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Department of Labor; Facchiano Construction Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . 822 Department of Labor; Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'rs v. . . . . . 964 Department of Labor; Perryman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851,1020 Department of Motor Vehicles; Nick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Department of Navy; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Department of Navy; Dunbar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Department of Navy; Gulbenkian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Department of Navy; Sanderlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch . . . . . . . . . . . 962,1009 Department of Revenue of Ore. v. ACF Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . 332 Department of State; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075,1216 Department of Taxation and Finance of N. Y. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943,1107,1162,1175 Department of Transportation; Sharkey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Department of Transportation and Development of La. v. Cosey 905 Department of Treasury; Goodwin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Department of Treasury; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Department of Treasury; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Department of Treasury; Tschupp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Department of Veterans Affairs; Laity v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Department of Veterans Affairs; Mack v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Department of Veterans Affairs; Pano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxi Page Department of Veterans Affairs; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 DeRosa v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924,1007 DeSalvo v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 DeSambourg v. Plaquemines Parish Government of La. . . . . . . . . 1093 Desamour v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Desarrollos Metropolitanos, Inc. v. Taber Partners I . . . . . . . . . . 823 Desert Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. California Dept. of Transp. . . 933 Desktop Direct, Inc.; Digital Equipment Corp. v. . . . . . . . . 804,942,1038 Detrex Corp. v. Amcast Industrial Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Detroit v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Detroit Bd. of Ed.; Swain v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920,1006 Detroit College of Law; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,1005 Detroit Diesel Allison Engine Plant/Truck & Bus GM Corp. Div.; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958 Detroit Police Dept.; Steen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Devall Towing & Boat Service of Hackberry, Inc.; Briscoe v. . . . . 865 Devaney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Developers Ins. Co.; Carpenters Health and Welf. Tr. Fd. for Cal. v. 827 Devers, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Devers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 De Vone v. Batchelor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 DeVries v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Diamond; Libertarian Party of Me. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co.; Hartman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co.; Ivy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Diaz; Cherrey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Diaz v. Richards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Diaz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957,1169,1198 Diaz-Batista, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 DiCarlo Constr. Co. v. H. H. Robertson Co., Cupples Products Div. 1019 DiCesare v. Stout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 DiCicco v. Tremblay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Dick; McKinney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Dick v. Peters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Dickerson v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Di Costanzo; LaPage v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 DiDomenico; Stochastic Decisions, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Dieter; Ortiz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Dietz; Perry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 DiGian v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc. . . . . . . . . 804,942,1038 Digitron Packaging, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . 990 Diller; Asante v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 DiMicco v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR lxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Dimmig v. Wahl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Dingle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Director, Dept. of Community Development v. Guimont . . . . . . . . 1176 Director, Dept. of Community Development; Guimont v. . . . . . . . 1176 Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068,1189 Director, OWCP v. Maher Terminals, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068,1189 Director of penal or correctional institution. See name or title of director. Dirker v. Aispuro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Dismukes v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 District Court. See U. S. District Court. District Judge. See U. S. District Judge. District of Columbia; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 District of Columbia; B. S. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 District of Columbia; Dano Resource Recovery, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . 931 District of Columbia; Fleming v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 District of Columbia; Government Employees v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 District of Columbia; Joseph v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 District of Columbia; McCoo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928,1007 District of Columbia; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 DiTrapano; Aliff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Dixie Machine, Welding & Metal Works v. Moss . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Dixon v. CSX Transportation, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Dixon; Lawson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Dixon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852,1134,1136 Dobles v. San Diego Dept. of Social Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076,1178 Dobson; Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Dobson v. Gabriel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Dockins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Dockter v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Cox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Doctors' Hospital of Prince George's County v. Shalala . . . . . . . . 990 Dodge v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Dodge County Dept. of Human Services; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Doe; Baby Boy Doe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032,1033,1168 Doe v. Bennett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Doe; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Doe v. Entergy Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Doe v. Mother Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032,1033,1168 Doe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812,1091,1169 Doe v. Woolsey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Dolan v. Tigard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989,1162 Dominguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891,927,1014 Dominguez-Alparo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxiii Page Domovich; Bartlett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972,1067 Domovich; Keller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Donahey v. Livingstone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Donahue; Camoscio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Donaldson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,1029,1030 Donley; Hernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Donley; Nero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Donnelley Information Pub., Inc.; BellSouth Adv. & Pub. Corp. v. 1101 Donovan; Cote v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Donovan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Don's Towing v. Wright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Dopico v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Dorsey; Larson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Dorsey v. Oregon Bd. of Parole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Dortch v. Godinez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Dortch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Doss v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Dotson v. Murphy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Dotson v. Serr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 D'Ottavio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Doucette v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Douglas v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Douglas v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Douglas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Douglas County; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Douglass v. Frontier Federal Savings & Loan Assn. . . . . . . . . . . 917 Douglas VanDyke Coal Co.; VanDyke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Dove v. Waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Dow; Circuit Court of First Circuit v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Dow Chemical Co.; Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. . . . . . . 813 Dow Chemical Co. v. Asociacion Nacional de Pescadores a Pequena Escala o Artesanales de Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Dow Corning Corp.; Riley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Dowdy v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Dowell v. Lensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Downs v. King . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Downs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Doyle v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Drayton v. Evatt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014,1159 Dresser Industries; Atkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Drew v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Drew v. Dwinell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Drew v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Drug Enforcement Administration; Sarit v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR lxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Duarte v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Dubyak v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096,1173 DuCharme; Enquist v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 DuCharme; Jordan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Duckworth; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Duckworth; Brooke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Duckworth; Cuppett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Duckworth; Mickens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Duckworth; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Duc Van Le; Ibarra v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Dudley; Fedoryk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Duenas v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Duest v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Duest; Singletary v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Duff; Facemire v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Duffield; First Interstate Bank of Denver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Dugan; Mathews v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Dugger; Fortner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Duke; Brooke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981,1159 Dukes v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Dula v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Dulock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Dunbar v. Department of Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Dunbar v. Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Duncan v. Cobb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860,1005 Duncan; Custer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Duncan v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Duncan; Kukes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Duncan; Ortiz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Duncan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Dunford, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 Dunkin v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Dunlap v. Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Dunlap-McCuller v. Riese Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Dunn; Gavin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Dunn; Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Dunn v. Sims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Dunning v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918,1006 Dunsmore v. Heleba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Dunson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Dunston; New Jersey Carpenters Welfare Fund v. . . . . . . . . . . 944,1031 Dunston; NYSA­ILA Welfare Fund v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Dunston; Trustees of Welfare Trust Fund, Local Union 475 v. . . . 944,1065 Dupard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxv Page Duphar, B. V. v. Tobin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Du Pont de Nemours & Co.; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985 Du Pont de Nemours & Co.; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Dupree; Lamar County Bd. of Ed. and Trustees v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068 Dupree; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068 Dupree v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Dupuy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Duque-Rodriquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Duran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Durante; Spremo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Durham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Duso v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Dutrow; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Dutton; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Duvall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Dvorak v. Fritz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Dwinell; Drew v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Dye v. Espy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Dyer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Dyke College Bd. of Trustees; Hegedeos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015,1159 Dykes v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Dykstra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Earls v. Gardner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Eartha D. v. Orange County Social Services Agency . . . . . . . . . . 951 Eason v. Chicago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Eastland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Easton v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Eatmon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957 Eaton; Seay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,959 Eaton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Eau Claire County; Gamble v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Ebbole v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Ebeling & Reuss Co.; Swaroviski Int'l Trading Corp., A. G. v. . . . 827 Ebeling & Reuss, Ltd.; Swaroviski Int'l Trading Corp., A. G. v. . . 827 Eberhart; Ritchie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Ebershoff; Shieh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Ebo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Ebow v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971,1087 Echarte v. University of Miami . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Echarte v. University of Miami School of Medicine . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Echlin v. LeCureux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Echols v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Eckert v. Eckert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Eckstein; Balcor Film Investors v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR lxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Edelin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Edenso v. Haida Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Edgar; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Edgeston v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Edgington, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Edmonds v. Western Pa. Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Edwards v. Arlington Hospital Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Edwards v. Federal Communications Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Edwards v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884,1048 E. F. Etie Sheet Metal Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 EF Operating Corp. v. S. S. Fisher Steel Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Egwuh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Ehrnfelt; Russell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Eichelberger v. Balette . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991,1081 E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985 E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Eisenbart v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Eisenstein v. Haber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038,1197 Elder v. Holloway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 510,806 Eldridge v. Cobb County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Electrical Workers; Festa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Electrical Workers; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Electrical Workers' Pension Trust Fund of Local Union #58 v. Electric One, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Electric One, Inc.; Electrical Workers' Pension Trust Fund of Local Union #58 v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Electric Power Authority; HPY Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Electronic Data Systems; Robb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Electronic Data Systems Corp.; Hafiz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Eli Lilly & Co.; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Eline v. Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Eline v. MTV, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Elkins v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Ellingsworth; Lovett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Ellingsworth; Wooten v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Elliot v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Elliott v. Administrator, Animal, Plant Health Inspection Serv. . . 867 Elliott v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Ellis v. Borg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Ellis; Kelly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Ellis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Ellzey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Elmer; Schultz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Elmore v. Bunnell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxvii Page El Paso Natural Gas Co.; Wise v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 El Pirata del Caribe, S. A.; Belize Trading, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Elsesser & Rader; Cazares v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 El-Tayeb v. Rabinowitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Embriano; Grosnick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Empire Services, Inc.; Kanza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Celotex Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. . . . . . . 813 Empresa Nacional Siderurgica, S. A. v. Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Emra v. Maass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Encarnacion v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Endell; Pennington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Eng v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 English; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 English v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Enoch v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Enquist v. DuCharme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Enriquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Enron Oil & Gas Co. v. Babbitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Entergy Services, Inc.; Doe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Entezari v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Entz; Attorney General of Tex. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Environmental Defense Fund; Chicago v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961,1008 EPA; Central Ariz. Water Conservation Dist. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Environmental Quality Comm'n of Ore.; Columbia Resource Co. v. 962 Enweremadu; Reichlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Episcopal Hospital v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Epperly v. Booker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Epperly v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867,985 EEOC; Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 E. R. Carpenter Co.; Cutright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Erdheim, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Erdman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Erickson; Freeman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Erickson; Schneider v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Erikson v. Rowland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015,1159 Errico v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Ersan Resources, Inc.; Kiratli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Ersan Resources, Inc.; Ozey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Ervin v. Busby . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Ervin v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Erwin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Erwin; Missouri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Escamilla v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR lxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Escobar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Escoffrey v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Espana v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Esparza; McDonald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Esparza v. Munoz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054,1216 Espy; Dye v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Espy; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Estate. See name of estate. Estelle; Wasko v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015,1101 Estes v. Seattle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Estes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Estrella v. Campbell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Etie Sheet Metal Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Eu; Cross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Eu; Rogers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Evans v. Baer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Evans; Battle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Evans v. Heichelbech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Evans v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Evans; Romer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Evans; Tennessee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,1008,1064 Evans; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Evans v. United Arab Shipping Co. S. A. G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Evans v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801,821,927,1086,1089,1170 Evans v. Valles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Evans-Smith v. Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Evans & Sons; Polyak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Evanston Hospital v. Hauck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Evatt; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Evatt; Drayton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014,1159 Evatt; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Even v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Everett v. American Central Gas Cos. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Excel Corp.; Medrano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Exxon Co., USA; Industrial Workers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Exxon Corp. v. Boyle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Exxon Corp.; Cheramie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Exxon Corp.; Sokaogon Chippewa Community v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Ezzell v. New Hampshire Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 F. v. Dale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 F.; Tamara B. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Facchiano Construction Co. v. Department of Labor . . . . . . . . . . 822 Faccio-Laboy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxix Page Facemire v. Duff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Fairchild v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Fairfax County Economic Development Authority; Goldbecker v. 1074 Fairley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Faison; Skeen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Faloon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Fant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Fantasy, Inc.; Fogerty v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517 Farley v. Commissioner, Me. Dept. of Human Services . . . . . . . . . 820 Farley v. Los Angeles County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Farley; Reed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Farley; Schiro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222,1215 Farley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Farley; Wickliffe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Farmer v. Brennan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811,941 Farmer v. Haas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Farmers Bank; Kittay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Farmers State Bank; Lightle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Farmers State Bank, Grafton; Huebner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Farr v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Farrar v. Franchise Tax Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Farrier; More v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Fass v. Dalton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Fassbender; Carlton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Faulkner; University of Tenn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Faust v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Fauver; Long v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Favela Romero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Favor v. Arvonio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Fayne v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 FCC National Bank; Price v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 F. D. Rich Construction Co.; Losacco v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Fears v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Featherlite Precast Corp.; Kellebrew v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Federal Aviation Administration; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Federal Bureau of Investigation; Abdullah v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Federal Bureau of Prisons; Grandison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Federal Bureau of Prisons; Prows v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Federal Bureau of Prisons; Tariq v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Federal Communications Comm'n; Edwards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Federal Communications Comm'n; Progressive Cellular III B­3 v. 860 Federal Communications Comm'n; Tsaconas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Federal Correctional Institution, Butner; Wedington v. . . . . . . . . 1053 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Banco Cooperativo de Puerto Rico v. 1111 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR lxxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Coones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Douglas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Fennell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Hemmerle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978,1101 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Hemmerle Construction Co. v. . . . . 978,1101 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Kurahara & Morrissey v. . . . . . . . . . . 944 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Lindsey, Stephenson & Lindsey v. . . 1111 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Noell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Normatrust U. S. A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; North American Fund Mgmt. Corp. v. 959 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; O'Melveny & Myers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Spawn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Vienna Mortgage Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . 819 Federal Election Comm'n v. LaRouche . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Federal Election Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory Fund . . . . 1085,1190 Federal Election Comm'n v. Political Contributions Data, Inc. . . . 1116 FERC; Michigan Municipal Coop. Group v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Federal Judiciary; Cossett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Federal Labor Relations Authority; Department of Defense v. . . . 487 Federal Land Bank; Barry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Federal Land Bank of St. Louis; Harlow Fay, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . 825 Federal Republic of Nigeria; Antares Aircraft, L. P. v. . . . . . . . . 1071 Federal Trade Comm'n; Figgie International, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Federal Trade Comm'n; Olin Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Federal Trade Comm'n; Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Federal Trade Comm'n; Ukiah Adventist Hospital v. . . . . . . . . . . 825 Fedoryk v. Dudley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Fee v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Felder v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Felder v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Feldman v. Resolution Trust Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 FELEC Services; Metcalf v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931,1065 Feliciano v. Cleveland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Feltman; Sassower v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Felts v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Fennell v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Ferenc v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Fergerson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Ferguson v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Ferguson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Fernandes v. Rockaway Township Town Council . . . . . . . . . . . . 863,984 Fernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Ferrara; Bougere v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxi Page Ferrara v. Keane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Ferrer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Ferri, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Ferri v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Festa v. Electrical Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Fetzner v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Feury v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 FHP, Inc. v. Solorzano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Fields; Bockes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Fields v. Brecher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Fields v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Fields v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079,1183 Figgie International, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Figueroa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Figueroa-Gomez; Velazquez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Figures v. Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960,1007 FilmTec Corp. v. Hydranautics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Finazzo v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806,1083,1189 Finch v. Chapman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Finch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Finn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Fire Fighters; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872,1006 First Baptist Church of San Antonio; Bexar County Appraisal Review Bd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 First Gibraltar Bank, FSB; Lake Forest Developments v. . . . . . . 945 First Interstate Bank of Cal. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 First Interstate Bank of Denver v. Duffield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 First National Bank of Bethany; Germano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802,973 First National Bank of Cicero; Bontkowski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 First National Bank of Md.; Maxwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 First National Bank & Trust Co.; AT&T Family Federal Credit Union v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 First Pyramid Life Ins. Co. of America; Stoltz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 First Union National Bank of Ga.; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Fisch v. Randall Mill Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Fischer; Philadelphia Electric Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Fish v. Collings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Fisher v. Rutgers, State Univ. of N. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Fisher v. Trainor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Fisher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Fishman; Perreault v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Fite v. Cantrell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837,972,1055,1216 Fitzgerald v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR lxxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Fitzhugh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Fitzpatrick v. Mackey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 F. J. Vollmer & Co. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Flagg v. Control Data Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Flanagan v. Brennan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Flanagan v. Shively . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Flanders v. Hurt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Flathead Valley Community College; Talley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Fleeher v. Tobin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Fleenor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Fleming v. Borden, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Fleming v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Fleming v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850,1059,1192 Fleming County; Mineer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Fletcher v. MacDonald . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Flojo Trading Corp. v. Browning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Florat v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Florence County School Dist. Four v. Carter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Flores v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Flores v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821,1063,1074 Flores-Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Florida; Bain v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Florida; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Florida; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Florida; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Florida; Critsley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Florida; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Florida; Duncan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Florida; Errico v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Florida; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Florida; Gaskin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Florida; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Florida; Happ v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Florida; Henry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Florida; Hodges v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Florida; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Florida; Lago v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Florida; Lawrence v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Florida; Lindemann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957 Florida; Long v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Florida; Longstaff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Florida; Lucas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Florida; Mason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxiii Page Florida; Melendez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Florida; Mingo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Florida; Oatess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Florida; Orlebeck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Florida; Ponticelli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Florida; Rankin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Florida; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Florida; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Florida; Rose v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Florida; Saavedra v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Florida; Shimek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Florida; Sochor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025,1159 Florida; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Florida; Sweet v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Florida; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Florida; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Florida; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Florida; Trepal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Florida; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Florida; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Florida; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Florida Dept. of Business and Professional Regulation, Bd. of Ac- countancy; Ibanez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services; Keegan v. . . 1180 Florida Power & Light Co.; Boca Grande Club, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . 1022 Florida Supreme Court; Graham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Flowers, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Floyd v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Floyd West & Co.; Newsome v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Flynn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 FMC Corp.; Fuller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Foden v. Gianoli Aldunate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Fogel v. Kopelson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517 Folks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Follette v. Clairol, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Fonar Corp. v. Deccaid Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Fonseca v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Fontenot v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Fontroy v. Owens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Food & Commercial Workers v. Aguinaga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Food & Commercial Workers; John Morrell & Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . 994 Food & Commercial Workers; Zady Natey, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Foppe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR lxxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Ford v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Ford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Forde v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Forklift Systems, Inc.; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Formby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985 Forrester v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Fortner v. Dugger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Fortner v. Snow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Fortner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Fort Wayne Community Schools; Fort Wayne Ed. Assn., Inc. v. . . 826 Fort Wayne Ed. Assn., Inc. v. Fort Wayne Community Schools . . 826 Fort Wayne Ed. Assn., Inc.; U. S. Postal Service v. . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Foss v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Foster; Atlantic Healthcare Benefits Trust v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Foster v. Bedell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Foster v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Foster v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Foster v. Rutgers, State Univ. of N. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Foster v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835,1087 Foulks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Fountain; Pennsylvania v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Fowler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Fowler; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Fowlin v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Fox v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Fox v. Hutton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851,1005 Fox v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Fox v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Foxx v. Dalton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 F. P. Corp. v. Twin Modal, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Franchise Tax Bd.; Farrar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal.; Barclays Bank PLC v. . . . . . . . 942,1037,1107 Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal.; Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. . . 806,943,1037,1107 Francis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Franco v. Myers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Franco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Frank; Crisler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Frank; Gordon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Frank; Relin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Frankel; Simmons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Franklin v. Adkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Franklin v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Franklin v. Witkowski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,973 Franklin County; Mixon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxv Page Frank Paxton Co.; Hartbarger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Franks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Franzen v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Fratus; Colquitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Frazier v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Frazier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Freeman v. Erickson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Freeman v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Freeman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003,1089 Freeport-McMoRan Inc.; Continental Potash Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Fremont County District Court; Castleberry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 French v. Beard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 French v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Frenz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Frey; Liberty Mortgage Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Frias v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Friday v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Friedman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Fripp v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Frison v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Fritz; Dvorak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Fritz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Frontier Federal Savings & Loan Assn.; Douglass v. . . . . . . . . . . 917 Frontier Pilots Litigation Steering Committee v. Texas Air Corp. 993 Frost; Snyder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Frost v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Fruehauf Corp. v. Southwest Motor Freight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Fruehauf Corp. v. Still . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Fry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Fry; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Frydenlund v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Fuentes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Fuentez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Fuhr; Krueger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Fujikawa v. PML Securities Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985 Fulbright & Jaworski; PSJ Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Fulbright & Jaworski; Rocheux International, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Fuller v. FMC Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Furmanski v. Furmanski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Gabriel; Dobson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Gachot v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Gacy v. Welborn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,1006 Gadson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 GAF Building Materials Corp.; Day v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR lxxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Gaffney v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Gafford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Galan v. Gegenheimer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Galatolo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Galetka v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Gallagher; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055,1216 Gallagher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Gallagher v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Gallardo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Gallegos; Gonsalves v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Galloway v. Borg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Galtieri v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Galu, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Galvan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Galviz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Gambina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Gamble v. Eau Claire County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Gambrah v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Gandotra v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Gann v. Rempel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Gant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Garced v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Garcia v. Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Garcia v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Garcia v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Garcia v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Garcia v. Spun Steak Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832,883,889,899,968,983 Gardner; Earls v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Gardner v. Reed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Gardner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Garelick v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Gargallo v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. . . . . . . . 1058 Garland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Garner; Gray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Garner; Memphis Police Dept. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Garner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Garnett; Renton School Dist. No. 403 v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Garney Cos.; Southwest Water Wells, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Garrett; Bartel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Garrett v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Garrett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Garrett Fluid Systems, Inc.; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Garrido v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxvii Page Garringer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Garringer v. Steelworkers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Garuda Indonesia; NYSA­ILA Pension Trust Fund v. . . . . . . . . . 1116 Garvin; Pearson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Gary v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895,1099 Garza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926,1018 Garza-Flores v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Garza-Juarez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Gaskin v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Gaster v. Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955,1159 Gas Utilities Co. of Ala., Inc. v. Southern Natural Gas Co. . . . . . . 1042 Gates, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Gates v. Port San Luis Harbor Dist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Gateway Broadcasting Corp.; Slawek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Gathwright v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Gator Office Supply & Furniture, Inc.; Kleinschmidt v. . . . . . . . . 1202 Gaudreault v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Gavin v. Dunn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Gay, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Geauga Dept. of Human Services; Lesher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Geery v. Shelley School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Gegenheimer; Galan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Geiger v. New York Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Geiger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Geiler; Tyler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885,985 Gem Boat Service, Inc.; Meek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Genentech, Inc.; Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 General Building Supply Co.; Sundwall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993,1101 General Chemical Corp. v. De la Lastra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985 General Electric Co.; Abuan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 General Mills, Inc. v. Power Authority of N. Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 General Motors Acceptance Corp.; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 General Motors Corp.; Lovett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 General Motors Corp., R. P. A., Dayton-Norwood Operation; Orr v. 994 Genninger v. Boston Magazine, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Dept. of Revenue and Taxation . 992 Geophysical Systems Corp. v. Raytheon Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 George v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,1089 George v. Zlotoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Georgia; Agan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Georgia; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Georgia; Coker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Georgia; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950,1066 Georgia; Hailey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR lxxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Georgia; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950,1066 Georgia; Lawal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847,1020 Georgia; Mobley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Georgia; Osborne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Georgia; Swails v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Georgia; Wooten v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Georgia; Worley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Georgia Television Co.; TV News Clips of Atlanta, Inc. v. . . . . . . 1118 Gerads v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Gerard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Gerber v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Germano v. First National Bank of Bethany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802,973 Gerrish v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Gerritsen v. Consulado General de Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Gerritsen v. Los Angeles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Gerwin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Geschke, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Geske & Sons, Inc. v. Operating Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Gettings v. McKune . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Getty Oil Co.; Youell & Cos. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Geurin v. Department of Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Geurin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Ghazibayat v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028,1160 Ghobashy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Ghobashy v. Departmental Disciplinary Comm., First Jud. Dept. 1045 Gianoli Alduante; Foden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Gibbons v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872,1133 Gibbs v. Clements Food Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Gibbs v. Oklahoma Dept. of Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Gibbs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Gibson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Gibson v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Gibson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843,925,1136 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Giganti; Klutznick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Gilbert; Latimore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Gilbert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870,1063,1183 Gilbert/Robinson, Inc.; Carrie Beverage Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Gilbertson v. Walker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Giles v. Murray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Giles v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876,1066 Giles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858,1018 Gilhooly v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Gill v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxix Page Gill v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Gilleo; Ladue v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809,1037 Gillespie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Gilless; Gladney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058,1216 Gillette v. Delmore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Gilliam v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Gilliam v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Gilliard v. Warden, Clinton Correctional Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Gillum v. Kerrville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Gilmer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Gilmore; Lilly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Gilmore v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Gilmore v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Gilpin; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Gipson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Giraldo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Girard; Stege v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 G. I. Trucking Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America . . . . . . . . . 1044 G­K Development Co. v. Broadmoor Place Investments . . . . . . . . 1071 Gladney v. Gilless . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058,1216 Glasper v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Glass v. Purkett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Gleason v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Gleda K. v. Dane County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Gleeson v. Kaminski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Global Divers & Contractors, Inc. v. Leevac Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Globe Int'l, Inc. v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Mountain Home 931 Glover v. Department of Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Glover v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Glover v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842,1062 Glover Landing Condominium Trust; Monga v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 GNAC Corp.; Bona v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Goanaga v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Gober v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Godinez; Castro Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Godinez; Dortch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Godinez; Kines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Godinez; Partee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952,1066 Godinez; Poole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Goff v. Dailey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Goines v. James . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Goines v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Goins v. Lang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Goldbecker v. Fairfax County Economic Development Authority 1074 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR xc TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Goldberg v. Cleveland Clinic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998,1101 Golden Gates Heights Investments v. San Francisco . . . . . . . . . . 928 Goldflam v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. of Los Angeles Cty. 932 Goldsborough, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 Goldschneider; Lindquist v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Goldsmith v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Goldstein & Baron, Chartered v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Gollomp v. Trump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Gomez; Buschbom v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Gomez; Gibson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Gomez; Harper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Gomez; McClintock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Gomez; Reber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Gomez; Rutulante v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Gomez; Toward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Gomez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888,1184 Gomez-Rendon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 Gomez-Salazar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Gomilla; Rubin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096,1216 Gonsalves v. Gallegos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Gonsalves v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Gonzales v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Gonzales v. Carter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Gonzales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858,1029,1115,1125,1170 Gonzales Rodriguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Gonzalez v. Abbott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Gonzalez v. Burson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Gonzalez v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Gonzalez v. Ocean County Bd. of Social Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Gonzalez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936,1029,1088,1095,1183 Gonzalez v. Walker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Gonzalez-Lopez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Gooch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Goodhart, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Goodie; Pritchard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Good Real Property; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Goodwin v. Department of Treasury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Goodwin; Granger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Goodwin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Googins; Atlantic Healthcare Benefits Trust v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Gool; Pilditch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Gordon v. Frank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Gordon v. Lyons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Gordon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xci Page Gore v. Babbitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Gore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Gorham v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Gorrion v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Gossett v. Walker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Gottshall; Consolidated Rail Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 912,1008,1107,1162 Gough v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Goulette v. Humphrey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936,1020 Government Employees v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Government of Virgin Islands; Knight v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Government of Virgin Islands; Tuitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Governor of Cal. v. Biggs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Governor of Colo.; American Council of Blind of Colo., Inc. v. . . . 864 Governor of Colo. v. Evans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Governor of Conn.; Carangelo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Governor of Fla.; Lightbourne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967,1066 Governor of Fla.; Phillips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Governor of Ill.; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Governor of Ky.; Mertens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Governor of Ky.; Northern Ky. Welfare Rights Assn. v. . . . . . . . . 806 Governor of Mo.; Tyler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Governor of Nev.; Theirault v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Governor of N. C. v. Republican Party of N. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Governor of Ohio; Prunty v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935,1020 Governor of Ohio; Sweet v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Go-Video, Inc. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Gower v. Bailey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Graben Wood Products, Inc.; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Grace v. Morgan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Grace v. Tabron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Grace Community Church v. Bethel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Grace & Co.; Concordia College Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Gracey v. Day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093,1216 Grady v. Miami Herald Publishing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Grady v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958 Graf v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Grafft v. Maxwell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Graham; Aliota v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Graham v. Florida Supreme Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Graham v. Kaestner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Graham v. Mengel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Graham v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Graham; North Carolina Assn. of Electronic Tax Filers, Inc. v. . . 946 Graham v. Rollins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR xcii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Graham v. Saunders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Graham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003,1030,1090,1130 Graham Correctional Center; Blair v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Graibe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Grambling & Mounce, Inc.; Kirkendall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Gramley; Brooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Gramley; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Gramley; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Granderson; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806,962,1161 Grandison v. Federal Bureau of Prisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Grand Rapids; Warren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Granger v. Goodwin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Grant v. Kaiser Permanente Medical Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Grant; Loyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Grant v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Grant v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Grant; Robbins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Grant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061,1086 Grant Investment Funds v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . . . . . . 1069 Graves v. World Omni Financial Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922,1020 Gray v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Gray v. Garner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Gray v. Hopkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Gray v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995,1086,1088,1169 Gray v. Whitley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Grayson; Katschor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Grayson; Ware v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Greater Rockford Energy & Technology Corp. v. Shell Oil Co. . . 1111 Greathouse v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.; Chicago v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.; Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. . . . . 1108 Great Western Coca-Cola Bottling; Theriot v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972,1067 Grecco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Green, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039,1175 Green; Barber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Green v. Chabad Jewish Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Green v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Green v. Lindsey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Green v. North Carolina Dept. of Transp., Div. of Motor Vehicles 991 Green v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Green v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Green v. Primerica Disability Income Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Green v. Sheffield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875,973 Green v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,872,958,1069,1088 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xciii Page Greenberg; Howard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Greene v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866,985 Greene v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935,1019,1079 Greene County Memorial Park v. Behm Funeral Homes, Inc. . . . 866 Greenwich Collieries; Director, OWCP v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068,1189 Greenwich Zoning Bd. of Appeals; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Greenwood v. Keane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Greer; Brooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Gregg; Mothershed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868,959 Gregg v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Gregor v. Newport Inn Joint Venture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Gregory v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Gregory; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 GRE Ins. Co.; Schilling v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958 Gresh v. Gresh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Grewe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Grievance Committee, Ninth Judicial District; Siegel v. . . . . . . . . 839 Griffes v. Barringer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Griffin v. Cooper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Griffin v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Griffin; South Carolina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Grifo; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896,1026 Grim v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Grim v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Grimaldi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Grimes v. Ohio Edison Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Grimm v. Rosenthal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Grist v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Griswold v. Bryant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Grocers Supply Co.; Hamilton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Groene v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Groesbeck v. Groesbeck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Grooms v. Mobay Chemical Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Groose; Aziz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921,1199 Groose; Craig v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Groose; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838,1005 Grose v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Grosnick v. Embriano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Gross; Carroll v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Gross; Woodrome v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Gruenberg v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Grumet; Attorney General of N. Y. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989,1107 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:04 PGT*TCR xciv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Grumet; Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. . . . 989,1107 Grumet; Board of Ed. of Monroe-Woodbury School Dist. v. . . . . . 989,1107 Grunwald v. San Bernardino City Unified School Dist. . . . . . . . . . 964 Grygar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Grynberg v. Northglenn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Grynberg v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812,984 Guajardo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Guam; Ibanez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Guam v. Turner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co.; Hampton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America; Kokkonen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Guardino v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Guder v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Guerra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Guerrero v. Davidson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Guerrero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Guevara v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Guidry v. Mississippi Utility, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Guillory v. Port of Houston Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Guimont v. Director, Dept. of Community Development . . . . . . . . 1176 Guimont; Director, Dept. of Community Development v. . . . . . . . 1176 Guinan v. Delo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Gulbenkian v. Department of Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Gulfport Paper Co.; Henry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981,1067 Gulf & Western, Inc.; Wittekamp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Gulley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Gullion v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Gumpl v. Bost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Gunn; Wilkerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Gunter v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Gunter v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Gunter; Valdez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Gustafson v. Alloyd Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085,1176 Gutierrez v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921,1050 Guy F. Atkinson Co.; Trandes Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Guzman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.; Steward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891,960 Haas; Farmer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Habegger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Haber; Eisenstein v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038,1197 Haberstroh v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Habiniak, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Hae Woo Youn; Maritime Overseas Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Hafiz v. Electronic Data Systems Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xcv Page Hagen v. Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399 Haggard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Hague v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Hahn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Haida Corp.; Edenso v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Hai Hoac v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Hailey v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Haislip v. Stephan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Hai Van Lo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Hale v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Hale v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Haley v. Borg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886,1006 Haley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Hall v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911,1045 Hall v. Associated Doctors Health & Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Hall v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Hall v. Harlan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Hall; Lombardi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Hall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873,903,1130 Hallstrom; Killeen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Halpin; Decker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Ham; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830,972 Ham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Hamann v. Threlkel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Hamblin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Hamel v. President's Comm'n on Executive Exchange . . . . . . . . . 931 Hamell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Hamell-El v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Hamilton v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Hamilton v. Grocers Supply Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Hamilton v. Kirkpatrick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054,1160 Hamilton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871,1086 Hamilton-Davidson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Hamm v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983,1089 Hammer v. Saffle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Hammond v. Air Line Pilots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Hammond v. Weekes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Hampton v. Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Hampton; Hughey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981,1067 Hana v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Hance v. Zant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920,1020 Hancock; Madera Irrigation Dist. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Hancock; Patuxent Institution Bd. of Review v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust and Savings Bank . . . 86 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR xcvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.; Whitmer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Handelsman; Bartley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Hanif v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Hanjin Container Lines, Inc. v. Tokio Fire & Marine Ins. Co. . . . 1194 Hannah v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Hannigan; Scaife v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057,1216 Hanoum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Hanover Society for Deaf v. Board of Supervisors of Hanover Cty. 1043 Hanserd v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Han Sho Wei v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Hanson v. Kelly Temporary Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Hanson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Happ v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Harbold v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Hardaway v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Hardaway Co. v. Department of Army Corps of Engineers . . . . . 820 Hardcastle; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877,1006 Hardin v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Hardin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Harding v. Ward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Hardwick v. Hodge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Hardy; Merkl v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Hardy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900,919,1168 Hargett; Benson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Hargett; Mhoon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Hargett; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Hargett; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Hargett; Stohler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013,1101 Hargett; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Hargett; Watts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Hargett; Wilcher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Hargrove v. Tansy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056,1160 Harker v. State Use Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Harlan; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Harley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Harlow; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Harlow Fay, Inc. v. Federal Land Bank of St. Louis . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Harmer v. Adkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Harmon v. Northern Ins. Co. of N. Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Harms v. Cavenham Forest Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Harold Washington Party v. Democratic Party of Cook County . . 825 Harper, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Harper v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Harper House, Inc.; Thomas Nelson, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xcvii Page Harrill v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Harris, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Harris v. Burton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Harris v. Campbell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Harris v. Gramley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Harris v. McCaughtry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Harris v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Pa. 863 Harris v. Sacramento County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842,1005 Harris v. Ski Park Farms, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Harris v. Sullivan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Harris v. United States . . . . . . . 856,885,966,982,1055,1059,1098,1129,1199 Harrison v. Bankers First Federal Savings & Loan Assn. . . . . . . 823 Harrison v. Rogers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053,1173 Harrison v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Harrison v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819,1089 Harris Trust and Savings Bank; John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 86 Harsh Investment Corp.; Love v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Hart v. Borgert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Hart v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Hartbarger v. Frank Paxton Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Hartford; Tucker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Hartman v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Hartman v. Pointer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Hartman; Stassis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Harvey v. Perrill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Harvey v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Harvey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843,1091,1130,1139 Harwood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Hashmi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958 Hassan v. Pruzansky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Hatch; McDonald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Hatch; Stokes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Hatcher; Pharm v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Hatchett v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Hatley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Hauck; Evanston Hospital v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Haugen v. Butler Machinery, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Haugen v. Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Hause v. Vaught . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Hauser v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Havens; Vance v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Hawaii; Eline v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806,1083,1189 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR xcviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Hawes; Boalbey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Hawkins; Magnolia Bar Assn., Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Hawkins v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Hawkins v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Hawkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025,1088 Hawley v. Stepanik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Hawthorne; Besing v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Hawthorne v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013,1159 Haynes, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Haynie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Hayward v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Haywood v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Haywood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Hazra v. National Rx Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Head v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957 Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America; NLRB v. . . . . . . 810,1037 Healy; Austin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Hearns v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Heartland Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Briscoe Enterprises, Ltd., II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Heath v. Strack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Heath v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Heck v. Humphrey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068 Heckemeyer; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Hector v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Hegedeos v. Dyke College Bd. of Trustees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015,1159 Heichelbech; Evans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Heil Co.; Snyder Industries, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Heimermann v. Wisconsin State Public Defender . . . . . . . . . . 1060,1216 Heine; Phillips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Heinrich; Day v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Heleba; Dunsmore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Helena; Benson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Helfand; National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. . . . . . . . . . 824 Helfrich; Key Pacific Mortgage v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Helms v. Reynolds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843,1005 Helton v. Morgan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Helton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Helzer v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Hemmerle v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978,1101 Hemmerle Construction Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . 978,1101 Henderson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Henderson v. Bank of New England . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995,1082 Henderson; Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,1004 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xcix Page Henderson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829,848,1060,1061,1088 Hendrix v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Henman; Bailey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Henman; Sinclair v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Hennepin County Sheriff's Dept.; Branch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061,1216 Henning v. Jacobs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Henry v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Henry v. Gulfport Paper Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981,1067 Henry v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Henry v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Henry; Pinkerton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Henry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Hensley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Henthorn, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809,942,1065 Henthorn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Hepting; Tedford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Herlong v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Herman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Herman; Wahi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969,1082 Hernandez v. Donley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Hernandez v. Kmart Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Hernandez v. Supt., Fredericksburg Rappahanock Jt. Security Ctr. 1119 Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163,889,925,1062,1136 Hernandez-Garza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Hernandez-Oviedo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Herrera v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951,966 Herrera-Avila v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Herrera-Meras v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Herrera-Rodriguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Herring, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Herring v. M/A Com, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Herring v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933,1111 Herrold v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Herron v. Ratelle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Herron v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Herships v. State Bar of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Hershko v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Hertz Corp. v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Hertz Corp.; New York City v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Herzog v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Hescott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Hess v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Hesse v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR c TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Hessell v. Overton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Hester v. NationsBank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Hetherington v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Heuer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Hexamer v. Johnson Controls, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 H. H. Robertson Co., Cupples Products Div.; DiCarlo Constr. Co. v. 1019 Hickey v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Hickle v. American Service Corp. of S. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Hicks v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Hicks v. Roark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Hicks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Hien Hai Hoac v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Higareda v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Higgins; Shelton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Higgins; Stallings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Highland Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. California . . . . . . . . . 928 Hill v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Hill v. Burd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Hill v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Hill v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Hill v. Department of Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Hill v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950,1066 Hill v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Hill v. Muncy Borough Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Hill v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,876,888,951,975 Hill v. Pitt-Ohio Express, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Hill v. Schoubroek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055,1173 Hill; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Hill v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838,846,878,1086,1100 Hill v. Zant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Hillcrest Medical Center v. Scribner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Hillhaven West, Inc.; Whitson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921,1006 Hilliard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Hilling v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Hineline v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Hines v. Thurman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Hinojosa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Hinojosa-Bencomo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Hirsh v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Hitchcock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Hittle v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Hoac v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Hobbs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Hodge, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED ci Page Hodge; Hardwick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Hodges v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Hodges v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Hodges v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959,1018,1160 Hodgson v. Ylst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Hoffer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Hoffman; Northington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Hoffman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Hoffman; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Hoffner v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Hofstatter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Hogg v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927,1062 Hogsett; Lumley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Hohenstein, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961 Hoke; Wysinger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Holabird Sports Discounters v. Tennis Tutor, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Holden v. Regional Airport Auth. of Louisville and Jefferson Cty. 994 Holladay v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Holland v. John Deere Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Holland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Holland v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Holley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821,1132 Hollister; Mission Oaks Mobile Home Park v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Holloway v. Browning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Holloway v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Holloway; Elder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 510,806 Holloway v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Hollywood; Smith's Estate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Holmes v. Lynaugh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Holmes v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Holmes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089,1204 Holmes & Narver Services, Inc.; Kimble v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Holsey v. Inmate Grievance Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Holtzclaw v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Home Fed Bank; Connell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Home Ins. Co.; Turnbull v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Home Ins. Co. of Ind.; Besing v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Homick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Honabach v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Honaker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Honda Motor Co.; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068,1162 Hooker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Hooks, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR cii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Hooks v. Jenrette . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Hooper v. Morgan County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Hope v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Hope v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Hope v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Hopkins; Gray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Hopper; Wade v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Horne v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843,852,1138 Hornick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904,973 Horning v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Horton v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Hoskins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 Houck v. Stephens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 House v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Houser v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Housing Authority of Englewood; McManus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009,1119 Houston; Cole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Houston v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Howard v. Greenberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Howard v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Howard v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Howard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872,949,1017 Howard County Sheriff's Dept.; Pruitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Howe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Howell; Bewley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012,1159 Howell v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Howick v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., S. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039,1175 Hoye v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 HPY Inc. v. Electric Power Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Hseieh v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Hubanks v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Hubbard v. Olde Discount Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Hubbard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Huber v. Borg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Hucke v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Huckelby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Huddleston v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Hudsmith v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Hudson; Mayberry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Hudson; Roanoke River Basin Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Hudson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831,1184 Hudson v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Huebner v. Farmers State Bank, Grafton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED ciii Page Huff v. ABC Enterprises, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,1005 Huff v. Chapman Design & Construction Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Huffman; Alford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Hughes; Cummings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Hughes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,1126,1165,1206 Hughey v. Hampton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981,1067 Huisinga v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Hulnick, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Humeumptewa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Humphrey v. Coleman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954,1066 Humphrey; Goulette v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936,1020 Humphrey; Heck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068 Humphreys v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Hunt v. Beyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953,979 Hunt v. Bradley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Hunt v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Hunt v. Republican Party of N. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Hunt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Hunt v. Vasquez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Hunter v. Aispuro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Hunter v. Carbondale Area School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Hunter v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Hunter Country Club, Inc. v. Bourne Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Huntington v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Huntington Breakers Apartments, Ltd. v. C. W. Driver . . . . . . . . 820 Huntley v. Allen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Huntsville; Bodie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Hurst; Bostic v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Hurst v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Hurt; Flanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Hurwitz v. Perales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Husman v. Climax Molybdenum Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Hussmann Corp. v. Cook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Hutcheson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929,987 Hutchinson v. Composite State Bd. of Medical Examiners . . . . . . 947 Hutsell v. Sayre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Hutton; Fox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851,1005 Hwan Kim v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Hyder v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970,1067 Hydranatics; FilmTec Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Hydro Aluminium Nordisk Aviation Products, A/S v. Torgeson . . 976 Hylin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Business and Professional Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR civ TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Ibanez v. Guam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Ibanez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Ibarra v. Duc Van Le . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Ibarra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Ibarra-Alejandro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Idaho v. Arnzen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Idaho; Baneulos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Idaho v. Curl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Idaho; Dunlap v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Idaho; Idaho Hispanic Caucus, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Idaho; Ransom v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Idaho Dept. of Finance; Tenney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Idaho Hispanic Caucus, Inc. v. Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Ige v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Ignagni v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Ihle; Platt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Il Hwan Kim v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Illinois; Bowen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Illinois; Cloutier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Illinois v. Crane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Illinois; Danielson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Illinois; Doyle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Illinois; Edgeston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Illinois; Enoch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Illinois; Flores v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Illinois; Freeman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Illinois; Glasper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Illinois; Hoffner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Illinois; Huisinga v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Illinois; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Illinois; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Illinois; Lynch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Illinois; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Illinois; Ngumoha v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Illinois; Padgett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Illinois; Page v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Illinois; Pasch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Illinois; Patterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Illinois; Peeples v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016,1082 Illinois; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Illinois; Schaff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Illinois; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Illinois; Strickland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Illinois; Sutherland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cv Page Illinois; Todd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Illinois; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Illinois; Uppole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Illinois; Walton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Illinois; Ward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Illinois; Winsett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Illinois; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Illinois Central R. Co. v. Martin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Illinois Dept. of Corrections; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Illinois Human Rights Comm'n; Winters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Illinois Secretary of State; Burgess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 INS; Andhoga v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 INS; Animashaun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 INS; Henry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 INS; Iredia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 INS; Kalejs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 INS; Katsis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 INS v. Legalization Assistance Project of Los Angeles County Federation of Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007,1301 INS; Medina-Batista v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 INS; Nwabueze v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052,1160 INS; Nwolise v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 INS; Okpala v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 INS; Price v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 INS; Pritchett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 INS; Shapouri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Independence Blue Cross; Bennett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Independent School Dist. #625; Laffey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054,1185 Indeterminate Sentence Review Bd.; Wallin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Indiana; Baird v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Indiana; Bivins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Indiana; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Indiana; Harbold v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Indiana; Tyson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Indiana; Vukadinovich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Indiana Dept. of Revenue; Area Interstate Trucking, Inc. v. . . . . 864 Indiana State Bd. of Public Welf.; Tioga Pines Living Center v. . 1195 Industrial Refrigerated Systems, Inc.; Kelley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Industrial Workers v. Exxon Co., USA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Industrias Marathon Ltda. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. . 1191 Industrias Marathon Ltda. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Ingram v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969,1183 Inmate Grievance Office; Holsey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Innamorati v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR cvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page In re. See name of party. Insurance Co. of North America; G. I. Trucking Co. v. . . . . . . . . . 1044 Intel Corp. v. ULSI System Technology, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Intercontinental Bulktank Corp. v. Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034,1094 Internal Revenue Service; Barnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Internal Revenue Service; Drew v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Internal Revenue Service; Gonsalves v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Internal Revenue Service; Grant Investment Funds v. . . . . . . . . 1069 Internal Revenue Service; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Internal Revenue Service; Steines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 962,1023,1049,1185 Internal Revenue Service; Towe Antique Ford Foundation v. . . . 1069 International. For labor union, see name of trade. International Coffee Corp.; Koerner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 International Paper; Delph v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 International Service System, Inc.; Omara v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 International Travel Arrangers v. NWA, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Inter Valley Health Plan; Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Conn. v. . . . . 1073 Iowa; McManus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Iowa; Myre v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Iowa City; Yeggy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Iowa Dept. of Human Services; Kruse v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962,1075 Iowa Dept. of Human Services; Toomey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Iredia v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Irvin v. Armontrout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Isby v. Wright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Ischy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Isiah B. v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Island Creek Coal Co.; Kuhn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Isquierdo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Istvan v. Willoughby of Chevy Chase Condominium Council of Unit Owners, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 ITT Consumer Financial Corp. v. Patterson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Ivers; Caldwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Iverson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961,1161 Ives v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Ivey, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Ivimey v. American Bank of Conn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Izard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U. S. Philips Corp. . . 27,1081 J. v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803,938 Jaakkola v. State Industrial Ins. System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997,1082 Jabe v. Bunker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Jabe; Seaton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cvii Page Jack v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889,1206 Jackson; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,962 Jackson v. Malecek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Jackson v. Mitchell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Jackson v. Moro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Jackson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881, 894, 898, 936, 968, 1026, 1030, 1060, 1086, 1087, 1112, 1133, 1183, 1197 Jackson v. Wisneski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Jackson v. Yarbrough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Jacob v. Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Jacobi v. McCoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Jacob II v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Jacobs v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Jacobs; Henning v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Jae v. Rowley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Jaffe v. Snow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 James; Goines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 James v. Livonia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915,1006 James v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 James v. Shiplevy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 James v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 James v. Sowders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 James v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838,958,979,1088,1120 James v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 James; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 James Daniel Good Real Property; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Janeau v. Pitman Mfg. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Janosik v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Jarrett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Jarvis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Jatoi v. Meier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Jay v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Jeffers v. Mazurkiewicz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Jeffers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Jeffes; Busch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098,1216 Jeffress v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1067 Jeffries; Blodgett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Jelinek v. Wasche . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 JEM Management Associates Corp. v. Sperber Adams Associates 945 Jenkins v. Leonardo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Jenkins v. Lorson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Jenn-Air Co.; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934,1020 Jenner v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR cviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Jennings v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Jennings v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Jenrette; Hooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Jensen v. Rayl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Jermyn v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803,1049 Jernigan v. Ashland Oil, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. . . . . 1108 Jerome Foods, Inc.; Cutting v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Jerrel v. Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008,1100 Jessee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Jewish Memorial Hospital v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Jimenez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Jiminez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Jindra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 J. M. v. V. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Joe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Joelson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Johl v. Peters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038 Johnakin v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 John Deere Co.; Burke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 John Deere Co.; Crosthwait Equipment Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 John Deere Co.; Holland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 John Deere Industrial Equipment Co.; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust and Savings Bank 86 John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.; Whitmer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 John Morrell & Co. v. Food & Commercial Workers . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Johns v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081,1160 Johnson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988,1035,1108 Johnson; Alabama v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Johnson v. Armitage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Johnson; Baby Boy J. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803,938 Johnson v. Bekins Van Lines Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Johnson v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886,1020 Johnson v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836,988 Johnson v. Calvert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Johnson v. Carter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Johnson v. Cheyenne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051,1173 Johnson v. Crown Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Johnson v. Detroit College of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,1005 Johnson v. Dodge County Dept. of Human Services . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Johnson v. English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Johnson v. Evatt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Johnson v. Hardcastle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877,1006 Johnson v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cix Page Johnson v. LeCureux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Johnson v. McKaskle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Johnson v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority . . . 1016,1159 Johnson v. Rosemeyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Johnson v. Ross . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Johnson v. Shillinger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057,1173 Johnson v. Sigismonti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Johnson v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Johnson; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Johnson v. South Main Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Johnson v. State Bar of Kan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Johnson v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Johnson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882, 903,928,937,950,959,982,1080,1086,1090,1100,1112,1123 Johnson v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957,1067 Johnson Controls, Inc.; Hexamer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Johnson Controls, Inc.; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Johnson-Johnson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Johnston v. Champion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Johnston v. Lehman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Johnston v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Johnston v. Zeff & Zeff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860,1005 Joiner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Jolly v. Bowers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Jones, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963,1023 Jones v. Barr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Jones v. Carlisle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Jones v. Caterpillar Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Jones; Cleveland Surgi-Center, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Jones v. Commercial State Bank of El Campo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Jones v. Dalton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Jones v. Edgar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Jones v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Jones; Garrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Jones; Hatchett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Jones v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Jones v. Jackson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,962 Jones; Lacey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Jones; Lager v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Jones; Lambert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Jones v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Jones; Murphy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Jones v. Nagle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Jones; Northern Ky. Welfare Rights Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR cx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Jones v. Pillsbury Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Jones; Salahuddin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Jones v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Jones; Sloan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956,1067 Jones; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Jones v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843, 847,853,871,895,908,923,934,975,1002,1009,1018,1019,1025, 1048,1059,1065,1088,1090 Jones v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Jones v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Jordan v. DuCharme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Jordan; Intercontinental Bulktank Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034,1094 Jordan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850,957,1012,1177 Jorgensen v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Jorling; Berman Enterprises, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Joseph v. Cannon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Joseph v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Joseph v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937,1138 Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co.; Milwaukee Brewery Pension Plan v. . . . 1070 Jossi v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Joyce D. v. Orange County Social Services Agency . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Judge, Circuit Court for Marshall Cty., W. Va.; Allstate Ins. Co. v. 1194 Judge, Circuit Court, Miss. County; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Judge, Circuit Court of Md., Howard County; Fedoryk v. . . . . . . . 979 Judge, Circuit Court of Mo., St. Louis County; Harris v. . . . . . . . 1130 Judge, Superior Court of Georgia, Henry County; Kelley v. . . . . . 1168 Judicial Inquiry and Review Bd.; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Juniper Development Group; Kahn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Justice v. Suits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Justice of Supreme Court of N. Y., New York County; Perko v. . . 1094 Juvenile Dept. of Washington County; Thomsen v. . . . . . . . . . . 818,1004 J. Z. G. Resources, Inc. v. Shelby Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 K. v. Dane County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Kaba v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Kadunc v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Kaestner; Graham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Kahn v. Juniper Development Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Kahn v. Kolb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Kailey v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Kaiser; Ballard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Kaiser; Wilkerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Kaiser; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Cal., Inc.; Cleary v. . . . . . . . . . 866 Kaiser Foundation Hospitals; Sawicki v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxi Page Kaiser Permanente Medical Center; Grant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Kalakay v. Newblatt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Kalejs v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Kaltenbach v. Whitley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Kambouris; Lockridge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate v. EEOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Kaminski; Gleeson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Kamm; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Kam Shing Chan; Chinese American Planning Council, Inc. v. . . . 978 Kam Shing Chan; New York City v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Kanaley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940 Kang v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Kansas v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Kansas; Cotton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Kansas; Foss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Kansas; Lane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Kansas; Quinn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Kansas City v. Tolefree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Kansas City Power & Light Co.; Prayson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Kansas Dept. of Health and Environment; Schloesser v. . . . . . . . . 916 Kantola v. Snider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Kanza v. Empire Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Kapture; Conn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Karas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Karim-Panahi v. California Dept. of Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Karl; Allstate Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Katschor v. Grayson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Katsis v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Katz v. Lear Siegler, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Kavanagh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc.; Wahlstrom v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Kaye; Weaver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891,1006 Kaylor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Kazimir; Coar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Kean v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Keane; Blount v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Keane; Ferrara v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Keane; Greenwood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Keane; Maddox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Keane; Strauch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Keaulii v. Simpson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Keck v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Keckler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Keegan v. Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services . . 1180 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR cxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Keels v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Keffalas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Keisler; Mayberry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Keister v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Keith v. Markley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Keithley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Kellam v. Linahan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Kellebrew v. Featherlite Precast Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Keller v. Domovich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Kelley v. Industrial Refrigerated Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Kelley v. Kirkpatrick & Lockhart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Kelley v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Kelley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Kelly; Boeing Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Kelly v. Ellis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Kelly v. LaShawn A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Kelly v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Kelly v. Murray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Kelly v. Ober . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Kelly; Rankel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Kelly v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Kelly v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,874,1064 Kelly Temporary Services; Hanson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Kemna; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Kemp v. Chrysler First Mortgage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Kemp v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Kendall v. Kendall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807,995,1159 Kendall v. O'Leary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Kenedy Independent School Dist.; Cooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Kennedy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035,1161 Kennedy v. Little . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Kennedy v. Steel Warehouse Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Kennedy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940,1076 Kennedy v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Kennett; Shands v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Kenney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Kenny v. Borgert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Kent; Monroe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Kent v. Poythress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Kent County; Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355 Kentucky; Crayton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856,1005 Kentucky; Gober v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Kentucky; Ladwig v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Kentucky; Preece v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxiii Page Kentucky; Stanford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Kentucky v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Kentucky; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946,1066 Kentucky; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Keough v. American Policyholders Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Kerby; Starnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Kernan v. Tanaka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Kerr; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Kerrville; Gillum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Kesel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Key v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Key Bank of Southern Me.; Spickler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Key Pacific Mortgage v. Helfrich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Keystone Health Plan East; Plymouth Healthcare Systems v. . . . 863 Key Tronic Corp. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023,1031 Kezer; LaRouche v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Khan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 KHVN Radio; Reedom v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Kibodeaux v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Kidd v. Department of Interior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Kidd v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Kidder, Peabody & Co.; Fletcher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Kiem Tran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Kiestler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Kikuts v. Pandozy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Kiles v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Kilimnik v. Stoumbos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Killeen; Clayton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Killeen v. Hallstrom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Killeen; Poole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033,1102,1180 Killion v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Kills Enemy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Kilpatrick, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940 Kim v. Reich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Kim v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874,1088,1133 Kimble v. Holmes & Narver Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Kimble v. Lungren . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Kincheloe; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Kincheloe; Coe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Kines v. Godinez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 King v. Abrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 King v. Board of Regents of Univ. System of Ga. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 King v. Collagen Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 King; Downs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR cxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page King v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985 King; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 King v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881,1058,1061,1181 Kingman; Rowland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Kinslow v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Kintzele; Deobler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873,1006 Kiratli v. Ersan Resources, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Kirk v. Mid America Title Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Kirkendall v. Grambling & Mounce, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Kirkendall v. Lara . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Kirkpatrick; Hamilton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054,1160 Kirkpatrick & Lockhart; Kelley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Kirsch; Prince George's County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Kirschenhunter v. Stalder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Kirsh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Kitchens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Kittay v. Farmers Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Klein v. Boxx . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Klein; Bryant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Kleinschmidt v. Gator Office Supply & Furniture, Inc. . . . . . . . . . 1202 Kleinschmidt v. Schwartz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849,1067 Klemick; Chapman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Kline v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Klingenstein v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Klinko v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Klutnick v. Giganti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Klvana, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Kmart Corp.; Hernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Kmart Corp.; Security Services, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,1037 Kmiecik; Corethers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Knight v. Government of Virgin Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Knight v. Knight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Knox v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Knox v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Knutson v. Wisconsin Air National Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Koch; DeLeonardis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Koch v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Kochan; Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Koenig; Maurer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Koerner v. International Coffee Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Kofkoff Egg Farm Ltd. Partnership; Rytman v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1046,1215 Kokaras v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Kokosing Construction Co.; Plumbers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxv Page Kolb; Al Ghashiyah (Kahn) v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Kolb; Casteel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Kolb; Kahn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Kole, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 Konstenius v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Koon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Kopelson; Fogel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Koprowski, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 Koroma v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Kosth v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958 Kostrubala v. Conners' Estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Kowalski v. Baldwin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Kowalski v. Commission on Judicial Fitness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Kowalski v. Oregon State Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Kraft v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Krail v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Krasner, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Krause v. Whitley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Krc v. U. S. Information Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Kregos v. Associated Press . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Kreisner v. San Diego . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Kren v. Springfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011,1101 Kriegel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Kriendler & Relkin; Sassower v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Krindle, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974,1161 Kristoff, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021,1161 Krohn, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 Krone v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Krueger v. Fuhr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Krug v. Valley Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Kruse, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911,1039 Kruse v. Iowa Dept. of Human Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962,1075 Krynicki v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Krzcuik v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Kuhbander v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Kuhl v. Lincoln National Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc. . . . . . . 1045 Kuhlmann; Loucks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Kuhn v. Island Creek Coal Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Kukes v. Duncan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Kumes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Kummer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Kuniara v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Kunimoto; Martinez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Kunkle v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR cxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Kuono, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Kurahara & Morrissey v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . 944 Kuri v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Kurth; Alaska Housing Finance Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Kurth Ranch; Department of Revenue of Mont. v. . . . . . . . . . . 962,1009 Kurylczyk v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Kurz v. Mairone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Kurz; Philadelphia Electric Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Laan v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Laborers; Reed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Laborers Pension Trust Fund for Northern Cal. v. Levingston . . 960 Labor Union. See name of trade. Labosco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Laboy v. O'Malley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Lacey v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas; Young v. . . . . . . . . 951 Ladue v. Gilleo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809,1037 Ladwig v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Lafferty v. Rey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Laffey v. Independent School Dist. #625 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054,1185 LaFleur v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 LaForest; Boswell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 L. A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Lager v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Lago v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Laity v. Department of Veterans Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Lake Forest Developments v. First Gibraltar Bank, FSB . . . . . . . 945 Lakeside Univ. Hospital; Corethers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077,1216 Lalor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 LaMaina; Brannon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,1005 LaMarca; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Lamar County Bd. of Ed. and Trustees v. Dupree . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068 Lamb v. O'Dea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Lambert v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Lambert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Lambright v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Lamson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Landau; Burghart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Landers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Landgraf v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Landrigan v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Landro v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Lane v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Lane v. Ramey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856,1005 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxvii Page Lang; Goins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Langenfelder & Son, Inc. v. Dana Marine Service, Inc. . . . . . . . . 815 Langford v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Langford v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Langham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Langsdon; Millsaps v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Langston v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Lann v. Westerfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Laos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 LaPage v. Di Costanzo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Lapsley v. Unemployment Ins. Review Bd. of Ind. Dept. of Em- ployment & Training Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Lara; Kirkendall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Lara v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Lara-Acosta v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Largo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 La Rosa; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 LaRouche; Federal Election Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 LaRouche v. Kezer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Larsen, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Larsen v. Maass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Larson v. Board of Fire and Police Comm'rs of Calumet City . . . 1072 Larson v. Dorsey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 LaShawn A.; Kelly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Laster v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Latimore v. Gilbert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Latimore v. Widseth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Lattany v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Laury; Morris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Lavespere v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Laviguer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Lawal v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847,1020 Lawal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Lawline v. American Bar Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Lawmaster v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Lawrence, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Lawrence v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Lawrence v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038,1178 Laws v. Terry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Lawson v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Lawson v. Dixon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Lawson; Patino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Lawson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Lawton; Camoscio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR cxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Layton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Lazenby v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Lazirko v. Brickman-Abegglen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Le; Ibarra v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Attorney General of Tex. 1071 Lear Siegler, Inc.; Katz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Leathers, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Leavell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 LeBeau v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 LeBouef v. Whitley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Lechuga v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 LeCureux; Bishop v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 LeCureux; Echlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 LeCureux; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 LeCureux; Watson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Ledbetter v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Ledger Publishing Corp.; Curry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836,972 Ledwith v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Lee v. Armontrout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875,973 Lee v. Caldwell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Lee; Chica v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Lee v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Lee; Lunsford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Lee v. Murray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Lee v. Rodriguez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Lee v. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Lee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890,1018,1086,1166 Leeks v. Cunningham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Lee S. S.; BP North America Petroleum, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Leevac Corp.; Global Divers & Contractors, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 814 LeFleur; Cannon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Legacy, Ltd. v. Channel Home Centers, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Legalization Assistance Project of Los Angeles County Federation of Labor; INS v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007,1301 Lehigh Valley Hospital Center, Inc. v. Boyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Lehman; Johnston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Lehman; Lumer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc.; Adolph v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Leiker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Lelsz; Meyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906,1004,1101 Lensing; Dowell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Leonard; Ahmad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866,1005 Leonard; Arnold v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866,1005 Leonardo; Cunningham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxix Page Leonardo; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Leonardo; Jenkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Leonardo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 LePrince v. Board of Trustees, Teachers' Pension and Annuity Fd. 1119 Lerch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Lerdahl v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 LeRoy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Lesher v. Geauga Dept. of Human Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Leslie v. School Bd. of Broward County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Lessin; Ohio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Lester v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Lester v. Zurn Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Lettieri v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Letts; Selch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Letts; Traylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Levald, Inc. v. Palm Desert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Levesque v. Levesque . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Levin v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Levine v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Levingston; Laborers Pension Trust Fund for Northern Cal. v. . . 960 Levinson; Meier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070,1166 Levy v. University of Cincinnati . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Lewis, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Lewis; Ashelman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Lewis; Barnwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Lewis v. Correll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Lewis v. King . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Lewis v. Morris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980,1067 Lewis v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041,1185 Lewis; St. Hilaire v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Lewis; Simpson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Lewis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878,918,1198 Lewis v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Lewis v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Lexington; Shabazz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Lexington; Vincent v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Libbey-Owens-Ford Co.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut. of Ohio v. 819 Libed v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Libertarian Party of Me. v. Diamond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Liberty Mortgage Co. v. Frey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Libutti v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Liebman v. Liebman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,1159 Lieu Thi Tran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Life Ins. Co. of North America; Wolff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR cxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Lifschultz Fast Freight v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Del. 993 Liggett v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Liggins v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Liggins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Lightbourne v. Chiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967,1066 Lightfoot; Lucas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Lightfoot v. Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Lightle v. Farmers State Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Lilly, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036,1104 Lilly v. Gilmore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Lilly v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Lilly & Co.; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Lima Memorial Hospital v. Manion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Limpach v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Limpy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Lin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Linahan; Austin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Linahan; Kellam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Linberg v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Lincoln v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Lincoln County; Stratemeyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Lincoln National Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc.; Kuhl v. . . . . . . 1045 Lindemann v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957 Lindler; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Lindquist v. Goldschneider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Lindquist; Say & Say v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Lindsay v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Lindsey; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Lindsey v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Lindsey, Stephenson & Lindsey v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . 1111 Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Linter Group Ltd.; Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Lips v. Commandant, U. S. Disciplinary Barracks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Lipscomb v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Liquori v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Liteky v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 540 Little; Kennedy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Little v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Livadas v. Aubry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806,1083 Livingstone; Donahey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Livonia; James v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915,1006 Lizarraga v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Lo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Lobar, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974,1161 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxi Page Local. For labor union, see name of trade. Loce v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Lockard v. Department of Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Lockett v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040,1173 Lockhart; Becker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Lockhart; Bilal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Lockhart; Logan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Lockhart; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Lockhart v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Lockhart v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Lockhart; Vaseur v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Lockheed Corp.; Pickens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.; Phelps v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Lockridge v. Kambouris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Lockwood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Loewenstein; Nebraska Dept. of Revenue v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Logan v. Lockhart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Logan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Logli; Crane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Lohman; Associated Industries of Mo. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Lohr, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Lohr v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958 Lohrey Enterprises, Inc.; Stanton Road Associates v. . . . . . . 1023,1031 Lombardi v. Hall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Lomprey v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Londoff, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Long v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862,932 Long v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Long v. Fauver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Long v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Long v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Long Beach; Binkley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Long Island R. Co. v. Bates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Longoria v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Longstaff v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Loomis v. Wallis & Short, P. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918,1006 Lopez v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Lopez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872,968,1126 Lopez-Alvarez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Lopez-Mesa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Lorain County Court of Common Pleas v. Malinovsky . . . . . . . . . 1194 Lord v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Lord; Loyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Lord; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR cxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Lorenzo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881,1006 Lorraine v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Lorson; Jenkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Losacco v. F. D. Rich Construction Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Los Angeles; Gerritsen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Los Angeles; Lunder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Los Angeles County; Farley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Los Angeles County; Mahon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Los Angeles County; Sweet v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Los Angeles County Superior Court; Rudder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Los Angeles County Superior Court; Say & Say v. . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Los Angeles Land Co. v. Brunswick Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Los Angeles Unified School Dist.; Brazile v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Los Angeles Unified School Dist. of Los Angeles Cty.; Goldflam v. 932 Lott v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Lottier v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Loucks v. Kuhlmann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Loucks v. Phillips Petroleum Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876,1006 Louisiana v. Abadie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Louisiana; B. C. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Louisiana; DeSalvo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Louisiana; Gachot v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Louisiana; LeBeau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Louisiana v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803,941,1036,1174 Louisiana; Spellman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Baker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Louisiana-Pacific Corp.; Dunkin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Bourgeois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Louisiana State Univ.; Omoike v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Louisiana State Univ. Bd. of Supervisors; McGregor v. . . . . . . . . 1131 Love v. Brigano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Love; DeBlois v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Love v. Harsh Investment Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Love; Maldonado v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Love; Sullivan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Lovelace; Sanchez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Loveman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Lovett v. Ellingsworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Lovett v. General Motors Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Lovett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903,1002 Lowe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Lower Merion Township; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Lowery v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Lowrance v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxiii Page Lowrey; Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Loya-Gutierrez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Loyd v. Criminal District Court #1 of Dallas County . . . . . . . . . . 841 Loyd v. Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Loyd v. Lord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 LSP Investment Partnership; Bennett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Lucas v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Lucas v. Lightfoot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Lucas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937,1087 Lucero; California v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Lucero v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Lucho v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Lucious v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Luevano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Luff v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Lugo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Lujan v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Lumer v. Lehman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Lumley v. Hogsett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Lumpkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Lunder v. Los Angeles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Lundquist; Security Pacific Automotive Financial Services Corp. v. 959 Lungren; Kimble v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Lunsford v. Lee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Luparelli v. Sohn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Luster; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Lykes Bros. S. S. Co.; North Fla. Shipyards, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Lyle v. Richardson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Lyles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Lyn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Lynaugh; Holmes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Lynch v. Blodgett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Lynch v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Lynch; Shearon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Lynn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Lyons; Gordon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 M. v. Northeast Independent School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972,1066 M. v. V. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Maass; Alexander v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Maass; Dang Minh Tran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Maass; Emra v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Maass; Larsen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Maberry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 MacDonald; Fletcher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR cxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Mack v. Department of Veterans Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Mack v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853,874 Mackey; Fitzpatrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 MacLeod v. Murray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 MacLeod v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 MacLeod v. Virginia Beach Correctional Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 M/A Com, Inc.; Herring v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Madden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Maddox v. Keane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Madera Irrigation Dist. v. Hancock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Madison v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929,1086 Madison Library, Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084,1189 Magnolia Bar Assn., Inc. v. Hawkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Magnuson v. Minneapolis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Maher Terminals, Inc.; Director, OWCP v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068,1189 Mahon v. Los Angeles County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Mahon; Pearson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Mahoney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Maine; Lightfoot v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Maine; Spiller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Maine; Uffelman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Maine Superintendent of Ins.; St. Hilaire v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Maintenance of Way Employes v. National R. Passenger Corp. 824 Mairone; Kurz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 MAI Systems Corp.; Peak Computer, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Majeno v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Makel; Oglesby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Malautea; Suzuki Motor Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Maldonado v. Love . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Maldonado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850,1100,1138 Malecek; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Malik v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 Malinovsky; Lorain County Court of Common Pleas v. . . . . . . . . 1194 Mallard & Minor; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Mallon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,973 Maloney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915,1006,1160 Mandel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 Manfred, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975,1066 Manger, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 Mangrum v. Morrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Manildra Milling Corp. v. OMI Holdings, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Manildra Milling Corp.; OMI Holdings, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Manilla; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxv Page Manion; Lima Memorial Hospital v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Manker v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Mann; Black v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Mann; Wanton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Mannesmann Demag Corp.; Bialen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924,1020 Manning v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919,956 Manrique v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Mans v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Mantilla v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002,1082 Manuelian; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Manufacturera del Atlantico Ltda. v. Mfrs. Hanover Tr. Co. . . . . . 1192 Manufacturera del Atlantico Ltda. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp. v. Lowrey . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.; Industrias Marathon Ltda. v. 1191 Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.; Manufacturera del Atlantico v. 1192 Manwani, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 MAPCO Petroleum, Inc. v. Memphis Barge Line, Inc. . . . . . . . . . 815 Mapp; Outlaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Marans; Browning v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 March v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Marciano v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Marcus; Consolidated Chemical Works v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Marilao v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Marin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Marina Ventures Internationale, Ltd. v. Polythane Systems, Inc. 1116 Marino v. Writers' Guild of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978,1066 Marisio-Gonzalez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Hae Woo Youn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Markley; Keith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Markowski; Channer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Marlborough; Veale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Marlowe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Marren v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Marrero v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Marriott Family Restaurants; Construction Interior Systems v. . 869 Marriott Hotel of Albuquerque; Vernon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Marsh v. Allstate Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Marsh; Michigan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Marsh v. Penrod Drilling Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Marshall; Browder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Marshall v. Nelson Electric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Marshall; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Marshall v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Marshall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957,1090 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR cxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin; Collier v. . . . 977,1196 Martin v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Martin v. Bunnell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Martin; Illinois Central R. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Martin v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855,1065 Martin v. McKune . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Martin v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Martin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979,998,1086,1138 Martinez; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Martinez v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Martinez v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Martinez; DeFazio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Martinez v. Kunimoto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Martinez v. Poole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,876,886,972,1062,1100,1193 Martinez-Cortez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Martinez-Hidalgo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Martinez-Mancilla v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Martinez-Rodriguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Marvich v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Marvin v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Marx v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018,1173 Maryland; Collins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Maryland; Dean v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Maryland; Gilliam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Maryland; Hunt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Maryland; Klingenstein v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Maryland; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855,1065 Maryland; McGinnis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Maryland; Rucker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Maryland; Simmons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Maryland; Ward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Maryland Dept. of Economic and Employment Development; Neal v. 923 Maryland Dept. of Economic and Employment Development Bd. of Appeals; Phillips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Maryland Home Improvement Comm'n; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Mason v. Bayer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Mason v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Mason v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Masoner v. Thurman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028,1159 Massachusetts; Jewish Memorial Hospital v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Massachusetts; McClary v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Massachusetts; Municipal Light Co. of Ashburnham v. . . . . . . . . . 866 Massachusetts; Woods v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxvii Page Massachusetts Dept. of Public Welfare v. United States . . . . . . . . 822 Massachusetts General Hospital; Bent v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Mastagni, Holstedt, Chiurazzi & Curtis; Debbs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Maston v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Mata v. South San Antonio Independent School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Mathes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Mathews v. Dugan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Mathews v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.; Go-Video, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . 826 Matthews, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Matthews; DeBardeleben v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Matthews; Pennsylvania v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Matthews v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Matthews v. Waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Mattison v. Quarles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Mauldin; Steffen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Maurer v. Koenig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Maxey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Maxie v. Superior Court of Los Angeles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Maxwell v. First National Bank of Md. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Maxwell; Grafft v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Maxwell v. Monsanto Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Maxwell v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Maxwell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 May v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Mayabb v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Mayberry v. Hudson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Mayberry v. Keisler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Mayer v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Mayer v. Secretary of HHS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Mayfield v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Mayles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Mayo; Religious Technology Center v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Mayor and City Council of Baltimore; Teachers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Mayor and Council of Baltimore; Baltimore Lodge No. 3, FOP v. 1141 Mayor and Council of Jackson; Mobile Home Village, Inc. v. . . . . . 866 Mayor and Council of Jackson; South Wind Village v. . . . . . . . . . 866 Mayor of District of Columbia v. LaShawn A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Mays v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Maze; Caton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Mazurkiewicz; Bonace v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Mazurkiewicz; Jeffers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Mazurkiewicz; McAleese v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 McAdory v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR cxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page McAleese v. Mazurkiewicz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 McAngues; Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 McAninch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 McAn Shoe Co.; L. A. Gear, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 McAnulty; Cardine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097,1216 McCall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140,1169 McCary v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 McCaughtry; Bergmann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028,1160 McCaughtry; Casteel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 McCaughtry; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 McClanahan Contractors, Inc.; Cupit v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 McClary v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 McClellan; Colon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 McClenic v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 McClintock v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 McConnell v. Armontrout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 McConnell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 McCoo v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928,1007 McCormick v. Dallas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 McCorvey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 McCoy; Jacobi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 McCoy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 McCray v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 McCrimmon v. Sumner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 McCullough v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 McCullough v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 McCummings; New York City Transit Authority v. . . . . . . . . . . . 991 McDaniel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 McDaughtery v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 McDonald v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,936 McDonald v. Esparza . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 McDonald v. Hatch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 McDonald v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994,1017,1086 McDonald v. Woods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953,1016 McDonnell v. Omaha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 McDonnell Douglas Corp.; California State Bd. of Equalization v. 814 McDonnell Douglas Corp.; Glover v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co.; Landgraf v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 McDougal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 McEaddy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 McElwee v. Ratelle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 McFall v. Wilkinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856,1005 McFarland v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938,989,1175 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxix Page McFarland v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 McFarland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 McFarley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 McGee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048,1173 McGhee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 McGill; Reihley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 McGinley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 McGinnis v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 McGinnis; Russell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 McGinnis v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 McGinnis; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 McGough v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 McGowan v. Cross . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909,985 McGowan v. Sowders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 McGowen v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 McGrath, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 McGraw; Society Bank & Trust v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 McGregor v. Louisiana State Univ. Bd. of Supervisors . . . . . . . . . 1131 McGregor; Yeager v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 McIntosh v. Pacific Holding Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 McIntyre; Caspari v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 McIntyre v. San Francisco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 McIntyre v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T Co. . . . . . . . . . . 989,1084,1107 MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Credit Builders of America 978 MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Danella Construction Corp. . . . 863 McIver v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 McKaskle; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 McKee v. Nix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 McKee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077,1088 McKethan v. Texas Farm Bureau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 McKinney v. Dick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 McKinney; Olivarez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 McKinney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 McKinnon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832,843 McKune; Gettings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 McKune; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 McKune; Perry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 McLaren v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 McLaughlin v. Rhode Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 McLaughlin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 McLendon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 McLeod v. Central Soya Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR cxxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page McLeod v. Myers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 McManus v. Housing Authority of Englewood . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009,1119 McManus v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 McMillan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 McMullen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 McNamara; Ventech Equipment, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 McNeil v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121,1135 McNichols v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 MCorp; Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 McPherson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 McQueen v. Pollard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840,973 McQueen v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 McQueen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 McSpadden; O'Dell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 McWherter; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 McWhorter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Meachum; Rochette v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Mead Data Central Inc.; Sassower v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Meade, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Means v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Mearis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Medical Center of Del. Inc.; Richards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951,1066 Medical College of Hampton Roads; Wolsky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Medina v. Anthem Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Medina v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054,1215 Medina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958,1109 Medina-Batista v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . 1166 Medina-Elenes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Medina-Ortiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,1060 Medley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Medlin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933,1089 Medrano v. Excel Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Medvecky v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Medved v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Medvik v. University City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Meek v. Gem Boat Service, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Meeks v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Meeks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Meier; Jatoi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Meier v. Levinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070,1166 Meier; Southern Timber Purchases Council v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Meier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Meinhold; Department of Defense v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Mejia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxxi Page Mejia-Alarcon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Melendez v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Melendez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Mellon Bank, N. A.; Upp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Melluzzo v. Babbitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Melton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Melvin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Memphis Barge Line, Inc.; MAPCO Petroleum, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . 815 Memphis Police Dept. v. Garner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Mendez v. Zingers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016,1082 Mendez-Villarreal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Mendia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Mendoza-Burciaga v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Mengel; Graham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Mentzer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Mercantile Employees' Beneficiary Assn. Trust v. Bank One, Tex. 990 Merchant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Mercy Convalescent v. Missouri Dept. of Social Services, Div. of Medical Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Mergerson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Merida v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034 Merit, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039,1173 Merit Systems Protection Bd.; Balderas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Merit Systems Protection Bd.; Booker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Merkl v. Hardy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Merrell v. Simpson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; DeLuca v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.; First Interstate Bank of Cal. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.; Gargallo v. . . . . . . . 1058 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.; Kelly v. . . . . . . . . . 1011 Merritt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Mershon v. Beasley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Mertens v. Wilkinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Mesa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Messa-Perez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Metcalf v. FELEC Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931,1065 Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority; Johnson v. . . . 1016,1159 Mettler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Metzmaker; Oswald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Meunier v. Minnesota Dept. of Revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Meyer; Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471 Meyer v. Lelsz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906,1004,1101 Meyer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931,1028 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR cxxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page MGW, Inc.; Pacific Lighting Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Mhoon v. Hargett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Miami Herald Publishing Co.; Grady v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Micelli, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center; Porter v. . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Michaels v. Prodigy Child Development Centers, Inc. . . . . . . . . . 1178 Michalek, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Michigan; Burton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Michigan; Cosgriff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Michigan; Franklin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Michigan; Hana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Michigan; Hawkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Michigan; Helzer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Michigan; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Michigan; Kurylczyk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Michigan; Langford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Michigan; Lindsey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Michigan v. Marsh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Michigan; Northington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Michigan; Strumpf v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Michigan; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Michigan; Turnpaugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975,1065 Michigan; Winfield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997,1159 Michigan Dept. of Corrections; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Michigan Municipal Cooperative Group v. FERC . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Michigan State Bd. of Law Examiners; Scarfone v. . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Mick v. Resolution Trust Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865,1005 Mickens v. Duckworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Micks, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Micro-Time Management Systems, Inc. v. Allard & Fish, P. C. . . 906 Mid-America Dairymen, Inc.; Sanford Redmond, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . 917 Mid America Title Co.; Kirk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Middlebrooks; Tennessee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124,805,1008,1064 Middleton v. Murphy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Mid-West National Life Ins. Co. of Tenn.; Randol v. . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Midwest Pride V, Inc. v. Ward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Mikhail v. California Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd. . . . . . . 1092 Milena Ship Management Co. v. Newcomb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Miles; Quiller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Miles, Inc. v. Sondergard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Miles Laboratories, Inc.; Shandon Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Milford v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U. S. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc.; Department of Taxation and Finance of N. Y. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943,1107,1162,1175 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxxiii Page Millard v. Cruzot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Millard Processing Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd. 1092 Miller, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807,1023,1108 Miller; American Dredging Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443 Miller v. American President Lines, Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Miller; Douglas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Miller v. La Rosa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Miller; Say & Say v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Miller v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Miller; Theirault v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Miller v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . 894,954,1045,1050,1159,1183,1207 Miller-El v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831,1004 Mills v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904,953 Millsaps v. Langsdon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Miloslavsky v. AES Engineering Society, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Milwaukee Brewery Workers' Pension Plan v. Schlitz Brewing Co. 1070 Mims v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Mineer v. Fleming County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Mines v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Mine Workers v. Bagwell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Mingo v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Mingo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Minh Tran v. Maass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Minneapolis; Magnuson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Minneapolis; Yoshiko's Sauna v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Minnesota; Christie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Minnesota; Franzen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Minnesota; Landro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue; Brainerd Area Civic Center v. . . 964 Minnesota Dept. of Revenue; Meunier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Minnesota State Bd. of Bar Examiners; Stevens v. . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Miranda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Miranda-Roman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Mira Slovak Aerobatics, Inc. v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization . . . 866 Mission Oaks Mobile Home Park v. Hollister . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Mississippi; Barnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Mississippi; De la Beckwith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Mississippi; Lockett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040,1173 Mississippi; Louisiana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803,941,1036,1174 Mississippi; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063,1216 Mississippi State Penitentiary; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Mississippi Utility, Inc.; Guidry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Missouri; Bullard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Missouri; Carrothers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR cxxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Missouri v. Erwin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Missouri; Grim v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Missouri; Hunter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Missouri; Peters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Missouri; Pullen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Missouri; Shaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895,1006 Missouri; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Missouri Dept. of Social Services, Div. of Medical Services; Mercy Convalescent v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Missouri Dept. of Social Services, Div. of Medical Services; St. Louis South Park, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Mitchell v. Albuquerque Bd. of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Mitchell v. Albuquerque Public Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Mitchell v. Bishop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Mitchell v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861,1005 Mitchell v. Heckemeyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Mitchell; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Mitchell v. Kemna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Mitchell; Rowenhorst v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Mitchell; Steffen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Mitchell v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Mitchell; Texas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Mitchell v. Totten . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Mitchell; Trinsey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Mitchell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849,999,1138 Mitchell; Whitfield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Mitchem v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Mixon v. Franklin County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Moats v. Reid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970,1082 Mobay Chemical Corp.; Grooms v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Mobay Corp.; Parkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Mobile Home Village, Inc. v. Mayor and Council of Jackson . . . . . 866 Mobile Oil Corp.; Morrison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Mobil Oil Corp.; Raymond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Mobley v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Mockmore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Moham v. Steego Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Mohawk Valley Medical Associates, Inc.; Capital Imaging Associ- ates, P. C. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Mohs v. Century 21 Real Estate Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Mojica v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Moland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Molina de Hernandez v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993,1082 Momeni v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:05 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxxv Page Money; Seymour v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Monga v. Glover Landing Condominium Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Monin v. Monin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Monroe, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988,1082 Monroe v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Monroe v. Kent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Monroe Community Hospital; Saulpaugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Monroe County v. New Port Largo, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Monsanto Co.; Maxwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Montague v. Camp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Montalvo v. U. S. Parole Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Monteleone v. Municipal Court of Cal., Northern Solano County Jud. Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Montgomery v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,982,1166 Montgomery Cty. Assn. of Realtors; Realty Photo Master Corp. v. 964 Montgomery Cty. Emergency Services; Ms. B v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Montgomery Cty. Government; Conboy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Moody v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Mooney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Moore v. Department of Treasury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Moore v. Dupree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068 Moore v. Electrical Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Moore v. Eli Lilly & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Moore v. Espy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Moore v. Ham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830,972 Moore v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Moore v. Kamm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Moore v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063,1216 Moore; Prewitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Moore v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Moore v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Moore; Tyler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,985 Moore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948,1029,1079,1088 Moorhead v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Moradian v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Morales v. Barge-Wagener Construction Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Morales; Cato v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859,1005 Morales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Morales; Word of Faith World Outreach Center Church, Inc. v. . . 823 Moran v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Mordi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 More v. Farrier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Morehouse School of Medicine, Inc.; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Morejon-Gomez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR cxxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Moreland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Moreno v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Moreno v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849,971 Moreno Gomez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Morgal v. Pinal County Bd. of Supervisors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Morgan; Grace v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Morgan; Helton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Morgan; Searle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Morgan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845,1089 Morgan County; Hooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . 1039,1189 Morissette v. Peters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Morley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Moro; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Morrell & Co. v. Food & Commercial Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Morris, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Morris v. Christian Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Morris v. Laury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Morris; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980,1067 Morris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,1029,1170 Morrison v. Associates in Internal Medicine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Morrison; Ball v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Morrison; Mangrum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Morrison v. Mobil Oil Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Morrison v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881,1086 Morristown Memorial Hospital; United Wire, Metal & Machine Health & Welfare Fund v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944,1031 Morrow, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809,1108 Morton v. Burton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Morton; Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Morton; Cumber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Moses; Ben-Avraham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Moses v. O'Dea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054,1173 Moses v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Mosier v. Reynolds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Moskowitz v. Sabol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Mosley v. Clark County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Mosley v. Pung . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Moss; Dixie Machine, Welding & Metal Works v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Motel Management Co.; Southards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Mother African Union First Colored Meth. Prot. Church; Confer- ence of African Union First Colored Meth. Prot. Church v. . . . 1025 Mother Doe; Baby Boy Doe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032,1033,1168 Mothershed v. Gregg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868,959 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxxvii Page Mouawad v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Moulton v. Cory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Mount v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873,957,972 Mount v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Mt. Adams Furniture; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Moutray; Butts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Moyer Packing Co. v. Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. . . . . . . . 994 M. R. v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Ms. B v. Montgomery County Emergency Services . . . . . . . . . . . 860 MTV, Inc.; Eline v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Mugford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Muhammad v. Muhammad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Muhammed, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Mullen; Ramoundos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Mullendore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Mullet v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Mullican; Mylett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Mullins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807,994 Mu'Min v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Muncy Borough Council; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Munda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Munez v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Municipal Court of Cal., Northern Solano County Jud. Dist.; Monteleone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Municipal Light Co. of Ashburnham v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . 866 Muniz v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Muniz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Munoz; Esparza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054,1216 Munoz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Murphy; Dotson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Murphy v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Murphy; Middleton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Murphy v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Murphy; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Murphy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890,971,1047,1087 Murphy v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Murr v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Murray; Clay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Murray v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Murray; Crisp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Murray; Giles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Murray; Kelly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Murray; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Murray; MacLeod v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR cxxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Murray; Simpson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Murray; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077,1216 Murray; Spencer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Murray v. Stempson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850,1135 Murray; Townes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881,1199 Murray; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Murray v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Murray; Watkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Murray v. Wyoming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Murray County v. Vineyard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Murtha v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Murtishaw; Vasquez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Musslyn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Muth; Bryant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Mutual of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Dahl-Eimers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Muzingo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Myers, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Myers; Franco v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Myers; McLeod v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Myers v. Rowland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Myers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Mylan Laboratories, Inc.; American Home Products Corp. v. . . . . 1197 Mylar v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Mylett v. Mullican . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Myre v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Myricks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Nadeau v. Budlong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Nadi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Nagle v. Alspach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Nagle; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849,1005 Nagle; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Nagy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Nahant v. O'Connor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Nalley Motor Trucks; Bonapfel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Napier v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Nash v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Nason v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Natey, Inc. v. Food & Commercial Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 National Assn. of Radiation Survivors v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 National Business Factors, Inc. v. Rollins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 National Car Rental System, Inc. v. Computer Associates Int'l 861 National City; Chuck's Bookstore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 National City; Wiener v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxxix Page National Educational Support Systems, Inc. v. Autoskill, Inc. . . . 916 National Hockey League; Dailey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 National Home Ins. Co.; Shangri-La Development Co. v. . . . . . . . 1032 National Kitchen Products; Columbiana Plastics v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 National Kitchen Products; Silver Cloud, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 NLRB; ABF Freight System, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317 NLRB; Alto-Shaam, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 NLRB; ARA Automotive Group, Div. of Reeves Bros., Inc. v. . . . 862 NLRB; Consolidated Coal Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 NLRB; Digitron Packaging, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 NLRB; Gilmore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America . . . . . . 810,1037 NLRB; Millard Processing Services, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 NLRB; NTA Graphics, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 NLRB; Pro-Tech Security Network v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler . . . . . 249,1036,1215 National R. Passenger Corp.; Maintenance of Way Employes v. . . 824 National R. Passenger Corp.; Polewsky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 National R. Passenger Corp.; Rasch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 National Rx Services, Inc.; Hazra v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 National Union Fire Ins. Co.; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Helfand . . . . . . . . . 824 NationsBank; Hester v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America; Fox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Naugle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Navarro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Navarro Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 NAVCO; Central States, S. E. & S. W. Areas Pension Fund v. . . 1115 NCR Corp.; Valutron, N. V. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Neal v. Maryland Dept. of Economic and Employment Dev. . . . . . 923 Neal; Plummer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Nealy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Nebraska; Abdullah v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829,1004 Nebraska; Betke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Nebraska; Christianson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Nebraska; Jacob v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Nebraska; Van Ackeren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Nebraska; Victor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008,1022 Nebraska v. Wyoming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,1189 Nebraska Dept. of Revenue v. Loewenstein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Neder, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Needler v. Olson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Neku v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Nelson v. Carlson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR cxl TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Nelson v. Neubert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Nelson; Shell Oil Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Nelson v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830,1215 Nelson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914,1061,1088,1098 Nelson v. Walker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Nelson Electric; Marshall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Nelson, Inc. v. Harper House, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Nero v. Donley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Nero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Neubert; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Nevada; Haberstroh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Nevada; Hickey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Nevada; Howard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Nevada; Parker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Nevada; Powell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811,1037 Nevada; Snow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Nevada Dept. of Motor Vehicles and Public Safety; Beavers v. . . 946 Nevener v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Nevers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Neville; Antonelli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Newberry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Newblatt; Kalakay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Newby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Newcomb; Milena Ship Management Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Newell v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 New Hampshire; Cote v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 New Hampshire; Smart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 New Hampshire Ins. Co.; Ezzell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 New Jersey; Escoffrey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 New Jersey; Graham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 New Jersey; Henry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 New Jersey; Krail v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 New Jersey; Loce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 New Jersey v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 New Jersey Carpenters Welfare Fund v. Dunston . . . . . . . . . . 944,1031 Newland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Newman; Shieh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Newman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812,1063 New Mexico; Lucero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 New Mexico; Oklahoma v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126,930,1106 New Mexico; Texas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,987,1106 New Mexico Dept. of Human Resources; Roman Nose v. . . . . . . . 1161 Newport Inn Joint Venture; Gregor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 New Port Largo, Inc.; Monroe County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxli Page Newsome v. Floyd West & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Newsome v. Peters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Newsome; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Newsome v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901,927,1062 Newtop, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,988,1067,1085,1162 Newtop v. San Francisco County Superior Court . . . . . . 837,838,972,973 New York; Delaware v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,1022,1106 New York; DeRosa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924,1007 New York; Dukes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 New York; Easton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 New York; Garced v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 New York; Ghazibayat v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028,1160 New York; Grant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 New York; Griffin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 New York; Holmes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 New York; James v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 New York; Munez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 New York; New Jersey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805 New York; Pruitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 New York; Purifoy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 New York v. Reich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 New York; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 New York; Shelton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 New York; Trellez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 New York; Woroncow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 New York City; DiMicco v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 New York City; Grant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 New York City v. Hertz Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 New York City; Hertz Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 New York City v. Kam Shing Chan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 New York City; Paganucci v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 New York City Transit Authority v. McCummings . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 New York Life Ins. Co.; Geiger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 New York Life Securities, Inc.; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095,1160 New York Stock Exchange, Inc.; Greene v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866,985 Ngumoha v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Nhan Kiem Tran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Niagara Machine & Tool Works, Inc.; Lavespere v. . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Nicholas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958 Nichols v. Tubb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Nichols v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,942,966,1022,1090,1189 Nick v. Department of Motor Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Nickens v. Cabana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Nickerson v. Pearson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR cxlii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Nickerson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Nicol v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Nicolau v. Yonkers Police Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Niemela v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Nigeria; Antares Aircraft, L. P. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Nimitpattana v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Nissan Motor Corp. in U. S. A.; Milford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Nix; McKee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Nix v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957,1002 Nkop, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809,1005 Noack v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Noble v. Wilkinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Nobles v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Nodland; Richmond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Noel v. Delo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Noel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Noell v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Nolan v. University of S. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Noor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Noramtrust U. S. A. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Nordell International Resources, Ltd. v. Triton Indonesia, Inc. . . 1119 Norman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850,1088,1131 Norris; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Norris; Finazzo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806,1083,1189 Norris; Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806,1083,1189 Norris; Pickens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 North v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970,1066 North American Fund Mgmt. Corp. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. 959 North Carolina v. Ballard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 North Carolina; Barnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 North Carolina v. Bates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 North Carolina; Jennings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 North Carolina; Lott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 North Carolina; May v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 North Carolina; Nobles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 North Carolina; Syriani v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948,1066 North Carolina Assn. of Electronic Tax Filers, Inc. v. Graham . . 946 North Carolina Dept. of Transp., Div. of Motor Vehicles; Green v. 991 North Dakota; Quill Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Northeast Independent School Dist.; Susan R. M. v. . . . . . . . . . 972,1066 Northern Ins. Co. of N. Y.; Harmon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Northern Ky. Welfare Rights Assn. v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 North Fla. Shipyards, Inc. v. Lykes Bros. S. S. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Northglenn; Grynberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxliii Page Northington v. Hoffman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Northington v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Northrup v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 North Star Steel Co. v. Steelworkers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Kent County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Northwest Airlines, Inc.; West v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Norton v. University of Mich. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077,1216 Nottingham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Nowlin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 NRA Political Victory Fund; Federal Election Comm'n v. . . . 1085,1190 NTA Graphics, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n; Reytblatt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Nunez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Nunez-Orozco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Nunley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Nunn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Nururdin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 Nuttle v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Nwabueze v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . 1052,1160 Nwaebo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Nwafor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 NWA, Inc.; International Travel Arrangers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Nwankwo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Nwanze v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Nwizzu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Nwolise v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Nyberg v. Snover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 NYSA­ILA Pension Trust Fund v. Garuda Indonesia . . . . . . . . . 1116 NYSA­ILA Welfare Fund v. Dunston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Oaks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Oatess v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Ober; Kelly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Oberg; Honda Motor Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068,1162 Oberle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 O'Brien v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875,1181 Occidental Petroleum Corp.; Employers Ins. of Wausau v. . . . . . . 813 Ocean County Bd. of Social Services; Gonzalez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Ocean Marine Mut. Protection & Indemnity Assn., Ltd. v. Wilson 1165 O'Connor, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 O'Connor v. Chicago Transit Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807,974 O'Connor; Nahant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Octagon Gas Systems, Inc.; Rimmer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 O'Dea; Lamb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR cxliv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page O'Dea; Moses v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054,1173 O'Dell v. McSpadden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 O'Dell v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 O'Diah v. Applied Risk Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 O'Diah v. California Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd. . . . . . . 951 O'Donnell v. American Career Training Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921,1006 Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Pa.; Harris v. 863 Office of Personnel Management; Gregory v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Office of State Engineer; Ramsey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890,1006 Office of Thrift Supervision; Schwarz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Official Committee of Customers of Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Columbia Gas Trans- mission Corp.; Charlottesville and Richmond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Columbia Gas Trans- mission Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Columbia Gas Trans- mission Corp.; Official Committee of Customers of Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Columbia Gas Trans- mission Corp.; Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n v. . . . . . . . 1110 Oglala Sioux Tribe; Swenson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Oglesby v. Makel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Oglesby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Ogunleye v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Ohai v. Community Development Comm'n of Santa Fe Springs . . 1073 O'Halloran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Ohio; Bailey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Ohio; Bradley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Ohio v. Butts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Ohio; Butts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Ohio; Cook v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Ohio v. Denune . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Ohio; Evans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Ohio; Gleason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Ohio; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Ohio; Hawkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Ohio; Horning v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Ohio v. Lessin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Ohio; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041,1185 Ohio; Lorraine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Ohio; Luff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Ohio; Murphy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxlv Page Ohio; Pearce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Ohio; Rettig v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929,1007 Ohio v. Rodriguez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Ohio; Slagle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Ohio; Tillimon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Ohio Edison Co.; Grimes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Ohio Elections Comm'n; McIntyre v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Ohio State Hospitals; Shalala v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Ohio State Univ.; Shalala v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Oiler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Ojeda-Jimenez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Ojo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Ojuade v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Okayfor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Okechukwu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Okegbenro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Oklahoma; Ballard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Oklahoma; Castro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Oklahoma; Childs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Oklahoma; Cooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Oklahoma; Goldsmith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Oklahoma; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Oklahoma v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126,930,1106 Oklahoma; North v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970,1066 Oklahoma; Pickens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Oklahoma; Romano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Oklahoma; Trice v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Oklahoma; West v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949,1066 Oklahoma; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Oklahoma; Woodruff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Oklahoma City; Bowman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n; Ward Petroleum Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Oklahoma Dept. of Transportation; Gibbs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Oklahoma Tax Comm'n; United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee In- dians v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Oklahoma Tax Comm'n; United Keetoowah Band v. . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Okolie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Okolo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Okpala v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Olde Discount Corp.; Hubbard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 O'Leary, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 O'Leary; Kendall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 O'Leary; Palo Alto v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Olin Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR cxlvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Olivarez v. McKinney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Oliver; Albright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266,1215 Oliver v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Olmo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Olness v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Olon v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Olson v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Olson; Needler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Olson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Omaha; McDonnell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 O'Malley; Antonelli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 O'Malley; Laboy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 O'Malley; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076,1173 Omara v. International Service System, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Omasta v. Stokes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 O'Melveny & Myers v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . 989 Omenwu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Manildra Milling Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 OMI Holdings, Inc.; Manildra Milling Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Omoike v. Louisiana State Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 O'Murchu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 O'Neill v. Shiplevy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078,1173 Ono v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Ontiveros v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Onuoha v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Onwuasoanya v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Oot v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Operating Engineers; Geske & Sons, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Operating Engineers v. Shimman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Opurum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Orange County Social Services Agency; Eartha D. v. . . . . . . . . . . 951 Orange County Social Services Agency; Joyce D. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Orantes-Arriaga v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Oregon; Barkley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Oregon; Boots v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Oregon; Hucke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Oregon; McIver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Oregon; Nash v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Oregon; Pratt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Oregon; Salzmann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Oregon Bd. of Parole; Dorsey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Oregon State Bar; Kowalski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Oregon State Bar; Parker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095,1216 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxlvii Page Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dept. of Env. Quality of Ore. . . . . 962 Organizacion JD Ltda. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Orlebeck v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Ornelas-Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Oropallo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Orr v. General Motors Corp., R. P. A., Dayton-Norwood Operation 994 Orr v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Ortega v. Second District Court of Appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Ortega v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893,1089 Ortiz v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Ortiz v. Dieter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Ortiz v. Duncan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Ortiz; Simpson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Ortiz v. Starr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Ortiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Osborne v. Ball . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Osborne v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Osborne v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Osoria v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Osorio-Gonzalez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Oswald v. Metzmaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Otis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Outdoor Media Group v. California Dept. of Transportation . . . . . 932 Outlaw v. Mapp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Outlaw v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Overmyer v. Barr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Overstreet v. Caspari . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Overton; Hessell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Oviatt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Owen v. Chevron, U. S. A., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Owen; Strickland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Owens v. Ashley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853,973 Owens; Fontroy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Owens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918,980 Owens v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Dunn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Kochan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Ozbun v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Ozey v. Ersan Resources, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 P. v. Commissioner of Social Services of New York City . . . . . . . 1041 Pace Investments; Tucker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Pacifica Bay Village Associates, Inc.; Breck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Pacific Dunlop Holdings Inc.; Allen & Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 806,1083,1160 Pacific Holding Co.; McIntosh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR cxlviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Pacific Lighting Corp. v. MGW, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.; Morgan Stanley & Co. v. . . . . . . . . 1039,1189 Packwood v. Senate Select Committee on Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1319 Pacumio; Sereno v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Padgett v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Pagan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,1088 Paganucci v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Page v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Palacio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Palacios v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Palaita v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Palazzola v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Palestine; Texas Fruit Palace, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Palkovich v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Palm Desert; Levald, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Palmer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Palmer's Succession; Reeder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Palmiero; Weston Controls v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Palmore; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Palo Alto v. O'Leary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Palomo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Pandozy; Kikuts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Pano v. Department of Veterans Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Papas v. Zoecon Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Pape v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Paramo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Pardee & Curtin Lumber Co. v. Webster County Comm'n . . . . . . 990 Parish v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Park v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Parker, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Parker v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Parker v. Oregon State Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095,1216 Parker v. Shoptaugh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Parker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839,1086,1202 Parker; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Parkins v. Mobay Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Parks v. Service America Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Parnell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Parole and Probation Comm'n; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053,1173 Parra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Parris v. Cuthbert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Parrish; Texas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Parsons v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Partee v. Godinez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952,1066 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxlix Page Partee v. Peters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877,1006 Pasch v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Paschall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925 Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'rs v. Department of Labor . . . . . 964 Patel v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Patino v. Lawson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Patrick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Patterson v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Patterson; ITT Consumer Financial Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Patterson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018,1059,1089,1120 Patton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894,1090 Patuxent Institution Bd. of Review v. Hancock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Paul v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876,936,1007 Paulino v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968,1018 Pawlak v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Law Examiners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Paxton Co.; Hartbarger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Payless Wholesale Distributor, Inc. v. Alberto Culver (P. R.) Inc. 931 Payne v. Borg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Payne v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Payton v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040,1173 Payton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904 Pazel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Peak v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Peak Computer, Inc. v. MAI Systems Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Pearce v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Pearl; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Pearsall v. Phillips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998,1160 Pearson v. Garvin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Pearson v. Mahon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Pearson; Nickerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Pearson v. Scully . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Peck v. Tegtmeyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Peeples v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016,1082 Peers; Blank v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Peguero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 Pelletier v. Zweifel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Pelts v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 Pemberton v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Penass v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Penn Central Transportation Co.; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Pennington v. Endell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Pennington v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Pennsylvania; Billheimer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Pennsylvania; Cheppa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR cl TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Pennsylvania; Chmiel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Pennsylvania; Ferri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Pennsylvania; Fetzner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Pennsylvania v. Fountain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Pennsylvania; Fowlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Pennsylvania; Fripp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Pennsylvania; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,876,888,951,975 Pennsylvania; Hirsh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Pennsylvania; Hope v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Pennsylvania; Jermyn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803,1049 Pennsylvania v. Matthews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Pennsylvania; Maxwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Pennsylvania; Moran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Pennsylvania; Sam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Pennsylvania; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Pennsylvania; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Pennsylvania; Stephenson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923,1020 Pennsylvania v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Pennsylvania; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829,1053 Pennsylvania Bd. of Law Examiners; Pawlak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections; Olon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Pennsylvania Office of Budget v. Department of HHS . . . . . . . . . 1010 Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. . . . . 1110 Pennsylvania State Police Bureau of Liquor Control Enforcement; Chisnell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review; Schulmerich Carillons, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Coats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Penrod Drilling Corp.; Marsh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.; Ailor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.; White Consolidated Industries v. 1042 Pentwater Wire Products, Inc.; Auto Club Ins. Assn. v. . . . . . . . . 1194 Peoples v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Peoples Bank & Tr. Co. of Mountain Home; Globe International v. 931 Perales; Hurwitz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992 Perales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Pereira-Poso v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Perez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,958,1122,1136 Perez Zambrano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Perkins; Perry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Perkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903,1087 Perko v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cli Page Permanent Mission of Republic of Zaire to United Nations; 767 Third Ave. Associates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Pernell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060,1097 Perreault v. Fishman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Perrill; Harvey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Perroton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Perry v. Dietz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Perry v. McKune . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Perry v. Perkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Perry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062,1091 Perryman v. Department of Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851,1020 Perrysburg; Pheils v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Persico v. Villa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Persley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Persyn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Pete F.; Tamara B. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Peters; Dick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Peters; Johl v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038 Peters v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Peters; Morissette v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Peters; Newsome v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Peters; Partee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877,1006 Peters; Ward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Peterson v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Petrochem Insulation, Inc. v. Plumbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Petros v. Sanitation Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Petrosky; Platt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc.; Moyer Packing Co. v. . . . . . . 994 Petry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Pettitt v. Westport Savings Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 PGDH Liquidating Trust v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Pharm v. Hatcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Pheils v. Perrysburg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Phelps v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Phelps v. Yale Security, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Phibbs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Fischer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Kurz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Phillips v. Champion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Phillips v. Chiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Phillips v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Phillips v. Heine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Phillips v. Maryland Dept. of Economic and Employment Develop- ment Bd. of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR clii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Phillips; Pearsall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998,1160 Phillips v. Solo/Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Phillips v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Phillips v. Thomaston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Phillips v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086,1088,1095 Phillips v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Phillips, King & Smith; Beeson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Phillips Petroleum Co.; Loucks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876,1006 Phipps v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Pickens v. Lockheed Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Pickens v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Pickens v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Pickens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Pierce v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Pierce; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Pierce v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852,885,927 Pierrie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Pierson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Pifer v. Bunnell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057,1173 Pilditch v. Gool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Pillsbury Co.; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Pinal County Bd. of Supervisors; Morgal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Pinder v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Piner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Pinette; Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1307 Pinkerton v. Henry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Pinkney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Pinter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Piontek v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056,1160 Piorecki v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Cleveland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Pipkins, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Pipkins v. State Bar of Nev. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968,1066 Pisciotta v. Smith Barney Shearson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Pisciotta v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Pitera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Pitman Mfg. Co.; Janeau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Pitner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068 Pitre's Estate v. Western Electric Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Pittman; Agency for Health Care Administration v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Pittman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Pittman v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Pitt-Ohio Express, Inc.; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Pizzo v. Whitley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,959 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cliii Page Plancarte-Raya v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Plan Comm. of Bank Bldg. & Equipment Corp. of America v. Reli- ance Ins. Co. of Ill. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Planned Parenthood of S. E. Pa. v. Casey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1309 Plant Guard Workers; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921,973 Plaquemines Parish Government of La.; DeSambourg v. . . . . . . . 1093 Platt v. Ihle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Platt v. Petrosky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Pleas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Pledger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Plumbers v. Kokosing Construction Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Plumbers; Petrochem Insulation, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Plumley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Plummer v. Neal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Plummer v. Springfield Terminal R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Plymouth Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. Keystone Health Plan East 863 PML Securities Co.; Fujikawa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985 Pohlmann, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940 Pointer; Hartman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Pointer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877,1042 Polanco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Polewsky v. Bay Colony Railroad Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Polewsky v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Political Contributions Data, Inc.; Federal Election Comm'n v. . . 1116 Polland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Pollard; McQueen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840,973 Pollen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Polyak, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823,909 Polyak v. Boston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823,909 Polyak v. Buford Evans & Sons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Polythane Systems, Inc.; Marina Ventures Internationale, Ltd. v. 1116 Pompe v. Yonkers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871,1006 Ponticelli v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Ponton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Poole v. Consolidated Rail Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Poole v. Godinez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Poole v. Killeen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033,1102,1180 Poole; Martinez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Pope v. University of Wash. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp.; Hess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Porter v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Porter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Porter Testing Laboratory v. Board of Regents for Okla. Agricul- ture and Mechanical Colleges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR cliv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Port Houston Authority; Guillory v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Port San Luis Harbor Dist.; Gates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Porzio, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975,1067 Postmaster General; Gerrish v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Postmaster General; Grist v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Postmaster General; Pyles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Postmaster General; Reeder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Postmaster General; Santos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Postmaster General; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Postmaster General; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Postmaster General; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Poston v. Poston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Potter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Powell v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Powell v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811,1037 Powell v. Rice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Powell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804,837,1088 Power Authority of N. Y.; General Mills, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Poythress; Kent v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Pozo-Aparicio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Pozsgai v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Prandy-Binett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Pratt v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Pratt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Prayson v. Kansas City Power & Light Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Preciado-Quinonez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Pree v. Brunswick Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Preece v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Prentice v. Title Ins. Co. of Minn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 President Judge, Superior Court of Pa., Western District; Jae v. 1202 President of U. S.; Agron v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857,1005 President of U. S.; Christiansen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 President's Comm'n on Executive Exchange; Hamel v. . . . . . . . . . 931 Pressley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Presswood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Preston v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Prewitt v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Price, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Price v. FCC National Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Price v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Price v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847,1063,1136 Price; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Prikakis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Primerica Disability Income Plan; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clv Page Prince George's County v. Kirsch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. MCorp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Pringle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Prison Industry Authority, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Pritchard v. Goodie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Pritchett v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . 932 Prochazka v. Zlotoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Proctor v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010,1038 Proctor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Prodigy Child Development Centers, Inc.; Michaels v. . . . . . . . . . 1178 Profeta v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Progressive Cellular III B­3 v. Federal Communications Comm'n 860 Pro-Tech Security Network v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . 1091 Provda, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Provizer v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Prows v. Federal Bureau of Prisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Proyect v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Rice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Pruett v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984,1032 Pruitt v. Howard County Sheriff's Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Pruitt v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Pruitt v. Rogers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Prunty v. Voinovich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935,1020 Pruzansky; Hassan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Pryor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038,1166 PSJ Corp. v. Fulbright & Jaworski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 PSJ Corp. v. Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County . . . . . . 1094 Public Citizen v. U. S. Trade Representative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Public Storage Management, Inc.; Awofolu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Puccini Clothes; Sassower v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Pudlo v. Adamski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dept. of Ecology . 810,1037 Pugh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925,926 Pullen v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Punchard, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Pung; Mosley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Puppolo Family Trust v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Purifoy v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Purkett; Glass v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Pursell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Pyle v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Pyles v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Pytell; Carlton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Q. G. Products; Shorty, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR clvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Qualtieri v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 Quarles; Mattison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Quarles v. Scuderi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Queen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Quiller v. Miles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Quinn v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Quisenberry v. Stelly-Hoven, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Qureshi v. Alexandria Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 R. v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Raba; Beauford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Rabb v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Rabbitt v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Rabinowitz, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Rabinowitz; El-Tayeb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Racimo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Rackley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Radford v. Chevron, U. S. A., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Rafla v. Aziz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Railway Labor Executives' Assn. v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co. 1193 Rakestraw v. Air Line Pilots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906 Ramage v. Villines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Ramaswami v. Texas Dept. of Human Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Ramey; Lane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856,1005 Ramirez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957,1089,1103,1202 Ramirez Delosantos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Ramirez-Gonzalez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Ramos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887,1057,1089,1207 Ramoundos v. Mullen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Ramsey v. Office of State Engineer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890,1006 Randall v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095,1181 Randall Mill Corp.; Fisch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Randel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Randol v. Mid-West National Life Ins. Co. of Tenn. . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Randolph v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Rangel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Rankel v. Kelly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Rankin v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Ransom v. Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Ransom v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Rapp, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804 Rasch v. Amtrak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Rasch v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Rashmi P. v. Commissioner of Social Services of New York City 1041 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clvii Page Ratelle; Adkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Ratelle; Cherry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924,1007 Ratelle; Herron v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Ratelle; McElwee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Ratliff v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Rattenni v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Ratzlaf v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc.; Peterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Rawls v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Rayford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Rayl; Jensen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Raymond v. Mobil Oil Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Raytheon Co.; Geophysical Systems Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Razo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Razo-Alvarado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891 Read v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Realty Photo Master Corp. v. Montgomery Cty. Assn. of Realtors 964 Reaves v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Reber v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Rector v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Redlin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Redner; Dean v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Reed v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Reed v. Farley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Reed; Gardner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Reed v. Laborers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Reed v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079,1188 Reed v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Reeder v. Palmer's Succession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Reeder v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Reedom v. KHVN Radio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Reedom v. Summit Broadcasting Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Reedy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Reef, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035,1104 Reel v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Reese v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Reese Hospital & Medical Center; Porter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Regents of Univ. of Cal.; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Regents of Univ. of Cal.; Cookston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Genentech, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Regents of Univ. of Cal.; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Regional Airport Auth. of Louisville and Jefferson Cty.; Holden v. 994 Reich; American Dental Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR clviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Reich v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070,1109 Reich; Kim v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Reich; New York v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Reich; Rutledge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Reich; Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 Reicha v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Reichlin v. Enweremadu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Reid; Moats v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970,1082 Reid v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Reidt v. Department of Health and Human Services . . . . . . . . . . 924 Reihley v. McGill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Reinert & Duree, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Reinke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Reinstein; Tripati v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Reise v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Relford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Reliance Ins. Co. of Ill.; Plan Comm. of Bank Bldg. & Equipment Corp. of America v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Religious Technology Center v. Mayo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Religious Technology Center v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Relin v. Frank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Rem v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Rembold v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 RemGrit Corp. v. Remington Arms Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Remington Arms Co.; RemGrit Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Rempel; Gann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Rendon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Renkiewicz; Allied Products Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Renneisen v. American Airlines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Rennie v. Dalton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Reno; Appell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Reno; Jeffress v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1067 Reno; Sassower v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Reno; Sexstone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Reno v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Reno; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Renton School Dist. No. 403 v. Garnett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Republican Party of N. C.; Hunt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Republic Steel Corp.; Bessemer & Lake Erie R. Co. v. . . . . . . . . 1021 Reserve National Ins. Co. v. Crowell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Resha v. Tucker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Resident Council of Allen Parkway Village v. Department of HUD 820 Resko v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Resolution Trust Corp.; Feldman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clix Page Resolution Trust Corp.; Mick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865,1005 Resolution Trust Corp.; Scheffey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Resolution Trust Corp.; Worldwide Ins. Management Corp. v. . . . 992 Restrepo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954,1079 Rettig v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929,1007 Revels v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Revenue Comm'r of Ga.; Reich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070,1109 Rexroat v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Rey; Lafferty v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Reyer v. Todd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992,1101 Reyes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1017,1088 Reyes-Santiago v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Reyna v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division 969,1066 Reynolds; Helms v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843,1005 Reynolds; Mosier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Reynolds v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,1090 Reytblatt v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Rhaburn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Rhode Island; McLaughlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Rhodes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Rhymer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Rice, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Rice; Powell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Rice; Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Rice v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Rice; Watts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Rich v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Richard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Richards; Diaz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Richards v. Medical Center of Del. Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951,1066 Richards; Weichert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Richardson v. Gramley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Richardson; Lyle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Richardson v. Mt. Adams Furniture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Richardson v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Richardson; Tilton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Richardson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087,1203 Richardson-Merrell, Inc.; Elkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Rich Construction Co.; Losacco v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Richmond v. Nodland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Richmond v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Richmond v. Waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Richmond County; S. J. T., Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Richmond County; TJ Smiles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR clx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Rideout v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Riese Organization; Dunlap-McCuller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Rigbymeth v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Rightsell; Clemons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Riles v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Riley v. Dow Corning Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Riley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949,1089 Rimmer v. Octagon Gas Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Rincon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Rind v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Rinier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916,1020 Rios, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961,1034 Ripley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Rison; Willis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Ritchie v. Eberhart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Ritter v. Ross . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Rivas Cruz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Rivera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843,854,1084,1130 Rivera-Arvelo, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Rivera-Farias v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Rivera Rodriguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Rivers v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Roach v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Roaf v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Roanoke River Basin Assn. v. Hudson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Roark; Hicks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Robb v. Electronic Data Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Robbins v. Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Robbins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Roberson v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Roberson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877,950,1204 Robert E. Lee S. S.; BP North America Petroleum, Inc. v. . . . . . 1072 Roberts; Colorado State Bd. of Agriculture v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Roberts; Sloan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Roberts v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900,1048 Robertson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Robertson Co., Cupples Products Div.; DiCarlo Constr. Co. v. . . . 1019 Robert Wasserwald, Inc.; Cleary v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Robichaux v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Robinson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961 Robinson v. Central Brass Mfg. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Robinson v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Robinson v. Schweier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Robinson; Simmons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxi Page Robinson; Simpson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Robinson v. United States . . . 855,867,875,925,1000,1086,1088,1089,1131 Robinson v. Welborn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Robinson v. Whitley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Robles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927,1087 Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Rocha; Brewer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Rocha v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Roche v. Sabo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Rochette v. Meachum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Rocheux International, Inc. v. Fulbright & Jaworski . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Rockaway Township Town Council; Fernandes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 863,984 Rockman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Rockwell International Corp.; Vickroy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Rockwell International Corp.; Wall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Rodenbaugh v. Singer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Rodgers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876,903,1089 Rodriguez v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Rodriguez v. Godinez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Rodriguez v. Marshall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Rodriguez v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Rodriguez; Ohio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Rodriguez; Royster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Rodriguez v. United States . . . . . . . . 830,843,856,901,950,1029,1137,1170 Rodriguez Diaz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Rodriguez-Galindo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Rodriquez; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Rodriquez-Peguero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Roehl v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Roers v. Schoolcraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,961,1081 Rogers, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Rogers v. Department of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Rogers v. Eu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Rogers; Harrison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053,1173 Rogers; Pruitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Rogers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881,1010 Rojas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955,1119 Rojas-Gonzalez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Rojas-Holguin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Rojo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Rokke v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Rokke v. Rokke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Rolfe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Roller; Cavanaugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR clxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Roller v. Tuggle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Rollins; Bernadou v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Rollins v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Rollins v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Rollins; Graham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Rollins; National Business Factors, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Roman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Roman Nose v. New Mexico Dept. of Human Resources . . . . . . . 1161 Romano v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Romer; American Council of Blind of Colo., Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Romer v. Evans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Romero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Romero-Aguilar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Romulus v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Ronwin v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Rooney, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940 Roque-Romero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Rosales v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Rose v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835,1005 Rose v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Rosemeyer; Baxter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969,1066 Rosemeyer; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Rosenbaum; Wildberger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Rosenthal; Grimm v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Rosiles-Ortiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Ross; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Ross; Ritter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Ross; Simmons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Ross v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Roston v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Rothwell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Roulette; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Rousseau v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Routt, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,988 Rowe v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Rowenhorst v. Mitchell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Rowland v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Rowland; Erikson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015,1159 Rowland v. Kingman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Rowland; Myers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Rowland; Vannorsdell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Rowley; Jae v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Royal Food Products, Inc. v. Buckeye Union Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . 817 Royal Thai Government v. Belton Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxiii Page Royster v. Rodriguez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 R. S. v. Children and Youth Services of Pa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Rubiani v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Rubin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Rubin v. Gomilla . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096,1216 Ruchman v. Wolff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871,1006 Rucker v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Rud v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Rudder v. Los Angeles County Superior Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Rudolph v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Rueda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Ruiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Ruiz-Avila v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Ruiz Camacho v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Ruiz Mejia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Rumler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 RunningEagle v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Runyon; Gerrish v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Runyon; Grist v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Runyon; Pyles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Runyon; Reeder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Runyon; Santos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Runyon; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Runyon; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Runyon; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Rupe v. Borg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Rupert v. Soley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Rupp v. Department of Health and Human Services . . . . . . . . . 912,995 Rupp v. San Diego County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Rusinskas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Russel v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Russell v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Russell v. Ehrnfelt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Russell v. McGinnis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Russell; Times Publishing Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Russell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852,971 Rutgers, State Univ. of N. J.; Fisher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Rutgers, State Univ. of N. J.; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Ruth v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949,1120 Rutledge v. Reich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Rutledge v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Rutulante v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Ruvalcaba v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Ryan, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR clxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Ryan; Burgess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Ryan; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Ryan; Veasey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954,1101 Ryles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Rytman v. Kofkoff Egg Farm Ltd. Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . 1046,1215 S. v. Children and Youth Services of Pa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 S. v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Saa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Saavedra v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Sablone v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Sabo; Roche v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Sabol; Moskowitz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Sabour v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Sack v. St. Francis Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Sack v. Wagoner County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Sacks, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034 Sacramento County; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842,1005 Saffeels v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Saffle; Hammer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Safir v. CSX Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Saget v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 St. Bernard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 St. Elizabeth Medical Center v. Browning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 St. Fleur v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 St. Francis Hospital; Sack v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 St. George "Dixie" Lodge #1743, B. P. O. Elks v. Beynon . . . . . . . 869 St. Germaine v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 St. Hilaire v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 St. Hilaire v. Maine Superintendent of Ins. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 St. Hilaire v. St. Hilaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012,1173 St. John's Hospital & Health Center, Inc.; Wightman v. . . . . . . . . 953 St. Louis South Park, Inc. v. Missouri Dept. of Social Services, Div. of Medical Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Camp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 St. Paul Property & Casualty; Vitek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Saklad; Standard Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Salahuddin v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Salamanca v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Salazar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955 Saleem v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Salomon Brothers, Inc.; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063,1160 Saltzstein; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Salzmann v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Sam v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxv Page Sam v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Sama v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Samaniego; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Sammons, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Sammons v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,1203,1204 Sams v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Sam's Wholesale Club; Blackmon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Sam's Wholesale Club v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Samuels v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 San Bernardino City Unified School Dist.; Grunwald v. . . . . . . . . 964 Sanchez v. Lovelace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Sanchez v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Sanchez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878,884,954,1087,1110 Sanchez Caicedo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Sandahl; Wells v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Sanderlin v. Department of Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Sanders, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Sanders v. Bunnell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Sanders v. Hargett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Sanders v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Sanders v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Sanders v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Sanders v. Samaniego . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Sanders v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . 878,900,955,958,1010,1014,1132 San Diego; Kreisner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 San Diego County; Rupp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 San Diego Dept. of Social Services; Dobles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076,1178 Sandoval v. Acevedo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Sandoval v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942,1008,1022 Sandoval v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Sandy River Nursing Care Center v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. . . 818 Sanford Redmond, Inc. v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc. . . . . . . . . 917 San Francisco; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 San Francisco; Golden Gates Heights Investments v. . . . . . . . . . . 928 San Francisco; McIntyre v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 San Francisco County Superior Court; Newtop v. . . . . . 837,838,972,973 Sanitation Dept.; Petros v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 San Miguel v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Sanon v. Taylor Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Santa Monica; Bernard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Santana v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Santana Products, Inc.; Compression Polymers, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . 1196 Santopietro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Santori v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR clxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Santos v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Sarin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Sarit v. Drug Enforcement Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Sassower, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Sassower v. Abrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Sassower v. A. R. Fuels, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Sassower v. Crites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Sassower v. Feltman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Sassower v. Kriendler & Relkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Sassower v. Mead Data Central Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Sassower v. Puccini Clothes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Sassower v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Sassower v. Thompson, Hine & Flory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Satterwhite v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Sauls v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Saunders v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Saunders; Graham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Sauser; Bunker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Savage v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Savoca, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974,1161 Sawicki v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Sawyer; Birdo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 Sayre; Hutsell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Say & Say v. Castellano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978,1094,1116 Say & Say v. Lindquist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Say & Say v. Los Angeles County Superior Court . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Say & Say v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Say & Say v. Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County . . . . 978,1094 Say & Say v. Superior Court of Cal., Orange County . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Scaife v. Hannigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057,1216 Scarbrough v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Scarce v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Scarfone v. Michigan State Bd. of Law Examiners . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Schaefers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Schaff v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Schallom v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Schapiro v. Schapiro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Scheffey v. Resolution Trust Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Scheidler; National Organization for Women, Inc. v. . . . . . 249,1036,1215 Schepis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Schilling v. GRE Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958 Schiraldi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Schiro v. Farley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222,1215 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxvii Page Schleeper v. Delo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Schlitz Brewing Co.; Milwaukee Brewery Workers' Pension Plan v. 1070 Schloegel v. Boswell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Schloesser v. Kansas Dept. of Health and Environment . . . . . . . . 916 Schmidling v. Chicago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Schmidt, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Schmidt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071,1086 Schmidt v. Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Schmitz v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Schmuck v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Schneider v. Erickson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Schoka v. Burns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Schoka v. Sheriff, Washoe County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 School Bd. of Broward County; Leslie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Schoolcraft; Roers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,961,1081 Schoolcraft; Shalala v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,961,1081 School Dist. of Bethlehem; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Schoubroek; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055,1173 Schrader v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Schram v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Schroder v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Schulmerich Carillons, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Unemployment Com- pensation Bd. of Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Schultz v. Copple . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Schultz v. Elmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Schultz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Schultz v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842,1005 Schurz v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Schuster v. South Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968,1066 Schwartz; Kleinschmidt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849,1067 Schwartz v. Worrall Publications, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Schwarz v. Church of Scientology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920,1123 Schwarz v. Church of Scientology International . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Schwarz v. Department of Commerce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Schwarz v. Office of Thrift Supervision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Schwarz v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Schweier; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. v. Henderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,1004 Scinto v. Stamm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861,1005 Scire v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Scott, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Scott v. Avon Products, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073,1216 Scott v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Scott v. Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR clxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Scott v. Judicial Inquiry and Review Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Scott v. Luster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Scott v. Manilla . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Scott v. Morehouse School of Medicine, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Scott; Shelton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Scott v. Tyson Foods, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1005 Scott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831,1018,1053,1087,1135 Scott v. Willson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Scott Paper Co.; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Scranton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Scribner; Hillcrest Medical Center v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Scruggs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Scuderi; Quarles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Scully; Charles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Scully; Pearson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Seacaucus; Bayonne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Seacor Marine, Inc.; Ardoin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Tinsley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Seale v. Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Seals v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Seaman; Arvida Realty Sales, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Searle v. Morgan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Sears, Roebuck & Co.; Dempsey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859,973 Seaton v. Jabe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Seattle; Estes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Seavoy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Seay v. Eaton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,959 Sebastian v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Second District Court of Appeal; Ortega v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Second Judicial District Court of Nev.; Allum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Secretary of Agriculture; Dye v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Secretary of Agriculture; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Secretary of Air Force; Powell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Secretary of Army; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Secretary of Army; Cowhig v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869,1006 Secretary of Army; Sikka v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Secretary of Army; Watts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Secretary of Commerce; Detroit v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Secretary of Commonwealth of Pa.; Trinsey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Secretary of Energy; Kendall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Secretary of Energy; Palo Alto v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Secretary of HHS; Administrators of Tulane Ed. Fund v. . . . . . . 1064 Secretary of HHS; Breaux v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Secretary of HHS; Clayborn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,1004 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxix Page Secretary of HHS; Collins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Secretary of HHS; Doctors' Hospital of Prince George's County v. 990 Secretary of HHS; Episcopal Hospital v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Secretary of HHS; Garelick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Secretary of HHS; Harrison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Secretary of HHS; Hetherington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Secretary of HHS; Hineline v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Secretary of HHS; Jacob II v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Secretary of HHS; Ledbetter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Secretary of HHS; Marshall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Secretary of HHS; Mayer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Secretary of HHS; McClenic v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Secretary of HHS; McGinnis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Secretary of HHS v. Ohio State Hospitals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Secretary of HHS v. Ohio State Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Secretary of HHS; PGDH Liquidating Trust v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Secretary of HHS; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Secretary of HHS v. Schoolcraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,961,1081 Secretary of HHS; Semien v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Secretary of HHS; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,1004,1198 Secretary of HHS; Sparhawk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Secretary of HHS; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Secretary of HHS; Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Secretary of HHS; Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hospital v. . . . . . . . . . 1039 Secretary of HHS; Tulane Medical Center Hospital and Clinic v. 1064 Secretary of HHS; Wiater v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Secretary of HHS; Widdoss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Secretary of Interior; Enron Oil & Gas Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Secretary of Interior; Gore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Secretary of Interior; Melluzzo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 Secretary of Interior; Wilkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Secretary of Labor; American Dental Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Secretary of Labor; Kim v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Secretary of Labor; New York v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Secretary of Labor; Rutledge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Secretary of Labor; Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 Secretary of Navy; Fass v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Secretary of Navy; Foxx v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Secretary of Navy; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Secretary of Navy; Rennie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Secretary of Navy v. Specter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,1022,1038,1084 Secretary of State of Cal.; Cross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Secretary of State of Cal.; Rogers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Secretary of State of Conn.; LaRouche v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR clxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Secretary of State of Ga.; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Secretary of State of Me.; Libertarian Party of Me. v. . . . . . . . . . 917 Secretary of Treasury; Brookman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Secretary of Treasury; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Secretary of Treasury; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Benjamin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,1159 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Bray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Grose v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Janosik v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886,1020 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Jossi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Mayer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Nat. Assn. of Radiation Survivors v. 1023 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Olson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Talon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028,1082 Securities and Exchange Comm'n; Fee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Securities and Exchange Comm'n; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Securities and Exchange Comm'n; Rind v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Security General Life Ins. Co.; Buell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Security Pacific Automotive Financial Services Corp. v. Lundquist 959 Security Services, Inc. v. Kmart Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,1037 Seeber; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988,1075 Seeman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Seibert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Selch v. Letts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Semien v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Senate Select Committee on Ethics; Packwood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1319 Senior v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Sentell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Sepulveda; Appleby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Sepulveda Aquerre v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Sereno v. Pacumio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Serr; South Dakota Dept. of Social Services ex rel. Dotson v. . . . 1177 Serra v. Toombs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Serrano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Service America Corp.; Parks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 767 Third Ave. Associates v. Permanent Mission of Republic of Zaire to United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819 Sexstone v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Seymour v. Money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Shabani; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Shabazz v. Beyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxxi Page Shabazz v. Lexington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Shah v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Shalala; Administrators of Tulane Ed. Fund v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Shalala; Breaux v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 Shalala; Clayborn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,1004 Shalala; Collins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Shalala; Doctors' Hospital of Prince George's County v. . . . . . . . . 990 Shalala; Episcopal Hospital v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Shalala; Garelick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Shalala; Harrison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Shalala; Hetherington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Shalala; Hineline v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Shalala; Jacob II v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Shalala; Ledbetter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Shalala; Marshall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Shalala; McClenic v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Shalala; McGinnis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Shalala v. Ohio State Hospitals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Shalala v. Ohio State Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Shalala; PGDH Liquidating Trust v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 Shalala; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Shalala v. Schoolcraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,961,1081 Shalala; Semien v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Shalala; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,1004,1198 Shalala; Sparhawk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Shalala; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Shalala; Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Shalala; Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hospital v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Shalala; Tulane Medical Center Hospital and Clinic v. . . . . . . . . . 1064 Shalala; Wiater v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Shalala; Widdoss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Shanahan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Shandon Inc. v. Miles Laboratories, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Shands v. Kennett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Shangri-La Development Co. v. National Home Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . 1032 Shank, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034 Shannon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943,987 Shapouri v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . 960 Sharkey v. Department of Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Sharp, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987 Sharp v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Sharpe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Shatek v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Shaver, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR clxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Shaw v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895,1006 Shearon v. Lynch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Sheeder v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Sheehan v. Beyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Sheet Metal Workers; E. F. Etie Sheet Metal Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Sheffield; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Sheffield; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875,973 Shehee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Shelby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Shelby Ins. Co.; J. Z. G. Resources, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Shelley School Dist.; Geery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Shelling v. Southern R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Shell Oil Co.; Greater Rockford Energy & Technology Corp. v. . . 1111 Shell Oil Co. v. Nelson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Shell Oil Co.; Stockstill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Shelton v. Higgins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Shelton v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Shelton v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Shenberg, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Shephard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184,1203 Sherer; Construcciones Aeronauticas, S. A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818 Sheriff, Washoe County; Schoka v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Shieh v. Christopher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948,1094,1116 Shieh v. Ebershoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Shieh v. Newman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Shieh v. Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Shields v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,1071 Shillinger; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057,1173 Shimek v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Shimman; Operating Engineers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Shimoda v. Burgo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Shing Chan; Chinese American Planning Council, Inc. v. . . . . . . . 978 Shing Chan; New York City v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Shipes; Trinity Industries, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Shiplevy; Blevins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Shiplevy; James v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Shiplevy; O'Neill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078,1173 Shirk v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068 Shively; Flanagan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Shoemaker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Shook; Wade v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Shoptaugh; Parker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Shorty, Inc. v. Q. G. Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxxiii Page Sho Wei v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Shrewsberry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Shu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Shuler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Shur; Vargas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Shutts & Bowen; D'Albissin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Shu Yan Eng v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Shyllon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 Sias v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015,1082 Sicairos v. Burns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Siegel v. Berkheimer Associates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893,1006 Siegel v. Grievance Committee, Ninth Judicial District . . . . . . . . 839 Siegler, Inc.; Katz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Sier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Sigismonti; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Sikka v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Silas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848,1087 Silva v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030,1183 Silver Cloud, Inc. v. National Kitchen Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823 Simard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Simmons v. Frankel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Simmons v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Simmons v. Robinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Simmons v. Ross . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978 Simmons v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811,942,1008 Simmons v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956,984,1170 Simon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Simpson; Keaulii v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Simpson v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Simpson; Merrell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Simpson v. Murray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Simpson v. Ortiz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Simpson v. Robinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Simpson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906,1060,1090 Simpson Paper (Vt.) Co. v. Department of Env. Conservation . . . 1032 Sims, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Sims v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Sims; Dunn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Sims v. Subway Equipment Leasing Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975,1049 Sims v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Sinaloa Lake Owners Assn. v. California Div. of Safety of Dams 977 Sinclair v. Henman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Sinclair v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Singer; Rodenbaugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR clxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Singletary; Bush v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065,1173 Singletary; Card v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Singletary; Combs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Singletary v. Cumbie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Singletary; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842,1202 Singletary; Duenas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Singletary v. Duest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Singletary; Duest v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Singletary; Gill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Singletary; Gorham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Singletary; Horton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Singletary; Howard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Singletary; James v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Singletary; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Singletary; Manker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Singletary; Marrero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Singletary; Medina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054,1215 Singletary; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Singletary; Randall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095,1181 Singletary; Sias v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015,1082 Singletary; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Singletary; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836,1027,1101,1170 Singleton v. Stiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Singleton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Sinkfield v. Wesch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988,1046 Sioux Mfg. Corp. v. Altheimer & Gray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Sipos v. Williamson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Sistrunk v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Siwinski v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 S. J. T., Inc. v. Richmond County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Skarbnik; Blackston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Skeen v. Faison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Ski Park Farms, Inc.; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Skipper v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Skurdal, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963 Skyywalker v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 569 Slabochova v. Westfield Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Slagle v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Slater v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Slawek v. Gateway Broadcasting Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Sledge v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Sloan v. Alameda County Social Services Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Sloan v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956,1067 Sloan v. Roberts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxxv Page Sloan v. Sloan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871,1051 Sloan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Sloan v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Slocum; Cross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Slovak Aerobatics, Inc. v. California State Bd. of Equalization . . . 866 Slusher; Wilford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Small v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Smart v. New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Smith, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961,1188 Smith; Alabama v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Smith v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Smith v. Barry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Smith v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Smith v. Del Mar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867,946 Smith v. Delo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Smith v. Department of Veterans Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Smith; Dubyak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096,1173 Smith v. Greenwich Zoning Bd. of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Smith; Harvey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Smith v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Smith; Jenner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Smith v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Smith; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Smith; Kelley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Smith v. Lower Merion Township . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Smith v. Mallard & Minor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Smith; Marvin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Smith v. Murray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077,1216 Smith v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Smith; Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Smith v. Roulette . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Smith v. Scott Paper Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Smith v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,1004,1198 Smith v. Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Smith v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Smith; Tennessee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,1040 Smith v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Smith v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829, 873,875,892,937,982,983,1003,1056,1061,1075,1087,1089,1095, 1122,1126,1131,1140,1199 Smith; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co.; Ronwin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Smith Barney Shearson; Pisciotta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Smith's Estate v. Hollywood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR clxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Snap-On Tools Corp. v. Vetter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Sneed, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Sneezer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Snell v. Denver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Snelling v. Chrysler Motors Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Snider; Kantola v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Snover; Nyberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Snow; Fortner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Snow; Jaffe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Snow v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Snyder v. Frost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Snyder v. Sumner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Snyder Industries, Inc. v. Heil Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Soares v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Sochor v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025,1159 Social Security Administration; Adeniji v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Society Bank & Trust v. McGraw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Society of Lloyd's; Bonny v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Sohn; Luparelli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Sokaogon Chippewa Community v. Exxon Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Soley; Rupert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Solis v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Solis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Soliz Cano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Solo/Discovery; Phillips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Soloman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893,1026 Solorzano; FHP, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Sondergard; Miles, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Southards v. B & M Management Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Southards v. Motel Management Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 South Carolina; Baughman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 South Carolina; Boughman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 South Carolina; Childers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 South Carolina v. Griffin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 South Carolina; Keels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 South Carolina; Simmons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811,942,1008 South Carolina Dept. of Revenue and Taxation; Geoffrey, Inc. v. 992 South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Stinnett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 South Dakota; Schuster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968,1066 South Dakota Dept. of Social Services ex rel. Dotson v. Serr . . . . 1177 Southern Natural Gas Co.; Gas Utilities Co. of Ala., Inc. v. . . . . . 1042 Southern Pacific Transp. Co.; Garcia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Southern Pacific Transp. Co.; Railway Labor Executives' Assn. v. 1193 Southern R. Co.; Shelling v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxxvii Page Southern R. Co.; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Southern Timber Purchasers Council v. Meier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 South Main Bank; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 South Main Bank; Van der Jagt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 South San Antonio Independent School Dist.; Mata v. . . . . . . . . . 1135 Southwest Airlines Co.; Westfall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.; U. S. Metroline Services, Inc. v. 864 Southwest Motor Freight; Fruehauf Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Southwest Water Wells, Inc. v. Garney Cos. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 South Wind Village v. Mayor and Council of Jackson . . . . . . . . . . 866 Sowder v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Sowders; James v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Sowders; McGowan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Sowels v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Spagnoli v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958 Sparhawk v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Sparks v. Continental Eagle Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Sparks v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Sparks; Tennessee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Sparks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Spawn v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Spears v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983,995 Specter; Dalton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,1022,1038,1084 Spell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Spellings v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Spellman v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Spencer v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Spencer v. Murray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Spencer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Sperber Adams Associates; JEM Management Associates Corp. v. 945 Spickler v. Key Bank of Southern Me. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Spies, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Spignor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Spiller v. Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Spindle v. Berrong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980,1067 Spiteri, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Spoerlein v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Spremo v. Durante . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Spriggs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Springfield; Kren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011,1101 Springfield Terminal R. Co.; Plummer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Spruill v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Spun Steak Co.; Garcia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 S. S. Fisher Steel Corp.; EF Operating Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR clxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page S. S. Fisher Steel Corp.; West Motor Freight of Pa. v. . . . . . . . . . 868 Stack v. Caspari . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Stadler; Kirschenhunter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 Stainer; Castillo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Stainer; Terrizzi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851,973 Stair v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Stallings v. Higgins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Stamm; Scinto v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861,1005 Stamps v. Collagen Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Burnaby . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Standard Ins. Co. v. Saklad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Standen; Whitley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Stanford v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Stanislaus County; Alvarado v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Stanley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Stanley v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921,1066 Stanley & Co. v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039,1189 Stansbury v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943,1009 Stanton Road Associates v. Lohrey Enterprises, Inc. . . . . . . . 1023,1031 Stapleton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Starcher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Starnes v. Kerby . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Starr; Ortiz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Stassis v. Hartman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 State. See also name of State. State Bar of Cal.; Herships v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 State Bar of Kan.; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 State Bar of Nev.; Pipkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968,1066 State Bar of Wis.; Strasburg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.; Noack v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 State Industrial Ins. System; Jaakkola v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997,1082 State of Ohio Prosecutor; Corethers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999,1082 State Use Industries; Harker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Statland v. American Airlines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Staton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Steeg v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Steego Corp.; Moham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Steel, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809,1009,1108 Steele v. California Dept. of Social Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,1005 Steel Warehouse Co.; Kennedy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Steelworkers; Amax Metals Recovery, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Steelworkers; Garringer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Steelworkers; North Star Steel Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Steen v. Central Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:06 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxxix Page Steen v. Detroit Police Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Steen v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Steers, Sullivan, McNamar & Rogers; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Stefanko v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Steffen, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961,1103 Steffen v. Mauldin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Steffen v. Mitchell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Stege v. Girard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Stein v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Steiner; Brunwasser v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Steines v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962,1023,1049,1185 Steinhorn, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Steirer v. Bethlehem Area School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Stelly-Hoven, Inc.; Quisenberry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Stempson; Murray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850,1135 Stepanik; Hawley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Stepanik; Stoltzfus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Stepanik; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009,1077 Stephan; Haislip v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Stephens; Houck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Stephens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Stephenson v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923,1020 Sterling Suffolk Racecourse Ltd. Partnership v. Burrillville Rac- ing Assn., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Stern; Burgess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Stern v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Stevens, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Stevens v. Cannon Beach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Stevens v. Minnesota State Bd. of Bar Examiners . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Stevens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900,906,1090 Stevens; Vernon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Steward v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891,960 Stewart v. Bentsen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Stewart v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Stewart v. Hargett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Stewart v. McGinnis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Stewart v. Mississippi State Penitentiary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Stewart v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Stewart v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Stewart v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871,919,957,1182 Stewart v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Stiles; Singleton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Still; Fruehauf Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Stinnett; BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:07 PGT*TCR clxxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Stinnett; South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Stiver v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Stochastic Decisions, Inc. v. DiDomenico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Stockstill v. Shell Oil Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Stohler v. Hargett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013,1101 Stokes v. American Express Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Stokes v. Hatch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Stokes; Omasta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Stokes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925,1179 Stokes v. Wurtsboro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Stoltz v. First Pyramid Life Ins. Co. of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Stoltzfus v. Stepanik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Stone, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Stone; Cowhig v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869,1006 Storm; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Storts v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Story v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Stouffer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Stoumbos; Kilimnik v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Stout; DiCesare v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Stovall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971,1014,1088 Stow; Amann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Stowers; Consolidated Rail Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 Strack; Heath v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843 Strain v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Strasburg v. State Bar of Wis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Stratemeyer v. Lincoln County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Strauch v. Keane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Strauss; Brewer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892 Stribling v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Strickland v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Strickland v. Owen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Strickland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981 Strickland; Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Strickler v. Waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Strine; Weaver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891,1006 Stromer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Strowbridge v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Struben v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Stuart Circle Hospital Corp.; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Stumpf v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Suarez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Subway Equipment Leasing Corp.; Sims v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975,1049 Succession. See name of succession. 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:07 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxxxi Page Suits; Justice v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Sulcer v. Citizens Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla. . . . . . . 870 Sullivan; Behlke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 Sullivan v. Bieluch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Sullivan v. Borg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Sullivan; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Sullivan v. Love . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Summer; McCrimmon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Summit Broadcasting Corp.; Reedom v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Summit Women's Center West, Inc.; Syversen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Sumner; Snyder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Sundwall v. General Building Supply Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993,1101 Sunrise Bank of Cal.; Anolik v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Superintendent, Fredericksburg Rappahanock Joint Security Cen- ter; Hernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Superintendent of correctional or penal institution. See name or title of superintendent. Superior Court of Ariz.; Tripati v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Superior Court of Cal., Alameda County; Whitaker v. . . . . . . . . . 1050 Superior Court of Cal., Appellate Dept., L. A. County; Andrisani v. 1115 Superior Court of Cal., L. A. County; PSJ Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Superior Court of Cal., L. A. County; Say & Say v. . . . . . . . . . 978,1094 Superior Court of Cal., L. A. County; Shieh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Superior Court of Cal., L. A. County, South Dist.; Camarena v. 1015 Superior Court of Cal., Orange County; Say & Say v. . . . . . . . . . 1116 Superior Court of Los Angeles; Maxie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Supreme Court of Colo.; Wiley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Surber v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Surface v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Susan R. M. v. Northeast Independent School Dist. . . . . . . . . . 972,1066 Susskind v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Sutherland v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 Suttle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Sutton; Bruce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Malautea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Swails v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Swain v. Accountants on Call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884,1082 Swain v. Decatur Federal Savings & Loan Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . 922,1082 Swain v. Detroit Bd. of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920,1006 Swarovski Int'l Trading Corp., A. G. v. Ebeling & Reuss Co. . . . . 827 Swarovski Int'l Trading Corp., A. G. v. Ebeling & Reuss, Ltd. . . 827 Swedzinski v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Sweet v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Sweet v. Los Angeles County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:07 PGT*TCR clxxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Sweet v. Voinovich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Swenson v. Oglala Sioux Tribe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Swenson v. Trickey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Swerdlow, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Swindall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Swiney v. Correctional Health Care, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Swinney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995 Syriani v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948,1066 Sysco Corp.; Condo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Syversen v. Summit Women's Center West, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 T. v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Taber Partners I; Dessarrollos Metropolitanos, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . 823 Tabor v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Tabora v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Tabron; Grace v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Tafalla-Orbino v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Tafoya; Castro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Tahoe Regional Planning Agency; Kelly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Taliaferro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Talley v. Flathead Valley Community College . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Talley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867,1089 Talon v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028,1082 Tamara B. v. Pete F. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Tanaka; Kernan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Tandem Computers Inc.; Yuter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Tanguma v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Tansy; Hargrove v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056,1160 Tansy; Zinn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Tape v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Tapert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Tapia v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Tapia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Tarazon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Tariq v. Federal Bureau of Prisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Taylor v. Borg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Taylor; Buckner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842,1077 Taylor v. Central States, S. E. & S. W. Areas Pension Fund . . . . 978 Taylor v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841 Taylor v. Duckworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Taylor; Evans-Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Taylor v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Taylor; Gaster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955,1159 Taylor v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Taylor v. Lockhart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:07 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxxxiii Page Taylor v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Taylor v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Taylor v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Taylor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829, 858,871,879,890,891,901,903,955,1001,1016,1095 Taylor Investment, Ltd. v. Upper Darby Township . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Taylor Univ.; Sanon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Teachers v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Teamsters v. Thorne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Tecnol Medical Products, Inc.; Anago Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,985 Tedford v. Hepting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Tegtmeyer; Peck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Teicher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Temple v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Temple Univ.; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951,970,1020 Tennessee v. Bane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,1040 Tennessee; Caughron v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Tennessee v. Evans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,1008,1064 Tennessee; Howell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Tennessee; Meeks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Tennessee v. Middlebrooks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124,805,1008,1064 Tennessee v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,1040 Tennessee; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Tennessee; Sowder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Tennessee v. Sparks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Tennessee; Sparks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Tennessee; Workman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Tenney v. Idaho Dept. of Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Tennis Tutor, Inc.; Holabird Sports Discounters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Tenon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Teran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Ternes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Territory. See name of Territory. Terrizzi v. Stainer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851,973 Terry; Laws v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Tesoreria General de la Seguridad Social de Espana v. Banco de Credito Industrial, S. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Testa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075,1179 Teters v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Texas; Adanandus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Texas; Aldridge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Texas; Alexander v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Texas; Allridge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Texas; Barnard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:07 PGT*TCR clxxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Texas; Bashir v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Texas; Beasley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Texas; Beavers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Texas; Bray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Texas; Burns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838,1005 Texas; Burtchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Texas; Callins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Texas; Clayton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Texas; Cordero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Texas; Crank v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975 Texas v. De Freece . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Texas; Delk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Texas; Elliott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Texas; Felder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Texas; Fontenot v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Texas; Frazier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Texas; Gunter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921 Texas; Gutierrez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921,1050 Texas; Hardin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936 Texas; Haywood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Texas; Hittle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Texas; Jennings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Texas; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Texas; Kunkle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Texas; Kuri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Texas; Lockhart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Texas; Mayabb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Texas; McFarland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Texas; McGowen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Texas; McQueen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971 Texas; Miller-El v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831,1004 Texas; Mines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 Texas v. Mitchell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Texas; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885 Texas; Moody v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Texas; Moorhead v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 Texas; Moreno v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Texas; M. R. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Texas; Muniz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Texas; Napier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Texas; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830,1215 Texas v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,987,1106 Texas v. Parrish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 Texas; Patel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:07 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxxxv Page Texas; Phillips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Texas; Riles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Texas; Rivers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Texas; Roberson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Texas; Rosales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Texas; Rousseau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Texas; Ruiz Camacho v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Texas; Sanchez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Texas; San Miguel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Texas; Satterwhite v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Texas; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Texas; Solis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Texas; Trevino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Texas; Waters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Texas; Ybarra v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Texas; Zimmerman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Texas Air Corp.; Frontier Pilots Litigation Steering Committee v. 993 Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, Institutional Div.; Reyna v. . . 969,1066 Texas Dept. of Human Services; Ramaswami v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Texas Farm Bureau; McKethan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Texas Fruit Palace, Inc. v. Palestine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 TFL, Inc. v. Walhout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Thakkar v. Debevoise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Thatcher; Beals v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 Theriault v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Theriot v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Houston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972,1067 Theriot v. Great Western Coca-Cola Bottling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972,1067 Thibodeaux; Boulet v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Thigpen; Bird v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Thigpen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988 Thi Tran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Thomas, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Thomas; Abramson Enterprises, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Thomas; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Thomas v. Cowley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Thomas v. Department of State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075,1216 Thomas v. Dutrow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 Thomas v. Evans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Thomas v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Thomas v. Garrett Fluid Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Thomas; Giles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876,1066 Thomas v. Graben Wood Products, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Thomas v. Hargett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Thomas v. Johnson Controls, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:07 PGT*TCR clxxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Thomas; Kentucky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Thomas; Lujan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Thomas; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Thomas v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Thomas v. Newsome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Thomas v. Pearl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Thomas; Pennsylvania v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Thomas; Rubiani v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Thomas; Saleem v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Thomas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839, 878,926,950,1000,1014,1060,1066,1087,1088,1134,1166 Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hospital v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Thomas Nelson, Inc. v. Harper House, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Thomaston; Phillips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Thomle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 Thom McAn Shoe Co.; L. A. Gear, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908 Thompson v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Thompson; Beaver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Thompson v. Department of Treasury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Thompson v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Thompson; Hseieh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Thompson v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867 Thompson; Mu'Min v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Thompson v. Murphy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Thompson; Pruett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984,1032 Thompson v. United States . . . . . . 903,952,972,1016,1088,1090,1119,1191 Thompson v. Ylst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Thompson, Hine & Flory; Sassower v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Thomsen v. Juvenile Dept. of Washington County . . . . . . . . . . 818,1004 Thorne; Teamsters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Thorne v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Thornton v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Thornton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Thrasher, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Thrasher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Threlkel; Hamann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Thrift v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871 Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 Thurman v. Curran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Thurman; Hines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 Thurman; Masoner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028,1159 Thurmon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Thurmond v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:07 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxxxvii Page Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810,941,1037 Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Tigard; Dolan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989,1162 Tilli v. Board of Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871,973 Tillimon v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Tillman v. Conroy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Tillman v. Cook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Tillman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087,1120 Tilson v. Wichita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976,1066 Tilton v. Richardson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Tilton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Times Publishing Co. v. Russell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Times Publishing Co. v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Timoney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Tindall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Tinsley; Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Tioga Pines Living Center v. Indiana State Bd. of Public Welf. 1195 Tippett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Tisdale v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999,1169 Title Ins. Co. of Minn.; Prentice v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 TJ Smiles v. Richmond County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Tobin; Duphar, B. V. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Tobin; Fleeher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Todaro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Todd v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Todd; Reyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992,1101 Todd v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Tofoya; Castro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803 Tokio Fire & Marine Ins. Co.; Hanjin Container Lines, Inc. v. . . . 1194 Toledo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878 Tolefree; Kansas City v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Tomaz v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Tome v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Tompkins; Corrigan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842,1005 Toombs; Serra v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Toomey v. Iowa Dept. of Human Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984 Torgeson; Hydro Aluminium Nordisk Aviation Products, A/S v. . 976 Toro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Torres v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830,925,982 Totten; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Toward v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Towe Antique Ford Foundation v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . 1069 Town. See name of town. Towner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:07 PGT*TCR clxxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Townes v. Murray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881,1199 Townsend; Vreeland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Trainor; Fisher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Trainor, Robertson, Smits & Wade; Cullen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Tran v. Maass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Tran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956,1170 Tran; Zebulon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Transportation Union v. Union Pacific R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Traumbauer; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Travis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883,889 Traylor v. Letts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Treas-Wilson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Trellez v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Tremblay; DiCicco v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Trepal v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Trevino v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Trice v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Trickey; Swenson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Triestman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953,1066 Trinity Industries, Inc. v. Shipes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Trinsey v. Mitchell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 Tripati v. Arpaio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Tripati v. Reinstein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Tripati v. Superior Court of Ariz. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Tripodi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Triton Indonesia, Inc.; Nordell International Resources, Ltd. v. . . 1119 Trotman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Trout v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Troy; Wattles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Trumbauer; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Trump; Gollomp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Trustees of Welfare Trust Fund, Local Union 475 v. Dunston . 944,1065 Tsaconas v. Federal Communications Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Tschupp v. Department of Treasury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Tubb; Nichols v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Tucker; Brunet v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Tucker v. Hartford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Tucker v. Pace Investments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Tucker; Resha v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943 Tucker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820,875,1182 Tucker Gun Specialty, Inc. v. Bureau of ATF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Tuesca-Noguera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Tuggle; Roller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:07 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxxxix Page Tuilaepa v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010,1038 Tuitt v. Government of Virgin Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Tulane Medical Center Hospital and Clinic v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Turk; Borg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905 Turnage v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Turnbow; Calia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Turnbull v. Home Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Turner v. Boswell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Turner; Davis, Gillenwater & Lynch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Turner; Guam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Turner v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Turner v. LaMarca . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Turner v. Murray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Turner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904,1026 Turnpaugh v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975,1065 TV News Clips of Atlanta, Inc. v. Georgia Television Co. . . . . . . . 1118 TV News Clips of Atlanta, Inc. v. WSB­TV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Twin Modal, Inc.; F. P. Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Tyler, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930 Tyler v. Ashcroft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Tyler v. Geiler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885,985 Tyler v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879,985 Tyler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900,1080 Tyson v. Borg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Tyson v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Tyson Foods, Inc.; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1005 Uduko v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Uffelman v. Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Ukiah Adventist Hospital v. Federal Trade Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . 825 Ullrich Copper, Inc.; Burley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 ULSI System Technology, Inc.; Intel Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Unemployment Appeals Comm'n; Wolstone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Unemployment Ins. Review Bd. of Ind. Dept. of Employment & Training Services; Lapsley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Union. For labor union, see name of trade. Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Co.; Bi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 Union Electric Co.; Arnick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Union Pacific R. Co.; Transportation Union v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 United. For labor union, see name of trade. United Airlines; Belgard-Krause v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 United Arab Shipping Co. S. A. G.; Evans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 United Bank of Bismarck; Delzer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 United Keetoowah Band v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . 803 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:07 PGT*TCR cxc TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 United Parcel Service; Austin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 United States. See name of other party. U. S. Air Force; Applewhite v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership . . . . 1039,1175 U. S. Court of Appeals; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 U. S. District Court; Bertoli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 U. S. District Court; Hodges v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959,1018,1160 U. S. District Court; James v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 U. S. District Court; Johns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081,1160 U. S. District Court; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957,1067 U. S. District Court; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 U. S. District Court; McCullough v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 U. S. District Court; Mount v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 U. S. District Court; Religious Technology Center v. . . . . . . . . . . 1041 U. S. District Court; Times Publishing Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 U. S. District Court; Vasquez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 U. S. District Court; Willis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 U. S. District Judge; Harvey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 U. S. District Judge; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,962 U. S. District Judge; Kalakay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 U. S. District Judge; Thakkar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 United States ex rel. Kelly; Boeing Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 U. S. Information Agency; Krc v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 U. S. Metroline Services, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. 864 U. S. Parole Comm'n; Montalvo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 U. S. Philips Corp.; Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. . 27,1081 U. S. Postal Service; Crespo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 U. S. Postal Service v. Fort Wayne Ed. Assn., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 U. S. Postal Service; Gilmore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 U. S. Postal Service; Higareda v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 U. S. Postal Service; Howick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 U. S. Postal Service; Palkovich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 U. S. Postal Service; Schwarz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 U. S. Postal Service; Steen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 U. S. Trade Representative; Public Citizen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 United Wire, Metal & Machine Health & Welfare Fund v. Morris- town Memorial Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944,1031 Universal Life Church; Zarling v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952,1020 University City; Medvik v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 University Health Services, Inc.; Willis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 University Hospital; Willis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 University of Ala. Birmingham Medical Center; Waters v. . . . . . . 1165 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:07 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxci Page University of Cincinnati; Levy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 University of Houston Bd. of Trustees; Vaksman v. . . . . . . . . . . 807,989 University of Miami; Echarte v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 University of Miami School of Medicine; Echarte v. . . . . . . . . . . . 915 University of Mich.; Norton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077,1216 University of North Tex.; Clarke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 University of S. C.; Nolan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 University of Tenn. v. Faulkner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 University of Tex., M. D. Anderson Cancer Center; Bradley v. . . 1119 University of Wash.; Conard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 University of Wash.; Pope v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Unknown Psychiatrist, U. S. Attorney Witness; Brown v. . . . . . . 950 Upp v. Mellon Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964 Upper Darby Township; Taylor Investment, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 914 Uppole v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Urbaez-Feliz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Urick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Urrunaga v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Usher, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 USS Iowa; Blakey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929 Utah; Archuleta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Utah; Cates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Utah; Dunbar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856 Utah; Hagen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399 Utah; Schmidt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808 Utah; Seale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Uwaezhoke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Uwaje v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847 Vagenas; Alllied Products Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Vaksman v. University of Houston Bd. of Trustees . . . . . . . . . . . 807,989 Valdes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Valdez v. Gunter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Valdez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839,894 Valencia-Vargas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901 Valentin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Valentine v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 Valenzuela v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927 Valles; Evans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Valley Bank of Nev.; Allum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Valley Fidelity Bank & Trust Co.; Krug v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Strickland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Valutron, N. V. v. NCR Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Van Ackeren v. Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Vance v. Havens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:07 PGT*TCR cxcii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Van der Jagt v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879 Van der Jagt v. South Main Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Vandervelden v. Victoria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 VanDyke v. Douglas VanDyke Coal Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 VanDyke Coal Co.; VanDyke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Van Le; Ibarra v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Van Lo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903 Vannorsdell v. Rowland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Varela v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Vargas v. Shur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 Vaseur v. Lockhart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Vasil v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Vasquez; Hunt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Vasquez v. Murtishaw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Vasquez v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Vasquez-Olvera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Vaughn v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 Vaughn; Holland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Vaughn; Johnakin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Vaughn; Murray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 Vaughn; Reel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Vaughn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Vaught; Hause v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 V. C.; J. M. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907 Veale v. Marlborough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Veasey v. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954,1101 Velazquez v. Figueroa-Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Veldhuizen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Velez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Veltman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Venable, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Ventech Equipment, Inc. v. McNamara . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 Vereb v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Vereen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Vermont; Condosta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Vernon v. Crutchfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Vernon v. Marriott Hotel of Albuquerque . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Vernon v. Stevens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Vesta Ins. Co.; Amoco Production Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Vetter; Snap-On Tools Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Veysada v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Vickrey; Cross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Vickroy v. Rockwell International Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Victor v. Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008,1022 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:07 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxciii Page Victoria; Vandervelden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 Vienna Mortgage Corp. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . 819 Vigil v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Villa; Persico v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Villa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Village. See name of village. Villa Marina Yacht Harbor, Inc.; Chase Manhattan Bank, N. A. v. 818 Villanueva v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001,1183 Villanueva-Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Villar v. Crowley Maritime Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Villarreal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926 Villegas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Villines; Ramage v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Vinagera-Cesar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Vincent v. Lexington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Vincent v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Vineyard; Murray County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Vinson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Virginia; Atherton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886,1006 Virginia; Barber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Virginia; Beachem v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039,1124 Virginia; Beavers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Virginia; Blount v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Virginia; Brooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 Virginia; Ciamaricone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Virginia; Clay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969 Virginia; Dykes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Virginia; Gallagher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Virginia; MacLeod v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Virginia; Murphy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Virginia; Phillips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887 Virginia; Sloan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852 Virginia; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Virginia; Watts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Virginia Beach Correctional Center; MacLeod v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Virgin Islands; Knight v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 Virgin Islands; Tuitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882 Vista Paint Corp. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Vitale v. Brock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Vitarelli v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Vitek v. St. Paul Property & Casualty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Voinche v. Department of Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 Voinovich; Prunty v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935,1020 Voinovich; Sweet v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:07 PGT*TCR cxciv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Vollbrecht v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923,1007 Vollmer & Co. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Von Zuckerstein v. Argonne National Laboratory . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Vose v. Bowling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Voulgarelis v. Voulgarelis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 Voyles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Vreeland v. Townsend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 Vukadinovich v. Board of School Trustees, Mich. City Schools 844 Vukadinovich v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Wade; Christopher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Wade v. Hopper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Wade v. Shook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Wade v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Wages v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Waggoner v. Waggoner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Wagner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,1056,1134 Wagoner County; Sack v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Wahi v. Herman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969,1082 Wahl; Dimmig v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Wakefield v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937,1061 Walcott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Walhout; TFL, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915 Walker v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Walker; Gilbertson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807 Walker; Gonzalez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Walker; Gossett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Walker; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Walker v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Walker v. United States . . . . . . . . 822,849,902,1060,1064,1086,1133,1169 Walkner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Wall v. Rockwell International Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Wallin v. Indeterminate Sentence Review Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945 Wallis & Short, P. C.; Loomis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918,1006 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.; Blackmon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Walsh v. Ward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Walsh; Ward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Walter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Walter Industries, Inc.; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 Walters v. Allentown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Walters v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Walton v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889,1006 Walton v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Wanton v. Mann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:07 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxcv Page Warbington v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Ward, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Ward v. Berry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,973 Ward v. Demosthenes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Ward v. Department of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Ward; Harding v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Ward v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873 Ward v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Ward; Midwest Pride V, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Ward v. Peters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Ward v. Walsh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Ward; Walsh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Ward v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 Warden. See also name of warden. Warden, Clinton Correctional Facility; Aziz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Warden, Clinton Correctional Facility; Gilliard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888 Ward Petroleum Corp. v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Ware v. Grayson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Ware v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Warfel v. Brady . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Warner; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974 Warner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Warner v. Zent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Warren v. Grand Rapids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Warren v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950,1087,1167 Wasche; Jelinek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881 Washburn v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Washington; Benn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Washington; Bortnick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016,1160 Washington v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855,970 Washington; Entezari v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 Washington v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Washington v. James . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Washington; Jorgensen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Washington; Kennedy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Washington; Langford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838 Washington; Lottier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Washington; O'Dell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Washington v. Parker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897 Washington v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Washington; Schmuck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Washington; Tabor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Washington v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898,936,995,1017 Washington Dept. of Ecology; PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cty. v. . . . 810,1037 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:07 PGT*TCR cxcvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm'n; Democratic Cen- tral Comm. of District of Columbia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Washington Mills Electro Minerals Corp. v. DeLong Equip. Co. 1012 Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. CAE-Link Corp. . . . . 907 Wasko v. Estelle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015,1101 Wasserwald, Inc.; Cleary v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Waters v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Waters v. Churchill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911,961 Waters; Dove v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Waters; Matthews v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Waters; Richmond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Waters; Strickler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 Waters v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Waters v. University of Ala. Birmingham Medical Center . . . . . . 1165 Watkins v. Bowers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Watkins v. Murray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Watroba v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Watson v. LeCureux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Watson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Watson; West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 Watt v. Arvonio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Wattles v. Troy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959 Watts v. Hargett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Watts v. Rice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Watts v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Watts v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Weathers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 Weaver v. Kaye . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891,1006 Weaver v. Strine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891,1006 Webb v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Webb v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851,1169 Webber, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Webber v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Weber v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Webster v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Webster County Comm'n; Pardee & Curtin Lumber Co. v. . . . . . 990 Wedington v. Federal Correctional Institution, Butner . . . . . . . . 1053 Weekes; Hammond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Wehringer v. Brannigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Wei v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Weichert v. Richards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991 Weicker; Carangelo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Weiner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Weingarten v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:07 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxcvii Page Weingarten; Chorney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Weiss v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 Welborn; Gacy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,1006 Welborn; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Wellman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Wells v. Arave . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033,1034 Wells v. Sandahl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Wells v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Werner, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,1034 Wesch; Sinkfield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988,1046 West v. Buffalo Center-Rake School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 West; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 West v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 West; Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 West v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949,1066 West; Sikka v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 West v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 West v. Zenon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Westbrook v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 West & Co.; Newsome v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Westerfield; Lann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Western Electric Co.; Pitre's Estate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972 Western Pa. Hospital; Edmonds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Westfall v. Southwest Airlines Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Westfield Ins. Co.; Slabochova v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Watson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 West Motor Freight of Pa. v. S. S. Fisher Steel Corp. . . . . . . . . . 868 Weston Controls v. Palmiero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Westport Savings Bank; Pettitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Wheelabrator Corp. v. Bidlack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Wheeled Coach; Carley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868 Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp.; Bessemer & Lake Erie R. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023,1032,1091 Wheelock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Whetstone v. Whetstone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Whitaker v. Superior Court of Cal., Alameda County . . . . . . . . . 1050 Whitaker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902,1167 White, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 White v. Cooney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 White v. Detroit Diesel Allison Engine Plant/Truck & Bus GM Corp. Div. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958 White v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842 White v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:07 PGT*TCR cxcviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page White v. Gregory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 White; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 White v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946,1066 White; Mylar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 White v. Plant Guard Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921,973 White v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 White; Stanley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921,1066 White v. Temple Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951,970,1020 White v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996,1087,1089,1090,1111,1131 White; Ward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855 White Consolidated Industries, Inc. v. Blaw Knox Retirement Income Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 White Consolidated Industries, Inc. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Whited v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 White Plains Towing Corp. v. Wright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Whitfield v. Mitchell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Whitfield v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892,1090 Whitley; Alexander v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 Whitley; Gray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Whitley; Kaltenbach v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 Whitley; Krause v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Whitley; LeBouef v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895 Whitley; Pizzo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,959 Whitley; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Whitley v. Standen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Whitley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983 Whitley; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951,1014 Whitlock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Whitmer v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814 Whitmore v. Board of Ed. of DeKalb School Dist. No. 428 . . . . . . 1113 Whitson v. Hillhaven West, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921,1006 Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, S. E. & S. W. Areas Pension Fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Whitworth Bros. Storage Co.; Central States, S. E. & S. W. Areas Pension Fund v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 Wiater v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999 Wichita; Tilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976,1066 Wickliffe v. Farley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Wicks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Widdoss v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944 Widseth; Latimore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Wiener v. National City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824 Wigen; Augustin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:07 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxcix Page Wightman v. St. John's Hospital & Health Center, Inc. . . . . . . . . 953 Wike v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Wilcher v. Hargett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Wilcoxson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Wildberger v. Rosenbaum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Wildnauer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Wiley v. Supreme Court of Colo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 Wiley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Wilford v. Slusher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Wilkerson v. Gunn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Wilkerson v. Kaiser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Wilkins v. Babbitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Wilkinson; Brewer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Wilkinson; McFall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856,1005 Wilkinson; Mertens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Wilkinson; Noble v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Williams v. Adams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Williams v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Williams v. Atlanta Journal & Constitution, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Williams v. Carpenters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873,1066 Williams v. Cleland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Williams v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Williams v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Williams v. First Union National Bank of Ga. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Williams v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 Williams v. Fowler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Williams; Hudson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846 Williams v. Jenn-Air Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934,1020 Williams; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951 Williams v. Lord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Williams v. Maryland Home Improvement Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Williams; McCullough v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Williams v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923 Williams; Owens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Williams v. Palmore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864 Williams v. Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980 Williams v. Saltzstein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Williams v. School Dist. of Bethlehem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Williams v. Seeber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988,1075 Williams v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836,1027,1101,1170 Williams v. Trumbauer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886,1006 Williams v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849, 853,883,884,888,897,902,926,958,966,978,983,991,1014,1019, 1029,1087,1088,1090,1094,1099,1101,1120,1121,1127,1182 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:07 PGT*TCR cc TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Williams v. Whitley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951,1014 Williams v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Williams; Withrow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Williamson; Sipos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Williamson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829,1039,1082 Willis, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Willis v. Chicago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Willis; Chicago v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Willis v. Cleveland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851,1065 Willis v. Rison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Willis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857,1050 Willis v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Willis v. University Health Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Willis v. University Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976 Willoughby of Chevy Chase Condominium Council of Unit Owners, Inc.; Istvan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Willson; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896 Wilson v. Biggs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Wilson v. Curran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Wilson v. Department of Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Wilson v. Harlow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Wilson; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Wilson v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 Wilson v. Lindler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Wilson; Ocean Marine Mut. Protection & Indemnity Assn., Ltd. v. 1165 Wilson v. O'Malley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076,1173 Wilson; Phipps v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Wilson v. Southern R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Wilson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838,888,914,1109 Wilson; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Wilson v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Winborn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849 Winchester v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Windham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 Windsor Properties, Inc.; Yari v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Winfield v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997,1159 Winfield v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Winsett v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Winston, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912 Winston v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Winterboer; Asgrow Seed Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Winters v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Wirs, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Wirts v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:07 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cci Page Wisconsin; Bohling v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Wisconsin; Chronopoulos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Wisconsin; Echols v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Wisconsin; Eisenbart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Wisconsin; Hubanks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Wisconsin; Isiah B. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884 Wisconsin; Koch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880 Wisconsin; Lomprey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898 Wisconsin; Pittman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845 Wisconsin; Reed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836 Wisconsin; Santori v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Wisconsin; Schmitz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844 Wisconsin; Schultz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842,1005 Wisconsin; Vollbrecht v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923,1007 Wisconsin; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Wisconsin; Wirts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Wisconsin; Wotnoske v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Wisconsin Air National Guard; Knutson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933 Wisconsin State Public Defender; Heimermann v. . . . . . . . . . 1060,1216 Wise v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870 Wisneski; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Withrow v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Witkowski; Franklin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,973 Wittekamp v. Gulf & Western, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917 Wohlfarth v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812 Wohlford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998,1082 Wolens; American Airlines, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen; Ezold v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826 Wolfe, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974,1161 Wolfe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Wolff v. Life Ins. Co. of North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827 Wolff; Ruchman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871,1006 Wollersheim; Church of Scientology of Cal. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Wolshonak v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948 Wolsky v. Medical College of Hampton Roads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Wolstone v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Wombacher; Brooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Women's Health Center; Operation Rescue v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Women's Health Center, Inc.; Madsen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084,1189 Wood v. Attorney General of Tex. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Wood; Campbell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Wood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013,1086 Woodard, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Woodard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875,940,1132 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:07 PGT*TCR ccii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Woodrome v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Woodruff v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 934 Woods v. AT&T Information Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907,1007 Woods v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 Woods; McDonald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953,1016 Woods v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826,841,880,919,1004,1088 Woolsey; Doe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 Wooten v. Ellingsworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Wooten v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853 Wooten v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854 Woo Youn; Maritime Overseas Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Word of Faith World Outreach Center Church, Inc. v. Morales . . 823 Workman v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 World Omni Financial Corp.; Graves v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922,1020 Worldwide Ins. Management Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp. . . . 992 Worley v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832 Woroncow v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Worrall Publications, Inc.; Schwartz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Wortham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Wotnoske v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Wrest v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 W. R. Grace & Co.; Concordia College Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Wright v. Blanchard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924 Wright v. Crawford Long Hospital of Emory Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Wright v. Deland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834 Wright; Don's Towing v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Wright v. Dutton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857 Wright v. Fry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Wright; Isby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Wright v. John Deere Industrial Equipment Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Wright v. Kaiser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920 Wright v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831 Wright v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Wright v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871,927,1132 Wright; White Plains Towing Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865 Writers' Guild of America; Marino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978,1066 WSB­TV; TV News Clips of Atlanta, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Wuliger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Wurtsboro; Stokes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Wyatt v. Cole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Wyoming; Murray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Wyoming; Nebraska v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,1189 Wyre, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942 Wysinger v. Hoke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:07 PGT*TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cciii Page X-Citement Video, Inc.; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Yahr v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Yale Security, Inc.; Phelps v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 Yan Eng v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Yanik; Ayrs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Yarbrough; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935 Yarbrough v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Yari v. Windsor Properties, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859 Yarrito v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886 Ybarra v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997 Yeager v. McGregor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 Yeager v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956 Yeakel; Borowy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894 Yeggy v. Iowa City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Yelder; Alabama v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Yi-Hai Lin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Ylst; Hodgson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Ylst; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848 Yonkers; Pompe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871,1006 Yonkers Police Dept.; Nicholau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953 Yoshiko's Sauna v. Minneapolis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Youell & Cos. v. Getty Oil Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. McAngues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Youn; Maritime Overseas Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Young, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 Young; Empresa Nacional Siderurgica, S. A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Young v. Grifo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896,1026 Young v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838,1005 Young v. Hoffman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Young v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829 Young v. Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas . . . . . . . . 951 Young v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829,1053 Young v. Stepanik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009,1077 Young v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892,898,901,933,1090,1198,1204 Ysarras Ramirez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Yuter v. Tandem Computers Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993 Zack, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039 Zack v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,982,1057 Zady Natey, Inc. v. Food & Commercial Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977 Zambrano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902 Zamora v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Zander v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Zant; Burden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 Zant; Burger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847,1005,1020 510rep$u12 06-20-97 16:38:07 PGT*TCR cciv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Zant; Hance v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920,1020 Zant; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931 Zapien v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919 Zaragoza v. Zaragoza . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Zarick v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Zarling v. Universal Life Church . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952,1020 Zebulon v. Tran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839 Zeff & Zeff; Johnston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860,1005 Zenon; West v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Zent; Warner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Ziebarth v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933,1020 Ziegenhagen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 979 Zils, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085,1216 Zimmer; Barth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034 Zimmerman; Bronson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 Zimmerman v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 Zingers; Mendez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016,1082 Zinn v. Tansy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835 Zirpoli v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Zirretta v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Zlotoff; George v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Zlotoff; Prochazka v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Zoecon Corp.; Papas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913 Zuckerman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057,1173 Zuluaga v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874 Zurn Industries, Inc.; Lester v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Zweibon, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986 Zweifel; Pelletier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918 510us1$$1Z 05-14-96 20:21:07 PAGES OPINPGT CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AT OCTOBER TERM, 1993 DAY v. DAY on motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis No. 92­8788. Decided October 12, 1993* Since this Court's Rule 39.8 was first invoked in June 1993 to deny pro se petitioner Day in forma pauperis status, he has filed eight more peti- tions for certiorari, all of them demonstrably frivolous. Held: Day is denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the instant cases, and the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions for certiorari from him in noncriminal matters unless he pays the required docketing fee and submits his petition in compliance with this Court's Rule 33. This order will free the Court's limited resources to consider the claims of those petitioners who, unlike Day, have not abused the certiorari process. Motions denied. Per Curiam. Pro se petitioner Roy A. Day requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis under Rule 39 of this Court. We deny this request pursuant to Rule 39.8. Day is allowed until Novem- ber 2, 1993, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38 and to submit his petitions in compliance with *Together with No. 92­8792, Day v. Bekiempis, No. 92­8888, Day v. Heinrich et al., No. 92­8905, Day v. GAF Building Materials Corp., No. 92­8906, Day v. Clinton et al., No. 92­9018, Day v. Black et al., No. 92­9101, Day v. Deason et al., and No. 93­5430, Day v. Day, also on motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 1 510us1$$1Z 05-14-96 20:21:07 PAGES OPINPGT 2 DAY v. DAY Per Curiam this Court's Rule 33. We also direct the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari from Day in noncriminal matters unless he pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petition in compliance with Rule 33. Day is an abuser of this Court's certiorari process. We first invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Day in forma pauperis status last June. See In re Day, 509 U. S. 902 (1993). At that time he had filed 27 petitions in the past nine years. Although Day was granted in forma pauperis status to file these peti- tions, all were denied without recorded dissent. Since we first denied him in forma pauperis status last June, he has filed eight more petitions for certiorari with this Court-all of them demonstrably frivolous. As we have recognized, "[e]very paper filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous, re- quires some portion of the institution's limited resources. A part of the Court's responsibility is to see that these re- sources are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice." In re McDonald, 489 U. S. 180, 184 (1989) (per curiam). Consideration of Day's repetitious and frivolous petitions for certiorari does not promote this end. We have entered orders similar to the present one on pre- vious occasions to prevent pro se petitioners from filing repe- titious and frivolous requests for certiorari, see Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam), and repetitious and frivolous requests for ex- traordinary relief. See In re Sindram, 498 U. S. 177 (1991) (per curiam); In re McDonald, supra. Day's refusal to heed our earlier warning requires us to take this step. His abuse of the writ of certiorari has been in noncriminal cases, and so we limit our sanction accord- ingly. The order therefore will not prevent Day from peti- tioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be im- posed on him. But it will free this Court's limited resources to consider the claims of those petitioners who have not abused our certiorari process. It is so ordered. 510us1$$1Z 05-14-96 20:21:07 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 1 (1993) 3 Stevens, J., dissenting Justice Stevens, dissenting. Adhering to the views expressed in the dissenting opinions in Brown v. Herald Co., 464 U. S. 928, 931 (1983), In re McDonald, 489 U. S. 180, 185 (1989), and Wrenn v. Benson, 490 U. S. 89, 92 (1989), I would deny these petitions for writs of certiorari without reaching the merits of the motions to proceed in forma pauperis. In the future, however, I shall not encumber the record by noting my dissent from similar orders denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis, absent exceptional circumstances. 510us1$$2Z 05-14-96 20:22:38 PAGES OPINPGT 4 OCTOBER TERM, 1993 Per Curiam IN RE SASSOWER on motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis No. 92­8933. Decided October 12, 1993* In the three years prior to this Term, pro se petitioner Sassower had filed 11 petitions. However, in the last four months, he has suddenly increased his filings and now has 10 petitions pending before this Court, all of them patently frivolous. Held: Sassower is denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the in- stant cases, pursuant to this Court's Rule 39.8, and the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions for certiorari nor any petitions for extraordinary writs from him in noncriminal matters, unless he pays the required docketing fee and submits his petition in compliance with this Court's Rule 33. For the important reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1, In re Sindram, 498 U. S. 177, and In re McDonald, 489 U. S. 180, the Court feels com- pelled to enter this order, which will allow the Court to devote its lim- ited resources to the claims of petitioners who, unlike Sassower, have not abused the Court's process. Motions denied. Per Curiam. Pro se petitioner George Sassower requests leave to pro- ceed in forma pauperis under Rule 39 of this Court. We deny this request pursuant to Rule 39.8. Sassower is al- lowed until November 2, 1993, within which to pay the dock- eting fees required by Rule 38 and to submit his petitions in compliance with this Court's Rule 33. For the reasons explained below, we also direct the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari nor any petitions for extraor- *Together with No. 92­8934, Sassower v. Mead Data Central Inc. et al., No. 92­9228, Sassower v. Crites et al., No. 93­5045, Sassower v. Kriend- ler & Relkin et al., No. 93­5127, Sassower v. Feltman et al., No. 93­5128, Sassower v. Puccini Clothes et al., No. 93­5129, Sassower v. A. R. Fuels, Inc., et al., No. 93­5252, Sassower v. Reno, No. 93­5358, Sassower v. Ab- rams, Attorney General of New York, and No. 93­5596, In re Sassower, also on motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 510us1$$2Z 05-14-96 20:22:38 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 4 (1993) 5 Per Curiam dinary writs from Sassower in noncriminal matters unless he pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petition in compliance with Rule 33. Prior to this Term, Sassower had filed 11 petitions in this Court over the last three years. Although Sassower was granted in forma pauperis status to file these petitions, all were denied without recorded dissent.* During the last four months, Sassower has suddenly increased his filings. He currently has 10 petitions pending before this Court-all of them patently frivolous. Although we have not previously denied Sassower in forma pauperis status pursuant to Rule 39.8, we think it appropriate to enter an order pursuant to Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992). In both In re Sindram, 498 U. S. 177 (1991) (per curiam), and In re McDonald, 489 U. S. 180 (1989) (per curiam), we entered orders similar to this one without having previously denied petitioners' motions to proceed in forma pauperis under Rule 39.8. For the important reasons discussed in Martin, Sindram, and McDonald, we feel compelled to enter the order today barring prospective filings from Sassower. Sassower's abuse of the writ of certiorari and of the ex- traordinary writs has been in noncriminal cases, and so we limit our sanction accordingly. The order therefore will not prevent Sassower from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed on him. The order, how- *See Sassower v. New York, 499 U. S. 966 (1991) (certiorari); In re Sas- sower, 499 U. S. 935 (1991) (mandamus/prohibition); In re Sassower, 499 U. S. 935 (1991) (mandamus/prohibition); Sassower v. Mahoney, 498 U. S. 1108 (1991); In re Sassower, 499 U. S. 904 (1991) (mandamus/prohibition); In re Sassower, 498 U. S. 1081 (1991) (habeas corpus); In re Sassower, 498 U. S. 1081 (1991) (mandamus/prohibition); Sassower v. United States Court of Appeals for D. C. Cir., 498 U. S. 1094 (1991) (certiorari); Sassower v. Brieant, 498 U. S. 1094 (1991) (certiorari); Sassower v. Thornburgh, 498 U. S. 1036 (1991) (certiorari); Sassower v. Dillon, 493 U. S. 979 (1989) (certiorari). 510us1$$2Z 05-14-96 20:22:38 PAGES OPINPGT 6 IN RE SASSOWER Per Curiam ever, will allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused our process. It is so ordered. Justice Thomas and Justice Ginsburg took no part in the consideration or decision of the motion in No. 93­5252. 510us1$$3Z 04-22-96 09:38:10 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1993 7 Syllabus FLORENCE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT FOUR et al. v. CARTER, a minor, by and through her father and next friend, CARTER certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit No. 91­1523. Argued October 6, 1993-Decided November 9, 1993 After respondent Shannon Carter, a student in petitioner public school district, was classified as learning disabled, school officials met with her parents to formulate an individualized education program (IEP), as re- quired under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA or Act), 20 U. S. C. § 1400 et seq. Shannon's parents requested a hearing to challenge the proposed IEP's appropriateness. In the meantime, Shannon's parents enrolled her in Trident Academy, a private school specializing in educating children with disabilities. After the state and local educational authorities concluded that the IEP was adequate, Shannon's parents filed this suit, claiming that the school district had breached its duty under IDEA to provide Shannon with a "free appro- priate public education," § 1401(a)(18), and seeking reimbursement for tuition and other costs incurred at Trident. The District Court ruled in the parents' favor, holding that the proposed IEP violated IDEA, and that the education Shannon received at Trident was "appropriate" and in substantial compliance with IDEA's substantive requirements, even though the school did not comply with all of the Act's procedures. In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected the school district's argument that reimbursement is never proper when the parents choose a private school that is not approved by the State or that does not comply with all of the requirements of § 1401(a)(18). Held: A court may order reimbursement for parents who unilaterally withdraw their child from a public school that provides an inappropriate education under IDEA and put the child in a private school that pro- vides an education that is otherwise proper under IDEA, but does not meet all of § 1401(a)(18)'s requirements. Pp. 12­16. (a) In School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Ed. of Mass., 471 U. S. 359, 369­370, the Court recognized the right of parents who disagree with a proposed IEP to unilaterally withdraw their child from public school and place the child in private school, and held that IDEA's grant of equitable authority empowers a court to order school authori- ties retroactively to reimburse the parents if the court ultimately deter- 510us1$$3Z 04-22-96 09:38:10 PAGES OPINPGT 8 FLORENCE COUNTY SCHOOL DIST. FOUR v. CARTER Syllabus mines that the private placement, rather than the proposed IEP, is proper under the Act. P. 12. (b) Trident's failure to meet § 1401(a)(18)'s definition of a "free appro- priate public education" does not bar Shannon's parents from reimburse- ment, because the section's requirements cannot be read as applying to parental placements. The § 1401(a)(18) requirements that the education be "provided . . . under public supervision and direction," and that the IEP be designed by "a representative of the local educational agency" and "establish[ed]," "revise[d]," and "review[ed]" by the agency, will never be met in the context of a parental placement. Therefore to read them as applying to parental placements would effectively eliminate the right of unilateral withdrawal recognized in Burlington, and would defeat IDEA's purpose of ensuring that children with disabilities re- ceive an education that is both appropriate and free. Similarly, the § 1401(a)(18)(B) requirement that the school meet the standards of the state educational agency does not apply to private parental placements. It would be inconsistent with the Act's goals to forbid parents to educate their child at a school that provides an appropriate education simply because that school lacks the stamp of approval of the same public school system that failed to meet the child's needs in the first place. Parents' failure to select a state-approved program in favor of an unapproved option does not itself bar reimbursement. Pp. 12­15. (c) The school district's argument that allowing reimbursement for parents such as Shannon's puts an unreasonable burden on financially strapped local educational authorities is rejected. Reimbursement claims need not worry school officials who conform to IDEA's mandate to either give the child a free appropriate public education in a public setting, or place the child in an appropriate private setting of the State's choice. Moreover, parents who unilaterally change their child's place- ment during the pendency of IDEA review proceedings are entitled to reimbursement only if a federal court concludes both that the public placement violated IDEA and that the private placement was proper under the Act. Finally, total reimbursement will not be appropriate if a court fashioning discretionary equitable relief under IDEA de- termines that the cost of the private education was unreasonable. Pp. 15­16. 950 F. 2d 156, affirmed. O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Donald B. Ayer argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Beth Heifetz and Bruce E. Davis. 510us1$$3Z 04-22-96 09:38:10 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 7 (1993) 9 Opinion of the Court Peter W. D. Wright argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Nancy C. McCormick. Amy L. Wax argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Wil- liam Kanter, and John P. Schnitker.* Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA or Act), 84 Stat. 175, as amended, 20 U. S. C. § 1400 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. IV), requires States to provide disabled chil- dren with a "free appropriate public education," § 1401(a)(18). This case presents the question whether a court may order reimbursement for parents who unilaterally withdraw their child from a public school that provides an inappropriate edu- cation under IDEA and put the child in a private school that provides an education that is otherwise proper under IDEA, but does not meet all the requirements of § 1401(a)(18). We *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Ari- zona et al. by J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, and Andrew H. Baida and Joann Goedert, Assistant Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Grant Woods of Arizona, Michael J. Bowers of Georgia, Richard Ieyoub of Louisiana, Michael E. Carpenter of Maine, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Robert J. Del Tufo of New Jersey, Tom Udall of New Mexico, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, Theodore R. Kulongoski of Oregon, T. Travis Medlock of South Carolina, Mark Bar- nett of South Dakota, Charles Burson of Tennessee, R. Paul Van Dam of Utah, Stephen D. Rosenthal of Virginia, and Joseph B. Meyer of Wyoming; for the National League of Cities et al. by Richard Ruda; and for the National School Boards Association et al. by August W. Steinhilber, Thomas A. Shannon, and Gwendolyn H. Gregory. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the National Head Injury Foundation, Inc., by Craig Denmead and Kevin M. Maloney; for the Learning Disability Association of America et al. by Mark S. Par- tin and Reed Martin; and for the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill et al. by Steven Ney and Andrew S. Penn. 510us1$$3Z 04-22-96 09:38:10 PAGES OPINPGT 10 FLORENCE COUNTY SCHOOL DIST. FOUR v. CARTER Opinion of the Court hold that the court may order such reimbursement, and therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I Respondent Shannon Carter was classified as learning dis- abled in 1985, while a ninth grade student in a school oper- ated by petitioner Florence County School District Four. School officials met with Shannon's parents to formulate an individualized education program (IEP) for Shannon, as required under IDEA. 20 U. S. C. §§ 1401(a)(18) and (20), 1414(a)(5) (1988 ed. and Supp. IV). The IEP provided that Shannon would stay in regular classes except for three peri- ods of individualized instruction per week, and established specific goals in reading and mathematics of four months' progress for the entire school year. Shannon's parents were dissatisfied, and requested a hearing to challenge the appro- priateness of the IEP. See § 1415(b)(2). Both the local edu- cational officer and the state educational agency hearing of- ficer rejected Shannon's parents' claim and concluded that the IEP was adequate. In the meantime, Shannon's parents had placed her in Trident Academy, a private school special- izing in educating children with disabilities. Shannon began at Trident in September 1985 and graduated in the spring of 1988. Shannon's parents filed this suit in July 1986, claiming that the school district had breached its duty under IDEA to pro- vide Shannon with a "free appropriate public education," § 1401(a)(18), and seeking reimbursement for tuition and other costs incurred at Trident. After a bench trial, the District Court ruled in the parents' favor. The court held that the school district's proposed educational program and the achievement goals of the IEP "were wholly inadequate" and failed to satisfy the requirements of the Act. App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a. The court further held that "[a]lthough [Trident Academy] did not comply with all of the procedures outlined in [IDEA]," the school "provided Shannon an excel- 510us1$$3Z 04-22-96 09:38:10 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 7 (1993) 11 Opinion of the Court lent education in substantial compliance with all the substan- tive requirements" of the statute. Id., at 37a. The court found that Trident "evaluated Shannon quarterly, not yearly as mandated in [IDEA], it provided Shannon with low teacher-student ratios, and it developed a plan which allowed Shannon to receive passing marks and progress from grade to grade." Ibid. The court also credited the findings of its own expert, who determined that Shannon had made "sig- nificant progress" at Trident and that her reading compre- hension had risen three grade levels in her three years at the school. Id., at 29a. The District Court concluded that Shannon's education was "appropriate" under IDEA, and that Shannon's parents were entitled to reimbursement of tuition and other costs. Id., at 37a. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 950 F. 2d 156 (1991). The court agreed that the IEP pro- posed by the school district was inappropriate under IDEA. It also rejected the school district's argument that reim- bursement is never proper when the parents choose a private school that is not approved by the State or that does not comply with all the terms of IDEA. According to the Court of Appeals, neither the text of the Act nor its legislative history imposes a "requirement that the private school be approved by the state in parent-placement reimbursement cases." Id., at 162. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals concluded, IDEA's state-approval requirement applies only when a child is placed in a private school by public school officials. Accordingly, "when a public school system has de- faulted on its obligations under the Act, a private school placement is `proper under the Act' if the education provided by the private school is `reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.' " Id., at 163, quoting Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U. S. 176, 207 (1982). The court below recognized that its holding conflicted with Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free School Dist., 873 F. 2d 563, 510us1$$3Z 04-22-96 09:38:10 PAGES OPINPGT 12 FLORENCE COUNTY SCHOOL DIST. FOUR v. CARTER Opinion of the Court 568 (1989), in which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that parental placement in a private school can- not be proper under the Act unless the private school in question meets the standards of the state education agency. We granted certiorari, 507 U. S. 907 (1993), to resolve this conflict among the Courts of Appeals. II In School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Ed. of Mass., 471 U. S. 359, 369 (1985), we held that IDEA's grant of equitable authority empowers a court "to order school au- thorities to reimburse parents for their expenditures on pri- vate special education for a child if the court ultimately de- termines that such placement, rather than a proposed IEP, is proper under the Act." Congress intended that IDEA's promise of a "free appropriate public education" for disabled children would normally be met by an IEP's provision for education in the regular public schools or in private schools chosen jointly by school officials and parents. In cases where cooperation fails, however, "parents who disagree with the proposed IEP are faced with a choice: go along with the IEP to the detriment of their child if it turns out to be inappropriate or pay for what they consider to be the appropriate placement." Id., at 370. For parents willing and able to make the latter choice, "it would be an empty victory to have a court tell them several years later that they were right but that these expenditures could not in a proper case be reimbursed by the school officials." Ibid. Be- cause such a result would be contrary to IDEA's guarantee of a "free appropriate public education," we held that "Con- gress meant to include retroactive reimbursement to parents as an available remedy in a proper case." Ibid. As this case comes to us, two issues are settled: (1) the school district's proposed IEP was inappropriate under IDEA, and (2) although Trident did not meet the § 1401(a)(18) requirements, it provided an education other- 510us1$$3Z 04-22-96 09:38:10 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 7 (1993) 13 Opinion of the Court wise proper under IDEA. This case presents the narrow question whether Shannon's parents are barred from reim- bursement because the private school in which Shannon enrolled did not meet the § 1401(a)(18) definition of a "free appropriate public education." * We hold that they are not, because § 1401(a)(18)'s requirements cannot be read as apply- ing to parental placements. Section 1401(a)(18)(A) requires that the education be "pro- vided at public expense, under public supervision and direc- tion." Similarly, § 1401(a)(18)(D) requires schools to provide an IEP, which must be designed by "a representative of the local educational agency," 20 U. S. C. § 1401(a)(20) (1988 ed., Supp. IV), and must be "establish[ed]," "revise[d]," and "re- view[ed]" by the agency, § 1414(a)(5). These requirements do not make sense in the context of a parental placement. In this case, as in all Burlington reimbursement cases, the parents' rejection of the school district's proposed IEP is the very reason for the parents' decision to put their child in a private school. In such cases, where the private place- ment has necessarily been made over the school district's objection, the private school education will not be under "public supervision and direction." Accordingly, to read the § 1401(a)(18) requirements as applying to parental place- ments would effectively eliminate the right of unilateral withdrawal recognized in Burlington. Moreover, IDEA was intended to ensure that children with disabilities receive an education that is both appropriate and free. Burlington, supra, at 373. To read the provisions of § 1401(a)(18) to bar *Section 1401(a)(18) defines "free appropriate public education" as "spe- cial education and related services that- "(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge, "(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency, "(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved, and "(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program . . . ." 510us1$$3Z 04-22-96 09:38:10 PAGES OPINPGT 14 FLORENCE COUNTY SCHOOL DIST. FOUR v. CARTER Opinion of the Court reimbursement in the circumstances of this case would de- feat this statutory purpose. Nor do we believe that reimbursement is necessarily barred by a private school's failure to meet state education standards. Trident's deficiencies, according to the school district, were that it employed at least two faculty members who were not state certified and that it did not develop IEP's. As we have noted, however, the § 1401(a)(18) re- quirements-including the requirement that the school meet the standards of the state educational agency, § 1401(a) (18)(B)-do not apply to private parental placements. In- deed, the school district's emphasis on state standards is somewhat ironic. As the Court of Appeals noted, "it hardly seems consistent with the Act's goals to forbid parents from educating their child at a school that provides an appropriate education simply because that school lacks the stamp of ap- proval of the same public school system that failed to meet the child's needs in the first place." 950 F. 2d, at 164. Accord- ingly, we disagree with the Second Circuit's theory that "a parent may not obtain reimbursement for a unilateral place- ment if that placement was in a school that was not on [the State's] approved list of private" schools. Tucker, 873 F. 2d, at 568 (internal quotation marks omitted). Parents' failure to select a program known to be approved by the State in favor of an unapproved option is not itself a bar to reimbursement. Furthermore, although the absence of an approved list of private schools is not essential to our holding, we note that parents in the position of Shannon's have no way of knowing at the time they select a private school whether the school meets state standards. South Carolina keeps no publicly available list of approved private schools, but instead ap- proves private school placements on a case-by-case basis. In fact, although public school officials had previously placed three children with disabilities at Trident, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a, Trident had not received blanket approval from 510us1$$3Z 04-22-96 09:38:10 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 7 (1993) 15 Opinion of the Court the State. South Carolina's case-by-case approval system meant that Shannon's parents needed the cooperation of state officials before they could know whether Trident was state approved. As we recognized in Burlington, such cooperation is unlikely in cases where the school officials disagree with the need for the private placement. 471 U. S., at 372. III The school district also claims that allowing reimburse- ment for parents such as Shannon's puts an unreasonable burden on financially strapped local educational authorities. The school district argues that requiring parents to choose a state-approved private school if they want reimbursement is the only meaningful way to allow States to control costs; otherwise States will have to reimburse dissatisfied parents for any private school that provides an education that is proper under the Act, no matter how expensive it may be. There is no doubt that Congress has imposed a significant financial burden on States and school districts that partici- pate in IDEA. Yet public educational authorities who want to avoid reimbursing parents for the private education of a disabled child can do one of two things: give the child a free appropriate public education in a public setting, or place the child in an appropriate private setting of the State's choice. This is IDEA's mandate, and school officials who conform to it need not worry about reimbursement claims. Moreover, parents who, like Shannon's, "unilaterally change their child's placement during the pendency of review proceedings, without the consent of state or local school offi- cials, do so at their own financial risk." Burlington, supra, at 373­374. They are entitled to reimbursement only if a federal court concludes both that the public placement violated IDEA and that the private school placement was proper under the Act. Finally, we note that once a court holds that the public placement violated IDEA, it is authorized to "grant such 510us1$$3Z 04-22-96 09:38:10 PAGES OPINPGT 16 FLORENCE COUNTY SCHOOL DIST. FOUR v. CARTER Opinion of the Court relief as the court determines is appropriate." 20 U. S. C. § 1415(e)(2). Under this provision, "equitable considerations are relevant in fashioning relief," Burlington, 471 U. S., at 374, and the court enjoys "broad discretion" in so doing, id., at 369. Courts fashioning discretionary equitable relief under IDEA must consider all relevant factors, including the appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement that should be required. Total reimbursement will not be appro- priate if the court determines that the cost of the private education was unreasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. So ordered. 510us1$$4Z 06-18-97 16:34:48 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1993 17 Syllabus HARRIS v. FORKLIFT SYSTEMS, INC. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit No. 92­1168. Argued October 13, 1993-Decided November 9, 1993 Petitioner Harris sued her former employer, respondent Forklift Systems, Inc., claiming that the conduct of Forklift's president toward her consti- tuted "abusive work environment" harassment because of her gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Declaring this to be "a close case," the District Court found, among other things, that Forklift's president often insulted Harris because of her gender and often made her the target of unwanted sexual innuendos. However, the court concluded that the comments in question did not create an abusive environment because they were not "so severe as to . . . seri- ously affect [Harris'] psychological well-being" or lead her to "suffe[r] injury." The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: To be actionable as "abusive work environment" harassment, con- duct need not "seriously affect [an employee's] psychological well-being" or lead the plaintiff to "suffe[r] injury." Pp. 21­23. (a) The applicable standard, here reaffirmed, is stated in Meritor Sav- ings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U. S. 57: Title VII is violated when the workplace is permeated with discriminatory behavior that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a discriminatorily hostile or abusive work- ing environment, id., at 64, 67. This standard requires an objectively hostile or abusive environment-one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive-as well as the victim's subjective perception that the environment is abusive. Pp. 21­22. (b) Whether an environment is "hostile" or "abusive" can be deter- mined only by looking at all the circumstances, which may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is phys- ically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work perform- ance. The effect on the employee's psychological well-being is relevant in determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive. But while psychological harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken into account, no single factor is required. Pp. 22­23. (c) Reversal and remand are required because the District Court's erroneous application of the incorrect legal standard may well have in- fluenced its ultimate conclusion that the work environment was not in- 510us1$$4Z 06-18-97 16:34:48 PAGES OPINPGT 18 HARRIS v. FORKLIFT SYSTEMS, INC. Opinion of the Court timidating or abusive to Harris, especially given that the court found this to be a "close case." P. 23. 976 F. 2d 733, reversed and remanded. O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Scalia, J., post, p. 24, and Ginsburg, J., post, p. 25, filed concurring opinions. Irwin Venick argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Robert Belton and Rebecca L. Brown. Jeffrey P. Minear argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae in support of petitioner. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Turner, Dennis J. Dimsey, Thomas E. Chandler, Donald R. Livingston, Gwendolyn Young Reams, and Carolyn L. Wheeler. Stanley M. Chernau argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Paul F. Mickey, Jr., Michael A. Carvin, and W. Eric Pilsk.* Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we consider the definition of a discriminatorily "abusive work environment" (also known as a "hostile work *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Steven R. Shapiro, John A. Powell, and Lois C. Waldman; for Feminists for Free Expression by Cathy E. Crosson; for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., et al. by Elaine R. Jones and Eric Schnapper; for the National Conference of Women's Bar Associations et al. by Edith Barnett; for the National Em- ployment Lawyers Association by Margaret A. Harris, Katherine L. But- ler, and William J. Smith; for the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. by Deborah A. Ellis, Sarah E. Burns, Richard F. Ziegler, and Shari Siegel; for the Southern States Police Benevolent Association et al. by J. Michael McGuinness; and for the Women's Legal Defense Fund et al. by Carolyn F. Corwin, Judith L. Lichtman, Donna R. Lenhoff, and Susan Deller Ross. Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Ann Elizabeth Rees- man filed a brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Psychological Asso- ciation by Dort S. Bigg; and for the Employment Law Center et al. by Patricia A. Shiu. 510us1$$4Z 06-18-97 16:34:48 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 17 (1993) 19 Opinion of the Court environment") under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (1988 ed., Supp. III). I Teresa Harris worked as a manager at Forklift Systems, Inc., an equipment rental company, from April 1985 until October 1987. Charles Hardy was Forklift's president. The Magistrate found that, throughout Harris' time at Forklift, Hardy often insulted her because of her gender and often made her the target of unwanted sexual innuendos. Hardy told Harris on several occasions, in the presence of other employees, "You're a woman, what do you know" and "We need a man as the rental manager"; at least once, he told her she was "a dumb ass woman." App. to Pet. for Cert. A­13. Again in front of others, he suggested that the two of them "go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate [Harris'] raise." Id., at A­14. Hardy occasionally asked Harris and other female employees to get coins from his front pants pocket. Ibid. He threw objects on the ground in front of Harris and other women, and asked them to pick the objects up. Id., at A­14 to A­15. He made sexual innuendos about Harris' and other women's clothing. Id., at A­15. In mid-August 1987, Harris complained to Hardy about his conduct. Hardy said he was surprised that Harris was of- fended, claimed he was only joking, and apologized. Id., at A­16. He also promised he would stop, and based on this assurance Harris stayed on the job. Ibid. But in early September, Hardy began anew: While Harris was arranging a deal with one of Forklift's customers, he asked her, again in front of other employees, "What did you do, promise the guy . . . some [sex] Saturday night?" Id., at A­17. On October 1, Harris collected her paycheck and quit. Harris then sued Forklift, claiming that Hardy's conduct had created an abusive work environment for her because of her gender. The United States District Court for the Mid- dle District of Tennessee, adopting the report and recom- 510us1$$4Z 06-18-97 16:34:48 PAGES OPINPGT 20 HARRIS v. FORKLIFT SYSTEMS, INC. Opinion of the Court mendation of the Magistrate, found this to be "a close case," id., at A­31, but held that Hardy's conduct did not create an abusive environment. The court found that some of Hardy's comments "offended [Harris], and would offend the reason- able woman," id., at A­33, but that they were not "so severe as to be expected to seriously affect [Harris'] psychological well-being. A reasonable woman man- ager under like circumstances would have been offended by Hardy, but his conduct would not have risen to the level of interfering with that person's work performance. "Neither do I believe that [Harris] was subjectively so offended that she suffered injury . . . . Although Hardy may at times have genuinely offended [Harris], I do not believe that he created a working environment so poi- soned as to be intimidating or abusive to [Harris]." Id., at A­34 to A­35. In focusing on the employee's psychological well-being, the District Court was following Circuit precedent. See Rab- idue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F. 2d 611, 620 (CA6 1986), cert. denied, 481 U. S. 1041 (1987). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a brief unpub- lished decision. Judgt. order reported at 976 F. 2d 733 (1992). We granted certiorari, 507 U. S. 959 (1993), to resolve a conflict among the Circuits on whether conduct, to be action- able as "abusive work environment" harassment (no quid pro quo harassment issue is present here), must "seriously affect [an employee's] psychological well-being" or lead the plaintiff to "suffe[r] injury." Compare Rabidue (requiring serious effect on psychological well-being); Vance v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 863 F. 2d 1503, 1510 (CA11 1989) (same); and Downes v. FAA, 775 F. 2d 288, 292 (CA Fed. 1985) (same), with Ellison v. Brady, 924 F. 2d 872, 877­878 (CA9 1991) (rejecting such a requirement). 510us1$$4Z 06-18-97 16:34:48 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 17 (1993) 21 Opinion of the Court II Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "an un- lawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discrimi- nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e­2(a)(1). As we made clear in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U. S. 57 (1986), this lan- guage "is not limited to `economic' or `tangible' discrimina- tion. The phrase `terms, conditions, or privileges of employ- ment' evinces a congressional intent `to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in em- ployment," which includes requiring people to work in a dis- criminatorily hostile or abusive environment. Id., at 64, quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, 707, n. 13 (1978) (some internal quotation marks omitted). When the workplace is permeated with "discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult," 477 U. S., at 65, that is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment," id., at 67 (internal brackets and quo- tation marks omitted), Title VII is violated. This standard, which we reaffirm today, takes a middle path between making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psy- chological injury. As we pointed out in Meritor, "mere ut- terance of an . . . epithet which engenders offensive feelings in a employee," ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted) does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to impli- cate Title VII. Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work envi- ronment-an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title VII's purview. Like- wise, if the victim does not subjectively perceive the environ- ment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the 510us1$$4Z 06-18-97 16:34:48 PAGES OPINPGT 22 HARRIS v. FORKLIFT SYSTEMS, INC. Opinion of the Court conditions of the victim's employment, and there is no Title VII violation. But Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown. A discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not seriously affect employees' psychological well-being, can and often will detract from employees' job performance, discourage em- ployees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advanc- ing in their careers. Moreover, even without regard to these tangible effects, the very fact that the discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or national origin offends Title VII's broad rule of workplace equality. The appalling conduct alleged in Meritor, and the reference in that case to environments " `so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy com- pletely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers,' " id., at 66, quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F. 2d 234, 238 (CA5 1971), cert. denied, 406 U. S. 957 (1972), merely present some especially egregious examples of harassment. They do not mark the boundary of what is actionable. We therefore believe the District Court erred in relying on whether the conduct "seriously affect[ed] plaintiff's psy- chological well-being" or led her to "suffe[r] injury." Such an inquiry may needlessly focus the factfinder's attention on concrete psychological harm, an element Title VII does not require. Certainly Title VII bars conduct that would seri- ously affect a reasonable person's psychological well-being, but the statute is not limited to such conduct. So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is per- ceived, as hostile or abusive, Meritor, supra, at 67, there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious. This is not, and by its nature cannot be, a mathematically precise test. We need not answer today all the potential 510us1$$4Z 06-18-97 16:34:48 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 17 (1993) 23 Opinion of the Court questions it raises, nor specifically address the Equal Em- ployment Opportunity Commission's new regulations on this subject, see 58 Fed. Reg. 51266 (1993) (proposed 29 CFR §§ 1609.1, 1609.2); see also 29 CFR § 1604.11 (1993). But we can say that whether an environment is "hostile" or "abusive" can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances. These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. The effect on the employee's psycholog- ical well-being is, of course, relevant to determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive. But while psychological harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken into account, no single factor is required. III Forklift, while conceding that a requirement that the con- duct seriously affect psychological well-being is unfounded, argues that the District Court nonetheless correctly applied the Meritor standard. We disagree. Though the District Court did conclude that the work environment was not "in- timidating or abusive to [Harris]," App. to Pet. for Cert. A­35, it did so only after finding that the conduct was not "so severe as to be expected to seriously affect plaintiff's psychological well-being," id., at A­34, and that Harris was not "subjectively so offended that she suffered injury," ibid. The District Court's application of these incorrect standards may well have influenced its ultimate conclusion, especially given that the court found this to be a "close case," id., at A­31. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Ap- peals, and remand the case for further proceedings consist- ent with this opinion. So ordered. 510us1$$4Z 06-18-97 16:34:48 PAGES OPINPGT 24 HARRIS v. FORKLIFT SYSTEMS, INC. Scalia, J., concurring Justice Scalia, concurring. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U. S. 57 (1986), held that Title VII prohibits sexual harassment that takes the form of a hostile work environment. The Court stated that sexual harassment is actionable if it is "sufficiently se- vere or pervasive `to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment.' " Id., at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F. 2d 897, 904 (CA11 1982)). Today's opinion elaborates that the chal- lenged conduct must be severe or pervasive enough "to cre- ate an objectively hostile or abusive work environment-an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive." Ante, at 21. "Abusive" (or "hostile," which in this context I take to mean the same thing) does not seem to me a very clear standard-and I do not think clarity is at all increased by adding the adverb "objectively" or by appealing to a "reason- able person['s]" notion of what the vague word means. To- day's opinion does list a number of factors that contribute to abusiveness, see ante, at 23, but since it neither says how much of each is necessary (an impossible task) nor identifies any single factor as determinative, it thereby adds little cer- titude. As a practical matter, today's holding lets virtually unguided juries decide whether sex-related conduct engaged in (or permitted by) an employer is egregious enough to war- rant an award of damages. One might say that what consti- tutes "negligence" (a traditional jury question) is not much more clear and certain than what constitutes "abusiveness." Perhaps so. But the class of plaintiffs seeking to recover for negligence is limited to those who have suffered harm, whereas under this statute "abusiveness" is to be the test of whether legal harm has been suffered, opening more expan- sive vistas of litigation. Be that as it may, I know of no alternative to the course the Court today has taken. One of the factors mentioned in the Court's nonexhaustive list-whether the conduct unrea- 510us1$$4Z 06-18-97 16:34:48 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 17 (1993) 25 Ginsburg, J., concurring sonably interferes with an employee's work performance- would, if it were made an absolute test, provide greater guid- ance to juries and employers. But I see no basis for such a limitation in the language of the statute. Accepting Meri- tor's interpretation of the term "conditions of employment" as the law, the test is not whether work has been impaired, but whether working conditions have been discriminatorily altered. I know of no test more faithful to the inherently vague statutory language than the one the Court today adopts. For these reasons, I join the opinion of the Court. Justice Ginsburg, concurring. Today the Court reaffirms the holding of Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U. S. 57, 66 (1986): "[A] plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that dis- crimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment." The critical issue, Title VII's text indi- cates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disad- vantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e­2(a)(1) (declaring that it is unlawful to discriminate with respect to, inter alia, "terms" or "conditions" of em- ployment). As the Equal Employment Opportunity Com- mission emphasized, see Brief for United States and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amici Curiae 9­14, the adjudicator's inquiry should center, dominantly, on whether the discriminatory conduct has unreasonably inter- fered with the plaintiff's work performance. To show such interference, "the plaintiff need not prove that his or her tangible productivity has declined as a result of the harass- ment." Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 858 F. 2d 345, 349 (CA6 1988). It suffices to prove that a reasonable person subjected to the discriminatory conduct would find, as the plaintiff did, that the harassment so altered working condi- tions as to "ma[k]e it more difficult to do the job." See ibid. Davis concerned race-based discrimination, but that differ- 510us1$$4Z 06-18-97 16:34:48 PAGES OPINPGT 26 HARRIS v. FORKLIFT SYSTEMS, INC. Ginsburg, J., concurring ence does not alter the analysis; except in the rare case in which a bona fide occupational qualification is shown, see Au- tomobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U. S. 187, 200­207 (1991) (construing 42 U. S. C. § 2000e­2(e)(1)), Title VII declares discriminatory practices based on race, gender, religion, or national origin equally unlawful.* The Court's opinion, which I join, seems to me in harmony with the view expressed in this concurring statement. *Indeed, even under the Court's equal protection jurisprudence, which requires "an exceedingly persuasive justification" for a gender-based clas- sification, Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U. S. 455, 461 (1981) (internal quota- tion marks omitted), it remains an open question whether "classifications based upon gender are inherently suspect." See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 724, and n. 9 (1982). 510us1$$5H 06-18-97 16:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1993 27 Syllabus IZUMI SEIMITSU KOGYO KABUSHIKI KAISHA v. U. S. PHILIPS CORP. et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the federal circuit No. 92­1123. Argued October 12, 1993-Decided November 30, 1993 Petitioner Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha was a party at the first trial in an action brought against it and respondent Windmere Corpora- tion by respondent U. S. Philips Corporation, but was not a party to the second trial, in which Windmere prevailed. While the judgments from the second trial were on appeal, respondents reached a settlement and filed a joint motion to vacate the District Court's judgments. Izumi's motion to intervene in the appeal for purposes of opposing vacatur was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that Izumi was not a party to the action, and the court went on to find that vacatur was appropriate. Held: The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. The single question Izumi presented to this Court for review is whether the courts of appeals should routinely vacate district court final judgments at the parties' request when cases are settled on appeal. However, in order to reach this question, the Court would have to address a question not raised by Izumi until its brief on the merits: whether the Court of Appeals improperly denied Izumi's motion to intervene. Since the lat- ter question was neither presented in the petition for certiorari nor fairly included in the question that was presented, as required by this Court's Rule 14.1, it can be considered only if the Court deems this to be an exceptional case. The case bears scant resemblance to those cases in which the Court has made exceptions to the Rule's provisions, for it is unlikely that any new principle of law would be enunciated should review be undertaken. Moreover, faithful application of the Rule helps ensure that the Court is not tempted to engage in ill-considered deci- sions of relatively factbound issues not presented in the petition in order to reach the question on which certiorari was actually granted. It also informs those seeking review that the Court strongly disapproves the practice of smuggling additional questions into a case after certiorari is granted. Certiorari dismissed. Reported below: 971 F. 2d 728. 510us1$$5H 06-18-97 16:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT 28 IZUMI SEIMITSU KOGYO KABUSHIKI KAISHA v. U. S. PHILIPS CORP. Per Curiam Herbert H. Mintz argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Robert D. Litowitz, Jean Burke Fordis, David S. Forman, and William L. Androlia. Garrard R. Beeney argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were William E. Willis, John L. Hardiman, Sheldon Karon, and Paul M. Dodyk. Thomas G. Hungar argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Acting Assistant At- torney General Schiffer, Acting Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Leonard Schaitman, and John P. Schnitker.* Per Curiam. In order to reach the merits of this case, we would have to address a question that was neither presented in the peti- tion for certiorari nor fairly included in the one question that was presented. Because we will consider questions not raised in the petition only in the most exceptional cases, and because we conclude this is not such a case, we dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. Petitioner was named as a defendant, along with respond- ent Windmere Corporation, in an action brought by respond- ent U. S. Philips Corporation in the District Court for the Southern District of Florida claiming that the defendants had infringed Philips' patent rights and engaged in unfair trade competition. Windmere counterclaimed for antitrust violations. At the first trial of the action, judgment was en- tered on a jury verdict for Philips on its patent infringement claim, and neither Izumi nor Windmere appealed. Philips also prevailed on Windmere's antitrust counterclaim, and the District Court ordered a new trial on the unfair competition *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Sears Roebuck & Co. by Roger D. Greer and Kara F. Cenar; and for Trial Lawyers for Public Justice by Jill E. Fisch and Arthur H. Bryant. Jay M. Smyser filed a brief for the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., as amicus curiae urging affirmance. 510us1$$5H 06-18-97 16:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 27 (1993) 29 Per Curiam claim. On Windmere's interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the judgment on the antitrust counterclaim and remanded the case for a new trial. U. S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 861 F. 2d 695 (CA Fed. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U. S. 1068 (1989). Izumi took no further part in the litigation. A second jury found in favor of Windmere both on Philips' unfair competition claim and on Windmere's antitrust coun- terclaim, and judgment was entered in favor of Windmere on the latter for more than $89 million. Philips appealed both judgments to the Federal Circuit. Before the Court of Appeals decided the case, however, Windmere and Philips reached a settlement wherein Philips agreed to pay Wind- mere $57 million. Windmere and Philips also agreed jointly to request the Court of Appeals to vacate the District Court's judgments, although the settlement was not condi- tioned on the Federal Circuit granting the vacatur motion. After Windmere and Philips filed their joint motion to va- cate, petitioner sought to intervene on appeal for purposes of opposing vacatur. The Court of Appeals denied Izumi's motion to intervene. U. S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 971 F. 2d 728, 730­731 (CA Fed. 1992). It reasoned that Izumi was not a party to the second trial, and that its financial support of Windmere's litigation as an indemnitor was not sufficient to confer party status. The Court of Appeals also concluded that Izumi's interest in preserving the judgment for collateral estoppel purposes was insufficient to provide standing.1 Ibid. The Court of Appeals proceeded to review the vacatur motion and concluded that, because the settlement included all the parties to the appeal, vacatur was appropriate. Id., at 731. Title 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1) provides, in relevant part: 1 Petitioner hoped to preserve the judgment for use in a suit brought by Philips against Sears and Izumi in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. As with Windmere, Izumi has agreed to indemnify Sears' litigation expenses. 510us1$$5H 06-18-97 16:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT 30 IZUMI SEIMITSU KOGYO KABUSHIKI KAISHA v. U. S. PHILIPS CORP. Per Curiam "Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court . . . "(1) [B]y writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree." (Emphasis added.) Because the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for intervention, Izumi is not a party to this particular civil case. One who has been denied the right to intervene in a case in a court of appeals may petition for certiorari to review that ruling, Automobile Workers v. Scofield, 382 U. S. 205, 208­ 209 (1965), but Izumi presented no such question in its peti- tion for certiorari. It presented a single question for our review: "Should the United States Courts of Appeals rou- tinely vacate district court final judgments at the parties' request when cases are settled while on appeal?" Because this question has divided the Courts of Appeals,2 we granted certiorari. 507 U. S. 907 (1993). In its brief on the merits, petitioner added the following to its list of questions pre- sented: "Whether the court of appeals should have permitted Petitioner to oppose Respondents' motion to vacate the dis- trict court judgment." This Court's Rule 14.1(a) provides, in relevant part: "The statement of any question presented [in a petition for certio- rari] will be deemed to comprise every subsidiary question fairly included therein. Only the questions set forth in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the 2 Like the Federal Circuit, the Second Circuit will generally grant mo- tions to vacate when parties settle on appeal. See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Market, Inc., 756 F. 2d 280, 282­284 (CA2 1985). The Third, District of Columbia, and Seventh Circuits will generally deny such motions. See Clarendon Ltd. v. Nu-West Industries, Inc., 936 F. 2d 127 (CA3 1991); In re United States, 927 F. 2d 626 (CADC 1991); In re Memorial Hospital of Iowa County, Inc., 862 F. 2d 1299 (CA7 1988). The Ninth Circuit requires district courts to balance "the competing values of finality of judgment and right to relitigation of unreviewed disputes." Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. Western Conference of Teamsters, 686 F. 2d 720, 722 (1982). 510us1$$5H 06-18-97 16:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 27 (1993) 31 Per Curiam Court." 3 Unless we can conclude that the question of the denial of petitioner's motion to intervene in the Court of Ap- peals was "fairly included" in the question relating to the vacatur of final judgments at the parties' request, Rule 14.1 would prevent us from reaching it. It seems clear that a challenge to the Federal Circuit's denial of petitioner's motion to intervene is not "subsidiary" to the question on which we granted certiorari. On the con- trary, it is akin to a question regarding a party's standing,4 which we have described as a "threshold inquiry" that " `in no way depends on the merits' " of the case. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155 (1990) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 500 (1975)). We also believe that the question is not "fairly included" in the question presented for our review.5 A question which is merely "complementary" or "related" to the question pre- sented in the petition for certiorari is not " `fairly included 3 The initial version of this Rule, promulgated in 1954, stated: "The statement of a question presented will be deemed to include every subsid- iary question fairly comprised therein. Only the questions set forth in the petition or fairly comprised therein will be considered by the court." Rule 23.1(c), Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, 346 U. S. 951, 972 (1954). The current version dates back to 1980, when we amended the Rules. The 1980 changes in syntax obviously did not alter the substance of the Rule. 4 The Court of Appeals actually dismissed Izumi's motion in terms of standing, concluding that Izumi did "not have standing to oppose the joint motion." U. S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 971 F. 2d 728, 731 (CA Fed. 1992). 5 We note that the fact that the parties devoted a portion of their merits briefs to the intervention issue does not bring that question properly be- fore us. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U. S. 148, 151, n. 3 (1976). Nor does "[t]he fact that the issue was mentioned in argument . . . bring the question properly before us." Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 206, n. 5 (1954). Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, see post, at 35­36, the fact that Izumi discussed this issue in the text of its petition for certiorari does not bring it before us. Rule 14.1(a) requires that a subsidiary question be fairly included in the question presented for our review. 510us1$$5H 06-18-97 16:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT 32 IZUMI SEIMITSU KOGYO KABUSHIKI KAISHA v. U. S. PHILIPS CORP. Per Curiam therein.' " Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 537 (1992). Thus, in Yee, we concluded that the question whether an or- dinance effected a physical taking did not include the related question of whether it effected a regulatory taking. Ibid. Whether petitioner should have been granted leave to inter- vene below is quite distinct, both analytically and factually, from the question whether the Court of Appeals should va- cate judgments where the parties have so stipulated. The questions are even less related or complementary to one an- other than were the questions in Yee. The intervention question being neither presented as a question in the petition for certiorari nor fairly included therein, "Rule 14.1(a) accordingly creates a heavy presump- tion against our consideration" of that issue. Ibid. Rule 14.1(a), of course, is prudential; it "does not limit our power to decide important questions not raised by the parties." Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U. S. 313, 320, n. 6 (1971). A prudential rule, however, is more than a precatory admonition. As we have stated on numerous occasions, we will disregard Rule 14.1(a) and consider issues not raised in the petition " `only in the most exceptional cases.' " Yee, supra, at 535 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 481, n. 15 (1976)); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 443, n. 38 (1984) ("Ab- sent unusual circumstances, . . . we are chary of considering issues not presented in petitions for certiorari").6 6 Even before the first version of the current Rule 14.1(a) was adopted, we indicated our unwillingness to decide issues not presented in petitions for certiorari. As we stated in General Talking Pictures Corp. v. West- ern Electric Co., 304 U. S. 175, 179 (1938): "One having obtained a writ of certiorari to review specified questions is not entitled here to obtain deci- sion on any other issue." And as Justice Jackson stated, writing for a plurality in Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128, 129­130 (1954): "We disap- prove the practice of smuggling additional questions into a case after we grant certiorari. The issues here are fixed by the petition unless we limit the grant, as frequently we do to avoid settled, frivolous or state law questions." 510us1$$5H 06-18-97 16:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 27 (1993) 33 Per Curiam We have made exceptions to Rule 14.1(a) in cases where we have overruled one of our prior decisions even though neither party requested it. See, e. g., Blonder-Tongue, supra, at 319­321. We have also decided a case on noncon- stitutional grounds even though the petition for certiorari presented only a constitutional question. See, e. g., Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U. S. 454, 457 (1960); Neese v. Southern R. Co., 350 U. S. 77, 78 (1955). We must also notice the possible absence of jurisdiction because we are obligated to do so even when the issue is not raised by a party. See, e. g., Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 398 (1979); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U. S. 737, 740 (1976). And we may, pursuant to this Court's Rule 24.1(a), "consider a plain error not among the questions presented but evident from the record and otherwise within [our] jurisdiction to decide." See, e. g., Wood v. Georgia, 450 U. S. 261, 265, n. 5 (1981); see generally R. Stern, E. Gress- man, & S. Shapiro, Supreme Court Practice § 6.26 (6th ed. 1986) (discussing Rule 14.1(a) and its exceptions). The present case bears scant resemblance to those cited above in which we have made exceptions to the provisions of Rule 14.1. While the decision on any particular motion to intervene may be a difficult one, it is always to some ex- tent bound up in the facts of the particular case. Should we undertake to review the Court of Appeals' decision on intervention, it is unlikely that any new principle of law would be enunciated, as is evident from the briefs of the par- ties on this question. As we said in Yee, Rule 14.1(a) helps us "[t]o use our resources most efficiently" by highlighting those cases "that will enable us to resolve particularly im- portant questions." 503 U. S., at 536. The Court of Ap- peals' disposition of petitioner's motion to intervene is simply not such a question.7 7 Justice Stevens in dissent urges that our disposition of United States v. Williams, 504 U. S. 36 (1992), provides authority for reaching the mer- its of this case. We disagree. There we applied a different prudential 510us1$$5H 06-18-97 16:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT 34 IZUMI SEIMITSU KOGYO KABUSHIKI KAISHA v. U. S. PHILIPS CORP. Stevens, J., dissenting Should we disregard the Rule here, there would also be a natural tendency-to be consciously resisted, of course-to reverse the holding of the Court of Appeals on the interven- tion question in order that we could address the merits of the question on which we actually granted certiorari; other- wise, we would have devoted our efforts solely to addressing a relatively factbound issue which does not meet the stand- ards that guide the exercise of our certiorari jurisdiction. Our faithful application of Rule 14.1(a) thus helps ensure that we are not tempted to engage in ill-considered decisions of questions not presented in the petition. Faithful application will also inform those who seek review here that we continue to strongly "disapprove the practice of smuggling additional questions into a case after we grant certiorari." Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128, 129 (1954) (plurality opinion). Izumi was not a party to the appeal below, and the Court of Appeals denied its motion to intervene there. Because we decline to review the propriety of the Court of Appeals' denial of intervention, petitioner lacks standing under § 1254(1) to seek review of the question presented in the petition for certiorari. The writ of certiorari is therefore dismissed as improvidently granted. It is so ordered. Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Blackmun joins, dissenting. When both parties to a case pending on appeal ask the appellate court to vacate the judgment entered by the trial court because they have settled their differences, should the court routinely take that action without first considering its effect on third parties? Subsumed within that question is the related question whether an affected third party should rule-the one which precludes our review of an issue that "was not pressed or passed upon below." Id., at 41 (internal quotation marks omit- ted). Because the issue there had been passed upon by the lower court, see id., at 39, we reviewed it. 510us1$$5H 06-18-97 16:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 27 (1993) 35 Stevens, J., dissenting be allowed to intervene to object to the vacation of the judg- ment. In this case the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit answered both of those questions incorrectly. Petitioner Izumi manufactures electric razors in Japan that it sells to American distributors, including Windmere and Sears Roebuck. It has indemnified those distributors against liability for patent or trade dress infringement. Re- spondent Philips is a competitor that has been engaged in protracted litigation with Izumi's distributors. In a case filed by respondent in the Southern District of Florida, the trial court entered a judgment dismissing respondent's trade dress claims and awarding Windmere $89,644,257 plus attor- ney's fees, interest, and costs on an antitrust counterclaim. In a second case filed by respondent in the Northern District of Illinois, the District Court held that the Florida judgment collaterally estopped respondent from pursuing certain claims against Sears. Thereafter, respondent and Wind- mere settled their differences on terms that included a pay- ment to Windmere of $57 million and Windmere's agreement to join in a motion to vacate the Florida judgment. Izumi was not a party to the settlement. Promptly after the settling parties filed their motion in the Federal Circuit, Izumi tried to object to the vacation of the Florida judgment. The court denied the motion on the ground that Izumi lacked standing, because it was not a party and its interest was insufficient to support intervention. The court then granted the motion to vacate. When that action was brought to the attention of the District Court in Illinois, it reinstated claims against Izumi's indemnitee (Sears). Izumi filed a petition for certiorari presenting a single question.1 The petition itself devoted an entire section to refuting the Federal Circuit's argument that Izumi's interest 1 "Should the United States Court of Appeals routinely vacate district court final judgments at the parties' request when cases are settled while on appeal?" Pet. for Cert. i. 510us1$$5H 06-18-97 16:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT 36 IZUMI SEIMITSU KOGYO KABUSHIKI KAISHA v. U. S. PHILIPS CORP. Stevens, J., dissenting was too insignificant to justify intervention.2 In its brief in opposition, respondent argued that the intervention issue was not properly raised.3 After consideration of respond- ent's arguments, we nevertheless decided to grant certiorari. We might, of course, have expressly directed the parties to argue the two questions separately, but it is now apparent that such direction was unnecessary because their briefs on the merits canvassed both issues. The question whether Izumi should have been allowed to intervene in the Court of Appeals is a "subsidiary question fairly included" in the question presented, Rule 14.1(a), be- cause the answer to the intervention question depends on the validity of the practice of routinely granting settling parties' motions to vacate trial court judgments. For if that routine practice is proper, then there is no point in allowing inter- vention. On the other hand, if vacation should ever be de- nied because of the potential impact on third-party interests, it was error to deny intervention in this case.4 If routine vacation is improper, the Court of Appeals' reasons for deny- ing intervention were clearly insufficient. Izumi obviously had a stake in the outcome of the motion, because the vaca- tion of the Florida judgment significantly increased the po- tential liability and litigation expenses of its indemnitee. The fact that Izumi was not a formal party to the case before it sought to intervene is irrelevant because the very purpose of intervention is to acquire the status of a party. 2 The substantive portion of Izumi's petition for certiorari was divided into four lettered sections. In the fourth, section D, petitioner argued that the prospect of relitigation in Illinois and Izumi's interest in the judg- ment against Windmere gave it "an immediate and direct interest in chal- lenging the propriety of granting vacatur following settlement," and therefore that "Izumi was entitled to intervene in the appeal for the pur- poses of opposing vacatur." Pet. for Cert. 14, 15. 3 Brief in Opposition 2, 4­5. 4 See National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Seafirst Corp., 891 F. 2d 762, 764 (CA9 1989) (intervention granted to allow nonparty to chal- lenge vacation of judgment). 510us1$$5H 06-18-97 16:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 27 (1993) 37 Stevens, J., dissenting Even if I were to concede that the intervention question is not "fairly included" in the question presented, I would still think it inappropriate to dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. In view of the fact that peti- tioner raised and discussed the issue in its petition for certio- rari, the Court's decision today rests purely on the technical- ity that the petition failed to frame a separate question to introduce this argument. Given the Court's occasional prac- tice of ordering parties to address questions they have not raised,5 it is ironic that the omission in this case should be given critical weight. Indeed, the Court's decision punishes this technical error much more severely than it has ever pun- ished similar violations. Until today, the Court had never dismissed a case because of a violation of Rule 14.1(a) or its predecessors.6 To justify its decision, the majority quotes Yee v. Escon- dido, 503 U. S. 519 (1992), for the proposition that Rule 14.1(a), although prudential, is disregarded " ` "only in the most exceptional cases," ' " 7 ante, at 32. But the majority omits the very next words, which explain that it is proper to 5 Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 484 U. S. 985 (1987) (directing parties to brief and argue jurisdictional question); Eisen v. Car- lisle & Jacquelin, 414 U. S. 908 (1973) (same); Payne v. Tennessee, 498 U. S. 1076 (1991); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U. S. 617 (1988). 6 Rule 14.1(a) itself dates only to 1990, but the 1990 revisions merely renumbered a rule which has not substantially changed since 1954. Rule 21.1(a) (1980) (identical language to present rule); Rule 23.1(c) (1954) ("Only the questions set forth in the petition or fairly comprised therein will be considered by the court"). The Court never dismissed certiorari under either of these earlier rules. Even under the harsher rule that governed between 1939 and 1954, which allowed consideration only of "questions specifically brought forward by the petition," the Court never sanctioned violations with dismissal of certiorari as improvidently granted. Rule 38.2 (1939). 7 The Court also notes that jurisdictional questions are a traditional ex- ception to the rule that an issue must fall under a question presented, ante, at 33, but the Court fails to recognize that the issue here-the propri- ety of intervention-is jurisdictional and thus falls within that exception. 510us1$$5H 06-18-97 16:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT 38 IZUMI SEIMITSU KOGYO KABUSHIKI KAISHA v. U. S. PHILIPS CORP. Stevens, J., dissenting set aside the rule "where reasons of urgency or of economy suggest the need to address the unpresented question." 503 U. S., at 535 (1992) (emphasis added). Judicial economy is not served by invoking prudential rules "after we have granted certiorari and the case has received plenary con- sideration on the merits. Our decision to grant certiorari represents a commitment of scarce judicial resources with a view to deciding the merits of one or more of the questions presented in the petition." Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U. S. 808, 815­816 (1985) (emphasis in original). See also Canton v. Harris, 489 U. S. 378, 384 (1989). The Court re- cently used stronger language when it refused to dismiss a case on prudential grounds raised and rejected in the process of granting certiorari. The majority noted that the dissent "proposes that-after briefing, argument, and full con- sideration of the issue by all the Justices of this Court- we now decline to entertain this petition for the same reason we originally rejected it, and that we dismiss it as improvidently granted. That would be improvident indeed. Our grant of certiorari was entirely in accord with our traditional practice, though even if it were not it would be imprudent (since there is no doubt that we have jurisdiction to entertain the case) to reverse course at this late stage." United States v. Williams, 504 U. S. 36, 40 (1992).8 8 The majority notes that Williams concerned a different prudential rule-the one which precludes review of an issue that " `was not pressed or passed upon below' "-but fails to provide any reason why violation of that rule should be forgiven more easily than violation of Rule 14.1(a). Ante, at 34, n. 7. If anything, one might think that the Court should be more reluctant to waive the rule requiring presentation of the issue below, because it ensures the adequate development of the record and protects the Court from deciding questions that could have been resolved by the lower courts. In addition, although the majority claims that the rule was satisfied "because the issue there had been passed upon by the lower court," it fails to note that part of the reason the rule was deemed to be satisfied was that the party had raised and the Court of Appeals had de- 510us1$$5H 06-18-97 16:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 27 (1993) 39 Stevens, J., dissenting Our opinion in Yee explains why Rule 14.1(a) ordinarily bars consideration of unpresented questions. First, the rule provides notice and prevents surprise, thus ensuring full briefing; second, the rule allows the Court to select only cases which present important questions and to focus its attention on those questions. Yee, 503 U. S., at 535­536. Neither reason applies here. There was no surprise, be- cause the intervention issue was raised in the petition for certiorari and in petitioner's opening brief, and respondent argued the propriety of denying intervention at every oppor- tunity. Nor did failure to use the word "intervention" in the "Question Presented" section of the petition for certiorari interfere with the efficient selection of cases for plenary re- view, since the Court was fully aware that the issue needed to be resolved in order to reach the vacation issue. It is not surprising that Yee's explanation of Rule 14.1(a) does not fit the circumstances of this case, because Rule 14.1(a) was never intended to provide the basis for dismissal, and, before today, was never used for that purpose.9 The Court today suggests an additional argument for strict enforcement of Rule 14.1(a), that "there would also be a natural tendency-to be consciously resisted, of course-to reverse the holding of the Court of Appeals on the interven- tion question in order that we could address the merits of the question on which we actually granted certiorari." Ante, at 34. Reliance on such a flimsy argument underestimates the character and the quality of the Court's decisional processes. Moreover, this argument overlooks the fact that the Court cided the issue in another case. 504 U. S., at 43­45. In this case, a com- parable response to the prudential rule precluding review of the issue not expressly mentioned in the "question presented" would simply note that the intervention issue was discussed in another section of the certiorari petition. Most importantly, the majority misses the point of the passage quoted from Williams. The majority in that case noted that "even if" the prudential rule were violated, "it would be imprudent . . . to reverse course at this late stage." Id., at 40. 9 See n. 6, supra. 510us1$$5H 06-18-97 16:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT 40 IZUMI SEIMITSU KOGYO KABUSHIKI KAISHA v. U. S. PHILIPS CORP. Stevens, J., dissenting was aware of that temptation at the time certiorari was granted. Nothing has changed since then to suggest dis- missal is now more appropriate. On the merits, I am persuaded that the Federal Circuit's routine practice is as objectionable as the practice we re- cently condemned in Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton Inter- national, Inc., 508 U. S. 83 (1993).10 While it is appropriate to vacate a judgment when mootness deprives the appellant of an opportunity for review, United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950), that justification does not apply to mootness achieved by purchase. Judicial precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the legal community as a whole. They are not merely the property of private litigants and should stand unless a court concludes that the public interest would be served by a vacatur. Respondent argues that a policy of routinely vacating judgments whenever both parties so request will encourage settlement. It will, of course, affect the terms of some set- tlements negotiated while cases are pending on appeal, but there is no evidence that the number of settlements will be appreciably increased by such a policy. Indeed, the experi- ence in California demonstrates that the contrary may well be true.11 Moreover, the facts of this case indicate that any 10 In Cardinal Chemical we held the Federal Circuit should discontinue its practice of routinely vacating as moot declaratory judgments of patent validity upon affirmance of a finding that the patent had not been infringed. 11 Barnett, Making Decisions Disappear: Depublication and Stipulated Reversal in the California Supreme Court, 26 Loyola (LA) L. Rev. 1033, 1073 (1993). In the years before the California Supreme Court endorsed routine vacation of judgments on settlement, there was a natural experi- ment in the California courts of appeals. While most courts routinely granted vacation, Division One of the Fourth Appellate District never did. Comparison of the rates of settlement in that court and the rest of the California appellate courts suggests that the denial of vacation did not discourage settlement. In fact, the rate of settlement in Division One of the Fourth Appellate District was twice as high as that in other appel- late courts. 510us1$$5H 06-18-97 16:37:53 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 27 (1993) 41 Stevens, J., dissenting benefit in the form of saving work for the appellate court will probably be offset by the added burdens imposed on trial courts in later proceedings. On the other hand, it seems evident that a regular practice of denying these motions un- less supported by a showing of special circumstances will create added pressure to settle in advance of trial. The pub- lic interest in preserving the work product of the judicial system should always at least be weighed in the balance be- fore such a motion is granted. I would therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 510us1$$6Z 04-15-96 14:59:24 PAGES OPINPGT 42 OCTOBER TERM, 1993 Per Curiam CAVANAUGH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF PROBATION, PAROLE, AND PARDON SERVICES, et al. v. ROLLER certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit No. 92­1510. Argued November 8, 1993-Decided November 30, 1993 Certiorari dismissed. Reported below: 984 F. 2d 120. Carl N. Lundberg argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina, and Edwin W. Evans, Chief Deputy Attor- ney General. W. Gaston Fairey, by appointment of the Court, 509 U. S. 920, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Per Curiam. The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:27 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1993 43 Syllabus UNITED STATES v. JAMES DANIEL GOOD REAL PROPERTY et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 92­1180. Argued October 6, 1993-Decided December 13, 1993 Four and one-half years after police found drugs and drug paraphernalia in claimant Good's home and he pleaded guilty to promoting a harmful drug in violation of Hawaii law, the United States filed an in rem action in the Federal District Court, seeking forfeiture of his house and land, under 21 U. S. C. § 881(a)(7), on the ground that the property had been used to commit or facilitate the commission of a federal drug offense. Following an ex parte proceeding, a Magistrate Judge issued a warrant authorizing the property's seizure, and the Government seized the prop- erty without prior notice to Good or an adversary proceeding. In his claim for the property and answer to the Government's complaint, Good asserted that he was deprived of his property without due process of law and that the action was invalid because it had not been timely commenced. The District Court ordered that the property be forfeited, but the Court of Appeals reversed. It held that the seizure without prior notice and a hearing violated the Due Process Clause, and re- manded the case for a determination whether the action, although filed within the 5-year period provided by 19 U. S. C. § 1621, was untimely because the Government failed to follow the internal notification and reporting requirements of §§ 1602­1604. Held:1. Absentexigent circumstances,the DueProcess Clauserequires the Government to afford notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before seizing real property subject to civil forfeiture. Pp. 48­62. (a) The seizure of Good's property implicates two " `explicit textual source[s] of constitutional protection,' " the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U. S. 56, 70. While the Fourth Amendment places limits on the Government's power to seize property for purposes of forfeiture, it does not provide the sole measure of consti- tutional protection that must be afforded property owners in forfeiture proceedings. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103; Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, distinguished. Where the Government seizes property not to preserve evidence of criminal wrongdoing but to assert ownership and control over the property, its action must also comply with the Due 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:27 PAGES OPINPGT 44 UNITED STATES v. JAMES DANIEL GOOD REAL PROPERTY Syllabus Process Clause. See, e. g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663; Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67. Pp. 48­52. (b) An exception to the general rule requiring predeprivation no- tice and hearing is justified only in extraordinary situations. Id., at 82. Using the three-part inquiry set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319-consideration of the private interest affected by the official action; the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the proce- dures used, as well as the probable value of additional safeguards; and the Government's interest, including the administrative burden that ad- ditional procedural requirements would impose, id., at 335-the seizure of real property for purposes of civil forfeiture does not justify such an exception. Good's right to maintain control over his home, and to be free from governmental interference, is a private interest of historic and continuing importance, cf., e. g., United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705, 714­715, that weighs heavily in the Mathews balance. Moreover, the practice of ex parte seizure creates an unacceptable risk of error, since the proceeding affords little or no protection to an innocent owner, who may not be deprived of property under § 881(a)(7). Nor does the gov- ernmental interest at stake here present a pressing need for prompt action. Because real property cannot abscond, a court's jurisdiction can be preserved without prior seizure simply by posting notice on the prop- erty and leaving a copy of the process with the occupant. In addition, the Government's legitimate interests at the inception of a forfeiture proceeding-preventing the property from being sold, destroyed, or used for further illegal activity before the forfeiture judgment-can be secured through measures less intrusive than seizure: a lis pendens no- tice to prevent the property's sale, a restraining order to prevent its destruction, and search and arrest warrants to forestall further illegal activity. Since a claimant is already entitled to a hearing before final judgment, requiring the Government to postpone seizure until after an adversary hearing creates no significant administrative burden, and any harm from the delay is minimal compared to the injury occasioned by erroneous seizure. Pp. 52­59. (c) No plausible claim of executive urgency, including the Gov- ernment's reliance on forfeitures as a means of defraying law enforce- ment expenses, justifies the summary seizure of real property under § 881(a)(7). Cf. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589. Pp. 59­61. 2. Courts may not dismiss a forfeiture action filed within the 5-year statute of limitations for noncompliance with the timing requirements of §§ 1602­1604. Congress' failure to specify a consequence for noncom- pliance implies that it intended the responsible officials administering the Act to have discretion to determine what disciplinary measures are appropriate when their subordinates fail to discharge their statutory 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 43 (1993) 45 Syllabus duties, and the federal courts should not in the ordinary course impose their own coercive sanction, see, e. g., United States v. Montalvo- Murillo, 495 U. S. 711, 717­721. Pp. 62­65. 971 F. 2d 1376, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and III, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts II and IV, in which Blackmun, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissent- ing in part, in which Scalia, J., joined, and in which O'Connor, J., joined as to Parts II and III, post, p. 65. O'Connor, J., post, p. 73, and Thomas, J., post, p. 80, filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part. Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Acting Solicitor General Bryson, and Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney. Christopher J. Yuen argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.* *A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for the State of Ken- tucky et al. by Chris Gorman, Attorney General, and David A. Sexton, Assistant Attorney General, Malaetasi Togafau, Attorney General of American Samoa, Grant Woods, Attorney General of Arizona, Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, Domenick J. Galluzzo, Acting Chief State's Attorney of Connecticut, Pamela Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas, Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General of Massachu- setts, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Mike Moore, Attor- ney General of Mississippi, Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General of Mon- tana, Don Stenberg, Attorney General of Nebraska, Jeffrey R. Howard, Attorney General of New Hampshire, Tom Udall, Attorney General of New Mexico, Heidi Heitkamp, Attorney General of North Dakota, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Attorney General of Pennsylvania, and Joseph B. Myer, Attorney General of Wyoming. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Steven Alan Reiss, Richard A. Rothman, Katherine Oberlies, Steven R. Shapiro, and John A. Powell; for the Insti- tute for Justice by William H. Mellor III and Clint Bolick; and for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Richard J. Trober- man and E. E. Edwards III. 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:27 PAGES OPINPGT 46 UNITED STATES v. JAMES DANIEL GOOD REAL PROPERTY Opinion of the Court Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. The principal question presented is whether, in the ab- sence of exigent circumstances, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Government in a civil forfeiture case from seizing real property without first af- fording the owner notice and an opportunity to be heard. We hold that it does. A second issue in the case concerns the timeliness of the forfeiture action. We hold that filing suit for forfeiture within the statute of limitations suffices to make the action timely, and that the cause should not be dismissed for failure to comply with certain other statutory directives for expedi- tious prosecution in forfeiture cases. I On January 31, 1985, Hawaii police officers executed a search warrant at the home of claimant James Daniel Good. The search uncovered about 89 pounds of marijuana, mari- juana seeds, vials containing hashish oil, and drug parapher- nalia. About six months later, Good pleaded guilty to pro- moting a harmful drug in the second degree, in violation of Hawaii law. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 712­1245(1)(b) (1985). He was sentenced to one year in jail and five years' probation, and fined $1,000. Good was also required to forfeit to the State $3,187 in cash found on the premises. On August 8, 1989, 41/2 years after the drugs were found, the United States filed an in rem action in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, seeking to forfeit Good's house and the 4-acre parcel on which it was situated. The United States sought forfeiture under 21 U. S. C. § 881(a)(7), on the ground that the property had been used to commit or facilitate the commission of a federal drug offense.1 1 Title 21 U. S. C. § 881(a)(7) provides: "(a) . . . "The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall exist in them: 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 43 (1993) 47 Opinion of the Court On August 18, 1989, in an ex parte proceeding, a United States Magistrate Judge found that the Government had es- tablished probable cause to believe Good's property was sub- ject to forfeiture under § 881(a)(7). A warrant of arrest in rem was issued, authorizing seizure of the property. The warrant was based on an affidavit recounting the fact of Good's conviction and the evidence discovered during the January 1985 search of his home by Hawaii police. The Government seized the property on August 21, 1989, without prior notice to Good or an adversary hearing. At the time of the seizure, Good was renting his home to tenants for $900 per month. The Government permitted the tenants to remain on the premises subject to an occupancy agree- ment, but directed the payment of future rents to the United States Marshal. Good filed a claim for the property and an answer to the Government's complaint. He asserted that the seizure de- prived him of his property without due process of law and that the forfeiture action was invalid because it had not been timely commenced under the statute. The District Court granted the Government's motion for summary judgment and entered an order forfeiting the property. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceed- ings. 971 F. 2d 1376 (1992). The court was unanimous in holding that the seizure of Good's property, without prior notice and a hearing, violated the Due Process Clause. . . . . . "(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a viola- tion of this subchapter punishable by more than one year's imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission estab- lished by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner." 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:27 PAGES OPINPGT 48 UNITED STATES v. JAMES DANIEL GOOD REAL PROPERTY Opinion of the Court In a divided decision, the Court of Appeals further held that the District Court erred in finding the action timely. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 5-year statute of limita- tions in 19 U. S. C. § 1621 is only an "outer limit" for filing a forfeiture action, and that further limits are imposed by 19 U. S. C. §§ 1602­1604. 971 F. 2d, at 1378­1382. Those pro- visions, the court reasoned, impose a "series of internal noti- fication and reporting requirements," under which "customs agents must report to customs officers, customs officers must report to the United States attorney, and the Attorney Gen- eral must `immediately' and `forthwith' bring a forfeiture action if he believes that one is warranted." Id., at 1379 (citations omitted). The Court of Appeals ruled that failure to comply with these internal reporting rules could require dismissal of the forfeiture action as untimely. The court re- manded the case for a determination whether the Govern- ment had satisfied its obligation to make prompt reports. Id., at 1382. We granted certiorari, 507 U. S. 983 (1993), to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on the constitutional question presented. Compare United States v. Premises and Real Property at 4492 South Livonia Road, 889 F. 2d 1258 (CA2 1989), with United States v. A Single Family Res- idence and Real Property, 803 F. 2d 625 (CA11 1986). We now affirm the due process ruling and reverse the ruling on the timeliness question. II The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guaran- tees that "[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Our precedents establish the general rule that individuals must receive no- tice and an opportunity to be heard before the Government deprives them of property. See United States v. $8,850, 461 U. S. 555, 562, n. 12 (1983); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 82 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 43 (1993) 49 Opinion of the Court 395 U. S. 337, 342 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 313 (1950). The Government does not, and could not, dispute that the seizure of Good's home and 4-acre parcel deprived him of property interests protected by the Due Process Clause. By the Government's own submission, the seizure gave it the right to charge rent, to condition occupancy, and even to evict the occupants. Instead, the Government argues that it af- forded Good all the process the Constitution requires. The Government makes two separate points in this regard. First, it contends that compliance with the Fourth Amend- ment suffices when the Government seizes property for pur- poses of forfeiture. In the alternative, it argues that the seizure of real property under the drug forfeiture laws justi- fies an exception to the usual due process requirement of preseizure notice and hearing. We turn to these issues. A The Government argues that because civil forfeiture serves a "law enforcement purpos[e]," Brief for United States 13, the Government need comply only with the Fourth Amendment when seizing forfeitable property. We dis- agree. The Fourth Amendment does place restrictions on seizures conducted for purposes of civil forfeiture, One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U. S. 693, 696 (1965) (holding that the exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture), but it does not follow that the Fourth Amendment is the sole constitutional provision in question when the Government seizes property subject to forfeiture. We have rejected the view that the applicability of one constitutional amendment pre-empts the guarantees of an- other. As explained in Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U. S. 56, 70 (1992): "Certain wrongs affect more than a single right and, accordingly, can implicate more than one of the Con- stitution's commands. Where such multiple violations 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:27 PAGES OPINPGT 50 UNITED STATES v. JAMES DANIEL GOOD REAL PROPERTY Opinion of the Court are alleged, we are not in the habit of identifying as a preliminary matter the claim's `dominant' character. Rather, we examine each constitutional provision in turn." Here, as in Soldal, the seizure of property implicates two " `explicit textual source[s] of constitutional protection,' " the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth. Ibid. The proper ques- tion is not which Amendment controls but whether either Amendment is violated. Nevertheless, the Government asserts that when property is seized for forfeiture, the Fourth Amendment provides the full measure of process due under the Fifth. The Govern- ment relies on Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975), and Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989), in support of this proposition. That reliance is misplaced. Gerstein and Gra- ham concerned not the seizure of property but the arrest or detention of criminal suspects, subjects we have considered to be governed by the provisions of the Fourth Amendment without reference to other constitutional guarantees. In addition, also unlike the seizure presented by this case, the arrest or detention of a suspect occurs as part of the regular criminal process, where other safeguards ordinarily ensure compliance with due process. Gerstein held that the Fourth Amendment, rather than the Due Process Clause, determines the requisite postarrest pro- ceedings when individuals are detained on criminal charges. Exclusive reliance on the Fourth Amendment is appropriate in the arrest context, we explained, because the Amendment was "tailored explicitly for the criminal justice system," and its "balance between individual and public interests always has been thought to define the `process that is due' for sei- zures of person or property in criminal cases." 420 U. S., at 125, n. 27. Furthermore, we noted that the protections afforded during an arrest and initial detention are "only the first stage of an elaborate system, unique in jurisprudence, 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 43 (1993) 51 Opinion of the Court designed to safeguard the rights of those accused of criminal conduct." Ibid. (emphasis in original). So too, in Graham we held that claims of excessive force in the course of an arrest or investigatory stop should be evaluated under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard, not under the "more generalized notion of `sub- stantive due process.' " 490 U. S., at 395. Because the degree of force used to effect a seizure is one determinant of its reasonableness, and because the Fourth Amendment guarantees citizens the right "to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures," we held that a claim of excessive force in the course of such a seizure is "most properly characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment." Id., at 394. Neither Gerstein nor Graham, however, provides support for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment is the begin- ning and end of the constitutional inquiry whenever a seizure occurs. That proposition is inconsistent with the approach we took in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663 (1974), which examined the constitutionality of ex parte seizures of forfeitable property under general princi- ples of due process, rather than the Fourth Amendment. And it is at odds with our reliance on the Due Process Clause to analyze prejudgment seizure and sequestration of per- sonal property. See, e. g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600 (1974). It is true, of course, that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches and seizures in the civil context and may serve to resolve the legality of these governmental actions without reference to other constitutional provisions. See Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U. S. 523 (1967) (holding that a warrant based on probable cause is required for administrative search of residences for safety inspections); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U. S. 602 (1989) (holding that federal regulations authorizing railroads to conduct blood and urine tests of cer- 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:27 PAGES OPINPGT 52 UNITED STATES v. JAMES DANIEL GOOD REAL PROPERTY Opinion of the Court tain employees, without a warrant and without reasonable suspicion, do not violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures). But the pur- pose and effect of the Government's action in the present case go beyond the traditional meaning of search or seizure. Here the Government seized property not to preserve evi- dence of wrongdoing, but to assert ownership and control over the property itself. Our cases establish that govern- ment action of this consequence must comply with the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Though the Fourth Amendment places limits on the Gov- ernment's power to seize property for purposes of forfeiture, it does not provide the sole measure of constitutional protec- tion that must be afforded property owners in forfeiture pro- ceedings. So even assuming that the Fourth Amendment were satisfied in this case, it remains for us to determine whether the seizure complied with our well-settled jurispru- dence under the Due Process Clause. B Whether ex parte seizures of forfeitable property satisfy the Due Process Clause is a question we last confronted in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., supra, which held that the Government could seize a yacht subject to civil forfeiture without affording prior notice or hearing. Cen- tral to our analysis in Calero-Toledo was the fact that a yacht was the "sort [of property] that could be removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed, or concealed, if advance warning of confiscation were given." Id., at 679. The ease with which an owner could frustrate the Government's interests in the forfeitable property created a " `special need for very prompt action' " that justified the postponement of notice and hear- ing until after the seizure. Id., at 678 (quoting Fuentes, supra, at 91). We had no occasion in Calero-Toledo to decide whether the same considerations apply to the forfeiture of real property, 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 43 (1993) 53 Opinion of the Court which, by its very nature, can be neither moved nor con- cealed. In fact, when Calero-Toledo was decided, both the Puerto Rican statute, P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 24, § 2512 (Supp. 1973), and the federal forfeiture statute upon which it was modeled, 21 U. S. C. § 881 (1970 ed.), authorized the forfeiture of personal property only. It was not until 1984, 10 years later, that Congress amended § 881 to authorize the forfeit- ure of real property. See 21 U. S. C. § 881(a)(7); Pub. L. 98­ 473, § 306, 98 Stat. 2050. The right to prior notice and a hearing is central to the Constitution's command of due process. "The purpose of this requirement is not only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual. Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and possession of property from arbitrary encroach- ment-to minimize substantively unfair or mistaken depriva- tions of property . . . ." Fuentes, 407 U. S., at 80­81. We tolerate some exceptions to the general rule requiring predeprivation notice and hearing, but only in " `extraordi- nary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event.' " Id., at 82 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 379 (1971)); United States v. $8,850, 461 U. S., at 562, n. 12. Whether the seizure of real property for purposes of civil forfeiture justifies such an exception requires an exami- nation of the competing interests at stake, along with the promptness and adequacy of later proceedings. The three- part inquiry set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976), provides guidance in this regard. The Mathews analysis requires us to consider the private interest affected by the official action; the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used, as well as the probable value of additional safeguards; and the Govern- ment's interest, including the administrative burden that ad- ditional procedural requirements would impose. Id., at 335. Good's right to maintain control over his home, and to be free from governmental interference, is a private interest of 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:27 PAGES OPINPGT 54 UNITED STATES v. JAMES DANIEL GOOD REAL PROPERTY Opinion of the Court historic and continuing importance. Cf. United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705, 714­715 (1984); Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 590 (1980). The seizure deprived Good of valuable rights of ownership, including the right of sale, the right of occupancy, the right to unrestricted use and enjoyment, and the right to receive rents. All that the seizure left him, by the Government's own submission, was the right to bring a claim for the return of title at some unscheduled future hearing. In Fuentes, we held that the loss of kitchen appliances and household furniture was significant enough to warrant a pre- deprivation hearing. 407 U. S., at 70­71. And in Connecti- cut v. Doehr, 501 U. S. 1 (1991), we held that a state statute authorizing prejudgment attachment of real estate without prior notice or hearing was unconstitutional, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, even though the attachment did not interfere with the owner's use or possession and did not affect, as a general matter, rentals from existing leaseholds. The seizure of a home produces a far greater deprivation than the loss of furniture, or even attachment. It gives the Government not only the right to prohibit sale, but also the right to evict occupants, to modify the property, to condition occupancy, to receive rents, and to supersede the owner in all rights pertaining to the use, possession, and enjoyment of the property. The Government makes much of the fact that Good was renting his home to tenants, and contends that the tangible effect of the seizure was limited to taking the $900 a month he was due in rent. But even if this were the only depriva- tion at issue, it would not render the loss insignificant or unworthy of due process protection. The rent represents a significant portion of the exploitable economic value of Good's home. It cannot be classified as de minimis for purposes of procedural due process. In sum, the private 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 43 (1993) 55 Opinion of the Court interests at stake in the seizure of real property weigh heav- ily in the Mathews balance. The practice of ex parte seizure, moreover, creates an un- acceptable risk of error. Although Congress designed the drug forfeiture statute to be a powerful instrument in en- forcement of the drug laws, it did not intend to deprive inno- cent owners of their property. The affirmative defense of innocent ownership is allowed by statute. See 21 U. S. C. § 881(a)(7) ("[N]o property shall be forfeited under this para- graph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner"). The ex parte preseizure proceeding affords little or no pro- tection to the innocent owner. In issuing a warrant of sei- zure, the magistrate judge need determine only that there is probable cause to believe that the real property was "used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of," a felony narcotics offense. Ibid. The Government is not required to offer any evidence on the question of innocent ownership or other potential de- fenses a claimant might have. See, e. g., Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602 (1993) (holding that forfeitures under 21 U. S. C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) are subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause). Nor would that inquiry, in the ex parte stage, suffice to protect the innocent owner's interests. "[F]airness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights. . . . No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 170­172 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). The purpose of an adversary hearing is to ensure the req- uisite neutrality that must inform all governmental decision- making. That protection is of particular importance here, 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:27 PAGES OPINPGT 56 UNITED STATES v. JAMES DANIEL GOOD REAL PROPERTY Opinion of the Court where the Government has a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceeding.2 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957, 979, n. 9 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.) ("[I]t makes sense to scrutinize governmental action more closely when the State stands to benefit"). Moreover, the availability of a postseizure hearing may be no recompense for losses caused by erroneous seizure. Given the congested civil dockets in federal courts, a claimant may not receive an ad- versary hearing until many months after the seizure. And even if the ultimate judicial decision is that the claimant was an innocent owner, or that the Government lacked probable cause, this determination, coming months after the seizure, "would not cure the temporary deprivation that an earlier hearing might have prevented." Doehr, 501 U. S., at 15. This brings us to the third consideration under Mathews, "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." 424 U. S., at 335. The governmental interest we consider here is not some general interest in forfeiting property but the specific interest in seizing real property before the forfeiture hearing. The question in the civil forfeiture context is whether ex parte seizure is justified by a pressing need for prompt action. See Fuentes, 407 U. S., at 91. We find no pressing need here. 2 The extent of the Government's financial stake in drug forfeiture is apparent from a 1990 memo, in which the Attorney General urged United States Attorneys to increase the volume of forfeitures in order to meet the Department of Justice's annual budget target: "We must significantly increase production to reach our budget target. ". . . Failure to achieve the $470 million projection would expose the Department's forfeiture program to criticism and undermine confidence in our budget projections. Every effort must be made to increase forfeiture income during the remaining three months of [fiscal year] 1990." Execu- tive Office for United States Attorneys, U. S. Dept. of Justice, 38 United States Attorney's Bulletin 180 (1990). 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 43 (1993) 57 Opinion of the Court This is apparent by comparison to Calero-Toledo, where the Government's interest in immediate seizure of a yacht subject to civil forfeiture justified dispensing with the usual requirement of prior notice and hearing. Two essential con- siderations informed our ruling in that case: First, immedi- ate seizure was necessary to establish the court's jurisdiction over the property, 416 U. S., at 679, and second, the yacht might have disappeared had the Government given advance warning of the forfeiture action, ibid. See also United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U. S. 242, 251 (1986) (no pre- seizure hearing is required when customs officials seize an automobile at the border). Neither of these factors is present when the target of forfeiture is real property. Because real property cannot abscond, the court's jurisdic- tion can be preserved without prior seizure. It is true that seizure of the res has long been considered a prerequisite to the initiation of in rem forfeiture proceedings. See Repub- lic Nat. Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U. S. 80, 84 (1992); United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U. S. 354, 363 (1984). This rule had its origins in the Court's early admiralty cases, which involved the forfeiture of ves- sels and other movable personal property. See Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583, 599 (1858); The Brig Ann, 9 Cranch 289 (1815); Keene v. United States, 5 Cranch 304, 310 (1809). Justice Story, writing for the Court in The Brig Ann, ex- plained the justification for the rule as one of fixing and pre- serving jurisdiction: "[B]efore judicial cognizance can attach upon a forfeiture in rem, . . . there must be a seizure; for until seizure it is impossible to ascertain what is the compe- tent forum." 9 Cranch, at 291. But when the res is real property, rather than personal goods, the appropriate judi- cial forum may be determined without actual seizure. As The Brig Ann held, all that is necessary "[i]n order to institute and perfect proceedings in rem, [is] that the thing should be actually or constructively within the reach of the Court." Ibid. And as we noted last Term, "[f]airly read, 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:27 PAGES OPINPGT 58 UNITED STATES v. JAMES DANIEL GOOD REAL PROPERTY Opinion of the Court The Brig Ann simply restates the rule that the court must have actual or constructive control of the res when an in rem forfeiture suit is initiated." Republic Nat. Bank, supra, at 87. In the case of real property, the res may be brought within the reach of the court simply by posting notice on the property and leaving a copy of the process with the occupant. In fact, the rules which govern forfeiture proceedings under § 881 already permit process to be executed on real property without physical seizure: "If the character or situation of the property is such that the taking of actual possession is impracticable, the mar- shal or other person executing the process shall affix a copy thereof to the property in a conspicuous place and leave a copy of the complaint and process with the per- son having possession or the person's agent." Rule E(4)(b), Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. See also United States v. TWP 17 R 4, Certain Real Prop- erty in Maine, 970 F. 2d 984, 986, and n. 4 (CA1 1992). Nor is the ex parte seizure of real property necessary to accomplish the statutory purpose of § 881(a)(7). The Gov- ernment's legitimate interests at the inception of forfeiture proceedings are to ensure that the property not be sold, de- stroyed, or used for further illegal activity prior to the for- feiture judgment. These legitimate interests can be secured without seizing the subject property. Sale of the property can be prevented by filing a notice of lis pendens as authorized by state law when the forfeiture proceedings commence. 28 U. S. C. § 1964; and see Haw. Rev. Stat. § 634­51 (1985) (lis pendens provision). If there is evidence, in a particular case, that an owner is likely to destroy his property when advised of the pending action, the Government may obtain an ex parte restraining order, or other appropriate relief, upon a proper showing in district court. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 65; United States v. Prem- 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:27 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 43 (1993) 59 Opinion of the Court ises and Real Property at 4492 South Livonia Road, 889 F. 2d 1258, 1265 (CA2 1989). The Government's policy of leaving occupants in possession of real property under an occupancy agreement pending the final forfeiture ruling demonstrates that there is no serious concern about destruc- tion in the ordinary case. See Brief for United States 13, n. 6 (citing Directive No. 90­10 (Oct. 9, 1990), Executive Of- fice for Asset Forfeiture, Office of Deputy Attorney General). Finally, the Government can forestall further illegal activity with search and arrest warrants obtained in the ordinary course. In the usual case, the Government thus has various means, short of seizure, to protect its legitimate interests in forfeit- able real property. There is no reason to take the additional step of asserting control over the property without first af- fording notice and an adversary hearing. Requiring the Government to postpone seizure until after an adversary hearing creates no significant administrative burden. A claimant is already entitled to an adversary hearing before a final judgment of forfeiture. No extra hearing would be required in the typical case, since the Gov- ernment can wait until after the forfeiture judgment to seize the property. From an administrative standpoint it makes little difference whether that hearing is held before or after the seizure. And any harm that results from delay is mini- mal in comparison to the injury occasioned by erroneous seizure. C It is true that, in cases decided over a century ago, we permitted the ex parte seizure of real property when the Government was collecting debts or revenue. See, e. g., Springer v. United States, 102 U. S. 586, 593­594 (1881); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272 (1856). Without revisiting these cases, it suffices to say that their apparent rationale-like that for allowing summary seizures during wartime, see Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:28 PAGES OPINPGT 60 UNITED STATES v. JAMES DANIEL GOOD REAL PROPERTY Opinion of the Court U. S. 239 (1921); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503 (1944), and seizures of contaminated food, see North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306 (1908)-was one of exec- utive urgency. "The prompt payment of taxes," we noted, "may be vital to the existence of a government." Springer, supra, at 594. See also G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 338, 352, n. 18 (1977) ("The rationale under- lying [the revenue] decisions, of course, is that the very exist- ence of government depends upon the prompt collection of the revenues"). A like rationale justified the ex parte seizure of tax- delinquent distilleries in the late 19th century, see, e. g., United States v. Stowell, 133 U. S. 1 (1890); Dobbins's Distill- ery v. United States, 96 U. S. 395 (1878), since before passage of the Sixteenth Amendment, the Federal Government relied heavily on liquor, customs, and tobacco taxes to generate op- erating revenues. In 1902, for example, nearly 75 percent of total federal revenues-$479 million out of a total of $653 million-was raised from taxes on liquor, customs, and to- bacco. See U. S. Bureau of Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to the Present 1122 (1976). The federal income tax code adopted in the first quarter of this century, however, afforded the taxpayer notice and an opportunity to be heard by the Board of Tax Appeals before the Government could seize property for nonpayment of taxes. See Revenue Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 265­266; Revenue Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 297. In Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589 (1931), the Court relied upon the availability, and adequacy, of these preseizure administrative procedures in holding that no judicial hearing was required prior to the seizure of property. Id., at 597­599 (citing Act of Feb. 26, 1926, ch. 27, § 274(a), 44 Stat. 9, 55; Act of May 29, 1928, ch. 852, §§ 272(a), 601, 45 Stat. 791, 852, 872). These constraints on the Commissioner could be overridden, but only when the Commissioner made a determination that a jeopardy assess- ment was necessary. 283 U. S., at 598. Writing for a unani- 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 43 (1993) 61 Opinion of the Court mous Court, Justice Brandeis explained that under the tax laws "[f]ormal notice of the tax liability is thus given; the Commissioner is required to answer; and there is a complete hearing de novo . . . . These provisions amply protect the [taxpayer] against improper administrative action." Id., at 598­599; see also Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U. S. 614, 631 (1976) ("[In] the Phillips case . . . the taxpayer's assets could not have been taken or frozen . . . until he had either had, or waived his right to, a full and final adjudication of his tax liability before the Tax Court (then the Board of Tax Appeals)"). Similar provisions remain in force today. The current In- ternal Revenue Code prohibits the Government from levying upon a deficient taxpayer's property without first affording the taxpayer notice and an opportunity for a hearing, unless exigent circumstances indicate that delay will jeopardize the collection of taxes due. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 6212, 6213, 6851, 6861. Just as the urgencies that justified summary seizure of property in the 19th century had dissipated by the time of Phillips, neither is there a plausible claim of urgency today to justify the summary seizure of real property under § 881(a)(7). Although the Government relies to some extent on forfeitures as a means of defraying law enforcement ex- penses, it does not, and we think could not, justify the pre- hearing seizure of forfeitable real property as necessary for the protection of its revenues. D The constitutional limitations we enforce in this case apply to real property in general, not simply to residences. That said, the case before us well illustrates an essential principle: Individual freedom finds tangible expression in property rights. At stake in this and many other forfeiture cases are the security and privacy of the home and those who take shelter within it. 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:28 PAGES OPINPGT 62 UNITED STATES v. JAMES DANIEL GOOD REAL PROPERTY Opinion of the Court Finally, the suggestion that this one claimant must lose because his conviction was known at the time of seizure, and because he raises an as applied challenge to the statute, founders on a bedrock proposition: Fair procedures are not confined to the innocent. The question before us is the le- gality of the seizure, not the strength of the Government's case. In sum, based upon the importance of the private interests at risk and the absence of countervailing Government needs, we hold that the seizure of real property under § 881(a)(7) is not one of those extraordinary instances that justify the postponement of notice and hearing. Unless exigent cir- cumstances are present, the Due Process Clause requires the Government to afford notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before seizing real property subject to civil forfeiture.3 To establish exigent circumstances, the Government must show that less restrictive measures-i. e., a lis pendens, re- straining order, or bond-would not suffice to protect the Government's interests in preventing the sale, destruction, or continued unlawful use of the real property. We agree with the Court of Appeals that no showing of exigent circum- stances has been made in this case, and we affirm its ruling that the ex parte seizure of Good's real property violated due process. III We turn now to the question whether a court must dismiss a forfeiture action that the Government filed within the stat- 3 We do not address what sort of procedures are required for preforfeit- ure seizures of real property in the context of criminal forfeiture. See, e. g., 21 U. S. C. § 853; 18 U. S. C. § 1963 (1988 ed. and Supp. IV). We note, however, that the federal drug laws now permit seizure before entry of a criminal forfeiture judgment only where the Government persuades a dis- trict court that there is probable cause to believe that a protective order "may not be sufficient to assure the availability of the property for forfeit- ure." 21 U. S. C. § 853(f). 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 43 (1993) 63 Opinion of the Court ute of limitations, but without complying with certain other statutory timing directives. Title 21 U. S. C. § 881(d) incorporates the "provisions of law relating to the seizure, summary and judicial forfeiture, and condemnation of property for violation of the customs laws." The customs laws in turn set forth various timing require- ments. Title 19 U. S. C. § 1621 contains the statute of limita- tions: "No suit or action to recover any pecuniary penalty or forfeiture of property accruing under the customs laws shall be instituted unless such suit or action is commenced within five years after the time when the alleged offense was dis- covered." All agree that the Government filed its action within the statutory period. The customs laws also contain a series of internal require- ments relating to the timing of forfeitures. Title 19 U. S. C. § 1602 requires that a customs agent "report immediately" to a customs officer every seizure for violation of the customs laws, and every violation of the customs laws. Section 1603 requires that the customs officer "report promptly" such sei- zures or violations to the United States attorney. And § 1604 requires the Attorney General "forthwith to cause the proper proceedings to be commenced" if it appears probable that any fine, penalty, or forfeiture has been incurred. The Court of Appeals held, over a dissent, that failure to comply with these internal timing requirements mandates dismissal of the forfeiture action. We disagree. We have long recognized that "many statutory requisitions intended for the guide of officers in the conduct of business devolved upon them . . . do not limit their power or render its exercise in disregard of the requisitions ineffectual." French v. Edwards, 13 Wall. 506, 511 (1872). We have held that if a statute does not specify a consequence for noncom- pliance with statutory timing provisions, the federal courts will not in the ordinary course impose their own coercive sanction. See United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U. S. 711, 717­721 (1990); Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U. S. 253, 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:28 PAGES OPINPGT 64 UNITED STATES v. JAMES DANIEL GOOD REAL PROPERTY Opinion of the Court 259­262 (1986); see also St. Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Brock, 769 F. 2d 37, 41 (CA2 1985) (Friendly, J.). In Montalvo-Murillo, for example, we considered the Bail Reform Act of 1984, which requires an "immediat[e]" hearing upon a pretrial detainee's "first appearance before the judi- cial officer." 18 U. S. C. § 3142(f). Because "[n]either the timing requirements nor any other part of the Act [could] be read to require, or even suggest, that a timing error must result in release of a person who should otherwise be de- tained," we held that the federal courts could not release a person pending trial solely because the hearing had not been held "immediately." 495 U. S., at 716­717. We stated that "[t]here is no presumption or general rule that for every duty imposed upon the court or the Government and its prosecu- tors there must exist some corollary punitive sanction for departures or omissions, even if negligent." Id., at 717 (cit- ing French, supra, at 511). To the contrary, we stated that "[w]e do not agree that we should, or can, invent a remedy to satisfy some perceived need to coerce the courts and the Government into complying with the statutory time limits." 495 U. S., at 721. Similarly, in Brock, supra, we considered a statute requir- ing that the Secretary of Labor begin an investigation within 120 days of receiving information about the misuse of federal funds. The respondent there argued that failure to act within the specified time period divested the Secretary of authority to investigate a claim after the time limit had passed. We rejected that contention, relying on the fact that the statute did not specify a consequence for a failure to comply with the timing provision. Id., at 258­262. Under our precedents, the failure of Congress to specify a consequence for noncompliance with the timing requirements of 19 U. S. C. §§ 1602­1604 implies that Congress intended the responsible officials administering the Act to have discre- tion to determine what disciplinary measures are appro- priate when their subordinates fail to discharge their statu- 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 43 (1993) 65 Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J. tory duties. Examination of the structure and history of the internal timing provisions at issue in this case supports the conclusion that the courts should not dismiss a forfeiture ac- tion for noncompliance. Because § 1621 contains a statute of limitations-the usual legal protection against stale claims- we doubt Congress intended to require dismissal of a forfeit- ure action for noncompliance with the internal timing re- quirements of §§ 1602­1604. Cf. United States v. $8,850, 461 U. S., at 563, n. 13. Statutes requiring customs officials to proceed with dis- patch have existed at least since 1799. See Act of Mar. 2, 1799, § 89, 1 Stat. 695­696. These directives help to ensure that the Government is prompt in obtaining revenue from forfeited property. It would make little sense to interpret directives designed to ensure the expeditious collection of revenues in a way that renders the Government unable, in certain circumstances, to obtain its revenues at all. We hold that courts may not dismiss a forfeiture action filed within the 5-year statute of limitations for noncompli- ance with the internal timing requirements of §§ 1602­1604. The Government filed the action in this case within the 5- year statute of limitations, and that sufficed to make it timely. We reverse the contrary holding of the Court of Appeals. IV The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice Scalia joins, and with whom Justice O'Connor joins as to Parts II and III, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in Parts I and III of the Court's opinion and dis- sent with respect to Part II. The Court today departs from longstanding historical precedent and concludes that the ex parte warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:28 PAGES OPINPGT 66 UNITED STATES v. JAMES DANIEL GOOD REAL PROPERTY Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J. fails to afford adequate due process protection to property owners who have been convicted of a crime that renders their real property susceptible to civil forfeiture under 21 U. S. C. § 881(a)(7). It reaches this conclusion although no such adversary hearing is required to deprive a criminal de- fendant of his liberty before trial. And its reasoning casts doubt upon long settled law relating to seizure of property to enforce income tax liability. I dissent from this ill- considered and disruptive decision. I The Court applies the three-factor balancing test for eval- uating procedural due process claims set out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976), to reach its unprecedented holding. I reject the majority's expansive application of Mathews. Mathews involved a due process challenge to the adequacy of administrative procedures established for the purpose of terminating Social Security disability benefits, and the Mathews balancing test was first conceived to ad- dress due process claims arising in the context of modern administrative law. No historical practices existed in this context for the Court to consider. The Court has expressly rejected the notion that the Mathews balancing test consti- tutes a "one-size-fits-all" formula for deciding every due process claim that comes before the Court. See Medina v. California, 505 U. S. 437 (1992) (holding that the Due Proc- ess Clause has limited operation beyond the specific guaran- tees enumerated in the Bill of Rights). More importantly, the Court does not work on a clean slate in the civil forfeiture context involved here. It has long sanctioned summary pro- ceedings in civil forfeitures. See, e. g., Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U. S. 395 (1878) (upholding seizure of a distillery by executive officers based on ex parte warrant); and G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 338 (1977) (upholding warrantless automobile seizures). 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 43 (1993) 67 Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J. A The Court's fixation on Mathews sharply conflicts with both historical practice and the specific textual source of the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" inquiry. The Fourth Amendment strikes a balance between the people's security in their persons, houses, papers, and effects and the public interest in effecting searches and seizures for law enforce- ment purposes. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U. S. 547, 559 (1978); see also Maryland v. Buie, 494 U. S. 325, 331 (1990); and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U. S. 602, 619 (1989). Compliance with the standards and procedures prescribed by the Fourth Amendment consti- tutes all the "process" that is "due" to respondent Good under the Fifth Amendment in the forfeiture context. We made this very point in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975), with respect to procedures for detaining a criminal defendant pending trial: "The historical basis of the probable cause requirement is quite different from the relatively recent application of variable procedural due process in debtor-creditor disputes and termination of government-created bene- fits. The Fourth Amendment was tailored explicitly for the criminal justice system, and its balance between in- dividual and public interests always has been thought to define the `process that is due' for seizures of person or property in criminal cases, including the detention of suspects pending trial." Id., at 125, n. 27 (emphasis added). The Gerstein Court went on to decide that while there must be a determination of probable cause by a neutral magistrate in order to detain an arrested suspect prior to trial, such a determination could be made in a nonadversarial proceeding, based on hearsay and written testimony. Id., at 120. It is paradoxical indeed to hold that a criminal defendant can be temporarily deprived of liberty on the basis of an ex parte 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:28 PAGES OPINPGT 68 UNITED STATES v. JAMES DANIEL GOOD REAL PROPERTY Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J. probable-cause determination, yet respondent Good cannot be temporarily deprived of property on the same basis. As we said in United States v. Monsanto, 491 U. S. 600, 615­ 616 (1989): "[I]t would be odd to conclude that the Government may not restrain property, such as the home and apartment in respondent's possession, based on a finding of proba- ble cause, when we have held that (under appropriate circumstances), the Government may restrain persons where there is a finding of probable cause to believe that the accused has committed a serious offense." Similarly, in Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 394­395 (1989), the Court faced the question of what constitutional standard governs a free citizen's claim that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an ar- rest, investigatory stop, or other "seizure" of his person. We held that the Fourth Amendment, rather than the Due Process Clause, provides the source of any specific limita- tions on the use of force in seizing a person: "Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this sort of physically intru- sive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Id., at 395. The "ex- plicit textual source of constitutional protection" found in the Fourth Amendment should also guide the analysis of re- spondent Good's claim of a right to additional procedural measures in civil forfeitures. B The Court dismisses the holdings of Gerstein and Graham as inapposite because they concern "the arrest or detention of criminal suspects." Ante, at 50. But we have never held that the Fourth Amendment is limited only to criminal pro- ceedings. In Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U. S. 56, 67 (1992), 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 43 (1993) 69 Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J. we expressly stated that the Fourth Amendment "applies in the civil context as well." Our historical treatment of civil forfeiture procedures underscores the notion that the Fourth Amendment specifically governs the process afforded in the civil forfeiture context, and it is too late in the day to ques- tion its exclusive application. As we decided in Calero- Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663 (1974), there is no need to look beyond the Fourth Amendment in civil forfeiture proceedings involving the Government be- cause ex parte seizures are " `too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now dis- placed.' " Id., at 686 (quoting J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 505, 510­511 (1921) (forfeiture not a denial of procedural due process despite the absence of preseizure notice and opportunity for a hearing)). The Court acknowledges the long history of ex parte sei- zures of real property through civil forfeiture, see Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589 (1931); Springer v. United States, 102 U. S. 586 (1881); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272 (1856); United States v. Stowell, 133 U. S. 1 (1890); and Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U. S. 395 (1878), and says "[w]ithout revis- iting these cases," ante, at 59-whatever that means-that they appear to depend on the need for prompt payment of taxes. The Court goes on to note that the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment alleviated the Government's reliance on liquor, customs, and tobacco taxes as sources of operating revenue. Whatever the merits of this novel distinction, it fails entirely to distinguish the leading case in the field, Phil- lips v. Commissioner, supra, a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Brandeis. That case dealt with the enforcement of income tax liability, which the Court says has replaced earlier forms of taxation as the principal source of govern- mental revenue. There the Court said: "The right of the United States to collect its inter- nal revenue by summary administrative proceedings has 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:28 PAGES OPINPGT 70 UNITED STATES v. JAMES DANIEL GOOD REAL PROPERTY Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J. long been settled. Where, as here, adequate opportu- nity is afforded for a later judicial determination of the legal rights, summary proceedings to secure prompt per- formance of pecuniary obligations to the government have been consistently sustained." Id., at 595 (foot- note omitted). "Where only property rights are involved, mere post- ponement of the judicial enquiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity given for the ultimate judicial determination of the liability is adequate." Id., at 596­597. Thus today's decision does not merely discard established precedents regarding excise taxes, but deals at least a glanc- ing blow to the authority of the Government to collect in- come tax delinquencies by summary proceedings. II The Court attempts to justify the result it reaches by ex- pansive readings of Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972), and Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U. S. 1 (1991). In Fuentes, the Court struck down state replevin procedures, finding that they served no important state interest that might jus- tify the summary proceedings. 407 U. S., at 96. Specifi- cally, the Court noted that the tension between the private buyer's use of the property pending final judgment and the private seller's interest in preventing further use and deteri- oration of his security tipped the balance in favor of a prior hearing in certain replevin situations. "[The provisions] allow summary seizure of a person's possessions when no more than private gain is directly at stake." Id., at 92. Cf. Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600 (1974) (upholding Louisiana sequestration statute that provided immediate postdeprivation hearing along with the option of damages). The Court in Fuentes also was careful to point out the limited situations in which seizure before hearing was consti- tutionally permissible, and included among them "summary 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 43 (1993) 71 Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J. seizure of property to collect the internal revenue of the United States." 407 U. S., at 91­92 (citing Phillips v. Com- missioner, supra). Certainly the present seizure is analo- gous, and it is therefore quite inaccurate to suggest that Fu- entes is authority for the Court's holding in the present case. Likewise in Doehr, the Court struck down a state statute authorizing prejudgment attachment of real estate without prior notice or hearing due to potential bias of the self- interested private party seeking attachment. The Court noted that the statute enables one of the private parties to " `make use of state procedures with the overt, significant assistance of state officials,' " that involve state action " `sub- stantial enough to implicate the Due Process Clause.' " Con- necticut v. Doehr, supra, at 11 (quoting Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U. S. 478, 486 (1988)). The Court concluded that, absent exigent circumstances, the private party's interest in attaching the property did not jus- tify the burdening of the private property owner's rights without a hearing to determine the likelihood of recovery. 501 U. S., at 18. In the present case, however, it is not a private party but the Government itself which is seizing the property. The Court's effort to distinguish Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663 (1974), is similarly unpersua- sive. The Court says that "[c]entral to our analysis in Calero-Toledo was the fact that a yacht was the `sort [of property] that could be removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed, or concealed, if advance warning of confiscation were given.' " Ante, at 52 (quoting Calero-Toledo, supra, at 679). But this is one of the three reasons given by the Court for upholding the summary forfeiture in that case: The other two-"fostering the public interest in preventing continued illicit use of the property," and the fact that the "seizure is not initiated by self-interested private parties; rather, Com- monwealth officials determine whether seizure is appro- priate . . . ," 416 U. S., at 679-are both met in the present 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:28 PAGES OPINPGT 72 UNITED STATES v. JAMES DANIEL GOOD REAL PROPERTY Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J. case. And while not capable of being moved or concealed, the real property at issue here surely could be destroyed or damaged. Several dwellings are located on the property that was seized from respondent Good, and these buildings could easily be destroyed or damaged to prevent them from falling into the hands of the Government if prior notice were required. The government interests found decisive in Calero-Toledo are equally present here: The seizure of respondent Good's real property serves important governmental purposes in combating illegal drugs; a preseizure notice might frustrate this statutory purpose by permitting respondent Good to de- stroy or otherwise damage the buildings on the property; and Government officials made the seizure rather than self- interested private parties seeking to gain from the seizure. Although the Court has found some owners entitled to an immediate postseizure administrative hearing, see, e. g., Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., supra, not until the majority adopted the Court of Appeals ruling have we held that the Constitution demanded notice and a preseizure hearing to satisfy due process requirements in civil forfeiture cases.* III This is not to say that the Government's use of civil forfeit- ure statutes to seize real property in drug cases may not cause hardship to innocent individuals. But I have grave *Ironically, courts and commentators have debated whether even a war- rant should be required for civil forfeiture seizures, not whether notice and a preseizure hearing should apply. See, e. g., Nelson, Should the Ranch Go Free Because the Constable Blundered? Gaining Compliance with Search and Seizure Standards in the Age of Asset Forfeiture, 80 Calif. L. Rev. 1309 (1992); Ahuja, Civil Forfeiture, Warrantless Property Seizures, and the Fourth Amendment, 5 Yale L. & Policy Rev. 428 (1987); and Comment, Forfeiture, Seizures and the Warrant Requirement, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 960 (1981). Forcing the Government to notify the affected property owners and go through a preseizure hearing in civil forfeiture cases must have seemed beyond the pale to these commentators. 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 43 (1993) 73 Opinion of O'Connor, J. doubts whether the Court's decision in this case will do much to alleviate those hardships, and I am confident that what- ever social benefits might flow from the decision are more than offset by the damage to settled principles of constitu- tional law which are inflicted to secure these perceived social benefits. I would reverse the decision of the Court of Ap- peals in toto. Justice O'Connor, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Today the Court declares unconstitutional an act of the Executive Branch taken with the prior approval of a Federal Magistrate Judge in full compliance with the laws enacted by Congress. On the facts of this case, however, I am unable to conclude that the seizure of Good's property did not afford him due process. I agree with the Court's observation in an analogous case more than a century ago: "If the laws here in question involved any wrong or unnecessary harshness, it was for Congress, or the people who make congresses, to see that the evil was corrected. The remedy does not lie with the judicial branch of the government." Springer v. United States, 102 U. S. 586, 594 (1881). I With respect to whether 19 U. S. C. §§ 1602­1604 impose a timeliness requirement over and above the statute of limita- tions, I agree with the dissenting judge below that the Ninth Circuit improperly "converted a set of housekeeping rules for the government into statutory protection for the prop- erty of malefactors." 971 F. 2d 1376, 1384 (1992). I there- fore join Parts I and III of the Court's opinion. I cannot agree, however, that under the circumstances of this case-where the property owner was previously con- victed of a drug offense involving the property, the Govern- ment obtained a warrant before seizing it, and the residents were not dispossessed-there was a due process violation 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:28 PAGES OPINPGT 74 UNITED STATES v. JAMES DANIEL GOOD REAL PROPERTY Opinion of O'Connor, J. simply because Good did not receive preseizure notice and an opportunity to be heard. I therefore respectfully dissent from Part II of the Court's opinion; I also join Parts II and III of the opinion of The Chief Justice. II My first disagreement is with the Court's holding that the Government must give notice and a hearing before seizing any real property prior to forfeiting it. That conclusion is inconsistent with over a hundred years of our case law. We have already held that seizure for purpose of forfeiture is one of those "extraordinary situations," Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 82 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted), in which the Due Process Clause does not require predepriva- tion notice and an opportunity to be heard. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663, 676­680 (1974). As we have recognized, Calero-Toledo "clearly indicates that due process does not require federal [agents] to conduct a hearing before seizing items subject to forfeiture." United States v. $8,850, 461 U. S. 555, 562, n. 12 (1983); see also United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U. S. 242, 249, n. 7 (1986). Those cases reflect the commonsense notion that the property owner receives all the process that is due at the forfeiture hearing itself. See id., at 251 ("[The claimant's] right to a [timely] forfeiture proceeding . . . satisfies any due process right with respect to the [forfeited property]"); Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274, 279 (1876). The distinction the Court tries to draw between our prece- dents and this case-the only distinction it can draw-is that real property is somehow different than personal property for due process purposes. But that distinction has never been considered constitutionally relevant in our forfeiture cases. Indeed, this Court rejected precisely the same dis- tinction in a case in which we were presented with a due process challenge to the forfeiture of real property for back taxes: 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 43 (1993) 75 Opinion of O'Connor, J. "The power to distrain personal property for the pay- ment of taxes is almost as old as the common law. . . . Why is it not competent for Congress to apply to realty as well as personalty the power to distrain and sell when necessary to enforce the payment of a tax? It is only the further legitimate exercise of the same power for the same purpose." Springer, supra, at 593­594. There is likewise no basis for distinguishing between real and personal property in the context of forfeiture of property used for criminal purposes. The required nexus between the property and the crime-that it be used to commit, or facilitate the commission of, a drug offense-is the same for forfeiture of real and personal property. Compare 21 U. S. C. § 881(a)(4) with § 881(a)(7); see Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602, 619­622 (1993) (construing the two pro- visions equivalently). Forfeiture of real property under similar circumstances has long been recognized. Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U. S. 395, 399 (1878) (uphold- ing forfeiture of "the real estate used to facilitate the [illegal] operation of distilling"); see also United States v. Stowell, 133 U. S. 1 (1890) (upholding forfeiture of land and buildings used in connection with illegal brewery). The Court attempts to distinguish our precedents by char- acterizing them as being based on "executive urgency." Ante, at 60. But this case, like all forfeiture cases, also involves executive urgency. Indeed, the Court in Calero- Toledo relied on the same cases the Court disparages: "[D]ue process is not denied when postponement of no- tice and hearing is necessary to protect the public from contaminated food, North American [Cold] Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306 (1908); . . . or to aid the collec- tion of taxes, Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589 (1931); or the war effort, United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U. S. 547 (1921)." 416 U. S., at 679. 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:28 PAGES OPINPGT 76 UNITED STATES v. JAMES DANIEL GOOD REAL PROPERTY Opinion of O'Connor, J. The Court says that there is no "plausible claim of urgency today to justify the summary seizure of real property under § 881(a)(7)." Ante, at 61. But we said precisely the op- posite in Calero-Toledo: "The considerations that justified postponement of notice and hearing in those cases are pres- ent here." 416 U. S., at 679. The only distinction between this case and Calero-Toledo is that the property forfeited here was realty, whereas the yacht in Calero-Toledo was personalty. It is entirely spurious to say, as the Court does, that execu- tive urgency depends on the nature of the property sought to be forfeited. The Court reaches its anomalous result by mischaracterizing Calero-Toledo, stating that the movability of the yacht there at issue was "[c]entral to our analysis." Ante, at 52. What we actually said in Calero-Toledo, how- ever, was that "preseizure notice and hearing might frustrate the interests served by [forfeiture] statutes, since the prop- erty seized-as here, a yacht-will often be of a sort that could be removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed, or con- cealed, if advance warning of confiscation were given." 416 U. S., at 679 (emphasis added). The fact that the yacht could be sunk or sailed away was relevant to, but hardly dispositive of, the due process analysis. In any event, land and build- ings are subject to damage or destruction. See ante, at 72 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Moreover, that was just one of the three justifications on which we relied in upholding the forfeiture in Calero-Toledo. The other two-the importance of the governmental purpose and the fact that the seizure was made by government officials rather than private parties-are without a doubt equally present in this case, as The Chief Justice's opinion demonstrates. Ante, at 71­72. III My second disagreement is with the Court's holding that the Government acted unconstitutionally in seizing this real 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 43 (1993) 77 Opinion of O'Connor, J. property for forfeiture without giving Good prior notice and an opportunity to be heard. I agree that the due process inquiry outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976)-which requires a consideration of the private inter- est affected, the risk of erroneous deprivation and the value of additional safeguards, and the Government's interest- provides an appropriate analytical framework for evaluating whether a governmental practice violates the Due Process Clause notwithstanding its historical pedigree. Cf. Medina v. California, 505 U. S. 437, 453 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concur- ring in judgment). But this case is an as applied challenge to the seizure of Good's property; on these facts, I cannot conclude that there was a constitutional violation. The private interest at issue here-the owner's right to control his property-is significant. Cf. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U. S. 1, 11 (1991) ("[T]he property interests that attachment affects are significant"). Yet the preforfeiture intrusion in this case was minimal. Good was not living on the property at the time, and there is no indication that his possessory interests were in any way infringed. Moreover, Good's tenants were allowed to remain on the property. The property interest of which Good was deprived was the value of the rent during the period between seizure and the entry of the judgment of forfeiture-a monetary interest identical to that of the property owner in United States v. $8,850, 461 U. S. 555 (1983), in which we stated that pre- seizure notice and hearing were not required. The Court emphasizes that people have a strong interest in their homes. Ante, at 53­55, 61. But that observation confuses the Fourth and the Fifth Amendments. The "sanc- tity of the home" recognized by this Court's cases, e. g., Pay- ton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 601 (1980), is founded on a concern with governmental intrusion into the owner's posses- sory or privacy interests-the domain of the Fourth Amend- ment. Where, as here, the Government obtains a warrant supported by probable cause, that concern is allayed. The 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:28 PAGES OPINPGT 78 UNITED STATES v. JAMES DANIEL GOOD REAL PROPERTY Opinion of O'Connor, J. Fifth Amendment, on the other hand, is concerned with dep- rivations of property interests; for due process analysis, it should not matter whether the property to be seized is real or personal, home or not. The relevant inquiry is into the gov- ernmental interference with the owner's interest in what- ever property is at issue, an intrusion that is minimal here. Moreover, it is difficult to see what advantage a preseizure adversary hearing would have had in this case. There was already an ex parte hearing before a magistrate to determine whether there was probable cause to believe that Good's property had been used in connection with a drug trafficking offense. That hearing ensured that the probable validity of the claim had been established. Cf. Sniadach v. Family Fi- nance Corp. of Bay View, 395 U. S. 337, 343 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring). The Court's concern with innocent owners (see ante, at 55­56) is completely misplaced here, where the warrant affidavit indicated that the property owner had al- ready been convicted of a drug offense involving the prop- erty. See App. 29­31. At any hearing-adversary or not-the Government need only show probable cause that the property has been used to facilitate a drug offense in order to seize it; it will be unlikely that giving the property owner an opportunity to respond will affect the probable-cause determination. Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 121­122 (1975). And we have already held that property owners have a due process right to a prompt postseizure hearing, which is sufficient to protect the owner's interests. See $8,850, supra, at 564­565; Von Neumann, 474 U. S., at 249. The Government's interest in the property is substantial. Good's use of the property to commit a drug offense con- veyed all right and title to the United States, although a judicial decree of forfeiture was necessary to perfect the Government's interest. See United States v. Parcel of Rumson, N. J., Land, 507 U. S. 111, 125­127 (1993) (plurality opinion); cf. Doehr, supra, at 16 (noting that the plaintiff 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 43 (1993) 79 Opinion of O'Connor, J. "had no existing interest in Doehr's real estate when he sought the attachment"). Seizure allowed the Government to protect its inchoate interest in the property itself. Cf. Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600, 608­609 (1974). Seizure also permitted the Government "to assert in rem jurisdiction over the property in order to conduct forfeiture proceedings, thereby fostering the public interest in prevent- ing continued illicit use of the property and in enforcing criminal sanctions." Calero-Toledo, 416 U. S., at 679 (foot- note omitted); see also Fuentes, 407 U. S., at 91, n. 23, citing Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94 (1921). In another case in which the forfeited property was land and buildings, this Court stated: "Judicial proceedings in rem, to enforce a forfeiture, cannot in general be properly instituted until the prop- erty inculpated is previously seized by the executive au- thority, as it is the preliminary seizure of the property that brings the same within the reach of such legal proc- ess." Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U. S., at 396, citing The Brig Ann, 9 Cranch 289 (1815). The Government in Dobbins's Distillery proceeded almost exactly as it did here: The United States Attorney swore out an affidavit alleging that the premises were being used as an illegal distillery, and thus were subject to forfeiture; a fed- eral judge issued a seizure warrant; a deputy United States marshal seized the property by posting notices thereon ad- monishing anyone with an interest in it to appear before the court on a stated date; and the court, after a hearing at which Dobbins claimed his interest, ordered the property forfeited to the United States. See Record in Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, No. 145, O. T. 1877, pp. 2­8, 37­ 39, 46­48. The Court noted that "[d]ue executive seizure was made in this case of the distillery and of the real and personal property used in connection with the same." 96 U. S., at 396. 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:28 PAGES OPINPGT 80 UNITED STATES v. JAMES DANIEL GOOD REAL PROPERTY Opinion of Thomas, J. The Court objects that the rule has its origins in admiralty cases, and has no applicability when the object of the forfeit- ure is real property. But Congress has specifically made the customs laws applicable to drug forfeitures, regardless of whether the Government seeks to forfeit real or personal property. 21 U. S. C. § 881(d); cf. Tyler v. Defrees, 11 Wall. 331, 346 (1871) ("Unquestionably, it was within the power of Congress to provide a full code of procedure for these cases [involving the forfeiture of real property belonging to re- bels], but it chose to [adopt], as a general rule, a well- established system of administering the law of capture"). Indeed, just last Term, we recognized in a case involving the seizure and forfeiture of real property that "it long has been understood that a valid seizure of the res is a prerequisite to the initiation of an in rem civil forfeiture proceeding." Republic Nat. Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U. S. 80, 84 (1992). Finally, the burden on the Government of the Court's deci- sion will be substantial. The practical effect of requiring an adversary hearing before seizure will be that the Govern- ment will conduct the full forfeiture hearing on the merits before it can claim its interest in the property. In the mean- time, the Government can protect the important federal in- terests at stake only through the vagaries of state laws. And while under the current system only a few property owners contest the forfeiture, the Court's opinion creates an incentive and an opportunity to do so, thus increasing the workload of federal prosecutors and courts. For all these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I therefore respectfully dissent from Part II of the opinion of the Court. Justice Thomas, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Two fundamental considerations seem to motivate the Court's due process ruling: first, a desire to protect the 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 43 (1993) 81 Opinion of Thomas, J. rights incident to the ownership of real property, especially residences, and second, a more implicitly expressed distrust of the Government's aggressive use of broad civil forfeiture statutes. Although I concur with both of these sentiments, I cannot agree that Good was deprived of due process of law under the facts of this case. Therefore, while I join Parts I and III of the Court's opinion, I dissent from Part II. Like the majority, I believe that "[i]ndividual freedom finds tangible expression in property rights." Ante, at 61. In my view, as the Court has increasingly emphasized the creation and delineation of entitlements in recent years, it has not always placed sufficient stress upon the protection of individuals' traditional rights in real property. Although I disagree with the outcome reached by the Court, I am sympathetic to its focus on the protection of property rights-rights that are central to our heritage. Cf. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 601 (1980) ("[R]espect for the sanctity of the home . . . has been embedded in our tradi- tions since the origins of the Republic"); Entick v. Carring- ton, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (C. P. 1765) ("The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property"). And like the majority, I am disturbed by the breadth of new civil forfeiture statutes such as 21 U. S. C. § 881(a)(7), which subjects to forfeiture all real property that is used, or intended to be used, in the commission, or even the facilita- tion, of a federal drug offense.1 As Justice O'Connor 1 Other courts have suggested that Government agents, and the statutes under which they operate, have gone too far in the civil forfeiture context. See, e. g., United States v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F. 2d 896, 905 (CA2 1992) ("We continue to be enormously troubled by the government's increasing and virtually unchecked use of the civil forfeiture statutes and the disregard for due process that is buried in those stat- utes"); United States v. One Parcel of Property, 964 F. 2d 814, 818 (CA8 1992) ("[W]e are troubled by the government's view that any property, 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:28 PAGES OPINPGT 82 UNITED STATES v. JAMES DANIEL GOOD REAL PROPERTY Opinion of Thomas, J. points out, ante, at 74­76, since the Civil War we have upheld statutes allowing for the civil forfeiture of real property. A strong argument can be made, however, that § 881(a)(7) is so broad that it differs not only in degree, but in kind, from its historical antecedents. See, e. g., Brief for Respondents 19­21. Indeed, it is unclear whether the central theory be- hind in rem forfeiture, the fiction "that the thing is primarily considered the offender," J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 505, 511 (1921), can fully justify the immense scope of § 881(a)(7). Under this provision, "large tracts of land [and any improvements thereon] which have no connection with crime other than being the location where a drug transaction occurred," Brief for Respondents 20, are subject to forfeiture. It is difficult to see how such real property is necessarily in any sense "guilty" of an offense, as could reasonably be argued of, for example, the distillery in Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U. S. 395 (1878), or the pirate vessel in Harmony v. United States, 2 How. 210 (1844). Given that current practice under § 881(a)(7) ap- pears to be far removed from the legal fiction upon which the civil forfeiture doctrine is based, it may be necessary-in an appropriate case-to reevaluate our generally deferential approach to legislative judgments in this area of civil forfeiture.2 In my view, however, Good's due process claim does not present that "appropriate" case. In its haste to serve laud- able goals, the majority disregards our case law and ignores whether it be a hobo's hovel or the Empire State Building, can be seized by the government because the owner, regardless of his or her past crimi- nal record, engages in a single drug transaction"), rev'd sub nom. Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602 (1993). 2 Such a case may arise in the excessive fines context. See Austin v. United States, 509 U. S., at 628 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concur- ring in judgment) (suggesting that "[t]he relevant inquiry for an excessive forfeiture under [21 U. S. C.] § 881 is the relationship of the property to the offense: Was it close enough to render the property, under traditional standards, `guilty' and hence forfeitable?"). 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 43 (1993) 83 Opinion of Thomas, J. the critical facts of the case before it. As the opinions of The Chief Justice, ante, at 69­72, and Justice O'Connor, ante, at 74­76, persuasively demonstrate, the Court's opinion is predicated in large part upon misreadings of important civil forfeiture precedents, especially Calero-Toledo v. Pear- son Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663 (1974).3 I will not re- peat the critiques found in the other dissents, but will add that it is twice puzzling for the majority to explain cases such as Springer v. United States, 102 U. S. 586 (1881), and Dobbins's Distillery, supra, as depending on the Federal Government's urgent need for revenue in the 19th century. First, it is somewhat odd that the Court suggests that the Government's financial concerns might justifiably control the due process analysis, see ante, at 59­60, and second, it is diffi- cult to believe that the prompt collection of funds was more essential to the Government a century ago than it is today. I agree with the other dissenters that a fair application of the relevant precedents to this case would indicate that no due process violation occurred. But my concerns regarding the legitimacy of the current scope of the Government's real property forfeiture operations lead me to consider these cases as only helpful to the analysis, not dispositive. What convinces me that Good's due process rights were not vio- lated are the facts of this case-facts that are disregarded by the Court in its well-intentioned effort to protect "innocent owners" from mistaken Government seizures. Ante, at 55. The Court forgets that "this case is an as applied challenge to the seizure of Good's property." Ante, at 77 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In holding that the Government generally may not seize real property prior to a final judgment of forfeiture, see ante, at 59, 62, the 3 With scant support, the Court also dispenses with the ancient jurisdic- tional rule that "a valid seizure of the res is a prerequisite to the initiation of an in rem civil forfeiture proceeding," Republic Nat. Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U. S. 80, 84 (1992), at least in the case of real property. See ante, at 57­58. 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:28 PAGES OPINPGT 84 UNITED STATES v. JAMES DANIEL GOOD REAL PROPERTY Opinion of Thomas, J. Court effectively declares that many of the customs laws are facially unconstitutional as they apply under 21 U. S. C. § 881(d) to forfeiture actions brought pursuant to § 881(a)(7). See, e. g., 19 U. S. C. §§ 1602, 1605 (authorizing seizure prior to adversary proceedings). We should avoid reaching be- yond the question presented in order to fashion a broad con- stitutional rule when doing so is unnecessary for resolution of the case before us. Cf. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). The Court's over- reaching is particularly unfortunate in this case because the Court's solicitude is so clearly misplaced: Good is not an "innocent owner"; he is a convicted drug offender. Like Justice O'Connor, I cannot agree with the Court that "under the circumstances of this case-where the prop- erty owner was previously convicted of a drug offense in- volving the property, the Government obtained a warrant before seizing it, and the residents were not dispossessed- there was a due process violation simply because Good did not receive preseizure notice and an opportunity to be heard." Ante, at 73­74 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Wherever the due process line properly should be drawn, in circumstances such as these, a preseizure hearing is not required as a matter of constitu- tional law. Moreover, such a hearing would be unhelpful to the property owner. As a practical matter, it is difficult to see what purpose it would serve. Notice, of course, is pro- vided by the conviction itself. In my view, seizure of the property without more formalized notice and an opportunity to be heard is simply one of the many unpleasant collateral consequences that follows from conviction of a serious drug offense. Cf. Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, 285 (1948) ("Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary with- drawal or limitation of many privileges and rights"). It might be argued that this fact-specific inquiry is too narrow. Narrow, too, however, was the first question pre- 510us1$$7J 06-18-97 16:43:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 43 (1993) 85 Opinion of Thomas, J. sented to us for review.4 Moreover, when, as here, ambi- tious modern statutes and prosecutorial practices have all but detached themselves from the ancient notion of civil for- feiture, I prefer to go slowly. While I sympathize with the impulses motivating the Court's decision, I disagree with the Court's due process analysis. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 4 "Whether the seizure of the respondent real property for forfeiture, pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate judge based on a finding of probable cause, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the owner (who did not reside on the premises) was not given notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to the seizure." Pet. for Cert. I. 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:12 PAGES OPINPGT 86 OCTOBER TERM, 1993 Syllabus JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE CO. v. HARRIS TRUST AND SAVINGS BANK, as trustee of the SPERRY MASTER RETIREMENT TRUST NO. 2 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit No. 92­1074. Argued October 12, 1993-Decided December 13, 1993 Petitioner John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company (Hancock) and respondent Harris Trust and Savings Bank (Harris), the current trustee of a corporation's retirement plan, are party to Group Annuity Contract No. 50 (GAC 50), an agreement of a type known as a "participating group annuity." Under such a contract, the insurer commingles with its general corporate assets deposits received to secure retiree benefits, and does not immediately apply those deposits to the purchase of annu- ities. During the life of the contract, however, amounts credited to the deposit account may be converted into a stream of guaranteed benefits for individual retirees. Funds in excess of those that have been so con- verted are referred to as "free funds." Dissatisfied over its inability to gain access to GAC 50's free funds, Harris filed this suit pursuant to, inter alia, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), alleging that Hancock is managing "plan assets," and there- fore is subject to ERISA's fiduciary standards in its administration of GAC 50. Hancock responded that its undertaking fits within the ERISA provision, 29 U. S. C. § 1101(b)(2)(B), that excludes from "plan assets" a "guaranteed benefit policy," defined as an insurance policy or contract "to the extent that [it] provides for benefits the amount of which is guaranteed by the insurer." The District Court granted Han- cock summary judgment on the ERISA claims, holding that it was not a fiduciary with respect to any portion of GAC 50. Reversing in part, the Court of Appeals held that the "guaranteed benefit policy" exclusion did not cover the GAC 50 free funds, as to which Hancock provides no guarantee of benefit payments or fixed rates of return. Held: Because the GAC 50 free funds are "plan assets," Hancock's actions in regard to their management and disposition must be judged against ERISA's fiduciary standards. Pp. 94­110. (a) The import of the pertinent ERISA provisions, read as a whole and in light of the statute's broad purpose of protecting retirement bene- fits, is reasonably clear. In contrast to other ERISA provisions creat- 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:12 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 86 (1993) 87 Syllabus ing unqualified exemptions from the statute's reach, Congress specifi- cally instructed, by the words of limitation it used in § 1101(b)(2)(B), that the guaranteed benefit policy exclusion be closely contained: The deposits over which Hancock is exercising authority or control under GAC 50 must have been obtained "solely" by reason of the issuance of "an insurance policy or contract" that provides for benefits "the amount of which is guaranteed," and even then the exemption applies only "to the extent" that GAC 50 provides for such benefits. Pp. 94­97. (b) The Court rejects Hancock's contention that, because Congress reserved to the States primary responsibility for regulating the insur- ance industry, ERISA's requirement that a fiduciary act "solely in the interest of . . . participants and beneficiaries and . . . for the exclusive purpose of . . . providing benefits," § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added), must yield to conflicting state-law requirements that an insurer manag- ing general account assets consider the interest of, and maintain equity among, all of its contractholders, creditors, and shareholders. The McCarran-Ferguson Act-which provides, among other things, that no federal "Act . . . shall be construed to . . . supersede any [state] law . . . enacted . . . for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . . unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance"-does not support Hancock's contention, since ERISA and the guaranteed ben- efit policy provision obviously and specifically "relat[e] to the business of insurance." Moreover, although state laws concerning an insurer's management of general account assets "regulat[e] insurance" in the words of ERISA's saving clause-which instructs that ERISA "shall not be construed to exempt . . . any person from any [state] law . . . which regulates insurance," § 1144(b)(2)(A)-state laws regulating gen- eral accounts also can "relate to [an] employee benefit plan" under ERISA's encompassing preemption clause, which directs that the stat- ute "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they . . . relate to any employee benefit plan," § 1144(a). There is no solid basis for believ- ing that Congress, when it designed ERISA, intended fundamentally to alter traditional preemption analysis. Thus, ERISA leaves room for complementary or dual federal and state regulation, and calls for federal supremacy when the two regimes cannot be harmonized or accommo- dated. Pp. 97­101. (c) Hancock is an ERISA fiduciary with respect to the free funds it holds under GAC 50. To determine whether a contract qualifies as a guaranteed benefit policy, each component of the contract bears exami- nation. A component fits within the guaranteed benefit policy exclusion only if it allocates investment risk to the insurer. Cf., e. g., SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U. S. 202. Such an allocation is present when the insurer provides a genuine guarantee of an aggregate amount 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:12 PAGES OPINPGT 88 JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. HARRIS TRUST AND SAV. BANK Syllabus of benefits payable to retirement plan participants and their beneficiar- ies, as Hancock indisputably did with respect to certain GAC 50 benefits not at issue. As to a contract's free funds, the insurer must guarantee a reasonable rate of return on those funds and provide a mechanism to convert them into guaranteed benefits at rates set by the contract. While another contract, with a different set of features, might satisfy these requirements, GAC 50 does not; indeed, Hancock provided no real guarantee that benefits in any amount would be payable from the free funds. Pp. 101­106. (d) The Court declines to follow the Labor Department's view that ERISA's fiduciary obligations do not apply in relation to assets held by an insurer in its general account under contracts like GAC 50. The 1975 interpretive bulletin assertedly expressing this view did not origi- nally have the scope now attributed to it, since it expressly addressed only a question regarding the scope of the prohibited transaction rules, and did not mention or elaborate upon its applicability to the guaranteed benefit policy exemption or explain how an unqualified exclusion for an insurer's general asset account can be reconciled with Congress' choice of a more limited ("to the extent that") formulation. Moreover, as of 1992, the Department apparently had no firm position to communi- cate, since it declined to file a brief in the Court of Appeals, citing the need to fully consider all of the implications of the issues. This Court will not accord deference to the Department's current view, since, by reading the statutory words "to the extent" to mean nothing more than "if," the Department has exceeded the scope of available ambiguity. Pp. 106­110. 970 F. 2d 1138, affirmed. Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Blackmun, Stevens, Scalia, and Souter, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ., joined, post, p. 111. Howard G. Kristol argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Robert M. Peak, Rosalie A. Hailey, and Richard J. J. Scarola. Christopher J. Wright argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Acting Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Judith E. Kramer, Allen H. Feldman, Nathaniel I. Spiller, and Elizabeth Hopkins. 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:12 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 86 (1993) 89 Opinion of the Court Lawrence Kill argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was John B. Berringer.* Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents an issue of statutory construction- whether the fiduciary standards stated in the Employee Re- tirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) govern an insurance company's conduct in relation to certain annuity contracts. Fiduciary status under ERISA generally attends the management of "plan assets." The statute, however, contains no comprehensive definition of "plan assets." Our task in this case is to determine the bounds of a statutory exclusion from "plan asset" categorization, an exclusion Con- gress prescribed for "guaranteed benefit polic[ies]." The question before us arises in the context of a contract between defendant-petitioner John Hancock Mutual Life In- surance Company (Hancock) and plaintiff-respondent Harris Trust and Savings Bank (Harris), current trustee of a Sperry Rand Corporation Retirement Plan.1 Pursuant to its con- *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of New York et al. by Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, and Jerry Boone, Solicitor General, and Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General of Massachusetts; for the American Council of Life Insurance by James F. Jorden, Stephen H. Goldberg, Perry Ian Cone, Waldemar J. Pflepsen, Jr., Richard E. Barnsback, Stephen W. Kraus, and Phillip E. Stano; and for the Life Insurance Council of New York by Theodore R. Groom, Stephen M. Saxon, William F. Hanrahan, William J. Flanagan, and Raymond A. D'Amico. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Certain United States Senators and Representatives by Howard M. Metzenbaum, pro se; for the American Association of Retired Persons et al. by Cathy Ventrell- Monsees, Joan S. Wise, Mary Ellen Signorille, and Edgar Pauk; and for the Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund by William H. Song, Brigid Carroll Anderson, and Timothy St. Clair Smith. 1 Sperry Rand Corporation has undergone a number of changes in name and corporate form since 1941, when the contract with Hancock was ini- tially made; for convenience, we use in this opinion only the employer- corporation's original name, Sperry. 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:12 PAGES OPINPGT 90 JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. HARRIS TRUST AND SAV. BANK Opinion of the Court tract with Harris, Hancock receives deposits from the Sperry Plan. Harris asserts that Hancock is managing "plan assets," and therefore bears fiduciary responsibility. Han- cock maintains that its undertaking fits within the statutory exclusion for "guaranteed benefit polic[ies]." "Guaranteed benefit policy" is not a trade term originating in the insur- ance industry; it is a statutory invention placed in ERISA and there defined as an insurance policy or contract that "provides for benefits the amount of which is guaranteed by the insurer." 88 Stat. 875, 29 U. S. C. § 1101(b)(2)(B). The contract in suit is of a kind known in the trade as a "deposit administration contract" or "participating group annuity." 2 Under a contract of this type, deposits to secure retiree benefits are not immediately applied to the purchase of annuities; instead, the deposits are commingled with the insurer's general corporate assets, and deposit account bal- ances reflect the insurer's overall investment experience. During the life of the contract, however, amounts credited to the deposit account may be converted into a stream of guaranteed benefits for individual retirees. We granted certiorari, 507 U. S. 983 (1993), to resolve a split among Courts of Appeals regarding the applicability of the guaranteed benefit policy exclusion to annuity contracts of the kind just described. The Second Circuit in the case we review held that the guaranteed benefit policy exclusion did not cover funds administered by Hancock that bear no fixed rate of return and have not yet been converted into guaranteed benefits. 970 F. 2d 1138, 1143­1144 (1992). We agree with the Second Circuit that ERISA's fiduciary obliga- tions bind Hancock in its management of such funds, and accordingly affirm that court's judgment. 2 For descriptions of these contracts, see D. McGill & D. Grubbs, Funda- mentals of Private Pensions 551­564 (6th ed. 1989) (hereinafter McGill & Grubbs); see also Goldberg & Altman, The Case for the Nonapplication of ERISA to Insurers' General Account Assets, 21 Tort & Ins. L. J. 475, 478­482 (1986) (hereinafter Goldberg & Altman). 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:12 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 86 (1993) 91 Opinion of the Court I The parties refer to the contract at issue as Group Annuity Contract No. 50 (GAC 50). Initially, GAC 50 was a simple deferred annuity contract under which Sperry purchased from Hancock individual deferred annuities, at rates fixed by the contract, for employees eligible under the Sperry Retire- ment Plan. Since its origination in 1941, however, GAC 50 has been transformed by amendments. By the time this litigation commenced, the contract included the following features. Assets and liabilities under GAC 50 were recorded (for book- keeping purposes) in two accounts-the "Pension Adminis- tration Fund" recorded assets, and the "Liabilities of the Fund," liabilities. GAC 50 assets were not segregated, how- ever; they were part of Hancock's pool of corporate funds, or general account, out of which Hancock pays its costs of oper- ation and satisfies its obligations to policyholders and other creditors. See Agreed Statement of Facts ¶¶ 11­19, App. 85­86; Brief for Petitioner 7­9; see also McGill & Grubbs 492 (describing general accounts); id., at 552 (describing asset allocation under deposit administration contracts). Hancock agreed to allocate to GAC 50's Pension Administration Fund a pro rata portion of the investment gains and losses at- tributable to Hancock's general account assets, Agreed Statement of Facts ¶ 11, App. 85, and also guaranteed that the Pension Administration Fund would not fall below its January 1, 1968, level, Agreed Statement of Facts ¶ 27, id., at 88. GAC 50 provided for conversion of the Pension Adminis- tration Fund into retirement benefits for Sperry employees in this way. Upon request of the Sperry Plan Administra- tor, Hancock would guarantee full payment of all benefits to which a designated Sperry retiree was entitled; attendant liability would then be recorded by adding an amount, set by 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:12 PAGES OPINPGT 92 JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. HARRIS TRUST AND SAV. BANK Opinion of the Court Hancock, to the Liabilities of the Fund.3 In the event that the added liability caused GAC 50's "Minimum Operating Level"-the Liabilities of the Fund plus a contingency cush- ion of five percent-to exceed the amount accumulated in the Pension Administration Fund, the "active" or "accumulation" phase of the contract would terminate automatically. In that event, Hancock would purchase annuities at rates stated in the contract to cover all benefits previously guaranteed by Hancock under GAC 50, and the contract itself would con- vert back to a simple deferred annuity contract. Agreed Statement of Facts ¶¶ 33, 36­37, 42, id., at 89­91. As GAC 50 was administered, amounts recorded in the Pension Administration Fund were used to provide retire- ment benefits to Sperry employees in other ways. In this connection, the parties use the term "free funds" to describe the excess in the Pension Administration Fund over the Min- imum Operating Level (105 percent of the amount needed to provide guaranteed benefits). In 1977, Sperry Plan trustee Harris obtained the right to direct Hancock to use the free funds to pay "nonguaranteed benefits" to retirees. These benefits were provided monthly on a pay-as-you-go basis; they were nonguaranteed in the sense that Hancock was ob- ligated to make payments only out of free funds, i. e., only when the balance in the Pension Administration Fund ex- ceeded the Minimum Operating Level. Additionally, in 1979 and again in 1981, Hancock permitted Harris to transfer portions of the free funds pursuant to "rollover" procedures. Agreed Statement of Facts ¶ 78, id., at 96. Finally, in 1988, a contract amendment allowed Har- ris to transfer over $50 million from the Pension Administra- tion Fund without triggering the contract's "asset liquidation 3 This liability calculation established, in effect, the price for Hancock's guarantee of a specified benefit stream. The liability associated with a given benefit entitlement was to be calculated using rates that, since 1972, could be altered by Hancock. Agreed Statement of Facts ¶ 39, App. 90. 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:12 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 86 (1993) 93 Opinion of the Court adjustment," a mechanism for converting the book value of the transferred assets to market value. While Harris in fact used these various methods to effect withdrawals from the Pension Administration Fund, Han- cock maintains that only the original method-conversion of the Pension Administration Fund into guaranteed benefits- is currently within the scope of Harris' contract rights. In May 1982, Hancock gave notice that it would no longer make nonguaranteed benefit payments. Agreed Statement of Facts ¶¶ 82­87, id., at 97­98. And since 1981 Hancock has refused all requests by Harris to make transfers using "rollover" procedures. Agreed Statement of Facts ¶ 79, id., at 96. Harris last exercised its right to convert Pension Adminis- tration Fund accumulations into guaranteed benefits in 1977. Agreed Statement of Facts ¶ 81, id., at 97. Harris contends, and Hancock denies, that the conversion price has been in- flated by incorporation of artificially low interest rate assumptions. One means remains by which Harris may gain access to GAC 50's free funds. Harris can demand transfer of those funds in their entirety out of the Pension Administration Fund. Harris has not taken that course because it entails an asset liquidation adjustment Harris regards as undervalu- ing the plan's share of Hancock's general account. In sum, nothing was removed from the Pension Administration Fund or converted into guaranteed benefits between June 1982 and 1988. During that period the free funds increased dramati- cally as a result of Hancock's continuing positive investment experience, the allocation of a portion of that experience to the Pension Administration Fund, and the absence of any offsetting increase in the Liabilities of the Fund for addi- tional guaranteed benefits. Harris commenced this action in July 1983, contending, inter alia, that Hancock breached its fiduciary obligations under ERISA by denying Harris any realistic means to make 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:12 PAGES OPINPGT 94 JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. HARRIS TRUST AND SAV. BANK Opinion of the Court use of GAC 50's free funds. Hancock responded that ERISA's fiduciary standards do not apply because GAC 50, in its entirety, "provides for benefits the amount of which is guaranteed by the insurer" within the meaning of the "guar- anteed benefit policy" exclusion accorded by 29 U. S. C. § 1101(b)(2)(B). In September 1989, the District Court granted Hancock's motion for summary judgment on Harris' ERISA claims, holding that Hancock was not an ERISA fiduciary with re- spect to any portion of GAC 50. 722 F. Supp. 998 (SDNY 1989). The District Court thereafter dismissed Harris' re- maining contract and tort claims. See 767 F. Supp. 1269 (1991). On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed in part. The Court of Appeals determined that although Hancock "provides guarantees with respect to one portion of the ben- efits derived from [GAC 50], it does not do so at all times with respect to all the benefits derived from the other, or free funds, portion" of the contract. 970 F. 2d, at 1143. The free funds "were not converted to fixed, guaranteed obliga- tions but instead were subject to fluctuation based on the insurer's investment performance." Id., at 1144. With re- spect to those free funds, the Second Circuit concluded, Han- cock "provides no guarantee of benefit payments or fixed rates of return." Ibid. The Court of Appeals accordingly ruled that ERISA's fiduciary standards govern Hancock's management of the free funds, and it instructed the District Court to determine whether those standards had been satis- fied. Ibid. II A Is Hancock a fiduciary with respect to any of the funds it administers under GAC 50? To answer that question, we examine first the language of the governing statute, guided not by "a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look[ing] to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:12 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 86 (1993) 95 Opinion of the Court and policy." Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41, 51 (1987), quoting Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U. S. 36, 43 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). The obligations of an ERISA fiduciary are described in 29 U. S. C. § 1104(a)(1): A fiduciary must discharge its duties with respect to a plan "solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiar- ies and- "(A) for the exclusive purpose of: "(i) providing benefits to participants and their bene- ficiaries . . . ." A person is a fiduciary with respect to an employee bene- fit plan "to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary author- ity or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respect- ing management or disposition of its assets . . . ." 29 U. S. C. § 1002(21)(A) (emphasis added). The "assets" of a plan are undefined except by exclusion in § 1101(b)(2), which reads in relevant part: "In the case of a plan to which a guaranteed benefit policy is issued by an insurer, the assets of such plan shall be deemed to include such policy, but shall not, solely by reason of the issuance of such policy, be deemed to include any assets of such insurer." A "guaranteed benefit policy," in turn, is defined as "an insurance policy or contract to the extent that such policy or contract provides for benefits the amount of which is guaranteed by the insurer. Such term includes any surplus in a separate account, but excludes any other portion of a separate account." § 1101(b)(2)(B).4 4 As noted by Goldberg and Altman, the term "guaranteed benefit con- tract . . . has never been a part of the insurance industry lexicon." Gold- berg & Altman 482. ERISA itself must thus supply the term's meaning. 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:12 PAGES OPINPGT 96 JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. HARRIS TRUST AND SAV. BANK Opinion of the Court Although these provisions are not mellifluous, read as a whole their import is reasonably clear. To help fulfill ERISA's broadly protective purposes,5 Congress commodi- ously imposed fiduciary standards on persons whose actions affect the amount of benefits retirement plan participants will receive. See 29 U. S. C. § 1002(21)(A) (defining as a fi- duciary any person who "exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of [a plan's] assets"); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93­1280, p. 296 (1974) (the "fiduciary responsibility rules generally apply to all employee benefit plans . . . in or affecting interstate commerce"). The guaran- teed benefit policy exclusion from ERISA's fiduciary regime 6 is markedly confined: The deposits over which Hancock is exercising authority or control under GAC 50 must have been obtained "solely" by reason of the issuance of "an insur- ance policy or contract" that provides for benefits "the amount of which is guaranteed," and even then it is only "to the extent" that GAC 50 provides for such benefits that the § 1101(b)(2)(B) exemption applies. In contrast, elsewhere in the statute Congress spoke with- out qualification. For example, Congress exempted from the definition of plan assets "any security" issued to a plan by a registered investment company. 29 U. S. C. § 1101(b)(1) (emphasis added). Similarly, Congress exempted "any as- sets of . . . an insurance company or any assets of a plan which are held by . . . an insurance company" from the re- 5 See, e. g., Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U. S. 107, 112­113 (1989); Met- ropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 732 (1985). The statute's statement of purpose observes that "the continued well-being and security of millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by [employee benefit plans]" and declares it "desirable . . . that disclosure be made and safeguards be provided with respect to the estab- lishment, operation, and administration of such plans . . . ." 29 U. S. C. § 1001(a). 6 Section 1101(b) also provides an exclusion for assets held by "an invest- ment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940." 29 U. S. C. § 1101(b)(1). 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:12 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 86 (1993) 97 Opinion of the Court quirement that plan assets be held in trust. § 1103(b)(2) (emphasis added). Notably, the guaranteed benefit policy exemption is not available to "any" insurance contract that provides for guaranteed benefits but only "to the extent that" the contract does so. See Comment, Insurers Beware: General Account Activities May Subject Insurance Compa- nies to ERISA's Fiduciary Obligations, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 803, 833­834 (1994). Thus, even were we not inclined, gen- erally, to tight reading of exemptions from comprehensive schemes of this kind, see, e. g., Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U. S. 726, 739­740 (1989) (when a general policy is qualified by an exception, the Court "usually read[s] the exception narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the [policy]"), A. H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U. S. 490, 493 (1945) (cautioning against extending exemptions "to other than those plainly and unmistakably within its terms"), Con- gress has specifically instructed, by the words of limitation it used, that we closely contain the guaranteed benefit pol- icy exclusion. B Hancock, joined by some amici, raises a threshold objec- tion. ERISA's fiduciary standards cannot govern an insur- er's administration of general account contracts, Hancock asserts, for that would pose irreconcilable conflicts between state and federal regulatory regimes. ERISA requires fi- duciaries to act "solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and . . . for the exclusive purpose of . . . providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries." 29 U. S. C. § 1104(a) (emphasis added). State law, however, requires an insurer, in managing general account assets, "to consider the interests of all of its contractholders, creditors and shareholders," and to "maintain equity among its various constituencies." Goldberg & Altman 477.7 To head off 7 See, e. g., N. Y. Ins. Law § 4224(a)(1) (McKinney 1985) (prohibiting un- fair discrimination between contractholders); see also Mack Boring & Parts v. Meeker Sharkey Moffitt, Actuarial Consultants of New Jersey, 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:12 PAGES OPINPGT 98 JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. HARRIS TRUST AND SAV. BANK Opinion of the Court conflicts, Hancock contends, ERISA must yield, because Congress reserved to the States primary responsibility for regulation of the insurance industry. We are satisfied that Congress did not order the unqualified deferral to state law that Hancock both advocates and attributes to the federal lawmakers. Instead, we hold, ERISA leaves room for com- plementary or dual federal and state regulation, and calls for federal supremacy when the two regimes cannot be harmo- nized or accommodated. To support its contention, Hancock refers first to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1011 et seq., which provides: "The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation . . . of such business." 15 U. S. C. § 1012(a). "No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . . unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance . . . ." § 1012(b). But as the United States points out, "ERISA, both in general and in the guaranteed benefit policy provision in particular, obviously and specifically relates to the business of insur- ance." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23, n. 13.8 Thus, the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not surrender reg- ulation exclusively to the States so as to preclude the appli- cation of ERISA to an insurer's actions under a general account contract. See ibid. 930 F. 2d 267, 275, n. 17 (CA3 1991) (noting state regulations requiring insurers to treat all contractholders fairly and equitably). See generally McGill & Grubbs 492­494. 8 We called attention to the "deliberately expansive" character of ERISA's preemption provisions in Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41, 45­46 (1987). 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:12 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 86 (1993) 99 Opinion of the Court More problematic are two clauses in ERISA itself, one broadly providing for preemption of state law, the other preserving, or saving from preemption, state laws regulating insurance. ERISA's encompassing preemption clause di- rects that the statute "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any em- ployee benefit plan." 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a). The "saving clause," however, instructs that ERISA "shall [not] be con- strued to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." § 1144(b)(2)(A). State laws concerning an insurer's manage- ment of general account assets can "relate to [an] employee benefit plan" and thus fall under the preemption clause, but they are also, in the words of the saving clause, laws "which regulat[e] insurance." ERISA's preemption and saving clauses " `are not a model of legislative drafting,' " Pilot Life, 481 U. S., at 46, quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 739 (1985), and the legislative history of these provisions is sparse, see id., at 745­746. In accord with the District Court in this case, however, see 722 F. Supp., at 1003­1004, we discern no solid basis for believing that Congress, when it designed ERISA, intended fundamentally to alter traditional preemption analysis. State law governing insurance gener- ally is not displaced, but "where [that] law stands as an ob- stacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objec- tives of Congress," federal preemption occurs. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238, 248 (1984).9 We note in this regard that even Hancock does not ascribe a discrete office to the "saving clause" but instead asserts that the clause "reaffirm[s] the McCarran-Ferguson Act's res- 9 No decision of this Court has applied the saving clause to supersede a provision of ERISA itself. See, e. g., FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U. S. 52, 61 (1990) (ERISA-covered benefit plans that purchase insurance poli- cies are governed by both ERISA and state law; self-insured plans are subject only to ERISA); Metropolitan Life, 471 U. S., at 746­747 (same). 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:12 PAGES OPINPGT 100 JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. HARRIS TRUST AND SAV. BANK Opinion of the Court ervation of the business of insurance to the States." Brief for Petitioner 31; see Metropolitan Life, 471 U. S., at 744, n. 21 (saving clause "appears to have been designed to preserve the McCarran-Ferguson Act's reservation of the business of insurance to the States"; saving clause and McCarran-Ferguson Act "serve the same federal policy and utilize similar language"). As the United States recognizes, "dual regulation under ERISA and state law is not an impos- sibility[;] [m]any requirements are complementary, and in the case of a direct conflict, federal supremacy principles require that state law yield." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23, n. 13.10 In resisting the argument that, with respect to general account contracts, state law, not federal law, is preemptive, we are mindful that Congress had before it, but failed to pass, just such a scheme. The Senate's proposed version of ERISA would have excluded all general account assets from the reach of the fiduciary rules.11 Instead of enacting the 10 See Chicago Bd. Options Exchange, Inc. v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 713 F. 2d 254, 260 (CA7 1983) ("That ERISA does not relieve insurance companies of the onus of state regulation does not mean that Congress intended ERISA not to apply to insurance companies. Had that been Congress' intent . . . ERISA would have directly stated that it was pre-empted by state insurance laws."); 722 F. Supp. 998, 1004 (SDNY 1989) ("dual regulation comports with the language of the preemption and sav- ing clauses, . . . which save certain state statutes from preemption, but which also assume that ERISA applies ab initio"). 11 The Senate version of ERISA originally defined an "employee benefit fund" to exclude "premium[s], subscription charges, or deposits received and retained by an insurance carrier . . . except for any separate account established or maintained by an insurance carrier," and defined a fiduciary as "any person who exercises any power of control, management, or dispo- sition with respect to any moneys or other property of any employee bene- fit fund . . . ." See S. 4, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 502(17)(B), (25), reprinted in Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of ERISA 147, 150 (Comm. Print 1976). After an amendment (Amdt. No. 496, Sept. 17, 1973), the provision regarding "Fiduciary Standards" was streamlined to exclude 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:12 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 86 (1993) 101 Opinion of the Court Senate draft, which would indeed have "settled [insurance industry] expectations," see post, at 111, Congress adopted an exemption containing words of limitation. We are di- rected by those words, and not by the discarded draft. Cf. Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23­24 (1983) (when Congress deletes limiting language, "it may be presumed that the limitation was not intended").12 Persuaded that a plan's deposits are not shielded from the reach of ERISA's fiduciary prescriptions solely by virtue of their placement in an insurer's general account, we proceed to the question the Second Circuit decided: Is Hancock an ERISA fiduciary with respect to the free funds it holds under GAC 50? C To determine GAC 50's qualification for ERISA's guaran- teed benefit policy exclusion, we follow the Seventh Circuit's lead, see Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. Retirement Plan v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 698 F. 2d 320, 324­327 (1983), and seek guidance from this Court's decisions construing the insurance policy exemption ordered in the Securities Act of 1933. See 48 Stat. 75, 15 U. S. C. § 77c(a)(8) (excluding from the reach of the Securities Act "[a]ny insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract or optional annuity contract"). In SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U. S. 65 (1959), we observed that "the concept of `insurance' involves some investment risk-taking on the part of the com- pany," and "a guarantee that at least some fraction of the "funds held by an insurance carrier unless that carrier holds funds in a separate account." S. 4, Amdt. No. 496, § 511, id., at 1451. 12 Congress' failure to pass a blanket exclusion for funds held by an in- surer in its general account also counsels against reading the second sen- tence of the guaranteed benefit policy exception, 29 U. S. C. § 1101(b)(2)(B), which includes all separate account assets within the definition of "plan assets," as implying that assets held in an insurer's general account are necessarily not plan assets. 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:12 PAGES OPINPGT 102 JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. HARRIS TRUST AND SAV. BANK Opinion of the Court benefits will be payable in fixed amounts." Id., at 71. A variable annuity, we held, is not an "insurance policy" within the meaning of the statutory exemption because the con- tract's entire investment risk remains with the policyholder inasmuch as "benefit payments vary with the success of the [insurer's] investment policy," id., at 69, and may be "greater or less, depending on the wisdom of [that] policy," id., at 70. Thereafter, in SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U. S. 202 (1967), we held that an annuity contract could be considered a nonexempt investment contract during the con- tract's accumulation phase, and an exempt insurance contract once contractually guaranteed fixed payouts began. Under the contract there at issue, the policyholder paid fixed monthly premiums which the issuer placed in a fund-called the "Flexible Fund"-invested by the issuer primarily in common stocks. At contract maturity the policyholder could either withdraw the cash value of his proportionate share of the fund (which the issuer guaranteed would not fall below a specified value), or convert to a fixed-benefit annuity, with payment amounts determined by the cash value of the policy. During the accumulation phase, the fund from which the poli- cyholder would ultimately receive benefits fluctuated in value according to the insurer's investment results; because the "insurer promises to serve as an investment agency and allow the policyholder to share in its investment experience," id., at 208, this phase of the contract was serving primarily an investment, rather than an insurance, function, ibid. The same approach-division of the contract into its com- ponent parts and examination of risk allocation in each com- ponent-appears well suited to the matter at hand because ERISA instructs that the § 1101(b)(2)(B) exemption applies only "to the extent that" a policy or contract provides for "benefits the amount of which is guaranteed." Analyzing GAC 50 this way, we find that the contract fits the statutory exclusion only in part. 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:12 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 86 (1993) 103 Opinion of the Court This much is not in dispute. During the contract's active, accumulation phase, any benefits payable by Hancock for which entries actually have been made in the Liabilities of the Fund fit squarely within the "guaranteed" category. Fur- thermore, if the active phase of the contract were to end, all benefits thereafter payable under the contract would be guaranteed in amount. To this extent also, GAC 50 "pro- vides for benefits the amount of which is guaranteed." We turn, then, to the nub of the controversy, Hancock's responsibility for administration of the free funds during GAC 50's active phase. Between 1977 and 1982, we note first, GAC 50 furnished retirement benefits expressly called "nonguaranteed"; those benefits, it is undisputed, entailed no "amount . . . guaranteed by the insurer." 29 U. S. C. § 1101(b)(2)(B); see supra, at 92. To that extent, GAC 50 does not fall within the statutory exemption. But the non- guaranteed benefit option is not the only misfit. GAC 50, in key respects, is similar to the Flexible Fund contract examined in United Benefit. In that case, as in this one, the contract's aggregate value depended upon the insur- er's success as an investment manager. Under both con- tracts, until the occurrence of a triggering event-contract maturity in the Flexible Fund case, Harris' exercise of its conversion option in the case of GAC 50-the investment risk is borne primarily by the contractholder. Confronting a contract bearing similar features, the Seventh Circuit stated: "The pension trustees did not buy an insurance contract with a fixed payout; they turned over the assets of the pension plan to [the insurer] to manage with full invest- ment discretion, subject only to a modest income guar- anty. If the pension plan had hired an investment advi- sor and given him authority to buy and sell securities at his discretion for the plan's account, the advisor would be a fiduciary within the meaning of [ERISA], and that is essentially what the trustees did during the accumula- 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:12 PAGES OPINPGT 104 JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. HARRIS TRUST AND SAV. BANK Opinion of the Court tion phase of th[is] contract . . . ." Peoria Union, 698 F. 2d, at 327. In the Second Circuit's words, "[t]o the extent that [Hancock] engages in the discretionary management of assets attribut- able to that phase of the contract which provides no guaran- tee of benefit payments or fixed rates of return, it seems to us that [Hancock] should be subject to fiduciary responsibil- ity." 970 F. 2d, at 1144. Hancock urges that to the full extent of the free funds- and hence, to the full extent of the contract-GAC 50 "pro- vides for" benefits the amount of which is guaranteed, inas- much as "Harris Trust . . . has the right . . . to use any `free funds' to purchase future guaranteed benefits under the contract, in addition to benefits previously guaranteed." Brief for Petitioner 26; see also Mack Boring & Parts v. Meeker Sharkey Moffitt, Actuarial Consultants of New Jer- sey, 930 F. 2d 267, 273 (CA3 1991) (statute's use of phrase "provides for" does not require that the benefits contracted for be delivered immediately; it is enough that the contract provides for guaranteed benefits "at some finite point in the future"). Logically pursued, Hancock's reading of the statute would exempt from ERISA's fiduciary regime any contract, in its entirety, so long as the funds held thereunder could be used at some point in the future to purchase some amount of guar- anteed benefits.13 But Congress did not say a contract is 13 This argument resembles one rejected in SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U. S. 202 (1967). In United Benefit, the policyholder was protected somewhat against fluctuations in the value of the contract fund through a promise that the cash value of the contract would not fall below the aggregate amount of premiums deposited with the insurer. Id., at 205, 208, n. 10. We held that although this "guarantee of cash value based on net premiums reduces substantially the investment risk of the contract holder, the assumption of an investment risk cannot by itself create an insurance provision under the federal definition. The basic difference between a contract which to some degree is insured and a contract of insurance must be recognized." Id., at 211 (citation omitted). 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:12 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 86 (1993) 105 Opinion of the Court exempt "if" it provides for guaranteed benefits; it said a con- tract is exempt only "to the extent" it so provides. Using these words of limitation, Congress apparently recognized that contracts may provide to some extent for something other than guaranteed benefits, and expressly declared the exemption unavailable to that extent. Tellingly with respect to GAC 50, the Pension Administra- tion Fund is guaranteed only against a decline below its Jan- uary 1, 1968, level. See supra, at 91. Harris thus bears a substantial portion of the risk as to fluctuations in the free funds, and there is not even the "modest income guaranty" the Seventh Circuit found insufficient in Peoria Union. 698 F. 2d, at 327. Furthermore, Hancock has the authority to set the price at which free funds are convertible into guaran- teed benefits. See supra, at 92, n. 3. In combination, these features provide no genuine guarantee of the amount of ben- efits that plan participants will receive in the future. It is true but irrelevant, Hancock pleads, that GAC 50 pro- vides no guaranteed return to the plan, for ERISA uniformly uses the word "benefits" to refer exclusively to payments to plan participants or beneficiaries, not payments to plans. Brief for Petitioner 25; see also Mack Boring, 930 F. 2d, at 273 ("benefits" refers only to payments to participants or beneficiaries; payments to plan sponsors can be variable without defeating guaranteed benefit exclusion); Goldberg & Altman 482. This confinement of the word "benefits," how- ever, perfectly fits the tight compass of the exclusion. A contract component that provides for something other than guaranteed payments to plan participants or beneficiaries- e. g., a guaranteed return to the plan-does not, without more, provide for guaranteed benefits and thus does not fall within the statutory exclusion. Moreover, the guaranteed benefit policy exclusion requires a guarantee of the amount of benefits to be provided; with no guaranteed investment return to the plan, and no guarantee regarding conversion price, plan participants are undeniably at risk inasmuch as 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:12 PAGES OPINPGT 106 JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. HARRIS TRUST AND SAV. BANK Opinion of the Court the future amount of benefits-payments to participants and beneficiaries-attributable to the free funds can fall to zero. But see post, at 117, n. 4 (contending that the plan's guaran- tee renders immaterial the absence of a guarantee by the insurer). A contract of that order does not meet the statu- tory prescription. In sum, we hold that to determine whether a contract qualifies as a guaranteed benefit policy, each component of the contract bears examination. A component fits within the guaranteed benefit policy exclusion only if it allocates investment risk to the insurer. Such an allocation is present when the insurer provides a genuine guarantee of an aggre- gate amount of benefits payable to retirement plan partici- pants and their beneficiaries. As to a contract's "free funds"-funds in excess of those that have been converted into guaranteed benefits-these indicators are key: the in- surer's guarantee of a reasonable rate of return on those funds and the provision of a mechanism to convert the funds into guaranteed benefits at rates set by the contract. While another contract, with a different mix of features, might satisfy these requirements, GAC 50 does not. Indeed, Hancock provided no real guarantee that benefits in any amount would be payable from the free funds. We there- fore conclude, as did the Second Circuit, that the free funds are "plan assets," and that Hancock's actions in regard to their management and disposition must be judged against ERISA's fiduciary standards. III One other contention pressed by Hancock and amici de- serves consideration. Hancock, supported by the United States, asserts that the Department of Labor has adhered consistently to the view that ERISA's fiduciary obligations do not apply in relation to assets held by an insurer in its 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:12 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 86 (1993) 107 Opinion of the Court general account under contracts like GAC 50.14 Hancock urges us to follow this view based on " `the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.' " Brief for Petitioner 39, quoting Skid- more v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944); see also Chev- ron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843­844 (1984). Hancock and the United States place primary reliance on an early interpretive bulletin in which the Department of Labor stated: "If an insurance company issues a contract or policy of insurance to a plan and places the consideration for such contract or policy in its general asset account, the assets in such account shall not be considered to be plan assets. Therefore, a subsequent transaction involving the gen- eral asset account between a party in interest and the insurance company will not, solely because the plan has been issued such a contract or policy of insurance, be a prohibited transaction." Interpretive Bulletin 75­2, 40 Fed. Reg. 31598 (1975), 29 CFR § 2509.75­2(b) (1992). If this passage squarely addressed the question we confront, namely, whether ERISA's fiduciary standards apply to assets held under participating annuity contracts like GAC 50, we would indeed have a clear statement of the Department's view on the matter at issue. But, as the second sentence of the quoted passage shows, the question addressed in Inter- pretive Bulletin 75­2 was "whether a party in interest has engaged in a prohibited transaction [under 29 U. S. C. § 1106] with an employee benefit plan." § 2509.75­2.15 The De- 14 The Department of Labor shares enforcement responsibility for ERISA with the Department of the Treasury. See 29 U. S. C. § 1204(a). 15 The subsection title for the interpretation, published in the Code of Federal Regulations, is "Interpretive bulletin relating to prohibited transactions." 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:12 PAGES OPINPGT 108 JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. HARRIS TRUST AND SAV. BANK Opinion of the Court partment did not mention, let alone elaborate on, any grounding for Interpretive Bulletin 75­2 in § 1101's guar- anteed benefit policy exemption, nor did the Bulletin speak of the application of its pronouncement, if any, to ERISA's fiduciary duty prescriptions. The Department asserts the absence of any textual basis for the view, adopted by the Second Circuit, that "certain assets [can be considered] plan assets for general fiduciary duty purposes but not for prohibited transaction purposes," 970 F. 2d, at 1145, and, accordingly, no reason to suppose that Interpretive Bulletin 75­2's statement regarding plan assets would not apply in both contexts. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 26­27. Nothing in Interpretive Bulletin 75­2 or 29 CFR § 2509.75­2 (1992), however, sets forth that position, or otherwise alerts the reader that more than the prohibited transaction exemption was then subject to the Department's scrutiny.16 Had the Department in- tended Interpretive Bulletin 75­2 to apply to the guaranteed benefit policy exclusion, it would have had to explain how an unqualified exclusion for an insurer's general asset account can be reconciled with Congress' choice of a more limited ("to the extent that") formulation. Its silence in that regard is an additional indication that the 1975 pronouncement did not originally have the scope the Department now attributes to it.17 16 It is noteworthy that the Secretary of Labor has express authority to grant exemptions from the rules regarding prohibited transactions, but not from § 1104's fiduciary duty provisions. See 29 U. S. C. § 1108. 17 After a lengthy rulemaking proceeding, the Department did promul- gate, in 1986, a comprehensive interpretation of what ERISA means by "plan assets." See 51 Fed. Reg. 41278 (1986), 29 CFR § 2510.3­101 (1992). Again, however, the Department did not mention the guaranteed benefit policy exemption contained in § 1101(b) or refer to the status of assets in that setting. See 29 CFR § 2510.3­101 (1992). The Department, without comment, "note[d] that the portion of Interpretive Bulletin 75­2 dealing with contracts or policies of insurance is not affected by the regulation being issued here." 51 Fed. Reg. 41278 (1986). But Interpretive Bulletin 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:12 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 86 (1993) 109 Opinion of the Court We note, too, that the United States was unable to comply with the Second Circuit's request for its assistance in this very case; the Department of Labor informed the Court of Appeals, after requesting and receiving a substantial exten- sion of time, that " `the need to fully consider all of the impli- cations of these issues within the Department precludes our providing the Court with a brief within a foreseeable time frame.' " 970 F. 2d, at 1141. We recognize the difficulties the Department faced, given the complexity of ERISA and the constant evolution of insurance contract practices as re- flected in this case. Our point is simply that, as of 1992, the Department apparently had no firm position it was prepared to communicate. We need not grapple here with the difficult question of the deference due an agency view first precisely stated in a brief supporting a petitioner. Cf. Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 476 (1992) ("If the Director asked us to defer to his new statutory interpretation, this case might present a difficult question regarding whether and under what circumstances deference is due to an interpreta- tion formulated during litigation.") (emphasis in original). It suffices to recall, once again, Congress' words of limitation. The Legislature provided an exemption "to the extent that" a contract provides for guaranteed benefits. By reading the words "to the extent" to mean nothing more than "if," the Department has exceeded the scope of available ambiguity. See Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U. S. 158, 171 (1989) ("no deference is due to agency in- terpretations at odds with the plain language of the statute itself"). We therefore cannot accept current pleas for the deference described in Skidmore or Chevron. 75­2, as we just observed, did not home in on whether, or to what extent, particular insurance contracts fit within the guaranteed benefit policy exemption. Thus the 1986 publication is no more enlightening than the interpretation published in 1975. 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:12 PAGES OPINPGT 110 JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. HARRIS TRUST AND SAV. BANK Opinion of the Court The Department of Labor recognizes that ranking free funds as "plan assets" would secure "added legal protections against losses by pension plans, because ERISA imposes re- strictions not currently provided by contract and insurance law." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 25­26. But the Department warns that "the disruptions and costs [of holding insurance compa- nies to be fiduciaries under participating group annuity contracts] would be significant, both in terms of the ad- ministrative changes the companies would be forced to undertake (e. g., segregation of plan-related assets into segmented or separate accounts, and re-allocation of operating costs to other policyholders) and in terms of the considerable exposure to the ensuing litigation that would be brought by pension plans and others alleging fiduciary breaches." Id., at 25. These are substantial concerns, but we cannot give them dis- positive weight. The insurers' views have been presented to Congress 18 and that body can adjust the statute. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U. S. 34, 42 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the Department of Labor can provide administrative relief to facilitate insurers' compliance with the law, thereby reduc- ing the disruptions it forecasts. * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is Affirmed. 18 See App. to Brief for Petitioner 19­64 (listing the hundreds of indi- viduals and organizations, including insurance industry representatives, testifying before Congress during deliberations on ERISA). Insurance industry representatives have constantly sought amendment of ERISA to exempt all general account assets. See Brief for Certain United States Senators as Amici Curiae 13­14. 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:12 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 86 (1993) 111 Thomas, J., dissenting Justice Thomas, with whom Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy join, dissenting. Insurance companies hold more than $332 billion in their general accounts pursuant to group annuity contracts with pension plans. See American Council of Life Insurance, 1993 Life Insurance Fact Book Update 27. Today, the Court abruptly overturns the settled expectations of the insurance industry by deeming a substantial portion of those funds "plan assets" and thus subjecting insurers to the fiduciary regime of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Although I agree with the Court that the guaranteed benefit policy exception, § 401(b)(2) of ERISA, 29 U. S. C. § 1101(b)(2), does not-as petitioner Hancock con- tends-exclude all general account assets from ERISA's cov- erage, the Court, in making the exception depend upon whether investment risk is allocated to the insurer, ante, at 106, proposes a new test that bears little relation to the stat- ute Congress enacted. The relevant question under the statute is not whether the contract shifts investment risk, but whether, and to what extent, it "provides for benefits the amount of which is guaranteed." 29 U. S. C. § 1101(b)(2)(B). In my view, a contract can "provide for" guaranteed benefits before it actually guarantees future payouts-that is, before it shifts the investment risk as to those benefits to the in- surer. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. I The guaranteed benefit policy exception, § 401(b)(2) of ERISA, excludes from the scope of ERISA's fiduciary re- quirements assets held pursuant to "an insurance policy or contract to the extent that such policy or contract provides for benefits the amount of which is guaranteed by the in- surer." 29 U. S. C. § 1101(b)(2)(B). In interpreting this exception, I begin, as in any case of statutory construction, with "the language of the statute," Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 475 (1992), and with the 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:12 PAGES OPINPGT 112 JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. HARRIS TRUST AND SAV. BANK Thomas, J., dissenting assumption that Congress "says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there," Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 254 (1992). Unlike the Court, I see no need to base an understanding of § 401(b)(2) on principles derived from the interpretation of dissimilar provisions in the Securities Act of 1933, see ante, at 101­104, or from a sense of the policy of ERISA as a whole, see ante, at 96. The meaning of the provision can be determined readily by examining its component terms. First, the insurance contract must "provide for" guaran- teed benefits. Because "provides for" is not defined by the statute, we should give the phrase its ordinary or natural meaning. See Smith v. United States, 508 U. S. 223, 228 (1993). Looking at the contract, the Court observes that there is "no genuine guarantee of the amount of benefits that plan participants will receive in the future." Ante, at 105. The Court apparently takes "provides for" to mean that the contract must currently guarantee the amounts to be dis- bursed in future payments. That is not, however, what "provides for" means in ordinary speech. When applied to a document such as a contract, "provides for" is "most natural[ly]" read and is "commonly understood" to mean " `make a provision for.' " Rake v. Wade, 508 U. S. 464, 473, 474 (1993) (interpreting a section of the Bankruptcy Code that applies to " `each allowed secured claim provided for by the [reorganization] plan' ") (emphasis added). See also Black's Law Dictionary 1224 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "provide" as "[t]o make, procure, or furnish for future use, prepare"). If "provides for" is construed in this way, the insurance contract need not guarantee the benefits for any particular plan participant until the benefits have vested, so long as it makes provision for the payment of guaranteed benefits in the future. See Mack Boring & Parts v. Meeker Sharkey Moffitt, Actuarial Consultants, 930 F. 2d 267, 273 (CA3 1991) ("Section 401(b)(2)(B) does not, on its face, re- quire that the benefits contracted for be delivered immedi- 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:12 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 86 (1993) 113 Thomas, J., dissenting ately, and we will not read into the statute such a require- ment. Rather, it is enough that the . . . contract `provided' guaranteed benefits to plan participants at some finite point in the future").1 Had Congress intended the meaning the Court suggests, it easily could have applied the exception to an insurance contract "to the extent that benefits, the amount of which is guaranteed by the insurer, are vested in plan participants." The concept of vested benefits was familiar to Congress, see, e. g., 29 U. S. C. § 1001(c), and it knew how to require vesting when it intended to do so. See ERISA § 1012(a), 26 U. S. C. § 411 (1988 ed. and Supp. IV). In the guaranteed benefit policy exception, however, Congress, rather than requiring that benefits be vested, required that guaranteed benefits be provided for.2 The second requirement under the statute is that the "amount" of benefits be guaranteed. The relevant "bene- 1 Even Harris Trust, which argues that benefits are not "provided for" until they have vested in plan participants, see Brief for Respondent 15, cannot avoid this common meaning of the phrase. In describing the origi- nal contract between Sperry and Hancock, Harris Trust states that "the contract provided for the annual purchase of individual deferred annuities . . . ." Id., at 2 (emphasis added). Certainly, one would not say-and Harris Trust did not mean-that the contract only "provided for" such annuities after they were purchased. Common sense and usage dictate precisely the sense in which Harris Trust used the phrase: The contract made provision for the purchase of annuities. Similarly, after 1968 the contract made provision for the payment of guaranteed benefits. 2 Giving "provides for" its ordinary meaning as outlined here would not, as the Court suggests, see ante, at 104­105, exempt from ERISA's fidu- ciary rules any contract "in its entirety" if it allows for the payment of some amount of guaranteed benefits in the future. As the Court implicitly ac- knowledges, that potential misconstruction of the exception results, not from a misreading of the term "provides for," but from a misunderstanding of the limitation imposed by the phrase "to the extent that." As I discuss below, see infra, at 117­118, I agree with the Court that by limiting the exception to policies "to the extent that" they provide for guaranteed ben- efits, Congress did not mean that any contract would be completely ex- empted "if" it provided for any guaranteed benefits. Ante, at 104­105. 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:13 PAGES OPINPGT 114 JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. HARRIS TRUST AND SAV. BANK Thomas, J., dissenting fits" under the statute are payments to plan participants, not any payments to the pension plan itself. See Mack Boring, supra, at 273 ("[T]he term `benefit,' when used in ERISA, uniformly refers only to payments due to the plan partici- pants or beneficiaries"). The Court recognizes that the term "benefits" does not include payments to the plan but concludes that the reference to "the amount of" benefits means the aggregate amount of benefits. Ante, at 106. The Court cites neither authority nor reason for its interpreta- tion, and with good cause. Given that "benefits" refers to payments to individuals, "amount" standing alone most natu- rally refers to the amount owed to each individual. If, on the other hand, "amount" means aggregate amount, benefits to individuals could vary so long as the insurance company guaranteed that a fixed total amount would be paid. That is hardly consistent with ERISA's focus on protecting plan participants and their beneficiaries. See ante, at 96, and n. 5; 29 U. S. C. § 1001(c). The Court's focus on the aggregate amount of benefits, combined with its understanding of "provides for" as requir- ing a current guarantee, shifts the inquiry from the nature of the benefits that the policy will provide to individuals to the nature of the return that the policy provides to the plan as a whole. In the Court's view, this is precisely the inquiry demanded by the statute. As it makes clear by its citation to Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. Retirement Plan v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 698 F. 2d 320 (CA7 1983), from which it takes its "lead," ante, at 101, the Court sees the guaran- teed benefit policy exception as requiring a guaranteed re- turn on all moneys paid to the insurer-that is, the guaran- teed benefit policy exception is really an exception for "insurance contract[s] with a fixed payout." Peoria Union, supra, at 327.3 In reaching this result, the Court is driven 3 To be sure, the payouts must be in the form of guaranteed benefits to plan participants, but the Court's focus remains on an overall fixed return. Thus, in its view, any funds not immediately committed to the payment of 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 86 (1993) 115 Thomas, J., dissenting by its gloss on the guaranteed benefit exception as a provi- sion demanding an "examination of risk allocation in each component" of the policy. See ante, at 102. But Congress nowhere mentioned allocation of risk, fixed payouts, or guar- anteed investment returns in the statute, despite the obvious superiority of those terms in conveying the meaning the Court ascribes to the text. Instead, Congress directed our attention to the provision of guaranteed benefits-that is, to the type of payments the policy provides to individual participants. The Court derives its gloss on the guaranteed benefit pol- icy exception from extratextual sources that lead it to a read- ing divorced from the statute's language. First, the Court begins its analysis not with an examination of the terms of § 401(b)(2), but with a discussion of cases decided under the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended. For exam- ple, the Court looks to a case in which we addressed whether a variable annuity was an "investment contract" covered by § 2 of the Securities Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77b, or an "insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract or optional annuity contract" exempted by § 3 of that Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77c(a)(8). See SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U. S. 202, 204­ 205, 211 (1967). Were it disputed that GAC 50 is an "insur- ance policy or contract," it might be useful to consider how this Court has defined an insurance policy under federal securities law and the extent to which GAC 50 meets that test. Here, however, no one denies that GAC 50 is an insur- ance policy. If it were not, § 401(b)(2) would not apply at all. Because GAC 50 is concededly an insurance policy, its allocation of risk is irrelevant to the distinct inquiry de- manded by the statute into the provision of guaranteed benefits. guaranteed benefits (through the purchase, for example, of fixed annuities) must be invested at a guaranteed return and converted to guaranteed benefits at a rate fixed by contract. Ante, at 106. 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:13 PAGES OPINPGT 116 JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. HARRIS TRUST AND SAV. BANK Thomas, J., dissenting The second source from which the Court distills its "risk of loss" test is the premise, based on ERISA "as a whole," that "Congress commodiously imposed fiduciary standards on persons whose actions affect the amount of benefits retire- ment plan participants will receive." Ante, at 96. Even were that true, there is no need to resort to such general understandings of the policy behind a statute when the lan- guage suggests a contrary meaning. Cf. Connecticut Nat. Bank, 503 U. S., at 253­254; Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U. S. 189, 194 (1985) (statutory con- struction begins with "the assumption that the ordinary meaning of [the] language accurately expresses the legisla- tive purpose"). The text of § 401(b)(2) gives no reason to think that Congress meant to protect pension plans from all risk or to impose a fiduciary duty on the insurer whenever the pension plan faced a possibility of loss. Congress easily could have required that all funds credited to a pension plan be guaranteed, but it did not. Moreover, contrary to the Court's assumption, in the stat- ute "as a whole" Congress did not impose fiduciary duties on all persons whose actions affect the amount of benefits plan participants receive. In the same section that contains the guaranteed benefit policy exception, for example, Congress exempted pension plans' investments in mutual funds from ERISA's fiduciary provisions. See 29 U. S. C. § 1101(b)(1); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93­1280, p. 296 (1974). Obviously, pen- sion plans bear a significant risk with respect to such invest- ments, yet Congress allowed them to bear that risk without imposing fiduciary duties on the companies that manage the funds. In any event, as long as a policy provides for guaranteed benefits as I have described them, the connection between the return to the plan and the amount of benefits individual plan participants receive is remote. The insurer's invest- ment performance would influence the amount of benefits if participants received either variable benefits or fixed benefit 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 86 (1993) 117 Thomas, J., dissenting payments that were not guaranteed, e. g., benefits paid for a fixed amount of time unless the fund from which they were paid was depleted sooner. In both cases, ERISA imposes fiduciary duties on the insurer. But as long as the benefits will be guaranteed, a variable return to the plan entails no such risk for plan participants. Whether the insurer earns 2% or 20%, or even loses 20% on its investments, participants will receive the same amount of benefits.4 In short, the provision of guaranteed benefits does not re- quire the provision of a guaranteed return to the plan, nor does it require that all amounts to be provided in the future be currently guaranteed. In my view, an insurance policy "provides for benefits the amount of which are guaranteed" when its terms make provision for fixed payments to plan participants and their beneficiaries that will be guaranteed by the insurer. The policy need not guarantee the aggre- gate amount of benefits that will ultimately be returned from the plan's contributions or insulate the plan from all invest- ment risk to accomplish that more limited goal. Of course, as the Court correctly observes, § 401(b)(2) ex- cludes an insurance company's assets from fiduciary obliga- tions only "to the extent that" the policy provides for guar- 4 In this case, Sperry's retirement plan, not the insurance policy, specifies the amount of benefits to which a plan participant is entitled. App. 119, 121. The return on the funds held under GAC 50 has no effect on that amount. Thus, even if the free funds fell to zero and the policy termi- nated, see ante, at 105­106, plan participants whose benefits had not yet vested would be entitled to the same amount of benefits under the plan itself, and would have an action against the plan if it failed to pay. See 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a). For this reason, it is simply wrong to suggest, as some amici curiae do, that reversing the decision below would leave millions of pensioners unprotected by ERISA. See Brief for Senator Howard Metzenbaum et al. as Amici Curiae 15. If the plan, on the other hand, is "trapped" by an unwise insurance contract, the trap is one of its own making. Those amici are in a far better position than this Court to persuade Congress to protect pension plans from their own mistakes and misjudgments. Nothing in either the text or the logic of the guaranteed benefit policy exception provides such protection. 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:13 PAGES OPINPGT 118 JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. HARRIS TRUST AND SAV. BANK Thomas, J., dissenting anteed benefits. That limitation does not mean that the exception is available to a contract "if" it provides for guar- anteed benefits. Cf. ante, at 104­105. Rather, the term suggests that a contract may provide for guaranteed benefits only to a certain extent. In the Court's view, to the extent that a policy allows a pension plan a variable return on free funds not yet committed to providing guaranteed benefits to participants, it falls outside the § 401(b)(2) exception. Once again, however, the Court's understanding of the statute is controlled by its focus on the allocation of risk. The diffi- culty the Court sees with the variable return on any compo- nent of the contract is that a variable return ensures no guaranteed aggregate amount of benefits. If all of the funds attributable to the policy are allocated to purchasing guaran- teed benefits, however, whether those funds come from pen- sion plan contributions or investment return, the contract is "provid[ing] for benefits the amount of which is guaranteed" in its entirety. Only if one assumes, as the Court does, that overall returns are critical would one read the "to the extent that" limitation more narrowly. II In its effort to insulate Harris Trust from all risk, the Court radically alters the law applicable to insurance compa- nies. The Department of Labor has taken the view that general account assets are not plan assets. See, e. g., Inter- pretive Bulletin 75­2, 40 Fed. Reg. 31598 (1975), 29 CFR § 2509.75­2 (1992) (concerning prohibited transactions); § 2510.3­101 (same).5 In reliance on that settled under- 5 I agree with the Court that Interpretive Bulletin 75­2's exemption of all general account assets from fiduciary requirements is at odds with the text of § 401(b)(2) and is therefore not entitled to deference under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). Rejecting the Department of Labor's interpretation of the guar- anteed benefit policy exception, however, does not require adopting the Court's extreme approach. 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 86 (1993) 119 Thomas, J., dissenting standing, insurers have set up general account contracts with pension plans and have managed assets theoretically attributable to those policies, not in accordance with ERISA's fiduciary obligations, but in accordance with poten- tially incompatible state-law rules. See Mack Boring, 930 F. 2d, at 275, n. 17. Most States treat the relationship be- tween insurer and insured as a matter of contract, not a fi- duciary relationship. See, e. g., Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co. v. Union Nat. Bank of Pittsburgh, 776 F. 2d 1174, 1177 (CA3 1985) (generally, relationship between insurer and insured is "solely a matter of contract"); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Foxfire, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 489, 497 (ND Cal. 1993) (implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not create fidu- ciary relationship between insurer and insured under Cali- fornia law). And state law generally requires that the in- surer not discriminate among its policyholders. See, e. g., N. Y. Ins. Law § 4224(a)(1) (McKinney 1985). ERISA, on the other hand, will require insurers to manage what the Court deems plan assets "solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries" of the plan, 29 U. S. C. § 1104(a)(1), and will impose a host of other requirements. These conflicting de- mands will place insurers in a difficult position: "Whenever an insurance company takes actions to ensure that under state law, it is treating its policyholders fairly and equitably, it runs the risk of violating ERISA's fiduciary require- ments." Mack Boring, supra, at 275, n. 17. Although the Court attempts to limit the fiduciary duty to the free funds-it dubs only the free funds " `plan assets,' " see ante, at 106-the duty it imposes on insurers extends much farther. The free funds are not identifiable assets at all, but are simply an accounting entry in Hancock's books. The amount of the free funds, and hence their "manage- ment," ibid., depends on the management of all of the assets in Hancock's Group Pension line of business. See Agreed Statement of Facts ¶ 43, App. 91. To impose fiduciary duties with respect to the management of the free funds is essen- 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:13 PAGES OPINPGT 120 JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. HARRIS TRUST AND SAV. BANK Thomas, J., dissenting tially to impose fiduciary duties on the management of the entire line of business. Although insurers in reaction to today's decision may be able to segregate their assets and allocate certain assets to free funds on specific contracts, that will not help insurers like Hancock in this case who now find themselves potentially liable for past actions.6 The Court's decision may also significantly disrupt insur- ers' transactions with companies whose pension plans they fund. The Court's interpretation of § 401(b)(2) will impose on insurers not only general fiduciary duties under 29 U. S. C. § 1104, but also restrictions on prohibited transactions under § 1106. The guaranteed benefit policy exception expressly applies to both. See § 1101(b) (applying subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) "[f]or purposes of this part," that is, Part 4, which comprises §§ 1101­1114). Indeed, this case concerns alleged violations of both sections. Amended Complaint ¶ 40, App. 58. Among the previously innocent transactions now po- tentially prohibited will be an insurer's investment in stock issued by any of the employers whose pension plans the insurer funds, a lease of a building owned by the insurer to one of those employers, or the purchase of goods or services from any of those employers. See Hearings on Public Law 93­406 before the Subcommittee on Labor Standards of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 390­391 (1975) (testimony of the Assistant Secretary of Labor). Thus, large insurance companies that may have sold policies to thousands of pension plans could suddenly find themselves restricted in contracting with the corre- 6 It will be especially difficult for the lower courts in this case to limit application of fiduciary duties to the free funds, as the Court appears to desire, because the pension plan claims that Hancock breached its fiduciary duty by understating the amount of the free funds. See Amended Com- plaint ¶¶ 29, 30, 40, App. 55­56, 58­60. Thus, it will not be possible to determine the extent of Hancock's fiduciary duty without first ascertaining whether Hancock violated it. 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 86 (1993) 121 Thomas, J., dissenting sponding thousands of employers whose goods and services they may require. See id., at 391. I do not intend to suggest that the Court should give dis- positive weight to the practical effects of its decision on the settled expectations of the insurance industry (and its cus- tomers, the pension plans, who stand to lose much of the benefit that these contracts presumably offered them). Such considerations are a matter for Congress. But surely the serious and far-reaching effects that today's ruling is likely to have should counsel caution and compel the Court to undertake a closer examination of the terms of the statute to ensure that Congress commanded the result the Court reaches. As discussed in Part I, supra, I believe Congress did not mandate that result. III Application of the standards I have outlined above to GAC 50, prior to its amendment in 1977 to allow for payment of nonguaranteed benefits, is relatively straightforward. In its pre-1977 form, GAC 50 provided for guaranteed benefits in its entirety. Plan participants would be guaranteed to receive the amount of benefits specified in the contract if the contract was in operation when they retired, regardless of the contract's subsequent termination, App. 137, or any other contingency. Hancock's entire general account, not simply the funds Hancock credited to the pension plan, stood behind that guarantee. Moreover, GAC 50 provided that all invest- ment return remained in a fund allocated exclusively to the payment of guaranteed benefits, and all of the free funds were available to pay such benefits. We therefore are not faced with a contract that uses a pretextual option of guaran- teed benefits to disguise an ordinary investment vehicle. Apart from an asset withdrawal mechanism that imposed a significant charge, the contract provided for no other way to 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:13 PAGES OPINPGT 122 JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. HARRIS TRUST AND SAV. BANK Thomas, J., dissenting use those funds. See 767 F. Supp. 1269, 1274­1275 (SDNY 1991).7 Indeed, that is precisely why this litigation arose. Han- cock had not squandered the pension plan's funds, as one might expect in the run-of-the-mill breach of fiduciary duty case. The Pension Administration Fund, and thus the free funds, had grown beyond the parties' expectations. The pension plan, however, was unhappy with the bargain it had struck in its contract. By 1977, it had discovered that it could get cheaper guaranteed benefits and a better return on its investment elsewhere, see id., at 1273­1274, but GAC 50 posed several obstacles to moving the uncommitted funds. Terminating the contract would require the plan to "re- purchase" annuities for the benefits already guaranteed. The repurchase price set by the contract depends on assump- tions concerning the interest rate that would be earned on the funds over the term of the annuity. See Agreed State- ment of Facts ¶¶ 33­34, 41, App. 89, 90­91 (21/2­3% for bene- fits vested before 1968; 5% for those vested after 1968).8 Because those interest rates turned out by the late 1970's to be relatively low compared to prevailing market rates, the contractually determined price for purchasing the annuities was correspondingly high and the pension plan considered the option of terminating the contract to be "prohibitively expensive." Brief for Respondent 5. Withdrawing assets, as already mentioned, entailed a significant asset liquidation adjustment. Therefore, before the 1977 amendment the only other way the free funds could be used was to purchase 7 GAC 50 made no provision for the rollover mechanism that Hancock allowed the pension plan to use on several occasions to reduce the surplus in the Pension Administration Fund. See 767 F. Supp., at 1274­1275. See also Agreed Statement of Facts ¶ 77, App. 96. 8 The "artificially low interest rate assumptions," ante, at 93, in the con- tract were last amended in 1968. See Agreed Statement of Facts ¶¶ 105, 111, App. 100, 101. The pension plan alleged that Hancock breached its fiduciary duties by refusing to amend the contract again to take into ac- count changed conditions. Amended Complaint ¶ 40(b), App. 58. 510us1$$8N 06-18-97 16:47:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 86 (1993) 123 Thomas, J., dissenting guaranteed benefits for plan participants. It is difficult to see how a policy that provided for nothing but guaranteed benefits could be said not to provide for such benefits in its entirety. The extent to which GAC 50 "provides for" guaran- teed benefits is more complicated, however, because the 1977 amendment discontinued the automatic provision of guaranteed benefits and permitted the payment of "Non-Guaranteed Benefits." See Agreed Statement of Facts ¶¶ 80, 82, App. 96­97. Proper resolution of this case ultimately depends on the operation and the effect of that amendment. Because the courts below did not discuss its relevance and should be given the opportunity to consider it in the first instance, I would remand. IV In the judgment of both the Court and the Second Circuit, to the extent that the contract " `provides no guarantee of benefit payments or fixed rates of return, it seems to us that [Hancock] should be subject to fiduciary responsibility.' " Ante, at 104 (quoting 970 F. 2d 1138, 1144 (CA2 1992)). Perhaps it should. But imposing that responsibility dis- rupts nearly 20 years of settled expectations among the buy- ers and sellers of group annuity contracts. I do not believe that the statute can be fairly read to command that result. I therefore respectfully dissent. 510us1$$9Z 04-16-96 21:07:32 PAGES OPINPGT 124 OCTOBER TERM, 1993 Syllabus TENNESSEE v. MIDDLEBROOKS certiorari to the supreme court of tennessee No. 92­989. Argued November 1, 1993-Decided December 13, 1993 Certiorari dismissed. Reported below: 840 S. W. 2d 317. Charles W. Burson, Attorney General of Tennessee, ar- gued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Kathy Morante Principe. David C. Stebbins, by appointment of the Court, 508 U. S. 937, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Paul R. Bottei and Lionel R. Barrett, Jr.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Cali- fornia et al. by Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette and Ward A. Campbell, Deputy Attorneys General, and Mark L. Krotoski, Special Assistant Attorney General, and by officials for their respective States as follows: James H. Evans, Attorney General of Alabama, Winston Bryant, Attorney General of Arkansas, Grant Woods, Attorney General of Arizona, John M. Bailey, Chief State's Attorney of Connecticut, Charles M. Oberly III, Attorney General of Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth, At- torney General of Florida, Larry EchoHawk, Attorney General of Idaho, Pamela Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Chris Gorman, Attorney General of Kentucky, Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Mike Moore, Attorney General of Mississippi, Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General of Montana, Don Stenberg, Attorney General of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa, At- torney General of Nevada, Robert J. Del Tufo, Attorney General of New Jersey, Michael F. Easley, Attorney General of North Carolina, Susan B. Loving, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Attorney General of Pennsylvania, T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina, Mark Barnett, Attorney General of South Dakota, Dan Morales, Attorney General of Texas, and Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General of Wyoming; for the Appellate Committee of the California District Attor- ney's Association by Gil Garcetti and Harry B. Sondheim; and for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger. 510us1$$9Z 04-16-96 21:07:32 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 124 (1993) 125 Per Curiam Per Curiam. The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. Justice Blackmun dissents. 510us1$10Z 04-16-96 21:08:46 PAGES OPINPGT 126 OCTOBER TERM, 1993 Decree OKLAHOMA et al. v. NEW MEXICO on joint motion for entry of stipulated judgment and decree No. 109, Orig. Decided June 17, 1991-Judgment and decree entered December 13, 1993 Judgment and decree entered. Opinion reported: 501 U. S. 221. The joint motion for entry of stipulated judgment and decree, as modified, is granted. STIPULATED JUDGMENT, AS MODIFIED 1. New Mexico has been in violation of Article IV(b) of the Canadian River Compact from 1987 to date. 2. Pursuant to Paragraph 8 of the Decree entered in this case, New Mexico shall release from Ute Reservoir in 1993 sufficient water to result in an aggregate of not more than 200,000 acre-feet of conservation storage below Conchas Dam in New Mexico, including conservation storage in the other reservoirs subject to the limitation under Article IV(b) of the Canadian River Compact. The release of water from Ute Reservoir will be coordinated with Oklahoma and Texas and will be at the call of Texas. 3. New Mexico shall also release from Ute Reservoir an additional 25,000 acre-feet of storage below the Article IV(b) limitation. New Mexico shall operate Ute Reservoir through the year 2002 at or below the elevations set forth in the schedule below and in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 8 of the Decree entered in this case. The sched- ule includes annual adjustments for sediment accumulation in Ute Reservoir and assumes the other reservoirs subject to the Article IV(b) limitation maintain storage at their total capacity of 6,760 acre-feet. The schedule shall be adjusted by the parties to reflect additional amounts of water in con- servation storage in any reservoir enlarged or constructed 510us1$10Z 04-16-96 21:08:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 126 (1993) 127 Decree after 1992. Releases of water from Ute Reservoir will be coordinated with Oklahoma and Texas and will be at the call of Texas. Ute Reservoir Operating Schedule Reduced Corresponding Authorized Storage Reduced Year Elevation Amount Elevation After release in 1993 3781.58 25,000 3777.86 1994 3781.66 25,000 3777.95 1995 3781.74 25,000 3778.04 1996 3781.83 25,000 3778.14 1997 3781.91 25,000 3778.23 1998 3781.99 20,000 3779.08 1999 3782.08 15,000 3779.91 2000 3782.16 6,250 3781.28 2001 3782.24 3,125 3781.80 Refilled in 2002 3782.32 -0- 3782.32 4. Within 75 days after entry of judgment New Mexico shall pay as attorney's fees $200,000 to Texas and $200,000 to Oklahoma. The parties agree that such payments do not constitute and shall not be considered as an admission, ex- press or implicit, that New Mexico has any liability to Texas or Oklahoma for attorney's fees. 5. Oklahoma and Texas shall release New Mexico from all claims for equitable or legal relief, other than the relief embodied in the Decree of the parties, arising out of New Mexico's violation of the Canadian River Compact during the years 1987 through the date this Stipulated Judgment is entered. 6. In the event of a conflict between this Judgment and the Decree entered in this case, the provisions of the Judg- ment shall control. 7. The costs of this case shall be equally divided among the parties. 510us1$10Z 04-16-96 21:08:46 PAGES OPINPGT 128 OKLAHOMA v. NEW MEXICO Decree DECREE, AS MODIFIED 1. Under Article IV(a) of the Canadian River Compact (Compact), New Mexico is permitted free and unrestricted use of the waters of the Canadian River and its tributaries in New Mexico above Conchas Dam, such use to be made above or at Conchas Dam, including diversions for use on the Tucumcari Project and the Bell Ranch and the on-project storage of return flow or operational waste from those two projects so long as the recaptured water does not include the mainstream or tributary flows of the Canadian River; provided that transfers of water rights from above Conchas Dam to locations below Conchas Dam shall be subject to the conservation storage limitation of Compact Article IV(b). Nothing in this paragraph shall be deemed to determine whether or not the place of use of water rights may be trans- ferred to locations outside the Canadian River basin in New Mexico. 2. Under Compact Article IV(b), New Mexico is limited to storage of no more than 200,000 acre-feet of the waters of the Canadian River and its tributaries, regardless of point of origin, at any time in reservoirs in the Canadian River basin in New Mexico below Conchas Dam for any beneficial use, exclusive of water stored for the exempt purposes specified in Compact Article II(d) and on-project storage of irrigation return flows or operational waste on the Tucumcari Project and Bell Ranch as provided for in Paragraph 1 of this Decree. 3. Quantities of water stored primarily for flood protec- tion, power generation, or sediment control are not charge- able as conservation storage under the Compact even though incidental use is made of such waters for recreation, fish and wildlife, or other beneficial uses not expressly mentioned in the Compact. In situations where storage may be for mul- tiple purposes, including both conservation storage and exempt storage, nothing in this Decree shall preclude the Canadian River Commission (Commission) from exempting 510us1$10Z 04-16-96 21:08:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 126 (1993) 129 Decree an appropriate portion of such storage from chargeability as conservation storage. 4. Water stored at elevations below a dam's lowest perma- nent outlet works is not chargeable as conservation storage under the Compact unless the primary use of that storage is for a nonexempt purpose, or unless other means, such as pumps, are utilized to discharge such storage volumes from the reservoir. No change in the location of a dam's lowest permanent outlet works to a higher elevation shall provide the basis for a claim of exempt status for all water stored below the relocated outlet works without prior approval of the Commission, which shall not be unreasonably withheld. Water stored for nonexempt purposes behind a dam with capacity in excess of 100 acre-feet and with no outlet works is chargeable as conservation storage. 5. Future designation or redesignation of storage volumes for flood control, power production, or sediment control pur- poses must receive prior Commission approval to be exempt from chargeability as conservation storage, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. 6. All water stored in Ute Reservoir above elevation 3,725 feet is conservation storage; provided that at such time as the authorization and funding of the Eastern New Mexico Water Supply Project or other project results in changed circumstances at Ute Reservoir, New Mexico may seek ex- emption of a reasonable portion of such water from the Com- mission under Paragraph 5 of this Decree and, if an exemp- tion is denied, may petition the Court for appropriate relief under Paragraph 11 of this Decree. 7. In 1988 there were 63 small reservoirs in New Mexico with capacities of 100 acre-feet or less with a total capacity of about 1,000 acre-feet, which the Commission has treated as de minimis by waiving storage volume reporting obliga- tions. Water stored in these reservoirs or in similarly sized reservoirs in the future is not chargeable as conservation storage, unless otherwise determined by the Commission. 510us1$10Z 04-16-96 21:08:46 PAGES OPINPGT 130 OKLAHOMA v. NEW MEXICO Decree 8. Based on the elevation-capacity relationship of Ute Res- ervoir effective January 1, 1993, and adjustments pursuant to Paragraph 9 of this Decree, New Mexico shall make and maintain appropriate releases of water from Ute Reservoir or other conservation storage facilities in excess of 100 acre- feet of capacity at the maximum rate consistent with safe operation of such reservoirs so that total conservation stor- age in the Canadian River basin below Conchas Dam in New Mexico is limited to no more than 200,000 acre-feet at any time; provided that operation of Ute Reservoir for the period 1993­2002 shall be pursuant to the schedule contained in the Judgment entered in this case; and provided that no violation of this paragraph will occur during any period in which the outlet works of Ute Reservoir are discharging water at the maximum safe discharge capacity (currently 350 cubic feet per second) following the first knowledge that the 1993­2002 schedule or the Article IV(b) limitation after 2002 probably would be exceeded; and provided further that Texas shall be notified by New Mexico prior to a release and may allow New Mexico to retain water in conservation storage in ex- cess of the 1993­2002 schedule or the Article IV(b) limitation after 2002, subject to the call of Texas and subject to the provisions of Article V of the Compact. The outlet works of Ute Reservoir shall be maintained in good working order and shall not be modified to reduce the safe discharge capac- ity without prior approval of the Commission, which shall not be unreasonably withheld. 9. Sediment surveys of Ute Reservoir shall be conducted at least every 10 years by New Mexico, unless such require- ment is waived by the Commission. Conservation storage in Ute Reservoir shall be determined from the most recent sediment survey and an annual estimate of the total addi- tional sediment deposition in the reservoir using an annual average of sediment accumulation during the period between 1963 and the most recently completed survey. 510us1$10Z 04-16-96 21:08:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 126 (1993) 131 Decree 10. Nothing in this Decree is intended to affect a State's rights or obligations under the Compact, except as specifi- cally addressed herein. 11. The Court retains jurisdiction of this suit for the pur- poses of any order, direction, or modification of this Decree, or any supplementary decree, that may at any time be deemed proper in relation to the subject matter in contro- versy; provided, that any party requesting the Court to exer- cise its jurisdiction under this paragraph or answering such request shall certify that it has attempted to negotiate in good faith with the other parties in an effort to resolve the dispute sought to be brought before the Court. 510us1$11z 06-19-97 20:42:49 PAGES OPINPGT 132 OCTOBER TERM, 1993 Per Curiam BURDEN v. ZANT, WARDEN on petition for writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit No. 92­8836. Decided January 10, 1994 The first time petitioner Burden's habeas petition was before this Court, his case was remanded so that his claim that his pretrial counsel's con- flict of interest denied his right to effective assistance of counsel could be considered by the Court of Appeals "free from" that court's erroneous failure to credit a state-court finding that the key prosecution witness was granted immunity while represented by Burden's counsel. 498 U. S. 433. In rejecting his claim a second time, the Court of Appeals held that it did not have to presume the immunity finding's correctness because the state court had not adequately developed the finding. It reasoned that the state court's conclusion amounted to mere personal impression on an issue not subject to significant dispute at trial and stated that the District Court had found that the key witness had not been granted immunity. Held: The Court of Appeals' decision was based on a manifest error. The District Court did not make the immunity finding as claimed by the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals overlooked evidence strongly supporting Burden's contention regarding an immunity deal. On remand, the Court of Appeals or, subject to its further order, the District Court must determine whether counsel's representation created an actual conflict of interest adversely affecting his performance. Certiorari granted; 975 F. 2d 771, reversed and remanded. Per Curiam. In Burden v. Zant, 498 U. S. 433 (1991) (per curiam), we reversed a judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Elev- enth Circuit, which had upheld denial of habeas relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel due to conflict of interest. The case is before us again on a petition seeking review of the decision rendered on remand, 975 F. 2d 771 (1992), in which the Court of Appeals once again rejected Burden's claim that he had been deprived of the right to be represented by counsel free of conflict of interest. 510us1$11z 06-19-97 20:42:49 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 132 (1994) 133 Per Curiam In our earlier unanimous per curiam opinion, we held that the courts below had failed to accord the presumption of cor- rectness apparently due a state-court determination bearing on the conflict claim (i. e., that Dixon, the key prosecution witness allegedly represented by Burden's pretrial counsel, " `was granted immunity from prosecution,' " 498 U. S., at 436). See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). We directed the Court of Appeals on remand to evaluate Burden's conflict-of-interest claim "free from" the "erroneous failure to credit the state trial court's finding . . . ." 498 U. S., at 438. In the decision now before us, the Eleventh Circuit major- ity first held that there was no need for a federal habeas court to presume the correctness of the immunity finding, because it had not been "adequately developed" in the state trial court proceeding. See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(3). The majority reasoned that the trial court's conclusion, contained in an administrative report to the State Supreme Court, see Ga. Code Ann. § 17­10­35(a) (1990), and not labeled a finding of fact or conclusion of law, amounted to the trial judge's mere personal "impression" on an issue not subject to sig- nificant dispute at trial. See 975 F. 2d, at 774­775. Declar- ing it "improper" to defer to the judge's "comment," id., at 775, the Court of Appeals explained that it would uphold its prior denial of relief on the basis of a District Court finding, said to be that "Dixon did not testify under a grant of trans- actional immunity or pursuant to a promise that the State would not prosecute him," ibid. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Anderson maintained that the District Court's order contained no such finding and that his colleagues had over- looked the record of evidence strongly supporting Burden's contention that some sort of immunity deal had, in fact, been struck. Reviewing the record, we are convinced that Judge Ander- son was correct, that the decision of the Court of Appeals was grounded on manifest mistake, and that reversal is war- ranted on that basis alone. We therefore grant the motion 510us1$11z 06-19-97 20:42:49 PAGES OPINPGT 134 BURDEN v. ZANT Per Curiam for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari and reverse and remand for the Eleventh Circuit, or subject to its further order the District Court, to determine whether Mr. Kondritzer's representation created "an actual conflict of interest adversely affect[ing] [his] per- formance." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335, 350 (1980). Reversed and remanded. 510us1$12F 06-18-97 16:59:17 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1993 135 Syllabus RATZLAF et ux. v. UNITED STATES certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 92­1196. Argued November 1, 1993-Decided January 11, 1994 As here relevant, federal law requires a domestic bank involved in a cash transaction exceeding $10,000 to file a report with the Secretary of the Treasury, 31 U. S. C. § 5313(a), 31 CFR § 103.22(a); makes it illegal to "structure" a transaction-i. e., to break up a single transaction above the reporting threshold into two or more separate transactions-"for the purpose of evading the reporting requiremen[t]," 31 U. S. C. § 5324(3); and sets out criminal penalties for "[a] person willfully violat- ing" the antistructuring provision, § 5322(a). After the judge at peti- tioner Waldemar Ratzlaf's trial on charges of violating §§ 5322(a) and 5324(3) instructed the jury that the Government had to prove both that the defendant knew of the § 5313(a) reporting obligation and that he attempted to evade that obligation, but did not have to prove that he knew the structuring in which he engaged was unlawful, Ratzlaf was convicted, fined, and sentenced to prison. In affirming, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's construction of the legislation. Held: To give effect to § 5322(a)'s "willfulness" requirement, the Govern- ment must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that the structuring he or she undertook was unlawful, not simply that the de- fendant's purpose was to circumvent a bank's reporting obligation. Sec- tion 5324 itself forbids structuring with a "purpose of evading the [§ 5313(a)] reporting requirements," and the lower courts erred in treat- ing the "willfulness" requirement essentially as words of no conse- quence. Viewing §§ 5322(a) and 5324(3) in light of the complex of provi- sions in which they are embedded, it is significant that the omnibus "willfulness" requirement, when applied to other provisions in the same statutory subchapter, consistently has been read by the Courts of Ap- peals to require both knowledge of the reporting requirement and a specific intent to commit the crime or to disobey the law. The "willful- ness" requirement must be construed the same way each time it is called into play. Because currency structuring is not inevitably nefarious, this Court is unpersuaded by the United States' argument that structuring is so obviously "evil" or inherently "bad" that the "willfulness" require- ment is satisfied irrespective of the defendant's knowledge of the illegal- ity of structuring. The interpretation adopted in this case does not dis- honor the venerable principle that ignorance of the law generally is no 510us1$12F 06-18-97 16:59:17 PAGES OPINPGT 136 RATZLAF v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court defense to a criminal charge, for Congress may decree otherwise in par- ticular contexts, and has done so in the present instance. Pp. 140­149. 976 F. 2d 1280, reversed and remanded. Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a dis- senting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 150. Stephen Robert LaCheen argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Anne M. Dixon, Peter Gold- berger, Pamela A. Wilk, James H. Feldman, Jr., Kevin O'Connell, and Christopher H. Kent. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., argued the cause for the United States. On the brief were Solicitor General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor Gen- eral Bryson, John F. Manning, and Richard A. Friedman.* Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. Federal law requires banks and other financial institutions to file reports with the Secretary of the Treasury whenever they are involved in a cash transaction that exceeds $10,000. 31 U. S. C. § 5313; 31 CFR § 103.22(a) (1993). It is illegal to "structure" transactions-i. e., to break up a single transac- tion above the reporting threshold into two or more separate transactions-for the purpose of evading a financial institu- tion's reporting requirement. 31 U. S. C. § 5324. "A person willfully violating" this antistructuring provision is subject to criminal penalties. § 5322. This case presents a ques- tion on which Courts of Appeals have divided: Does a defend- ant's purpose to circumvent a bank's reporting obligation suffice to sustain a conviction for "willfully violating" the antistructuring provision? 1 We hold that the "willfulness" *Alan Zarky filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging reversal. 1 Compare, e. g., United States v. Scanio, 900 F. 2d 485, 491 (CA2 1990) ("proof that the defendant knew that structuring is unlawful" is not re- 510us1$12F 06-18-97 16:59:17 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 135 (1994) 137 Opinion of the Court requirement mandates something more. To establish that a defendant "willfully violat[ed]" the antistructuring law, the Government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful. I On the evening of October 20, 1988, defendant-petitioner Waldemar Ratzlaf ran up a debt of $160,000 playing blackjack at the High Sierra Casino in Reno, Nevada. The casino gave him one week to pay. On the due date, Ratzlaf re- turned to the casino with cash of $100,000 in hand. A casino official informed Ratzlaf that all transactions involving more than $10,000 in cash had to be reported to state and federal authorities. The official added that the casino could accept a cashier's check for the full amount due without triggering any reporting requirement. The casino helpfully placed a limousine at Ratzlaf's disposal, and assigned an employee to accompany him to banks in the vicinity. Informed that banks, too, are required to report cash transactions in excess of $10,000, Ratzlaf purchased cashier's checks, each for less than $10,000 and each from a different bank. He delivered these checks to the High Sierra Casino. Based on this endeavor, Ratzlaf was charged with "struc- turing transactions" to evade the banks' obligation to report cash transactions exceeding $10,000; this conduct, the indict- ment alleged, violated 31 U. S. C. §§ 5322(a) and 5324(3). The trial judge instructed the jury that the Government had to prove defendant's knowledge of the banks' reporting obli- gation and his attempt to evade that obligation, but did not quired to satisfy § 5322's willfulness requirement), with United States v. Aversa, 984 F. 2d 493, 502 (CA1 1993) (en banc) (a "willful action" within the meaning of § 5322(a) "is one committed in violation of a known legal duty or in consequence of a defendant's reckless disregard of such a duty"). 510us1$12F 06-18-97 16:59:17 PAGES OPINPGT 138 RATZLAF v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court have to prove defendant knew the structuring was unlawful. Ratzlaf was convicted, fined, and sentenced to prison.2 Ratzlaf maintained on appeal that he could not be con- victed of "willfully violating" the antistructuring law solely on the basis of his knowledge that a financial institution must report currency transactions in excess of $10,000 and his in- tention to avoid such reporting. To gain a conviction for "willful" conduct, he asserted, the Government must prove he was aware of the illegality of the "structuring" in which he engaged. The Ninth Circuit upheld the trial court's con- struction of the legislation and affirmed Ratzlaf's conviction. 976 F. 2d 1280 (1992). We granted certiorari, 507 U. S. 1050 (1993), and now conclude that, to give effect to the statutory "willfulness" specification, the Government had to prove Ratzlaf knew the structuring he undertook was unlawful. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. II A Congress enacted the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act (Bank Secrecy Act) in 1970, Pub. L. 91­2508, Tit. II, 84 Stat. 1118, in response to increasing use of banks and other institutions as financial intermediaries by persons engaged in criminal activity. The Act imposes a variety of reporting requirements on individuals and institutions re- garding foreign and domestic financial transactions. See 31 U. S. C. §§ 5311­5325. The reporting requirement relevant here, § 5313(a), applies to domestic financial transactions. Section 5313(a) reads: "When a domestic financial institution is involved in a transaction for the payment, receipt, or transfer of 2 Ratzlaf's wife and the casino employee who escorted Ratzlaf to area banks were codefendants. For convenience, we refer only to Waldemar Ratzlaf in this opinion. 510us1$12F 06-18-97 16:59:17 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 135 (1994) 139 Opinion of the Court United States coins or currency (or other monetary in- struments the Secretary of the Treasury prescribes), in an amount, denomination, or amount and denomination, or under circumstances the Secretary prescribes by reg- ulation, the institution and any other participant in the transaction the Secretary may prescribe shall file a re- port on the transaction at the time and in the way the Secretary prescribes. . . ." 3 To deter circumvention of this reporting requirement, Congress enacted an antistructuring provision, 31 U. S. C. § 5324, as part of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99­570, Tit. I, Subtit. H, § 1354(a), 100 Stat. 3207­22.4 Section 5324,5 which Ratzlaf is charged with "willfully violat- ing," reads: "No person shall for the purpose of evading the re- porting requirements of section 5313(a) with respect to such transaction- . . . . . 3 By regulation, the Secretary ordered reporting of "transaction[s] in currency of more than $10,000." 31 CFR § 103.22(a) (1993). Although the Secretary could have imposed a report-filing requirement on "any . . . participant in the transaction," 31 U. S. C. § 5313(a), the Secretary chose to require reporting by the financial institution but not by the customer. 31 CFR § 103.22(a) (1993). 4 Other portions of this Act make "money laundering" itself a crime. See Pub. L. 99­570, Tit. XIII, § 1352(a), 100 Stat. 3207­18, codified at 18 U. S. C. § 1956(a)(2)(b) (prohibiting various transactions involving the "pro- ceeds of some form of unlawful activity"). The Government does not as- sert that Ratzlaf obtained the cash used in any of the transactions relevant here in other than a lawful manner. 5 Subsequent to Ratzlaf's conviction, Congress recodified § 5324(1)­(3) as § 5324(a)(1)­(3), without substantive change. In addition, Congress added subsection (b) to replicate the prohibitions of subsection (a) in the context of international currency transactions. See Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act, Pub. L. 102­550, Tit. XV, § 1525(a), 106 Stat. 4064, 31 U. S. C. § 5324 (1988 ed., Supp. IV). For simplicity, we refer to the codifi- cation in effect at the time the Court of Appeals decided this case. 510us1$12F 06-18-97 16:59:17 PAGES OPINPGT 140 RATZLAF v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court "(3) structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure or assist in structuring, any transaction with one or more domestic financial institutions." 6 The criminal enforcement provision at issue, 31 U. S. C. § 5322(a), sets out penalties for "[a] person willfully vio- lating," inter alia, the antistructuring provision. Section 5322(a) reads: "A person willfully violating this subchapter [31 U. S. C. § 5311 et seq.] or a regulation prescribed under this subchapter (except section 5315 of this title or a regulation prescribed under section 5315) shall be fined not more than $250,000, or [imprisoned for] not more than five years, or both." B Section 5324 forbids structuring transactions with a "pur- pose of evading the reporting requirements of section 5313(a)." Ratzlaf admits that he structured cash transac- tions, and that he did so with knowledge of, and a purpose to avoid, the banks' duty to report currency transactions in excess of $10,000. The statutory formulation (§ 5322) under which Ratzlaf was prosecuted, however, calls for proof of "willful[ness]" on the actor's part. The trial judge in Ratz- laf's case, with the Ninth Circuit's approbation, treated § 5322(a)'s "willfulness" requirement essentially as surplus- age-as words of no consequence.7 Judges should hesitate so to treat statutory terms in any setting, and resistance 6 Regarding enforcement of § 5324, the Secretary considered, but did not promulgate, a regulation requiring banks to inform currency transaction customers of the section's proscription. See 53 Fed. Reg. 7948 (1988) (pro- posing "procedures to notify [bank] customers of the provisions to Section 5324" in order to "insure compliance" with those provisions); 54 Fed. Reg. 20398 (1989) (withdrawing proposal). 7 The United States confirmed at oral argument that, in its view, as in the view of the courts below, "the 5324 offense is just what it would be if you never had 5322." Tr. of Oral Arg. 23. 510us1$12F 06-18-97 16:59:17 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 135 (1994) 141 Opinion of the Court should be heightened when the words describe an element of a criminal offense. See Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U. S. 552, 562 (1990) (expressing "deep reluctance" to interpret statutory provisions "so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment") (citation omitted); cf. Potter v. United States, 155 U. S. 438, 446 (1894) (word "wilful" used to describe certain offenses but not others in same statute "cannot be regarded as mere surplusage; it means something"). "Willful," this Court has recognized, is a "word of many meanings," and "its construction [is] often . . . influenced by its context." Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492, 497 (1943). Accordingly, we view §§ 5322(a) and 5324(3) mindful of the complex of provisions in which they are embedded. In this light, we count it significant that § 5322(a)'s omnibus "willfulness" requirement, when applied to other provisions in the same subchapter, consistently has been read by the Courts of Appeals to require both "knowledge of the report- ing requirement" and a "specific intent to commit the crime," i. e., "a purpose to disobey the law." See United States v. Bank of New England, N. A., 821 F. 2d 844, 854­859 (CA1 1987) ("willful violation" of § 5313's reporting requirement for cash transactions over $10,000 requires "voluntary, inten- tional, and bad purpose to disobey the law"); United States v. Eisenstein, 731 F. 2d 1540, 1543 (CA11 1984) ("willful vio- lation" of § 5313's reporting requirement for cash transac- tions over $10,000 requires " `proof of the defendant's knowl- edge of the reporting requirement and his specific intent to commit the crime' ") (quoting United States v. Granda, 565 F. 2d 922, 926 (CA5 1978)). Notable in this regard are 31 U. S. C. § 5314,8 concerning records and reports on monetary transactions with foreign 8 Section 5314 provides that "the Secretary of the Treasury shall require a resident or citizen of the United States or a person in, and doing business in, the United States, to keep records, file reports, or keep records and file reports, when the resident, citizen, or person makes a transaction or maintains a relation for any person with a foreign financial agency." 510us1$12F 06-18-97 16:59:17 PAGES OPINPGT 142 RATZLAF v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court financial agencies, and § 5316,9 concerning declaration of the transportation of more than $10,000 into, or out of, the United States. Decisions involving these provisions de- scribe a "willful" actor as one who violates "a known legal duty." See, e. g., United States v. Sturman, 951 F. 2d 1466, 1476­1477 (CA6 1991) ("willful violation" of § 5314's report- ing requirement for foreign financial transactions requires proof of " `voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty' ") (quoting Cheek v. United States, 498 U. S. 192, 201 (1991)); United States v. Warren, 612 F. 2d 887, 890 (CA5 1980) ("willful violation" of § 5316's reporting requirement for transportation of currency across international bound- aries requires that defendant "have actually known of the currency reporting requirement and have voluntarily and in- tentionally violated that known legal duty"); United States v. Dichne, 612 F. 2d 632, 636 (CA2 1979) ("willful violation" of § 5316's reporting requirement for transportation of currency across international boundaries requires proof of defendant's " `knowledge of the reporting requirement and his specific intent to commit the crime' ") (quoting Granda, 565 F. 2d, at 926); Granda, 565 F. 2d, at 924­926 (overturning conviction for "willful violation" of § 5316 because jury was not given "proper instruction [that] would include some discussion of defendant's ignorance of the law" and rejecting Govern- ment's contention that the statutory provisions "do not re- quire that the defendant be aware of the fact that he is breaking the law").10 9 Section 5316 requires the filing of reports prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury when "a person or an agent or bailee of the person . . . knowingly (1) transports, is about to transport, or has transported, mone- tary instruments of more than $10,000 at one time" into, or out of, the United States. 10 "[S]pecific intent to commit the crime[s]" described in 31 U. S. C. §§ 5313, 5314, and 5316 might be negated by, e. g., proof that defendant relied in good faith on advice of counsel. See United States v. Eisenstein, 731 F. 2d 1540, 1543­1544 (CA11 1984). 510us1$12F 06-18-97 16:59:17 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 135 (1994) 143 Opinion of the Court A term appearing in several places in a statutory text is generally read the same way each time it appears. See Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 479 (1992). We have even stronger cause to construe a single formulation, here § 5322(a), the same way each time it is called into play. See United States v. Aversa, 984 F. 2d 493, 498 (CA1 1993) (en banc) ("Ascribing various meanings to a single iteration of [§ 5322(a)'s willfulness requirement]- reading the word differently for each code section to which it applies-would open Pandora's jar. If courts can render meaning so malleable, the usefulness of a single penalty pro- vision for a group of related code sections will be eviscerated and . . . almost any code section that references a group of other code sections would become susceptible to individu- ated interpretation."). The United States urges, however, that § 5324 violators, by their very conduct, exhibit a purpose to do wrong, which suffices to show "willfulness": "On occasion, criminal statutes-including some re- quiring proof of `willfulness'-have been understood to require proof of an intentional violation of a known legal duty, i. e., specific knowledge by the defendant that his conduct is unlawful. But where that con- struction has been adopted, it has been invoked only to ensure that the defendant acted with a wrongful pur- pose. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U. S. 419, 426 (1985) . . . . . . . . . "The anti-structuring statute, 31 U. S. C. § 5324, satis- fies the `bad purpose' component of willfulness by explic- itly defining the wrongful purpose necessary to violate the law: it requires proof that the defendant acted with the purpose to evade the reporting requirement of Sec- tion 5313(a)." Brief for United States 23­25. 510us1$12F 06-18-97 16:59:17 PAGES OPINPGT 144 RATZLAF v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court " `[S]tructuring is not the kind of activity that an ordinary person would engage in innocently,' " the United States as- serts. Id., at 29 (quoting United States v. Hoyland, 914 F. 2d 1125, 1129 (CA9 1990)). It is therefore "reasonable," the Government concludes, "to hold a structurer responsible for evading the reporting requirements without the need to prove specific knowledge that such evasion is unlawful." Brief for United States 29. Undoubtedly there are bad men who attempt to elude of- ficial reporting requirements in order to hide from Gov- ernment inspectors such criminal activity as laundering drug money or tax evasion.11 But currency structuring is not inevitably nefarious. Consider, for example, the small business operator who knows that reports filed under 31 U. S. C. § 5313(a) are available to the Internal Revenue Serv- ice. To reduce the risk of an IRS audit, she brings $9,500 in cash to the bank twice each week, in lieu of transporting over $10,000 once each week. That person, if the United States is right, has committed a criminal offense, because she structured cash transactions "for the specific purpose of depriving the Government of the information that Section 5313(a) is designed to obtain." Brief for United States 28­ 11 On brief, the United States attempted to link Ratzlaf to other bad conduct, describing at some length his repeated failure to report gambling income in his income tax returns. Brief for United States 5­7. Ratzlaf was not prosecuted, however, for these alleged misdeeds. Tr. of Oral Arg. 35­36. Nor has the Government ever asserted that Ratzlaf was engaged in other conduct Congress sought principally to check through the legisla- tion in question-not gambling at licensed casinos, but laundering money proceeds from drug sales or other criminal ventures. See S. Rep. No. 99­433, pp. 1­2 (1986) (purpose of Act creating § 5324 is to "provide Fed- eral law enforcement agencies with additional tools to investigate money laundering [and to] curb the spread of money laundering, by which crimi- nals have successfully disguised the nature and source of funds from their illegal enterprises"). 510us1$12F 06-18-97 16:59:17 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 135 (1994) 145 Opinion of the Court 29.12 Nor is a person who structures a currency transaction invariably motivated by a desire to keep the Government in the dark. But under the Government's construction an individual would commit a felony against the United States by making cash deposits in small doses, fearful that the bank's reports would increase the likelihood of burglary,13 or in an endeavor to keep a former spouse unaware of his wealth.14 Courts have noted "many occasions" on which persons, without violating any law, may structure transactions "in order to avoid the impact of some regulation or tax." United States v. Aversa, 762 F. Supp. 441, 446 (NH 1991), aff'd in part, 984 F. 2d 493 (CA1 1993). This Court, over a century ago, supplied an illustration: "The Stamp Act of 1862 imposed a duty of two cents upon a bank-check, when drawn for an amount not less than twenty dollars. A careful individual, having the amount of twenty dollars to pay, pays the same by hand- ing to his creditor two checks of ten dollars each. He thus draws checks in payment of his debt to the amount 12 At oral argument, the United States recognized that, under its reading of the legislation, the entrepreneur in this example, absent special exemp- tion, would be subject to prosecution. Tr. of Oral Arg. 32­34. 13 See United States v. Dollar Bank Money Market Account No. 1591768456, 980 F. 2d 233, 241 (CA3 1992) (forfeiture action under 18 U. S. C. § 981(a)(1)(A) involving a cash gift deposited by the donee in sev- eral steps to avoid bank's reporting requirement; court overturned grant of summary judgment in Government's favor, noting that jury could be- lieve donee's "legitimate explanations for organizing his deposits in amounts under $10,000," including respect for donor's privacy and fear that information regarding the donor-an "eccentric old woman [who] hid hundreds of thousands of dollars in her house"-might lead to burglary attempts). 14 See Aversa, 984 F. 2d, at 495 (real estate partners feared that "paper trail" from currency transaction reports would obviate efforts to hide ex- istence of cash from spouse of one of the partners). 510us1$12F 06-18-97 16:59:17 PAGES OPINPGT 146 RATZLAF v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court of twenty dollars, and yet pays no stamp duty. . . . While his operations deprive the government of the duties it might reasonably expect to receive, it is not perceived that the practice is open to the charge of fraud. He resorts to devices to avoid the payment of duties, but they are not illegal. He has the legal right to split up his evidences of payment, and thus to avoid the tax." United States v. Isham, 17 Wall. 496, 506 (1873). In current days, as an amicus noted, countless taxpayers each year give a gift of $10,000 on December 31 and an iden- tical gift the next day, thereby legitimately avoiding the tax- able gifts reporting required by 26 U. S. C. § 2503(b).15 See Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae 16. In light of these examples, we are unpersuaded by the ar- gument that structuring is so obviously "evil" or inherently "bad" that the "willfulness" requirement is satisfied irrespec- tive of the defendant's knowledge of the illegality of structur- ing. Had Congress wished to dispense with the require- ment, it could have furnished the appropriate instruction.16 C In § 5322, Congress subjected to criminal penalties only those "willfully violating" § 5324, signaling its intent to re- quire for conviction proof that the defendant knew not only 15 The statute provides that "[i]n the case of gifts . . . made to any person by [a] donor during [a] calendar year, the first $10,000 of such gifts to such person shall not . . . be included in the total amount of gifts made during such year." 26 U. S. C. § 2503(b). 16 Congress did provide for civil forfeiture without any "willfulness" re- quirement in the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986. See 18 U. S. C. § 981(a) (subjecting to forfeiture "[a]ny property, real or personal, involved in a transaction . . . in violation of section 5313(a) or 5324(a) of title 31 . . ."); see also 31 U. S. C. § 5317(a) (subjecting to forfeiture any "monetary instrument . . . being transported [when] a report on the instrument under section 5316 of this title has not been filed or contains a material omission or misstatement"). 510us1$12F 06-18-97 16:59:17 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 135 (1994) 147 Opinion of the Court of the bank's duty to report cash transactions in excess of $10,000, but also of his duty not to avoid triggering such a report. There are, we recognize, contrary indications in the statute's legislative history.17 But we do not resort to legis- 17 The United States points to one of the Senate Reports accompanying the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, which stated that "a person who converts $18,000 in currency to cashier's checks by purchasing two $9,000 cashier's checks at two different banks or on two different days with the specific intent that the participating bank or banks not be re- quired to file Currency Transaction Reports for those transactions, would be subject to potential civil and criminal liability." S. Rep. No. 99­433, p. 22 (1986), cited in Brief for United States 35. The same Report also indicated that § 5324 "would codify [United States v.] Tobon-Builes[, 706 F. 2d 1092 (CA11 1983),] and like cases [by] expressly subject[ing] to poten- tial liability a person who causes or attempts to cause a financial institution to fail to file a required report or who causes a financial institution to file a required report that contains material omissions or misstatements of fact." S. Rep. No. 99­433, at 22, cited in Brief for United States 33. But the legislative history cited by the United States is hardly crystal- line. The reference to United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F. 2d 1092 (CA11 1983), is illustrative. In that case, the defendant was charged under 18 U. S. C. § 1001, the False Statements Act, with "conceal[ing] . . . the existence, source, and transfer of approximately $185,200 in cash by purchasing approximately twenty-one cashier's checks in amounts less than $10,000 [and] using a variety of names, including false names . . . ." 706 F. 2d, at 1094. The defendant's "main contention," rejected by the Eleventh Circuit, was that he "could not have violated the concealment prohibition of § 1001 because he was under no legal duty to report any of his cash transactions." Id., at 1096. No "ignorance of the law" defense was asserted. Congress may indeed have "codified" that decision in § 5324 by "expressly subject[ing] to potential liability a person who causes or attempts to cause a financial institution to fail to file a required report or who causes a financial institution to file a required report that contains material omissions or misstatements of fact," S. Rep. No. 99­433, at 22, but it appears that Congress did so in the first and second subsections of § 5324, which track the Senate Report language almost verbatim. See 31 U. S. C. § 5324(1) (no person shall "cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to fail to file a report required under section 5313(a)"); 31 U. S. C. § 5324(2) (no person shall "cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to file a report required under section 5313(a) that contains a material omission or misstatement of fact"). Indeed, the Sen- ate Report stated that "[i]n addition" to codifying Tobon-Builes, § 5324 510us1$12F 06-18-97 16:59:17 PAGES OPINPGT 148 RATZLAF v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court lative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.18 More- over, were we to find § 5322(a)'s "willfulness" requirement ambiguous as applied to § 5324, we would resolve any doubt in favor of the defendant. Hughey v. United States, 495 U. S. 411, 422 (1990) (lenity principles "demand resolution of ambiguities in criminal statutes in favor of the defendant"); Crandon v. United States, 494 U. S. 152, 160 (1990) ("Because construction of a criminal statute must be guided by the need for fair warning, it is rare that legislative history or statutory policies will support a construction of a statute broader than that clearly warranted by the text."); United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 347­350 (1971) (rule of lenity premised on concepts that " `fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will under- stand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed' " and that "legislatures and not courts should define would also "create the offense of structuring a transaction to evade the reporting requirements." S. Rep. No. 99­433, at 22. The relevance of Tobon-Builes to the proper construction of § 5324(3), the subsection under which Ratzlaf was convicted, is not evident. 18 See Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U. S. 393, 401 (1992) (appeals to legisla- tive history are well taken only to resolve statutory ambiguity). See also United States v. Aversa, 984 F. 2d, at 499, n. 8 (commenting that legislative history of provisions here at issue " `is more conflicting than the [statutory] text is ambiguous' ") (quoting Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 49 (1950)). As the First Circuit noted, no House, Senate, or Conference Report accompanied the final version of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986; instead, over 20 separate reports accompanied various proposed bills, por- tions of which were incorporated into that Act. See 1986 U. S. C. C. A. N. 5393 (listing reports). The dissent, see post, at 161, features a House Report issued in 1991 in connection with an unenacted version of the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act. We do not find that Report, commenting on a bill that did not pass, a secure indicator of congressional intent at any time, and it surely affords no reliable guide to Congress' intent in 1986. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750, 758 (1979) (cautioning against giving weight to "history" written years after the passage of a statute). 510us1$12F 06-18-97 16:59:18 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 135 (1994) 149 Opinion of the Court criminal activity") (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U. S. 25, 27 (1931) (Holmes, J.)). We do not dishonor the venerable principle that ignorance of the law generally is no defense to a criminal charge. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U. S. 192, 199 (1991); Barlow v. United States, 7 Pet. 404, 410­412 (1833) (Story, J.). In par- ticular contexts, however, Congress may decree otherwise. That, we hold, is what Congress has done with respect to 31 U. S. C. § 5322(a) and the provisions it controls. To convict Ratzlaf of the crime with which he was charged, violation of 31 U. S. C. §§ 5322(a) and 5324(3), the jury had to find he knew the structuring in which he engaged was unlawful.19 Because the jury was not properly instructed in this regard, we reverse the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 19 The dissent asserts that our holding "largely nullifies the effect" of § 5324 by "mak[ing] prosecution for structuring difficult or impossible in most cases." See post, at 161, 162. Even under the dissent's reading of the statute, proof that the defendant knew of the bank's duty to report is required for conviction; we fail to see why proof that the defendant knew of his duty to refrain from structuring is so qualitatively different that it renders prosecution "impossible." A jury may, of course, find the requi- site knowledge on defendant's part by drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence of defendant's conduct, see Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492, 499­500 (1943) (illustrating conduct that can support permissible in- ference of an "affirmative willful attempt" to evade a tax); United States v. Bank of New England, N. A., 821 F. 2d 844, 854 (CA1 1987) (willfulness "is usually established by drawing reasonable inferences from the avail- able facts"), and the Government has not found it "impossible" to persuade a jury to make such inferences in prosecutions for willful violations of §§ 5313, 5314, or 5316. See, e. g., United States v. Dichne, 612 F. 2d 632, 636­638 (CA2 1979) (evidence that Government took "affirmative steps" to bring the reporting requirement to the defendant's attention by means of visual notices supports inference that defendant "willfully violated" § 5316). 510us1$12F 06-18-97 16:59:18 PAGES OPINPGT 150 RATZLAF v. UNITED STATES Blackmun, J., dissenting Justice Blackmun, with whom The Chief Justice, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Thomas join, dissenting. On October 27, 1988, petitioner Waldemar Ratzlaf 1 arrived at a Nevada casino with a shopping bag full of cash to pay off a $160,000 gambling debt. He told casino personnel he did not want any written report of the payment to be made. The casino vice president informed Ratzlaf that he could not accept a cash payment of more than $10,000 without filing a report. Ratzlaf, along with his wife and a casino employee, then proceeded to visit several banks in and around Stateline, Ne- vada, and South Lake Tahoe, California, purchasing separate cashier's checks, each in the amount of $9,500. At some banks the Ratzlafs attempted to buy two checks-one for each of them-and were told that a report would have to be filed; on those occasions they canceled the transactions. Ratzlaf then returned to the casino and paid off $76,000 of his debt in cashier's checks. A few weeks later, Ratzlaf gave three persons cash to purchase additional cashier's checks in amounts less than $10,000. The Ratzlafs them- selves also bought five more such checks in the course of a week. A jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Ratzlaf knew of the financial institutions' duty to report cash transactions in excess of $10,000 and that he structured transactions for the specific purpose of evading the reporting requirements. The Court today, however, concludes that these findings are insufficient for a conviction under 31 U. S. C. §§ 5322(a) and 5324(3),2 because a defendant also must have known that the structuring in which he engaged was illegal. Because this conclusion lacks support in the text of the statute, con- flicts in my view with basic principles governing the inter- 1 For convenience, I follow the majority, see ante, at 138, n. 2, and refer only to Waldemar Ratzlaf in this opinion. 2 As does the majority, I refer to the codification in effect at the time the Court of Appeals decided this case. See ante, at 139, n. 5. 510us1$12F 06-18-97 16:59:18 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 135 (1994) 151 Blackmun, J., dissenting pretation of criminal statutes, and is squarely undermined by the evidence of congressional intent, I dissent. I "The general rule that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal system." Cheek v. United States, 498 U. S. 192, 199 (1991). The Court has applied this common- law rule "in numerous cases construing criminal statutes." Ibid., citing United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U. S. 558 (1971); Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 119­124 (1974); and Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U. S. 337 (1952). Thus, the term "willfully" in criminal law generally "refers to consciousness of the act but not to consciousness that the act is unlawful." Cheek, 498 U. S., at 209 (Scalia, J., concur- ring in judgment); see also Browder v. United States, 312 U. S. 335, 341 (1941); Potter v. United States, 155 U. S. 438, 446 (1894); American Surety Co. of New York v. Sullivan, 7 F. 2d 605, 606 (CA2 1925) (L. Hand, J.) ("[T]he word `willful' . . . means no more than that the person charged with the duty knows what he is doing," not that "he must suppose that he is breaking the law"); American Law Institute, Model Penal Code § 2.02(8) (1985) ("A requirement that an offense be committed wilfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements appears"). As the majority explains, 31 U. S. C. § 5322(a), originally enacted in 1970, imposes criminal penalties upon "person[s] willfully violating this subchapter." The subchapter (enti- tled "Records and Reports on Monetary Instruments Trans- actions") contains several different reporting requirements, including § 5313, which requires financial institutions to file reports for cash transactions over an amount prescribed by regulation; § 5314, which requires reports for transactions with foreign financial agencies; and § 5316, which requires 510us1$12F 06-18-97 16:59:18 PAGES OPINPGT 152 RATZLAF v. UNITED STATES Blackmun, J., dissenting reports for transportation of more than $10,000 into or out of the United States. In 1986, Congress added § 5324 to the subchapter to deter rampant evasion by customers of finan- cial institutions' duty to report large cash transactions. See infra, at 162, and n. 13. The new section provides: "No per- son shall for the purpose of evading the reporting require- ments of section 5313(a) . . . (3) structure . . . any transaction with one or more domestic financial institutions." Unlike other provisions of the subchapter, the antistruc- turing provision identifies the purpose that is required for a § 5324 violation: "evading the reporting requirements." The offense of structuring, therefore, requires (1) knowledge of a financial institution's reporting requirements, and (2) the structuring of a transaction for the purpose of evading those requirements. These elements define a violation that is "willful" as that term is commonly interpreted. The majori- ty's additional requirement that an actor have actual knowl- edge that structuring is prohibited strays from the statutory text, as well as from our precedents interpreting criminal statutes generally and "willfulness" in particular. The Court reasons that the interpretation of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and that of nine other Cir- cuits,3 renders § 5322(a)'s willfulness requirement superflu- ous. See ante, at 140. This argument ignores the general- 3 See United States v. Scanio, 900 F. 2d 485, 489­492 (CA2 1990); United States v. Shirk, 981 F. 2d 1382, 1389­1392 (CA3 1993); United States v. Rogers, 962 F. 2d 342, 343­345 (CA4 1992); United States v. Beaumont, 972 F. 2d 91, 93­95 (CA5 1992); United States v. Baydoun, 984 F. 2d 175, 180 (CA6 1993); United States v. Jackson, 983 F. 2d 757, 767 (CA7 1993); United States v. Gibbons, 968 F. 2d 639, 643­645 (CA8 1992); United States v. Dashney, 937 F. 2d 532, 537­540 (CA10), cert. denied, 502 U. S. 951 (1991); United States v. Brown, 954 F. 2d 1563, 1567­1569 (CA11), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 900 (1992). The only Court of Appeals to adopt a contrary interpretation is the First Circuit, and even that court allows "reckless disregard" of one's legal duty to support a conviction for structuring. See United States v. Aversa, 984 F. 2d 493, 502 (1993) (en banc). 510us1$12F 06-18-97 16:59:18 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 135 (1994) 153 Blackmun, J., dissenting ity of § 5322(a), which sets a single standard-willfulness- for the subchapter's various reporting provisions. Some of those provisions do not themselves define willful conduct, so the willfulness element cannot be deemed surplusage. More- over, the fact that § 5322(a) requires willfulness for criminal liability to be imposed does not mean that each of the under- lying offenses to which it applies must involve something less than willfulness. Thus, the fact that § 5324 does describe a "willful" offense, since it already requires "the purpose of evading the reporting requirements," provides no basis for imposing an artificially heightened scienter requirement. The majority also contends that § 5322(a)'s willfulness ele- ment, when applied to the subchapter's other provisions, has been read by the Courts of Appeals to require knowledge of and a purpose to disobey the law. See ante, at 141­142. In fact, the cases to which the majority refers stand for the more subtle proposition that a willful violation requires knowledge of the pertinent reporting requirements and a purpose to avoid compliance with them.4 Consistent with and in light 4 The dominant formulation of the standard for a willful violation of the related provisions demands "proof of the defendant's knowledge of the reporting requirement and his specific intent to commit the crime." United States v. Granda, 565 F. 2d 922, 926 (CA5 1978); see also United States v. Bank of New England, N. A., 821 F. 2d 844, 854 (CA1) ("willful" violation of § 5313 requires " `knowledge of the reporting requirements and [defendant's] specific intent to commit the crime' "), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 943 (1987); United States v. Eisenstein, 731 F. 2d 1540, 1543 (CA11 1984) (same); United States v. Dichne, 612 F. 2d 632, 636 (CA2 1979) (same stand- ard under predecessor to § 5316), cert. denied, 445 U. S. 928 (1980); United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F. 2d 1208, 1211 (CA5 1978) (same). The term "specific intent" does not, as the majority appears to assume, import the notion of knowledge of illegality. Rather, that term generally corres- ponds to the concept of "purpose," see United States v. Bailey, 444 U. S. 394, 405 (1980), and it does not add to the requisite knowledge, which is specified in the first prong of the standard. The majority correctly notes that courts in a few instances have referred to a willful violation of the reporting provisions as involving violation of a "known legal duty." Those courts, however, either applied the standard from Cheek v. United 510us1$12F 06-18-97 16:59:18 PAGES OPINPGT 154 RATZLAF v. UNITED STATES Blackmun, J., dissenting of that construction, Congress' 1986 enactment prohibited structuring "for the purpose of evading the reporting re- quirements." The level of knowledge imposed by the term "willfully" as it applies to all the underlying offenses in the subchapter on reporting requirements is "knowledge of the reporting requirements." 5 The Court next concludes that its interpretation of "will- fully" is warranted because structuring is not inherently "ne- farious." See ante, at 144. It is true that the Court, on occasion, has imposed a knowledge-of-illegality requirement upon criminal statutes to ensure that the defendant acted with a wrongful purpose. See, e. g., Liparota v. United States, 498 U. S. 192, 200 (1991), despite this Court's restriction of that standard's application to the tax context, see United States v. Sturman, 951 F. 2d 1466, 1476 (CA6 1991), or were referring simply to the reporting requirements as the "law" that one must know and actually applied the dominant standard from Granda, see Bank of New England, 821 F. 2d, at 854; United States v. Warren, 612 F. 2d 887, 890 (CA5 1980). This understanding is supported by Granda's statement that "the proper in- struction would include some discussion of the defendant's ignorance of the law since the defendant's alleged ignorance of the reporting require- ments goes to the heart of his or her denial of the specific intent necessary to commit the crime." 565 F. 2d, at 926 (emphasis added). 5 "Knowledge of the reporting requirements" is easily confused with "knowledge of illegality" because, in the context of the other reporting provisions-§§ 5313, 5314, and 5316-the entity that can "willfully violate" each provision is also the entity charged with the reporting duty; as a result, a violation with "knowledge of the reporting requirements" neces- sarily entails the entity's knowledge of the illegality of its conduct (that is, its failure to file a required report). In contrast, § 5324 prohibits a customer from purposefully evading a bank's reporting requirements, so knowledge of the reporting requirements does not collapse into actual knowledge that the customer's own conduct is prohibited. Under the cases interpreting the statute as well as fundamental principles of criminal law, it is one's knowledge of the reporting requirements, not "knowledge of the illegality of one's conduct," that makes a violation "willful." More- over, as explained below, Congress in 1992 rejected the majority's con- struction when it enacted a parallel antistructuring provision for attempts to evade § 5316's reporting requirements. See infra, at 161­162. 510us1$12F 06-18-97 16:59:18 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 135 (1994) 155 Blackmun, J., dissenting States, 471 U. S. 419, 426 (1985). I cannot agree, however, that the imposition of such a requirement is necessary here. First, the conduct at issue-splitting up transactions involv- ing tens of thousands of dollars in cash for the specific pur- pose of circumventing a bank's reporting duty-is hardly the sort of innocuous activity involved in cases such as Liparota, in which the defendant had been convicted of fraud for pur- chasing food stamps for less than their face value. Further, an individual convicted of structuring is, by definition, aware that cash transactions are regulated, and he cannot seriously argue that he lacked notice of the law's intrusion into the particular sphere of activity. Cf. Lambert v. California, 355 U. S. 225, 229 (1957). By requiring knowledge of a bank's reporting requirements as well as a "purpose of evading" those requirements, the antistructuring provision targets those who knowingly act to deprive the Government of infor- mation to which it is entitled. In my view, that is not so plainly innocent a purpose as to justify reading into the stat- ute the additional element of knowledge of illegality.6 In 6 The question is not whether structuring is "so obviously `evil' or inher- ently `bad' that the `willfulness' requirement is satisfied irrespective of the defendant's knowledge of the illegality of structuring." Ante, at 146. The general rule is that "willfulness" does not require knowledge of ille- gality; the inquiry under exceptional cases such as Liparota v. United States, 471 U. S. 419 (1985), is whether the statute criminalizes "a broad range of apparently innocent conduct," id., at 426, such that it requires no element of wrongfulness. The majority expresses concern about the potential application of the antistructuring law to a business operator who deposits cash twice each week to reduce the risk of an IRS audit. See ante, at 144­145. First, it is not at all clear that the statute would apply in this situation. If a person has legitimate business reasons for conducting frequent cash transactions, or if the transactions genuinely can be characterized as separate, rather than artificially structured, then the person is not engaged in "structur- ing" for the purpose of "evasion." See United States v. Brown, 954 F. 2d, at 1571; S. Rep. No. 99­433, p. 22 (1986). Even if application of § 5324 were theoretically possible in this extreme situation, the example would not establish prohibition of a "broad range of apparently innocent conduct" 510us1$12F 06-18-97 16:59:18 PAGES OPINPGT 156 RATZLAF v. UNITED STATES Blackmun, J., dissenting any event, Congress has determined that purposefully struc- turing transactions is not innocent conduct.7 In interpreting federal criminal tax statutes, this Court has defined the term "willfully" as requiring the " `voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.' " Cheek v. United States, 498 U. S., at 200, quoting United States v. Bishop, 412 U. S. 346, 360 (1973); see also United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389, 394­396 (1933). Our rule in the tax area, however, is an "exception to the traditional rule," ap- plied "largely due to the complexity of the tax laws." Cheek, 498 U. S., at 200; see also Browder v. United States, 312 U. S., at 341­342. The rule is inapplicable here, where, far from being complex, the provisions involved are perhaps among the simplest in the United States Code.8 as in Liparota, 471 U. S., at 426, and it would not justify reading into the statute a knowledge-of-illegality requirement. 7 "[The antistructuring provision] requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the purpose of the `structured' aspect of a currency exchange was to evade the reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act. It is this requirement which shields innocent conduct from prosecution." Hearing on S. 571 and S. 2306 before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 136­137 (1986) (response of Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen. Knapp and Asst. U. S. Atty. Sun to written question of Sen. D'Amato). 8 The majority offers examples of tax "avoidance" as further evidence of the apparent "innocence" of structuring transactions to evade the report- ing requirements. See ante, at 145­146. These examples are inapposite because Congress specifically has prohibited the structuring of transac- tions to evade the reporting requirements. Indeed, its use of the word "evading" in § 5324 reveals that Congress deemed the intent to circumvent those requirements a "bad purpose." Moreover, the analogy to the tax field is flawed. Tax law involves a unique scheme consisting of myriad categories and thresholds, applied in yearly segments, designed to gener- ate appropriate levels of taxation while also influencing behavior in vari- ous ways. Innocent "avoidance" is an established part of this scheme, and it does not operate to undermine the purposes of the tax law. In sharp contrast, evasion of the currency transaction reporting requirements com- pletely deprives the Government of the information that those require- ments are designed to obtain, and thus wholly undermines the purpose of the statute. 510us1$12F 06-18-97 16:59:18 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 135 (1994) 157 Blackmun, J., dissenting II Although I believe the statutory language is clear in light of our precedents, the legislative history confirms that Con- gress intended to require knowledge of (and a purpose to evade) the reporting requirements but not specific knowl- edge of the illegality of structuring.9 Before 1986, the reporting requirements included no pro- vision explicitly prohibiting the structuring of transactions to evade the reporting requirements. The Government attempted to combat purposeful evasion of the reporting re- quirements through 18 U. S. C. § 1001, which applies to any- one who "knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact" within the jurisdiction of a federal agency, and 18 U. S. C. § 2(b), which applies to anyone who "willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense" under federal law. Some Courts of Appeals upheld application of those criminal statutes where a report would have been filed but for the defendant's purposeful structuring. See, e. g., United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F. 2d 1092, 1096­1101 (CA11 1983); United States v. Heyman, 794 F. 2d 788, 790­793 (CA2), cert. denied, 479 U. S. 989 (1986). As the leading case explained, a defendant's willful- ness was established if he "knew about the currency report- ing requirements and . . . purposely sought to prevent the financial institutions from filing required reports . . . by structuring his transactions as multiple smaller transactions under $10,000." Tobon-Builes, 706 F. 2d, at 1101. Other courts rejected imposition of criminal liability for structuring under §§ 1001 and 2(b), concluding either that the 9 Because the statutory language unambiguously imposes no require- ment of knowledge of the illegality of structuring, I would not apply the rule of lenity. Moreover, I am not persuaded that that rule should be applied to defeat a congressional purpose that is as clear as that evidenced here. See Liparota, 471 U. S., at 427; United States v. Bramblett, 348 U. S. 503, 509­510 (1955). 510us1$12F 06-18-97 16:59:18 PAGES OPINPGT 158 RATZLAF v. UNITED STATES Blackmun, J., dissenting law did not impose a duty not to structure or that criminal liability was confined to limited forms of structuring. See, e. g., United States v. Varbel, 780 F. 2d 758, 760­763 (CA9 1986); United States v. Denemark, 779 F. 2d 1559, 1561­1564 (CA11 1986); United States v. Anzalone, 766 F. 2d 676, 679­ 683 (CA1 1985). Congress enacted the antistructuring provision in 1986 "to fill a loophole in the Bank Secrecy Act caused by" the latter three decisions, which "refused to apply the sanctions of [the Act] to transactions `structured' to evade the act's $10,000 cash reporting requirement." S. Rep. No. 99­433, p. 7 (1986). As explained by the Report of the Senate Judi- ciary Committee: "[The antistructuring provision] would codify Tobon- Builes and like cases and would negate the effect of Anzalone, Varbel and Denemark. It would expressly subject to potential liability a person who causes or at- tempts to cause a financial institution to fail to file a required report or who causes a financial institution to file a required report that contains material omissions or misstatements of fact. In addition, the proposed amendment would create the offense of structuring a transaction to evade the reporting requirements, with- out regard to whether an individual transaction is, itself, reportable under the Bank Secrecy Act." Id., at 22. See also H. R. Rep. No. 99­746, pp. 18­19, and n. 1 (1986). Congress' stated purpose to "codify Tobon-Builes" reveals its intent to incorporate Tobon-Builes' standard for a willful violation, which required knowledge of the reporting re- quirements and a purpose to evade them. Nothing in Tobon-Builes suggests that knowledge of the illegality of one's conduct is required.10 10 Contrary to the majority's suggestion, ante, at 147­148, n. 17, Con- gress did sanction Tobon-Builes' scienter standard. In that case, which Congress intended to "codify," the Eleventh Circuit clearly addressed the 510us1$12F 06-18-97 16:59:18 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 135 (1994) 159 Blackmun, J., dissenting The Senate Report proceeds to explain the intent required under the antistructuring provision: "For example, a person who converts $18,000 in currency to cashier's checks by purchasing two $9,000 cashier's checks at two different banks or on two different days level of knowledge required for a willful violation. See United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F. 2d 1092, 1101 (CA11 1983). Moreover, Congress was aware of the standard that the court had adopted, explicitly characterizing Tobon-Builes as imposing criminal liability upon individuals who structure transactions "to evade the reporting requirements." S. Rep. No. 99­433, at 21. The majority misreads the Senate Report as stating that § 5324 cre- ates the structuring offense " `[i]n addition' to codifying Tobon-Builes." Ante, at 148, n. 17. The phrase "in addition" plainly refers to the previous sentence in the Report, which states that § 5324 "would expressly subject to potential liability a person who causes or attempts to cause a financial institution to fail to file a required report or who causes a financial institu- tion to file a required report that contains material omissions or misstate- ments of fact." S. Rep. No. 99­433, at 22. The "codification" of Tobon- Builes encompasses both sentences, and thus all three subsections of the original § 5324. In any event, there is no doubt that the Report's refer- ence to "codifying Tobon-Builes" is a reference to the creation of the anti- structuring offense, particularly given that Tobon-Builes expressly im- posed criminal liability for "structuring" transactions. 706 F. 2d, at 1101. Even more direct evidence of Congress' intent to incorporate the Tobon-Builes scienter standard is found in the response to a question from Senator D'Amato, the Senate sponsor of the antistructuring provision. He asked Deputy Assistant Attorney General Knapp and Assistant United States Attorney Sun: "Assuming that [the antistructuring] provision had been on the books, could you have demonstrated a willful violation in the Anzalone, Varbel and Denemark cases?" The written response stated: "Assuming that the terms of [the antistructuring provision] were in effect at the time of the conduct described in Anzalone, Varbel, and Denemark, the result would, or should have been markedly different. Statements from defendants in those cases indicated that the structuring conduct was purposely undertaken to evade the reporting requirements of Title 31. As this is expressly what is prohibited under [the antistructuring provi- sion], a willful violation . . . would have been demonstrated." Hearing on S. 571 and S. 2306 before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 141­142. 510us1$12F 06-18-97 16:59:18 PAGES OPINPGT 160 RATZLAF v. UNITED STATES Blackmun, J., dissenting with the specific intent that the participating bank or banks not be required to file Currency Transaction Re- ports for those transactions, would be subject to poten- tial civil and criminal liability. A person conducting the same transactions for any other reasons or a person splitting up an amount of currency that would not be reportable if the full amount were involved in a single transaction (for example, splitting $2,000 in currency into four transactions of $500 each), would not be subject to liability under the proposed amendment." S. Rep. No. 99­433, at 22 (emphasis added). The Committee's specification of the requisite intent as only the intent to prevent a bank from filing reports confirms that Congress did not contemplate a departure from the general rule that knowledge of illegality is not an essential element of a criminal offense. A recent amendment to § 5324 further supports the inter- pretation of the court below. In 1992, Congress enacted the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act, creating a par- allel antistructuring provision for the reporting require- ments under 31 U. S. C. § 5316, which governs international monetary transportation. See Pub. L. 102­550, Tit. XV, § 1525(a), 106 Stat. 4064.11 Like the provision at issue here, the new provision prohibits structuring "for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements" (in that case, the re- quirements of § 5316). At the time Congress amended the statute, every Court of Appeals to consider the issue had held that a willful violation of the antistructuring provision requires knowledge of the bank's reporting requirements and an intent to evade them; none had held that knowledge of the illegality of structuring was required. See n. 3, supra. 11 The new law moved the antistructuring provision at issue here into a new subsection (a) of § 5324 and created subsection (b) for the new antistructuring provision. 510us1$12F 06-18-97 16:59:18 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 135 (1994) 161 Blackmun, J., dissenting The House Report accompanying an earlier bill containing the pertinent provision explained: "Under the new provision, codified as subsection (b) of section 5324, it would be illegal to structure the im- portation or exportation of monetary instruments with the intent to evade the . . . reporting requirement. As is the case presently for structuring cases involving cur- rency transaction reports, the government would have to prove that the defendant knew of the . . . reporting requirement, but would not have to prove that the defendant knew that structuring itself had been made illegal. United States v. Hoyland, 903 F. 2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1990)." H. R. Rep. No. 102­28, pt. 1, p. 45 (1991) (emphasis added).12 The 1992 amendment's replication of the original antistruc- turing provision's language strongly suggests that Congress intended to preserve the then-uniform interpretation of the scienter requirement of § 5324. See Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U. S. 200, 212­213 (1993). At the very least, then, today's decision poses a dilemma for any attempt to reconcile the two parallel antistructuring provisions now codified in § 5324: Courts must either ignore clear evidence of legislative intent as to the newly added antistructuring provision or interpret its identical language differently from the antistructuring provision at issue in this case. Finally, it cannot be ignored that the majority's interpreta- tion of § 5324 as a practical matter largely nullifies the effect of that provision. In codifying the currency transaction reporting requirements in 1970, "Congress recognized the importance of reports of large and unusual currency trans- actions in ferreting out criminal activity." California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21, 38 (1974). Congress enacted the antistructuring law to close what it perceived as 12 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied on Hoyland in affirming the conviction in this case. 510us1$12F 06-18-97 16:59:18 PAGES OPINPGT 162 RATZLAF v. UNITED STATES Blackmun, J., dissenting a major loophole in the federal reporting scheme due to easy circumvention.13 Because requiring proof of actual knowl- edge of illegality will make prosecution for structuring diffi- cult or impossible in most cases,14 the Court's decision re- opens the loophole that Congress tried to close. III The petitioner in this case was informed by casino officials that a transaction involving more than $10,000 in cash must be reported, was informed by the various banks he visited that banks are required to report cash transactions in excess of $10,000, and then purchased $76,000 in cashier's checks, each for less than $10,000 and each from a different bank. Petitioner Ratzlaf, obviously not a person of limited intelli- gence, was anything but uncomprehending as he traveled from bank to bank converting his bag of cash to cashier's checks in $9,500 bundles. I am convinced that his actions constituted a "willful" violation of the antistructuring provi- sion embodied in 31 U. S. C. § 5324. As a result of today's decision, Waldemar Ratzlaf-to use an old phrase-will be "laughing all the way to the bank." The majority's interpretation of the antistructuring provi- sion is at odds with the statutory text, the intent of Con- gress, and the fundamental principle that knowledge of ille- gality is not required for a criminal act. Now Congress must try again to fill a hole it rightly felt it had filled before. I dissent. 13 See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 99­433, at 2­3, 7. 14 See Welling, Smurfs, Money Laundering, and the Federal Criminal Law: The Crime of Structuring Transactions, 41 Fla. L. Rev. 287, 320 (1989). 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1993 163 Syllabus WEISS v. UNITED STATES certiorari to the united states court of military appeals No. 92­1482. Argued November 3, 1993-Decided January 19, 1994* After courts-martial sentenced petitioners Weiss and Hernandez, United States Marines, on their pleas of guilty to offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), their convictions were affirmed by the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review in separate appeals. In affirming Weiss' conviction, the Court of Military Appeals rejected his contentions, first, that military trial and appellate judges have no au- thority to convict because the method of their appointment by the vari- ous Judge Advocates General under the UCMJ violates the Appoint- ments Clause, U. S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and, second, that such judges' lack of a fixed term of office violates the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Based on this decision, the court summarily affirmed Hernandez' conviction. Held:1. The current method of appointing military judges does not violate the Appointments Clause, which, inter alia, requires the President to appoint "Officers of the United States" with the advice and consent of the Senate. All of the military judges involved in these cases were already commissioned military officers when they were assigned to serve as judges, and thus they had already been appointed pursuant to the Clause. The position of military judge is not so different from other positions to which an officer may be assigned that Congress has by im- plication required a second appointment under the Clause before the officer may discharge judicial duties. The fact that the UCMJ requires military judges to possess certain qualifications, including membership in a state or federal bar, does not in itself indicate a congressional intent to create a separate office, since special qualifications are needed to fill a host of military positions. Moreover, the UCMJ's explicit and exclusive treatment of military judges as officers who must be "detailed" or "as- signed" by a superior officer is quite different from Congress' treatment of a number of top-level positions in the military hierarchy, such as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for which a second appointment under the Clause is expressly required. Nor does the Clause by its own *Together with Hernandez v. United States, also on certiorari to the same court (see this Court's Rule 12.2). 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT 164 WEISS v. UNITED STATES Syllabus force require a second appointment. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, and subsequent decisions simply do not speak to this question. The present case is also distinguishable from Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S. 282. Even assuming, arguendo, that the "germaneness" principle set forth in Shoemaker, id., at 300­301, applies to the present situation, no second appointment is necessary because the role of military judge is "germane" to that of military officer: By contrast to civilian society, non- judicial military officers play a significant part in the administration of military justice; and, by the same token, the position of military judge is less distinct from other military positions than the office of full-time civilian judge is from other offices in civilian society. Pp. 169­176. 2. The lack of a fixed term of office for military judges does not violate the Due Process Clause. Neither Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, nor Medina v. California, 505 U. S. 437, provides a due process analysis that is appropriate to the military context, in which judicial deference to Congress' determinations is at its apogee. Rather, the appropriate standard is that found in Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U. S. 25, 44: whether the factors militating in favor of fixed terms are so extraordinarily weighty as to overcome the balance struck by Congress. The historical fact that military judges in the Anglo-American system have never had tenure is a factor that must be weighed in this calculation. Moreover, the applicable provisions of the UCMJ, and corresponding regulations, sufficiently insulate military judges from the effects of command influ- ence. Thus, since neither history nor current practice supports peti- tioners' assumption that a military judge who does not have a fixed term lacks the independence necessary to ensure impartiality, petitioners have fallen far short of satisfying the applicable standard. Pp. 176­181. 36 M. J. 224 and 37 M. J. 252, affirmed. Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Black- mun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, and in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined as to Parts I and II­A. Souter, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 182. Ginsburg, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 194. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 195. Alan B. Morrison argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Philip D. Cave, Dwight H. Sullivan, Eugene R. Fidell, and Ronald W. Meister. Solicitor General Days argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Assistant At- 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 163 (1994) 165 Opinion of the Court torney General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor General Bryson, Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Thomas E. Booth, Theodore G. Hess, and Albert Diaz. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. We must decide in these cases whether the current method of appointing military judges violates the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, and whether the lack of a fixed term of office for military judges violates the Fifth Amend- ment's Due Process Clause. We conclude that neither con- stitutional provision is violated. Petitioner Weiss, a United States Marine, pleaded guilty at a special court-martial to one count of larceny, in violation of Article 121 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ or Code), 10 U. S. C. § 921. He was sentenced to three months of confinement, partial forfeiture of pay, and a bad-conduct discharge. Petitioner Hernandez, also a Ma- rine, pleaded guilty to the possession, importation, and dis- tribution of cocaine, in violation of Article 112a, UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 912a, and conspiracy, in violation of Article 81, UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 881. He was sentenced to 25 years of confinement, forfeiture of all pay, a reduction in rank, and a dishonorable discharge. The convening authority reduced Hernandez' sentence to 20 years of confinement. The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review, in sep- arate appeals, affirmed petitioners' convictions. The Court of Military Appeals granted plenary review in petitioner Weiss' case to address his contention that the judges in his case had no authority to convict him because their appoint- ments violated the Appointments Clause, and their lack of a Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by David B. Isbell, John Vanderstar, David H. Resnicoff, Steven R. Shapiro, and Arthur B. Spitzer; and for the United States Air Force Appellate Defense Division by Robert I. Smith, Jay L. Cohen, and Frank J. Spinner. 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT 166 WEISS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court fixed term of office violated the Due Process Clause. Rely- ing on its recent decision in United States v. Graf, 35 M. J. 450 (1992), cert. pending, No. 92­1102, in which the court unanimously held that due process does not require military judges to have a fixed term of office, the court rejected Weiss' due process argument. 36 M. J. 224, 235, n. 1 (1992). In a splintered decision, the court also rejected petitioner's Appointments Clause challenge. Two of the five judges concluded that the initial appoint- ment of military trial and appellate judges as commissioned officers is sufficient to satisfy the Appointments Clause. Id., at 225­234 (plurality opinion). A separate appointment be- fore taking on the duties of a military judge is unnecessary, according to the plurality, in part because the duties of a judge in the military justice system are germane to the duties that military officers already discharge. Ibid. One judge concurred in the result only, concluding that the Ap- pointments Clause does not apply to the military. Id., at 234­240 (opinion of Crawford, J.). The other two judges dissented separately. Both stressed the significant changes brought about by the Military Justice Act of 1968, particu- larly the duties added to the newly created office of military judge, and both concluded that the duties of a military judge are sufficiently distinct from the other duties performed by military officers to require a second appointment. See id., at 240­256 (Sullivan, C. J., dissenting), and id., at 256­263 (Wiss, J., dissenting). The Court of Military Appeals accordingly affirmed peti- tioner Weiss' conviction. Based on its decision in Weiss, the court, in an unpublished opinion, also affirmed petitioner Hernandez' conviction. Judgt. order reported at 37 M. J. 252 (1993). Weiss and Hernandez then jointly petitioned for our review, and we granted certiorari. 508 U. S. 939 (1993). It will help in understanding the issues involved to review briefly the contours of the military justice system and the role of military judges within that system. Pursuant to Ar- 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 163 (1994) 167 Opinion of the Court ticle I of the Constitution, Congress has established three tiers of military courts. See U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 14. At the trial level are the courts-martial, of which there are three types: summary, special, and general. The summary court-martial adjudicates only minor offenses, has jurisdic- tion only over servicemembers, and can be conducted only with their consent. It is presided over by a single commis- sioned officer who can impose up to one month of confinement and other relatively modest punishments. Arts. 16(3), 20, UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. §§ 816(3), 820. The special court-martial usually consists of a military judge and three court-martial members,1 although the Code allows the members to sit without a judge, or the accused to elect to be tried by the judge alone. Art. 16(2), UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 816(2). A special court-martial has jurisdiction over most offenses under the UCMJ, but it may impose pun- ishment no greater than six months of confinement, three months of hard labor without confinement, a bad-conduct dis- charge, partial and temporary forfeiture of pay, and a reduc- tion in grade. Art. 19, UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 819. The gen- eral court-martial consists of either a military judge and at least five members, or the judge alone if the accused so re- quests. Art. 16(1), UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 816(1). A general court-martial has jurisdiction over all offenses under the UCMJ and may impose any lawful sentence, including death. Art. 18, UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 818. The military judge, a position that has officially existed only since passage of the Military Justice Act of 1968, acts as presiding officer at a special or general court-martial. Art. 26, UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 826. The judge rules on all legal questions, and instructs court-martial members regard- ing the law and procedures to be followed. Art. 51, UCMJ, 1 Court-martial members may be officers or enlisted personnel, depend- ing on the military status of the accused; the members' responsibilities are analogous to, but somewhat greater than, those of civilian jurors. See Art. 25, UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 825. 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT 168 WEISS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court 10 U. S. C. § 851. The members decide guilt or innocence and impose sentence unless, of course, the trial is before the judge alone. Ibid. No sentence imposed becomes final until it is approved by the officer who convened the court- martial. Art. 60, UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 860. Military trial judges must be commissioned officers of the Armed Forces 2 and members of the bar of a federal court or a State's highest court. Art. 26, UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 826. The judges are selected and certified as qualified by the Judge Advocate General of their branch of the Armed Forces.3 They do not serve for fixed terms and may per- form judicial duties only when assigned to do so by the appropriate Judge Advocate General. While serving as judges, officers may also, with the approval of the Judge Advocate General, perform other tasks unrelated to their judicial duties. Ibid. There are approximately 74 judges currently certified to preside at general and special courts- martial. An additional 25 are certified to preside only over special courts-martial. At the next tier are the four Courts of Military Review, one each for the Army, Air Force, Coast Guard, and Navy- Marine Corps. These courts, which usually sit in three- judge panels, review all cases in which the sentence imposed is for one or more years of confinement, involves the dis- missal of a commissioned officer, or involves the punitive dis- charge of an enlisted servicemember. Art. 66, UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 866. The courts may review de novo both factual and legal findings, and they may overturn convictions and sentences. Ibid. 2 All commissioned officers are appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. 10 U. S. C. § 531. 3 The Judge Advocate General for each service is the principal legal offi- cer for that service. See 10 U. S. C. § 3037 (Army), § 5148 (Navy-Marine Corps), § 8037 (Air Force); Art. 1(1), UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 801(1) (Coast Guard). 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 163 (1994) 169 Opinion of the Court Appellate judges may be commissioned officers or civil- ians, but each must be a member of a bar of a federal court or of a State's highest court. Ibid. The judges are selected and assigned to serve by the appropriate Judge Advocate General. Ibid. Like military trial judges, appellate judges do not serve for a fixed term. There are presently 31 appel- late military judges. Atop the system is the Court of Military Appeals, which consists of five civilian judges who are appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for fixed terms of 15 years. Arts. 67, 142, UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. §§ 867, 942 (1988 ed., Supp. IV). The appointment and ten- ure of these judges are not at issue here. I The Appointments Clause of Article II of the Constitution reads as follows: "[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambas- sadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the Presi- dent alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." U. S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. We begin our analysis on common ground. The parties do not dispute that military judges, because of the authority and responsibilities they possess, act as "Officers" of the United States. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868 (1991) (concluding special trial judges of Tax Court are officers); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 126 (1976) ("[A]ny appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an `Officer of the United States,' and must, 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT 170 WEISS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by [the Ap- pointments Clause]"). The parties are also in agreement, and rightly so, that the Appointments Clause applies to mili- tary officers. As we said in Buckley, "all officers of the United States are to be appointed in accordance with the Clause. . . . No class or type of officer is excluded because of its special functions." Id., at 132 (emphasis in original). It follows that those serving as military judges must be appointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause. All of the military judges involved in these cases, however, were al- ready commissioned officers when they were assigned to serve as judges,4 and thus they had already been appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.5 The question we must answer, therefore, is whether these officers needed another appointment pursuant to the Ap- pointments Clause before assuming their judicial duties. Petitioners contend that the position of military judge is so different from other positions to which an officer may be as- signed that either Congress has, by implication, required a second appointment, or the Appointments Clause, by consti- tutional command, requires one. We reject both of these arguments. Petitioners' argument that Congress by implication has re- quired a separate appointment is based in part on the fact that military judges must possess certain qualifications, in- 4 The constitutionality of the provision allowing civilians to be assigned to Courts of Military Review, without being appointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause, obviously presents a quite different question. See Art. 66(a), UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 866(a). It is not at issue here. 5 Although the record before us does not contain complete information regarding the military careers of the judges involved in these cases, it is quite possible that they had been appointed more than once before being detailed or assigned to serve as military judges. This is because 10 U. S. C. § 624 requires a new appointment by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, each time a commissioned officer is promoted to a higher grade-e. g., if a captain is promoted to major, he must receive another appointment. 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 163 (1994) 171 Opinion of the Court cluding membership in a state or federal bar. But such spe- cial qualifications in themselves do not, we believe, indicate a congressional intent to create a separate office. Special qualifications are needed to perform a host of military du- ties; yet no one could seriously contend that the positions of military lawyer or pilot, for example, are distinct offices because officers performing those duties must possess additional qualifications. Petitioners' argument also ignores the fact that Congress has not hesitated to expressly require the separate appoint- ment of military officers to certain positions. An additional appointment by the President and confirmation by the Sen- ate is required for a number of top-level positions in the mili- tary hierarchy, including: the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 U. S. C. §§ 152, 154; the Chief and Vice Chief of Naval Operations, §§ 5033, 5035; the Com- mandant and Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, §§ 5043, 5044; the Surgeons General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, §§ 3036, 5137, 8036; the Chief of Naval Personnel, § 5141; the Chief of Chaplains, § 5142; and the Judge Advo- cates General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, §§ 3037, 5148, 8037. With respect to other positions, however, Congress has spoken quite differently. The Deputy and Assistant Chiefs of Staff for the Army, for example, are "general officers de- tailed to these positions." § 3035 (emphasis added). The Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps and his assistants are "detailed" to those positions by the Secretary of the Navy. § 5045. Commissioned officers "may be detailed for duty" with the American Red Cross by the appropriate military Secretary. § 711a. Secretaries of military departments "may assign or detail members of the armed forces" to be inspectors of buildings owned or occupied abroad by the United States. § 713. The Secretary of the Navy "may as- sign" enlisted members of the Navy to serve as custodians of foreign embassies and consulates. § 5983. And the Pres- 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT 172 WEISS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court ident may "detail" officers of the Navy to serve as superin- tendents or instructors at nautical schools. This contrasting treatment indicates rather clearly that Congress repeatedly and consistently distinguished between an office that would require a separate appointment and a position or duty to which one could be "assigned" or "detailed" by a superior officer. The sections of the UCMJ relating to military judges speak explicitly and exclusively in terms of "detail" or "as- sign"; nowhere in these sections is mention made of a sepa- rate appointment. Section 826(a) provides that a military judge shall be "detail[ed]" to each general court-martial, and may be "detail[ed]" to any special court-martial. The mili- tary judge of a general court-martial must be designated by the Judge Advocate General, or his designee, § 826(c), but the appropriate Service Secretary prescribes by regulation the manner in which military judges are detailed for special courts-martial, and what persons are authorized to so detail them. Section 866, in turn, provides that military appellate judges shall be "assigned to a Court of Military Review." The appropriate Judge Advocate General designates a chief judge for each Court of Military Review, and the chief judge determines "on which panels of the court the appellate judges assigned to the court will serve and which military judge assigned to the court will act as the senior judge on each panel." Ibid. (emphasis added). Congress' treatment of military judges is thus quite differ- ent from its treatment of those offices, such as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for which it wished to require a second appointment before already-commissioned officers could occupy them. This difference negates any permissible inference that Congress intended that military judges should receive a second appointment, but in a fit of absentminded- ness forgot to say so. Petitioners' alternative contention is that even if Congress did not intend to require a separate appointment for a mili- 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 163 (1994) 173 Opinion of the Court tary judge, the Appointments Clause requires such an ap- pointment by its own force. They urge upon us in support of this contention our decisions in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868 (1991), and Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654 (1988). These decisions undoubtedly establish the analytical framework upon which to base the conclusion that a military judge is an "officer of the United States"-a proposition to which both parties agree. But the decisions simply do not speak to the issue of whether, and when, the Appointments Clause may require a second appointment. The lead and dissenting opinions in the Court of Military Appeals devoted considerable attention to, and the parties before us have extensively briefed, the significance of our opinion in Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S. 282 (1893). There Congress had enacted a statute establishing a commis- sion to supervise the development of Rock Creek Park in the District of Columbia. Three of the members were ap- pointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, but the remaining two members were the Chief of Engineers of the Army and the Engineer Commissioner of the District of Columbia. Both of the latter were already commissioned as military officers, but it was contended that the Appointments Clause required that they again be ap- pointed to their new positions. The Court rejected the argument, saying: "[T]he argument is, that while Congress may create an office, it cannot appoint the officer; that the officer can only be appointed by the President with the approval of the Senate. . . . As, however, the two persons whose eligibility is questioned were at the time of the passage of the act . . . officers of the United States who had been theretofore appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, we do not think that, because additional duties, germane to the offices already held by them, were devolved upon them by the act, it was necessary 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT 174 WEISS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court that they should be again appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. It cannot be doubted, and it has frequently been the case, that Congress may in- crease the power and duties of an existing office without thereby rendering it necessary that the incumbent should be again nominated and appointed." Id., at 300­301. The present cases before us differ from Shoemaker in sev- eral respects, at least one of which is significant for purposes of Appointments Clause analysis. In Shoemaker, Congress assigned new duties to two existing offices, each of which was held by a single officer. This no doubt prompted the Court's description of the argument as being that "while Congress may create an office, it cannot appoint the officer." By looking to whether the additional duties assigned to the offices were "germane," the Court sought to ensure that Congress was not circumventing the Appointments Clause by unilaterally appointing an incumbent to a new and dis- tinct office. But here the statute authorized an indefinite number of military judges, who could be designated from among hundreds or perhaps thousands of qualified commis- sioned officers. In short, there is no ground for suspicion here that Congress was trying to both create an office and also select a particular individual to fill the office. Nor has Congress effected a "diffusion of the appointment power," about which this Court expressed concern in Freytag, supra, at 878. Even if we assume, arguendo, that the principle of "ger- maneness" applies to the present situation, we think that principle is satisfied here. By enacting the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950, and through subsequent statutory changes, Congress has gradually changed the system of mili- tary justice so that it has come to more closely resemble the civilian system. But the military in important respects re- mains a "specialized society separate from civilian society," Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 743 (1974). Although military 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 163 (1994) 175 Opinion of the Court judges obviously perform certain unique and important func- tions, all military officers, consistent with a long tradition, play a role in the operation of the military justice system. Commissioned officers, for example, have the power and duty to "quell quarrels, frays, and disorders among persons subject to [the UCMJ] and to apprehend persons subject to [the UCMJ] who take part therein." Art. 7(c), UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 807(c). Commanding officers can impose nonjudi- cial disciplinary punishment for minor offenses, without the intervention of a court-martial, which includes correctional custody, forfeiture of pay, reduction in grade, extra duties, restriction to certain limits, and detention of pay. Art. 15, UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 815. A commissioned officer may serve as a summary court-martial or a member of a special or general court-martial. When acting as a summary court- martial or as the president of a special court-martial without a military judge, this officer conducts the proceedings and resolves all issues that would be handled by the military judge, except for challenge for cause against the president of a special court-martial without a military judge. Art. 51, UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 851. Convening authorities, finally, have the authority to review and modify the sentence im- posed by courts-martial. Art. 60, UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 860. Thus, by contrast to civilian society, nonjudicial military officers play a significant part in the administration of military justice. By the same token, the position of military judge is less distinct from other military positions than the office of full- time civilian judge is from other offices in civilian society. As the lead opinion in the Court of Military Appeals noted, military judges do not have any "inherent judicial authority separate from a court-martial to which they have been de- tailed. When they act, they do so as a court-martial, not as a military judge. Until detailed to a specific court-martial, they have no more authority than any other military officer of the same grade and rank." 36 M. J., at 228. Military 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT 176 WEISS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court appellate judges similarly exercise judicial functions only when they are "assigned" to a Court of Military Review. Neither military trial nor appellate judges, moreover, have a fixed term of office. Commissioned officers are assigned or detailed to the position of military judge by a Judge Advo- cate General for a period of time he deems necessary or ap- propriate, and then they may be reassigned to perform other duties. Even while serving as military trial judges, officers may perform, with the permission of the Judge Advocate General, duties unrelated to their judicial responsibilities. Art. 26(c), UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 826(c). Whatever might be the case in civilian society, we think that the role of military judge is "germane" to that of military officer. In sum, we believe that the current scheme satisfies the Appointments Clause. It is quite clear that Congress has not required a separate appointment to the position of mili- tary judge, and we believe it equally clear that the Appoint- ments Clause by its own force does not require a second ap- pointment before military officers may discharge the duties of such a judge. II Petitioners next contend that the Due Process Clause re- quires that military judges must have a fixed term of office. Petitioners recognize, as they must, that the Constitution does not require life tenure for Article I judges, including military judges. See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11, 17 (1955). Nor does the trial by an Article I judge lacking life tenure violate an accused's due process rights. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U. S. 389, 410 (1973). Petitioners thus confine their argument to the asser- tion that due process requires military judges to serve for some fixed length of time-however short. Congress, of course, is subject to the requirements of the Due Process Clause when legislating in the area of military affairs, and that Clause provides some measure of protection to defendants in military proceedings. See Rostker v. Gold- 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 163 (1994) 177 Opinion of the Court berg, 453 U. S. 57, 67 (1981); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U. S. 25, 43 (1976). But in determining what process is due, courts "must give particular deference to the determination of Congress, made under its authority to regulate the land and naval forces, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8." Ibid. Petition- ers urge that we apply the due process analysis established in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 334­335 (1976). The Government contends that Medina v. California, 505 U. S. 437 (1992), supplies the appropriate analytical framework. Neither Mathews nor Medina, however, arose in the mili- tary context, and we have recognized in past cases that "the tests and limitations [of due process] may differ because of the military context." Rostker, supra, at 67. The differ- ence arises from the fact that the Constitution contemplates that Congress has "plenary control over rights, duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the Military Establish- ment, including regulations, procedures, and remedies re- lated to military discipline." Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296, 301 (1983). Judicial deference thus "is at its apogee" when reviewing congressional decisionmaking in this area. Rostker, supra, at 70. Our deference extends to rules relat- ing to the rights of servicemembers: "Congress has primary responsibility for the delicate task of balancing the rights of servicemen against the needs of the military. . . . [W]e have adhered to this principle of deference in a variety of contexts where, as here, the constitutional rights of servicemen were implicated." Solorio v. United States, 483 U. S. 435, 447­ 448 (1987). We therefore believe that the appropriate standard to apply in these cases is found in Middendorf, supra, where we also faced a due process challenge to a facet of the mili- tary justice system. In determining whether the Due Proc- ess Clause requires that servicemembers appearing before a summary court-martial be assisted by counsel, we asked "whether the factors militating in favor of counsel at sum- mary courts-martial are so extraordinarily weighty as to 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT 178 WEISS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court overcome the balance struck by Congress." 425 U. S., at 44. We ask the same question here with respect to fixed terms of office for military judges. It is elementary that "a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process." In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 136 (1955). A necessary component of a fair trial is an impartial judge. See ibid.; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 532 (1927). Petitioners, however, do not allege that the judges in their cases were or appeared to be biased. In- stead, they ask us to assume that a military judge who does not have a fixed term of office lacks the independence neces- sary to ensure impartiality. Neither history nor current practice, however, supports such an assumption. A Although a fixed term of office is a traditional component of the Anglo-American civilian judicial system, it has never been a part of the military justice tradition. The early Eng- lish military tribunals, which served as the model for our own military justice system, were historically convened and presided over by a military general. No tenured military judge presided. See Schlueter, The Court-Martial: An His- torical Survey, 87 Mil. L. Rev. 129, 135, 136­144 (1980). In the United States, although Congress has on numerous occasions during our history revised the procedures govern- ing courts-martial, it has never required tenured judges to preside over courts-martial or to hear immediate appeals therefrom.6 See W. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 6 Congress did create a nine-member commission in 1983 to examine, inter alia, the possibility of providing tenure for military judges. Mili- tary Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. 98­209, § 9(b), 97 Stat. 1393, 1404­1405 (1983). The commission published its report a year later, in which it rec- ommended against providing a guaranteed term of office for military trial and appellate judges. See D. Schlueter, Military Criminal Justice: Prac- tice and Procedure 33­34, and nn. 86, 87 (3d ed. 1992) (listing members of commission and describing report). Congress has taken no further action on the subject. 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 163 (1994) 179 Opinion of the Court 21­24, 953­1000 (2d ed. 1920) (describing and reprinting the Articles of War, which governed court-martial proceedings during the 17th and 18th centuries); F. Gilligan & F. Lederer, 1 Court-Martial Procedure 11­24 (1991) (describing 20th- century revisions to Articles of War, and enactment of and amendments to UCMJ). Indeed, as already mentioned, Congress did not even create the position of military judge until 1968. Courts-martial thus have been conducted in this country for over 200 years without the presence of a tenured judge, and for over 150 years without the presence of any judge at all. B As the Court of Military Appeals observed in Graf, 35 M. J., at 462, the historical maintenance of the military jus- tice system without tenured judges "suggests the absence of a fundamental fairness problem." Petitioners in effect urge us to disregard this history, but we are unwilling to do so. We do not mean to say that any practice in military courts which might have been accepted at some time in history au- tomatically satisfies due process of law today. But as Con- gress has taken affirmative steps to make the system of military justice more like the American system of civilian justice, it has nonetheless chosen not to give tenure to mili- tary judges. The question under the Due Process Clause is whether the existence of such tenure is such an extraordi- narily weighty factor as to overcome the balance struck by Congress. And the historical fact that military judges have never had tenure is a factor that must be weighed in this calculation. A fixed term of office, as petitioners recognize, is not an end in itself. It is a means of promoting judicial independ- ence, which in turn helps to ensure judicial impartiality. We believe the applicable provisions of the UCMJ, and corre- sponding regulations, by insulating military judges from the effects of command influence, sufficiently preserve judicial impartiality so as to satisfy the Due Process Clause. 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT 180 WEISS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court Article 26 places military judges under the authority of the appropriate Judge Advocate General rather than under the authority of the convening officer. 10 U. S. C. § 826. Rather than exacerbating the alleged problems relating to judicial independence, as petitioners suggest, we believe this structure helps protect that independence. Like all military officers, Congress made military judges accountable to a su- perior officer for the performance of their duties. By plac- ing judges under the control of Judge Advocates General, who have no interest in the outcome of a particular court- martial, we believe Congress has achieved an acceptable bal- ance between independence and accountability. Article 26 also protects against unlawful command in- fluence by precluding a convening authority or any com- manding officer from preparing or reviewing any report concerning the effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency of a mili- tary judge relating to his judicial duties. Ibid. Article 37 prohibits convening authorities from censuring, reprimand- ing, or admonishing a military judge "with respect to the findings or sentence adjudged by the court, or with respect to any other exercise of its or his functions in the conduct of the proceeding." 10 U. S. C. § 837. Any officer who "know- ingly and intentionally fails to enforce or comply" with Arti- cle 37 "shall be punished as a court-martial may direct." Art. 98, UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 898. The Code also provides that a military judge, either trial or appellate, must refrain from adjudicating a case in which he has previously partici- pated, Arts. 26(c), 66(h), UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. §§ 826(c), 866(h), and the Code allows the accused to challenge both a court- martial member and a court-martial judge for cause, Art. 41, UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 841. The Code also allows the accused to learn the identity of the military judge before choosing whether to be tried by the judge alone, or by the judge and court-martial members. Art. 16, UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 816. 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 163 (1994) 181 Opinion of the Court The entire system, finally, is overseen by the Court of Mili- tary Appeals, which is composed entirely of civilian judges who serve for fixed terms of 15 years. That court has dem- onstrated its vigilance in checking any attempts to exert im- proper influence over military judges. In United States v. Mabe, 33 M. J. 200 (1991), for example, the court considered whether the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, or his des- ignee, could rate a military judge based on the appropriate- ness of the judge's sentences at courts-martial. As the court later described: "We held [in Mabe] that the existence of such a power in these military officers was inconsistent with Congress' establishment of the military `judge' in Arti- cle 26 and its exercise violated Article 37 of the Code." Graf, 35 M. J., at 465. And in Graf, the court held that it would also violate Articles 26 and 37 if a Judge Advocate General decertified or transferred a military judge based on the General's opinion of the appropriateness of the judge's findings and sentences. Ibid.7 The absence of tenure as a historical matter in the system of military justice, and the number of safeguards in place to ensure impartiality, lead us to reject petitioners' due process challenge. Petitioners have fallen far short of demonstrat- ing that the factors favoring fixed terms of office are so ex- traordinarily weighty as to overcome the balance achieved by Congress. See Middendorf, 425 U. S., at 44. For the reasons stated, we reject the petitioners' Appoint- ments Clause and Due Process Clause attacks on the judges who convicted them and those who heard their appeals. The judgments of the Court of Military Appeals are accordingly Affirmed. 7 This added limitation on the power of the Judge Advocates General to remove military judges refutes petitioners' contention that Judge Ad- vocates General have unfettered discretion both to appoint and remove military judges. 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT 182 WEISS v. UNITED STATES Souter, J., concurring Justice Souter, concurring. I join the Court's opinion on the understanding that mili- tary judges, like ordinary commissioned military officers, are "inferior officers" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause. Because these cases would raise a far more difficult constitutional question than the one the Court today decides if, as petitioners argue, military judges were "principal offi- cers," I write separately to explain why I conclude that they are not. I Under the Appointments Clause, the President "shall nom- inate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint" all "Officers of the United States" (or "princi- pal officers," as we have called them, see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 670 (1988); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 132 (1976)). Art. II, § 2. "[B]ut the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." Ibid. Military officers performing ordinary military duties are inferior officers, and none of the parties to this case contends otherwise. Though military officers are appointed in the manner of principal officers, no analysis permits the conclu- sion that each of the more than 240,000 active military offi- cers (see Department of Defense, Military Manpower Statis- tics 18 (Mar. 31, 1993) (Table 9)) is a principal officer. See Morrison v. Olson, supra, at 670­673 (outlining criteria for determining Appointments Clause status of a federal officer). Congress has simply declined to adopt the less onerous ap- pointment process available for inferior officers. The Uniform Code of Military Justice authorizes the Judge Advocate General of the relevant branch of the Armed Forces to select as a military judge any commissioned mili- tary officer who meets certain qualifications going to legal knowledge and experience. See ante, at 168. If, as peti- 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 163 (1994) 183 Souter, J., concurring tioners argue, military judges were principal officers, this method of choosing them from among the ranks of inferior officers would raise two constitutional questions. As to mil- itary officers who received their commissions before Con- gress created the post of military judge in 1968, the question would be whether the duties of a principal officer may be assigned to an existing multiperson inferior office, so that some of the office's occupants, at the choice of a lower level Executive Branch official, will serve in new principal-officer positions. And as to officers who received their commis- sions after 1968 and whose appointments therefore included the potential for service as military judge, the question would be whether a multiperson office may be created in which individuals will occupy, again at the choice of a lower level Executive Branch official, either inferior-officer or principal-officer positions. The Appointments Clause requires each question to be an- swered in the negative. "The Constitution, for purposes of appointment, very clearly divides all its officers into two classes," United States v. Germaine, 99 U. S. 508, 509 (1879), and though Congress has broad power to create federal of- fices and assign duties to them, see Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 128­129 (1926), it may not, even with the Presi- dent's assent, disregard the Constitution's distinction be- tween principal and inferior officers. It may not, in particu- lar, dispense with the precise process of appointment required for principal officers, whether directly or "by indi- rection." Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 202 (1928). Accordingly, I find it necessary to consider the sta- tus of military judges under the Appointments Clause but, first, to explain why the Appointments Clause's origins and purposes support my reading of its text. A In framing an Appointments Clause that would ensure "a judicious choice" of individuals to fill the important offices 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT 184 WEISS v. UNITED STATES Souter, J., concurring of the Union, The Federalist No. 76, p. 510 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton), the delegates to the Philadelphia Con- vention could draw on their experiences with two flawed methods of appointment. They were aware of the pre- revolutionary " `manipulation of official appointments' " by the Crown and its colonial governors, "one of the American revolutionary generation's greatest grievances against exec- utive power." Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868, 883 (1991) (quoting G. Wood, The Creation of The American Republic 1776­1787, p. 79 (1969)). They were also aware of the postrevolutionary abuse by several state legislatures which, in reaction, had been given the sole power of appoint- ment; by the time of the Convention the lodging of exclusive appointing authority in state legislatures " `had become the principal source of division and faction in the states.' " Freytag, supra, at 904, and n. 4 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (quoting Wood, supra, at 407). With error and overcorrection behind them, the Framers came to appreciate the necessity of separating at least to some degree the power to create federal offices (a power they assumed would belong to Congress) from the power to fill them, and they came to see good reason for placing the initia- tive to appoint the most important federal officers in the single-person presidency, not the multimember Legislature. But the Framers also recognized that lodging the appoint- ment power in the President alone would pose much the same risk as lodging it exclusively in Congress: the risk of "a[n] incautious or corrupt nomination." 2 M. Farrand, Rec- ords of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 43 (rev. ed. 1937) (J. Madison) (hereinafter Farrand). Just as the Appoint- ments Clause's grant to the President of the power to nomi- nate principal officers would avert legislative despotism, its requirement of Senate confirmation would serve as an "ex- cellent check" against Presidential missteps or wrongdoing. 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 163 (1994) 185 Souter, J., concurring The Federalist No. 76, supra, at 513.1 Accord, 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 374­ 377 (1833) (The President will be more likely than "a large [legislative] body" to make appointments whose "qualifica- tions are unquestioned, and unquestionable"; but because 1 Hamilton's Federalist Papers writings contain the most thorough con- temporary justification for the method of appointing principal officers that the Framers adopted. See The Federalist Nos. 76 and 77, pp. 509­521. Hamilton was clear that the President ought initially to select principal officers and that the President was therefore rightly given the sole power to nominate: "The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputation. He will on this account feel himself under stronger obligations, and more inter- ested to investigate with care the qualities requisite to the stations to be filled, and to prefer with impartiality the persons who may have the fairest pretentions to them." Id., No. 76, at 510­511. Hamilton also left no doubt that the role of ultimate approval assigned to the Senate was vital: "To what purpose then require the co-operation of the Senate? I answer, that the necessity of their concurrence would have a powerful, though in general a silent operation. It would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from family con- nection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity." Id., at 513. The same notes were struck in the Constitutional Convention, where Hamilton was actually the first to suggest that both the President and the Senate be involved in the appointments process. See 1 Farrand 128; J. Harris, The Advice and Consent of the Senate 21 (1953). For example, Gouvernor Morris, who was among those initially favoring vesting exclu- sive appointment power in the President, see 2 Farrand 82, 389, ultimately defended the assignment of shared authority for appointment on the ground that "as the President was to nominate, there would be responsibil- ity, and as the Senate was to concur, there would be security." Id., at 539. See also 4 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 134 (1891) (James Iredell in North Carolina ratifying convention) ("[T]he Senate has no other influence but a restraint on improper appointments . . . . [The Appointments Clause provides] a double security"). See generally Har- ris, supra, at 17­26 (summarizing debates in the Constitutional Convention and in the ratifying conventions). 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT 186 WEISS v. UNITED STATES Souter, J., concurring exclusive Presidential appointment power "may be abused," the Appointments Clause provides the "salutary check" of Senate confirmation, and "[t]he consciousness of this check will make the president more circumspect, and deliberate in his nominations for office"). In the Framers' thinking, the process on which they set- tled for selecting principal officers would ensure "judicious" appointments not only by empowering the President and the Senate to check each other, but also by allowing the public to hold the President and Senators accountable for injudicious appointments. "[T]he circumstances attending an appoint- ment [of a principal officer], from the mode of conducting it, would naturally become matters of notoriety," Hamilton wrote; "and the public would be at no loss to determine what part had been performed by the different actors." The Fed- eralist No. 77, at 517. As a result, "[t]he blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the president singly and absolutely. The censure of reject- ing a good one would lie entirely at the door of the sen- ate; aggravated by the consideration of their having counteracted the good intentions of the executive. If an ill appointment should be made the executive for nominating and the senate for approving would partici- pate though in different degrees in the opprobrium and disgrace." Ibid. The strategy by which the Framers sought to ensure ju- dicious appointments of principal officers is, then, familiar enough: the Appointments Clause separates the Govern- ment's power but also provides for a degree of intermingling, all to ensure accountability and "preclude the exercise of arbitrary power." Myers v. United States, 272 U. S., at 293 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The strict requirements of nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate were not carried over to the appointment of inferior officers. A degree of flexibility was 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 163 (1994) 187 Souter, J., concurring thought appropriate in providing for the appointment of of- ficers who, by definition, would have only inferior govern- mental authority. See 2 Farrand 627. But although they allowed an alternative appointment method for inferior offi- cers, the Framers still structured the alternative to ensure accountability and check governmental power: any decision to dispense with Presidential appointment and Senate con- firmation is Congress's to make, not the President's, but Con- gress's authority is limited to assigning the appointing power to the highly accountable President or the heads of federal departments, or, where appropriate, to the courts of law. B If the structural benefits the Appointments Clause was de- signed to provide are to be preserved, the Clause must be read to forbid the two ways in which the benefits can be defeated. First, no branch may aggrandize its own appoint- ment power at the expense of another. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 128­129. Congress, for example, may not unilaterally fill any federal office; and the President may neither select a principal officer without the Senate's concur- rence, nor fill any office without Congress's authorization.2 2 While it is true that "the debates of the Constitutional Convention, and the Federalist Papers, are replete with expressions of fear that the Legislative Branch of the National Government will aggrandize itself at the expense of the other two branches," Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 129 (1976), the Framers also expressed concern over the threat of expanding Presidential power, including specifically in the context of appointments. See, e. g., 1 Farrand 101 (G. Mason); id., at 103 (B. Franklin). Indeed, the Framers added language to both halves of the Appointments Clause specifically to address the concern that the President might attempt uni- laterally to create and fill federal offices. See C. Warren, The Making of the Constitution 642 (1937) (discussing references in the Appointments Clause to principal offices " `established by Law,' " and to the power of appointing inferior officers which " `Congress may by law' " vest as speci- fied). No doubt, Article I's assignment to Congress of the power to make laws makes the Legislative Branch the most likely candidate for encroach- ing on the power of the others. But Article II gives the President means 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT 188 WEISS v. UNITED STATES Souter, J., concurring Second, no branch may abdicate its Appointments Clause duties. Congress, for example, may not authorize the ap- pointment of a principal officer without Senate confirmation; nor may the President allow Congress or a lower level Exec- utive Branch official to select a principal officer.3 To be sure, "power is of an encroaching nature" and more likely to be usurped than surrendered. The Federalist No. 48, at 332 (J. Madison). For this reason, our Appointments Clause cases (like our separation-of-powers cases generally) have typically addressed allegations of aggrandizement rather than abdication. See, e. g., Buckley v. Valeo, supra; Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189 (1928); Shoe- maker v. United States, 147 U. S. 282 (1893).4 Nevertheless, of his own to encroach, and indeed we have been forced to invalidate Presi- dential attempts to usurp legislative authority, as the Buckley Court rec- ognized: "The Court has held that the President may not execute and exercise legislative authority belonging only to Congress." Buckley, supra, at 123 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952)). 3 In Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868, 884 (1991), we observed that in the Appointments Clause the Framers limited the "diffusion" of the appointment power in order to "ensure that those who wielded it were accountable to political force and the will of the people." Id., at 884. Depending on the means used to circumvent the Appointments Clause, "diffusion" can implicate either the anti-aggrandizement or the anti- abdication principle. If the full Congress creates a principal office and fills it, for example, it has adopted a more diffuse and less accountable mode of appointment than the Constitution requires; and it has violated the bar on aggrandizement. Cf. The Federalist No. 77, at 519 (explaining that the House of Representatives is too numerous a body to be involved in appointments). And if Congress, with the President's approval, au- thorizes a lower level Executive Branch official to appoint a principal offi- cer, it again has adopted a more diffuse and less accountable mode of ap- pointment than the Constitution requires; this time it has violated the bar on abdication. 4 The theme of abdication has not been entirely absent, however. In Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654 (1988), the Court considered a challenge to a law authorizing appointment of an independent counsel by a three- judge panel and without Senate confirmation. Though the law was 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 163 (1994) 189 Souter, J., concurring "[t]he structural interests protected by the Appointments Clause are not those of any one branch of Government but of the entire Republic," and "[n]either Congress nor the Ex- ecutive can agree to waive th[e] structural protection[s]" the Clause provides. Freytag, 501 U. S., at 880. The Appoint- ments Clause forbids both aggrandizement and abdication.5 C If military judges were principal officers, the method for selecting them, which is prescribed in legislation adopted by adopted by Congress and signed by the President, the Court said that the law would nevertheless violate the Appointments Clause if the independ- ent counsel were a principal officer. See id., at 671. If the independent counsel were such an officer, the law would represent an impermissible abdication by both Congress and the President of their Appointments Clause duties. 5 Cf. J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 406 (1928) (Taft, C. J.) ("[I]t is a breach of the National fundamental law if Congress gives up its legislative power and transfers it to the President, or to the Judicial branch, or if by law it attempts to invest itself or its members with either executive power or judicial power"). As Chief Justice Taft's remark suggests, the ready analogy to the Appointments Clause's anti- abdication principle is what has been called "nondelegation doctrine." The Court has unanimously invalidated legislation in which Congress dele- gated "to others the essential legislative functions with which it is . . . vested," A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 529 (1935); id., at 553­554 (Cardozo, J., concurring), and it has read other statutes narrowly to avoid annulling them as excessive abdications of con- stitutional responsibility, see Industrial Union Dept., AFL­CIO v. Ameri- can Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S. 607, 646 (1980) (plurality opinion); Na- tional Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. United States, 415 U. S. 336, 342 (1974). See also Industrial Union Dept., supra, at 672­676 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment) (discussing limits on the delegation of Con- gress's legislative power). Nondelegation doctrine has been criticized. But see J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 131­134 (1980) (distinguishing non- delegation doctrine from less defensible theories invoked to strike down New Deal legislation). Barring Appointments Clause abdication strikes me as plainly less problematic, however, because the text of the Constitu- tion describes with precision the nature of the branches' appointments powers. 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT 190 WEISS v. UNITED STATES Souter, J., concurring Congress and signed by the President, would amount to an impermissible abdication by both political branches of their Appointments Clause duties. Military officers commis- sioned before 1968, though they received Presidential ap- pointment and Senate confirmation, were chosen to fill infe- rior offices that did not carry the possibility of service as a military judge. If military judges were principal officers, the Military Justice Act of 1968 would have authorized the creation and filling of principal offices without any Presiden- tial nomination or Senate confirmation to that principal of- fice, or indeed to any principal office at all. Such a process would preclude the President, the Senate, and the public from playing the parts assigned to them, parts the Framers thought essential to preventing the exercise of arbitrary power and encouraging judicious appointments of principal officers. The office to which military officers have been appointed since enactment of the 1968 Act includes the potential for service as a military judge. But that would be a sufficient response to petitioners' Appointments Clause objection only if military judges were inferior officers. Otherwise, the method for selecting military judges even from the ranks of post-1968 commissioned officers would reflect an abdication of the political branches' Appointments Clause duties with respect to principal officers. Admittedly, the degree of abdi- cation would not be as extreme as in the prior setting, for the President and Senate are theoretically aware that each officer nominated and confirmed may serve as a military judge. Judging by the purposes of the Appointments Clause, however, this difference is immaterial. It cannot se- riously be contended that in confirming the literally tens of thousands of military officers each year the Senate would, or even could, adequately focus on the remote possibility that a small number of them would eventually serve as military 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 163 (1994) 191 Souter, J., concurring judges.6 And the method for appointing military judges allows the President no formal role at all in the selection of the particular individuals who will actually serve in those positions. This process likewise deprives the public of any realistic ability to hold easily identifiable elected officials to account for bad appointments. Thus while, as the Court ex- plains, see ante, at 171­172, Congress has certainly at- tempted to create a single military office that includes the potential of service as a military judge, I believe the Ap- pointments Clause forbids the creation of such a single office that combines inferior- and principal-officer roles, thereby disregarding the special treatment the Constitution requires for the appointment of principal officers. For these reasons, if military judges were principal officers, the current scheme for appointing them would raise a serious Appointments Clause problem indeed, as the Solicitor General conceded at oral argument. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 30­31. D The argument that military judges are principal officers is far from frivolous. It proceeds by analogizing military judges to Article III circuit and district judges, who are prin- cipal officers,7 and to Article I Tax Court judges, who Frey- 6 Writing in 1953, one observer pointed out that if each of the 49,956 nominations for military office sent to the Senate in 1949 "were considered for one minute . . . , it would require 832 hours to pass upon the nomina- tions [or] an average of more than 5 hours each day that the Senate is in session." Harris, Advice and Consent of the Senate, at 331. This ob- server concluded that "Senate confirmation of military and naval officers has become for all practical purposes an empty formality." Ibid. 7 It is true that the Court has never so held and that the Constitution refers to the lower federal courts as "inferior Courts." Art. III, § 1. But from the early days of the Republic "[t]he practical construction has uni- formly been that [judges of the inferior courts] are not . . . inferior offi- cers," 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 456, n. 1 (1833), and I doubt many today would disagree. In Freytag, indeed, the Court as- 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT 192 WEISS v. UNITED STATES Souter, J., concurring tag suggests are principal officers too (since, Freytag held, Tax Court judges may appoint inferior officers). In terms of the factors identified in Morrison v. Olson as significant to determining the Appointments Clause status of a federal officer, the office of military judge is not "limited in tenure," as that phrase was used in Morrison to describe "appoint- [ment] essentially to accomplish a single task [at the end of which] the office is terminated." 487 U. S., at 672. Nor are military judges "limited in jurisdiction," as used in Morrison to refer to the fact that an independent counsel may investi- gate and prosecute only those individuals, and for only those crimes, within the scope of the jurisdiction granted by the special three-judge appointing court. See ibid. Over the cases before them, military judges would seem to be no more "limited [in] duties" than lower Article III or Tax Court judges. Id., at 671. And though military judges are re- movable, the same is true of "most (if not all) principal offi- cers in the Executive Branch." Id., at 716 (Scalia, J., dis- senting) (emphasis deleted). The argument that military judges are principal officers, however, is not without response. Since Article I military judges are much more akin to Article I Tax Court judges than lower Article III judges, the analogy to Tax Court judges proves nothing if Tax Court judges are inferior offi- cers, which they may be. The history that justifies declar- ing the judges of "inferior" Article III courts to be principal officers is not available for Tax Court judges, and though Freytag holds that the Tax Court is a "Cour[t] of Law" that can appoint inferior officers, it may be that the Appointments sumed that lower federal judges were principal officers. See 501 U. S., at 884 (listing "ambassadors, ministers, heads of departments, and judges" as principal officers). But see Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision, and Removal-Some Possibilities Under the Constitution, 28 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 499­529 (1930) (arguing that lower federal judges should, and constitutionally can, be appointed by the Chief Justice). 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 163 (1994) 193 Souter, J., concurring Clause envisions appointment of some inferior officers by other inferior officers. But even if Tax Court judges are principal officers, mili- tary trial judges compare poorly with them, because not only the legal rulings of military trial judges but also their fact- finding and sentencing are subject to de novo scrutiny by the Courts of Military Review. See 10 U. S. C. § 866(c). Though the powers of Court of Military Review judges are correspondingly greater, they too are distinguishable from Tax Court judges. First, Tax Court judges are removable only for cause, see 26 U. S. C. § 7443(f), while Court of Mili- tary Review judges may be freely "detail[ed]" by the rele- vant Judge Advocate General to nonjudicial assignments.8 See ante, at 171­172. Second, Tax Court judges serve fixed 15-year terms, see 26 U. S. C. § 7443(e), while Court of Mili- tary Review judges have no fixed term of office and typically serve for far less than 15 years.9 See Brief for Petitioners 5 (military judges "often serve terms of two, three, or four years"). "The line between `inferior' and `principal' officers is one that is far from clear," Morrison, 487 U. S., at 671, and though there is a good deal of force to the argument that military judges, at least those on the Courts of Military Re- view, are principal officers, it is ultimately hard to say with any certainty on which side of the line they fall. The Court 8 According to the Government, "[t]he [Uniform Code of Military Justice] and the services' implementing regulations are carefully structured to en- sure that military judges are independent and impartial." Brief for United States 42. This is offered to repel petitioners' due process claim, but it strengthens petitioners' Appointments Clause position. It does not strengthen it enough, however, for the fact remains that military judges are removable for a broad array of reasons. 9 According to the Government, "military judges have the equivalent of tenure in the form of stable tours of duty." Id., at 31. Again, though offered as a defense to petitioners' due process challenge, this aids peti- tioners' Appointments Clause argument. The fact remains, however, that the statute provides no fixed term of office for military judges. 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT 194 WEISS v. UNITED STATES Ginsburg, J., concurring has never decided how to resolve doubt in this area; the Mor- rison Court did not address this issue since it understood the independent counsel to be "clearly" an inferior officer. Ibid. Forced to decide now, I agree with the approach of- fered by then-Judge Ginsburg in her Court of Appeals opin- ion in the independent-counsel case. "Where . . . the label that better fits an officer is fairly debatable, the fully rational congressional determination surely merits . . . tolerance." In re Sealed Case, 838 F. 2d 476, 532 (CADC) (dissenting opinion), rev'd sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654 (1988). Since the chosen method for selecting military judges shows that neither Congress nor the President thought military judges were principal officers, and since in the presence of doubt deference to the political branches' judgment is appropriate, I conclude that military judges are inferior officers for purposes of the Appointments Clause. II Because the limits the Appointments Clause places on the creation and assignment of duties to inferior offices are re- spected here, for the reasons the Court and Justice Scalia give, and on the understanding that the Court addresses only the Appointments Clause's limits regarding inferior officers, I join the Court's opinion. Justice Ginsburg, concurring. The care the Court has taken to analyze petitioners' claims demonstrates once again that men and women in the Armed Forces do not leave constitutional safeguards and judicial protection behind when they enter military service. To- day's decision upholds a system of military justice notably more sensitive to due process concerns than the one prevail- ing through most of our country's history, when military jus- tice was done without any requirement that legally trained officers preside or even participate as judges. Nevertheless, there has been no peremptory rejection of petitioners' pleas. 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 163 (1994) 195 Opinion of Scalia, J. Instead, the close inspection reflected in the Court's opinion confirms: "[I]t is the function of the courts to make sure, in cases properly coming before them, that the men and women constituting our Armed Forces are treated as honored members of society whose rights do not turn on the charity of a military commander. . . . A member of the Armed Forces is entitled to equal justice under law not as conceived by the generosity of a commander but as written in the Constitution . . . ." Winters v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 57, 59­60, 21 L. Ed. 2d 80, 84 (1968) (Douglas, J., in chambers). See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973); Har- mon v. Brucker, 355 U. S. 579 (1958); Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F. 2d 1114 (CA2 1976). Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I think the Appointments Clause issue requires somewhat more analysis than the Court provides, and the Due Process Clause issue somewhat less. I As to the former: The Court states that these cases differ from Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S. 282 (1893), be- cause, after the passage of the Military Justice Act of 1968, military judges could be selected from "hundreds or perhaps thousands of qualified commissioned officers," ante, at 174, so that there is no concern (as there was in Shoemaker, where a single incumbent held the office whose duties were enlarged) that "Congress was trying to both create an office and also select a particular individual to fill the office," ante, at 174. That certainly distinguishes Shoemaker, but I do not see why it leads to the Court's conclusion that therefore "ger- maneness" analysis need not be conducted here as it was in 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT 196 WEISS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of Scalia, J. Shoemaker (though the Court proceeds to conduct it anyway, ante, at 174­176). Germaneness analysis must be conducted, it seems to me, whenever that is necessary to assure that the conferring of new duties does not violate the Appointments Clause. Viola- tion of the Appointments Clause occurs not only when (as in Shoemaker) Congress may be aggrandizing itself (by effec- tively appropriating the appointment power over the officer exercising the new duties), but also when Congress, without aggrandizing itself, effectively lodges appointment power in any person other than those whom the Constitution specifies. Thus, "germaneness" is relevant whenever Congress gives power to confer new duties to anyone other than the few potential recipients of the appointment power specified in the Appointments Clause-i. e., the President, the Courts of Law, and Heads of Departments. The Judge Advocates General are none of these. There- fore, if acting as a military judge under the Military Justice Act of 1968 is nongermane to serving as a military officer, giving Judge Advocates General the power to appoint mili- tary officers to serve as military judges would violate the Appointments Clause, even if there were "hundreds or perhaps thousands" of individuals from whom the selections could be made. For taking on the nongermane duties of military judge would amount to assuming a new "Offic[e]" within the meaning of Article II, and the appointment to that office would have to comply with the strictures of Article II. I find the Appointments Clause not to have been violated in the present case, only because I agree with the Court's dictum that the new duties are germane.* *The further issues perceptively discussed in Justice Souter's concur- rence-namely, whether the Appointments Clause permits conferring principal-officer responsibilities upon an inferior officer in a manner other than that required for the appointment of a principal officer (and, if not, whether the responsibilities of a military judge are those of a principal officer)-were in my view wisely avoided by the Court, since they were 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 163 (1994) 197 Opinion of Scalia, J. II With respect to the Due Process Clause challenge, I think it neither necessary nor appropriate for this Court to pro- nounce whether "Congress has achieved an acceptable bal- ance between independence and accountability," ante, at 180. As today's opinion explains, a fixed term of office for a mili- tary judge "has never been a part of the military justice tradition," ante, at 178. "Courts-martial . . . have been con- ducted in this country for over 200 years without the pres- ence of a tenured judge," ante, at 179. Thus, in the Military Justice Act of 1968 the people's elected representatives achieved a "balance between independence and accountabil- ity" which, whether or not "acceptable" to five Justices of this Court, gave members of the military at least as much procedural protection, in the respects at issue here, as they enjoyed when the Fifth Amendment was adopted and have enjoyed ever since. That is enough, and to suggest other- wise arrogates to this Court a power it does not possess. "[A] process of law, which is not otherwise forbidden, must be taken to be due process of law, if it can show the sanction of settled usage both in England and in this country . . . . [That which], in substance, has been im- memorially the actual law of the land . . . is due process of law." Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 528 (1884). inadequately presented and not at all argued. The Petition for Certiorari said only: "There is considerable force to the argument that military appel- late judges are `superior' or `principal' officers, in which case the President must appoint them with the advice and consent of the Senate. But in any event, . . . ." Pet. for Cert. 12. The only reference in petitioners' brief was the statement that "if military judges are principal officers, it is an even more serious transgression of the purposes of the Appointments Clause to have their original commissions substitute for an appointment to a principal office." Brief for Petitioners 15. As Justice Souter's opinion demonstrates, the issues are complex; they should be resolved only after full briefing and argument. 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT 198 WEISS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of Scalia, J. As sometimes ironically happens when judges seek to deny the power of historical practice to restrain their decrees, see, e. g., Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Marin, 495 U. S. 604, 637­639 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in judg- ment), the present judgment makes no sense except as a con- sequence of historical practice. Today's opinion finds "an acceptable balance between independence and accountabil- ity" because the Uniform Code of Military Justice "protects against unlawful command influence by precluding a conven- ing authority or any commanding officer from preparing or reviewing any report concerning the effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency of a military judge relating to his judicial duties"; because it "prohibits convening authorities from censuring, reprimanding, or admonishing a military judge `. . . with re- spect to any . . . exercise of . . . his functions in the conduct of the proceeding' "; and because a Judge Advocate General cannot decertify or transfer a military judge "based on the General's opinion of the appropriateness of the judge's find- ings and sentences." Ante, at 180, 181. But no one can suppose that similar protections against improper influence would suffice to validate a state criminal-law system in which felonies were tried by judges serving at the pleasure of the Executive. I am confident that we would not be satis- fied with mere formal prohibitions in the civilian context, but would hold that due process demands the structural protec- tion of tenure in office, which has been provided in England since 1700, see J. H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 145­146 (2d ed. 1979), was provided in almost all the former English colonies from the time of the Revolution, see Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the American Constitution: Eng- lish and American Precedents, 1969 S. Ct. Rev. 135, 138­147, and is provided in all the States today, see National Center for State Courts, Conference of State Court Administrators, State Court Organization 1987, pp. 271­302 (1988). (It is noteworthy that one of the grievances recited against King George III in the Declaration of Independence was that "[h]e 510us1$13M 06-18-97 17:14:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 163 (1994) 199 Opinion of Scalia, J. has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices.") Thus, while the Court's opinion says that historical prac- tice is merely "a factor that must be weighed in [the] calcula- tion," ante, at 179, it seems to me that the Court's judgment today makes the fact of a differing military tradition utterly conclusive. That is as it should be: "[N]o procedure firmly rooted in the practices of our people can be so `fundamen- tally unfair' as to deny due process of law." Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U. S. 1, 38 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). For these reasons, I concur in Parts I and II­A and concur in the judgment. 510us1$14F 06-18-97 17:31:47 PAGES OPINPGT 200 OCTOBER TERM, 1993 Syllabus THUNDER BASIN COAL CO. v. REICH, SECRETARY OF LABOR, et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the tenth circuit No. 92­896. Argued October 5, 1993-Decided January 19, 1994 Petitioner mine operator's nonunion work force designated two employees of the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) to serve as miners' representatives under 30 U. S. C. § 813(f). Claiming that the designa- tions compromised its rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), petitioner refused to post information about the representa- tives as required by a regulation issued by the Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), 30 CFR § 40.4. Rather, petitioner filed suit in the District Court and obtained an injunc- tion preventing enforcement of 30 CFR pt. 40. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that district court jurisdiction was precluded by the administrative-review scheme of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977, 30 U. S. C. § 801 et seq. (Mine Act or Act), under which challenges to enforcement measures are reviewed by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission and then by the appropriate court of appeals. The court rejected petitioner's conten- tion that requiring it to challenge the MSHA's interpretation of 30 U. S. C. § 813(f) and 30 CFR pt. 40 through the statutory-review proce- dures would violate its rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Held:1. The Mine Act's statutory-review scheme precludes a district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over a pre-enforcement chal- lenge to the Act. Pp. 207­218. (a) In cases involving delayed judicial review of final agency ac- tions, this Court finds that Congress has allocated initial review to an administrative body where such intent is fairly discernible in the statu- tory scheme. Whether a statute is intended to preclude initial judicial review is determined from the statute's language, structure, and pur- pose, its legislative history, and whether the claims can be afforded meaningful review. P. 207. (b) Although the Mine Act is facially silent about pre-enforcement claims, its comprehensive enforcement structure demonstrates that Congress intended to preclude challenges such as the present one. The 510us1$14F 06-18-97 17:31:47 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 200 (1994) 201 Syllabus statutory-review process does not distinguish between pre-enforcement and postenforcement challenges, but applies to all violations of the Act and its regulations. The Act expressly authorizes district court juris- diction in only two provisions, which respectively empower the Secre- tary to enjoin habitual violations of health and safety standards and to coerce payment of civil penalties. Mine operators enjoy no correspond- ing right but must complain to the Commission and then to the court of appeals. Pp. 207­209. (c) The Mine Act's legislative history confirms the foregoing in- terpretation by demonstrating that Congress intended to channel and streamline enforcement, directing ordinary challenges to a single review process. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 142­144, 155­ 156, distinguished. Pp. 209­212. (d) Petitioner's claims are of the type that Congress intended to be addressed through the statutory-review process and can be meaning- fully reviewed under the Mine Act. The NLRA claims at root require interpretation of the parties' rights and duties under § 813(f) and 30 CFR pt. 40, and as such arise under the Act and fall squarely within the expertise of the Commission, which recently has addressed the pre- cise NLRA claims presented here. As for petitioner's due process claim, the general rule disfavoring constitutional adjudication by agen- cies is not mandatory, and is perhaps of less consequence where, as here, the reviewing body is not the agency itself but an independent commis- sion established exclusively to adjudicate Mine Act disputes. The Com- mission has addressed constitutional questions in previous enforcement proceedings and, even if it had not, petitioner's claims could be meaning- fully addressed in the Court of Appeals. Pp. 212­216. 2. The Court need not consider petitioner's contention that, because the absence of pre-enforcement declaratory relief before the Commis- sion will subject petitioner to serious and irreparable harm, due process requires district court review. The record contains no evidence that petitioner will be subject to a serious prehearing deprivation if it com- plies with § 813(f) and 30 CFR pt. 40 by posting the designations. The potential for abuse of the miners' representative position appears lim- ited, and petitioner has failed to demonstrate that any such abuse could not be remedied on an individual basis under the Mine Act. Nor will petitioner face any serious prehearing deprivation if it refuses to post the designations while challenging MSHA's interpretation. Although the Act's civil penalties unquestionably may become onerous if peti- tioner chooses not to comply, full judicial review is available before any penalty must be paid. Under the Act, petitioner is neither barred as a practical matter from all access to the courts nor put to a constitution- 510us1$14F 06-18-97 17:31:47 PAGES OPINPGT 202 THUNDER BASIN COAL CO. v. REICH Opinion of the Court ally intolerable choice between compliance and potent coercive penal- ties. Pp. 216­218. 969 F. 2d 970, affirmed. Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, and in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined except for Parts III­B, IV, and V. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and con- curring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 219. Wayne S. Bishop argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Charles W. Newcom, Stewart A. Block, and Thomas F. Linn. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for respondents. On the brief were Solicitor General Days, Acting Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, William K. Kelley, Allen H. Feldman, and Nathaniel I. Spiller.* Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, we address the question whether the statutory-review scheme in the Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 1290, as amended, 30 U. S. C. § 801 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. IV) (Mine Act or Act), prevents a district court from exercising subject- matter jurisdiction over a pre-enforcement challenge to the Act. We hold that it does. I Congress adopted the Mine Act "to protect the health and safety of the Nation's coal or other miners." 30 U. S. C. § 801(g). The Act requires the Secretary of Labor or his representative to conduct periodic, unannounced health and *Timothy M. Biddle and J. Michael Klise filed a brief for the American Mining Congress et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Patrick K. Nakamura, George N. Davies, Robert H. Stropp, Jr., and Mary Lu Jordan filed a brief for the International Union, United Mine Workers of America, as amicus curiae urging affirmance. 510us1$14F 06-18-97 17:31:47 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 200 (1994) 203 Opinion of the Court safety inspections of the Nation's mines.1 Section § 813(f) provides: "[A] representative of the operator and a representative authorized by his miners shall be given an opportunity to accompany the Secretary or his authorized repre- sentative during the physical inspection of any coal or other mine . . . for the purpose of aiding such inspection and to participate in pre- or post-inspection conferences held at the mine." Regulations promulgated under this section define a min- ers' representative as "[a]ny person or organization which represents two or more miners at a coal or other mine for the purposes of the Act." 30 CFR § 40.1(b)(1) (1993). In addition to exercising these "walk-around" inspection rights under § 813(f), persons designated as representatives of the miners may obtain certain health and safety informa- tion 2 and promote health and safety enforcement.3 Once the mine employees designate one or more persons as their rep- 1 Underground mines must be inspected at least four times a year, and surface mines must be inspected at least twice annually. 30 U. S. C. § 813(a). 2 Miners' representatives are entitled to receive "a copy of any order, citation, notice, or decision" issued by the Secretary to the mine operator, 30 U. S. C. § 819(b), as well as copies of certain mine health and safety records available to the Secretary regarding employee exposure to toxic or other harmful agents, § 813(c), daily mine inspections, 30 CFR § 77.1713, and plans for mine evacuation, § 77.1101, roof control, § 75.220, and em- ployee training, §§ 48.3 and 48.23. 3 Miners' representatives, among other things, may inform the Secretary of mine hazards, 30 U. S. C. § 813(g)(2), request immediate additional in- spections of the mine when a violation or imminent danger exists, § 813(g)(1), and participate in proceedings before the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, § 815(d). Representatives may request or challenge certain enforcement actions against a mine operator, §§ 815(d) and 817(e)(1), contest the time an operator is given to abate a Mine Act violation, § 815(d), and initiate proceedings to modify the application of health and safety standards, 30 CFR § 44.3. 510us1$14F 06-18-97 17:31:47 PAGES OPINPGT 204 THUNDER BASIN COAL CO. v. REICH Opinion of the Court resentatives, the employer must post at the mine informa- tion regarding these designees. 30 CFR § 40.4. The Secretary has broad authority to compel immediate compliance with Mine Act provisions through the use of man- datory civil penalties, discretionary daily civil penalties, and other sanctions.4 Challenges to enforcement are reviewed by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, 30 U. S. C. §§ 815 and 823, which is independent of the Department of Labor, and by the appropriate United States court of appeals, § 816. II Petitioner Thunder Basin Coal Company operates a sur- face coal mine in Wyoming with approximately 500 nonunion employees. In 1990, petitioner's employees selected two employees of the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA), who were not employees of the mine, to serve as their min- ers' representatives pursuant to § 813(f). Petitioner did not post the information regarding the miners' representatives as required by 30 CFR § 40.4, but complained to the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) 5 that the desig- nation compromised its rights under the National Labor Re- lations Act (NLRA). App. 31. The MSHA district man- ager responded with a letter instructing petitioner to post the miners' representative designations. Id., at 49. 4 The Secretary must issue a citation and recommend assessment of a civil penalty of up to $50,000 against any mine operator believed to have violated the Act. 30 U. S. C. §§ 814(a), 815(a), and 820(a). If an operator fails to abate the violation within the time allotted, the Secretary may assess additional daily civil penalties of up to $5,000 per day pending abatement. § 820(b). The Secretary's representative also may issue a "withdrawal order," directing all individuals to withdraw from the af- fected mine area, §§ 814(b) and (d), or pursue criminal penalties, § 820(d). 5 The MSHA is established within the Department of Labor and repre- sents the Secretary in enforcing the Mine Act. 91 Stat. 1319, 29 U. S. C. § 557a. 510us1$14F 06-18-97 17:31:47 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 200 (1994) 205 Opinion of the Court Rather than post the designations and before receiving the MSHA letter, petitioner filed suit in the United States Dis- trict Court for the District of Wyoming for pre-enforcement injunctive relief. Id., at 6. Petitioner contended that the designation of nonemployee UMWA "representatives" vio- lated the principles of collective-bargaining representation under the NLRA as well as the company's NLRA rights to exclude union organizers from its property. Id., at 9­10. Petitioner argued then, as it does here, that deprivation of these rights would harm the company irreparably by "giv- [ing] the union organizing advantages in terms of access, per- sonal contact and knowledge that would not be available under the labor laws, as well as enhanced credibility flowing from the appearance of government imprimatur." Reply Brief for Petitioner 14. Petitioner additionally alleged that requiring it to chal- lenge the MSHA's interpretation of 30 U. S. C. § 813(f) and 30 CFR pt. 40 through the statutory-review process would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, since the company would be forced to choose between violat- ing the Act and incurring possible escalating daily penalties,6 or, on the other hand, complying with the designations and suffering irreparable harm. The District Court enjoined respondents from enforcing 30 CFR pt. 40, finding that 6 Petitioner relied for this proposition on a similar case in which a mine operator refused to post the designation of a UMWA employee, a citation was issued, and the MSHA ordered abatement within 24 hours and threat- ened to impose daily civil penalties. See Kerr-McGee Coal Corp. v. Secre- tary, 15 F. M. S. H. R. C. 352 (1993), appeal pending, No. 93­1250 (CADC). Kerr-McGee complied but contested the citation. An administrative law judge rejected the operator's claim, and the Commission affirmed, holding that § 813(f) did not violate the NLRA. 15 F. M. S. H. R. C., at 362­363. The Commission eventually fined Kerr-McGee a total of $300 for its noncompliance. 510us1$14F 06-18-97 17:31:47 PAGES OPINPGT 206 THUNDER BASIN COAL CO. v. REICH Opinion of the Court petitioner had raised serious questions going to the merits and that it might face irreparable harm.7 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, hold- ing that the Mine Act's comprehensive enforcement and administrative-review scheme precluded district court juris- diction over petitioner's claims. 969 F. 2d 970 (1992). The court stated: "[T]he gravamen of Thunder Basin's case is a dispute over an anticipated citation and penalty . . . . Operators may not avoid the Mine Act's administrative review process simply by filing in a district court before actu- ally receiving an anticipated citation, order, or assess- ment of penalty." Id., at 975. To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, "would permit pre- emptive strikes that could seriously hamper effective en- forcement of the Act, disrupting the review scheme Congress intended." Ibid. The court also concluded that the Mine Act's review procedures adequately protected petitioner's due process rights. Ibid. We granted certiorari on the jurisdictional question, 507 U. S. 971 (1993), to resolve a claimed conflict with the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. See Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. Donovan, 774 F. 2d 693 (1985), amended, 781 F. 2d 57 (1986). 7 App. to Pet. for Cert. A­24. Before the Court of Appeals ruled on the appeal from the preliminary injunction, the District Court held a trial and entered a permanent injunction in favor of petitioner. See Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Martin, No. 91­CV­0050­B (D. Wyo., Mar. 13, 1992). The Court of Appeals subsequently denied petitioner's motion to stay ap- peal of the preliminary injunction and to consolidate the two cases, finding conclusive its holding that the District Court lacked jurisdiction. 969 F. 2d 970, 973, n. 3 (CA10 1992). 510us1$14F 06-18-97 17:31:47 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 200 (1994) 207 Opinion of the Court III In cases involving delayed judicial review 8 of final agency actions, we shall find that Congress has allocated initial re- view to an administrative body where such intent is "fairly discernible in the statutory scheme." Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S. 340, 351 (1984), quoting Asso- ciation of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 157 (1970). Whether a statute is in- tended to preclude initial judicial review is determined from the statute's language, structure, and purpose, its legislative history, Block, 467 U. S., at 345, and whether the claims can be afforded meaningful review. See, e. g., Board of Gover- nors, FRS v. MCorp Financial, Inc., 502 U. S. 32 (1991); Whitney Nat. Bank in Jefferson Parish v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U. S. 411 (1965). A Applying this analysis to the review scheme before us, we conclude that the Mine Act precludes district court jurisdic- tion over the pre-enforcement challenge made here. The Act establishes a detailed structure for reviewing violations of "any mandatory health or safety standard, rule, order, or regulation promulgated" under the Act. § 814(a). A mine operator has 30 days to challenge before the Commission any citation issued under the Act, after which time an un- contested order becomes "final" and "not subject to review by any court or agency." §§ 815(a) and (d). Timely chal- lenges are heard before an administrative law judge (ALJ), 8 Because court of appeals review is available, this case does not impli- cate " `the strong presumption that Congress did not mean to prohibit all judicial review.' " Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, 672 (1986), quoting Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U. S. 560, 567 (1975). 510us1$14F 06-18-97 17:31:47 PAGES OPINPGT 208 THUNDER BASIN COAL CO. v. REICH Opinion of the Court § 823(d)(1), with possible Commission review.9 Only the Commission has authority actually to impose civil penalties proposed by the Secretary, § 820(i), and the Commission re- views all proposed civil penalties de novo according to six criteria.10 The Commission may grant temporary relief pending review of most orders, § 815(b)(2), and must expedite review where necessary, § 815(d). Mine operators may challenge adverse Commission deci- sions in the appropriate court of appeals, § 816(a)(1), whose jurisdiction "shall be exclusive and its judgment and decree shall be final" except for possible Supreme Court review, ibid. The court of appeals must uphold findings of the Com- mission that are substantially supported by the record, ibid., but may grant temporary relief pending final determination of most proceedings, § 816(2). Although the statute establishes that the Commission and the courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction over chal- lenges to agency enforcement proceedings, the Act is facially silent with respect to pre-enforcement claims. The struc- ture of the Mine Act, however, demonstrates that Congress intended to preclude challenges such as the present one. The Act's comprehensive review process does not distinguish between pre-enforcement and postenforcement challenges, 9 30 U. S. C. § 823(d)(2). The Commission exercises discretionary review over any case involving, among others, a "substantial question of law, pol- icy or discretion," § 823(d)(2)(A)(ii)(IV), and may review on its own initia- tive any decision "contrary to law or Commission policy" or in which "a novel question of policy has been presented," § 823(d)(2)(B). Any ALJ decision not granted review by the Commission within 40 days becomes a "final decision of the Commission." § 823(d)(1). 10 The statutory criteria are "the operator's history of previous viola- tions, the appropriateness of such penalty to the size of the business of the operator charged, whether the operator was negligent, the effect on the operator's ability to continue in business, the gravity of the violation, and the demonstrated good faith of the person charged in attempting to achieve rapid compliance." 30 U. S. C. § 820(i). 510us1$14F 06-18-97 17:31:47 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 200 (1994) 209 Opinion of the Court but applies to all violations of the Act and its regulations. § 814(a). Contrary to petitioner's suggestion, Reply Brief for Petitioner 3, actions before the Commission are initiated not by the Secretary but by a mine operator who claims to be aggrieved. See § 815(a). The Act expressly authorizes district court jurisdiction in only two provisions, §§ 818(a) and 820(j), which respectively empower the Secretary to en- join habitual violations of health and safety standards and to coerce payment of civil penalties. Mine operators enjoy no corresponding right 11 but are to complain to the Commission and then to the court of appeals. B The legislative history of the Mine Act confirms this inter- pretation. At the time of the Act's passage, at least 1 worker was killed and 66 miners were disabled every work- ing day in the Nation's mines. See S. Rep. No. 95­181, p. 4 (1977), Legislative History of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Committee Print prepared for the Sub- committee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Human Re- sources), Ser. No. 95­2, p. 592 (1978) (Leg. Hist.). Frequent and tragic mining disasters testified to the ineffectiveness of 11 Petitioner points to § 960, which provides that "no justice, judge, or court of the United States shall" enjoin enforcement of interim mandatory health and safety standards, and to § 815(a), which provides that citations not contested in a timely manner are "not subject to review by any court or agency," as evidence that Congress expressly prohibited federal juris- diction when it so intended. Petitioner misconstrues § 960, which bars a certain form of relief but says nothing about the appropriate forum for a challenge. Section 815(a) similarly provides only that failure timely to challenge a citation precludes review before the Commission and court of appeals; it does not suggest that district court review is otherwise avail- able. In light of the Act's other provisions granting district courts juris- diction over challenges brought only by the Secretary, §§ 818(a) and 820(j), petitioner's argument based on the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is unpersuasive. 510us1$14F 06-18-97 17:31:47 PAGES OPINPGT 210 THUNDER BASIN COAL CO. v. REICH Opinion of the Court then-existing enforcement measures.12 Under existing leg- islation,13 civil penalties were not always mandatory and were too low to compel compliance, and enforcement was hobbled by a cumbersome review process.14 Congress expressed particular concern that under the pre- vious Coal Act mine operators could contest civil-penalty as- sessments de novo in federal district court once the adminis- trative review process was complete, thereby "seriously hamper[ing] the collection of civil penalties." 15 Concluding 12 In February 1972, for example, 125 persons were killed when a mine dam broke at Buffalo Creek in West Virginia. Leg. Hist. 592. See gener- ally G. Stern, The Buffalo Creek Disaster (1976). Ninety-one miners died of carbon monoxide asphyxiation in May 1972 at the Sunshine Silver Mine in Idaho. In July 1972, nine miners were killed in a mine fire in Blacks- ville, W. Va., and in March 1976, 23 miners and 3 federal inspectors died in methane gas explosions at the Scotia coal mine in Kentucky. Ibid. The House and Senate Committee Reports observed that these acci- dents resulted from hazards that were remediable and that in many cases already had been the object of repeated enforcement efforts. See gener- ally Leg. Hist. 362, 371, 592­593, 637. The 1972 Buffalo Creek disaster, for example, occurred after the mine had been assessed over $1.5 million in penalties, "not one cent of which had been paid." Id., at 631. Sixty-two ventilation violations were noted in the two years prior to the Scotia gas explosions, but the imposed penalties failed to coerce compliance. Id., at 629­630. 13 The 1977 Mine Act renamed and amended the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (Coal Act), 91 Stat. 1290, and repealed the Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act of 1966, id., at 1322. 14 The Senate Report found it "unacceptable that years after enactment of these mine safety laws . . . [m]ine operators still find it cheaper to pay minimal civil penalties than to make the capital investments necessary to adequately abate unsafe or unhealthy conditions, and there is still no means by which the government can bring habitual and chronic violators of the law into compliance." Leg. Hist. 592; see also id., at 597. 15 Id., at 633. The Senate Report explained: "The Committee firmly believes that to effectively induce compliance, the penalty must be paid by the operator in reasonably close time proxim- ity to the occurrence of the underlying violation. A number of problems with the current penalty assessment and collection system interfere with this. Final determinations of penalties are not self-enforcing, and opera- 510us1$14F 06-18-97 17:31:47 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 200 (1994) 211 Opinion of the Court that "rapid abatement of violations is essential for the pro- tection of miners," Leg. Hist. 618, Congress accordingly made improved penalties and enforcement measures a pri- mary goal of the Act. The 1977 Mine Act thus strengthened and streamlined health and safety enforcement requirements. The Act au- thorized the Secretary to compel payment of penalties and to enjoin habitual health and safety violators in federal district court. See Leg. Hist. 627; 30 U. S. C. §§ 820(j) and 818(a). Assessment of civil penalties was made mandatory for all mines, and Congress expressly eliminated the power of a mine operator to challenge a final penalty assessment de novo in district court. Cf. Whitney Nat. Bank, 379 U. S., at 420 (that "Congress rejected a proposal for a de novo review in the district courts of Board decisions" supports a finding of district court preclusion).16 We consider the legislative history and these amendments to be persuasive evidence that Congress intended to direct ordinary challenges under the Mine Act to a single review process. tors have the right to seek judicial review of penalty determinations, and may request a de novo trial on the issues in the U. S. District Courts. This encourages operators who are not pre-disposed to voluntarily pay assessed penalties to pursue cases through the elaborate administrative procedure and then to seek redress in the Courts. Since the District Courts are still reluctant to schedule trials on these cases, and the Depart- ment of Justice has been reluctant to pursue such cases in the courts, the matters generally languish at that stage, and the penalties go uncollected." Id., at 604. 16 The Senate Report's citation, see Leg. Hist. 602, of Bituminous Coal Operators' Assn. v. Secretary of Interior, 547 F. 2d 240 (CA4 1977) (hold- ing that pre-enforcement district court challenges were not precluded under the 1969 Coal Act), does not support petitioner's claim that Con- gress intended to preserve district court jurisdiction over pre-enforcement suits. That case was cited for an unrelated proposition and does not con- stitute a "settled judicial construction" that Congress presumptively pre- served. United States v. Powell, 379 U. S. 48, 55, n. 13 (1964); see also Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U. S. 200, 207­209 (1993). 510us1$14F 06-18-97 17:31:47 PAGES OPINPGT 212 THUNDER BASIN COAL CO. v. REICH Opinion of the Court Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136 (1967), is not to the contrary. In that case, this Court held that statutory review of certain provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. 1040, as amended by the Drug Amendments of 1962, 76 Stat. 780, 21 U. S. C. § 301 et seq., did not preclude district court jurisdiction over a pre- enforcement challenge to regulations promulgated under separate provisions of that Act. In so holding, the Court found that the presence of a statutory saving clause, see 387 U. S., at 144, and the statute's legislative history demon- strated "rather conclusively that the specific review provi- sions were designed to give an additional remedy and not to cut down more traditional channels of review," id., at 142. It concluded that Congress' primary concern in adopting the administrative-review procedures was to supplement review of specific agency determinations over which traditional forms of review might be inadequate. Id., at 142­144. Con- trary to petitioner's contentions, no comparable statutory language or legislative intent is present here. Indeed, as discussed above, the Mine Act's text and legislative history suggest precisely the opposite. The prospect that federal jurisdiction might thwart effective enforcement of the stat- ute also was less immediate in Abbott Laboratories, since the Abbott petitioners did not attempt to stay enforcement of the challenged regulation pending judicial review, as peti- tioner did here. Id., at 155­156. C We turn to the question whether petitioner's claims are of the type Congress intended to be reviewed within this statu- tory structure. This Court previously has upheld district court jurisdiction over claims considered "wholly `collateral' " to a statute's review provisions and outside the agency's ex- pertise, Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U. S. 602, 618 (1984), discuss- ing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976), particularly where a finding of preclusion could foreclose all meaningful 510us1$14F 06-18-97 17:31:47 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 200 (1994) 213 Opinion of the Court judicial review. See Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U. S. 535, 544­ 545 (1988) (statutory prohibition of all judicial review of Vet- erans Administration benefits determinations did not pre- clude jurisdiction over an otherwise unreviewable collateral statutory claim); Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, 678­680 (1986); Johnson v. Robi- son, 415 U. S. 361, 373­374 (1974); Oestereich v. Selective Serv. System Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U. S. 233, 237­238 (1968); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U. S. 184, 190 (1958) (upholding injunc- tion of agency action where petitioners had "no other means, within their control . . . to protect and enforce that right"). In Mathews v. Eldridge, for example, it was held that 42 U. S. C. § 405(g), which requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before the denial of Social Security disability bene- fits may be challenged in district court, was not intended to bar federal jurisdiction over a due process challenge that was "entirely collateral" to the denial of benefits, 424 U. S., at 330, and where the petitioner had made a colorable showing that full postdeprivation relief could not be obtained, id., at 331. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U. S. 479 (1991), similarly held that an alien could bring a due process challenge to Immigration and Naturalization Service am- nesty determination procedures, despite an Immigration and Nationality Act provision expressly limiting judicial review of individual amnesty determinations to deportation or ex- clusion proceedings. See 8 U. S. C. § 1160(e). This Court held that the statutory language did not evidence an intent to preclude broad "pattern and practice" challenges to the program, 498 U. S., at 494, 497, and acknowledged that "if not allowed to pursue their claims in the District Court, re- spondents would not as a practical matter be able to obtain meaningful judicial review," id., at 496. An analogous situation is not presented here. Petitioner pressed two primary claims below: that the UMWA designa- tion under § 813(f) violates the principles of collective bar- 510us1$14F 06-18-97 17:31:47 PAGES OPINPGT 214 THUNDER BASIN COAL CO. v. REICH Opinion of the Court gaining under the NLRA and petitioner's right "to exclude nonemployee union organizers from [its] property," Lech- mere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U. S. 527, 532 (1992), and that adju- dication of petitioner's claims through the statutory-review provisions will violate due process by depriving petitioner of meaningful review. Petitioner's statutory claims at root require interpretation of the parties' rights and duties under § 813(f) and 30 CFR pt. 40, and as such arise under the Mine Act and fall squarely within the Commission's expertise. The Commission, which was established as an independent- review body to "develop a uniform and comprehensive inter- pretation" of the Mine Act, Hearing on the Nomination of Members of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission before the Senate Committee on Human Re- sources, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1978), has extensive experi- ence interpreting the walk-around rights 17 and recently addressed the precise NLRA claims presented here.18 Al- 17 See Cyprus Empire Corp. v. Secretary, 15 F. M. S. H. R. C. 10 (1993) (striking workers' entitlement to walk-around representation); Council of Southern Mountains, Inc. v. Martin County Coal Corp., 6 F. M. S. H. R. C. 206 (1984), aff'd sub nom. Council of Southern Mountains, Inc. v. FMS­ HRC, 751 F. 2d 1418 (CADC 1985) (nonemployee miners' representative entitlement to monitor training courses at the mine); Magma Copper Co. v. Secretary, 1 F. M. S. H. R. C. 1948 (1979), aff'd in part, 645 F. 2d 694 (CA9 1981) (compensation for multiple miners' representatives). 18 See Kerr-McGee Coal Corp. v. Secretary, 15 F. M. S. H. R. C. 352 (1993). The Commission concluded that there was "no basis" for limiting the designation of miners' representatives to "member[s] of a union that also represents the miners for collective bargaining purposes under the NLRA," id., at 361, since the "discrete safety and health purpose of the Mine Act . . . render these NLRA principles inapplicable here," id., at 362. The Commission noted that the preamble to 30 CFR pt. 40 expressly disapproves incorporation of the NLRA's majoritarian representation principles, 15 F. M. S. H. R. C., at 359, and n. 8, and rejected petitioner's property-rights claim, since "Lechmere does not reverse walkaround law as it has developed under the Mine Act." Id., at 362. Cf. Emery Mining Corp. v. Secretary, 10 F. M. S. H. R. C. 276 (1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Utah Power & Light Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 897 F. 2d 510us1$14F 06-18-97 17:31:47 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 200 (1994) 215 Opinion of the Court though the Commission has no particular expertise in con- struing statutes other than the Mine Act, we conclude that exclusive review before the Commission is appropriate since "agency expertise [could] be brought to bear on" the statu- tory questions presented here. Whitney Nat. Bank, 379 U. S., at 420. As for petitioner's constitutional claim, we agree that "[a]djudication of the constitutionality of congressional en- actments has generally been thought beyond the jurisdiction of administrative agencies," Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S., at 368, quoting Oestereich v. Selective Serv. System Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U. S., at 242 (Harlan, J., concurring in result); accord, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U. S. 99, 109 (1977). This rule is not mandatory, however, and is perhaps of less consequence where, as here, the reviewing body is not the agency itself but an independent Commission established exclusively to adjudicate Mine Act disputes. See Secretary v. Richardson, 3 F. M. S. H. R. C. 8, 18­20 (1981). The Commission has addressed constitutional questions in previ- ous enforcement proceedings.19 Even if this were not the case, however, petitioner's statutory and constitutional claims here can be meaningfully addressed in the Court of Appeals.20 447 (CA10 1990) (construing the Mine Act in light of the NLRA and con- cluding that a miners' representative may be a nonemployee). 19 See Secretary v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 9 F. M. S. H. R. C. 1305, 1306­1307 (1987), aff'd, 920 F. 2d 738 (CA11 1990) (due process); Secretary v. Alabama By-Products Corp., 4 F. M. S. H. R. C. 2128, 2129­2130 (1982) (vagueness); Secretary v. Richardson, 3 F. M. S. H. R. C. 8, 21­28 (1981) (equal protection). Kaiser Coal Corp. v. Secretary, 10 F. M. S. H. R. C. 1165 (1988), does not suggest otherwise, but simply held that declaratory relief from the Commission was unavailable for a question already under consideration in the Court of Appeals. 20 Cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 762 (1975). This case thus does not present the "serious constitutional question" that would arise if an agency statute were construed to preclude all judicial review of a constitu- tional claim. See Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, 681, n. 12 (1986). 510us1$14F 06-18-97 17:31:47 PAGES OPINPGT 216 THUNDER BASIN COAL CO. v. REICH Opinion of the Court We conclude that the Mine Act's comprehensive enforce- ment structure, combined with the legislative history's clear concern with channeling and streamlining the enforcement process, establishes a "fairly discernible" intent to preclude district court review in the present case. See Block v. Com- munity Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S., at 351. Petitioner's claims are "pre-enforcement" only because the company sued before a citation was issued, and its claims turn on a question of statutory interpretation that can be meaningfully re- viewed under the Mine Act. Had petitioner persisted in its refusal to post the designation, the Secretary would have been required to issue a citation and commence enforcement proceedings. See 30 U. S. C. §§ 815(a) and 820 (1988 ed. and Supp. IV). Nothing in the language and structure of the Act or its legislative history suggests that Congress intended to allow mine operators to evade the statutory-review proc- ess by enjoining the Secretary from commencing enforce- ment proceedings, as petitioner sought to do here. To up- hold the District Court's jurisdiction in these circumstances would be inimical to the structure and the purposes of the Mine Act. IV Petitioner finally contends, in the alternative, that due process requires district court review because the absence of pre-enforcement declaratory relief before the Commission will subject petitioner to serious and irreparable harm. We need not consider this claim, however, because neither com- pliance with, nor continued violation of, the statute will sub- ject petitioner to a serious prehearing deprivation. The record before us contains no evidence that petitioner will be subject to serious harm if it complies with 30 U. S. C. § 813(f) and 30 CFR pt. 40 by posting the designations, and the potential for abuse of the miners' representative position appears limited. As the district manager of the MSHA stated to petitioner, designation as a miners' representative 510us1$14F 06-18-97 17:31:47 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 200 (1994) 217 Opinion of the Court does not convey "an uncontrolled access right to the mine property to engage in any activity that the miners' rep- resentative wants." App. 49. Statutory inspections of petitioner's mine need occur only twice annually and are conducted with representatives of the Secretary and the operator. Because the miners' representative cannot re- ceive advance notice of an inspection, the ability of the non- employee UMWA designees to exercise these limited walk- around rights is speculative. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 31; Brief for International Union, UMWA, as Amicus Curiae 11, n. 2. Although it is possible that a miners' representative could abuse his privileges, we agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner has failed to demonstrate that such abuse, entirely hypothetical on the record before us, cannot be rem- edied on an individual basis under the Mine Act. See 969 F. 2d, at 976­977, and n. 6; Utah Power & Light Co. v. Secre- tary of Labor, 897 F. 2d 447, 452 (CA10 1990); Kerr-McGee Coal Corp. v. Secretary, 15 F. M. S. H. R. C. 352, 361­362 (1993).21 Nor will petitioner face any serious prehearing depriva- tion if it refuses to post the designations while challenging 21 Without addressing the merits of petitioner's underlying claim, we note that petitioner appears to misconstrue Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U. S. 527 (1992). The right of employers to exclude union organizers from their private property emanates from state common law, and while this right is not superseded by the NLRA, nothing in the NLRA expressly protects it. To the contrary, this Court consistently has maintained that the NLRA may entitle union employees to obtain access to an employer's property under limited circumstances. See id., at 537; NLRB v. Bab- cock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S. 105, 112 (1956). Moreover, in a related con- text, the Court has held that Congress' interest in regulating the mining industry may justify limiting the private property interests of mine opera- tors. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594 (1981) (unannounced Mine Act inspections do not violate the Fourth Amendment). 510us1$14F 06-18-97 17:31:47 PAGES OPINPGT 218 THUNDER BASIN COAL CO. v. REICH Opinion of the Court the Secretary's interpretation.22 Although the Act's civil penalties unquestionably may become onerous if petitioner chooses not to comply, the Secretary's penalty assessments become final and payable only after full review by both the Commission and the appropriate court of appeals. 30 U. S. C. §§ 820(i) and 816. A mine operator may request that the Commission expedite its proceedings, § 815(d), and tem- porary relief of certain orders is available from the Commis- sion and the court of appeals. §§ 815(b)(2) and 816(a)(2). Thus, this case does not present the situation confronted in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 148 (1908), in which the prac- tical effect of coercive penalties for noncompliance was to foreclose all access to the courts. Nor does this approach a situation in which compliance is sufficiently onerous and coercive penalties sufficiently potent that a constitutionally intolerable choice might be presented. V We conclude that the Mine Act's administrative structure was intended to preclude district court jurisdiction over peti- tioner's claims and that those claims can be meaningfully re- viewed through that structure consistent with due process.23 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. 22 We note that petitioner expressly disavows any abstract challenge to the Mine Act's statutory review scheme, but limits its due process claim to the present situation where the Act allegedly requires petitioner to relinquish an independent statutory right. See Brief for Petitioner 31, n. 31. 23 Because we have resolved this dispute on statutory preclusion grounds, we do not reach the parties' arguments concerning final agency action, a cause of action, ripeness, and exhaustion. 510us1$14F 06-18-97 17:31:47 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 200 (1994) 219 Opinion of Scalia, J. Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I join all except Parts III­B, IV, and V of the Court's opin- ion. The first of these consists of a discussion of the legisla- tive history of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Amend- ments Act of 1977, 30 U. S. C. § 801 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. IV), which is found to "confir[m]," ante, at 209, the Court's interpretation of the statute. I find that discussion unneces- sary to the decision. It serves to maintain the illusion that legislative history is an important factor in this Court's de- ciding of cases, as opposed to an omnipresent makeweight for decisions arrived at on other grounds. See Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U. S. 597, 617, 621 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). As to Part V: The only additional analysis introduced in that brief section is the proposition that "the parties' argu- ments concerning final agency action, a cause of action, ripe- ness, and exhaustion" need not be reached "[b]ecause we have resolved this dispute on statutory preclusion grounds." Ante, at 218, n. 23. That is true enough as to the claims disposed of in Part III, but quite obviously not true as to the constitutional claim disposed of in Part IV, which is rejected not on preclusion grounds but on the merits.* The alleged impediments to entertaining that claim must be considered. It suffices here to say that I do not consider them valid. *I understand Part IV to be dealing with the issue of whether the ex- clusion of judicial review adjudged in Part III is constitutional. Even though, as Part III has determined, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977 precludes judicial review of the agency action that is the subject of the present suit, the district court retains jurisdiction under the grant of general federal-question jurisdiction, see 28 U. S. C. § 1331, for the limited purpose of determining whether that preclusion it- self is unconstitutional and hence ineffective. Cf. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 282­285 (1922) (permitting habeas corpus review of deporta- tion orders); Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F. 2d 254, 257 (CA2 1948). 510us1$14F 06-18-97 17:31:47 PAGES OPINPGT 220 THUNDER BASIN COAL CO. v. REICH Opinion of Scalia, J. And finally, as to Part IV: The Court holds that the preclu- sion of review is constitutional "because neither compliance with, nor continued violation of, the statute will subject peti- tioner to a serious prehearing deprivation." Ante, at 216. I presume this means that any such deprivation will be de minimis (since I know of no doctrine which lets stand uncon- stitutional injury that is more than de minimis but short of some other criterion of gravity). It seems to me, however, that compliance with the inspection regulations will cause petitioner more than de minimis harm (assuming, as we must in evaluating the harm resulting from compliance, that petitioner is correct on the merits of his claims). Compli- ance will compel the company to allow union officials to enter its premises (and in a position of apparent authority, at that), notwithstanding its common-law right to exclude them, cf. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U. S. 527, 534­535 (1992). And compliance will provide at least some confidential business information to officers of the union. (The UMWA's conten- tion, on which the Court relies, that it is "speculative" whether a nonemployee miners' representative will be able to accompany the walk-arounds means only that such a rep- resentative may not always be able to do so. He will surely often be able to do so, since the statute requires that he "be given an opportunity to accompany" the inspector. 30 U. S. C. § 813(f).) In my view, however, the preclusion of pre-enforcement judicial review is constitutional whether or not compliance produces irreparable harm-at least if a summary penalty does not cause irreparable harm (e. g., if it is a recoverable summary fine) or if judicial review is provided before a pen- alty for noncompliance can be imposed. (The latter condi- tion exists here, as it does in most cases, because the penalty for noncompliance can only be imposed in court.) Were it otherwise, the availability of pre-enforcement challenges would have to be the rule rather than the exception, since complying with a regulation later held invalid almost always 510us1$14F 06-18-97 17:31:47 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 200 (1994) 221 Opinion of Scalia, J. produces the irreparable harm of nonrecoverable compliance costs. Petitioner's claim is that the imposition of a choice between (1) complying with what the Government says to be the law, and (2) risking potential penalties (without a prior opportunity to challenge the law in district court) denies due process. This is similar to the constitutional challenge brought in the line of cases beginning with Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), but with one crucial difference. As the Court notes, see ante, at 217­218, petitioner, unlike the plain- tiff in Young, had the option of complying and then bringing a judicial challenge. The constitutional defect in Young was that the dilemma of either obeying the law and thereby for- going any possibility of judicial review, or risking "enor- mous" and "severe" penalties, effectively cut off all access to the courts. See 209 U. S., at 146­148. That constitutional problem does not exist here, nor does any other of which I am aware. Cf. Bailey v. George, 259 U. S. 16, 19 (1922). I would decide the second constitutional challenge (Part IV) on the simple grounds that the company can obtain judicial review if it complies with the agency's request, and can ob- tain presanction judicial review if it does not. 510us1$15J 06-18-97 17:25:30 PAGES OPINPGT 222 OCTOBER TERM, 1993 Syllabus SCHIRO v. FARLEY, SUPERINTENDENT, INDIANA STATE PRISON, et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit No. 92­7549. Argued November 1, 1993-Decided January 19, 1994 At petitioner Schiro's state court trial on three counts of murder-includ- ing, in Count I, the charge that he "knowingly" killed the victim, and, in Count II, that he killed her while committing rape-the jury returned a verdict of guilty on Count II, but left the remaining verdict sheets blank. The trial court imposed the death sentence, finding that the State had proved the statutory aggravating factor that Schiro "com- mitted the murder by intentionally killing the victim while committing or attempting to commit . . . rape," and that no mitigating circumstances had been established. After twice affirming the sentence in state pro- ceedings, the Indiana Supreme Court again affirmed on remand from the Federal District Court in habeas proceedings, rejecting Schiro's argument that the jury's failure to convict him on the Count I murder charge operated as an acquittal of intentional murder, and that the Dou- ble Jeopardy Clause prohibited the use of the intentional murder aggra- vating circumstance for sentencing purposes. The Federal Court of Appeals accepted this conclusion in affirming the District Court's denial of habeas relief, ruling also that collateral estoppel was not implicated since Schiro had to show that the jury's verdict actually and necessarily determined the issue he sought to foreclose and his Count II conviction did not act as an acquittal with respect to the Count I murder charge. Held: 1. Although this Court undoubtedly has the discretion to reach the State's argument that granting relief to Schiro would require the retro- active application of a new rule, in violation of the principle announced in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, the Court will not do so in the present circumstances, where the State did not raise the Teague argument either in the lower courts or in its brief in opposition to the petition for a writ of certiorari. Pp. 228­229. 2. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not require vacation of Schiro's death sentence. His argument that his sentencing proceeding amounted to a successive prosecution for intentional murder in violation of the Clause is inconsistent with the Court's prior decisions. Because a second sentencing proceeding following retrial ordinarily is constitu- tional, see, e. g., Stroud v. United States, 251 U. S. 15, 17­18, an initial 510us1$15J 06-18-97 17:25:30 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 222 (1994) 223 Opinion of the Court sentencing proceeding following trial on the issue of guilt does not vio- late the Clause. The Court has also upheld the use of prior convictions to enhance sentences for subsequent convictions, even though this means a defendant must, in a certain sense, relitigate in a sentencing proceeding conduct for which he was previously tried. See, e. g., Spen- cer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554, 560. In short, as applied to successive prose- cutions, the Clause is written in terms of potential or risk of trial and conviction, not punishment. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S. 430, 438, 446, distinguished. Pp. 229­232. 3. Nor does the doctrine of collateral estoppel require vacation of Schiro's death sentence. The Court does not address his contention that the doctrine bars the use of the "intentional" murder aggravating circumstance, because he has not met his burden of establishing the factual predicate for the application of the doctrine, namely, that an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined in his favor. See, e. g., Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, 443. Specifically, because an examina- tion of the entire record shows that the trial court's instructions on the issue of intent to kill were ambiguous, and that uncertainty exists as to whether the jury believed it could return more than one verdict, the verdict actually entered could have been grounded on an issue other than intent to kill, see id., at 444, and, accordingly, Schiro has failed to demonstrate that it amounted to an acquittal on the intentional murder count. Pp. 232­236. 963 F. 2d 962, affirmed. O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 237. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, J., joined, post, p. 239. Monica Foster, by appointment of the Court, 508 U. S. 970, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs was Rhonda Long-Sharp. Arend J. Abel, Deputy Attorney General of Indiana, ar- gued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Pamela Carter, Attorney General, and Matthew R. Gutwein and Wayne E. Uhl, Deputy Attorneys General. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we determine whether the Double Jeopardy Clause requires us to vacate the sentence of death imposed 510us1$15J 06-18-97 17:25:30 PAGES OPINPGT 224 SCHIRO v. FARLEY Opinion of the Court on petitioner Thomas Schiro. For the reasons explained below, we hold that it does not. I Schiro was convicted and sentenced to death for murder. The body of Laura Luebbehusen was discovered in her home on the morning of February 5, 1981, by her roommate, Dar- lene Hooper, and Darlene Hooper's former husband. Dar- lene Hooper, who had been away, returned to find the home in disarray. Blood covered the walls and floor; Laura Lueb- behusen's semiclad body was lying near the entrance. The police recovered from the scene a broken vodka bottle, a han- dle and metal portions of an iron, and bottles of various types of liquor. The pathologist testified that there were a number of con- tusions on the body, including injuries to the head. The vic- tim also had lacerations on one nipple and a thigh, and a tear in the vagina, all caused after death. A forensic dentist determined that the thigh injury was caused by a human bite. The cause of death was strangulation. Laura Luebbehusen's car was later found near a halfway house where Schiro was living. Schiro told one counselor at the halfway house he wanted to discuss something "heavy." App. 53. Schiro later confessed to another counselor that he had committed the murder. After his arrest, he confessed to an inmate in the county jail that he had been drinking and taking Quaaludes the night of the killing, and that he had had intercourse with the victim both before and after killing her. Schiro also admitted the killing to his girlfriend, Mary Lee. Schiro told Mary Lee that he gained access to Laura Luebbehusen's house by telling her his car had broken down. Once in the house, he exposed himself to her. She told him that she was a lesbian, that she had been raped as a child, that she had never otherwise had intercourse before and did not want to have sex. Nonetheless, Schiro raped her nu- merous times. There was evidence that Schiro forced her 510us1$15J 06-18-97 17:25:30 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 222 (1994) 225 Opinion of the Court to consume drugs and alcohol. When Laura Luebbehusen tried to escape, Schiro restrained and raped her at least once more. Then, as Laura Luebbehusen lay or slept on the bed, Schiro realized that she would have to die so that she would not turn him in. He found the vodka bottle and beat her on the head with it until it broke. He then beat her with the iron and, when she resisted, finally strangled her to death. Schiro dragged her body into another room and sexually assaulted the corpse. After the murder, he attempted to destroy evidence linking him to the crime. II At the time of the crime, the State of Indiana defined murder as follows: "A person who: "(1) knowingly or intentionally kills another human being; or "(2) kills another human being while committing or attempting to commit arson, burglary, child molesting, criminal deviate conduct, kidnapping, rape or robbery; "commits murder, a felony." Ind. Code § 35­42­1­1 (Supp. 1978). Schiro was charged with three counts of murder. In Count I he was charged with "knowingly" killing Laura Luebbehu- sen; in Count II with killing her while committing the crime of rape; and in Count III with killing her while committing criminal deviate conduct. App. 3­5. The State sought the death penalty for Counts II and III. At trial, Schiro did not contest that he had killed Laura Luebbehusen. Indeed, in closing argument, Schiro's de- fense attorney stated: "Was there a killing? Sure, no doubt about it. Did Tom Schiro do it? Sure . . . . There's no question about it, I'm not going to try . . . and `bamboozle' this jury. There was a killing and he did it." App. to Brief for Respondent 24. Instead, the defense argued that Schiro 510us1$15J 06-18-97 17:25:30 PAGES OPINPGT 226 SCHIRO v. FARLEY Opinion of the Court either was not guilty by reason of insanity or was guilty but mentally ill, an alternative verdict permitted under Indiana law. The jury was given 10 possible verdicts, among them the 3 murder counts described above, the lesser included of- fenses of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, guilty but mentally ill, not guilty by reason of insanity, and not guilty. App. 37­38. After five hours of deliberation, the jury re- turned a verdict of guilty on Count II; it left the remaining verdict sheets blank. Under Indiana law, to obtain the death penalty the State is required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the exist- ence of at least one of nine aggravating factors. Ind. Code § 35­50­2­9(b) (Supp. 1978). The aggravating factor rele- vant here is: "[T]he defendant committed the murder by in- tentionally killing the victim while committing or attempting to commit . . . rape" or another enumerated felony. § 35­ 50­2­9(b)(1). Upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of an aggravating factor, the sentencer weighs the factor against any mitigating circumstances. When the initial conviction is by a jury, the "jury . . . reconvene[s] for the sentencing hearing" to "recommend to the court whether the death pen- alty should be imposed." §§ 35­50­2­9(d), (e). The trial judge makes "the final determination of the sentence, after considering the jury's recommendation." § 35­50­2­9(e)(2). "The court is not bound by the jury's recommendation," how- ever. Ibid. The primary issue at the sentencing hearing was the weight to be given Schiro's mitigating evidence. Defense counsel stated to the jury that "I assume by your verdict [at the guilt phase that] you've probably decided" that the aggravating circumstance was proved. App. to Brief for Respondent 31­32. He therefore confined his argument to a plea for leniency, citing Schiro's mental and emotional prob- lems. After considering the statements of counsel, the jury recommended against the death penalty. The trial judge 510us1$15J 06-18-97 17:25:30 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 222 (1994) 227 Opinion of the Court rejected the jury's recommendation and sentenced Schiro to death. While the case was pending on direct appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court granted the State's petition to remand the case to the trial court to make written findings of fact regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The trial court found that the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that "[t]he defendant committed the mur- der by intentionally killing the victim while committing or attempting to commit . . . rape." App. 46. The trial court also found that no mitigating circumstances had been estab- lished, and reaffirmed the sentence of death. Id., at 50. The sentence was affirmed on direct appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court. Schiro v. State, 451 N. E. 2d 1047 (1983). This Court denied certiorari. Schiro v. Indiana, 464 U. S. 1003 (1983). Schiro sought postconviction relief in state court. Again, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Schiro v. State, 479 N. E. 2d 556 (1985). This Court again denied a petition for a writ of certiorari. Schiro v. Indiana, 475 U. S. 1036 (1986). Schiro then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. The District Judge remanded the case to the Indiana courts for exhaustion of state remedies. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence for a third time. Schiro v. State, 533 N. E. 2d 1201 (1989). In so doing, the Indiana Supreme Court rejected Schiro's argument that the jury's failure to convict him on the first murder count oper- ated as an acquittal of intentional murder, and that the Dou- ble Jeopardy Clause prohibited the use of the intentional murder aggravating circumstance for sentencing purposes. The Indiana Supreme Court held that "[felony murder] is not an included offense of [murder] and where the jury, as in the instant case, finds the defendant guilty of one of the types of murder and remains silent on the other, it does not operate as an acquittal of the elements of the type of murder the jury 510us1$15J 06-18-97 17:25:30 PAGES OPINPGT 228 SCHIRO v. FARLEY Opinion of the Court chose not to consider." Id., at 1208. This Court denied certiorari. Schiro v. Indiana, 493 U. S. 910 (1989). The Federal District Court then denied Schiro's federal habeas petition. Schiro v. Clark, 754 F. Supp. 646 (ND Ind. 1990). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit af- firmed. Schiro v. Clark, 963 F. 2d 962 (1992). The Court of Appeals accepted the Indiana Supreme Court's conclusion that the jury's verdict was not an acquittal on the Count I murder charge, and that the Double Jeopardy Clause was not violated by the use of the intentional murder aggravating circumstance. The Court of Appeals also concluded that collateral estoppel was not implicated since "the defendant must show that the jury's verdict actually and necessarily determined the issue he seeks to foreclose" and "Schiro's con- viction for murder/rape did not act as an acquittal with re- spect to the pure murder charge as a matter of state law." Id., at 970, n. 7. We granted certiorari, 508 U. S. 905 (1993), to con- sider whether the trial court violated the Double Jeopardy Clause by relying on the intentional murder aggravat- ing circumstance. III The State argues that granting relief to Schiro would re- quire the retroactive application of a new rule, in violation of the principle announced in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion). Teague analysis is ordinarily our first step when we review a federal habeas case. See, e. g., Graham v. Collins, 506 U. S. 461, 466­467 (1993). The Teague bar to the retroactive application of new rules is not, however, jurisdictional. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U. S. 37, 40­41 (1990). In this case, the State did not raise the Teague argument in the lower courts. Cf. Parke v. Raley, 506 U. S. 20, 26 (1993). While we ordinarily do not review claims made for the first time in this Court, see, e. g., Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U. S. 638, 645­646 (1992), we recog- nize that the State, as respondent, is entitled to rely on any 510us1$15J 06-18-97 17:25:30 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 222 (1994) 229 Opinion of the Court legal argument in support of the judgment below. See, e. g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 475, n. 6 (1970). Nevertheless, the State failed to argue Teague in its brief in opposition to the petition for a writ of certiorari. In de- ciding whether to grant certiorari in a particular case, we rely heavily on the submissions of the parties at the petition stage. See this Court's Rule 15.1. If, as in this case, a legal issue appears to warrant review, we grant certiorari in the expectation of being able to decide that issue. Since a State can waive the Teague bar by not raising it, see Godinez v. Moran, 509 U. S. 389, 397, n. 8 (1993), and since the propriety of reaching the merits of a dispute is an important consider- ation in deciding whether or not to grant certiorari, the State's omission of any Teague defense at the petition stage is significant. Although we undoubtedly have the discretion to reach the State's Teague argument, we will not do so in these circumstances. IV Schiro first argues that he could not be sentenced to death based on the intentional murder aggravating circumstance, because the sentencing proceeding amounted to a successive prosecution for intentional murder in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. We have recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause con- sists of several protections: "It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after con- viction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 717 (1969) (footnotes omitted). These protections stem from the underlying premise that a defendant should not be twice tried or punished for the same offense. United States v. Wilson, 420 U. S. 332, 339 (1975). The Clause operates as a "bar against repeated attempts to convict, with consequent subjection of the defendant to embarrassment, expense, anxi- ety, and insecurity, and the possibility that he may be found 510us1$15J 06-18-97 17:25:30 PAGES OPINPGT 230 SCHIRO v. FARLEY Opinion of the Court guilty even though innocent." United States v. DiFran- cesco, 449 U. S. 117, 136 (1980). When a defendant has been acquitted, the "Clause guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict him." Wil- son, supra, at 343. Where, however, there is "no threat of either multiple punishment or successive prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended." 420 U. S., at 344 (footnote omitted). Thus, our cases establish that the pri- mary evil to be guarded against is successive prosecutions: "[T]he prohibition against multiple trials is the controlling constitutional principle." DiFrancesco, supra, at 132 (inter- nal citations omitted). See also United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564, 569 (1977). Schiro urges us to treat the sentencing phase of a single prosecution as a successive prosecution for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. We decline to do so. Our prior decisions are inconsistent with the argument that a first sen- tencing proceeding can amount to a successive prosecution. In Stroud v. United States, 251 U. S. 15, 17­18 (1919), we held that where a defendant's murder conviction was overturned on appeal, the defendant could be resentenced after retrial. Similarly, we found no constitutional infirmity in holding a second sentencing hearing where the first sentence was im- properly based on a prior conviction for which the defendant had been pardoned. Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U. S. 33 (1988). See also North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, at 721 ("[W]e cannot say that the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy of its own weight restricts the imposition of an oth- erwise lawful single punishment" upon retrial); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U. S. 17, 23­24 (1973) (same). If a second sentencing proceeding ordinarily does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, we fail to see how an initial sentencing proceeding could do so. We have also upheld the use of prior convictions to en- hance sentences for subsequent convictions, even though this means a defendant must, in a certain sense, relitigate in a 510us1$15J 06-18-97 17:25:30 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 222 (1994) 231 Opinion of the Court sentencing proceeding conduct for which he was previously tried. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554, 560 (1967). Cf. Moore v. Missouri, 159 U. S. 673, 678 (1895) ("[T]he State may undoubtedly provide that persons who have been before convicted of a crime may suffer severer punishment for sub- sequent offences than for a first offence"). In short, as ap- plied to successive prosecutions, the Clause "is written in terms of potential or risk of trial and conviction, not punish- ment." Price v. Georgia, 398 U. S. 323, 329 (1970). Our decision in Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S. 430 (1981), is not to the contrary. Bullington was convicted of capital murder. At the first death penalty sentencing pro- ceeding, the jury rejected the death penalty and sentenced him to a term of years. The conviction was overturned; on resentencing the State again sought the death penalty. In Bullington we recognized the general rule that "the Double Jeopardy Clause imposes no absolute prohibition against the imposition of a harsher sentence at retrial." Id., at 438. Nonetheless, we recognized a narrow exception to this gen- eral principle because the capital sentencing scheme at issue "differ[ed] significantly from those employed in any of the Court's cases where the Double Jeopardy Clause has been held inapplicable to sentencing." Ibid. Because the capital sentencing proceeding "was itself a trial on the issue of pun- ishment," ibid., requiring a defendant to submit to a second, identical proceeding was tantamount to permitting a second prosecution of an acquitted defendant, id., at 446. This case is manifestly different. Neither the prohibition against a successive trial on the issue of guilt nor the Bull- ington prohibition against a second capital sentencing pro- ceeding is implicated here-the State did not reprosecute Schiro for intentional murder, nor did it force him to submit to a second death penalty hearing. It simply conducted a single sentencing hearing in the course of a single prosecu- tion. The state is entitled to "one fair opportunity" to pros- ecute a defendant, Bullington, supra, at 446 (internal quota- 510us1$15J 06-18-97 17:25:30 PAGES OPINPGT 232 SCHIRO v. FARLEY Opinion of the Court tion marks omitted), and that opportunity extends not only to prosecution at the guilt phase, but also to present evidence at an ensuing sentencing proceeding. V Schiro also contends that principles of constitutional collat- eral estoppel require vacation of his death sentence. In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436 (1970), we held that the Double Jeopardy Clause incorporates the doctrine of collat- eral estoppel in criminal proceedings. See also Dowling v. United States, 493 U. S. 342, 347 (1990). Collateral estoppel, or, in modern usage, issue preclusion, "means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." Ashe, 397 U. S., at 443. Schiro reasons that the jury acquitted him of "intentionally" murdering Laura Luebbehusen, and that as a result, the trial court was precluded from finding the exist- ence of the aggravating circumstance that he "committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim while committing or attempting to commit . . . rape." We do not address whether collateral estoppel could bar the use of the "inten- tional" murder aggravating circumstance, because Schiro has not met his burden of establishing the factual predicate for the application of the doctrine, if it were applicable, namely, that an "issue of ultimate fact has once been determined" in his favor. Ibid. The Indiana Supreme Court concluded that the jury ver- dict did not amount to an acquittal on the intentional murder count. Schiro v. State, 533 N. E. 2d, at 1201. Ordinarily on habeas review, we presume the correctness of state court findings of fact. See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). Cf. also Cichos v. Indiana, 385 U. S. 76, 79­80 (1966). The preclusive effect of the jury's verdict, however, is a question of federal law which we must review de novo. Cf. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S., at 444. 510us1$15J 06-18-97 17:25:30 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 222 (1994) 233 Opinion of the Court We must first determine "whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than" Schiro's intent to kill. Ibid. Cf. 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4421, p. 192 (1981) ("Issue preclusion attaches only to determinations that were necessary to support the judgment entered in the first ac- tion"). To do so, we "examine the record of a prior proceed- ing taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter . . . ." Ashe v. Swenson, supra, at 444 (internal quotation marks omitted). The burden is "on the defendant to demonstrate that the issue whose relitigation he seeks to foreclose was actually decided in the first pro- ceeding." Dowling, 493 U. S., at 350. In Dowling, for ex- ample, the defendant contended that because he had been acquitted of a robbery, the jury must have concluded that he had not been present at the crime. Ibid. In rejecting that argument, we considered the fact that during the trial there was a discussion between the lawyers and the judge where it was asserted that the intruder's identity was not a factual issue in the case. Id., at 351. Because there were "any number of possible explanations for the jury's acquittal verdict," the defendant had "failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating" that he was not one of the intruders. Id., at 352. Applying these principles, we find that the jury could have grounded its verdict on an issue other than Schiro's intent to kill. The jury was not instructed to return verdicts on all the counts listed on the verdict sheets. In fact, there are indications in the record that the jury might have believed it could only return one verdict. In closing argument at the guilt phase, defense counsel told the jury that it would "have to go back there and try to figure out which one of eight or ten verdicts . . . that you will return back into this Court." App. to Brief for Respondents 17. The prosecution also told the jury that "you are only going to be allowed to return one verdict." Id., at 27. Although the jury instructions indi- 510us1$15J 06-18-97 17:25:30 PAGES OPINPGT 234 SCHIRO v. FARLEY Opinion of the Court cated to the jury that more than one verdict was possible, id., at 27­28, on this record it is impossible to tell which of these statements the jury relied on. The dissent concludes that the jury acquitted on Count I for lack of intent, based on the fact that the only way the jury could have expressed that conclusion was by leaving the Count I verdict form blank, as it did. What stands in the way of such an infer- ence, however, is that the jury would also have acted as it did after reaching a guilty verdict on Count II but without ever deliberating on Count I. In short, since it was not clear to the jury that it needed to consider each count independ- ently, we will not draw any particular conclusion from its failure to return a verdict on Count I. The jury instructions on the issue of intent to kill were also ambiguous. Under Indiana law, a person who either "knowingly or intentionally kills another human being" or "kills another human being while committing or attempting to commit . . . rape" is guilty of "murder." Ind. Code § 35­ 42­1­1 (Supp. 1978). Thus, intent to kill is not required for a felony murder conviction. Schiro reasons that since the jury found him guilty of felony murder in the course of a rape, but failed to convict him of intentional murder, the jury must have found that he did not have an intent to kill. We do not so interpret the jury's failure to convict on Count I, however. Although the jury was provided with the state law definition of murder, App. 21, the judge also in- structed the jury that the State had to prove intent for both felony and intentional murder: "To sustain the charge of murder, the State must prove . . . [t]hat the defendant en- gaged in the conduct which caused the death of Laura Lueb- behusen [and] [t]hat when the defendant did so, he knew the conduct would or intended the conduct to cause the death of Laura Luebbehusen." Id., at 22­23 (emphasis added). This instruction did not differentiate between the two ways of proving "murder" under Indiana law. The jury was fur- 510us1$15J 06-18-97 17:25:30 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 222 (1994) 235 Opinion of the Court ther told that "[t]he instructions of the court are the best source as to the law applicable to this case." Id., at 20. The jury may well have believed, therefore, that it was re- quired to find a knowing or intentional killing in order to convict Schiro on any of the three murder counts. In sum, in light of the jury instructions, we find that as a matter of law the jury verdict did not necessarily depend on a finding that Schiro lacked an intent to kill. Although not necessary to our conclusion, we note that there is additional evidence in the record indicating that Schiro's intent to kill was not a significant issue in the case. The defense primarily confined its proof at trial to showing that Schiro was insane, and did not dispute that Schiro had committed the murder. At no point during the guilt phase did defense counsel or any of the defense witnesses assert that Schiro should be acquitted on Count I because he lacked an intent to kill. Indeed, we have located no point in the transcript of the proceedings where defense counsel or de- fense witnesses even discussed the issue of Schiro's intent to kill. Schiro argues that his intent to kill was put in issue by the insanity defense. But, even if that were so, the jury did not accept this defense. Even defense counsel appar- ently believed that Schiro's intent was not an issue in the case. After the jury returned its verdict of guilty on Count II, and reconvened to consider the appropriate sentence, de- fense counsel indicated his belief that by convicting Schiro on Count II, the jury had found that he had an intent to kill: "The statute . . . provides for aggravating circumstances. There is one listed in this case, and one which you may consider. And that one is that the murder was com- mitted, was intentionally committed in the commission of rape and some other things. I assume by your ver- dict Friday, or Saturday, that you've probably . . . de- cided that issue. In finding him guilty of murder in the commission of rape, I'm assuming you've decided beyond 510us1$15J 06-18-97 17:25:30 PAGES OPINPGT 236 SCHIRO v. FARLEY Opinion of the Court a reasonable doubt that it was done in the commission of a rape, and so that aggravating circumstance most likely exists in your mind." App. to Brief for Respond- ent 31­32. Finally, we observe that a jury finding of intent to kill is entirely consistent with the evidence presented at trial. By Schiro's own admission, he decided to kill Laura Luebbehu- sen after she tried to escape and he realized she would go to the police. In addition, the physical evidence suggested a deliberate, rather than unintentional, accidental, or even reckless, killing. The victim was repeatedly beaten with a bottle and an iron; when she resisted, she was strangled to death. We have in some circumstances considered jury silence as tantamount to an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes. Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 190­191 (1957); Price v. Georgia, 398 U. S., at 329. The failure to return a verdict does not have collateral estoppel effect, however, unless the record establishes that the issue was actually and necessarily decided in the defendant's favor. As explained above, our cases require an examination of the entire record to deter- mine whether the jury could have "grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to fore- close from consideration." Ashe, 397 U. S., at 444 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Dowling, 493 U. S., at 350. In view of Schiro's confession to the killing, the in- struction requiring the jury to find intent to kill, and the uncertainty as to whether the jury believed it could return more than one verdict, we find that Schiro has not met his "burden . . . to demonstrate that the issue whose relitigation he seeks to foreclose was actually decided" in his favor. Ibid. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. So ordered. 510us1$15J 06-18-97 17:25:30 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 222 (1994) 237 Blackmun, J., dissenting Justice Blackmun, dissenting. I join Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion. I write separately because I believe Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S. 430 (1981), provides a compelling alternative ground for vacation of Schiro's death sentence. In Bullington, this Court held that once a capital defend- ant is acquitted of the death sentence, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars his again being placed in jeopardy of death at a subsequent sentencing proceeding. The majority rejects Schiro's double jeopardy claim on the theory that because "a second sentencing proceeding ordinarily does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause," it fails to see "how an initial sen- tencing proceeding could do so." Ante, at 230. The essen- tial holding of Bullington, however, was that capital sentenc- ing proceedings uniquely can constitute a "jeopardy" under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The proceeding examined in Bullington had "the hallmarks of the trial on guilt or inno- cence," 451 U. S., at 439, where the prosecution must "prov[e] its case" beyond a reasonable doubt, id., at 443. We con- cluded that such a bifurcated capital penalty proceeding is it- self a trial that places a defendant in jeopardy of death. Ibid. The sentencing proceeding at issue here is indistinguish- able from that confronted in Bullington. As Justice De- Bruler noted in dissent from the affirmance of Schiro's sen- tence on direct appeal: "[T]he jury reconvenes in court for the sentencing hear- ing. It is presided over by the judge. The defendant is present with his counsel and the state by its trial prosecutor. Evidence is presented in an adversarial setting . . . . The burden is upon the state to prove the aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. The lawyers make final arguments to the jury. The jury retires to deliberate and returns into open court with its verdict in the form of a recommendation. This is a full scale jury trial in every sense of those terms. The defendant must surely feel that he is in `direct peril' 510us1$15J 06-18-97 17:25:30 PAGES OPINPGT 238 SCHIRO v. FARLEY Blackmun, J., dissenting of receiving the death penalty as he stands to receive the recommendation of the jury." Schiro v. State, 451 N. E. 2d 1047, 1065 (Ind. 1983) (citation omitted). The "unique" nature of modern capital sentencing proceed- ings identified in Bullington, 451 U. S., at 442, n. 15, derives from the fundamental principle that death is "different," see, e. g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S. 349, 357 (1977) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring), and that heightened reliability is required at all stages of the capital trial. The "trial-like" nature of Schiro's capital sentencing proceeding, and the trauma he necessarily underwent in de- fending against the sentence of death, are directly analogous to guilt-phase proceedings and thus bring the Double Jeop- ardy Clause into play. Even if the issue of Schiro's intent to kill was not "actually and necessarily decided" for collateral estoppel purposes, ante, at 236, the jury's failure to convict Schiro of intentional murder impliedly acquitted him under the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 191 (1957) (jury "was given a full opportunity to return a verdict"); Price v. Georgia, 398 U. S. 323, 329 (1970). As Justice Ste- vens pointedly notes, post, at 243, there is no question that Schiro could not have been reprosecuted for intentional mur- der. Nor is there any question that the aggravator required the prosecution to prove again at sentencing, beyond a rea- sonable doubt, the identical elements of that murder charge. Thus, "the jury ha[d] already acquitted the defendant of whatever was necessary to impose the death sentence." 451 U. S., at 445. Over a unanimous jury recommendation of life and after a State Supreme Court remand, the trial judge condemned Schiro to death in reliance nunc pro tunc on the very conduct for which Schiro had been acquitted. This sentence cannot be tolerated under the Double Jeopardy Clause. I respectfully dissent. 510us1$15J 06-18-97 17:25:30 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 222 (1994) 239 Stevens, J., dissenting Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Blackmun joins, dissenting. The jury found Thomas Schiro guilty of felony murder but not intentional murder. Thereafter, in a separate sentenc- ing hearing, the same jury unanimously concluded that Schiro did not deserve the death penalty, presumably be- cause he had not intended to kill.1 Nevertheless, without finding any aggravating circumstance, the trial judge over- rode the jury's recommendation and sentenced Schiro to death. Months later, when the Indiana Supreme Court re- manded the case to give the judge an opportunity to justify that sentence, the judge found that Schiro had intentionally killed his victim. That finding, like the majority's holding today, violated the central purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause. After the issue of intent had been raised at trial and twice resolved by the jury, and long after that jury had been discharged, it was constitutionally impermissible for the trial judge to reexamine the issue. Because the death sentence rests entirely on that unauthorized finding, the law requires that it be set aside. I The Court devotes most of its opinion to a discussion of the facts. I cannot disagree that the gruesome character of the crime is significant. It is important precisely because it is so favorable to prosecutors seeking the death penalty. 1 Under Indiana's death penalty statute, the State may seek the death penalty for murder by proving beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance. Ind. Code § 35­50­2­ 9(a) (Supp. 1978). The only aggravating circumstance at issue here was whether the defendant committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim while committing or attempting to commit rape or one of six other enumerated felonies. § 35­50­2­9(b)(1). When trial is by jury, the jury that convicted the defendant may recommend the death penalty only if it finds that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one aggravating circumstance exists and that the aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances. § 35­50­2­9(e). 510us1$15J 06-18-97 17:25:30 PAGES OPINPGT 240 SCHIRO v. FARLEY Stevens, J., dissenting Such facts undoubtedly would increase jurors' inclination to impose the death penalty if they believed the defendant had intentionally killed his unfortunate victim. Yet in this case, despite the horror of the crime, the jurors still unanimously refused to find Schiro guilty of intentional murder and unani- mously concluded that he should not be executed. These determinations are enigmatic unless the jury resolved the intent issue in Schiro's favor. The principal issue at trial was Schiro's mental condition. No one disputed that he had caused his victim's death, but intent remained at issue in other ways. Five expert wit- nesses-two employed by the State, one selected by the court, and two called by the defense-testified at length about Schiro's unusual personality, e. g., Tr. 1699, his drug and alcohol addiction, id., at 1859, 1877, and his history of mental illness, e. g., id., at 1412, 1414, 1703­1708, 1871, 1877. Lay and expert witnesses described Schiro's bizarre attach- ment to a mannequin, id., at 1469­1470, 1699­1702, and other incidents that lent support to a claim of diminished capacity. Conceivably, that evidence might have persuaded the jury to find Schiro not responsible by reason of insanity, App. 37, or guilty of murder, voluntary manslaughter, or involuntary manslaughter but mentally ill, id., at 37­38. Instead, that evidence and the details of Schiro's confessions apparently convinced the jury that at the time of his offense, Schiro did not have the requisite mental state to support a conviction for intentional murder. A careful perusal of the verdict forms demonstrates that there is nothing even arguably ambiguous about the jury's verdict and that the jurors expressed their conclusion in the only way they could. Each of the 10 forms contained a space to be checked to record agreement with a proposed verdict. The only way to record disagreement was to leave the space blank. Thus, by leaving nine forms blank and checking only one, the jurors rejected seven alternatives that were favor- able to the defendant (two involving lesser offenses, one 510us1$15J 06-18-97 17:25:30 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 222 (1994) 241 Stevens, J., dissenting finding the defendant not responsible by reason of insanity, three finding him guilty of murder or lesser offenses but mentally ill, and one finding him not guilty of anything), re- jected two alternatives favorable to the prosecution (guilty on Counts I and III), and ultimately recorded their conclu- sion that he was guilty on Count II.2 The jurors therefore found Schiro guilty on Count II and not guilty on the remain- der of the charges. Notably, only the fourth verdict form provided for a not guilty verdict, and that form could not be executed unless the defendant was not guilty of all charges. The only way the jurors could return a verdict of guilty on Count II and not guilty on the other counts was to check the fifth form and leave the others blank-which is exactly what they did. Even if the record were less clear, the governing rule of law would lead to the same conclusion. After a full trial, the jury was given the opportunity to find Schiro guilty on each of three counts of murder, on just two of those counts, or on just one. As in the similar situation in Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184 (1957), the jury's silence on two counts 2 Each form began: "We, the jury, find the defendant . . . ." The 10 alternatives were: (1) ". . . not responsible by reason of insanity at the time of the death . . . ." (2) ". . . guilty of Murder but mentally ill . . . ." (3) ". . . guilty of the Murder of Laura Luebbehusen as charged in Count I of the information." (4) ". . . not guilty." (5) ". . . guilty of Murder while the said Thomas N. Schiro was commit- ting and attempting the crime of rape as charged in Count II of the information." (6) ". . . guilty while . . . committing and attempting to commit the crime of criminal deviate conduct as charged in Count III of the information." (7) ". . . guilty of . . . the included offense of Voluntary Manslaughter." (8) ". . . guilty of . . . the included offense of Involuntary Manslaughter." (9) ". . . guilty of . . . Voluntary Manslaughter, but mentally ill." (10) ". . . guilty of . . . Involuntary Manslaughter, but mentally ill." App. 37­38. 510us1$15J 06-18-97 17:25:30 PAGES OPINPGT 242 SCHIRO v. FARLEY Stevens, J., dissenting should be treated no differently, for double jeopardy pur- poses, than if the jury had returned a verdict that expressly read: " `We find the defendant not guilty of intentional mur- der but guilty of murder in the second degree.' " Id., at 191.3 The only rational explanation for such a verdict is a failure of proof on the issue of intent-a failure that should have precluded relitigation of that issue at sentencing. As Justice DeBruler of the Indiana Supreme Court explained in his dissenting opinion: "At the trial, the prosecution used every resource at its disposal to persuade the jury that appellant had a knowing state of mind when he killed his victim. It failed to do so. At the sentencing hearing before the jury it had an opportunity to persuade the jury that ap- pellant had an intentional state of mind when he killed his victim. The jury returned a recommendation of no death. At the sentencing hearing before the judge, the prosecution had yet another opportunity to demonstrate an intentional state of mind, and finally succeeded. In my view, the silent verdict of the jury on Count I, charg- ing a knowing state of mind, must be deemed the consti- tutional equivalent of a final and immutable rejection of the State's claim that appellant deserves to die because he had an intentional state of mind. That verdict ac- quitted appellant of that condition which was necessary to impose the death penalty under this charge." Schiro v. State, 533 N. E. 2d 1201, 1209 (1989). In this case the trial judge's decision to override the jury's recommendation against the death sentence rested entirely on his finding that Schiro had intentionally killed his vic- 3 "American courts have held with uniformity that where a defendant is charged with two offenses, neither of which is a lesser offense included within the other, and has been found guilty on one but not on the second he cannot be tried again on the second . . . ." 355 U. S., at 194, n. 14. See also Price v. Georgia, 398 U. S. 323, 328­329 (1970). 510us1$15J 06-18-97 17:25:30 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 222 (1994) 243 Stevens, J., dissenting tim-an aggravating circumstance that, in Indiana capital sentencing proceedings, must be established beyond a rea- sonable doubt. Ind. Code § 35­50­2­9(e)(1) (Supp. 1978). In other words, the judge sentenced Schiro to death because he was guilty of intentional murder, even though the jury had found otherwise. Even though the Court has held that the Constitution does not preclude a judge from overriding a jury's recommendation of a life sentence, Spaziano v. Flor- ida, 468 U. S. 447, 490 (1984), an egregious violation of the collateral estoppel principles embedded in the Double Jeop- ardy Clause occurs if the judge can base a capital sentence on a factual predicate that the jury has rejected.4 That is what happened here. II Having failed to convict Schiro of intentional murder after a full trial, the State plainly could not retry him for that offense after the jury was discharged. An estoppel that would bar a retrial should equally foreclose a death sentence predicated on a postverdict reexamination of the central issue resolved by the jury against the State. Schiro's execu- tion will nonetheless go forward because the trial judge 4 To be sure, it is generally accepted among the Federal Courts of Ap- peals that a judge may base a sentence in a noncapital case upon factors that the jury did not find beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e. g., United States v. Carrozza, 4 F. 3d 70, 80 (CA1 1993); United States v. Olderbak, 961 F. 2d 756, 764­765 (CA8), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 959 (1992); United States v. Averi, 922 F. 2d 765, 765­766 (CA11 1991); United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F. 2d 177, 180­182 (CA2), cert. denied, 498 U. S. 844 (1990); United States v. Isom, 886 F. 2d 736, 738­739 (CA4 1989); United States v. Juarez-Ortega, 866 F. 2d 747, 749 (CA5 1989); see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U. S. 79 (1986) (applying preponderance- of-evidence standard to sentencing considerations under state mandatory minimum statute satisfies due process). This view stems from the lower standard of proof required to establish sentencing factors in noncapital cases. United States v. Mocciola, 891 F. 2d 13, 16­17 (CA1 1989). But reliance upon this principle cannot sustain such a practice in a capital case where the sentencing factors-just as the elements at trial-must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 510us1$15J 06-18-97 17:25:30 PAGES OPINPGT 244 SCHIRO v. FARLEY Stevens, J., dissenting made a postverdict finding equivalent to a determination that Schiro was guilty of intentional murder. The Court attempts to justify this anomalous result by relying on the improbable assumption that the jury may not have resolved the intent issue in Schiro's favor. The Court advances three reasons in support of that assumption: Schiro's "confession to the killing, the instruction requiring the jury to find intent to kill, and the uncertainty as to whether the jury believed it could return more than one verdict." Ante, at 236.5 None justifies the majority's result. As to Schiro's confessions, such statements must be evalu- ated in the context of the entire record. Even though they would have been sufficient to support a guilty verdict on the intentional murder count, it is quite wrong to suggest that they necessitated such a verdict. See Schiro v. State, 451 N. E. 2d 1047, 1068 (Ind. 1983) (Prentice, J., concurring and dissenting) (stating that a finding of intentional killing "was not compelled"). The record as a whole, including the ex- perts' testimony, is fully consistent with the conclusion that the jury rejected the prosecutor's submission on the intent question. 5 The Court correctly avoids reliance upon the quite different rationale- namely, the distinction between a "knowing" killing and an "intentional" killing-that the Indiana Supreme Court adopted. Noting that Count I merely required the jury to find that Schiro had "knowingly" killed his victim, whereas the aggravating circumstance supporting the death pen- alty required proof that he had "intentionally" killed, the court concluded that the verdict on Count I "could not be considered to have included any conclusion" on the intent issue raised at the sentencing hearing. Schiro v. State, 533 N. E. 2d 1201, 1208 (Ind. 1989). Yet because an "intentional" killing requires greater awareness of the consequences of the act than a "knowing" killing, such an illusory distinction is plainly unsatisfactory. As the dissenting justices pointed out, the difference between the two states of mind is insignificant and, in this instance, esoteric: "To accord the difference, one would have to believe that a person can be presently unaware that he is strangling another, while at the same time having a goal presently in mind to strangle such other person." Id., at 1209. 510us1$15J 06-18-97 17:25:30 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 222 (1994) 245 Stevens, J., dissenting The Court also seeks support from the trial court's In- struction No. 8, which informed the jury that to sustain the charge of murder, the State had to prove intent. Ante, at 234.6 Most naturally read, however, that instruction re- ferred only to the knowing or intentional murder charge in Count I. It did not, as the Court's opinion suggests, ex- pressly refer to "both" felony and intentional murder, ibid.; on the contrary, it made no mention of felony murder. In Indiana, intent to kill is not an element of felony murder. Accordingly, the definition of murder in Instruction No. 4 clearly indicated that a person commits murder either when he knowingly or intentionally kills someone or when he "[k]ills another human being while committing or attempting to commit arson, burglary, child molesting, criminal deviate conduct, kidnapping, rape or robbery." App. 21; Ind. Code § 35­42­2­1 (Supp. 1978). If Instruction No. 8 were in- tended to refer to the felony murder charges in Counts II and III, it plainly misstated the law. The instruction did accurately state the elements of the knowing or intentional murder charge in Count I, however. It is worth noting that not one of the seven opinions that various members of the Indiana Supreme Court wrote at different stages of this liti- gation construed that instruction as applicable to Counts II and III.7 6 Specifically, Instruction No. 8 provided that "to sustain the charge of murder," the State must prove (1) that "the defendant engaged in the conduct which caused the death of Laura Luebbehusen," and (2) that "when the defendant did so, he knew the conduct would or intended the conduct to cause the death of Laura Luebbehusen." App. 22­23. The instruction further stated that "[i]f you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the defendant was not insane at the time of the murder, then you should find the defendant guilty." Id., at 23. 7 If, as the Court assumes, the jury believed "that it was required to find a knowing or intentional killing in order to convict Schiro on any of the three murder counts," ante, at 235, there is no rational explanation for its failure to return a guilty verdict for intentional murder (Count I) if it 510us1$15J 06-18-97 17:25:30 PAGES OPINPGT 246 SCHIRO v. FARLEY Stevens, J., dissenting Finally, the Court surmises that the jury "might have be- lieved it could only return one verdict." Ante, at 233. In view of the trial court's instruction that the jury foreman "must sign and date the verdict(s) to which you all agree," App. 28, this speculation is unfounded. Similarly unwar- ranted is the majority's reliance upon isolated remarks by the prosecution and defense counsel to substantiate this speculation. Defense counsel understandably urged the jury to return only one verdict because he was seeking a verdict that would exonerate his client or minimize his culpa- bility. Any one of 7 of the 10 forms submitted to the jury would have served that purpose. In fact, after defense counsel made the amorphous reference to one verdict in his closing argument, he went on to suggest that the jurors consider first the question of insanity, "because depending on that, you may just stop there or go on." App. to Brief for Respondents 17 (emphasis added). As to the prosecutor's comment about "one verdict," id., at 27, if that statement meant that the jury could only return 1 of the 10 forms, it blatantly misstated Indiana law.8 More plausibly, the comment referred to a verdict in the general sense as the jury's one opportunity to return one or more verdict forms. In any event, we should not uphold a death sentence based on such an insubstantial and improper predicate. Nothing the Indiana Supreme Court said supports the Court's speculation about the jury's reasons for failing to return a guilty verdict on Count I. Moreover, the Court believed convicting Schiro of killing during the commission of rape (Count II) also required a knowing or intentional killing. 8 The judge's final instructions to the jury set forth no limitation on the number of verdicts it might properly return, and Indiana juries have regularly found a defendant guilty of both mens rea murder and felony murder with respect to a single killing. See, e. g., Roche v. State, 596 N. E. 2d 896 (Ind. 1992); Lewis v. State, 595 N. E. 2d 753 (Ind. App. 1992); Hopkins v. State, 582 N. E. 2d 345 (Ind. 1991). 510us1$15J 06-18-97 17:25:30 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 222 (1994) 247 Stevens, J., dissenting refuses to acknowledge that the only way the jury could use the verdict forms submitted to it to express the conclusion that Schiro was guilty on Count II and not guilty on Counts I and III was to do just what it did-that is, to authorize the foreman to sign the verdict form for felony murder and to leave blank those forms for intentional murder and criminal deviate conduct.9 Once found not guilty of intentional mur- der, Schiro could not thereafter have been prosecuted a sec- ond time for that offense. Given that Schiro admitted the killing, the only issue that the jury's verdict on Count I could possibly have resolved in his favor is the intent issue. Since there is not even an arguable basis for assuming that the jury's verdict on Count I was grounded on any other issue, the collateral estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause also precluded the State from attempting to prove intentional murder at the penalty phase to support a sen- tence of death. As Justice Stewart explained in his opinion for the Court in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, 444 (1970) (footnotes omitted): "The federal decisions have made clear that the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal cases is not to be ap- plied with the hypertechnical and archaic approach of a 19th century pleading book, but with realism and ration- 9 The Court's suggestion that the jury may have reached "a guilty ver- dict on Count II . . . without ever deliberating on Count I," ante, at 234, is not only pure speculation, but highly improbable. Presumably jurors would normally begin their deliberations with the first count in the indict- ment or the first verdict form the court submitted to them. It is also noteworthy that the record explains why the jury concluded that Schiro was not guilty of killing while committing or attempting to commit criminal deviate conduct as charged in Count III-namely, that Schiro killed his victim prior to the deviate sexual conduct on which the charge was based rather than while he was engaged in that predicate felony. Thus the record fully supports the jury's disposition of the three counts at the guilt phase of the trial as well as its decision at the penalty phase. 510us1$15J 06-18-97 17:25:30 PAGES OPINPGT 248 SCHIRO v. FARLEY Stevens, J., dissenting ality. Where a previous judgment of acquittal was based upon a general verdict, as is usually the case, this approach requires a court to `examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evi- dence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.' The inquiry `must be set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings.' Sealfon v. United States, 332 U. S. 575, 579. Any test more technically restrictive would, of course, simply amount to a rejec- tion of the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal proceed- ings, at least in every case where the first judgment was based upon a general verdict of acquittal." A fair appraisal of the general verdict of acquittal on Count I compels the conclusion that Schiro's death sentence rests entirely on the trial judge's constitutionally impermissible reexamination of the critical issue resolved in Schiro's favor by the jury's verdict on Count I. The Court's contrary con- clusion rests on a "technically restrictive" approach that amounts to a rejection of the rule of collateral estoppel in capital sentencing proceedings. I respectfully dissent. 510us2$16H 06-18-97 17:06:35 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1993 249 Syllabus NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC., et al. v. SCHEIDLER et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit No. 92­780. Argued December 8, 1993-Decided January 24, 1994 In this action, petitioner health care clinics alleged, among other things, that respondents, a coalition of antiabortion groups called the Pro-Life Action Network (PLAN) and others, were members of a nationwide conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics through a pattern of racketeer- ing activity-including extortion under the Hobbs Act-in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) chap- ter of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U. S. C. §§ 1961­1968. They claimed that respondents conspired to use threatened or actual force, violence, or fear to induce clinic employees, doctors, and patients to give up their jobs, their right to practice medicine, and their right to obtain clinic services; that the conspiracy injured the clinics' business and property interests; and that PLAN is a racketeering enterprise. The District Court dismissed the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). It found that the clinics failed to state a claim under § 1962(c)-which makes it unlawful "for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate . . . in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeer- ing activity or collection of unlawful debt"-because they did not allege a profit-generating purpose in the activity or enterprise. It also dis- missed their conspiracy claim under § 1962(d) on the ground that the § 1962(c) and other RICO claims they made could not stand. The Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that there is an economic motive require- ment implicit in § 1962(c)'s enterprise element. Held:1. The clinics have standing to bring their claim. Since their com- plaint was dismissed at the pleading stage, the complaint must be sus- tained if relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U. S. 69, 73. Nothing more than the complaint's extortion and injury allega- tions are needed to confer standing at this stage. Pp. 255­256. 2. RICO does not require proof that either the racketeering enter- prise or the predicate acts of racketeering in § 1962(c) were motivated by an economic purpose. Nowhere in either § 1962(c) or in § 1961's 510us2$16H 06-18-97 17:06:35 PAGES OPINPGT 250 NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC. v. SCHEIDLER Syllabus definitions of "enterprise" and "pattern of racketeering activity" is there any indication that such a motive is required. While arguably an enter- prise engaged in interstate or foreign commerce would have a profit- seeking motive, § 1962(c)'s language also includes enterprises whose activities "affect" such commerce. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "affect" as "to have a detrimental influence on"; and an enterprise surely can have such an influence on commerce without having its own profit-seeking motives. The use of the term "enter- prise" in subsections (a) and (b), where it is arguably more tied in with economic motivation, also does not lead to the inference of an economic motive requirement in subsection (c). In subsections (a) and (b), an "enterprise" is an entity acquired through illegal activity or the money generated from illegal activity: the victim of the activity. By contrast, the "enterprise" in subsection (c) connotes generally the vehicle through which the unlawful pattern of racketeering activity is committed. Since it is not being acquired, it need not have a property interest that can be acquired nor an economic motive for engaging in illegal activity; it need only be an association in fact that engages in a pattern of rack- eteering activity. Nor is an economic motive requirement supported by the congressional statement of findings that prefaces RICO and refers to activities that drain billions of dollars from America's economy. Predi- cate acts, such as the alleged extortion here, may not benefit the protest- ers financially, but they still may drain money from the economy by harming businesses such as the clinics. Moreover, a statement of con- gressional findings is a rather thin reed upon which to base a require- ment neither expressed nor fairly implied from the Act's operative sec- tions. Cf. United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576. The Department of Justice's 1981 guidelines on RICO prosecutions are also unpersuasive, since 1984 amendments broadened the focus of RICO prosecutions from those association-in-fact enterprises that exist "for the purpose of main- taining operations directed toward an economic goal" to those that are "directed toward an economic or other identifiable goal." In addition, the statutory language is unambiguous, and there is no clearly ex- pressed intent to the contrary in the legislative history that would war- rant a different construction. Nor is there an ambiguity in RICO that would suffice to invoke the rule of lenity. See Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 499. Pp. 256­262. 968 F. 2d 612, reversed. Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Sou- ter, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Kennedy, J., joined, post, p. 263. 510us2$16H 06-18-97 17:06:35 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 249 (1994) 251 Counsel Fay Clayton argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were Susan Valentine, Lowell E. Sachnoff, Jack L. Block, Judi A. Lamble, Alan M. Pollack, and Mitch- ell G. Mandell. Miguel A. Estrada argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor General Bryson, and Cynthia A. Young. G. Robert Blakey argued the cause for respondents. Clark D. Forsythe and Thomas Brejcha filed a brief for respondent Scheidler et al. Jay Alan Sekulow, Walter M. Weber, Keith A. Fournier, and Vincent P. McCarthy filed a brief for respondent Terry et al. Craig L. Parshall, John W. Whitehead, and Alexis I. Crow filed a brief for respondent Migliorino (Miller). Paul Benjamin Linton filed a brief for respondent Murphy.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of New York et al. by Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, Jerry Boone, Solicitor General, and Sanford M. Cohen, Assistant Attorney Gen- eral, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Roland W. Burris of Illinois, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Stephen D. Rosenthal of Virginia, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, and Lee Fisher of Ohio; for the American Medical Association et al. by Jack R. Bierig, Carter G. Phillips, Kirk B. Johnson, and Ann E. Allen; for the National Abortion Federation et al. by Elaine Metlin, Eve W. Paul, and Roger K. Evans; for the National Network of Abortion Funds by Kathryn Kolbert; and for the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. by David I. Goldblatt, Charles S. Sims, Deborah A. Ellis, and Burt Neuborne. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., et al. by Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., David Goldberger, and Victor G. Rosenblum; for the Ohio Right to Life Society, Inc., et al. by David F. Forte; and for the Southern Center for Law & Ethics et al. by Albert L. Jordan, Steven T. McFarland, and Bradley P. Jacob. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union by Louis M. Bograd and Steven R. Shapiro; and for Focus on the Family by Stephen W. Reed and Ronald E. McKinstry. 510us2$16H 06-18-97 17:06:35 PAGES OPINPGT 252 NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC. v. SCHEIDLER Opinion of the Court Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. We are required once again to interpret the provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) chapter of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (OCCA), Pub. L. 91­452, Title IX, 84 Stat. 941, as amended, 18 U. S. C. §§ 1961­1968 (1988 ed. and Supp. IV). Section 1962(c) prohibits any person associated with an enterprise from conducting its affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. We granted certiorari to determine whether RICO requires proof that either the racketeering enterprise or the predicate acts of racketeering were motivated by an economic purpose. We hold that RICO requires no such economic motive. I Petitioner National Organization for Women, Inc. (NOW), is a national nonprofit organization that supports the legal availability of abortion; petitioners Delaware Women's Health Organization, Inc. (DWHO), and Summit Women's Health Organization, Inc. (SWHO), are health care centers that perform abortions and other medical procedures. Re- spondents are a coalition of antiabortion groups called the Pro-Life Action Network (PLAN), Joseph Scheidler and other individuals and organizations that oppose legal abor- tion, and a medical laboratory that formerly provided serv- ices to the two petitioner health care centers.1 Petitioners sued respondents in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging viola- tions of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., and RICO's §§ 1962(a), (c), and (d), as well as several pendent state-law claims stemming from the activ- 1 The other respondents named in the complaint include the following: John Patrick Ryan, Randall A. Terry, Andrew Scholberg, Conrad Wojnar, Timothy Murphy, Monica Migliorino, Vital-Med Laboratories, Inc., Pro- Life Action League, Inc. (PLAL), Pro-Life Direct Action League, Inc. (PDAL), Operation Rescue, and Project Life. 510us2$16H 06-18-97 17:06:35 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 249 (1994) 253 Opinion of the Court ities of antiabortion protesters at the clinics. According to respondent Scheidler's congressional testimony, these pro- testers aim to shut down the clinics and persuade women not to have abortions. See, e. g., Abortion Clinic Violence, Oversight Hearings before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judi- ciary, 99th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 55 (1987) (statement of Joseph M. Scheidler, Executive Director, Pro-Life Action League). Petitioners sought injunctive relief, along with treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees. They later amended their complaint, and pursuant to local rules, filed a "RICO Case Statement" that further detailed the enterprise, the pattern of racketeering, the victims of the racketeering activity, and the participants involved. The amended complaint alleged that respondents were members of a nationwide conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics through a pattern of racketeering activity including extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1951.2 Section 1951(b)(2) defines extortion as "the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrong- ful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right." Petitioners alleged that re- spondents conspired to use threatened or actual force, vio- lence, or fear to induce clinic employees, doctors, and pa- tients to give up their jobs, give up their economic right to practice medicine, and give up their right to obtain medical services at the clinics. App. 66, Second Amended Complaint ¶ 97. Petitioners claimed that this conspiracy "has injured 2 The Hobbs Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1951(a), provides: "Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both." Respondents contend that petitioners are unable to show that their actions violated the Hobbs Act. We do not reach that issue and express no opinion upon it. 510us2$16H 06-18-97 17:06:35 PAGES OPINPGT 254 NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC. v. SCHEIDLER Opinion of the Court the business and/or property interests of the [petitioners]." Id., at 72, ¶ 104. According to the amended complaint, PLAN constitutes the alleged racketeering "enterprise" for purposes of § 1962(c). Id., at 72­73, ¶¶ 107­109. The District Court dismissed the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Citing Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U. S. 127 (1961), it held that since the activities alleged "in- volve[d] political opponents, not commercial competitors, and political objectives, not marketplace goals," the Sherman Act did not apply. 765 F. Supp. 937, 941 (ND Ill. 1991). It dis- missed petitioners' RICO claims under § 1962(a) because the "income" alleged by petitioners consisted of voluntary dona- tions from persons opposed to abortion which "in no way were derived from the pattern of racketeering alleged in the complaint." Ibid. The District Court then concluded that petitioners failed to state a claim under § 1962(c) since "an economic motive requirement exists to the extent that some profit-generating purpose must be alleged in order to state a RICO claim." Id., at 943. Finally, it dismissed petitioners' RICO conspiracy claim under § 1962(d) since petitioners' other RICO claims could not stand. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 968 F. 2d 612 (CA7 1992). As to the RICO counts, it agreed with the District Court that the voluntary contributions received by respondents did not constitute income derived from racketeering activities for purposes of § 1962(a). Id., at 625. It adopted the analy- sis of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Ivic, 700 F. 2d 51 (1983), which found an "economic motive" requirement implicit in the "enterprise" element of the offense. The Court of Appeals determined that "non- economic crimes committed in furtherance of non-economic motives are not within the ambit of RICO." 968 F. 2d, at 629. Consequently, petitioners failed to state a claim under § 1962(c). The Court of Appeals also affirmed dismissal of the RICO conspiracy claim under § 1962(d). 510us2$16H 06-18-97 17:06:35 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 249 (1994) 255 Opinion of the Court We granted certiorari, 508 U. S. 971 (1993), to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on the putative eco- nomic motive requirement of 18 U. S. C. §§ 1962(c) and (d). Compare United States v. Ivic, supra, and United States v. Flynn, 852 F. 2d 1045, 1052 (CA8), ("For purposes of RICO, an enterprise must be directed toward an economic goal"), cert. denied, 488 U. S. 974 (1988), with Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F. 2d 1342 (CA3) (because the predicate offense does not require economic motive, RICO requires no additional economic motive), cert. denied, 493 U. S. 901 (1989). II We first address the threshold question raised by respond- ents whether petitioners have standing to bring their claim. Standing represents a jurisdictional requirement which remains open to review at all stages of the litigation. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U. S. 534, 546­547 (1986). Respondents are correct that only DWHO and SWHO, and not NOW, have sued under RICO.3 Despite the fact that the clinics attempted to bring the RICO claim as class actions, DWHO and SWHO must themselves have standing. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organiza- tion, 426 U. S. 26, 40, n. 20 (1976), citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 502 (1975). Respondents are wrong, however, in asserting that the complaint alleges no "injury" to DWHO and SWHO "fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct." Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751 (1984). 3 NOW sought class certification for itself, its women members who use or may use the targeted health centers, and other women who use or may use the services of such centers. The District Court did not certify the class, apparently deferring its ruling until resolution of the motions to dismiss. All pending motions were dismissed as moot when the court granted respondents' motion to dismiss. 765 F. Supp. 937, 945 (ND Ill. 1991). 510us2$16H 06-18-97 17:06:35 PAGES OPINPGT 256 NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC. v. SCHEIDLER Opinion of the Court We have held that "[a]t the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presume that gen- eral allegations embrace those specific facts that are neces- sary to support the claim." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 561 (1992) (citations omitted). The District Court dismissed petitioners' claim at the pleading stage pur- suant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), so their complaint must be sustained if relief could be granted "under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U. S. 69, 73 (1984). DWHO and SWHO alleged in their complaint that respondents conspired to use force to induce clinic staff and patients to stop working and obtain medical services else- where. App. 66, Second Amended Complaint ¶ 97. Petition- ers claimed that this conspiracy "has injured the business and/or property interests of the [petitioners]." Id., at 72, ¶ 104. In addition, petitioners claimed that respondent Scheidler threatened DWHO's clinic administrator with re- prisals if she refused to quit her job at the clinic. Id., at 68, ¶ 98(g). Paragraphs 106 and 110 of petitioners' complaint incorporate these allegations into the § 1962(c) claim. Id., at 72, 73. Nothing more is needed to confer standing on DWHO and SWHO at the pleading stage. III We turn to the question whether the racketeering enter- prise or the racketeering predicate acts must be accompa- nied by an underlying economic motive. Section 1962(c) makes it unlawful "for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or partici- pate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collec- tion of unlawful debt." Section 1961(1) defines "pattern of racketeering activity" to include conduct that is "chargeable" 510us2$16H 06-18-97 17:06:35 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 249 (1994) 257 Opinion of the Court or "indictable" under a host of state and federal laws.4 RICO broadly defines "enterprise" in § 1961(4) to "includ[e] any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." Nowhere in either § 1962(c) or the RICO definitions in § 1961 is there any indica- tion that an economic motive is required. The phrase "any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce" comes the clos- est of any language in subsection (c) to suggesting a need for an economic motive. Arguably an enterprise engaged in 4 Section 1961(1) provides: " `racketeering activity' means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other dan- gerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by im- prisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891­894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1029 (relating to fraud and related activity in connection with access devices), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1344 (relating to financial institution fraud), sections 1461­1465 (relating to obscene matter), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (re- lating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1512 (relating to tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1513 (relating to retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extor- tion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering) . . . (C) any act which is indict- able under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restric- tions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punish- able under any law of the United States . . . ." 510us2$16H 06-18-97 17:06:35 PAGES OPINPGT 258 NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC. v. SCHEIDLER Opinion of the Court interstate or foreign commerce would have a profit-seeking motive, but the language in § 1962(c) does not stop there; it includes enterprises whose activities "affect" interstate or foreign commerce. Webster's Third New International Dic- tionary 35 (1969) defines "affect" as "to have a detrimental influence on-used especially in the phrase affecting com- merce." An enterprise surely can have a detrimental influ- ence on interstate or foreign commerce without having its own profit-seeking motives. The Court of Appeals thought that the use of the term "enterprise" in §§ 1962(a) and (b), where it is arguably more tied in with economic motivation, should be applied to re- strict the breadth of use of that term in § 1962(c). 968 F. 2d, at 629. Respondents agree and point to our comment in Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 489 (1985), regarding the term "violation," that "[w]e should not lightly infer that Congress intended the term [violation] to have wholly different meanings in neighboring subsections." We do not believe that the usage of the term "enterprise" in subsections (a) and (b) leads to the inference that an eco- nomic motive is required in subsection (c). The term "enter- prise" in subsections (a) and (b) plays a different role in the structure of those subsections than it does in subsection (c). Section 1962(a) provides that it "shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indi- rectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity . . . to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce." Correspondingly, § 1962(b) states that it "shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any inter- est in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com- 510us2$16H 06-18-97 17:06:35 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 249 (1994) 259 Opinion of the Court merce." The "enterprise" referred to in subsections (a) and (b) is thus something acquired through the use of illegal ac- tivities or by money obtained from illegal activities. The enterprise in these subsections is the victim of unlawful ac- tivity and may very well be a "profit-seeking" entity that represents a property interest and may be acquired. But the statutory language in subsections (a) and (b) does not mandate that the enterprise be a "profit-seeking" entity; it simply requires that the enterprise be an entity that was acquired through illegal activity or the money generated from illegal activity. By contrast, the "enterprise" in subsection (c) connotes generally the vehicle through which the unlawful pattern of racketeering activity is committed, rather than the victim of that activity. Subsection (c) makes it unlawful for "any per- son employed by or associated with any enterprise . . . to conduct or participate . . . in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. . . ." Consequently, since the enterprise in subsection (c) is not being acquired, it need not have a property interest that can be acquired nor an economic motive for engaging in illegal activity; it need only be an association in fact that engages in a pattern of racketeering activity.5 Nothing in subsec- tions (a) and (b) directs us to a contrary conclusion. The Court of Appeals also relied on the reasoning of United States v. Bagaric, 706 F. 2d 42 (CA2), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 840 (1983), to support its conclusion that subsection (c) requires an economic motive. In upholding the convic- tions, under RICO, of members of a political terrorist group, the Bagaric court relied in part on the congressional state- ment of findings which prefaces RICO and refers to the ac- tivities of groups that " `drai[n] billions of dollars from Ameri- 5 One commentator uses the terms "prize," "instrument," "victim," and "perpetrator" to describe the four separate roles the enterprise may play in § 1962. See Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflec- tions on Bennett v. Berg, 58 Notre Dame L. Rev. 237, 307­325 (1982). 510us2$16H 06-18-97 17:06:35 PAGES OPINPGT 260 NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC. v. SCHEIDLER Opinion of the Court ca's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption.' " 706 F. 2d, at 57, n. 13 (quoting OCCA, 84 Stat. 922). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided that the sort of activity thus condemned re- quired an economic motive. We do not think this is so. Respondents and the two Courts of Appeals, we think, overlook the fact that predicate acts, such as the alleged extortion, may not benefit the pro- testers financially but still may drain money from the econ- omy by harming businesses such as the clinics which are petitioners in this case. We also think that the quoted statement of congressional findings is a rather thin reed upon which to base a require- ment of economic motive neither expressed nor, we think, fairly implied in the operative sections of the Act. As we said in H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U. S. 229, 248 (1989): "The occasion for Congress' action was the perceived need to combat organized crime. But Con- gress for cogent reasons chose to enact a more general stat- ute, one which, although it had organized crime as its focus, was not limited in application to organized crime." In United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576 (1981), we faced the analogous question whether "enterprise" as used in § 1961(4) should be confined to "legitimate" enterprises. Looking to the statutory language, we found that "[t]here is no restriction upon the associations embraced by the definition: an enterprise includes any union or group of indi- viduals associated in fact." Id., at 580. Accordingly, we resolved that § 1961(4)'s definition of "enterprise" "appears to include both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises within its scope; it no more excludes criminal enterprises than it does legitimate ones." Id., at 580­581. We noted that Con- gress could easily have narrowed the sweep of the term "en- terprise" by inserting a single word, "legitimate." Id., at 581. Instead, Congress did nothing to indicate that "enter- 510us2$16H 06-18-97 17:06:35 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 249 (1994) 261 Opinion of the Court prise" should exclude those entities whose sole purpose was criminal. The parallel to the present case is apparent. Congress has not, either in the definitional section or in the operative language, required that an "enterprise" in § 1962(c) have an economic motive. The Court of Appeals also found persuasive guidelines for RICO prosecutions issued by the Department of Justice in 1981. The guidelines provided that a RICO indictment should not charge an association as an enterprise, unless the association exists " `for the purpose of maintaining opera- tions directed toward an economic goal . . . .' " United States v. Ivic, 700 F. 2d, at 64, quoting U. S. Dept. of Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual § 9­110.360 (1984) (empha- sis added). The Second Circuit believed these guidelines were entitled to deference under administrative law princi- ples. See 700 F. 2d, at 64. Whatever may be the appro- priate deference afforded to such internal rules, see, e. g., Crandon v. United States, 494 U. S. 152, 177 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment), for our purposes we need note only that the Department of Justice amended its guide- lines in 1984. The amended guidelines provide that an association-in-fact enterprise must be "directed toward an economic or other identifiable goal." U. S. Dept. of Justice, United States Attorney's Manual § 9­110.360 (Mar. 9, 1984) (emphasis added). Both parties rely on legislative history to support their positions. We believe the statutory language is unambig- uous and find in the parties' submissions respecting legisla- tive history no such "clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary" that would warrant a different construction. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U. S. 170, 177 (1993), citing United States v. Turkette, supra, at 580, quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 108 (1980). 510us2$16H 06-18-97 17:06:35 PAGES OPINPGT 262 NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC. v. SCHEIDLER Opinion of the Court Respondents finally argue that the result here should be controlled by the rule of lenity in criminal cases. But the rule of lenity applies only when an ambiguity is present; " `it is not used to beget one. . . . The rule comes into operation at the end of the process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding consider- ation of being lenient to wrongdoers.' " Turkette, supra, at 587­588, n. 10, quoting Callanan v. United States, 364 U. S. 587, 596 (1961) (footnote omitted). We simply do not think there is an ambiguity here which would suffice to invoke the rule of lenity. " `[T]he fact that RICO has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Con- gress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth.' " Sedima, 473 U. S., at 499 (quoting Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F. 2d 384, 398 (CA7 1984)).6 We therefore hold that petitioners may maintain this action if respondents conducted the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. The questions whether respondents committed the requisite predicate acts, and whether the commission of these acts fell into a pattern, are not before us. We hold only that RICO contains no eco- nomic motive requirement. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly Reversed. 6 Several of the respondents and several amici argue that application of RICO to antiabortion protesters could chill legitimate expression pro- tected by the First Amendment. However, the question presented for review asked simply whether the Court should create an unwritten re- quirement limiting RICO to cases where either the enterprise or rack- eteering activity has an overriding economic motive. None of the re- spondents made a constitutional argument as to the proper construction of RICO in the Court of Appeals, and their constitutional argument here is directed almost entirely to the nature of their activities, rather than to the construction of RICO. We therefore decline to address the First Amendment question argued by respondents and the amici. 510us2$16H 06-18-97 17:06:35 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 249 (1994) 263 Souter, J., concurring Justice Souter, with whom Justice Kennedy joins, concurring. I join the Court's opinion and write separately to explain why the First Amendment does not require reading an economic-motive requirement into the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO or statute), and to stress that the Court's opinion does not bar First Amend- ment challenges to RICO's application in particular cases. Several respondents and amici argue that we should avoid the First Amendment issues that could arise from allowing RICO to be applied to protest organizations by construing the statute to require economic motivation, just as we have previously interpreted other generally applicable statutes so as to avoid First Amendment problems. See, e. g., Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U. S. 127, 138 (1961) (holding that antitrust laws do not apply to businesses combining to lobby the government, even where such conduct has an anticompetitive purpose and an anticompetitive effect, because the alternative "would raise important constitutional questions" under the First Amendment); see also Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U. S. 573, 577 (1929) (a law "must be construed with an eye to possible con- stitutional limitations so as to avoid doubts as to its valid- ity"). The argument is meritless in this case, though, for this principle of statutory construction applies only when the meaning of a statute is in doubt, see Noerr, supra, and here "the statutory language is unambiguous," ante, at 261. Even if the meaning of RICO were open to debate, how- ever, it would not follow that the statute ought to be read to include an economic-motive requirement, since such a requirement would correspond only poorly to free-speech concerns. Respondents and amici complain that, unless so limited, the statute permits an ideological organization's opponents to label its vigorous expression as RICO predicate acts, thereby availing themselves of powerful remedial provisions that could destroy the organization. But an 510us2$16H 06-18-97 17:06:35 PAGES OPINPGT 264 NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC. v. SCHEIDLER Souter, J., concurring economic-motive requirement would protect too much with respect to First Amendment interests, since it would keep RICO from reaching ideological entities whose members commit acts of violence we need not fear chilling. An economic-motive requirement might also prove to be under- protective, in that entities engaging in vigorous but fully protected expression might fail the proposed economic- motive test (for even protest movements need money) and so be left exposed to harassing RICO suits. An economic-motive requirement is, finally, unnecessary, because legitimate free-speech claims may be raised and ad- dressed in individual RICO cases as they arise. Accord- ingly, it is important to stress that nothing in the Court's opinion precludes a RICO defendant from raising the First Amendment in its defense in a particular case. Conduct al- leged to amount to Hobbs Act extortion, for example, or one of the other, somewhat elastic RICO predicate acts may turn out to be fully protected First Amendment activity, entitling the defendant to dismissal on that basis. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 917 (1982) (holding that a state common-law prohibition on malicious interfer- ence with business could not, under the circumstances, be constitutionally applied to a civil-rights boycott of white merchants). And even in a case where a RICO violation has been validly established, the First Amendment may limit the relief that can be granted against an organization otherwise engaging in protected expression. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958) (invalidating under the First Amendment a court order compelling production of the NAACP's membership lists, issued to enforce Alabama's re- quirements for out-of-state corporations doing business in the State). See also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., supra, at 930­932 (discussing First Amendment limits on the assessment of derivative liability against ideological organi- zations); Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Mohla, 944 F. 2d 531 (CA9 1991) (applying a heightened pleading stand- 510us2$16H 06-18-97 17:06:35 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 249 (1994) 265 Souter, J., concurring ard to a complaint based on presumptively protected First Amendment conduct). This is not the place to catalog the speech issues that could arise in a RICO action against a protest group, and I express no view on the possibility of a First Amendment claim by the respondents in this case (since, as the Court observes, such claims are outside the question presented, see ante, at 262, n. 6). But I think it prudent to notice that RICO ac- tions could deter protected advocacy and to caution courts applying RICO to bear in mind the First Amendment inter- ests that could be at stake. 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:54 PAGES OPINPGT 266 OCTOBER TERM, 1993 Syllabus ALBRIGHT v. OLIVER et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit No. 92­833. Argued October 12, 1993-Decided January 24, 1994 Upon learning that Illinois authorities had issued an arrest warrant charg- ing him with the sale of a substance which looked like an illegal drug, petitioner Albright surrendered to respondent Oliver, a policeman, and was released after posting bond. At a preliminary hearing, Oliver tes- tified that Albright sold the look-alike substance to a third party, and the court found probable cause to bind Albright over for trial. How- ever, the court later dismissed the action on the ground that the charge did not state an offense under state law. Albright then filed this suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging that Oliver deprived him of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment-his "liberty interest"- to be free from criminal prosecution except upon probable cause. The District Court dismissed on the ground that the complaint did not state a claim under § 1983. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that prosecution without probable cause is a constitutional tort actionable under § 1983 only if accompanied by incarceration, loss of employment, or some other "palpable consequenc[e]." Held: The judgment is affirmed. 975 F. 2d 343, affirmed. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, and Justice Ginsburg, concluded that Albright's claimed right to be free from prosecution without probable cause must be judged under the Fourth Amendment, and that substantive due process, with its "scarce and open-ended" "guideposts for responsible decision- making," Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 115, 125, can afford Al- bright no relief. Where a particular Amendment "provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection" against a particular sort of government behavior, "that Amendment, not the more generalized no- tion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing" such a claim. Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 395. The Fourth Amendment addresses the matter of pretrial deprivations of liberty, and the Court has noted that Amendment's relevance to the liberty deprivations that go hand in hand with criminal prosecutions. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 114. The Court has said that the accused is not "entitled to judicial oversight or review of the decision to prosecute." Id., at 118­ 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 266 (1994) 267 Syllabus 119. But Albright was not merely charged; he submitted himself to arrest. No view is expressed as to whether his claim would succeed under the Fourth Amendment, since he has not presented the question in his certiorari petition. Pp. 271­275. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Thomas, determined that Albright's due process claim concerns not his arrest but instead the malicious initiation of a baseless criminal prosecution against him. The due process requirements for criminal proceedings do not include a standard for the initiation of a prosecution. Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, that the common-law interest in freedom from malicious prosecution is protected by the Due Process Clause, there is neither need nor legitimacy in invoking 42 U. S. C. § 1983 in this case, given the fact that Illinois provides a tort remedy for malicious prosecution and the Court's holding in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527, 535­544, that a state actor's random and unauthorized deprivation of such a due process interest cannot be challenged under § 1983 so long as the State provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy. Pp. 281­286. Justice Souter concluded that, because this case presents no sub- stantial burden on liberty beyond what the Fourth Amendment is gener- ally thought to redress already, petitioner has not justified recognition of a substantive due process violation in his prosecution without proba- ble cause. Substantive due process should be reserved for otherwise homeless substantial claims, and should not be relied on when doing so will duplicate protection that a more specific constitutional provision already bestows. Petitioner's asserted injuries-including restraints on his movement, damage to his reputation, and mental anguish-are not alleged to have flowed from the formal instrument of prosecution, as distinct from the ensuing police seizure of his person; have been treated by the Courts of Appeals as within the ambit of compensability under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for Fourth Amendment violations; and usually occur only after an arrest or other seizure. Pp. 286­291. Rehnquist, C. J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which O'Connor, Scalia, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., post, p. 275, and Ginsburg, J., post, p. 276, filed concurring opinions. Kennedy, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 281. Souter, J., filed an opinion concur- ring in the judgment, post, p. 286. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, J., joined, post, p. 291. John H. Bisbee argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Barry Nakell. 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:54 PAGES OPINPGT 268 ALBRIGHT v. OLIVER Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J. James G. Sotos argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Michael W. Condon, Charles E. Her- vas, and Michael D. Bersani.* Chief Justice Rehnquist announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, and Justice Ginsburg join. A warrant was issued for petitioner's arrest by Illinois authorities, and upon learning of it he surrendered and was released on bail. The prosecution was later dismissed on the ground that the charge did not state an offense under Illinois law. Petitioner asks us to recognize a substantive right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from criminal prosecution except upon probable cause. We decline to do so. We review a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sev- enth Circuit affirming the grant of a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and we must therefore accept the well-pleaded alle- gations of the complaint as true. Illinois authorities issued an arrest warrant for petitioner Kevin Albright, charging him on the basis of a previously filed criminal information with the sale of a substance which looked like an illegal drug. When he learned of the outstanding warrant, petitioner sur- rendered to respondent, Roger Oliver, a police detective em- ployed by the city of Macomb, but denied his guilt of such an offense. He was released after posting bond, one of the conditions of which was that he not leave the State without permission of the court.1 *Leon Friedman, Steven R. Shapiro, John A. Powell, and Harvey Grossman filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Richard Ruda filed a brief for the National League of Cities et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. 1 Before the criminal information was filed, one Veda Moore, an under- cover informant, had told Oliver that she bought cocaine from one John Albright, Jr., at a student hotel in Macomb. The "cocaine" turned out to 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 266 (1994) 269 Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J. At a preliminary hearing, respondent Oliver testified that petitioner sold the look-alike substance to Moore, and the court found probable cause to bind petitioner over for trial. At a later pretrial hearing, the court dismissed the criminal action against petitioner on the ground that the charge did not state an offense under Illinois law. Albright then instituted this action under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, against Detective Oliver in his indi- vidual and official capacities, alleging that Oliver deprived him of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment-his "liberty interest"-to be free from crimi- nal prosecution except upon probable cause.2 The District Court granted respondent's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that the complaint did not state a claim under § 1983.3 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, 975 F. 2d 343 (1992), relying on our decision in Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693 (1976). The Court of Appeals held that prosecution without probable cause is a constitu- tional tort actionable under § 1983 only if accompanied by incarceration or loss of employment or some other "palpable be baking powder, however, and the grand jury indicted John Albright, Jr., for selling a "look-alike" substance. When Detective Oliver went to serve the arrest warrant, he discovered that John Albright, Jr., was a retired pharmacist in his sixties, and apparently realized he was on a false scent. After discovering that it could not have been the elderly Al- bright's son, John David, who was involved in the incident, Detective Oli- ver contacted Moore to see if the sale was actually made by petitioner Kevin Albright, a second son of John Albright, Jr. Moore confirmed that petitioner Kevin Albright made the sale. 2 The complaint also named the city of Macomb as a defendant to the § 1983 action and charged a common-law malicious prosecution claim against Detective Oliver. 3 The District Court also held that Detective Oliver was entitled to a defense of qualified immunity, and that the complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to support municipal liability against the city of Macomb. The District Court also dismissed without prejudice the common-law claim of malicious prosecution against Detective Oliver. These issues are not be- fore this Court. 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:54 PAGES OPINPGT 270 ALBRIGHT v. OLIVER Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J. consequenc[e]." 975 F. 2d, at 346­347. The panel of the Seventh Circuit reasoned that "just as in the garden-variety public-officer defamation case that does not result in exclu- sion from an occupation, state tort remedies should be ade- quate and the heavy weaponry of constitutional litigation can be left at rest." Id., at 347.4 We granted certiorari, 507 4 As noted by the Court of Appeals below, the extent to which a claim of malicious prosecution is actionable under § 1983 is one "on which there is an embarrassing diversity of judicial opinion." 975 F. 2d, at 345, citing Brummett v. Camble, 946 F. 2d 1178, 1180, n. 2 (CA5 1991) (cataloging divergence of approaches by the Courts of Appeals). Most of the lower courts recognize some form of malicious prosecution action under § 1983. The disagreement among the courts concerns whether malicious prosecu- tions, standing alone, can violate the Constitution. The most expansive approach is exemplified by the Third Circuit, which holds that the ele- ments of a malicious prosecution action under § 1983 are the same as the common-law tort of malicious prosecution. See, e. g., Lee v. Mihalich, 847 F. 2d 66, 70 (1988) ("[T]he elements of liability for the constitutional tort of malicious prosecution under § 1983 coincide with those of the common law tort"). See also Sanders v. English, 950 F. 2d 1152, 1159 (CA5 1992) ("[O]ur circuit recognizes causes of action under § 1983 for false arrest, illegal detention . . . and malicious prosecution" because these causes of action "implicate the constitutional `guarantees of the fourth and four- teenth amendments' "); Robinson v. Maruffi, 895 F. 2d 649 (CA10 1990); Strength v. Hubert, 854 F. 2d 421, 426, and n. 5 (CA11 1988) (recognizing that "freedom from malicious prosecution is a federal right protected by § 1983"). Other Circuits, however, require a showing of some injury or deprivation of a constitutional magnitude in addition to the traditional elements of common-law malicious prosecution. The exact standards announced by the courts escape easy classification. See, e. g., Torres v. Superintendent of Police of Puerto Rico, 893 F. 2d 404, 409 (CA1 1990) (the challenged conduct must be "so egregious that it violated substantive or procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment"); Usher v. Los Angeles, 828 F. 2d 556, 561­562 (CA9 1987) ("[T]he general rule is that a claim of malicious prosecution is not cognizable under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 if process is available within the state judicial system to provide a remedy . . . . However, `an exception exists to the general rule when a malicious prosecution is conducted with the intent to deprive a person of equal protection of the laws or is otherwise intended to subject a person to a denial of constitutional rights' "); Coogan v. Wixom, 820 F. 2d 170, 175 (CA6 1987) (in addition to elements of malicious prosecution under 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 266 (1994) 271 Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J. U. S. 959 (1993), and while we affirm the judgment below, we do so on different grounds. We hold that it is the Fourth Amendment, and not substantive due process, under which petitioner Albright's claim must be judged. Section 1983 "is not itself a source of substantive rights," but merely provides "a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 144, n. 3 (1979). The first step in any such claim is to iden- tify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 394 (1989); and Baker v. McCollan, supra, at 140. Petitioner's claim before this Court is a very limited one. He claims that the action of respondents infringed his sub- stantive due process right to be free of prosecution without probable cause. He does not claim that Illinois denied him the procedural due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor does he claim a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, notwithstanding the fact that his surren- der to the State's show of authority constituted a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 19 (1968); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U. S. 593, 596 (1989).5 We begin analysis of petitioner's claim by repeating our observation in Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 115, 125 (1992). "As a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process state law, plaintiff must show an egregious misuse of a legal proceeding resulting in a constitutional deprivation). In holding that malicious prosecution is not actionable under § 1983 unless it is accompanied by in- carceration, loss of protected status, or some other palpable consequence, the Seventh Circuit's decision below places it in this latter camp. In view of our disposition of this case, it is evident that substantive due process may not furnish the constitutional peg on which to hang such a "tort." 5 Thus, Albright may have missed the statute of limitations for any claim he had based on an unconstitutional arrest or seizure. 975 F. 2d 343, 345 (CA7 1992). We express no opinion as to the timeliness of any such claim he might have. 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:54 PAGES OPINPGT 272 ALBRIGHT v. OLIVER Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J. because the guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended." The protections of substantive due process have for the most part been accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity. See, e. g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 847­849 (1992) (describing cases in which substantive due process rights have been recognized). Petitioner's claim to be free from prosecution except on the basis of probable cause is markedly different from those recognized in this group of cases. Petitioner relies on our observations in cases such as United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 746 (1987), and Dan- iels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 331 (1986), that the Due Proc- ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment confers both sub- stantive and procedural rights. This is undoubtedly true, but it sheds little light on the scope of substantive due proc- ess. Petitioner points in particular to language from Hur- tado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 527 (1884), later quoted in Daniels, supra, stating that the words "by the law of the land" from the Magna Carta were " `intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of gov- ernment.' " This, too, may be freely conceded, but it does not follow that, in all of the various aspects of a criminal prosecution, the only inquiry mandated by the Constitution is whether, in the view of the Court, the governmental action in question was "arbitrary." Hurtado held that the Due Process Clause did not make applicable to the States the Fifth Amendment's requirement that all prosecutions for an infamous crime be instituted by the indictment of a grand jury. In the more than 100 years which have elapsed since Hurtado was decided, the Court has concluded that a number of the procedural protections contained in the Bill of Rights were made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 266 (1994) 273 Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J. 25 (1949), and holding the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule applicable to the States; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964), overruling Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908), and holding the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self- incrimination applicable to the States; Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), overruling Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937), and holding the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment applicable to the States; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942), and holding that the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel was applicable to the States. See also Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U. S. 213 (1967) (Sixth Amendment speedy trial right applicable to the States); Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14 (1967) (Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process applicable to the States); Dun- can v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968) (Sixth Amendment right to jury trial applicable to the States). This course of decision has substituted, in these areas of criminal procedure, the specific guarantees of the various provisions of the Bill of Rights embodied in the first 10 Amendments to the Constitution for the more generalized language contained in the earlier cases construing the Four- teenth Amendment. It was through these provisions of the Bill of Rights that their Framers sought to restrict the exer- cise of arbitrary authority by the Government in particular situations. Where a particular Amendment "provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection" against a particular sort of government behavior, "that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Graham v. Connor, supra, at 395.6 6 Justice Stevens' dissent faults us for ignoring, inter alia, our deci- sion in In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970). Winship undoubtedly rejected the notion that all of the required incidents of a fundamentally fair trial were to be found in the provisions of the Bill of Rights, but it did so as a matter of procedural due process: " `This notion [that the government must prove 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:54 PAGES OPINPGT 274 ALBRIGHT v. OLIVER Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J. We think this principle is likewise applicable here. The Framers considered the matter of pretrial deprivations of liberty and drafted the Fourth Amendment to address it. The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War- rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." We have in the past noted the Fourth Amendment's rele- vance to the deprivations of liberty that go hand in hand with criminal prosecutions. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 114 (1975) (holding that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to any extended restraint on liberty following an arrest). We have said that the accused is not "entitled to judicial oversight or review of the decision to prosecute." Id., at 118­119. See also Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541, 545 (1962); Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U. S. 586 (1913). But here petitioner was not merely charged; he submitted himself to arrest. the elements of a criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt]-basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society-is a requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of "due process." ' " Id., at 362, quoting Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790, 802­803 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Similarly, other cases relied on by the dissent, including Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935), Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264 (1959), Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963), Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150 (1972), and United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97 (1976), were accurately described in the latter opinion as "dealing with the defendant's right to a fair trial mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution." Id., at 107. 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 266 (1994) 275 Scalia, J., concurring We express no view as to whether petitioner's claim would succeed under the Fourth Amendment, since he has not pre- sented that question in his petition for certiorari. We do hold that substantive due process, with its "scarce and open- ended" "guideposts," Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S., at 125, can afford him no relief.7 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore Affirmed. Justice Scalia, concurring. One can conceive of many abuses of the trial process (for example, the use of a patently biased judge, see Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U. S. 455, 465­466 (1971)) that might cause a criminal sentence to be a deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process. But here there was no criminal sentence (the indictment was dismissed), and so the only deprivation of life, liberty or property, if any, consisted of petitioner's pretrial arrest. I think it unlikely that the procedures constitutionally "due," with regard to an arrest, consist of anything more than what the Fourth Amendment specifies; but petitioner has in any case not invoked "proce- dural" due process. Except insofar as our decisions have included within the Fourteenth Amendment certain explicit substantive protec- tions of the Bill of Rights-an extension I accept because it is both long established and narrowly limited-I reject the proposition that the Due Process Clause guarantees certain (unspecified) liberties, rather than merely guarantees certain procedures as a prerequisite to deprivation of liberty. See TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U. S. 7 Petitioner appears to have argued in the Court of Appeals some vari- ant of a violation of his constitutional right to interstate travel because of the condition imposed upon him pursuant to his release on bond. But he has not presented any such question in his petition for certiorari and has not briefed the issue here. We therefore do not consider it. 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:54 PAGES OPINPGT 276 ALBRIGHT v. OLIVER Ginsburg, J., concurring 443, 470­471 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). As I have ac- knowledged, however, see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U. S. 110, 121 (1989) (opinion of Scalia, J.), this Court's current jurisprudence is otherwise. But that jurisprudence rejects "the more generalized notion of `substantive due process' " at least to this extent: It cannot be used to impose additional requirements upon such of the States' criminal processes as are already addressed (and left without such requirements) by the Bill of Rights. Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 395 (1989). That proscription applies here. The Bill of Rights sets forth, in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, procedural guarantees relating to the period before and during trial, including a guarantee (the Grand Jury Clause) regarding the manner of indictment. Those requirements are not to be supplemented through the device of "substantive due process." For these reasons, in addition to those set forth by The Chief Justice, the judgment here should be affirmed. Justice Ginsburg, concurring. I agree with the plurality that Albright's claim against the police officer responsible for his arrest is properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment rather than under the heading of substantive due process. See ante, at 271. I therefore join the plurality opinion and write separately to indicate more particularly my reasons for viewing this case through a Fourth Amendment lens. Albright's factual allegations convey that Detective Oliver notoriously disobeyed the injunction against unreasonable seizures imposed on police officers by the Fourth Amend- ment, and Albright appropriately invoked that Amendment as a basis for his claim. See App. to Pet. for Cert. A­37, A­53. Albright's submission to arrest unquestionably con- stituted a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. See ante, at 271. And, as the Court of Appeals recognized, if the facts were as Albright alleged, then Oliver lacked cause 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 266 (1994) 277 Ginsburg, J., concurring to suspect, let alone apprehend him. 975 F. 2d 343, 345 (CA7 1992); see post, at 292­293 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Yet in his presentations before this Court, Albright delib- erately subordinated invocation of the Fourth Amendment and pressed, instead, a substantive due process right to be free from prosecution without probable cause.1 This strate- gic decision appears to have been predicated on two doubtful assumptions, the first relating to the compass of the Fourth Amendment, the second, to the time frame for commencing this civil action. Albright may have feared that courts would narrowly de- fine the Fourth Amendment's key term "seizure" so as to deny full scope to his claim. In particular, he might have anticipated a holding that the "seizure" of his person ended when he was released from custody on bond, and a corre- sponding conclusion that Oliver's allegedly misleading testi- mony at the preliminary hearing escaped Fourth Amend- ment interdiction.2 The Fourth Amendment's instruction to police officers seems to me more purposive and embracing. This Court has noted that the common law may aid contemporary in- quiry into the meaning of the Amendment's term "seizure." See California v. Hodari D., 499 U. S. 621, 626, n. 2 (1991). At common law, an arrested person's seizure was deemed to 1 Albright's presentations essentially carve up the officer's conduct, though all part of a single scheme, so that the actions complained of match common-law tort categories: first, false arrest (Fourth Amendment's do- main); next, malicious prosecution (Fifth Amendment territory). In my view, the constitutional tort 42 U. S. C. § 1983 authorizes stands on its own, influenced by the substance, but not tied to the formal categories and procedures, of the common law. According the Fourth Amendment full sway, I would not force Albright's case into a different mold. 2 Such a concern might have stemmed from Seventh Circuit precedent set before Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989). See Wilkins v. May, 872 F. 2d 190, 192­195 (1989) (substantive due process "shock the con- science" standard, not Fourth Amendment, applies to brutal "post-arrest pre-charge" interrogation). 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:54 PAGES OPINPGT 278 ALBRIGHT v. OLIVER Ginsburg, J., concurring continue even after release from official custody. See, e. g., 2 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown *124 ("he that is bailed, is in supposition of law still in custody, and the parties that take him to bail are in law his keepers"); 4 W. Blackstone, Com- mentaries *297 (bail in both civil and criminal cases is "a delivery or bailment, of a person to his sureties, . . . he being supposed to continue in their friendly custody, instead of going to gaol"). The purpose of an arrest at common law, in both criminal and civil cases, was "only to compel an appear- ance in court," and "that purpose is equally answered, whether the sheriff detains [the suspect's] person, or takes sufficient security for his appearance, called bail." 3 id., at *290 (civil cases); 4 id., at *297 (nature of bail is the same in criminal and civil cases). The common law thus seems to have regarded the difference between pretrial incarceration and other ways to secure a defendant's court attendance as a distinction between methods of retaining control over a defendant's person, not one between seizure and its opposite.3 This view of the definition and duration of a seizure com- ports with common sense and common understanding. A person facing serious criminal charges is hardly freed from the state's control upon his release from a police officer's physical grip. He is required to appear in court at the state's command. He is often subject, as in this case, to the condition that he seek formal permission from the court (at significant expense) before exercising what would otherwise be his unquestioned right to travel outside the jurisdiction. Pending prosecution, his employment prospects may be di- minished severely, he may suffer reputational harm, and he will experience the financial and emotional strain of prepar- ing a defense. 3 For other purposes, e. g., to determine the proper place for condemna- tion trials, "seizure" traditionally had a time- and site-specific meaning. See Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, 471 (1874) ("seizure [of a sloop] is a single act"; "[p]ossession, which follows seizure, is continuous"). 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 266 (1994) 279 Ginsburg, J., concurring A defendant incarcerated until trial no doubt suffers greater burdens. That difference, however, should not lead to the conclusion that a defendant released pretrial is not still "seized" in the constitutionally relevant sense. Such a defendant is scarcely at liberty; he remains apprehended, ar- rested in his movements, indeed "seized" for trial, so long as he is bound to appear in court and answer the state's charges. He is equally bound to appear, and is hence "seized" for trial, when the state employs the less strong-arm means of a summons in lieu of arrest to secure his presence in court.4 This conception of a seizure and its course recognizes that the vitality of the Fourth Amendment depends upon its con- stant observance by police officers. For Oliver, the Fourth Amendment governed both the manner of, and the cause for, arresting Albright. If Oliver gave misleading testimony at the preliminary hearing, that testimony served to maintain and reinforce the unlawful haling of Albright into court, and so perpetuated the Fourth Amendment violation.5 4 On the summons-and-complaint alternative to custodial arrest, see 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 432­436 (2d ed. 1987). 5 Albright's reliance on a "malicious prosecution" theory, rather than a Fourth Amendment theory, is anomalous. The principal player in carry- ing out a prosecution-in "the formal commencement of a criminal pro- ceeding," see post, at 295 (Stevens, J., dissenting)-is not police officer but prosecutor. Prosecutors, however, have absolute immunity for their conduct. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U. S. 478, 487­492 (1991). Under Al- bright's substantive due process theory, the star player is exonerated, but the supporting actor is not. In fact, Albright's theory might succeed in exonerating the supporting actor as well. By focusing on the police officer's role in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution, rather than his role in effectuating and maintaining a seizure, Albright's theory raises serious questions about whether the police officer would be entitled to share the prosecutor's abso- lute immunity. See post, at 308­309, n. 26 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (not- ing that the issue is open); cf. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U. S. 325, 326 (1983) (holding that § 1983 does not "authoriz[e] a convicted person to assert a claim for damages against a police officer for giving perjured testimony at 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:54 PAGES OPINPGT 280 ALBRIGHT v. OLIVER Ginsburg, J., concurring A second reason for Albright's decision not to pursue a Fourth Amendment claim concerns the statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals suggested in dictum that any Fourth Amendment claim Albright might have had accrued on the date of his arrest, and that the applicable 2-year limitations period expired before the complaint was filed.6 975 F. 2d, at 345. Albright expressed his acquiescence in this view at oral argument. Tr. of Oral Arg. 13, 20­21. Once it is recognized, however, that Albright remained ef- fectively "seized" for trial so long as the prosecution against him remained pending, and that Oliver's testimony at the preliminary hearing, if deliberately misleading, violated the Fourth Amendment by perpetuating the seizure, then the limitations period should have a different trigger. The time to file the § 1983 action should begin to run not at the start, but at the end of the episode in suit, i. e., upon dismissal of the criminal charges against Albright. See McCune v. Grand Rapids, 842 F. 2d 903, 908 (CA6 1988) (Guy, J., concur- ring in result) ("Where . . . innocence is what makes the state action wrongful, it makes little sense to require a federal suit to be filed until innocence or its equivalent is established by the termination of the state procedures in a manner favor- able to the state criminal defendant."). In sum, Albright's Fourth Amendment claim, asserted within the requisite pe- riod after dismissal of the criminal action, in my judgment was neither substantively deficient nor inevitably time barred. It was, however, a claim Albright abandoned in the District Court and did not attempt to reassert in this Court. his criminal trial"). A right to sue someone who is absolutely immune from suit would hardly be a right worth pursuing. 6 In § 1983 actions, federal courts apply the state statute of limitations governing actions for personal injury. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261, 276­280 (1985). The question when the limitations period begins to run, however, is one of federal law. See id., at 268­271; see generally Connors v. Hallmark & Son Coal Co., 935 F. 2d 336, 341 (CADC 1991) (collecting cases). 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 266 (1994) 281 Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment The principle of party presentation cautions decisionmakers against asserting it for him. See ante, at 275. * * * In Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989), this Court re- fused to analyze under a "substantive due process" heading an individual's right to be free from police applications of excessive force. "Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this sort of . . . governmental conduct," we said, "that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Id., at 395. I conclude that the Fourth Amendment simi- larly proscribes the police misconduct Albright alleges. I therefore resist in this case the plea "to break new ground," see Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 115, 125 (1992), in a field-substantive due process-that "has at times been a treacherous [one] for this Court." See Moore v. East Cleve- land, 431 U. S. 494, 502 (1977) (opinion of Powell, J.). Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in the judgment. I agree with the plurality that an allegation of arrest with- out probable cause must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment without reference to more general considera- tions of due process. But I write because Albright's due process claim concerns not his arrest but instead the mali- cious initiation of a baseless criminal prosecution against him. I The State must, of course, comply with the constitutional requirements of due process before it convicts and sentences a person who has violated state law. The initial question here is whether the due process requirements for crimi- nal proceedings include a standard for the initiation of a prosecution. 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:54 PAGES OPINPGT 282 ALBRIGHT v. OLIVER Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment The specific provisions of the Bill of Rights neither impose a standard for the initiation of a prosecution, see U. S. Const., Amdts. 5, 6, nor require a pretrial hearing to weigh evidence according to a given standard, see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119 (1975) ("[A] judicial hearing is not prerequisite to prosecution"); Costello v. United States, 350 U. S. 359, 363 (1956) ("An indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, like an information drawn by the prose- cutor, . . . is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits. The Fifth Amendment requires nothing more") (footnote omitted). Instead, the Bill of Rights requires a grand jury indictment and a speedy trial where a petit jury can determine whether the charges are true. Amdts. 5, 6. To be sure, we have held that a criminal rule or procedure that does not contravene one of the more specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights may nonetheless violate the Due Process Clause if it " `offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' " Medina v. California, 505 U. S. 437, 445 (1992) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197, 202 (1977)). With respect to the initiation of charges, however, the specific guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights mirror the traditional requirements of the criminal process. The common law provided for a grand jury indictment and a speedy trial; it did not provide a specific evidentiary stand- ard applicable to a pretrial hearing on the merits of the charges or subject to later review by the courts. See United States v. Williams, 504 U. S. 36, 51 (1992); Costello, supra, at 362­363; United States v. Reed, 27 F. Cas. 727, 738 (No. 16,134) (CC NDNY 1852) (Nelson, J.) ("No case has been cited, nor have we been able to find any, furnishing an authority for looking into and revising the judgment of the grand jury upon the evidence, for the purpose of determining whether or not the finding was founded upon sufficient proof"). Moreover, because the Constitution requires a speedy trial but no pretrial hearing on the sufficiency of the charges 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:54 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 266 (1994) 283 Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment (leaving aside the question of extended pretrial detention, see County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U. S. 44 (1991)), any standard governing the initiation of charges would be superfluous in providing protection during the criminal proc- ess. If the charges are not proved beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, the charges are dismissed; if the charges are proved beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, any standard applicable to the initiation of charges is irrelevant because it is perforce met. This case thus differs in kind from In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970), and the other criminal cases where we have recognized due process requirements not specified in the Bill of Rights. The constitutional require- ments we enforced in those cases ensured fundamental fair- ness in the determination of guilt at trial. See, e. g., Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, 112 (1935) (due process prohibits "deliberate deception of court and jury" by prosecution's knowing use of perjured testimony); ante, at 273­274, n. 6. In sum, the due process requirements for criminal pro- ceedings do not include a standard for the initiation of a criminal prosecution. II That may not be the end of the due process inquiry, how- ever. The common law of torts long recognized that a mali- cious prosecution, like a defamatory statement, can cause unjustified torment and anguish-both by tarnishing one's name and by costing the accused money in legal fees and the like. See generally W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 119, pp. 870­889 (5th ed. 1984); T. Cooley, Law of Torts 180­187 (1879). We have held, of course, that the Due Process Clause protects interests other than the interest in freedom from physical restraint, see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U. S. 110, 121 (1989), and for purposes of this case, we can assume, arguendo, that some of the interests granted histori- cal protection by the common law of torts (such as the inter- ests in freedom from defamation and malicious prosecution) 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:54 PAGES OPINPGT 284 ALBRIGHT v. OLIVER Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment are protected by the Due Process Clause. Even so, our precedents make clear that a state actor's random and unau- thorized deprivation of that interest cannot be challenged under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 so long as the State provides an ade- quate postdeprivation remedy. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527, 535­544 (1981); see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517, 531­536 (1984); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 674­682 (1977); id., at 701 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("adequate state remedy for defamation may satisfy the due process require- ment when a State has impaired an individual's interest in his reputation"). The commonsense teaching of Parratt is that some ques- tions of property, contract, and tort law are best resolved by state legal systems without resort to the federal courts, even when a state actor is the alleged wrongdoer. As we ex- plained in Parratt, the contrary approach "would almost nec- essarily result in turning every alleged injury which may have been inflicted by a state official acting under `color of law' into a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment cogniza- ble under § 1983. . . . Presumably, under this rationale any party who is involved in nothing more than an automobile accident with a state official could allege a constitutional vio- lation under § 1983. Such reasoning `would make of the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superim- posed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States.' " 451 U. S., at 544 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693, 701 (1976)). The Parratt principle respects the delicate balance between state and federal courts and comports with the design of § 1983, a statute that reinforces a legal tradition in which protection for persons and their rights is afforded by the common law and the laws of the States, as well as by the Constitution. See Parratt, supra, at 531­532. Yet it is fair to say that courts, including our own, have been cautious in invoking the rule of Parratt. See Mann v. Tucson, 782 F. 2d 790, 798 (CA9 1986) (Sneed, J., concurring). 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 266 (1994) 285 Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment That hesitancy is in part a recognition of the important role federal courts have assumed in elaborating vital constitu- tional guarantees against arbitrary or oppressive state ac- tion. We want to leave an avenue open for recourse where we think the federal power ought to be vindicated. Cf. Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945). But the price of our ambivalence over the outer limits of Parratt has been its dilution and, in some respects, its trans- formation into a mere pleading exercise. The Parratt rule has been avoided by attaching a substantive rather than pro- cedural label to due process claims (a distinction that if ac- cepted in this context could render Parratt a dead letter) and by treating claims based on the Due Process Clause as claims based on some other constitutional provision. See Taylor v. Knapp, 871 F. 2d 803, 807 (CA9 1989) (Sneed, J., concurring). It has been avoided at the other end of the spectrum by construing complaints alleging a substantive in- jury as attacks on the adequacy of state procedures. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U. S. 113, 139­151 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Easter House v. Felder, 910 F. 2d 1387, 1408 (CA7 1990) (Easterbrook, J., concurring). These evasions are unjustified given the clarity of the Parratt rule: In the ordinary case where an injury has been caused not by a state law, policy, or procedure, but by a random and unauthorized act that can be remedied by state law, there is no basis for intervention under § 1983, at least in a suit based on "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment simpliciter." 451 U. S., at 536. As Parratt's precedential force must be acknowledged, I think it disposes of this case. Illinois provides a tort rem- edy for malicious prosecution; indeed, Albright brought a state-law malicious prosecution claim, albeit after the statute of limitations had expired. (That fact does not affect the adequacy of the remedy under Parratt. See Daniels v. Wil- liams, 474 U. S. 327, 342 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).) Given the state remedy and the holding of Parratt, there is 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT 286 ALBRIGHT v. OLIVER Souter, J., concurring in judgment neither need nor legitimacy to invoke § 1983 in this case. See 975 F. 2d 343, 347 (CA7 1992) (case below). III That said, if a State did not provide a tort remedy for malicious prosecution, there would be force to the argument that the malicious initiation of a baseless criminal prosecu- tion infringes an interest protected by the Due Process Clause and enforceable under § 1983. Compare Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S., at 676, id., at 701­702 (Stevens, J., dis- senting), and Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 573 (1972), with Paul v. Davis, supra, at 711­712; see PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 93­94 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring); Martinez v. Califor- nia, 444 U. S. 277, 281­282 (1980); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 134 (1877). But given the state tort remedy, we need not conduct that inquiry in this case. * * * For these reasons, I concur in the judgment of the Court holding that the dismissal of petitioner Albright's complaint was proper. Justice Souter, concurring in the judgment. While I agree with the Court's judgment that petitioner has not justified recognition of a substantive due process vio- lation in his prosecution without probable cause, I reach that result by a route different from that of the plurality. The Court has previously rejected the proposition that the Con- stitution's application to a general subject (like prosecution) is necessarily exhausted by protection under particular tex- tual guarantees addressing specific events within that sub- ject (like search and seizure), on a theory that one specific constitutional provision can pre-empt a broad field as against another more general one. See United States v. James Dan- iel Good Real Property, ante, at 49 ("We have rejected the 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 266 (1994) 287 Souter, J., concurring in judgment view that the applicability of one constitutional amendment pre-empts the guarantees of another"); Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U. S. 56, 70 (1992) ("Certain wrongs affect more than a single right and, accordingly, can implicate more than one of the Constitution's commands. Where such multiple violations are alleged, we are not in the habit of identifying as a preliminary matter the claim's `dominant' character. Rather, we examine each constitutional provision in turn"). It has likewise rejected the view that incorporation of the substantive guarantees of the first eight Amendments to the Constitution defines the limits of due process protection, see Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 89­92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). The second Justice Harlan put it this way: "[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause . . . is not a series of isolated points . . . . It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, in- cludes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary imposi- tions and purposeless restraints . . . ." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 543 (1961) (dissenting opinion). We are, nonetheless, required by "[t]he doctrine of judicial self-restraint . . . to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in [the] field" of substantive due process. Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 115, 125 (1992). Just as the concept of due process does not protect against insubstantial impositions on liberty, neither should the "rational continuum" be reduced to the mere duplication of protections adequately addressed by other constitutional provisions. Justice Harlan could not infer that the due proc- ess guarantee was meant to protect against insubstantial burdens, and we are not free to infer that it was meant to be applied without thereby adding a substantial increment to protection otherwise available. The importance of recogniz- ing the latter limitation is underscored by pragmatic con- cerns about subjecting government actors to two (potentially inconsistent) standards for the same conduct and needlessly 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT 288 ALBRIGHT v. OLIVER Souter, J., concurring in judgment imposing on trial courts the unenviable burden of reconciling well-established jurisprudence under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments with the ill-defined contours of some novel due process right.1 This rule of reserving due process for otherwise homeless substantial claims no doubt informs those decisions, see Gra- ham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989), Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975), and Whitley v. Albers, 475 U. S. 312, 327 (1986), in which the Court has resisted relying on the Due Process Clause when doing so would have duplicated protec- tion that a more specific constitutional provision already be- stowed.2 This case calls for just such restraint, in present- 1 Justice Stevens suggests that these concerns are not for this Court, since Congress resolved them in deciding to provide a remedy for constitu- tional violations under § 1983. Post, at 312. The question before the Court, however, is not about the existence of a statutory remedy for an admitted constitutional violation, but whether a particular violation of sub- stantive due process, as distinct from the Fourth Amendment, should be recognized on the facts pleaded. This question is indisputably within the province of the Court, and should be addressed with regard for the con- cerns about unnecessary duplication in constitutional adjudication re- flected in Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989), Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975), and Whitley v. Albers, 475 U. S. 312 (1986). Nothing in Congress's enactment of § 1983 suggests otherwise. 2 Recognizing these concerns makes sense of what at first blush may seem a tension between our decisions in Graham v. Connor, supra, and Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, on the one hand, and United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, ante, p. 43, and Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U. S. 56 (1992), on the other. The Court held in Graham that all claims of excessive force by law enforcement officials in the course of a "seizure" should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" standard. "Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Graham v. Connor, supra, at 395. The Gerstein Court held that the Fourth Amendment, not the Due Process Clause, determines what post- arrest proceedings are required for suspects detained on criminal charges. Gerstein v. Pugh, supra. As we recently explained in United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, ante, at 50, the Court reasoned in 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 266 (1994) 289 Souter, J., concurring in judgment ing no substantial burden on liberty beyond what the Fourth Amendment is generally thought to redress already. In framing his claim of infringement of a liberty interest in freedom from the initiation of a baseless prosecution, peti- tioner has chosen to disclaim any reliance on the Fourth Amendment seizure that followed when he surrendered him- self into police custody. Petitioner has failed, however, to allege any substantial injury that is attributable to the for- mer event, but not the latter. His complaint presents an extensive list of damages: limitations on his liberty, freedom of association, and freedom of movement by virtue of the terms of his bond; financial expense of his legal defense; rep- utational harm among members of the community; inability to transact business or obtain employment in his local area, necessitating relocation to St. Louis; inability to secure credit; and personal pain and suffering. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a­50a. None of these injuries, however, is alleged to have followed from the issuance of the formal instrument of prosecution, as distinct from the ensuing assertion of cus- tody. Thus, petitioner has not shown a substantial depriva- tion of liberty from the mere initiation of prosecution. The significance of this failure follows from the recognition that none of petitioner's alleged injuries has been treated by the Courts of Appeals as beyond the ambit of compensability Gerstein that the Fourth Amendment "balance between individual and public interests always has been thought to define the `process that is due' for seizures of person or property in criminal cases." See Gerstein, supra, at 125, n. 27. Thus, in both Gerstein and Graham, separate analy- sis under the Due Process Clause was dispensed with as redundant. The Court has reached the same result in the context of claims of unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in penal institutions. See Whitley v. Albers, supra, at 327 ("It would indeed be surprising if . . . `conduct that shocks the conscience' or `afford[s] brutality the cloak of law,' and so violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 172, 173 (1952), were not also punishment `inconsistent with contemporary stand- ards of decency' and `repugnant to the conscience of mankind,' Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S., at 103, 106, in violation of the Eighth"). 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT 290 ALBRIGHT v. OLIVER Souter, J., concurring in judgment under the general rule of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 liability for a sei- zure unlawful under Fourth Amendment standards, see Ten- nessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1 (1985) (affirming § 1983 liability based on Fourth Amendment violation); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U. S. 593, 599 (1989) (unreasonable seizure in viola- tion of the Fourth Amendment gives rise to § 1983 liability). On the contrary, the Courts of Appeals have held that inju- ries like those petitioner alleges are cognizable in § 1983 claims founded upon arrests that are bad under the Fourth Amendment. See, e. g., Hale v. Fish, 899 F. 2d 390, 403­404 (CA5 1990) (affirming award of damages for mental anguish, harm to reputation, and legal fees for defense); B. C. R. Transport Co., Inc. v. Fontaine, 727 F. 2d 7, 12 (CA1 1984) (affirming award of damages for destruction of business due to publicity surrounding illegal search); Sims v. Mulcahy, 902 F. 2d 524, 532­533 (CA7 1990) (approving damages for pain, suffering, and mental anguish in the context of a challenge to jury instructions); Sevigny v. Dicksey, 846 F. 2d 953, 959 (CA4 1988) (affirming damages for extreme emotional dis- tress); Dennis v. Warren, 779 F. 2d 245, 248­249 (CA5 1985) (affirming award of damages for pain, suffering, humiliation, and embarrassment); Konczak v. Tyrrell, 603 F. 2d 13, 17 (CA7 1979) (affirming damages for lost wages, mental dis- tress, humiliation, loss of reputation, and general pain and suffering). Indeed, it is not surprising that rules of recovery for such harms have naturally coalesced under the Fourth Amend- ment, since the injuries usually occur only after an arrest or other Fourth Amendment seizure, an event that normally follows promptly (three days in this case) upon the formality of filing an indictment, information, or complaint. There is no restraint on movement until a seizure occurs or bond terms are imposed. Damage to reputation and all of its at- tendant harms also tend to show up after arrest. The de- fendant's mental anguish (whether premised on reputational harm, burden of defending, incarceration, or some other con- 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 266 (1994) 291 Stevens, J., dissenting sequence of prosecution) customarily will not arise before an arrest, or at least before the notification that an arrest war- rant has been issued, informs him of the charges. There may indeed be exceptional cases where some quan- tum of harm occurs in the interim period after groundless criminal charges are filed but before any Fourth Amendment seizure. Whether any such unusual case may reveal a sub- stantial deprivation of liberty, and so justify a court in rest- ing compensation on a want of government power or a lim- itation of it independent of the Fourth Amendment, are issues to be faced only when they arise. They do not arise in this case and I accordingly concur in the judgment of the Court.3 Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Blackmun joins, dissenting. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution constrains the power of the Federal Government to accuse a citizen of an infamous crime. Under that Amendment, no accusation may issue except on a grand jury determination that there is probable cause to support the accusation.1 The question presented by this case is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes any comparable con- straint on state governments. 3 Justice Stevens argues that the fact that "few of petitioner's injuries flowed solely from the filing of the charges against him does not make those injuries insubstantial," post, at 312 (emphasis in original), and main- tains that the arbitrary filing of criminal charges may work substantial harm on liberty. Ibid. While I do not quarrel with either proposition, neither of them addresses the threshold question whether the complaint alleges any substantial deprivation beyond the scope of what settled law recognizes at the present time. 1 "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger . . . ." U. S. Const., Amdt. 5. See also United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 343 (1974). 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT 292 ALBRIGHT v. OLIVER Stevens, J., dissenting In Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884), we decided that the Due Process Clause does not compel the States to proceed by way of grand jury indictment when they initiate a prosecution. In reaching that conclusion, however, we noted that the substance of the federal guarantee was pre- served by California's requirement that a magistrate certify "to the probable guilt of the defendant." Id., at 538. In accord with Hurtado, I would hold that Illinois may dispense with the grand jury procedure only if the substance of the probable-cause requirement remains adequately protected.2 I Assuming, as we must, that the allegations of petitioner's complaint are true, it is perfectly clear that the probable- cause requirement was not satisfied in this case. Indeed, it is plain that respondent Oliver, who attested to the criminal information against petitioner, either knew or should have known that he did not have probable cause to initiate crimi- nal proceedings. Oliver's only evidence against petitioner came from a paid informant who established her unreliability on more than 50 occasions, when her false accusations led to aborted and dismissed prosecutions.3 Nothing about her performance in 2 In Hurtado, 110 U. S., at 532, the Court made this comment on the traditions inherited from English law, with particular reference to the Magna Carta: "Applied in England only as guards against executive usurpation and tyr- anny, here they have become bulwarks also against arbitrary legislation; but, in that application, as it would be incongruous to measure and restrict them by the ancient customary English law, they must be held to guaran- tee not particular forms of procedure, but the very substance of individual rights to life, liberty, and property. ". . . Such regulations, to adopt a sentence of Burke's, `may alter the mode and application but have no power over the substance of original justice.' " 3 According to the complaint, Oliver, a detective in the Macomb, Illinois, Police Department, agreed to provide Veda Moore with protection and money in exchange for her assistance in acting as a confidential inform- 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 266 (1994) 293 Stevens, J., dissenting this case suggested any improvement on her record. The substance she described as cocaine turned out to be baking soda. She twice misidentified her alleged vendor before, in response to a leading question, she agreed that petitioner might be he; 4 in fact, she had never had any contact with petitioner. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the commencement of a serious criminal proceeding on such "scanty grounds" was nothing short of "shocking." 5 ant. Allegedly, Moore, addicted to cocaine, lied to Oliver about her under- cover purchases of controlled substances in order to receive the promised payments. During the course of her tenure as an informant, Moore falsely implicated over 50 individuals in criminal activity, resulting each time in a dismissed prosecution. 4 Relying entirely on information provided by Moore, Oliver testified before a grand jury and secured an indictment against a first suspect, John Albright, Jr., for selling a "look-alike" substance in violation of Illinois law. When he attempted to arrest John Albright, Jr., however, Oliver became convinced that he had the wrong man, and substituted the name of a sec- ond suspect, Albright's son, on the arrest warrant. Once again, it became clear that Oliver's suspect could not have committed the crime. Oliver then asked Moore whether her vendor might have been a different son of the man she had first identified. When Moore admitted of that possibility, Oliver attested to the criminal information charging petitioner, his third and final suspect, with a felony. 5 "Detective Oliver made no effort to corroborate Veda Moore's unsub- stantiated accusation. A heap of baking soda was no corroboration. Her initial misidentification of the seller cast grave doubt on the accuracy of her information. And this was part of a pattern: of fifty persons she re- ported to Oliver as trafficking in drugs, none was successfully prosecuted for any crime. In the case of `Albright,' Oliver should have suspected that Moore had bought cocaine either from she knew not whom or from someone she was afraid to snitch on (remember that she had gone to work for Oliver in the first place because she was being threatened by a man to whom she owed money for previous purchases of cocaine), that she had consumed it and replaced it with baking soda, and that she had then picked a name from the phone book at random. The fact that she used her in- formant's reward to buy cocaine makes this hypothesis all the more plausi- ble. An arrest is a serious business. To arrest a person on the scanty grounds that are alleged to be all that Oliver had to go on is shocking." 975 F. 2d 343, 345 (CA7 1992). 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT 294 ALBRIGHT v. OLIVER Stevens, J., dissenting These shocking factual allegations give rise to two impor- tant questions of law: does the commencement of formal criminal proceedings deprive the accused person of "liberty" as that term is used in the Fourteenth Amendment; and, if so, are the demands of "due process" satisfied solely by com- pliance with certain procedural formalities which ordinarily ensure that a prosecution will not commence absent probable cause? I shall discuss these questions separately, and then comment on the several opinions supporting the Court's judgment. II Punishment by confinement in prison is a frequent conclu- sion of criminal proceedings. Had petitioner's prosecution resulted in his conviction and incarceration, then there is no question but that the Due Process Clause would have been implicated; a central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to deny States the power to impose this sort of depriva- tion of liberty until after completion of a fair trial. Over the years, however, our cases have made it clear that the inter- ests protected by the Due Process Clause extend well be- yond freedom from an improper criminal conviction. As a qualitative matter, we have decided that the liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment is significantly broader than mere freedom from physical constraint. Al- though its contours have never been defined precisely, that liberty surely includes the right to make basic decisions about the future; to participate in community affairs; to take advantage of employment opportunities; to cultivate family, business, and social relationships; and to travel from place to place.6 On a quantitative level, we have, to be sure, ac- 6 As we stated in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923): "While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it de- notes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 266 (1994) 295 Stevens, J., dissenting knowledged that not every modest impairment of individual liberty amounts to a deprivation raising constitutional con- cerns. Cf. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215 (1976). At the same time, however, we have recognized that a variety of state actions have such serious effects on protected liberty interests that they may not be undertaken arbitrarily,7 or without observing procedural safeguards.8 In my opinion, the formal commencement of a criminal proceeding is quintessentially this type of state action. The initiation of a criminal prosecution, regardless of whether it to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up chil- dren, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as es- sential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Id., at 399 (cita- tions omitted). 7 See, e. g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 94­99 (1987) (invalidating prison regulation of inmate marriages); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 500 (1977) (striking down ordinance that prohibited certain relatives from residing together because it had only a "tenuous relation" to its goals); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 191 (1952) (requiring loyalty oaths of public employees violates due process because "[i]ndiscriminate classification of innocent with knowing activity must fall as an assertion of arbitrary power"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534­535 (1925) (state law requiring parents to send children to public school vio- lates due process because "rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some pur- pose within the competency of the State"). 8 See, e. g., Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U. S. 532, 542 (1985) ("An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property `be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appro- priate to the nature of the case' ") (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 313 (1950)); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 581 (1975) ("[D]ue process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10 days or less, that the student be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story"); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433, 436­437 (1971) ("Where a per- son's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential"). 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT 296 ALBRIGHT v. OLIVER Stevens, J., dissenting prompts an arrest, immediately produces "a wrenching dis- ruption of everyday life." Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A., 481 U. S. 787, 814 (1987). Every prose- cution, like every arrest, "is a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends." United States v. Marion, 404 U. S. 307, 320 (1971). In short, an official accusation of serious crime has a direct impact on a range of identified liberty interests. That im- pact, moreover, is of sufficient magnitude to qualify as a dep- rivation of liberty meriting constitutional protection.9 III The next question, of course, is what measure of "due proc- ess" must be provided an accused in connection with this deprivation of liberty. In In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 361­ 364 (1970), we relied on both history and certain societal in- terests to find that, in the context of criminal conviction, due process entails proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The same considerations support a requirement that criminal prosecution be predicated, at a minimum, on a finding of probable cause. It has been the historical practice in our jurisprudence to withhold the filing of criminal charges until the state can marshal evidence establishing probable cause that an identi- fiable defendant has committed a crime. This long tradition 9 The Court of Appeals was persuaded that the Court's reasoning in Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693 (1976), required a different conclusion. 975 F. 2d, at 345. Even if one accepts the dubious proposition that an individ- ual's interest in his or her reputation simpliciter is not an interest in liberty, Paul v. Davis recognized that liberty is infringed by governmental conduct that injures reputation in conjunction with other interests. 424 U. S., at 701. The commencement of a criminal prosecution is certainly such conduct. 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 266 (1994) 297 Stevens, J., dissenting is reflected in the common-law tort of malicious prosecu- tion,10 as well as in our cases.11 In addition, the probable- cause requirement serves valuable societal interests, pro- tecting the populace from the whim and caprice of governmental agents without unduly burdening the govern- ment's prosecutorial function.12 Consistent with our reason- ing in Winship, these factors lead to the conclusion that one element of the "due process" prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment is a responsible decision that there is probable cause to prosecute.13 Illinois has established procedures intended to ensure that evidence of "the probable guilt of the defendant," see Hur- 10 See, e. g., W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 119, pp. 876­882 (5th ed. 1984). 11 Wayte v. United States, 470 U. S. 598, 607 (1985); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U. S. 357, 364 (1978) ("In our system, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense de- fined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discre- tion"); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119 (1975) ("The standard of proof required of the prosecution is usually referred to as `probable cause,' but in some jurisdictions it may approach a prima facie case of guilt"); see also United States v. Lovasco, 431 U. S. 783, 791 (1977) (noting that "it is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to recommend an indictment on less than probable cause") (footnote omitted); United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S., at 343 (noting that one of the "grand jury's historic functions" was to determine whether probable cause existed); Dinsman v. Wilkes, 12 How. 390, 402 (1852) (noting that instigation of a criminal prosecution without probable cause creates an action for malicious prosecution). 12 Because probable cause is already required for an arrest, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt for a conviction, the burden on law enforcement is not appreciably enhanced by a requirement of probable cause for prosecution. 13 I thus disagree with dicta to the contrary in a footnote in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S., at 125, n. 26 ("Because the probable cause determination is not a constitutional prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those suspects who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition that they appear for trial"). As I have explained, the com- mencement of criminal proceedings itself infringes on liberty interests, regardless of the restraints imposed. 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT 298 ALBRIGHT v. OLIVER Stevens, J., dissenting tado, 110 U. S., at 538, has been assembled before a criminal prosecution is pursued.14 Petitioner does not challenge the general adequacy of these procedures. Rather, he claims that the probable-cause determination in his case was invalid as a substantive matter, because it was wholly unsupported by reliable evidence and tainted by Oliver's disregard or sup- pression of facts bearing on the reliability of his informant. This contention requires us to consider whether a state's compliance with facially valid procedures for initiating a prosecution is by itself sufficient to meet the demands of due process, without regard to the substance of the resulting probable-cause determination. Fortunately, our prior cases have rejected such a formalis- tic approach to the Due Process Clause. In Mooney v. Holo- han, 294 U. S. 103, 110 (1935), a criminal defendant claimed that the prosecutor's knowing use of perjured testimony, and deliberate suppression of evidence that would have im- peached that testimony, constituted a denial of due process. The State urged us to reject this submission on the ground that the petitioner's trial had been free of procedural error. Our treatment of the State's argument should dispose of the analogous defense advanced today: "Without attempting at this time to deal with the question at length, we deem it sufficient for the present purpose to say that we are unable to approve this nar- row view of the requirement of due process. That re- quirement, in safeguarding the liberty of the citizen against deprivation through the action of the State, em- bodies the fundamental conceptions of justice which lie 14 At the time of this suit, Illinois law allowed the filing of felony charges only by information or indictment. Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 38, § 111­2(a) (1987). If the filing were by information, as was the case here, then the charges could be filed but not pursued until a preliminary hearing had been held or waived pursuant to Ch. 38, § 109­3, and, if held, had concluded in a finding of probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed an offense. Ch. 38, §§ 111­2(a), 109­3. 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 266 (1994) 299 Stevens, J., dissenting at the base of our civil and political institutions. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 316, 317 [(1926)]. It is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a State has contrived a con- viction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured. Such a contrivance by a State to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation." Id., at 112. In the years since Mooney, we have consistently reaf- firmed this understanding of the requirements of due proc- ess. Our cases make clear that procedural regularity not- withstanding, the Due Process Clause is violated by the knowing use of perjured testimony or the deliberate sup- pression of evidence favorable to the accused.15 It is, in other words, well established that adherence to procedural forms will not save a conviction that rests in substance on false evidence or deliberate deception. 15 See, e. g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 103, and n. 8 (1976) (citing cases); Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150, 153­154 (1972) (failure to disclose Government agreement with witness violates due process); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83, 87 (1963) ("[S]uppression by the prosecu- tion of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespec- tive of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution"); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264 (1959) (failure of State to correct testimony known to be false violates due process); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U. S. 213, 215­216 (1942) (allegations of the knowing use of perjured testimony and the suppression of evidence favorable to the accused "sufficiently charge a deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, and, if proven, would enti- tle petitioner to release from his present custody"). But cf. United States v. Williams, 504 U. S. 36 (1992) (prosecutor need not present exculpatory evidence in his possession to the grand jury). 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT 300 ALBRIGHT v. OLIVER Stevens, J., dissenting Just as perjured testimony may invalidate an otherwise proper conviction, so also may the absence of proof render a criminal conviction unconstitutional. The traditional as- sumption that "proof of a criminal charge beyond a reason- able doubt is constitutionally required," Winship, 397 U. S., at 362, has been endorsed explicitly and tied directly to the Due Process Clause. Id., at 364.16 When the quantum of proof supporting a conviction falls sufficiently far below this standard, then the Due Process Clause requires that the con- viction be set aside, even in the absence of any procedural error. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979). In short, we have already recognized that certain substan- tive defects can vitiate the protection ordinarily afforded by a trial, so that formal compliance with procedural rules is no longer enough to satisfy the demands of due process. The same is true of a facially valid determination of probable cause. Even if prescribed procedures are followed meticu- lously, a criminal prosecution based on perjured testimony, or evidence on which "no rational trier of fact" could base a finding of probable cause, cf. id., at 324, simply does not com- port with the requirements of the Due Process Clause. IV I do not understand the plurality to take issue with the proposition that commencement of a criminal case deprives the accused of liberty, or that the state has a duty to make a probable-cause determination before filing charges. In- stead, both The Chief Justice and Justice Scalia iden- tify petitioner's reliance on a "substantive due process" the- ory as the critical flaw in his argument. Because there is no substantive due process right available to petitioner, they 16 "Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a rea- sonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 364. 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 266 (1994) 301 Stevens, J., dissenting conclude, his due process claim can be rejected in its entirety and without further consideration. In my opinion, this approach places undue weight on the label petitioner has attached to his claim.17 The Fourteenth Amendment contains only one Due Process Clause. Though it is sometimes helpful, as a matter of doctrine, to distinguish between substantive and procedural due process, see Dan- iels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 337­340 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgments), the two concepts are not mutually exclusive, and their protections often overlap. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment, upon which the plurality principally relies, provides both procedural and substantive protections, and these protections converge. When the Court first held that the right to be free from unreasonable official searches was "implicit in `the concept of ordered lib- erty,' " and therefore protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 27­28 (1949), it refused to require the States to provide the procedures accorded in federal trials to protect that right.18 Id., at 28­33. Significantly, however, when we overruled the procedural component of that decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), we made it clear that we were "extending the substantive protections of due proc- ess to all constitutionally unreasonable searches-state or federal . . . ." Id., at 655 (emphasis added). Moreover, in Winship, we found it unnecessary to clarify whether our holding rested on substantive or procedural due process grounds; it was enough to say that the "Due 17 In any event, it should be noted that in presenting his question for review, petitioner invokes the Due Process Clause generally, without ref- erence to "substantive" due process. See Pet. for Cert. i. 18 Our refusal in Wolf to require States to adopt a federal rule of proce- dure-the exclusionary rule-paralleled our earlier refusal in Hurtado to require States to adopt a federal rule of procedure-the grand jury proc- ess for ascertaining probable cause. Nevertheless, both cases recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment protected the substantive rights as im- plicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT 302 ALBRIGHT v. OLIVER Stevens, J., dissenting Process Clause" itself requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 397 U. S., at 364. Similarly, whether the analogous probable-cause standard urged by petitioner is more appro- priately characterized as substantive or procedural is not a matter of overriding significance. In either event, the same Due Process Clause operates to protect the individual against the abuse of governmental power, by guaranteeing that no criminal prosecution shall be initiated except on a finding of probable cause. V According to the plurality, the application of certain portions of the Bill of Rights to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment "has substituted, in these areas of criminal procedure, the specific guarantees of the various provisions of the Bill of Rights . . . for the more generalized language contained in the earlier cases construing the Four- teenth Amendment." Ante, at 273. The plurality then rea- sons, in purported reliance on Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989), that because the Fourth Amendment is designed to address pretrial deprivations of liberty, petitioner's claim must be analyzed under that Amendment alone. Ante, at 273­274. In the end, however, The Chief Justice con- cludes that he need not consider petitioner's claim under the Fourth Amendment after all, because that question was not presented in the petition for certiorari. Ante, at 275. There are two glaring flaws in the plurality's analysis. First, the pretrial deprivation of liberty at issue in this case is addressed by a particular Amendment, but not the Fourth; rather, it is addressed by the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment. That the Framers saw fit to provide a specific procedural guarantee against arbitrary accusations indicates the importance they attached to the liberty interest at stake. Though we have not required the States to use the grand jury procedure itself, it by no means follows that the under- lying liberty interest is unworthy of Fourteenth Amendment 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 266 (1994) 303 Stevens, J., dissenting protection. As we explained in Hurtado, "bulwarks" of protection such as the Magna Carta and the Due Process Clause "guarantee not particular forms of procedure, but the very substance of individual rights to life, liberty, and property." 19 Second, and of greater importance, the cramped view of the Fourteenth Amendment taken by the plurality has been rejected time and time again by this Court. In his famous dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 89­92 (1947), Justice Black took the position that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes the en- tire Bill of Rights applicable to the States. As a corollary, he advanced a theory not unlike that endorsed today by The Chief Justice and Justice Scalia: that the express guar- antees of the Bill of Rights mark the outer limit of Due Proc- ess Clause protection. Ibid. What is critical, for present purposes, is that the Adamson majority rejected this conten- tion and held instead that the "ordered liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause is not coextensive with the specific provisions of the first eight Amendments to the Constitution. Justice Frankfurter's concurrence made this point perfectly clear: "It may not be amiss to restate the pervasive function of the Fourteenth Amendment in exacting from the States observance of basic liberties. . . . The Amendment neither comprehends the specific provisions by which the founders deemed it appropriate to restrict the fed- eral government nor is it confined to them. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has an independent potency . . . ." Id., at 66. In the years since Adamson, the Court has shown no incli- nation to reconsider its repudiation of Justice Black's posi- 19 Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 532 (1884). See n. 2, supra. 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT 304 ALBRIGHT v. OLIVER Stevens, J., dissenting tion.20 Instead, the Court has identified numerous viola- tions of due process that have no counterparts in the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. And contrary to the sug- gestion of the plurality, ante, at 271­272, 273, these decisions have not been limited to the realm outside criminal law. As I have already discussed, it is the Due Process Clause itself, and not some explicit provision of the Bill of Rights, that forbids the use of perjured testimony and the suppression of evidence favorable to the accused.21 Similarly, we have held that the Due Process Clause requires an impartial judge,22 and prohibits the use of unnecessarily suggestive identifi- cation procedures.23 Characteristically, Justice Black was the sole dissenter when the Court concluded in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333 (1966), that the failure to control disruptive influences in the courtroom constitutes a denial of due process. Perhaps most important, and virtually ignored by the plu- rality today, is our holding in In re Winship that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction ex- cept upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 397 U. S., at 364. Because the reasonable-doubt standard has no explicit textual source in the Bill of Rights, the Winship Court was faced with precisely the same argument now advanced by The Chief Justice and Justice Scalia: Noting the proce- dural guarantees for which the Bill of Rights specifically pro- vides in criminal cases, Justice Black maintained that "[t]he Constitution thus goes into some detail to spell out what kind 20 Indeed, no other Justice has joined Justice Black in maintaining that the scope of the Due Process Clause is limited to the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Although Justice Douglas joined Justice Black in dissent in Adamson, he later retreated from this position. See, e. g., Gris- wold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 484 (1965); L. Tribe, American Consti- tutional Law § 11­2, p. 774, and n. 32 (2d ed. 1988). 21 See n. 15, supra. 22 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927). 23 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 302 (1967). Justice Black dissented. Id., at 303­306. 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 266 (1994) 305 Stevens, J., dissenting of trial a defendant charged with crime should have, and I believe the Court has no power to add to or subtract from the procedures set forth by the Founders." Id., at 377 (dis- senting opinion). Holding otherwise, the Winship majority resoundingly rejected this position, which Justice Harlan characterized as "fl[ying] in the face of a course of judicial history reflected in an unbroken line of opinions that have interpreted due process to impose restraints on the pro- cedures government may adopt in its dealing with its citizens . . . ." Id., at 373, n. 5 (concurring opinion). Nevertheless, The Chief Justice and Justice Scalia seem intent on resuscitating a theory that has never been viable, by reading our opinion in Graham v. Connor more broadly than our actual holding. In Graham, which in- volved a claim of excessive force in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop, we held that "[b]ecause the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitu- tional protection against this sort of physically intrusive gov- ernmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more general- ized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." 490 U. S., at 395. Under Graham, then, the existence of a specific protection in the Bill of Rights that is incorporated by the Due Process Clause may preclude what would in any event be redundant reliance on a more general conception of liberty.24 Nothing in Graham, however, forecloses a general due process claim when a more specific source of protection is absent or, as here, open to question. See ante, at 275 (reserving ques- 24 Moreover, it likely made no difference to the outcome in Graham that the Court rested its decision on the Fourth Amendment rather than the Due Process Clause. The text of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against "unreasonable" seizures is no more specific than the Due Process Clause's prohibition against deprivations of liberty without "due process." Under either provision, the appropriate standards for evaluating excessive force claims must be developed through the same common-law process of case-by-case adjudication. 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT 306 ALBRIGHT v. OLIVER Stevens, J., dissenting tion whether Fourth Amendment protects against filing of charges without probable cause). At bottom, the plurality opinion seems to rest on one fun- damental misunderstanding: that the incorporation cases have somehow "substituted" the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights for the "more generalized language contained in the earlier cases construing the Fourteenth Amendment." Ante, at 273. In fact, the incorporation cases themselves rely on the very "generalized language" The Chief Justice would have them displacing.25 Those cases add to the lib- erty protected by the Due Process Clause most of the specific guarantees of the first eight Amendments, but they do not purport to take anything away; that a liberty interest is not the subject of an incorporated provision of the Bill of Rights does not remove it from the ambit of the Due Process Clause. I cannot improve on Justice Harlan's statement of this set- tled proposition: "[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the pre- cise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This `liberty' is not a series of iso- lated points pricked out in terms of the taking of prop- erty; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreason- 25 See, e. g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 655 (1961) (applying the exclu- sionary rule to the States because "without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral . . . as not to merit this Court's high regard as a freedom `implicit in the concept of ordered lib- erty' "); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784, 794 (1969) (holding that "the double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth Amendment represents a funda- mental ideal in our constitutional heritage, and that it should apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment"); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 149 (1968) ("Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which-were they to be tried in a federal court-would come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee"). 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 266 (1994) 307 Stevens, J., dissenting able searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purpose- less restraints . . . and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain in- terests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 543 (1961) (dissenting opinion). I have no doubt that an official accusation of an infamous crime constitutes a deprivation of liberty worthy of constitu- tional protection. The Framers of the Bill of Rights so con- cluded, and there is no reason to believe that the sponsors of the Fourteenth Amendment held a different view. The Due Process Clause of that Amendment should therefore be con- strued to require a responsible determination of probable cause before such a deprivation is effected. VI A separate comment on Justice Ginsburg's opinion is appropriate. I agree with her explanation of why the initial seizure of petitioner continued until his discharge and why the seizure was constitutionally unreasonable. Had it been conducted by a federal officer, it would have violated the Fourth Amendment. And, because unreasonable official sei- zures by state officers are deprivations of liberty or property without due process of law, the seizure of petitioner violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, Justice Gins- burg is correct in concluding that the complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Having concluded that the complaint states a cause of ac- tion, however, her opinion does not adequately explain why a dismissal of that complaint should be affirmed. Her sub- mission, as I understand it, rests on the propositions that (1) petitioner abandoned a meritorious claim based on the component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that is coterminous with the Fourth Amend- 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT 308 ALBRIGHT v. OLIVER Stevens, J., dissenting ment; and (2) the Due Process Clause provides no protection for deprivations of liberty associated with the initiation of a criminal prosecution unless an unreasonable seizure occurs. For reasons already stated, I firmly disagree with the sec- ond proposition. In the Bill of Rights, the Framers provided constitutional protection against unfounded felony accusations in the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment and separate protection against unwarranted arrests in the Fourth Amendment. Quite obviously, they did not regard the latter protection as sufficient to avoid the harm associated with an irresponsible official accusation of serious criminal conduct. Therefore, although in most cases an arrest or summons to appear in court may promptly follow the initiation of criminal pro- ceedings, the accusation itself causes a harm that is analyti- cally, and often temporally, distinct from the arrest. In this very case, the petitioner suffered a significant injury before he voluntarily surrendered.26 In other cases a significant 26 The petitioner was deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty in- terest at the moment that he was formally charged with a crime-an event that occurred prior to his seizure, and several months prior to the prelimi- nary hearing. I agree with Justice Ginsburg that the officer's incom- plete testimony at the preliminary hearing perpetuated the violation of petitioner's right to be free from unreasonable seizure, ante, at 279, but it also perpetuated the violation of his right to be free from prosecution absent probable cause. As such, contrary to her suggestion, ante, at 277, n. 1, either constitutional violation-the prosecution absent probable cause or the unreasonable seizure-can independently support an action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Furthermore, although Justice Ginsburg speculates that respondent may be fully protected from damages liability by an immunity defense, ante, at 279, and n. 5, that issue is neither free of difficulty, cf. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U. S. 259 (1993), nor properly before us. See plurality opinion, ante, at 269, n. 3. The question on which we granted certiorari is whether the initiation of criminal charges absent probable cause is a deprivation of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. Neither the fact that the seizure caused by petitioner's arrest also deprived him of liberty, nor the possible availability of an affirmative defense, is a suffi- cient reason for failing to discuss or decide this question. The question 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 266 (1994) 309 Stevens, J., dissenting interval may separate the formal accusation from the arrest, possibly because the accused is out of the jurisdiction or be- cause of administrative delays in effecting the arrest.27 Because the constitutional protection against unfounded accusations is distinct from, and somewhat broader than, the protection against unreasonable seizures, there is no reason why an abandonment of a claim based on the seizure should constitute a waiver of the claim based on the accusation. Moreover, a case holding that allegations of police miscon- duct in connection with an arrest or seizure are adequately reviewed under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard, Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989), tells us nothing about how unwarranted accusations should be evaluated. Graham merely held that the due process right to be free from police applications of excessive force when state officers effect a seizure is governed by the same reasonableness standard as that governing seizures effected by federal offi- cers. Id., at 394­395. In the unlawful seizure context exemplified by Graham, there is no need to differentiate be- tween a so-called Fourth Amendment theory and a substan- tive due process theory because they are coextensive.28 Whether viewed through a Fourth Amendment lens or a sub- whether one is protected by the Due Process Clause from unfounded prosecutions has implications beyond whether damages are ultimately obtainable. Indeed, in this very case petitioner's complaint sought in- junctive relief in addition to damages. 27 See, e. g., Doggett v. United States, 505 U. S. 647 (1992) (time lag be- tween indictment and arrest of 81/2 years due in part to the defendant's absence from the country and in part to the Government's negligence). 28 It is worthwhile to emphasize that the Fourth Amendment itself does not apply to state actors. It is only because the Court has held that the privacy rights protected against federal invasion by that Amendment are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that the Fourth Amendment has any relevance in this case. Strictly speaking, petitioner's claim is based entirely and exclusively on the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT 310 ALBRIGHT v. OLIVER Stevens, J., dissenting stantive due process lens, the substantive right protected is the same. When, however, the scope of the Fourth Amendment protection does not fully encompass the liberty interest at stake-as in this case-it is both unwise and unfair to place a blinder on the lens that focuses on the specific right being asserted. Although history teaches us that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments have been viewed "as running `almost into each other,' " Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S., at 646, quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886), and citing Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (C. P. 1765), we have never previously thought that the area of overlapping protection should constrain the independent protection pro- vided by either. VII Although Justice Souter leaves open the possibility that in some future case, a due process claim could be stated for a prosecution absent probable cause, he concludes that this is not such a case. He is persuaded that the federal remedy for Fourth Amendment violations provides an adequate jus- tification for refusing to " `break new ground' " by recogniz- ing the "novel due process right" asserted by petitioner. Ante, at 287, 288. Like The Chief Justice, ante, at 271, 275, and Justice Ginsburg, ante, at 281, he points to Col- lins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 115 (1992), as a pertinent example of our reluctance "to expand the concept of substan- tive due process . . . in [an] unchartered area." Id., at 125. Our relevant holding in that case was that a city's failure to provide an employee with a reasonably safe place to work did not violate the Federal Constitution. We unanimously characterized the petitioner's constitutional claim as "un- precedented." Id., at 127. The contrast between Collins and this case could not be more stark. The lineage of the constitutional right asserted in this case dates back to the Magna Carta. See n. 2, supra. In an 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 266 (1994) 311 Stevens, J., dissenting early Massachusetts case, Chief Justice Shaw described it as follows: "The right of individual citizens to be secure from an open and public accusation of crime, and from the trou- ble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, before a proba- ble cause is established by the presentment and indict- ment of a grand jury, in case of high offences, is justly regarded as one of the securities to the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive public prosecutions, and as one of the ancient immunities and privileges of Eng- lish liberty." Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. 329, 344 (1857). Moreover, most of the Courts of Appeals have treated claims of prosecutions without probable cause as within "the ambit of compensability under the general rule of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 liability," see ante, at 289­290 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment). See, e. g., Golino v. New Haven, 950 F. 2d 864, 866­867 (CA2 1991) (and case cited therein), cert. denied, 505 U. S. 1221 (1992); Robinson v. Maruffi, 895 F. 2d 649, 654­657 (CA10 1990) (citing cases); Torres v. Superintendent of Po- lice of Puerto Rico, 893 F. 2d 404, 408 (CA1 1990) (citing cases, and finding cause of action if "egregious"); Goodwin v. Metts, 885 F. 2d 157, 162 (CA4 1989) (citing cases), cert. de- nied, 494 U. S. 1081 (1990); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F. 2d 331, 348­349 (CA3 1989) (citing cases); Strength v. Hubert, 854 F. 2d 421 (CA11 1988); Wheeler v. Cosden Oil & Chemical Co., 734 F. 2d 254 (CA5 1984). Given the abundance of precedent in the Courts of Ap- peals, the vintage of the liberty interest at stake, and the fact that the Fifth Amendment categorically forbids the Fed- eral Government from initiating a felony prosecution without presentment to a grand jury, it is quite wrong to characterize petitioner's claim as an invitation to enter unchartered terri- tory. On the contrary, the claim is manifestly of constitu- tional dimension. 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT 312 ALBRIGHT v. OLIVER Stevens, J., dissenting This conclusion should end our inquiry. Whether the Due Process Clause in any given case may provide a "duplication of protections," ante, at 287 (Souter, J., concurring in judg- ment) is irrelevant to whether a liberty interest is at stake.29 Even assuming the dubious proposition that, in this case, due process protection against a baseless prosecution may not provide "a substantial increment to protection otherwise available," ibid.,30 that is a consideration relevant only to damages, not to the existence of constitutional protection. Furthermore, that few of petitioner's injuries flowed solely from the filing of the charges against him does not make those injuries insubstantial. To the contrary, I can think of few powers that the State possesses which, if arbitrarily imposed, can harm liberty as substantially as the filing of criminal charges. 29 Justice Souter relies in part upon "pragmatic concerns about sub- jecting government actors to two (potentially inconsistent) standards for the same conduct." Ante, at 287. I see no basis for that concern in this case. Moreover, Congress properly weighs "pragmatic concerns" when it decides whether to provide a remedy for a violation of federal law. Such concerns motivated the enactment of § 1983-a statute that provides a remedy for constitutional violations. Thus, if such a violation is alleged- and I am satisfied that one is here-we have a duty to enforce the statute without examining pragmatic concerns. 30 It seems to me quite wrong to attribute to a subsequent arrest the reputational and other harms caused by an unjustified accusation. In ad- dition, although Justice Ginsburg is prepared to hold that a Fourth Amendment claim does not accrue until the baseless charges are dis- missed, at least some of the Courts of Appeals have held that the arrest triggers the running of the statute of limitations. See, e. g., Rose v. Bar- tle, 871 F. 2d 331, 351 (CA3 1989); McCune v. Grand Rapids, 842 F. 2d 903, 906 (CA6 1988); Mack v. Varelas, 835 F. 2d 995, 1000 (CA2 1987); Venegas v. Wagner, 704 F. 2d 1144, 1146 (CA9 1983). And, given the dis- position of this case, a majority of this Court might agree. In any event, uncertainties about such matters counsel against constitutional adjudica- tion based upon "pragmatic concerns." 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 266 (1994) 313 Stevens, J., dissenting VIII While the supposed adequacy of an alternative federal remedy persuades Justices Ginsburg and Souter that petitioner's claim fails, the availability of an alternative state remedy convinces Justice Kennedy. I must therefore ex- plain why I do not agree with his reliance on Parratt v. Tay- lor, 451 U. S. 527 (1981). In 1975, I helped plant the seed that ultimately flowered into the Parratt doctrine. See Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F. 2d 1311, 1318­1319 (CA7 1975), modified en banc, 545 F. 2d 565 (1976), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 932 (1978) (cited in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S., at 541­542). The plaintiff in Bonner, like the plaintiff in Parratt, claimed that the negligence of state agents had deprived him of a property interest "without due process of law." In both cases, the claim was rejected because a predeprivation rem- edy was infeasible and the State's postdeprivation remedy was considered adequate to prevent a constitutional viola- tion. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S., at 543­544; Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F. 2d, at 1319­1320. Both of those cases in- volved the type of ordinary common-law tort that can be committed by anyone. Such torts are not deprivations "without due process" simply because the tortfeasor is a public official. The rationale of those cases is inapplicable to this case whether one views the claim at issue as substantive or proce- dural.31 If one views the petitioner's claim as one of sub- stantive due process, Parratt is categorically inapplicable. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U. S. 113, 125 (1990). Conversely, if one views his claim as one of procedural due process, Par- ratt is also inapplicable, because its rationale does not apply to officially authorized deprivations of liberty or property. 31 See 1 S. Nahmod, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Litigation: The Law of Section 1983, § 3.15, pp. 211­212 (3d ed. 1991). 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT 314 ALBRIGHT v. OLIVER Stevens, J., dissenting Thus, contrary to Justice Kennedy's conclusion, ante, at 285, Parratt's "precedential force" does not dispose of this case. Petitioner was subjected to criminal charges by an affirmative, deliberate act of a state official.32 The filing of criminal charges is effectuated through established state pro- cedures under which government agents, such as respondent Oliver, are authorized to act.33 In addition, the State's au- thorized agent knows precisely when the deprivation of the liberty interest to be free from criminal prosecution will occur-the moment that the charges are filed.34 Therefore, as with arrest or imprisonment, the State is capable of providing a reasoned predeprivation determination, at least ex parte, prior to the commencement of criminal proceedings.35 See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U. S., at 136­139. Failure to do so, or to do so in a meaningful way, see supra, at 298­300, is consti- tutionally unacceptable.36 Thus, notwithstanding the possi- ble availability of a state tort action for malicious prosecu- tion, § 1983 provides a federal remedy for the constitutional violation alleged by petitioner. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 183 (1961) ("The federal remedy is supplementary to the 32 This case is thus distinguishable from Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517 (1984), in which petitioner alleged that a prison guard intentionally destroyed his property. Id., at 533 (holding that the Due Process Clause is not violated by random and unauthorized intentional deprivations of property "until and unless it provides or refuses to provide a suitable postdeprivation remedy"). 33 See n. 14, supra. 34 The Parratt doctrine is also inapplicable here because it does not apply to cases in which the constitutional deprivation is complete when the tort occurs. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U. S. 113, 125 (1990) (citing Dan- iels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 338 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in judg- ments)); see supra, at 313. 35 See, e. g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S., at 114 (holding that the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, "requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest"). 36 See, e. g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422, 435­437 (1982). 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 266 (1994) 315 Stevens, J., dissenting state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked") (overruled in part not relevant here, Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 664­689 (1978)). The remedy for a violation of the Fourteenth Amend- ment's Due Process Clause provided by § 1983 is not limited, as Justice Kennedy posits, ante, at 285, to cases in which the injury has been caused by "a state law, policy, or proce- dure." One of the primary purposes of § 1983 was to pro- vide a remedy "against those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S., at 175­176 (emphasis in original). Therefore, despite his suggestion to the contrary, ante, at 285, Justice Kennedy's interpretation of Parratt is in direct conflict with both the language and the purposes of § 1983. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S., at 172­187. Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action against "[e]very person" who under color of state authority causes the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The Parratt doctrine is reconcilable with § 1983 only when its application is limited to situations in which no constitu- tional violation occurs. In the context of certain depriva- tions of property, due process is afforded-and therefore the Constitution is not violated-if an adequate postdeprivation state remedy is available in practice to provide either the property's prompt return or an equivalent compensation. See Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F. 2d, at 1320. In other con- texts, however, including criminal cases and most cases in- volving a deprivation of liberty, the deprivation is complete, and the Due Process Clause has been violated, when the loss of liberty occurs.37 In those contexts, any postdeprivation 37 Postdeprivation procedures may provide adequate due process for deprivations of liberty in limited circumstances. See, e. g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U. S., at 132 ("[I]n situations where a predeprivation hearing is unduly burdensome in proportion to the liberty interest at stake . . . or 510us2$17P 06-30-97 16:18:55 PAGES OPINPGT 316 ALBRIGHT v. OLIVER Stevens, J., dissenting state procedure is merely a remedy; because it does not pro- vide the predeprivation process that is "due," it does not avoid the constitutional violation. In such cases, like this one, § 1983 provides a federal remedy regardless of the ade- quacy of the state remedy. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S., at 183. IX The Court's judgment of affirmance is supported by five different opinions. Significantly, none of them endorses the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, and none of them com- mands a majority. Of greatest importance, in the aggregate those opinions do not reject my principal submission: the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment con- strains the power of state governments to accuse a citizen of an infamous crime. I respectfully dissent. where the State is truly unable to anticipate and prevent a random depri- vation of a liberty interest, postdeprivation remedies might satisfy due process"); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S., at 342 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgments) (noting that Parratt could defeat a procedural due process claim that alleged a deprivation of liberty when "a predeprivation hearing was definitionally impossible"); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 701 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the Court's holding that the State's postdeprivation remedies for corporal punishment in the schools satisfied the Due Process Clause, but noting that "a postdepriva- tion remedy is sometimes constitutionally sufficient"). 510us2$18I 06-23-97 18:58:41 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1993 317 Syllabus ABF FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the tenth circuit No. 92­1550. Argued December 1, 1993-Decided January 24, 1994 After Michael Manso gave his employer, petitioner ABF Freight System, Inc. (ABF), a false excuse for being late to work, ABF ascertained that he was lying and fired him on the asserted ground of tardiness. He filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board (Board) and repeated his false tardiness excuse while testifying under oath before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who denied him relief upon concluding that he had lied and that ABF had discharged him for cause. The Board reversed in relevant part, finding that ABF did not in fact fire Manso for lying but had seized upon his tardiness as a pretext to discharge him for earlier union activities. Notwithstand- ing his dishonesty, the Board ordered ABF to reinstate him with back- pay. The Court of Appeals enforced the order, rejecting ABF's argu- ment that awarding reinstatement and backpay to an employee who lied to his employer and to the ALJ violated public policy. Held: Manso's false testimony under oath before the ALJ did not preclude the Board from granting him reinstatement with backpay. Although such misconduct is intolerable in a formal proceeding, 29 U. S. C. § 160(c) expressly delegates to the Board the primary responsibility for making remedial decisions, including awarding reinstatement with backpay, that best effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act (Act) when the Board has substantiated an unfair labor practice. Confronted with that kind of express delegation, courts must give an agency's deci- sion controlling weight unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the Act. It cannot be said that the Board's remedial order in this case was an abuse of its broad discretion or that it was obligated to adopt a rigid rule that would foreclose relief in all comparable cases. Nor can its conclusions be faulted that Manso's reason for being late to work was ultimately irrelevant to whether antiunion animus actually motivated his discharge and that ordering effective relief in a case of this character promotes a vital public interest. It would be unfair to sanction Manso while indirectly rewarding the lack of candor of several ABF witnesses, whose testimony the ALJ and the Board refused to credit. Moreover, a categorical rule against relief might force the 510us2$18I 06-23-97 18:58:41 PAGES OPINPGT 318 ABF FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC. v. NLRB Opinion of the Court Board to divert its attention away from its primary mission and toward resolving collateral credibility disputes. Pp. 322­325. 982 F. 2d 441, affirmed. Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Blackmun, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 325. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which O'Connor, J., joined, post, p. 326. John V. Jansonius argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Jill J. Weinberg and Alan Wright. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Michael R. Dreeben, Jerry M. Hunter, Nicholas E. Karatinos, Norton J. Come, Linda Sher, and John Emad Arbab.* Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. Michael Manso gave his employer a false excuse for being late to work and repeated that falsehood while testifying under oath before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Not- withstanding Manso's dishonesty, the National Labor Rela- tions Board (Board) ordered Manso's former employer to re- instate him with backpay. Our interest in preserving the integrity of administrative proceedings prompted us to grant *James D. Holzhauer, Timothy S. Bishop, and Daniel R. Barney filed a brief for the American Trucking Associations as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Marsha S. Berzon and Laurence Gold; for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Herbert M. Wachtell, William H. Brown III, Norman Redlich, Thomas J. Henderson, Richard T. Seymour, Sharon R. Vinick, Mitchell Rogovin, Randal S. Milch, Robert C. Bell, Jr., and Donna R. Lenhoff. E. Carl Uehlein, Jr., Joseph E. Santucci, Jr., Stephen A. Bokat, Robin S. Conrad, and Mona C. Zeiberg filed a brief for the Chamber of Com- merce of the United States et al. as amici curiae. 510us2$18I 06-23-97 18:58:41 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 317 (1994) 319 Opinion of the Court certiorari to consider whether Manso's misconduct should have precluded the Board from granting him that relief. I Manso worked as a casual dockworker at petitioner ABF Freight System, Inc.'s (ABF's) trucking terminal in Albu- querque, New Mexico, from the summer of 1987 to August 1989. He was fired three times. The first time, Manso was 1 of 12 employees discharged in June 1988 in a dispute over a contractual provision relating to so-called "preferential casual" dockworkers.1 The grievance Manso's union filed eventually secured his reinstatement; Manso also filed an unfair labor practice charge against ABF over the incident. Manso's return to work was short lived. Three supervi- sors warned him of likely retaliation from top management- alerting him, for example, that ABF was "gunning" for him, App. 96, and that "the higher echelon was after [him]," id., at 96­97. See also ABF Freight System, Inc., 304 N. L. R. B. 585, 592, 597 (1991). Within six weeks ABF dis- charged Manso for a second time on pretextual grounds- ostensibly for failing to respond to a call to work made under a stringent verification procedure ABF had recently imposed upon preferential casuals.2 Once again, a grievance panel ordered Manso reinstated. 1 ABF at this time had three dockworker classifications: those on the regular seniority list, nonpreferential casuals, and preferential casuals. ABF Freight System, Inc., 304 N. L. R. B. 585, 589, n. 10 (1991). A sup- plemental labor agreement ABF negotiated with the union in April 1988 created the preferential casual dockworker classification with certain se- niority rights. Id., at 585­586. 2 The policy required preferential casuals-though not other dockwork- ers-to be available by phone prior to a shift in case a foreman needed them to work. A worker who did not respond risked disciplinary ac- tion for failing to "protect his shift"; two such failures authorized ABF to discharge the worker. Id., at 597. ABF issued a written warning to Manso on May 6, 1989, after he failed to respond to such a call. On June 19, a supervisor again asked a regular dockworker to summon Manso to work just prior to 6 a.m. for the 8:30 a.m. shift. When Manso did not 510us2$18I 06-23-97 18:58:41 PAGES OPINPGT 320 ABF FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC. v. NLRB Opinion of the Court Manso's third discharge came less than two months later. On August 11, 1989, Manso arrived four minutes late for the 5 a.m. shift. At the time, ABF had no policy regarding late- ness. After Manso was late to work, however, ABF decided to discharge preferential casuals-though not other employ- ees-who were late twice without good cause. Six days later Manso triggered the policy's first application when he arrived at work nearly an hour late for the same shift. Manso telephoned at 5:25 a.m. to explain that he was having car trouble on the highway, and repeated that excuse when he arrived. ABF conducted a prompt investigation, ascer- tained that he was lying,3 and fired him for tardiness under its new policy on lateness. Manso filed a second unfair labor practice charge. In the hearing before the ALJ, Manso repeated his story about the car trouble that preceded his third discharge. The ALJ credited most of his testimony about events surrounding his dismissals, but expressly concluded that Manso lied when he told ABF that car trouble made him late to work. Id., at 600. Accordingly, although the ALJ decided that ABF had illegally discharged Manso the second time because he was a answer, the employee who had dialed his number asked to dial it again, fearing he had misdialed. The supervisor denied permission and instead had the employee sign a form verifying that Manso had not responded. Manso was then discharged. The ALJ found that the special call policy discriminated against preferential casual dockworkers as a class, id., at 598, 600; both the ALJ and the Board concluded that it was discriminato- rily applied to Manso, id., at 600, 589, n. 11. 3 Manso told ABF management that his car had overheated on the high- way, that he had to phone his wife to pick him up and take him to work. Manso also said a deputy sheriff stopped him for speeding in his ensuing rush. A plant manager who looked for Manso's overheated car on the highway found nothing, however, and the officer who Manso said issued him a warning for speeding told ABF officials-and later the ALJ-that Manso had been alone in the car. 510us2$18I 06-23-97 18:58:41 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 317 (1994) 321 Opinion of the Court party to the earlier union grievance,4 the ALJ denied Manso relief for the third discharge based on his finding that ABF had dismissed Manso for cause. Ibid. The Board affirmed the ALJ's finding that Manso's second discharge was unlawful, but reversed with respect to the third discharge. Id., at 591. Acknowledging that Manso lied to his employer and that ABF presumably could have discharged him for that dishonesty, id., at 590, n. 13, the Board nevertheless emphasized that ABF did not in fact dis- charge him for lying and that the ALJ's conclusion to the contrary was "a plainly erroneous factual statement of [ABF]'s asserted reasons." 5 Instead, Manso's lie "estab- lished only that he did not have a legitimate excuse for the August 17 lateness." Id., at 589. The Board focused pri- marily on ABF's retroactive application of its lateness policy to include Manso's first time late to work, holding that ABF had "seized upon" Manso's tardiness "as a pretext to dis- charge him again and for the same unlawful reasons it dis- charged him on June 19." 6 In addition, though the Board deemed Manso's discharge unlawful even assuming the valid- ity of ABF's general disciplinary treatment of preferential casuals, it observed that ABF's disciplinary approach and lack of uniform rules for all dockworkers "raise[d] more questions than they resolve[d]." Id., at 590. The Board ordered ABF to reinstate Manso with backpay. Id., at 591. 4 Specifically, the ALJ held that the dismissal violated §§ 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §§ 158(a)(1), (3), and (4). 5 304 N. L. R. B., at 590. The Board found that the record in this case unequivocally established that ABF did not treat Manso's dishonesty "in and of itself as an independent basis for discharge or any other disciplinary action." Ibid. 6 Id., at 591. The Board also noted that the supervisors' threats of re- taliation and the earlier unlawful discharge under the verification policy provided "strong evidence" of unlawful motivation regarding Manso's third discharge. Id., at 590. 510us2$18I 06-23-97 18:58:41 PAGES OPINPGT 322 ABF FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC. v. NLRB Opinion of the Court The Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order. Miera v. NLRB, 982 F. 2d 441 (CA10 1992). Its review of the rec- ord revealed "abundant evidence of antiunion animus in ABF's conduct towards Manso," id., at 446, including "ample evidence" that Manso's third discharge was not for cause, ibid. The court regarded as important the testimony in the record confirming that Manso would not have been dis- charged under ABF's new tardiness policy had he provided a legitimate excuse. Ibid. The court also rejected ABF's argument that awarding reinstatement and backpay to an employee who lied to his employer and to the ALJ violated public policy.7 Noting that "Manso's original misrepresenta- tion was made to his employer in an attempt to avoid being fired under a policy the application of which the Board found to be the result of antiunion animus," the court reasoned that the Board had wide discretion to ascertain what remedy best furthered the policies of the National Labor Relations Act (Act). Id., at 447. II The question we granted certiorari to review is a narrow one.8 We assume that the Board correctly found that ABF discharged Manso unlawfully in August 1989. We also as- sume, more importantly, that the Board did not abuse its discretion in ordering reinstatement even though Manso 7 ABF's public policy argument relies on several decisions refusing to enforce reinstatement orders where the employee had engaged in serious misconduct. See, e. g., Precision Window Mfg. v. NLRB, 963 F. 2d 1105, 1110 (CA8 1992) (employee lied about extent of union activities and threat- ened to kill supervisor); NLRB v. Magnusen, 523 F. 2d 643, 646 (CA9 1975) (employee padded time card and lied about it under oath); NLRB v. Commonwealth Foods, Inc., 506 F. 2d 1065, 1068 (CA4 1974) (employees engaged in theft from employer); NLRB v. Breitling, 378 F. 2d 663, 664 (CA10 1967) (employee confessed to stealing from employer). 8 We limited our grant of certiorari to the third question in the petition: "Does an employee forfeit the remedy of reinstatement with backpay after the Administrative Law Judge finds that he purposefully testified falsely during the administrative hearing?" Pet. for Cert. i. 510us2$18I 06-23-97 18:58:41 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 317 (1994) 323 Opinion of the Court gave ABF a false reason for being late to work. We are concerned only with the ramifications of Manso's false testi- mony under oath in a formal proceeding before the ALJ. We recognize that the Board might have decided that such misconduct disqualified Manso from profiting from the pro- ceeding, or it might even have adopted a flat rule precluding reinstatement when a former employee so testifies. As the case comes to us, however, the issue is not whether the Board might adopt such a rule, but whether it must do so. False testimony in a formal proceeding is intolerable. We must neither reward nor condone such a "flagrant affront" to the truth-seeking function of adversary proceedings. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U. S. 564, 576­577 (1976). See also United States v. Knox, 396 U. S. 77 (1969); Bryson v. United States, 396 U. S. 64 (1969); Dennis v. United States, 384 U. S. 855 (1966); Kay v. United States, 303 U. S. 1 (1938); United States v. Kapp, 302 U. S. 214 (1937); Glickstein v. United States, 222 U. S. 139, 141­142 (1911). If knowingly exploited by a criminal prosecutor, such wrongdoing is so "inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice" that it can vitiate a judgment even after it has become final. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, 112 (1935). In any pro- ceeding, whether judicial or administrative, deliberate false- hoods "well may affect the dearest concerns of the parties before a tribunal," United States v. Norris, 300 U. S. 564, 574 (1937), and may put the factfinder and parties "to the disadvantage, hindrance, and delay of ultimately extracting the truth by cross examination, by extraneous investigation or other collateral means." Ibid. Perjury should be se- verely sanctioned in appropriate cases. ABF submits that the false testimony of a former em- ployee who was the victim of an unfair labor practice should always preclude him from winning reinstatement with back- pay. That contention, though not inconsistent with our ap- praisal of his misconduct, raises countervailing concerns. Most important is Congress' decision to delegate to the 510us2$18I 06-23-97 18:58:41 PAGES OPINPGT 324 ABF FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC. v. NLRB Opinion of the Court Board the primary responsibility for making remedial deci- sions that best effectuate the policies of the Act when it has substantiated an unfair labor practice. The Act expressly authorizes the Board "to take such affirmative action includ- ing reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of [the Act]." 29 U. S. C. § 160(c). Only in cases of discharge for cause does the statute restrict the Board's authority to order reinstatement.9 This is not such a case. When Congress expressly delegates to an administrative agency the authority to make specific policy determinations, courts must give the agency's decision controlling weight un- less it is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources De- fense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 844 (1984). Because this case involves that kind of express delegation, the Board's views merit the greatest deference. This has been our con- sistent appraisal of the Board's remedial authority through- out its long history of administering the Act.10 As we ex- plained over a half century ago: "Because the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence, courts must not enter the allowable area of the Board's discretion and must guard against the danger of sliding unconsciously from the narrow confines of law into the more spacious domain of policy." Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 194 (1941). 9 "No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individ- ual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause." 29 U. S. C. § 160(c). 10 See Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U. S. 533, 539­540 (1943). We stated in Virginia Electric that such administrative determi- nations should stand "unless it can be shown that the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to effec- tuate the policies of the Act." Id., at 540. 510us2$18I 06-23-97 18:58:41 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 317 (1994) 325 Kennedy, J., concurring Notwithstanding our concern about the seriousness of Manso's ill-advised decision to repeat under oath his false excuse for tardiness, we cannot say that the Board's remedial order in this case was an abuse of its broad discretion or that it was obligated to adopt a rigid rule that would foreclose relief in all comparable cases. Nor can we fault the Board's conclusions that Manso's reason for being late to work was ultimately irrelevant to whether antiunion animus actually motivated his discharge and that ordering effective relief in a case of this character promotes a vital public interest. Notably, the ALJ refused to credit the testimony of sev- eral ABF witnesses, see, e. g., 304 N. L. R. B., at 598, and the Board affirmed those credibility findings, id., at 585. The unfairness of sanctioning Manso while indirectly rewarding those witnesses' lack of candor is obvious. Moreover, the rule ABF advocates might force the Board to divert its at- tention from its primary mission and devote unnecessary time and energy to resolving collateral disputes about credi- bility. Its decision to rely on "other civil and criminal reme- dies" for false testimony, cf. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U. S. 502, 521 (1993), rather than a categorical exception to the familiar remedy of reinstatement is well within its broad discretion. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. Justice Kennedy, concurring. I join the opinion of the Court and agree as well with the concerns expressed by Justice Scalia. Our law must not become so caught up in procedural niceties that it fails to sort out simple instances of right from wrong and give some redress for the latter. At the very least, when we proceed on the assumption that perjury was committed, the Govern- ment ought not to suggest, as it seemed to do here, that one who violates his testimonial oath is no worse than the stu- 510us2$18I 06-23-97 18:58:41 PAGES OPINPGT 326 ABF FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC. v. NLRB Scalia, J., concurring in judgment dent who claims the dog ate his homework. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 42. The Board's opinions show that it can become quite exer- cised about trial-related misconduct that obstructs its own processes. See Lear-Siegler Management Service Corp., 306 N. L. R. B. 393, 394 (1992) (tolling the backpay award of an employee who threatened a witness, because such manip- ulation undermined "[t]he integrity of the Board's judicial process"). The Board seems more blithe, however, about the potential for dishonesty to disrupt the workplace. See Owens Illinois, Inc., 290 N. L. R. B. 1193 (1988) (reinstating and awarding backpay to an employee who lied under oath, because the employer "failed to meet its burden of establish- ing that [the employee] is unfit for further employment"). True, the gravest consequence of lying under oath is the af- front to the law itself. But both employer and employee have reason to insist upon honesty in the resolution of dis- putes within the workplace itself. And this interest, too, is not beyond the Board's discretion to take into account in fashioning appropriate relief. Justice Scalia, with whom Justice O'Connor joins, concurring in the judgment. It is ordinarily no proper concern of the judge how the Executive chooses to exercise discretion, so long as it be within the scope of what the law allows. For that reason, judicial dicta criticizing unintelligent (but nonetheless law- ful) executive action are almost always inappropriate. The context changes, however, when the exercise of discretion relates to the integrity of the unitary adjudicative process that begins in an administrative hearing before a federal administrative law judge and ends in a judgment of this or some other federal court. Agency action or inaction that undermines and dishonors that process undermines and dishonors the legal system-undermines and dishonors the courts. Judges may properly protest, no matter how lawful 510us2$18I 06-23-97 18:58:41 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 317 (1994) 327 Scalia, J., concurring in judgment (and hence unreversible) the agency action or inaction may be. Such a protest is called for in the present case, in which the Board has displayed-from its initial decision through its defense of that decision in this Court-an unseemly tolera- tion of perjury in the course of adjudicative proceedings. Michael Manso, the employee to whom the Board awarded backpay and reinstatement, testified in this case before Ad- ministrative Law Judge Walter H. Maloney the week of Jan- uary 8, 1990. He was placed under oath-presumably stand- ing up, his right hand raised, to respond to the form of oath set forth in the NLRB Judges' Manual § 17008 (1984): "Do you solemnly swear that the testimony which you will give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?" He then proceeded to lie to the administrative tribunal, as he had earlier lied to his employer, concerning the reason he reported an hour late for work on August 17, 1989. He said that his car had broken down; that he called his wife, who came in her pajamas to pick him up; that he drove the rest of the way to work, with his wife, and was stopped for speed- ing along the way. The employer produced the officer that stopped him, who testified with assurance that Manso was all alone; that Manso mentioned no car trouble as an excuse for his speeding, but simply that he was late for work; and that the officer himself observed no car trouble. Hearsay evidence admitted (without objection) at the hearing showed that an ABF official, after Manso told his breakdown story on August 17, drove out to the portion of the highway where Manso said he had left the disabled vehicle, and found it not to be there. Administrative Law Judge Maloney found that "Manso was lying to the Respondent when he reported that his car had overheated and that he was late for work because of car trouble"-which meant, of course that he was also lying under oath when he repeated that story. ABF Freight System, Inc., 304 N. L. R. B. 585, 600 (1991). The ALJ did 510us2$18I 06-23-97 18:58:41 PAGES OPINPGT 328 ABF FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC. v. NLRB Scalia, J., concurring in judgment not punish the false testimony, but his finding that the dis- missal on August 17 was for cause had something of that effect, depriving Manso of reinstatement. The Board itself accepted the ALJ's finding that the car- breakdown story was a lie, but since it found that the real reason for the August 17 dismissal was neither Manso's late- ness nor his dishonesty, but rather retaliation for his filing of an earlier unfair-labor-practice complaint, it ordered Manso's reinstatement. In stark contrast to today's opinion for the Court, the Board's opinion did not carefully weigh the pros and cons of using the Board's discretion in the conferral of relief to protect the integrity of its proceedings. It weighed those pros and cons not at all. Indeed, it mentioned the apparent perjury not at all, as though that is just part of the accepted background of Board proceedings, in no way worthy of note. That insouciance persisted even through the filing of the Board's brief in this Court, which makes the astounding statement that, in light of his "history of mistreatment," Manso's lying under oath, "though unjusti- fiable, is understandable." Brief for Respondent 22, n. 15. (In that context, of course, the plain meaning of "to under- stand" is "[t]o know and be tolerant or sympathetic toward." American Heritage Dictionary 1948 (3d ed. 1992).) Well, I am not understanding of lying under oath, what- ever the motivation for it, and I do not believe that any law enforcement agency of the United States ought to be. Title 18 U. S. C. § 1621 provides: "Whoever- ". . . having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify . . . truly, . . . willfully and contrary to such oath states . . . any material matter which he does not believe to be true . . . . . . . . 510us2$18I 06-23-97 18:58:42 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 317 (1994) 329 Scalia, J., concurring in judgment "is guilty of perjury and shall . . . be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. . . ." United States Attorneys doubtless cannot prosecute perjury indictments for all the lies told in the Nation's federal pro- ceedings-not even, perhaps, for all the lies so cleanly nailed as was the one here. Not only, however, did the Board not refer the matter for prosecution, it did not impose, indeed did not even explicitly consider imposing, another sanction available to it (and not generally available to federal judges): denying discretionary relief because of the intentional sub- version of the Board's processes. While the Court is correct that we have no power to com- pel the Board to apply such a sanction, nor even, perhaps, to require that the Board's opinion explicitly consider it, neither was the Board's action in this case as eminently reasonable as the Court makes it out to be. Nor does it deserve the characterization of being "well within [the Board's] broad discretion," ante, at 325 (emphasis added). In my estima- tion, it is at the very precipice of the tolerable, particularly as concerns the Board's failure even to consider and discuss the desirability of limiting its discretionary relief. Denying reinstatement would not, as the Court contends, involve the "unfairness of sanctioning Manso while indirectly rewarding [ABF] witnesses' lack of candor." Ibid. First of all, no "indirect reward" comes to ABF, which receives noth- ing from the Board. There is a world of difference between the mere inaction of failing to punish ABF for lying (which is the "indirect reward" that the Court fears) and the be- neficence of conferring a nonmandated award upon Manso despite his lying (which is the much greater evil that the Court embraces). The principle that a perjurer should not be rewarded with a judgment-even a judgment otherwise deserved-where there is discretion to deny it, has a long and sensible tradition in the common law. The "unclean 510us2$18I 06-23-97 18:58:42 PAGES OPINPGT 330 ABF FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC. v. NLRB Scalia, J., concurring in judgment hands" doctrine "closes the door of a court of equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the mat- ter in which he seeks relief, however improper may have been the behavior of the defendant." Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U. S. 806, 814 (1945) (denying relief because of perjury). See H. McClintock, Principles of Equity § 26, p. 63, and n. 75 (2d ed. 1948). And the Board itself has sometimes applied this sanction in the past. See, e. g., D. V. Copying & Printing, Inc., 240 N. L. R. B. 1276 (1979); O'Donnell's Sea Grill, 55 N. L. R. B. 828 (1944). In any case, there is no realistic comparison between the ABF managers' disbelieved testi- mony concerning motivations for firing and Manso's crystal- clear lie that he was where he was not. The latter is the stuff of perjury prosecutions; the former is not. The Court is correct that an absolute rule requiring the denial of discretionary relief for perjury "might force the Board to divert its attention from its primary mission and devote unnecessary time and energy to resolving collateral disputes about credibility." Ante, at 325. But intelligent and conscientious application of the Board's supposed rule permitting denial of discretionary relief for perjury would not have that effect-and such application should probably have occurred, and should surely have been considered, in an obvious case such as this. Nor am I as impressed as the Court is by the Board's assertion that "ordering effective relief in a case of this character promotes a vital public inter- est." Ibid. Assuredly it does, but plenty of effective relief was ordered here without adding Manso's reinstatement, in- cluding (1) the entry of a cease-and-desist order subjecting ABF to severe sanctions if it commits similar unfair labor practices in the future, (2) the award of backpay to Manso for the period from his unlawful discharge on June 19, 1989, to the date of his subsequent reinstatement, and (3) the post- ing of a notice on ABF's premises, reciting its commitments under the cease-and-desist order, and its commitment to give 510us2$18I 06-23-97 18:58:42 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 317 (1994) 331 Scalia, J., concurring in judgment Manso backpay. All of this would have made it clear enough to ABF and to ABF's employees that violating the National Labor Relations Act does not pay. Had the posted notice also included, instead of ABF's commitment to reinstate Manso (which is what the Board ordered), a statement to the effect that Manso's reinstatement would have been ordered but for his false testimony, then it also would have been made clear to ABF and to ABF's employees that perjury does not pay. I would have felt no need to write separately if I thought that, as the Court puts it, the Board has simply decided "to rely on `other civil and criminal remedies' for false testi- mony." Ibid. My impression, however, from the Board's opinion and from its presentation to this Court, is that it is really not very much concerned about false testimony. I concur in the judgment of the Court that the NLRB did nothing against the law, and regret that it missed an oppor- tunity to do something for the law. 510us2$19L 06-18-97 18:42:46 PAGES OPINPGT 332 OCTOBER TERM, 1993 Syllabus DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF OREGON v. ACF INDUSTRIES, INC., et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 92­74. Argued November 8, 1993-Decided January 24, 1994 The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, in rele- vant part, forbids States to impose (1) higher property tax rates and assessment ratios upon "rail transportation property" than upon "other commercial and industrial property," 49 U. S. C. §§ 11503(b)(1)­(3), and (2) "another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier providing trans- portation," § 11503(b)(4). Oregon exempts from its ad valorem prop- erty tax various classes of business personal property, but not railroad cars owned by respondent companies. They filed suit in the District Court, alleging that the tax violates § 11503(b)(4) because it exempts certain classes of commercial property from taxation while taxing rail- road cars in full. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals agreed that discriminatory property tax exemptions may be challenged under subsection (b)(4). However, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's finding that Oregon's tax complied with the provision, holding instead that respondents were entitled to the same exemption enjoyed by preferred property owners. Held: Section 11503 does not limit the States' discretion to exempt non- railroad property, but not railroad property, from generally applicable ad valorem property taxes. Pp. 338­348. (a) Respondents' position that "another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier" is a residual category designed to reach any discrimina- tory state tax, including property taxes, not covered by subsections (b)(1)­(3) is plausible only if subsection (b)(4) is read in isolation. How- ever, the structure of § 11503 as a whole supports the view that subsec- tion (b)(4) does not speak to property tax exemptions. "[C]ommercial and industrial property," which serves as the comparison class for mea- suring property tax discrimination under subsections (b)(1)­(3), is de- fined in subsection (a)(4) as "property, other than transportation prop- erty and land used primarily for agricultural purposes or timber growing, devoted to commercial or industrial use and subject to a prop- erty tax levy." The interplay between subsections (b)(1)­(3) and this definition is central to subsection (b)(4)'s interpretation. For example, Congress' exclusion of agricultural land from the definition demon- strates its intent to permit the States to tax railroad property at a higher rate than agricultural land, notwithstanding subsection (b)(3)'s 510us2$19L 06-18-97 18:42:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 332 (1994) 333 Syllabus general prohibition of rate discrimination. To consider such a tax "an- other tax" under subsection (b)(4) would subvert the statutory plan by reading subsection (b)(4) to prohibit what subsection (b)(3), in conjunc- tion with subsection (a)(4), was designed to allow. The result would contravene the elementary canon of construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative. Pp. 338­341. (b) The phrase "subject to a property tax levy" further qualifies the subsection (a)(4) definition. When used elsewhere in § 11503, that phrase means property that is taxed; and since identical words used in different parts of the same Act are intended to have the same meaning, the phrase must carry the same meaning in subsection (a)(4), Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, 475 U. S. 851, 860. Thus, exempt property is not part of the comparison class. It would be illogical to conclude that Congress, having allowed States to grant property tax exemptions in subsections (b)(1)­(3), would turn around and nullify its own choice in subsection (b)(4). Pp. 341­343. (c) Other considerations reinforce the foregoing construction of the statute. Section 11503's silence on the subject of tax exemptions-in light of the explicit prohibition of tax rate and assessment ratio discrimi- nation-reflects a determination to permit the States to leave their ex- emptions in place. Principles of federalism compel this view, for a stat- ute is interpreted to pre-empt traditional state powers only if that result is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. The statute's legislative history casts no doubt upon this interpretation. Nor does the interpre- tation lead to an anomalous result. Since railroads are not the only commercial entities subject to Oregon's tax, it need not be decided whether subsection (b)(4) would prohibit a tax that did single out rail- road property. And since it is within Congress' sound discretion to weigh the benefit of preserving some exemptions against the benefit of protecting rail carriers from every tax scheme that favors some nonrail- road property, the result reached here is not so bizarre that Congress could not have intended it. See Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U. S. 184, 191. Pp. 343­348. 961 F. 2d 813, reversed and remanded. Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Gins- burg, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 348. Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General of Oregon, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Theo- dore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General, Thomas A. Balmer, 510us2$19L 06-18-97 18:42:46 PAGES OPINPGT 334 DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF ORE. v. ACF INDUSTRIES, INC. Opinion of the Court Deputy Attorney General, and Robert M. Atkinson, Assist- ant Attorney General. Kent L. Jones argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Paup, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Gary R. Allen, Paul M. Geier, Dale C. Andrews, S. Mark Lindsey, and G. Joseph King. Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was James W. McBride.* Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. The power of state and local governments to impose ad valorem property taxes upon railroads and other interstate *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Iowa by Bonnie J. Campbell, Attorney General, and C. A. Daw; for the State of Washington et al. by Christine O. Gregoire, Attorney General of Washing- ton, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Grant Woods of Arizona, Daniel E. Lungren of California, Robert A. But- terworth of Florida, Larry EchoHawk of Idaho, Chris Gorman of Ken- tucky, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Tom Udall of New Mexico, Robert Abrams of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Heidi Heitkamp of North Da- kota, Lee Fisher of Ohio, Susan B. Loving of Oklahoma, T. Travis Medlock of South Carolina, Charles W. Burson of Tennessee, Jan Graham of Utah, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, Stephen D. Rosenthal of Virginia, James E. Doyle of Wisconsin, and Joseph B. Meyer of Wyoming; and for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Richard Ruda and Richard G. Taranto. Richard A. Malm and Thomas W. Andrews filed a brief for the Railway Progress Institute et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the State of California by Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, Timothy G. Laddish, Assistant Attorney General, Richard F. Finn, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Robert E. Murphy and Marguerite C. Stricklin, Deputy Attorneys Gen- eral; for the Association of American Railroads by Betty Jo Christian, Timothy M. Walsh, Jerald S. Howe, Jr., Robert W. Blanchette, and Ken- neth P. Kolson; and for Interstate Air Carriers by Jay R. Martin, Peter W. Davis, and John E. Carne. 510us2$19L 06-18-97 18:42:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 332 (1994) 335 Opinion of the Court carriers has been the source of recurrent litigation under the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause. See, e. g., Central R. Co. of Pa. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U. S. 607 (1962); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska Bd. of Equalization and Assessment, 347 U. S. 590 (1954); Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471 (1873). In the case before us, a state property tax is challenged under a federal statute, the Railroad Revital- ization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4­R Act). Pub. L. 94­210, 90 Stat. 31. The question presented is whether the State of Oregon violated the statute by imposing an ad valorem tax upon rail- road property while exempting various other, but not all, classes of commercial and industrial property. We hold that a State may grant exemptions from a generally applicable ad valorem property tax without subjecting the taxation of railroad property to challenge under the relevant provision of the 4­R Act, § 306(1)(d), 49 U. S. C. § 11503(b)(4). I Oregon imposes an ad valorem tax upon all real and per- sonal property within its jurisdiction, except property granted an express exemption. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 307.030 (1991). Various classes of business personal property are exempt, including agricultural machinery and equipment; nonfarm business inventories; livestock; poultry; bees; fur- bearing animals; and agricultural products in the possession of farmers. §§ 307.325, 307.400. Standing timber is also ex- empt, but is subject to a severance tax when harvested. § 321.272. Oregon, like many other States, exempts motor vehicles as well, instead levying upon them a modest annual registration fee. §§ 803.585, 803.420(1). Respondents, called the "Carlines" in this litigation, are eight companies that lease railroad cars to railroads and ship- pers. The railroad cars are considered "tangible personal property" under Oregon law, § 307.030, and are not exempt from taxation. The Carlines brought suit in United States District Court under § 306(1)(d) of the 4­R Act, seeking de- 510us2$19L 06-18-97 18:42:46 PAGES OPINPGT 336 DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF ORE. v. ACF INDUSTRIES, INC. Opinion of the Court claratory and injunctive relief against the assessment, levy, and collection of the State's property tax upon their rail- road cars. Congress enacted the 4­R Act in part to "restore the fi- nancial stability of the railway system of the United States." § 101(a), 90 Stat. 33. When drafting the legislation, Con- gress was aware that the railroads " `are easy prey for State and local tax assessors' in that they are `nonvoting, often nonresident, targets for local taxation,' who cannot easily re- move themselves from the locality." Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Board of Equalization of S. D., 480 U. S. 123, 131 (1987) (quoting S. Rep. No. 91­630, p. 3 (1969)). Section 306 of the 4­R Act, now codified at 49 U. S. C. § 11503, addresses this concern by prohibiting the States (and their subdivi- sions) from enacting certain taxation schemes that discrimi- nate against railroads. See Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U. S. 454, 457 (1987). The relevant provisions of § 11503 are contained in subsec- tion (b), which states: "The following acts unreasonably burden and discrimi- nate against interstate commerce, and a State, subdivi- sion of a State, or authority acting for a State or subdivi- sion of a State may not do any of them: "(1) assess rail transportation property at a value that has a higher ratio to the true market value of the rail transportation property than the ratio that the as- sessed value of other commercial and industrial prop- erty in the same assessment jurisdiction has to the true market value of the other commercial and industrial property. "(2) levy or collect a tax on an assessment that may not be made under clause (1) of this subsection. "(3) levy or collect an ad valorem property tax on rail transportation property at a tax rate that exceeds the tax rate applicable to commercial and industrial prop- erty in the same assessment jurisdiction. 510us2$19L 06-18-97 18:42:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 332 (1994) 337 Opinion of the Court "(4) impose another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier providing transportation . . . ." The reach of subsections (b)(1)­(3) is straightforward: These provisions forbid the imposition of higher assessment ratios or tax rates upon rail transportation property than upon "other commercial and industrial property." The scope of subsection (b)(4), which forbids the imposition of "another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier provid- ing transportation," is not as clear. The Carlines do not challenge Oregon's ad valorem prop- erty tax under subsections (b)(1)­(3). We attribute this choice to the fact that the State subjects all nonexempt prop- erty "to assessment and taxation in equal and ratable pro- portion." Ore. Rev. Stat. § 307.030 (1991). Rather, it is the Carlines' contention that Oregon's tax should be considered "another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier," in vio- lation of subsection (b)(4), because it exempts certain classes of commercial and industrial property while taxing railroad cars in full. The District Court, after reviewing a stipulated record, held that discriminatory property tax exemptions are sub- ject to challenge under subsection (b)(4). On the facts pre- sented, however, the court determined that Oregon's ad val- orem property tax complied with the provision. The court observed that, in other cases, only those state taxes exempt- ing more than 50% of nonrailroad commercial personal prop- erty had been found to contravene subsection (b)(4). See Trailer Train Co. v. Leuenberger, 885 F. 2d 415 (CA8 1988), cert. denied, 490 U. S. 1066 (1989); Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Bair, 766 F. 2d 1222 (CA8 1985). Because (according to the court's calculations) Oregon exempted only 31.4% of nonrailroad commercial personal property from taxation, the court granted judgment to the State. The Court of Appeals reversed. 961 F. 2d 813 (CA9 1992). In accordance with Circuit precedent, see ACF Industries, Inc. v. Arizona, 714 F. 2d 93, 94 (CA9 1983), the court ac- 510us2$19L 06-18-97 18:42:46 PAGES OPINPGT 338 DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF ORE. v. ACF INDUSTRIES, INC. Opinion of the Court knowledged that subsections (b)(1)­(3) do not speak to the question of discriminatory property tax exemptions. Like the District Court, however, the Court of Appeals accepted the Carlines' contention that property tax exemptions are subject to challenge under subsection (b)(4). The court ex- plained that Congress enacted § 11503 to " `prevent tax dis- crimination against railroads in any form whatsoever.' " 961 F. 2d, at 820 (emphasis in original) (citing Ogilvie v. State Bd. of Equalization of N. D., 657 F. 2d 204, 210 (CA8), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 1086 (1981)). Rejecting the District Court's apparent view that ad val- orem tax schemes exempting less than 50% of nonrailroad business property are not proscribed by subsection (b)(4), the Court of Appeals held that the "most natural reading" of the provision dictates that "any exemption given to other taxpayers but not to railroads" is forbidden, with possible room for "a de minimis level of exemption[s]." 961 F. 2d, at 822 (emphasis in original). The court found that Oregon's property tax, under the calculation most generous to the State, exempted 25% of nonrailroad commercial property, far exceeding any possible de minimis exception. On this ground, the court concluded that the State's taxation of rail- road property violated subsection (b)(4). Id., at 823. Hold- ing that the Carlines "were entitled to the same total exemp- tion preferred property owners enjoyed," the court enjoined the State from levying any tax upon the Carlines' railroad property. Ibid. We granted certiorari, 508 U. S. 905 (1993), and now reverse. II Before passing upon the validity of Oregon's ad valorem property tax under § 11503(b)(4), the Court of Appeals and the District Court addressed a preliminary question: Whether a tax upon railroad property is even subject to chal- lenge under subsection (b)(4) on the ground that certain 510us2$19L 06-18-97 18:42:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 332 (1994) 339 Opinion of the Court other classes of commercial and industrial property are exempt. We consider the same question. Both parties contend that the plain meaning of subsection (b)(4), which prohibits "another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier," dictates an answer in their favor. In the State's view, the word "another" means "different from that which precedes it." Because subsections (b)(1)­(3) ad- dress property taxes and only property taxes, it follows that the term "another tax" in subsection (b)(4) must mean "a tax different from a property tax." The State concludes that subsection (b)(4) does not speak to discriminatory property tax exemptions for the simple reason that the provision does not speak to property taxes at all. The Carlines, like the Court of Appeals, take a different view. They understand the phrase "another tax that dis- criminates against a rail carrier" to be a residual category designed to reach any discriminatory state tax, including discriminatory property taxes, not covered by subsections (b)(1)­(3). It follows that property tax exemptions disfavor- ing railroad transportation property-exemptions the Car- lines in effect admit fall outside the scope of subsections (b)(1)­(3), see Brief for Respondents 16­17-are within the ambit of subsection (b)(4). Accord, e. g., Trailer Train Co. v. Leuenberger, 885 F. 2d 415, 417­418 (CA8 1988), cert. denied, 490 U. S. 1066 (1989); Department of Revenue of Fla. v. Trailer Train Co., 830 F. 2d 1567, 1573 (CA11 1987). If Con- gress had intended to exclude property taxes from the reach of subsection (b)(4), the Carlines contend, it would have drafted the provision to prohibit "any tax other than a prop- erty tax," and not phrased the statute as it did. Brief for Respondents 17. Both the State's and the Carlines' readings are defensible if subsection (b)(4) is read in isolation, cf. Burlington North- ern R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U. S., at 461 (lan- guage of subsection (b)(1) "plainly declares [its] purpose"), and so we must look elsewhere to determine its meaning. 510us2$19L 06-18-97 18:42:46 PAGES OPINPGT 340 DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF ORE. v. ACF INDUSTRIES, INC. Opinion of the Court The structure of § 11503 as a whole does yield an answer, one adverse to the Carlines' challenge to Oregon's property tax. We conclude that a State may grant exemptions from a gen- erally applicable ad valorem property tax without exposing the taxation of railroad property to invalidation under sub- section (b)(4). Subsections (b)(1)­(3) of § 11503, as noted, forbid the im- position of higher property tax rates and assessment ratios upon "rail transportation property" than upon "other com- mercial and industrial property." 49 U. S. C. §§ 11503(b)(1)­ (3). "Commercial and industrial property," which serves as the comparison class for measuring unlawful discrimination under those provisions, is defined as "property, other than transportation property and land used primarily for agri- cultural purposes or timber growing, devoted to a commer- cial or industrial use and subject to a property tax levy." § 11503(a)(4). The interplay between subsections (b)(1)­(3) and the defi- nition of "commercial and industrial property" in subsection (a)(4) is central to the interpretation of subsection (b)(4). For example, the definition of "commercial and industrial property" excludes "land used primarily for agricultural pur- poses." The fact that Congress made this particular exclu- sion demonstrates its intent to permit the States to tax rail- road property at a higher rate than agricultural land, notwithstanding subsection (b)(3)'s general prohibition of rate discrimination. One still could maintain, we suppose, that taxing railroad property at a higher rate than agricul- tural land should be considered "another tax that discrimi- nates against a rail carrier," and thus forbidden under sub- section (b)(4). That interpretation, however, would subvert the statutory plan by reading subsection (b)(4) to prohibit what subsection (b)(3), in conjunction with subsection (a)(4), was designed to allow. The result would contravene the "elementary canon of construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative." 510us2$19L 06-18-97 18:42:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 332 (1994) 341 Opinion of the Court Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U. S. 237, 249 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). Congress qualified the definition of "commercial and indus- trial property" further, limiting the comparison class to property "subject to a property tax levy." 49 U. S. C. § 11503(a)(4). The statute does not define this phrase, which on its face could bear one of two interpretations: (1) taxed property; or (2) taxable property, a broader category consist- ing of the general mass of property within the State's juris- diction and power to tax, including property that enjoys a current exemption. The first interpretation has been the subject of some criti- cism, see Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Board of Equalization of S. D., 480 U. S., at 135 (White, J., concurring),* but we *Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Board of Equalization of S. D. raised the question whether certain property tax exemptions were prohibited under the antidiscrimination provisions of the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 (AAIA), 49 U. S. C. App. §§ 1513(d)(1)(A)­(C), which are identi- cal for all relevant purposes to analogous provisions under the 4­R Act, 49 U. S. C. §§ 11503(b)(1)­(3). The case was on appeal from the Supreme Court of South Dakota, which had held that such exemptions were not subject to challenge under the AAIA. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Hughes County, 372 N. W. 2d 106 (1985). The court rested this ruling upon its conclusion that the definition of "commercial and industrial property" in the AAIA, 49 U. S. C. App. § 1513(d)(2)(D)-which, like the parallel defini- tion in 49 U. S. C. § 11503(a)(4), is limited to property "subject to a prop- erty tax levy"-included taxed property but not exempt property, 372 N. W. 2d, at 110. Because the comparison class against which tax discrim- ination was measured under §§ 1513(d)(1)(A)­(C) did not include exempt property, the court reasoned that the AAIA did not prohibit property tax exemptions. We affirmed, but on grounds unrelated to the court's construction of the terms "commercial and industrial property" and "sub- ject to a property tax levy." Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Board of Equal- ization of S. D., 480 U. S., at 129­134. Justice White concurred, but ex- pressed his view that the "ground on which the South Dakota Supreme Court sustained the tax" was "plainly improvident." Id., at 135; see also Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. North Dakota, 358 N. W. 2d 515, 517 (N. D. 1984). 510us2$19L 06-18-97 18:42:46 PAGES OPINPGT 342 DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF ORE. v. ACF INDUSTRIES, INC. Opinion of the Court believe it follows from the way Congress used identical lan- guage elsewhere in § 11503. Section 11503(c) confers juris- diction upon United States district courts to enforce the terms of § 11503(b) despite the bar otherwise imposed by the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1341. Subsection (c)(1) grants district courts the power (under certain circum- stances not pertinent here) to prohibit "an assessment of the rail transportation property at a value that has a higher ratio to the true market value of the rail transportation property than the assessed value of all other property subject to a property tax levy in the assessment jurisdiction has to the true market value of all other commercial and industrial property." (Emphasis added.) In the context of this provision, which concerns the differen- tial assessment of taxed property, the words "property sub- ject to a property tax levy" must mean "taxed property." Given the "normal rule of statutory construction" that " ` "identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning," ' " Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, 475 U. S. 851, 860 (1986) (quoting Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84, 87 (1934) (in turn quoting Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 433 (1932))), that phrase must carry the same meaning in subsection (a)(4), where it quali- fies the definition of "commercial and industrial property." All this bears on the case before us. Because property "subject to a property tax levy" means property that is taxed, the definition of "commercial and industrial property" excludes property that is exempt. Exempt property, then, is not part of the comparison class against which discrimina- tion is measured under subsections (b)(1)­(3), and it follows that railroads may not challenge property tax exemptions under those provisions. 510us2$19L 06-18-97 18:42:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 332 (1994) 343 Opinion of the Court As was the case with agricultural land, we must pay heed to the fact that Congress placed exempt property beyond the reach of subsections (b)(1)­(3). It would be illogical to conclude that Congress, having allowed the States to grant property tax exemptions in subsections (b)(1)­(3), would turn around and nullify its own choice in subsection (b)(4). So the Carlines' reading of subsection (b)(4), while plausible when viewed in isolation (see supra, at 339), is untenable in light of § 11503 as a whole. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U. S. 88, 99 (1992); see also United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Asso- ciates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365, 371 (1988) ("A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remain- der of the statutory scheme . . . because only one of the per- missible meanings produces a substantive effect that is com- patible with the rest of the law"). It is true that tax exemptions, as an abstract matter, could be a variant of tax discrimination. See Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803 (1989). The structure of § 11503, however, warrants the conclusion that subsection (b)(4) does not limit state discretion to levy a tax upon railroad property while exempting various classes of nonrailroad property. Other considerations reinforce our construction of the stat- ute. In drafting § 11503, Congress prohibited discrimina- tory tax rates and assessment ratios in no uncertain terms, see 49 U. S. C. §§ 11503(b)(1)­(3), and set forth precise stand- ards for judicial scrutiny of challenged rate and assessment practices, see §§ 11503(c)(1)­(2). By contrast, the statute does not speak with any degree of particularity to the ques- tion of tax exemptions. Subsection (b)(4), which prohibits the States from "impos[ing] another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier," is, at best, vague on the point. Con- gress did not state whether exemptions are a form of forbid- den discrimination against rail carriers, and further did not provide a standard for courts to distinguish valid from in- valid exemption schemes. 510us2$19L 06-18-97 18:42:46 PAGES OPINPGT 344 DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF ORE. v. ACF INDUSTRIES, INC. Opinion of the Court Had Congress, as a condition of permitting the taxation of railroad property, intended to restrict state power to exempt nonrailroad property, we are confident that it would have spoken with clarity and precision. Property tax exemptions are an important aspect of state and local tax policy. It was common at the time § 11503 was drafted, as it is now, for States with generally applicable ad valorem property taxes to exempt various classes of commercial property. Before 1960, a number of States granted such exemptions. See, e. g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 150.040 (1949) (exempting unmanufac- tured articles consigned for sale and held by commission merchants); N. J. Rev. Stat. § 54:4­3.20 (1937) (exempting personal property stored in a public warehouse); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 32, § 3802 (1959) (exempting tools and implements possessed by mechanics and farmers, and highway-building equipment); see also Jacobs, Exemption of Tangible Person- alty, in Tax Exemptions 141, 146 (1939) (by 1938, 16 States permitted "temporary exemption of newly located or newly constructed plants, and the machinery and equipment in such plants"). By the 1960's, about 20 States granted real and personal property tax exemptions to pollution control facili- ties. See McNulty, State Tax Incentives to Fight Pollution, 56 A. B. A. J. 747, 748, and n. 8 (Aug. 1970). By 1971, still well before enactment of the 4­R Act, a majority of the States exempted one or more classes of business personal property, including business inventories, raw materials used in textile manufacturing, manufacturing machinery and al- lied equipment, and mechanics tools. See Education Com- mission of the States, Property Assessment and Exemptions: They Need Reform, Table C­1 (Mar. 10, 1973). Given the prevalence of property tax exemptions when Congress enacted the 4­R Act, § 11503's silence on the subject-in light of the explicit prohibition of tax rate and assessment ratio discrimination-reflects a determination to permit the States to leave their exemptions in place. 510us2$19L 06-18-97 18:42:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 332 (1994) 345 Opinion of the Court Principles of federalism support, in fact compel, our view. Subsection (b)(4), like the whole of § 11503, sets limits upon the taxation authority of state government, an authority we have recognized as central to state sovereignty. See, e. g., Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U. S. 68, 73 (1976); Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5, 29 (1873). When determining the breadth of a federal statute that impinges upon or pre-empts the States' traditional powers, we are hesitant to extend the statute beyond its evident scope. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U. S. 504, 533 (1992) ("We do not, absent unambiguous evidence, infer a scope of pre-emption beyond that which clearly is mandated by Congress' language") (Blackmun, J., concurring); id., at 523 (opinion of Stevens, J.); R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, 479 U. S. 130, 140 (1986). We will interpret a statute to pre-empt the traditional state powers only if that result is "the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947). As explained above, neither subsection (b)(4) nor the whole of § 11503 meets this standard with regard to the prohibition of property tax exemptions. The Carlines contend that the legislative history of § 11503 casts doubt upon our interpretation, but the history-to the extent it has any relevance to our inquiry-affords the Car- lines no comfort. The excerpts from the legislative record cited by the Carlines do nothing more than manifest Con- gress' general concern with the discriminatory taxation of rail carriers. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 94­595, p. 166 (1976) (de- scribing the Senate bill, which the Conference adopted, as prohibiting "the imposition of any other tax which results in the discriminatory treatment of any common or contract carrier"). The Carlines do not point to a single instance in the legislative record suggesting that Congress had any par- ticular concern with property tax exemptions, or that Con- gress intended to prohibit exemptions in subsection (b)(4). In fact, the available evidence suggests the opposite of what the Carlines would have us believe. See 120 Cong. Rec. 510us2$19L 06-18-97 18:42:46 PAGES OPINPGT 346 DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF ORE. v. ACF INDUSTRIES, INC. Opinion of the Court 38734 (1974) (providing assurances that subsection (b)(4) would not prevent the States from granting tax exemptions to encourage industrial development) (remarks of Reps. Staggers, Adams, and Kuykendall). Nor do the Carlines draw our attention to a single instance in the 15-year legislative history of the 4­R Act in which representatives of the railroad industry expressed concern about discriminatory property tax exemptions. In fact, when urging the Senate to adopt subsection (b)(4), industry representatives characterized the provision as prohibiting only discriminatory in lieu taxes and gross receipts taxes; property tax exemptions, in contrast, were not mentioned. See Hearings before the Subcommittee on Surface Transpor- tation of the Senate Committee on Commerce on Legislation Relating to Rail Passenger Service, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, pp. 1837, 1883 (1975). In sum, the Carlines' argument with respect to legislative history is without foundation. As a final matter, we address the contention that our inter- pretation of subsection (b)(4) leads to an anomalous result. The Carlines maintain that it would be nonsensical for Con- gress to prohibit the States from imposing higher tax rates or assessment ratios upon railroad property than upon other taxed property, while at the same time permitting the States to exempt some or all classes of nonrailroad property alto- gether. That result, it is argued, prohibits discrimination of a mild form, but permits it in the extreme. We think our interpretation is not at all implausible. To begin with, this is not a case in which the railroads- either alone or as part of some isolated and targeted group- are the only commercial entities subject to an ad valorem property tax. Cf. Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Superior, 932 F. 2d 1185 (CA7 1991) (occupation tax on owners and operators of "iron ore concentrates docks," in practical effect, applied only to docks owned by one particular rail carrier). If such a case were to arise, it might be incorrect to say that the State "exempted" the nontaxed property. Rather, one 510us2$19L 06-18-97 18:42:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 332 (1994) 347 Opinion of the Court could say that the State had singled out railroad property for discriminatory treatment. See J. Hellerstein & W. Hell- erstein, State and Local Taxation 973 (5th ed. 1988) (the term "exemption" does not mean every exclusion from the reach of a levy, but rather exclusions of "property, persons, trans- actions . . . which are logically within the tax base"). On the record before us, Oregon's ad valorem property tax does not single out railroad property in that manner, and we need not decide whether subsection (b)(4) would prohibit a tax of that nature. In addition, though some may think it unwise to forbid discrimination in tax rates and assessment ratios while permitting exemptions of certain nonrailroad property, the result is not "so bizarre that Congress `could not have intended' " it. Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U. S. 184, 191 (1991) (citing Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U. S. 564, 575 (1982)). About half of the States grant property tax exemptions to encourage investment in air and water pollution control devices. See 1 CCH State Tax Guide 691­ 692 (1992). And it is standard practice for States to grant exemptions to commercial entities for other beneficial pur- poses. See, e. g., La. Const., Art. VII, § 21(F) (10-year ex- emption for any "new manufacturing establishment or [any] addition to an existing manufacturing establishment"); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 285.597 (1991) (exemption for business property in an "enterprise zone"); Va. Code Ann. § 58.1­3661 (1991) (permitting any county, city, or town to exempt from its property tax "solar energy equipment, facilities or devices" and "recycling equipment, facilities, or devices"). It is within Congress' sound discretion to weigh the benefit of preserving those exemptions, on the one hand, against the benefit of protecting rail carriers from every tax scheme that favors some nonrailroad property, on the other. We conclude that § 11503, which expresses Congress' reso- lution of the matter, does not limit the States' discretion to exempt nonrailroad property, but not railroad property, from 510us2$19L 06-18-97 18:42:46 PAGES OPINPGT 348 DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF ORE. v. ACF INDUSTRIES, INC. Stevens, J., dissenting ad valorem property taxes of general application. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Stevens, dissenting. Section 306(1)(d) of the Railroad Revitalization and Regu- latory Reform Act of 1976 (4­R Act), 90 Stat. 54, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 11503(b)(4) (subsection (b)(4)), prohibits States from imposing taxes that discriminate against railroads.1 In my view, a state tax that fell upon railroad property, but from which comparable nonrailroad property was exempt, would clearly implicate that prohibition. The Court errs in holding that such arrangements are not even subject to chal- lenge under subsection (b)(4). Because subsection (b)(4) by its terms bars any tax that "discriminates" against rail carriers, it is not surprising that the Courts of Appeals have held that the provision applies to revenue measures that discriminate by imposing taxes on railroad property and exempting similar property owned by others.2 While those courts (and the District Court and 1 As originally enacted, subsection (b)(4) prohibited the States from im- posing "any other tax which results in discriminatory treatment of a com- mon carrier by railroad . . . ." 4­R Act, § 306(1)(d), 90 Stat. 54. Pursuant to a recodification in 1978, the current version of subsection (b)(4) speaks of "another tax that discriminates against" a rail carrier. Congress spe- cifically provided that the 1978 recodification "may not be construed as making a substantive change in the laws replaced." 92 Stat. 1466. 2 In addition to the Ninth Circuit's decision in this case, 961 F. 2d 813, 818­820 (1992), see Department of Revenue of Fla. v. Trailer Train Co., 830 F. 2d 1567, 1573 (CA11 1987) (provision targets "discrimination in all its guises" and "requires consideration of tax exemptions in determining whether there has been discriminatory treatment") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Oglivie v. State Bd. of Equalization of N. D., 657 F. 2d 204, 209­210 (CA8) (history of provision demonstrates that "its purpose was to prevent tax discrimination against railroads in any form whatsoever," including exemption of nonrailroad property), cert. denied, 510us2$19L 06-18-97 18:42:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 332 (1994) 349 Stevens, J., dissenting Court of Appeals in this case) have differed on precisely how to decide whether a wholesale exemption unlawfully "dis- criminates" and thus gives rise to liability, none has taken the position accepted by the Court today that a claim predi- cated on discriminatory exemptions is not cognizable under subsection (b)(4). As the Court explains, ante, at 343, subsection (b)(4) does not contain a specific prohibition against imposing on rail- roads an ad valorem tax from which other property owners are exempt. That omission, of course, does not answer the question before us: whether the tax that Oregon has imposed "discriminates against a rail carrier" within the meaning of subsection (b)(4). A State might discriminate against a dis- favored class of taxpayers in a variety of ways. The absence in the 4­R Act of a provision specifically addressing exemp- tions is no more significant than the absence of a provision addressing deductions, credits, methods of collecting or pro- testing state taxes, or penalties. Surely a state tax law that allowed a substantial tax deduction for all taxpayers except rail carriers would readily be recognized as discriminatory. That conclusion would not be affected by the fact that the antidiscrimination statute does not speak specifically to de- ductions. Indeed, the Court suggests that an exemption for all taxpayers except rail carriers would make the tax dis- criminatory. See ante, at 346. Rather than addressing every means that might be de- vised to accord discriminatory tax treatment to rail carriers, Congress specified two familiar methods (differential rates and assessments) and then included a general provision de- 454 U. S. 1086 (1981). Only the Virginia Supreme Court has reached the contrary conclusion, see Richmond, F. & P. R. Co. v. State Corporation Comm'n, 230 Va. 260, 262, 336 S. E. 2d 896, 897 (1985), and it did so on a basis that I do not understand the Court to accept today-that because ad valorem property taxes are treated in the first three subsections, an ad valorem property tax may never be attacked as discriminatory under sub- section (b)(4). 510us2$19L 06-18-97 18:42:46 PAGES OPINPGT 350 DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF ORE. v. ACF INDUSTRIES, INC. Stevens, J., dissenting signed to block other routes to the same end. In my opin- ion, it is anomalous to read § 11503(b) to prohibit even minor deviations in rates or assessments, but then to allow States to put manifestly disproportionate tax burdens on railroads by exempting most comparable property. Both the text of subsection (b)(4) and its evident purposes convince me that Congress intended to bar discrimination by any means, in- cluding exemptions. In Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803 (1989), this Court held that a State's exemption of a limited class of residents violated a general statutory prohibition against discriminatory taxation (4 U. S. C. § 111) that made no specific reference to exemptions. While I disagreed with the Court's conclusion that the limited exemption at issue could fairly be characterized as discrimination against the protected class, Davis surely demonstrates that an exemp- tion, even if not expressly prohibited, may support the con- clusion that a tax is discriminatory. Indeed, tax exemptions may make a tax unconstitutionally discriminatory. See, e. g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S. 263, 273 (1984); Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U. S. 638, 642­646 (1984). I see no reason why they should be totally ignored when Congress has expressly prohibited "discrimination" against a particu- lar kind of interstate enterprise. The Court puts great stock in the difference between the specific and strict bar against discriminatory tax rates and assessments in subsections (b)(1)­(3) and the open-ended language of subsection (b)(4), which speaks only tersely of "discriminat[ion]." As the Court explains, the definition of "commercial and industrial property" that is applicable to subsections (b)(1)­(3) is best read to embrace only property that is taxed, rather than exempted. If we were to accept the Carlines' position, the Court reasons, subsection (b)(4) would render the earlier provisions redundant and would "nullify" the limitations Congress placed on the rate and assessment provisions. Ante, at 343. I disagree. 510us2$19L 06-18-97 18:42:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 332 (1994) 351 Stevens, J., dissenting The ban on discriminatory rates and assessments targets two patent and historically common forms of discrimination. In order to find discrimination in rates or assessment ratios, a court need only compare the rates and assessments applica- ble to railroads to the rates and assessments of other owners of comparable property. That inquiry would be com- plicated indeed if the courts were required to divine the "rates" and "assessments" governing property that is ex- empt from tax. It is not surprising, then, that the strict bars against disparate rates and assessments exclude from the comparison class property that is not taxed at all. Congress' exclusion of exempted property from the com- parison class for purposes of subsections (b)(1)­(3) does not determine the scope of subsection (b)(4), for that provi- sion does not depend on the limited definition of "commercial and industrial property" that governs its neighbors. Read- ing subsection (b)(4) to require judicial scrutiny of state ex- emption schemes creates no disharmony with subsections (b)(1)­(3) unless one assumes that the test of "discrimina- tion" under subsection (b)(4), like the per se rules against differential rates and assessments, prohibits all but the most minor differentials in tax treatment between railroad prop- erty and owners of similar property. That assumption is unwarranted. The statute before the Court today (like the statute it con- strued in Davis) does not contain a definition of the term "discrimination," but that familiar concept and the policies of the 4­R Act provide guidance. Like the statute at issue in Davis, the 4­R Act protects taxpayers who often have little voice in the policy decisions of the taxing State, and whose situation makes them likely targets for unfavorable treatment.3 The prohibition of discrimination should be 3 Railroads' high rates of fixed investment and their immobile assets leave them less able than other interstate enterprises to restrain state taxation by threatening to pull up their stakes and leave. See Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Superior, 932 F. 2d 1185, 1186 (CA7 1991). 510us2$19L 06-18-97 18:42:46 PAGES OPINPGT 352 DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF ORE. v. ACF INDUSTRIES, INC. Stevens, J., dissenting read to give effect to those concerns, but it need not be read more broadly. A sensible test for prohibited discrimina- tion-focusing on whether the protected class is being treated substantially less favorably than most similarly situ- ated persons-would leave the States room to employ ex- emptions without falling afoul of subsection (b)(4). As amicus the Solicitor General suggests, a discrimination standard allows the States to impose disparate tax burdens when the disparity is supported by some legitimate differ- ence between the exempted nonrailroad property and the taxed railroad property.4 In my view, an exemption for a small minority of the resident taxpayers would not warrant a conclusion that prohibited "discrimination" has occurred. See Davis, 489 U. S., at 819­823 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Because subsection (b)(4) merely protects railroads from dis- crimination, rather than conferring on them a right to be treated like the most favorably treated taxpayer, a violation would not be established when the tax paid on railroad prop- erty is not materially greater than the tax imposed on most comparable property.5 But surely a tax imposed on rail car- riers is not saved from discrimination merely because some other kind of enterprise (e. g., motor carriers) is also subject to taxation. The evident purpose of this part of the 4­R Act, as the Court recognizes, is to protect a class of interstate enter- prises that has traditionally been subject to disproportion- ately heavy state and local tax burdens. This is an area in which state authority has always been circumscribed, most 4 A State might, for example, be able to defend an exemption by showing that the exempted class was subject to an equivalent tax to which rail- roads were not. 5 For similar reasons, the Court of Appeals erred when it held that the remedy for a discriminatory exemption scheme is a refund of the entire tax paid by the railroad. See 961 F. 2d, at 823. To remedy unlawful discrimination under subsection (b)(4), a State need refund only the differ- ence between the tax collected from the railroad and the average tax im- posed on owners of comparable property. 510us2$19L 06-18-97 18:42:46 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 332 (1994) 353 Stevens, J., dissenting prominently by the Commerce Clause itself. Subsection (b)(4) plainly requires States to readjust their tax arrange- ments to the extent those arrangements "discriminat[e]." I cannot agree that federalism "compels" us to read subsection (b)(4) as inapplicable to exemption arrangements. See ante, at 345. Federalism concerns would weigh more heavily in favor of Oregon's position if, as the Court suggests, ante, at 344­345, reading subsection (b)(4) to apply to exemption schemes would require States to choose between exempting railroads or eliminating tax exemptions across the board. But as I have explained, such a reading is by no means required. Be- cause the statutory term "discrimination" permits the States greater flexibility to employ exemptions than do the bans on disparate rates and assessments, the Court's concerns about imposing onerous choices on States are overstated.6 More- over, an exemption that is meaningfully available to rail- roads-as in the Court's example of an exemption for funds spent on environmental cleanup-would not make a tax "dis- criminatory" merely because the exemption may be more useful for some other businesses than it is for railroads. Cf. Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Superior, 932 F. 2d 1185, 1187 (CA7 1991) (invalidating tax "imposed on an activity in which only a railroad or railroads engage"). The Court appears to hedge against its position that sub- section (b)(4) flatly does not apply to taxes and exemption schemes that operate to burden railroads disproportionately. Thus, the Court intimates that the state ad valorem tax 6 The cases in which exemption schemes have been found unlawful under subsection (b)(4) certainly do not suggest any undue incursions into state fiscal policy. See, e. g., Trailer Train Co. v. Leuenberger, 885 F. 2d 415, 416 (CA8 1988) (violation found because State imposed ad valorem tax on railroad personal property but exempted over 75 percent of comparable property), cert. denied, 490 U. S. 1066 (1989); Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Bair, 766 F. 2d 1222, 1223­1224 (CA8 1985) (tax on railroad personal property coupled with exemption for 95 percent of other personal property violated statute). 510us2$19L 06-18-97 18:42:46 PAGES OPINPGT 354 DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF ORE. v. ACF INDUSTRIES, INC. Stevens, J., dissenting must, in order to escape scrutiny under subsection (b)(4), be "generally applicable," ante, at 335, 340, and that a scheme that taxed railroad property but exempted all nonrailroad property might be unlawful because it would not be a bona fide "exemption." See ante, at 346­347. If I were con- vinced that Oregon's ad valorem property taxes were gener- ally applicable, I would agree with the Court's disposition of this case. The narrowness or breadth of the exemptions, and correspondingly the evenhanded or discriminatory na- ture of the tax on railroads, goes to whether a subsection (b)(4) claim has merit, not to whether it is cognizable. The statute provides no basis for prohibiting the exemption of 100 percent of nonrailroad property but allowing the exemp- tion of, for example, 90 percent. I recognize that application of the statutory "discrimina- tion" standard will sometimes involve problems of line draw- ing, and that discriminatory exemptions raise special diffi- culties. But, in my view, the statute requires courts to grapple with those difficulties. I would remand the case to the Court of Appeals to give it an opportunity to resolve the parties' disputes about the extent of any disparate burdens imposed on rail carriers by Oregon's ad valorem tax and to review the discrimination issue in accordance with the con- siderations set forth in this opinion. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 510us2$20N 06-23-97 19:02:02 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1993 355 Syllabus NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., et al. v. COUNTY OF KENT, MICHIGAN, et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit No. 92­97. Argued November 29, 1993-Decided January 24, 1994 Respondents, the owner and operators of Michigan's Kent County Interna- tional Airport (collectively, the Airport), collect rent and fees from three groups of Airport users: commercial airlines, including petitioners (Air- lines); general aviation; and concessionaires such as car rental agencies and gift shops. The Airport allocates its air-operations costs-e. g., maintaining runways-to the Airlines and general aviation in propor- tion to their airfield use, and its terminal maintenance costs to the Air- lines and concessions in proportion to each tenant's square footage. It charges the Airlines 100% of their allocated costs, but general aviation only 20% of its costs. The concessions' rates substantially exceed their allocated costs, yielding a sizable surplus that offsets the general avia- tion shortfall and has swelled the Airport's reserve fund by more than $1 million per year. After the County Board of Aeronautics unilater- ally increased the Airlines' fees, they challenged the new rates, attack- ing (1) the Airport's failure to allocate any airfield costs to the conces- sions, (2) the surplus generated by the fee structure, and (3) the Airport's failure to charge general aviation 100% of its allocated costs. They alleged that these features made the fees unreasonable and thus unlawful under the Anti-Head Tax Act (AHTA)-which prohibits States and their subdivisions from collecting user fees, 49 U. S. C. App. § 1513(a), other than "reasonable rental charges, landing fees, and other service charges from aircraft operators for the use of airport facilities," § 1513(b)-and under the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 (AAIA). The Airlines also asserted that the Airport's treatment of general aviation discriminates against interstate commerce in favor of primarily local traffic, in violation of the Commerce Clause. The Dis- trict Court held, inter alia, that the Airlines have an implied right of action under the AHTA, but not the AAIA, and no cause of action under the Commerce Clause, and that the challenged fees are not unreasonable under the AHTA. The Court of Appeals affirmed in principal part, but held that the Airport had misallocated fees for the cost of providing "crash, fire, and rescue" (CFR) services. 510us2$20N 06-23-97 19:02:02 PAGES OPINPGT 356 NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC. v. COUNTY OF KENT Syllabus Held:1. The Court declines to decide whether there is a private right of action under the AHTA but assumes, for purposes of this case, that the right exists. A prevailing party may defend a judgment on any ground properly raised below, without filing a cross-petition, so long as that party seeks to preserve, and not to change, the judgment. The Airport did not cross-petition on the CFR issue it lost below, and resolving the private right of action issue in its favor would alter that portion of the judgment. Pp. 364­365. 2. The Airport's fees have not been shown to be unreasonable under the AHTA. Pp. 365­373. (a) The AHTA sets no standards for determining a fee's reasonable- ness. In the absence of guidance from the Secretary of Transportation, the Court adopts the parties' suggestion to resolve the reasonableness issue using the standards stated in Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U. S. 707, for determin- ing reasonableness under the Commerce Clause. Although Congress enacted the AHTA because it found unsatisfactory the end result in Evansville-the validation of "head" taxes-§ 1513(b) permits "rea- sonable" charges and the Evansville formulation has been used to determine "reasonableness" in related contexts, see, e. g., American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U. S. 266, 289­290. Thus, the levy here is reasonable if it (1) is based on some fair approximation of the facilities' use, (2) is not excessive in relation to the benefits conferred, and (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce. Evansville, supra, at 716­717. Pp. 365­369. (b) The Airport's decision to allocate air-operations costs to the Air- lines and general aviation, but not to the concessions, appears to "reflect a fair, if imperfect, approximation of the use of facilities for whose bene- fit they are imposed." Evansville, 405 U. S., at 716­717. While those operations generate the concessions' customer flow and, thus, benefit the concessions, only the Airlines and general aviation actually use the runways and navigational facilities. Accepting the District Court's finding that the Airlines were charged only the break-even costs, the Court concludes that the fees in question were not "excessive in compar- ison with the governmental benefit conferred." Id., at 717. Nor is the Airport's methodology unlawful because it generates large surpluses. Since § 1513(b) applies only to fees charged to "aircraft operators," it does not authorize judicial inquiry focused on the surplus generated from the concessions' fees. The Court rejects the Airlines' argument that it should take into account concession revenues, as the Seventh Circuit did in a 1984 decision, when deciding whether the Airlines' fees are reasonable. The Seventh Circuit overlooked the Department of 510us2$20N 06-23-97 19:02:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 355 (1994) 357 Syllabus Transportation's regulatory authority regarding the federal aviation laws. In view of the Department's authority, there is no cause for courts to offer a substitute for conventional public utility regulation. While the AAIA directly addresses the use of airport revenues, the Airlines do not suggest that the Airport has misused the funds in viola- tion of that Act and did not seek review of the lower courts' ruling that they had no AAIA cause of action. Finally, the record in this case does not support the Airlines' argument that the lower general aviation fees discriminate against interstate commerce and travel. There is no proof that the large and diverse general aviation population served by the Airport travels typically intrastate and seldom ventures beyond Michi- gan's borders. Pp. 369­373. 3. The fees do not violate the "dormant" Commerce Clause. Even if the AHTA's express permission for States' imposition of reasonable fees were insufficiently clear to rule out dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the Court has already found the challenged fees reasonable under the AHTA using a standard taken directly from the Court's dormant Com- merce Clause jurisprudence. Pp. 373­374. 955 F. 2d 1054, affirmed. Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 374. Blackmun, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Walter A. Smith, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Jonathan S. Franklin. William F. Hunting, Jr., argued the cause for respond- ents. With him on the brief were Mark S. Allard, Robert A. Buchanan, and Michael M. Conway. Edward C. DuMont argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Wil- liam Kanter, Christine N. Kohl, Paul M. Geier, and Dale C. Andrews.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Air Transport Association of America by Mary E. Downs; for Thrifty Rent-A-Car Sys- tem, Inc., by Randall J. Holder and Nancy Glisan Gourley; and for the 510us2$20N 06-23-97 19:02:02 PAGES OPINPGT 358 NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC. v. COUNTY OF KENT Opinion of the Court Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. Seven commercial airlines, petitioners in this case, assert that certain airport user fees charged to them are unreason- able and discriminatory, in violation of the federal Anti-Head Tax Act (AHTA), 49 U. S. C. App. § 1513, and the Commerce Clause. Because the record, as it now stands, does not war- rant a judicial determination that the fees in question are unreasonable or unlawfully discriminatory, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I A The user fees contested in this case are charged by the Kent County International Airport in Grand Rapids, Michi- gan. The Airport is owned by respondent Kent County and operated by respondents Kent County Board of Aeronautics and Kent County Department of Aeronautics (collectively, American Trucking Associations, Inc., by Andrew L. Frey, Andrew J. Pin- cus, Daniel R. Barney, and Robert Digges, Jr. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of New Hampshire et al. by Jeffrey R. Howard, Attorney General of New Hampshire, and Monica A. Ciolfi, Assistant Attorney General, Grant Woods, Attorney General of Arizona, Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney Gen- eral of California, Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, Bonnie J. Campbell, Attorney General of Iowa, Michael E. Carpenter, Attorney General of Maine, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michi- gan, Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General of Montana, Frederick P. DeVesa, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, Heidi Heitkamp, Attor- ney General of North Dakota, Mark Barnett, Attorney General of South Dakota, and James E. Doyle, Attorney General of Wisconsin; for the City of Los Angeles by James K. Hahn, Gary R. Netzer, Breton K. Lob- ner, Steven S. Rosenthal, and Anthony L. Press; for the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association by John S. Yodice; for the Airports Council International-North America by Patricia A. Hahn; for the American Association of Airport Executives by Scott P. Lewis; for the National Business Aircraft Association, Inc., et al. by Raymond J. Rasenberger; and for the U. S. Conference of Mayors et al. by Richard Ruda. 510us2$20N 06-23-97 19:02:02 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 355 (1994) 359 Opinion of the Court the Airport). Petitioners are seven commercial airlines serving the Airport (the Airlines). The Airport collects rent and fees from three groups of users: (1) commercial airlines, including petitioners; (2) "gen- eral aviation," i. e., corporate and privately owned aircraft not used for commercial, passenger, cargo, or military serv- ice; and (3) nonaeronautical concessionaires, including car rental agencies, the parking lot, restaurants, gift shops, "rent-a-cart" facilities, and other small vendors. Since 1968, the Airport has allocated its costs and set charges to aircraft operators pursuant to a "cost of service" accounting system known as the "Buckley methodology." 1 This system is de- signed to charge the Airlines only for the cost of providing the particular facilities and services they use.2 Under its accounting system, the Airport first determines the costs of operating the airfield and the passenger termi- nal, and allocates these costs among the users of the facili- ties. Costs associated with airfield operations (e. g., main- taining the runways and navigational facilities) are allocated to the Airlines and general aviation in proportion to their use of the airfield. No portion of these costs is allocated to the concessions. Costs associated with maintaining the airport terminal are allocated among the terminal tenants- the Airlines and the concessions-in proportion to each ten- ant's square footage.3 The Airport then establishes fees and rates for each user group. It charges the Airlines 100% of the costs allocated to them, in the form of aircraft landing and parking fees (for use of the airfield), and rent (for the terminal space the Air- 1 See James C. Buckley, Rental Fee Recommendations (Feb. 1969), App. 223­275. 2 In contrast, "residual cost" accounting systems base rates and fees on the total cost of operating the airport. See Brief for City of Los Angeles as Amicus Curiae 5. 3 The parking lot is owned and operated by the Airport itself and is not material to this dispute. 510us2$20N 06-23-97 19:02:03 PAGES OPINPGT 360 NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC. v. COUNTY OF KENT Opinion of the Court lines occupy).4 General aviation, however, is charged at a lower rate. The Airport recovers from that user group a per gallon fuel flowage fee for local aircraft and a landing fee for aircraft based elsewhere. These fees account for only 20% of the airfield costs allocated to general aviation. In relation to costs, the Airport thus "undercharges" gen- eral aviation. At the same time, measured by allocated costs, the Airport vastly "overcharges" the concessions. The Airlines pay a cost-based per square foot rate for their terminal space. The concessions, however, pay market rates for their space.5 Market rates substantially exceed the concessions' allocated costs and yield a sizable surplus.6 The surplus offsets the general aviation shortfall of approxi- mately $525,000 per year, and has swelled the Airport's re- serve fund by more than $1 million per year. B Using the "Buckley methodology" just described, the Air- lines and the Airport periodically negotiated and agreed upon fees to be charged through December 31, 1986. Follow- ing a new rate study made in 1986, the Airport proposed increased fees beginning January 1, 1987. App. 193 (Plain- tiffs' Exh. 6). The Airlines objected to the higher fees and failed to reach an agreement with the Airport. Ultimately, the County Board of Aeronautics adopted an ordinance unilaterally increasing the fees.7 On the effective date of 4 The Airlines are also charged for the cost of providing "crash, fire, and rescue" services, and amortization fees for assets acquired by the Airport. 5 Most concessions pay 10% of their gross receipts as rent for space. 6 For example, the Airport's annual net revenues from 1987 to 1989 ranged from approximately $1.6 million to $1.9 million. App. 278­279 (Plaintiffs' Exhs. 301 and 355). 7 The ordinance increased aircraft landing fees by $.20 per thousand pounds, and increased terminal rent charges by $6.67 per square foot for prime heated and air-conditioned space, $.59 per square foot for nonprime air-conditioned space, and $1.84 per square foot for nonprime, heated, non- air-conditioned space. The ordinance also decreased aircraft parking fees by $.12 per thousand pounds. 738 F. Supp. 1112, 1115 (WD Mich. 1990). 510us2$20N 06-23-97 19:02:03 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 355 (1994) 361 Opinion of the Court the ordinance, April 1, 1988, the Airlines sued the Airport, primarily challenging post-December 31, 1986, rates. The Airlines attacked (1) the Airport's failure to allocate to the concessions a portion of the airfield costs, (2) the surplus generated by the Airport's fee structure, and (3) the Air- port's failure to charge general aviation 100% of its allocated airfield costs. These features, the Airlines alleged, made the fees imposed on them unreasonable and thus unlawful under the AHTA, as added, 87 Stat. 90, and as amended, 49 U. S. C. App. § 1513, and the Airport and Airway Improve- ment Act of 1982 (AAIA), 96 Stat. 686, as amended, 49 U. S. C. App. § 2210. The Airlines also asserted that the Airport's treatment of general aviation discriminates against interstate commerce in favor of primarily local traffic, in violation of the Commerce Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In the first of three opinions, the District Court denied the motions, holding that the Airport's cost methodology is not per se unreasonable. App. to Pet. for Cert. 57. In its sec- ond opinion, the District Court held that the Airlines have an implied right of action to challenge the fees under the AHTA but not under the AAIA, and that the Airlines have no cause of action under the Commerce Clause. Id., at 42­ 46. Following a bench trial, the District Court issued its third and final opinion, concluding that the challenged fees are not unreasonable under the AHTA. 738 F. Supp. 1112 (WD Mich. 1990). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment in principal part. 955 F. 2d 1054 (1992). In accord with the District Court, the Court of Ap- peals held that the AHTA impliedly confers a private right of action on the Airlines, but the AAIA does not. Id., at 1058. On the merits, the Court of Appeals (1) upheld as reasonable under the AHTA the bulk of the charges that the Airport imposes on the Airlines, and (2) rejected the Air- 510us2$20N 06-23-97 19:02:03 PAGES OPINPGT 362 NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC. v. COUNTY OF KENT Opinion of the Court lines' dormant Commerce Clause claim on the ground that the AHTA regulates the area. Id., at 1060­1064. On one matter, however, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's judgment and remanded the case. The District Court had upheld as reasonable under the AHTA the Airport's decision to allocate to the Airlines 100% of the costs of providing "crash, fire, and rescue" (CFR) services. 738 F. Supp., at 1119. Emphasizing that the CFR facilities service all aircraft, not just the Airlines, the Court of Ap- peals held that the Airport must allocate CFR costs between the Airlines and general aviation. 955 F. 2d, at 1062­1063, 1064. Petitioning for this Court's review, the Airlines challenged the Court of Appeals' adverse rulings on the AHTA and Commerce Clause issues. The Airport did not cross- petition for review of the Sixth Circuit's judgment to the extent that it favored the Airlines; specifically, the Airport did not petition for review of the remand to the District Court for allocation of the costs of CFR services between the Airlines and general aviation. We granted certiorari, 508 U. S. 959 (1993), to resolve a conflict between the decision under review and a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Indianapolis Airport Authority v. Ameri- can Airlines, Inc., 733 F. 2d 1262 (1984), which declared key parts of a similar fee structure unreasonable under the AHTA. II A In Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U. S. 707 (1972), this Court held that the Commerce Clause does not prohibit States or municipali- ties from charging commercial airlines a "head tax" on pas- sengers boarding flights at airports within the jurisdiction, to defray the costs of airport construction and maintenance. We stated in Evansville: "At least so long as the toll is based 510us2$20N 06-23-97 19:02:03 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 355 (1994) 363 Opinion of the Court on some fair approximation of use or privilege for use, . . . and is neither discriminatory against interstate commerce nor excessive in comparison with the governmental benefit conferred, it will pass constitutional muster, even though some other formula might reflect more exactly the relative use of the state facilities by individual users." Id., at 716­717. Concerned that our decision in Evansville might prompt a proliferation of local taxes burdensome to interstate air transportation, Congress enacted the AHTA. See Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation of Haw., 464 U. S. 7, 9­10 (1983) (summarizing history of AHTA's enactment); S. Rep. No. 93­12, p. 4 (1973) (Congress intended AHTA to "ensure . . . that local `head' taxes will not be permitted to inhibit the flow of interstate commerce."); id., at 17 ("The head tax . . . cuts against the grain of the traditional Ameri- can right to travel among the States."). The AHTA provides in pertinent part: "(a) Prohibition; exemption "No State (or political subdivision thereof . . .) shall levy or collect a tax, fee, head charge, or other charge, directly or indirectly, on persons traveling in air com- merce or on the carriage of persons traveling in air com- merce or on the sale of air transportation or on the gross receipts derived therefrom . . . . "(b) Permissible State taxes and fees "[N]othing in this section shall prohibit a State (or political subdivision thereof . . .) from the levy or collec- tion of taxes other than those enumerated in subsection (a) of this section, including property taxes, net income taxes, franchise taxes, and sales or use taxes on the sale of goods or services; and nothing in this section shall prohibit a State (or political subdivision thereof . . .) owning or operating an airport from levying or collect- ing reasonable rental charges, landing fees, and other 510us2$20N 06-23-97 19:02:03 PAGES OPINPGT 364 NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC. v. COUNTY OF KENT Opinion of the Court service charges from aircraft operators for the use of airport facilities." 49 U. S. C. App. § 1513. Primarily, the Airlines urge that the Airport's fees over- charge them in violation of the AHTA. Before reaching that issue, however, we face a threshold question. The United States as amicus curiae and, less strenuously, the Airport, urge that the Airlines have no right to enforce the AHTA through a private action commenced in a federal court of first instance. Instead, they maintain, complaints under the AHTA must be pursued initially in administrative proceedings before the Secretary of Transportation, subject to judicial review in the courts of appeals. The threshold question is substantial: If Congress in- tended no right of immediate access to a federal court under the AHTA, then the Airlines' AHTA claim should have been dismissed, not adjudicated on the merits as it was, indeed in part favorably to the Airlines. However, the Airport filed no cross-petition for certiorari seeking to upset the judg- ment to the extent that it rejected the Airport's CFR cost allocation (100% to the Airlines) as inconsonant with the AHTA. For that reason, we decline to resolve the private right of action question in this case. A prevailing party need not cross-petition to defend a judgment on any ground properly raised below, so long as that party seeks to preserve, and not to change, the judg- ment. See, e. g., Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U. S. 27, 29­30 (1984). A cross-petition is required, however, when the re- spondent seeks to alter the judgment below. See, e. g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U. S. 111, 119, n. 14 (1985); United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U. S. 159, 166, n. 8 (1977); Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U. S. 548, 560, n. 11 (1976); United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U. S. 223, 226­227, n. 2 (1975). Alteration would be in order if the private right of action question were resolved in favor of the Airport. For then, the entire judgment would be undone, including 510us2$20N 06-23-97 19:02:03 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 355 (1994) 365 Opinion of the Court the portion remanding for reallocation of CFR costs between the Airlines and general aviation. The Airport's failure to file a cross-petition on the CFR issue-the issue on which it was a judgment loser-thus leads us to resist the plea to declare the AHTA claim unfit for District Court adjudication.8 The question whether a federal statute creates a claim for relief is not jurisdictional. See Air Courier Conference v. Postal Workers, 498 U. S. 517, 523, n. 3 (1991); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S. 471, 476, n. 5 (1979); Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 278­279 (1977); Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 682 (1946). Accordingly, we shall assume, solely for purposes of this case, that the alleged AHTA pri- vate right of action exists. B The AHTA prohibits States and their subdivisions from levying a "fee" or "other charge" "directly or indirectly" on "persons traveling in air commerce or on the carriage of persons traveling in air commerce." 49 U. S. C. § 1513(a). Landing fees, terminal charges, and other airport user fees of the sort here challenged fit § 1513(a)'s description. As we confirmed in an opinion invalidating a state tax on airlines' gross receipts, § 1513(a)'s compass is not limited to direct "head" taxes. Aloha Airlines, 464 U. S., at 12­13. But § 1513(a) does not stand alone. That subsection's pro- hibition is immediately modified by § 1513(b)'s permission. See Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 477 8 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 435, n. 23 (1984), is not to the contrary. There the Court of Appeals had reversed the respondent's criminal conviction, holding postarrest incriminating statements inadmis- sible under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). Because he pre- vailed in the Court of Appeals, obtaining a judgment entirely in his favor, respondent could not have filed a cross-petition. Accordingly, his conten- tion that certain prearrest statements (whose admissibility the Court of Appeals had left ambiguous) were inadmissible was a permissible argu- ment in defense of the judgment below. 510us2$20N 06-23-97 19:02:03 PAGES OPINPGT 366 NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC. v. COUNTY OF KENT Opinion of the Court U. S. 1, 15­16 (1986) (Burger, C. J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (§ 1513(b)'s saving clause was enacted in response to the States' concern that § 1513(a)'s "sweeping provision would prohibit even unobjectionable taxes such as landing fees . . ."). Sections 1513(a) and (b) together instruct that airport user fees are permissible only if, and to the extent that, they fall within § 1513(b)'s saving clause, which removes from § 1513(a)'s ban "reasonable rental charges, landing fees, and other service charges from aircraft operators for the use of airport facilities." 9 While § 1513(b) allows only "reasonable rental charges, landing fees, and other service charges," the AHTA does not set standards for assessing reasonableness. Courts, we rec- ognize, are scarcely equipped to oversee, without the initial superintendence of a regulatory agency, rate structures and practices. See Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U. S. 581, 589 (1945) ("Rate-making is essentially a legislative function."); cf. Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U. S. 570, 574 (1952) ("in cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges or cases requir- ing the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies cre- ated by Congress for regulating the subject matter should not be passed over").10 The Secretary of Transportation is 9 The Airport's argument, accepted by the dissent, that user fees are entirely outside the scope of the AHTA because they are not "head" taxes, advances an untenable reading of the statute. We note, in this regard, § 1513(b)'s recognition, in its first clause, of "taxes other than those enu- merated in subsection (a) of this section, including property taxes, net income taxes, franchise taxes, and sales or use taxes on the sale of goods or services" (emphasis added). Unlike the property and income taxes listed in the first clause of § 1513(b), the airport user fees listed in § 1513(b)'s second clause are not described as taxes "other than those enu- merated in subsection (a)." The statute, in sum, is hardly ambiguous on this matter: User fees are covered by § 1513(a), but may be saved by § 1513(b). 10 The reasonableness of the Airport's rates might have been referred, prior to any court's consideration, to the Department of Transportation under the primary jurisdiction doctrine. That doctrine is "specifically ap- 510us2$20N 06-23-97 19:02:03 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 355 (1994) 367 Opinion of the Court charged with administering the federal aviation laws, includ- ing the AHTA.11 His Department is equipped, as courts are not, to survey the field nationwide, and to regulate based on a full view of the relevant facts and circumstances. If we had the benefit of the Secretary's reasoned decision concern- ing the AHTA's permission for the charges in question, we would accord that decision substantial deference. See Chev- ron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842­845 (1984). Lacking guidance from the Secretary, however, and compelled to give effect to the stat- ute's use of "reasonable," we must look elsewhere. The parties point to the standards this Court employs to measure the reasonableness of fees under the Commerce Clause, as stated in the Evansville case, see supra, at 362­ 363; they invite our use of the Evansville standards as base- lines for determining the reasonableness of fees under the plicable to claims properly cognizable in court that contain some issue within the special competence of an administrative agency" and permits courts to make a " `referral' to the agency, staying further proceedings so as to give the parties reasonable opportunity to seek an administrative ruling." Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U. S. 258, 268 (1993). However, as the parties have not briefed or argued this question, we decline to invoke the doctrine here. 11 The Federal Aviation Act, which encompasses the AHTA, authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to conduct investigations, issue orders, and promulgate regulations necessary to implement the statute. See 49 U. S. C. App. § 1354(a). The Act provides a mechanism for administrative adjudication, subject to judicial review in the courts of appeals, of alleged violations. See § 1482(a) ("[a]ny person may file with the Secretary of Transportation . . . a complaint in writing with respect to anything done or omitted to be done by any person in contravention of any provisions of [the Act], or of any requirement established pursuant thereto"); § 1486 (ju- dicial review provision). The Secretary has established procedures for adjudicating such complaints through the Federal Aviation Administra- tion, see 14 CFR pt. 13 (1993), and the FAA has entertained challenges to the reasonableness of airport landing fees under the AHTA. See New England Legal Foundation v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 883 F. 2d 157, 159­166 (CA1 1989). 510us2$20N 06-23-97 19:02:03 PAGES OPINPGT 368 NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC. v. COUNTY OF KENT Opinion of the Court AHTA.12 We accept the parties' suggestions. Although Congress enacted the AHTA because it found unsatisfactory the end result of our Commerce Clause analysis in Evans- ville-the validation of "head" taxes-Congress specifically permitted, through § 1513(b)'s saving clause, "reasonable rental charges, landing fees, and other services charges." 13 The formulation in Evansville has been used to determine "reasonableness" in related contexts. See, e. g., American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U. S. 266, 289­290 (1987) (applying Evansville test to assess validity under Commerce Clause of state taxes applied to interstate motor carrier); Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444, 466­ 467 (1978) (applying Evansville test to determine constitu- tionality of tax under intergovernmental immunity doctrine). It will suffice for the purpose at hand.14 12 See Brief for Petitioners 20, 22­23; Reply Brief for Petitioners 3­4; Brief for Respondents 32; see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23­29 (arguing that Evansville reasonableness test is satisfied without explicitly endorsing its application). 13 Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, applying Evansville's standards to determine whether airport fees are "reasonable" under § 1513(b) would not permit airports to "impos[e] a modest per passenger fee on airlines as a service charge for use of airport facilities." Post, at 380. Section 1513(a)'s prohibition is written broadly, whereas § 1513(b) is narrow, saving only "reasonable rental charges, landing fees, and other service charges." A per passenger service charge would be an impermissible "head charge" under § 1513(a), and does not fit into any of the three categories saved by § 1513(b). The user fees challenged here, by contrast, are "rental charges, landing fees, and other service charges," § 1513(b), that would be prohib- ited as "fee[s]" or "other charge[s]" under § 1513(a), unless they are "rea- sonable." See supra, at 365­366. 14 It remains open to the Secretary, utilizing his Department's capacity to comprehend the details of airport operations across the country, and the economics of the air transportation industry, to apply some other formula (including one that entails more rigorous scrutiny) for determining whether fees are "reasonable" within the meaning of the AHTA; his expo- sition will merit judicial approbation so long as it represents "a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842­845 (1984). 510us2$20N 06-23-97 19:02:03 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 355 (1994) 369 Opinion of the Court To recapitulate, a levy is reasonable under Evansville if it (1) is based on some fair approximation of use of the facilities, (2) is not excessive in relation to the benefits conferred, and (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce. 405 U. S., at 716­717. The Airlines contend that the Airport's fee structure fails the Evansville test on three main counts. We consider each contention in turn. 1 As noted above, the Airport allocates its air-operations costs between the Airlines and general aviation; the conces- sions in fact supply the lion's share of the Airport's revenues, see supra, at 360, but are allocated none of these costs. The Airlines contend that the concessions benefit substantially, albeit indirectly, from air operations, because those opera- tions generate the concessions' customer flow. Therefore, the Airlines urge, the Airport's failure to allocate to the con- cessions any of the airfield-associated costs violates Evans- ville's requirement that user fees be "based on some fair approximation of use or privilege for use." 405 U. S., at 716­717. The cost reallocation sought by the Airlines would not change the market-based rent paid by the concessions, see supra, at 360, but it would lower the charges imposed on the Airlines. We see no obvious conflict with Evansville in the Airport's allocation of the costs of air operations to the Airlines and general aviation, but not to the concessions. Only the Air- lines and general aviation actually use the runways and navi- gational facilities of the Airport; the concessions use only the terminal facilities. The Airport's decision to allocate costs according to a formula that accounts for this distinction ap- pears to "reflect a fair, if imperfect, approximation of the use of facilities for whose benefit they are imposed." 405 U. S., at 716­717.15 15 See also 405 U. S., at 718­719 (airports may lawfully distinguish among classes of users, including aircraft operators and concessions, based on their differing uses of airport facilities); Denver v. Continental Air Lines, 510us2$20N 06-23-97 19:02:03 PAGES OPINPGT 370 NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC. v. COUNTY OF KENT Opinion of the Court The District Court found that (with one minor exception 16) the Airport charged the Airlines "the break-even costs for the areas they use." 738 F. Supp., at 1119.17 In this light, we cannot conclude that the Airlines were charged fees "excessive in comparison with the governmental benefit conferred." Evansville, supra, at 717. See also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 25 ("As long as an airport's charges to air carriers do not result in revenues that exceed by more than a reasonable margin the costs of servicing those carriers, the Secretary would normally sustain those charges as reasonable under federal law.") (citing Federal Aviation Administration, Airport Compliance Require- ments, Order No. 5190.6A §§ 4­13, 4­14, pp. 20­22 (Oct. 2, 1989), and 14 CFR § 399.110(f) (1993)). 2 The Airlines also contend that the Airport's fee methodol- ogy is unlawful because, by imposing on the Airlines virtu- Inc., 712 F. Supp. 834, 838, 839 (Colo. 1989) (rejecting a similar argument, noting: "Nothing in the history and purpose of the Anti-Head Tax Act indicates that Congress intended the courts to act as a public utility com- mission and intervene in the setting of airport rates and charges through the adoption or rejection of any particular type of cost accounting meth- odology. Denver's division of costs and revenues between airlines and concessionaires is facially a reasonable approach to establishing rental charges, terminal rates, landing fees and other service charges which are collected from the users of the facilities at Stapleton [Airport]."). 16 The District Court found that the Airport overcharged the Airlines for aircraft parking and ordered the Airport "to recalculate this fee to result in a true break-even charge." 738 F. Supp., at 1120. The Airport did not appeal this order. 17 The Airlines do not dispute that they are charged only their allocated share of the airfield and terminal costs. They assert, however, that the Airport has allocated to them excessive "carrying charges" or amortiza- tion fees for capital improvements. The Court of Appeals specifically ad- dressed and rejected this contention, concluding that the rate charged "is reasonable and should not result in a net present value which exceeds the initial cost of the [capital improvements] project." 955 F. 2d 1054, 1063 (CA6 1992). We have no cause to disturb that determination. 510us2$20N 06-23-97 19:02:03 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 355 (1994) 371 Opinion of the Court ally all of the air-operations costs, and exacting fees from the concessions far in excess of their allocated costs, the method- ology generates huge surpluses. The AHTA, however, does not authorize judicial inquiry focused on the amount of the Airport's surplus. The statute requires only that an air- port's fees not "be excessive in relation to costs incurred by the taxing authorities" for benefits conferred on the user. Evansville, supra, at 719. As we have explained, the Air- lines are charged only for the costs of benefits they receive. The Airport's surplus is generated from fees charged to con- cessions, and the amounts of those fees are not at issue. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, § 1513(b) applies only to fees charged to "aircraft operators." 955 F. 2d, at 1060. The Airlines urge us to consider the effect of the conces- sion revenues when deciding whether the fees charged the Airlines are reasonable, pointing to the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Indianapolis Airport v. American Airlines, Inc., 733 F. 2d, at 1268 (invalidating the Indianapolis Airport's fee structure on the ground, inter alia, that the Airport's gener- ation of a surplus from the concession fees indirectly raised the costs of air travel). The Seventh Circuit, however, over- looked a key factor. It reasoned explicitly from the incor- rect premise that "[n]o agency has regulatory authority over the rate practices of the Indianapolis Airport Authority." Ibid. The Seventh Circuit panel believed that "the duty of regulation [fell] to the courts in the enforcement of the state and federal statutes forbidding unreasonable rates." Ibid. That court thought it necessary to "imagine [itself] in the role of a regulatory agency." Ibid. In contrast, our opinion in this case emphasizes that the Department of Transporta- tion has regulatory authority to enforce the federal aviation laws, including the AHTA and the AAIA, see supra, at 366­ 367, and n. 11, so there is no cause for courts to offer a substi- tute for "conventional public utility regulation," 733 F. 2d, at 1268. 510us2$20N 06-23-97 19:02:03 PAGES OPINPGT 372 NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC. v. COUNTY OF KENT Opinion of the Court We resist inferring a limit on airport surpluses from the AHTA for a further reason. That measure does not mention surplus accumulation, but another statute, the AAIA, di- rectly addresses the use of airport revenues. The AAIA requires that "all revenues generated by the airport . . . be expended for the capital or operating costs of the airport . . . ." 49 U. S. C. App. § 2210(a)(12) (emphasis supplied). The Airlines do not suggest that the Airport is using its surplus for any purpose other than Airport-related expenses, nor did they seek review of the lower courts' hold- ing that they had no right of action under the AAIA. 955 F. 2d, at 1058­1059. For these reasons, even if the AAIA is read to impose a limit on the accumulation of surplus reve- nues, see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 26­27, the question whether the Airport's surpluses are excessive is not properly before us. 3 Finally, the Airlines contend that the Airport's fees dis- criminate against them in favor of general aviation, in viola- tion of Evansville's instruction that airport tolls be nondis- criminatory regarding interstate commerce and travel. As earlier recounted, see supra, at 359­360, the Airlines pay 100% of their allocated costs while general aviation users are assessed fees covering only 20% of their allocated costs. We need not consider whether the Airlines would have a compelling point had they established that general aviation is properly categorized as intrastate commerce. Cf., e. g., Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U. S. 334, 339­348 (1992) (invalidating state fee on hazardous wastes generated outside, but disposed of inside, the State, because it discriminated against interstate commerce); American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U. S., at 268­269 (invalidating state highway use taxes because they discrimi- nated against interstate motor carriers). The record in this case, it suffices to say, does not support the Airlines' argu- ment. We cannot assume, in the total absence of proof, that 510us2$20N 06-23-97 19:02:03 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 355 (1994) 373 Opinion of the Court the large and diverse general aviation population served by the Airport travels typically intrastate and seldom ventures beyond Michigan's borders.18 III The Airlines assert that, even if the Airport's user fees are not unreasonable under the AHTA, they violate the "dormant" Commerce Clause. Even if we considered the AHTA's express permission for States' imposition of "reason- able rental charges, landing fees, and other service charges from aircraft operators for the use of airport facilities," 49 U. S. C. App. § 1513(b), insufficiently clear 19 to rule out judi- cial dormant Commerce Clause analysis,20 petitioners' argu- 18 The Airlines suggest that they had no opportunity to develop a record demonstrating discrimination in favor of intrastate carriers, because the District Court granted summary judgment for respondents on the Com- merce Clause question. See Reply Brief for Petitioners 9­10, n. 14. This argument does not fly. The case did proceed to trial on the AHTA claim. The Airlines have asserted that Evansville's standard governs AHTA rea- sonableness. Thus, under their own theory, they had to demonstrate the equivalent of a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause-i. e., discrimi- nation against interstate commerce-in order to prevail at the AHTA trial. The Airlines' belated suggestion-which contradicts their endorse- ment of Evansville, see Brief for Petitioners 22­23-that discrimination in favor of intrastate commerce is relevant under the Commerce Clause, but not under the AHTA, is unimpressive. The AHTA was a direct re- sponse to Evansville; Congress' principal concern in enacting the measure was to proscribe fees that unduly burden interstate commerce. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 93­12, p. 17 (1973). Covered fees, as we have emphasized, include, but are not limited to, head taxes. See supra, at 365­366, and n. 9. 19 See, e. g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U. S. 437, 458 (1992) (requiring that Congress "manifest its unambiguous intent before a federal statute will be read to permit" state regulation discriminating against interstate commerce). 20 See, e. g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U. S. 130, 154 (1982) ("Once Congress acts, courts are not free to review state taxes or other regulations under the dormant Commerce Clause. When Congress has struck the balance it deems appropriate, the courts are no longer needed to prevent States from burdening commerce, and it matters not that the 510us2$20N 06-23-97 19:02:03 PAGES OPINPGT 374 NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC. v. COUNTY OF KENT Thomas, J., dissenting ment would fail. We have already found the challenged fees reasonable under the AHTA through the lens of Evans- ville-that is, under a reasonableness standard taken di- rectly from our dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. * * * For the reasons stated, and without prejudging the out- come of any eventual proceeding before or regulation by the Secretary of Transportation, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It is so ordered. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Justice Thomas, dissenting. Today the Court transforms a statutory prohibition on a narrow class of charges on air travel into a broad mandate for federal regulation and review of virtually all airport fees. I disagree with the Court that the landing fees, rental charges, and carrying charges challenged here fall within the scope of the Anti-Head Tax Act (AHTA or Act), 49 U. S. C. App. § 1513. Unlike the Court, I do not believe that the Act imposes a "reasonableness" requirement on all airport charges and user fees. Instead, the Act merely prohibits fees, taxes, and charges imposed on the bases specified in § 1513(a), and leaves airports free to impose other charges, subject to the restrictions of the dormant Commerce Clause. Because the Act does not apply to the fees at issue in this case, I would remand for consideration of petitioners' Com- merce Clause claim. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. I As the Court recognizes, ante, at 362­363, Congress passed the AHTA in response to this Court's decision in courts would invalidate the state tax or regulation under the Commerce Clause in the absence of congressional action."). 510us2$20N 06-23-97 19:02:03 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 355 (1994) 375 Thomas, J., dissenting Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U. S. 707 (1972), which upheld against Commerce Clause challenge the imposition of a per capita ("head") tax on air travelers. The Act was designed primar- ily to deal with the proliferation of local head taxes in the wake of the Evansville decision. Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation of Haw., 464 U. S. 7, 9, 13 (1983). Two AHTA provisions are relevant here. Section 1513(a) prohibits state and local governments from imposing "a tax, fee, head charge, or other charge, directly or indirectly, on persons traveling in air commerce or on the carriage of per- sons traveling in air commerce or on the sale of air transpor- tation or on the gross receipts derived therefrom." Section 1513(b), however, states that "nothing in [the Act]" prohibits the imposition of "taxes other than those enumerated in subsection (a)," including, among other things, property and net income taxes, and that the Act does not prohibit "reason- able rental charges, landing fees, and other service charges" collected from "aircraft operators for the use of airport facilities." In the Court's view, § 1513(a) prohibits virtually all airport user fees, ante, at 365 ("Landing fees, terminal charges, and other airport user fees of the sort here challenged fit § 1513(a)'s description"), and § 1513(b) "saves" those fees that are "reasonable," ante, at 366, n. 9 ("[U]ser fees are covered by § 1513(a), but may be saved by § 1513(b)"). The Court supports its broad reading of § 1513(a) in part by noting that the section prohibits not only head taxes but also taxes on gross receipts. Ante, at 365 (citing Aloha Airlines, 464 U. S., at 12­13). That, however, merely states the obvious. Section 1513(a) expressly prohibits taxes "on the gross re- ceipts derived" from the sale of air transportation. The mere fact that the Act is not strictly limited to head taxes, which were the Act's primary target, id., at 13, but also en- compasses taxes on gross receipts from the sale of air trans- 510us2$20N 06-23-97 19:02:03 PAGES OPINPGT 376 NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC. v. COUNTY OF KENT Thomas, J., dissenting portation, in no way suggests that the Act should be read to encompass all airport "user fees." To be sure, the Act's apparently broad ban on any fees, taxes, or charges imposed "directly or indirectly, on persons traveling in air commerce," etc., superficially supports the Court's interpretation. Any cost an airline bears is in some sense an "indirect" charge "on persons traveling in air com- merce," because the airline ultimately will pass that cost on to consumers in the form of higher ticket prices. But if § 1513(a) covers all charges indirectly imposed on air travel- ers, as the Court apparently believes, see ante, at 365, it should logically encompass all taxes imposed on airlines as well, including property taxes, net income taxes, franchise taxes, and sales and use taxes on the sale of goods and serv- ices. Yet § 1513(b) instructs that such taxes are not covered by § 1513(a)-that they are "taxes other than those enumer- ated in subsection (a)." (Emphasis added.) Significantly, § 1513(b) is not phrased as an exemption for taxes otherwise within § 1513(a)'s prohibition, but rather as a clarification of the reach of § 1513(a). It makes clear that the language of § 1513(a) defining the prohibition does not extend by its own force to the taxes enumerated in § 1513(b). Under the Court's broad construction of § 1513(a)'s "directly or indi- rectly" language, however, the two provisions would appear to be in conflict. Recognizing the significance of § 1513(b)'s treatment of taxes, the Court implicitly acknowledges that § 1513(a) does not cover the taxes listed in § 1513(b). Ante, at 366, n. 9. But the Court can only accomplish this reading by assuming that § 1513(b) treats the "rental charges, landing fees, and other service charges . . . for the use of airport facilities" listed in that subsection differently from the enumerated taxes. In this understanding, while as to taxes § 1513(b) merely clarifies the scope of § 1513(a), as to fees it serves the altogether different function of providing an exemption from § 1513(a)'s prohibition. The Court supports this reading on 510us2$20N 06-23-97 19:02:03 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 355 (1994) 377 Thomas, J., dissenting the ground that § 1513(b) does not explicitly describe the fees as distinct from ("other than") the fees prohibited in § 1513(a). That construction requires a rather unlikely read- ing of § 1513(a), however, because it means that the same language defining the scope of the prohibition in that section inexplicably would have one meaning when applied to fees, and quite a different (and more limited) meaning when applied to taxes. None of the taxes listed in § 1513(b), although borne indirectly by airline passengers, would con- stitute a "tax, fee, . . . or other charge, [levied] directly or indirectly, on persons traveling in air commerce," etc. But a user fee charged to an airline, because it is borne indirectly by airline passengers, would constitute such a "tax, fee, . . . or other charge . . . ." Thus, the prohibition in § 1513(a) would not extend to, for example, property taxes, because they are not imposed on one of the bases listed in § 1513(a), but would extend to other fees or charges, regardless of the basis upon which they are imposed. Adherence to the plain language of § 1513(a) avoids these problems. In my view, when the statute prohibits a tax or charge "on persons traveling in air commerce," "on the car- riage of" such persons, "on the sale of air transportation," or "on the gross receipts derived therefrom," it defines the prohibition in terms of the prohibited basis of the tax or charge. That is, § 1513(a) prohibits the levy or collection of a tax or fee "on" certain subjects. A head tax, for example, is a charge "on persons traveling in air commerce" in that it is imposed on a per passenger basis. A landing fee, by con- trast, is not-rather, it is a charge on an aircraft's landing at an airport, without regard to the number of passengers it carries.1 1 Of course, as the Court notes, ante, at 366, n. 9, user fees such as landing fees are not per se excluded from the Act. An airport could not, for example, simply replace a head tax, which is clearly forbidden by the Act, with a "landing fee" calculated according to the number of passengers on an airplane. Such a thinly disguised substitute for a head tax no doubt 510us2$20N 06-23-97 19:02:03 PAGES OPINPGT 378 NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC. v. COUNTY OF KENT Thomas, J., dissenting Section 1513(b) confirms that § 1513(a) is concerned with the basis on which the tax or charge is calculated. Property taxes, net income taxes, and franchise taxes are not imposed on one of the bases prohibited in § 1513(a), and as explained above, are not included in § 1513(a). Because the same lan- guage in § 1513(a) restricts taxes as well as fees and other charges, it seems logical that the fees referred to in § 1513(b), which also are not generally calculated on the bases listed in § 1513(a), are similarly beyond § 1513(a)'s prohibition. Section 1513(b)'s reference to "reasonable" charges, then, does not impose a requirement that all airport user fees be "reasonable." Instead, it simply makes clear that state and local governments remain free to impose charges other than those proscribed by § 1513(a). Cf. Aloha Airlines, 464 U. S., at 12, n. 6 ("Section 1513(a) pre-empts a limited number of state taxes, . . . [and] [§]1513(b) clarifies Congress' view that the States are still free to impose on airlines and air carriers `taxes other than those enumerated in subsection (a)' "). That is not to say that the term "reasonable" is superfluous. Had the Act made unqualified reference to landing fees and other user fees, it might have been read as an indication of congressional intent to authorize fees or charges that would otherwise be invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131, 139 (1986). An unquali- fied reference might have also been understood to permit landing fees and other fees calculated on one of the bases prohibited by § 1513(a). See n. 1, supra. By including the term "reasonable," Congress ensured that the Act would not is a charge on the carriage of passengers traveling in air commerce within the meaning of § 1513(a). A landing fee is not such a prohibited charge where it is based merely on the weight of an airplane, as here. See App. 194 (Plaintiffs' Trial Exh. 6: Fees for the Use of Public Aircraft Facilities and Rental for Passenger Terminal Premises, Kent County International Airport, Three Years Beginning Jan. 1, 1987 (Dec. 31, 1986)). Similarly, neither a rental fee based on square footage, see ibid., nor a carrying charge based on the depreciation of an asset, see App. 68­70 (trial testi- mony of Richard K. Dompke), is such a prohibited charge. 510us2$20N 06-23-97 19:02:03 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 355 (1994) 379 Thomas, J., dissenting be understood to displace the dormant Commerce Clause or to exempt user fees on aircraft operators per se from § 1513(a). In short, § 1513(b) merely clarifies that fees, taxes, and other charges not encompassed within § 1513(a) may be imposed if consistent with our dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.2 II The considerable difficulty the Court has in finding content for the term "reasonable" should signal that Congress did not intend the Act to impose a comprehensive new regulation on airport fees. As the Court admits, the Act itself sets no standards for reasonableness. Ante, at 366. Finding no other source for a definition, the Court uses Evansville as its test of reasonableness, apparently for want of anything better. See ante, at 367­368. The Court seems to recog- nize that this is not a perfect fit (but "will suffice for the purpose at hand," ante, at 368), and with good reason. Rea- sonableness was only one of several factors considered in Evansville; nondiscrimination against interstate commerce is a separate concern and is of at least equal importance. See 405 U. S., at 716­717. Moreover, as the Court acknowl- edges, Congress enacted the Act precisely because it found the result in Evansville "unsatisfactory." Ante, at 368. Nevertheless, the Court reads the Evansville standard into the statute for no reason other than that the parties invite us to do so and that this Court (after enactment of the AHTA) occasionally has applied Evansville to test reason- ableness in other contexts. Ante, at 367­368. That the parties agree on a standard, however, does not mean that it is the correct one. Moreover, it seems somewhat odd to im- port into the Act the very standard that created the problem Congress ostensibly intended the Act to "correct." Indeed, read as the Court construes it, the Act would fail to prohibit 2 Other statutory restrictions might also apply to the fees at issue here, see, e. g., 49 U. S. C. App. § 2210, but their applicability is not before us. 510us2$20N 06-23-97 19:02:03 PAGES OPINPGT 380 NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC. v. COUNTY OF KENT Thomas, J., dissenting precisely the sort of fees § 1513(a) most clearly forbids. A head tax itself was held to be a "reasonable" user fee in Evansville (assuming, as the Court does, that Evansville applied a "reasonableness" standard). Under the Court's interpretation of the AHTA, there is nothing to prevent an airport from imposing a modest per passenger fee on airlines as a service charge for use of airport facilities.3 Such a fee would pass muster under Evansville, and therefore would be "saved" by § 1513(b) as a "reasonable" fee, even though it is clearly a charge "on the carriage of persons traveling in air commerce." § 1513(a).4 It is doubtful that Congress in- tended the AHTA to prohibit "unreasonable" landing fees, whatever they might be, while permitting "Evansville- reasonable" per capita user fees on aircraft operators. If, as the Court implies, Congress disapproved of the result but not the analysis in Evansville, it seems far more likely that it would have left the Commerce Clause analysis undisturbed while prohibiting head taxes and similar fees. In my view, that is precisely what § 1513 does. Having applied a construction of "reasonable" that it ad- mits is not compelled by the Act, the Court invites the Secre- tary of Transportation to devise a different, presumably bet- 3 Presumably, under the Court's analysis, § 1513(b) would not save head taxes exacted directly from passengers because it refers only to user fees collected "from aircraft operators." 4 It is no answer to say, as the Court does, ante, at 368, n. 13, that "head charges" are prohibited by § 1513(a). In the Court's view, "user fees are [also] covered by § 1513(a)." Ante, at 366, n. 9. As the Court construes the Act, charges covered by § 1513(a) are permitted only if they are "saved" by § 1513(b). Ibid. It is not clear why § 1513(b) would save rea- sonable "fee[s]" and "other charge[s]" covered by § 1513(a) but not reason- able "head charge[s]" covered by § 1513(a). Head charges certainly may constitute "reasonable . . . service charges from aircraft operators for the use of airport facilities," § 1513(b), if Evansville is the standard of reason- ableness. See Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U. S. 707, 710, 714 (1972) (upholding a $1 per passenger "service charge" collected from air carriers for "use of runways and other airport facilities"). 510us2$20N 06-23-97 19:02:03 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 355 (1994) 381 Thomas, J., dissenting ter, interpretation of the term, to which the Court will defer if it is a permissible construction of the Act.5 Ante, at 368, n. 14. Given that the Act sets no standards for "reasonable- ness," ante, at 366, it is difficult to imagine how the Secre- tary's interpretation could be an impermissible one. In- deed, although the Court seems to assume that the standard would be at least as rigorous as the one it applies here, pre- sumably the Secretary could, in the exercise of his expertise, devise a more permissive standard. Under the Court's anal- ysis, there is no reason to assume that the Evansville stand- ard is a minimum. If the Act imposes the comprehensive regulation of the reasonableness of airport charges that the Court sees, it would certainly constitute a clear expression of Congress' intention to displace the dormant Commerce Clause in this area, see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S., at 139, in which case the Secretary would be free to regulate either more or less restrictively than would the dormant Commerce Clause. Cf. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U. S. 130, 154 (1982). I simply find nothing in the AHTA that gives the Secretary such unbridled discretion to regulate all airport user fees. III Because the AHTA does not, in my view, apply to the fees in this case, it does not foreclose petitioners' challenge under the dormant Commerce Clause.6 The courts below, how- 5 The Secretary of Transportation has not so far promulgated any regu- latory standards for judging reasonableness under the Act. Although that fact is not directly relevant to our inquiry, it is surprising, if the Act means what the Court thinks it does, that the Secretary has not done so in the 20 years since the AHTA's enactment. 6 Nor, in my view, does the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 (AAIA), 49 U. S. C. App. § 2210, foreclose dormant Commerce Clause analysis here. Although the AAIA places a variety of conditions on fed- eral funding of airports, some of which relate to user fees, it imposes no flat prohibitions, and therefore does not make " `unmistakably clear' " that it is intended to displace the dormant Commerce Clause. Maine v. Tay- lor, 477 U. S. 131, 139 (1986). Moreover, this Court in Evansville held 510us2$20N 06-23-97 19:02:03 PAGES OPINPGT 382 NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC. v. COUNTY OF KENT Thomas, J., dissenting ever, held that the Act, as they interpreted it, precluded that claim. 955 F. 2d 1054, 1063­1064 (CA6 1992); No. G88­243 CA (WD Mich., Jan. 19, 1990), App. to Pet. for Cert. 46a. Because the lower courts should be given the opportunity to consider the merits of petitioners' dormant Commerce Clause challenge in the first instance, I would remand. I therefore respectfully dissent. that the AAIA's predecessor, which was substantially similar to the AAIA, did not preclude dormant Commerce Clause analysis. See 405 U. S., at 721. 510us2$21J 05-09-96 18:20:24 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1993 383 Syllabus CASPARI, SUPERINTENDENT, MISSOURI EASTERN CORRECTIONAL CENTER, et al. v. BOHLEN certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit No. 92­1500. Argued December 6, 1993-Decided February 23, 1994 The state trial judge sentenced respondent as a persistent offender follow- ing his conviction on three robbery counts, but the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the sentence because there was no proof of prior con- victions, as is necessary to establish persistent-offender status under state law. On remand, the trial judge resentenced respondent as a persistent offender based on evidence of prior felony convictions, reject- ing his contention that allowing the State another opportunity to prove such convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. In affirming, the State Court of Appeals agreed that there was no double jeopardy bar, as did the Federal District Court, which denied respondent's habeas corpus petition. However, in reversing, the Federal Court of Appeals extended the rationale of Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S. 430, a capital case, to hold that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a State from subjecting a defendant to successive noncapital sentence enhancement proceedings. The court ruled that taking that step did not require the announcement of a "new rule" of constitutional law, and thus that grant- ing habeas relief to respondent would not violate the nonretroactivity principle of Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, which prohibits such relief based on a rule announced after the defendant's conviction and sentence became final. Held:1. Because the State argued in the certiorari petition, as it had in the courts below and as it does in its brief on the merits, that the nonretro- activity principle barred the relief sought by respondent, this Court must apply Teague analysis before considering the merits of respond- ent's claim. See Graham v. Collins, 506 U. S. 461, 466­467. The Teague issue is a necessary predicate to the resolution of the primary question presented in the petition: whether the Double Jeopardy Clause should apply to successive noncapital sentence enhancement proceed- ings. Pp. 388­390. 2. The Court of Appeals erred in directing the District Court to grant respondent habeas relief because doing so required the announcement 510us2$21J 05-09-96 18:20:24 PAGES OPINPGT 384 CASPARI v. BOHLEN Syllabus and application of a new rule in violation of Teague and subsequent cases. Pp. 390­396. (a) Under those precedents, a court must proceed in three steps: (1) it must ascertain the date on which the conviction and sentence be- came final for Teague purposes; (2) it must determine whether a state court considering the defendant's claim on that date would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule sought was required by the Constitution; and (3), even if it determines that the defendant seeks the benefit of a new rule, it must decide whether that rule falls within one of the two narrow exceptions to the nonretroactiv- ity principle. P. 390. (b) Respondent's conviction and sentence became final for purposes of retroactivity analysis on January 2, 1986, the date on which the 90-day period for filing a certiorari petition elapsed following exhaustion of the availability of direct appeal to the state courts. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314, 321, n. 6. Pp. 390­391. (c) The Federal Court of Appeals announced a new rule in this case. A reasonable jurist reviewing this Court's precedents as of January 2, 1986, would not have considered the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to a noncapital sentencing proceeding to be dictated by prece- dent. At that time, the Court had not so applied the Clause, cf., e. g., United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U. S. 117, 133­135; Bullington, supra, and Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203, distinguished, and indeed sev- eral of the Court's decisions pointed in the opposite direction, see, e. g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668. Moreover, two Federal Courts of Appeals and several state courts had reached conflicting hold- ings on the issue. Because that conflict concerned a development in the law over which reasonable jurists could disagree, Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 234, the Court of Appeals erred in resolving it in respondent's favor. To the limited extent this Court's cases decided subsequent to January 2, 1986, have any relevance to the Teague analysis, they are entirely consistent with the foregoing new rule determination. Pp. 391­396. (d) Neither of the two narrow exceptions to the nonretroactivity principle applies in this case. First, imposing a double jeopardy bar here would not place respondent's conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority, since he is still subject to imprisonment on each of his robbery convictions, regardless of whether he is sentenced as a persistent offender. Second, applying the Double Jeopardy Clause in these circumstances would not constitute a watershed criminal rule, since persistent-offender status is a fact objectively ascertainable on the basis of readily available evidence, and subjecting a defendant to a sec- ond proceeding at which the State has the opportunity to show the req- 510us2$21J 05-09-96 18:20:24 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 383 (1994) 385 Syllabus uisite number of prior convictions is not unfair and will enhance the proceeding's accuracy by ensuring that the determination is made on the basis of competent evidence. P. 396. 3. Because of the resolution of this case on Teague grounds, the Court need not reach the questions whether the Double Jeopardy Clause ap- plies to noncapital sentencing, whether Missouri's persistent-offender scheme is sufficiently trial-like to invoke double jeopardy protections, or whether Bullington should be overruled. Pp. 396­397. 979 F. 2d 109, reversed. O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Blackmun, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Gins- burg, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 397. Frank A. Jung, Assistant Attorney General of Missouri, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General. William K. Kelley argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor General Bryson, and Ronald J. Mann. Richard H. Sindel, by appointment of the Court, 510 U. S. 806, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Cook County, Illinois, by Jack O'Malley, Renee G. Goldfarb, and Theodore Fotios Burt- zos; and for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson. Michael D. Gooch filed a brief for the National Legal Aid and Defender Association et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. A brief of amici curiae was filed for the State of Arkansas et al. by Winston Bryant, Attorney General of Arkansas, Clint Miller, Senior As- sistant Attorney General, and Kyle R. Wilson, Assistant Attorney Gen- eral, John M. Bailey, Chief State's Attorney of Connecticut, Charles M. Oberly III, Attorney General of Delaware, Larry EchoHawk, Attorney General of Idaho, Mike Moore, Attorney General of Mississippi, Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General of Montana, Don Stenberg, Attorney General of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General of Nevada, Carol Henderson, Deputy Attorney General of New Jersey, T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina, and Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney Gen- eral of Wyoming. 510us2$21J 05-09-96 18:20:24 PAGES OPINPGT 386 CASPARI v. BOHLEN Opinion of the Court Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. In Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S. 430 (1981), we held that a defendant sentenced to life imprisonment following a trial-like capital sentencing proceeding is protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause against imposition of the death pen- alty if he obtains reversal of his conviction and is retried and reconvicted. In this case we are asked to decide whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a State from twice subjecting a defendant to a noncapital sentence enhance- ment proceeding. I Respondent and others entered a jewelry store in St. Louis County, Missouri, on April 17, 1981. Holding store employees and customers at gunpoint, they stole money and jewelry. After a jury trial, respondent was convicted on three counts of first-degree robbery. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 569.020 (1978). The authorized punishment for that of- fense, a class A felony, is "a term of years not less than ten years and not to exceed thirty years, or life imprisonment." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 558.011.1(1) (Supp. 1982). Under Missouri law, the jury is to "assess and declare the punishment as a part of [the] verdict." § 557.036.2. The judge is then to determine the punishment "having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the his- tory and character of the defendant," § 557.036.1, although the sentence imposed by the judge generally cannot be more severe than the advisory sentence recommended by the jury. § 557.036.3. If the trial judge finds the defendant to be a "persistent offender," however, the judge sets the punish- ment without seeking an advisory sentence from the jury. §§ 557.036.4, 557.036.5. A persistent offender is any person "who has pleaded guilty to or has been found guilty of two or more felonies committed at different times." § 558.016.3. The judge must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the de- fendant is a persistent offender. § 558.021. For a defendant who has committed a class A felony, a finding of persistent- 510us2$21J 05-09-96 18:20:24 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 383 (1994) 387 Opinion of the Court offender status shifts the sentencing decision from the jury to the judge but does not alter the authorized sentencing range. §§ 557.036.4(2), 558.016.6(1). The trial judge in this case sentenced respondent as a persistent offender to three consecutive terms of 15 years in prison. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed respond- ent's convictions. State v. Bohlen, 670 S. W. 2d 119 (1984). The state court reversed respondent's sentence, however, be- cause "although [respondent] was sentenced by the judge as a persistent offender no proof was made of the prior convic- tions." Id., at 123. Following Missouri practice, see State v. Holt, 660 S. W. 2d 735, 738­739 (Mo. App. 1983), the court remanded for proof of those convictions and resentencing. On remand, the State introduced evidence of four prior felony convictions. Rejecting respondent's contention that allowing the State another opportunity to prove his prior convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, the trial judge found respondent to be a persistent offender and again sentenced him to three consecutive 15-year terms. App. A­29, A­35. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed: "The question of double jeopardy was not involved because those provisions of the Fifth Amendment have been held not to apply to sentencing." State v. Bohlen, 698 S. W. 2d 577, 578 (1985), citing State v. Lee, 660 S. W. 2d 394, 399 (Mo. App. 1983). The Missouri Court of Appeals subsequently af- firmed the trial court's denial of respondent's motion for postconviction relief. Bohlen v. State, 743 S. W. 2d 425 (1987). In 1989, respondent filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The District Court, adopting the re- port and recommendation of a Magistrate, denied the peti- tion. App. to Pet. for Cert. A25­A26. The court rejected respondent's contention that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the State from introducing evidence of respondent's 510us2$21J 05-09-96 18:20:24 PAGES OPINPGT 388 CASPARI v. BOHLEN Opinion of the Court prior convictions at the second sentencing hearing. Id., at A37­A49. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 979 F. 2d 109 (1992). Based on its conclusion that "[t]he persistent offender sentenc[e] enhancement proce- dure in Missouri has protections similar to those in the capi- tal sentencing hearing in Bullington," id., at 112, the court stated that "it is a short step to apply the same double jeop- ardy protection to a non-capital sentencing hearing as the Supreme Court applied to a capital sentenc[ing] . . . hearing." Id., at 113. The court held that taking that step did not require the announcement of a "new rule" of constitutional law, and thus that granting habeas relief to respondent would not violate the nonretroactivity principle of Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion). The Court of Ap- peals accordingly directed the District Court to grant re- spondent a writ of habeas corpus. 979 F. 2d, at 115. We granted certiorari, 508 U. S. 971 (1993), and now reverse. II We have consistently declined to consider issues not raised in the petition for a writ of certiorari. See this Court's Rule 14.1(a) ("Only the questions set forth in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court"). In Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519 (1992), for example, the question presented was whether certain governmental action had ef- fected a physical taking of the petitioner's property; we held that the question whether the same action had effected a regulatory taking, while "related" and "complementary" to the question presented, was not fairly included therein. Id., at 537. In Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U. S. Philips Corp., 510 U. S. 27 (1993) (per curiam), the question presented in the petition was whether the courts of appeals should routinely vacate district court judgments when cases are settled while on appeal; we held that the "analytically and factually" distinct issue whether the petitioner was im- 510us2$21J 05-09-96 18:20:24 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 383 (1994) 389 Opinion of the Court properly denied leave to intervene in the court below was not fairly included in the question presented. Id., at 32. See also American Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U. S. 606, 608 (1985) (per curiam). The primary question presented in the petition for a writ of certiorari in this case was "[w]hether the Double Jeopardy Clause . . . should apply to successive non-capital sentence enhancement proceedings." Pet. for Cert. 1. The State ar- gues that answering that question in the affirmative would require the announcement of a new rule of constitutional law in violation of Teague and subsequent cases. We conclude that this issue is a subsidiary question fairly included in the question presented. The nonretroactivity principle prevents a federal court from granting habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner based on a rule announced after his conviction and sentence be- came final. See, e. g., Stringer v. Black, 503 U. S. 222, 227 (1992). A threshold question in every habeas case, there- fore, is whether the court is obligated to apply the Teague rule to the defendant's claim. We have recognized that the nonretroactivity principle "is not `jurisdictional' in the sense that [federal courts] . . . must raise and decide the issue sua sponte." Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U. S. 37, 41 (1990) (em- phasis omitted). Thus, a federal court may, but need not, decline to apply Teague if the State does not argue it. See Schiro v. Farley, 510 U. S. 222, 228­229 (1994). But if the State does argue that the defendant seeks the benefit of a new rule of constitutional law, the court must apply Teague before considering the merits of the claim. See Graham v. Collins, 506 U. S. 461, 466­467 (1993). In this case, the State argued in the petition, as it had in the courts below and as it does in its brief on the merits, that the nonretroactivity principle barred the relief sought by respondent. In contrast to Yee, which involved a claim that was related but not subsidiary, and Izumi, in which the intervention question was a procedural one wholly divorced 510us2$21J 05-09-96 18:20:24 PAGES OPINPGT 390 CASPARI v. BOHLEN Opinion of the Court from the question on which we granted review, the Teague issue raised by the State in this case is a necessary predicate to the resolution of the question presented in the petition. Cf. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335, 342­343, n. 6 (1980). We therefore proceed to consider it. III "[A] case announces a new rule if the result was not dic- tated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's con- viction became final." Teague v. Lane, supra, at 301. In determining whether a state prisoner is entitled to habeas relief, a federal court should apply Teague by proceeding in three steps. First, the court must ascertain the date on which the defendant's conviction and sentence became final for Teague purposes. Second, the court must "[s]urve[y] the legal landscape as it then existed," Graham v. Collins, supra, at 468, and "determine whether a state court considering [the defendant's] claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [he] seeks was required by the Constitution," Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 488 (1990). Finally, even if the court determines that the defendant seeks the benefit of a new rule, the court must decide whether that rule falls within one of the two narrow exceptions to the nonretroac- tivity principle. See Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U. S. 333, 345 (1993). A A state conviction and sentence become final for purposes of retroactivity analysis when the availability of direct ap- peal to the state courts has been exhausted and the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has elapsed or a timely filed petition has been finally denied. See Griffith v. Ken- tucky, 479 U. S. 314, 321, n. 6 (1987). The Missouri Court of Appeals denied respondent's petition for rehearing on Octo- ber 3, 1985, and respondent did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari. Respondent's conviction and sentence therefore 510us2$21J 05-09-96 18:20:24 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 383 (1994) 391 Opinion of the Court became final on January 2, 1986-91 days (January 1 was a legal holiday) later. 28 U. S. C. § 2101(c); see this Court's Rules 13.4 and 30.1. B In reviewing the state of the law on that date, we note that it was well established that there is no double jeopardy bar to the use of prior convictions in sentencing a persistent offender. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554, 560 (1967). Cf. Moore v. Missouri, 159 U. S. 673, 678 (1895). Respondent's claim, however, is that the State's failure to prove his persistent-offender status at his first sentencing hearing operated as an "acquittal" of that status, so that he cannot be again subjected to a persistent-offender determination. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U. S. 332, 343 (1975) ("When a defendant has been acquitted of an offense, the Clause guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict him"). At first blush, respondent's argument would appear to be foreclosed by the fact that "[h]istorically, the pronouncement of sentence has never carried the finality that attaches to an acquittal." United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U. S. 117, 133 (1980). In that case, we upheld the constitutionality of 18 U. S. C. § 3576, a pre-Guidelines statute that allowed the United States to appeal the sentence imposed on a defendant adjudged to be a "dangerous special offender," and allowed the court of appeals to affirm the sentence, impose a different sentence, or remand to the district court for further sentenc- ing proceedings. A review of our prior cases led us to the conclusion that "[t]his Court's decisions in the sentencing area clearly establish that a sentence does not have the qual- ities of constitutional finality that attend an acquittal." 449 U. S., at 134; see also id., at 135, citing Chaffin v. Stynch- combe, 412 U. S. 17 (1973); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969); Bozza v. United States, 330 U. S. 160 (1947); and Stroud v. United States, 251 U. S. 15 (1919). 510us2$21J 05-09-96 18:20:24 PAGES OPINPGT 392 CASPARI v. BOHLEN Opinion of the Court Respondent acknowledges our traditional refusal to ex- tend the Double Jeopardy Clause to sentencing, but contends that a different result is compelled in this case by Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S. 430 (1981), and Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203 (1984). In Bullington, the defendant was con- victed of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. After he obtained a reversal of his conviction on appeal and was reconvicted, the State again sought the death penalty. We recognized the general principle that "[t]he imposition of a particular sentence usually is not regarded as an `acquittal' of any more severe sentence that could have been imposed." 451 U. S., at 438. We nonetheless held that because Missou- ri's "presentence hearing resembled and, indeed, in all rele- vant respects was like the immediately preceding trial on the issue of guilt or innocence," ibid., the first jury's refusal to impose the death penalty operated as an acquittal of that punishment. In Rumsey, we extended the rationale of Bull- ington to a capital sentencing scheme in which the judge, as opposed to a jury, had initially determined that a life sen- tence was appropriate. 467 U. S., at 212. Both Bullington and Rumsey were capital cases, and our reasoning in those cases was based largely on the unique circumstances of a capital sentencing proceeding. In Bull- ington itself we distinguished our contrary precedents, par- ticularly DiFrancesco, on the ground that "[t]he history of sentencing practices is of little assistance to Missouri in this case, since the sentencing procedures for capital cases insti- tuted after the decision in Furman [v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972),] are unique." 451 U. S., at 441­442, n. 15 (internal quotation marks omitted). We recognized as much in Penn- sylvania v. Goldhammer, 474 U. S. 28 (1985) (per curiam): "[T]he decisions of this Court `clearly establish that a sen- tenc[ing in a noncapital case] does not have the qualities of constitutional finality that attend an acquittal.' " Id., at 30, quoting DiFrancesco, supra, at 134 (bracketed phrase added by the Goldhammer Court; emphasis added). 510us2$21J 05-09-96 18:20:24 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 383 (1994) 393 Opinion of the Court In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984), we held that the same standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel applies to trials and to capital sentenc- ing proceedings because "[a] capital sentencing proceeding . . . is sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of standards for decision, see [Bullington], that counsel's role in the proceeding is comparable to coun- sel's role at trial." Id., at 686­687. Because Strickland in- volved a capital sentencing proceeding, we left open the question whether the same test would apply to noncapital cases: "We need not consider the role of counsel in an ordi- nary sentencing, which may involve informal proceedings and standardless discretion in the sentencer, and hence may require a different approach to the definition of constitution- ally effective assistance." Id., at 686; see also id., at 704­705 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (" `Time and again the Court has condemned procedures in capital cases that might be completely acceptable in an ordi- nary case. See, e. g., [Bullington]' ") (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 913­914 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissent- ing)). See also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U. S. 447, 458 (1984). While our cases may not have foreclosed the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to noncapital sentencing, neither did any of them apply the Clause in that context. On the contrary, Goldhammer and Strickland strongly suggested that Bullington was limited to capital sentencing. We therefore conclude that a reasonable jurist reviewing our precedents at the time respondent's conviction and sentence became final would not have considered the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to a noncapital sentencing pro- ceeding to be dictated by our precedents. Cf. Stringer v. Black, 503 U. S., at 236­237. This analysis is confirmed by the experience of the lower courts. Prior to the time respondent's conviction and sen- tence became final, one Federal Court of Appeals and two 510us2$21J 05-09-96 18:20:24 PAGES OPINPGT 394 CASPARI v. BOHLEN Opinion of the Court state courts of last resort had held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar the introduction of evidence of prior con- victions at resentencing in noncapital cases, Linam v. Grif- fin, 685 F. 2d 369, 374­376 (CA10 1982); Durham v. State, 464 N. E. 2d 321, 323­326 (Ind. 1984); People v. Sailor, 65 N. Y. 2d 224, 231­236, 480 N. E. 2d 701, 706­710 (1985), while another Federal Court of Appeals and two other state courts of last resort had held to the contrary, Briggs v. Procunier, 764 F. 2d 368, 371 (CA5 1985); State v. Hennings, 100 Wash. 2d 379, 386­390, 670 P. 2d 256, 259­262 (1983); Cooper v. State, 631 S. W. 2d 508, 513­514 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). Moreover, the Missouri Court of Appeals had previously rejected pre- cisely the same claim raised by respondent. State v. Lee, 660 S. W. 2d, at 399­400. In its retroactivity analysis, the Court of Appeals dis- missed the Tenth Circuit's decision in Linam as "ultimately based on trial error," 979 F. 2d, at 114, failing to recognize that the Linam court offered two "alternative bas[e]s for de- cision," 685 F. 2d, at 374-the second being that the "unique- ness of the death penalty unquestionably serves to distin- guish DiFrancesco from Bullington," id., at 375. Nor did the Court of Appeals acknowledge the relevant portion of the Lee decision, in which a Missouri court held that "the death penalty second stage trial in a capital murder case bears no similarity to a determination of persistent offender status by a judge upon the basis of largely formal evidence." 660 S. W. 2d, at 400. Instead, the court focused on whether there was any "federal holding resting squarely on the prop- osition that Bullington does not apply to non-capital sen- tenc[e] enhancement proceedings." 979 F. 2d, at 114 (em- phasis added). At oral argument in this Court, counsel for respondent candidly admitted that he did not know "exactly what State courts had decided or when" with respect to the applicability of the Double Jeopardy Clause to noncapital sentencing. Tr. of Oral Arg. 31. In fact, two state courts had held the Dou- 510us2$21J 05-09-96 18:20:24 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 383 (1994) 395 Opinion of the Court ble Jeopardy Clause inapplicable to noncapital sentencing prior to 1986. Durham v. State, supra; People v. Sailor, supra. Constitutional law is not the exclusive province of the federal courts, and in the Teague analysis the reasonable views of state courts are entitled to consideration along with those of federal courts. See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U. S. 407, 414 (1990). In sum, at the time respondent's conviction and sentence became final this Court had not applied the Double Jeopardy Clause to noncapital sentencing, and indeed several of our cases pointed in the opposite direction. Two Federal Courts of Appeals and several state courts had reached conflicting holdings on the issue. Because that conflict concerned a "developmen[t] in the law over which reasonable jurists [could] disagree," Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 234 (1990), the Court of Appeals erred in resolving it in respondent's favor. Finally, to the limited extent our cases decided subsequent to the time respondent's conviction and sentence became final have any relevance to the Teague analysis, cf. Graham v. Collins, 506 U. S., at 472, 477, they are entirely consistent with our conclusion that the Court of Appeals announced a new rule in this case. See Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U. S. 33, 37­38, n. 6 (1988) (reserving question whether Double Jeopardy Clause applies to noncapital sentencing); see also Poland v. Arizona, 476 U. S. 147, 155 (1986) ("Bullington indicates that the proper inquiry is whether the sentencer or reviewing court has `decided that the prosecution has not proved its case' that the death penalty is appropriate") (em- phasis in original); Hunt v. New York, 502 U. S. 964 (1991) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting con- flict on the question "whether the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to trial-like sentence enhancement proceedings in noncapital cases"). Because "[t]he `new rule' principle . . . validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though they are shown 510us2$21J 05-09-96 18:20:24 PAGES OPINPGT 396 CASPARI v. BOHLEN Opinion of the Court to be contrary to later decisions," Butler v. McKellar, supra, at 414, a fortiori it should protect a reasonable interpreta- tion that is entirely consistent with subsequent cases. C Neither of the two narrow exceptions to the nonretroactiv- ity principle applies to this case. The first exception is for new rules that place "certain kinds of primary, private indi- vidual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe." Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S., at 307 (internal quotation marks omitted). Imposing a double jeopardy bar in this case would have no such effect. Respond- ent is subject to imprisonment on each of his three convic- tions, regardless of whether he is sentenced as a persistent offender. The second exception is for " `watershed rules of criminal procedure' implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding." Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S., at 495. Applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to suc- cessive noncapital sentencing is not such a groundbreaking occurrence. Persistent-offender status is a fact objectively ascertainable on the basis of readily available evidence. Either a defendant has the requisite number of prior convic- tions, or he does not. Subjecting him to a second proceeding at which the State has the opportunity to show those convic- tions is not unfair and will enhance the accuracy of the pro- ceeding by ensuring that the determination is made on the basis of competent evidence. IV The Court of Appeals recognized that it was a "stretch" to apply the Double Jeopardy Clause to a noncapital sentencing proceeding, 979 F. 2d, at 115, one that required "[e]xtending" the rationale of Bullington, 979 F. 2d, at 115, but held that because it was only a "short step," id., at 113, the nonretroac- tivity principle was not violated. We disagree. The Court of Appeals erred in directing the District Court to grant re- 510us2$21J 05-09-96 18:20:24 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 383 (1994) 397 Stevens, J., dissenting spondent a writ of habeas corpus because doing so required the announcement and application of a new rule of constitu- tional law. Because of our resolution of this case on Teague grounds, we have no occasion to decide whether the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to noncapital sentencing, or whether Missouri's persistent-offender scheme is sufficiently trial-like to invoke double jeopardy protections; nor need we consider the State's contention that Bullington should be overruled. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. Justice Stevens, dissenting. The nonretroactivity principle announced in the plurality opinion in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), is a judge- made defense that can be waived. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U. S. 37, 41 (1990). In recent years, the Court has fash- ioned harsh rules regarding waiver and claim forfeiture to defeat substantial constitutional claims. See, e. g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478 (1986). If we are to apply such a strict approach to waiver in habeas corpus litigation, we should hold the war- den to the same standard. Accordingly, given the treatment accorded the private litigant in Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Ka- bushiki Kaisha v. U. S. Philips Corp., 510 U. S. 27 (1993) (per curiam), I would hold that petitioner Caspari forfeited his Teague defense under this Court's Rule 14.1(a). Distinguishing Izumi, the Court explains that the inter- vention question in that case was "wholly divorced from the question on which we granted review," whereas here the Teague issue "is a necessary predicate to the resolution of the question presented in the petition." Ante, at 389­390. Yet Izumi itself opened by acknowledging that it "would have to address" the intervention issue "[i]n order to reach the merits of this case." 510 U. S., at 28. It is no more "necessary" to answer the Teague question in this case than it was, for example, in Collins, supra. 510us2$21J 05-09-96 18:20:24 PAGES OPINPGT 398 CASPARI v. BOHLEN Stevens, J., dissenting On the merits, I agree with the Court of Appeals. Under Missouri law courts must make findings of fact that persistent-offender status is warranted for those convicted of certain offenses when the prosecutor establishes requisite facts by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.* That status sub- jects the defendant to more severe sentences, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 558.016.1 (Supp. 1982), and deprives him of the opportunity to have a jury sentence him, § 557.036.2. The sentence en- hancement thus has the same legal effect as conviction of a separate offense; the separate sentencing hearing likewise is the practical equivalent of the trial. Missouri law acknowl- edges as much by properly requiring prosecutors to prove the factual predicate for the enhanced sentence beyond a rea- sonable doubt. A defendant opposing such an enhancement undoubtedly has a constitutional right to counsel and to the basic proce- dural protections the Due Process Clause affords. I have no hesitation in concluding that these protections include the right not to be "twice put in jeopardy" for the same offense. U. S. Const., Amdt. 5. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. *Mo. Rev. Stat. § 558.021.1(2) (Supp. 1982). A "persistent offender" had previously been adjudged guilty of two or more felonies committed at dif- ferent times. § 558.016.3. Missouri also mandates an enhanced sentence if the prosecutor proves that the defendant is a "dangerous offender"- meaning one who is being sentenced for a felony during which he know- ingly "murdered or endangered or threatened the life" of another, who "knowingly inflicted or attempted or threatened to inflict serious physical injury" on another, or who is guilty of certain felonies. § 558.016.4. It is unfair to afford the prosecutor two opportunities to satisfy either provision. 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:28 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1993 399 Syllabus HAGEN v. UTAH certiorari to the supreme court of utah No. 92­6281. Argued November 2, 1993-Decided February 23, 1994 Petitioner, an Indian, was charged in Utah state court with distribution of a controlled substance in the town of Myton, which lies within the original boundaries of the Uintah Indian Reservation on land that was opened to non-Indian settlement in 1905. The trial court rejected peti- tioner's claim that it lacked jurisdiction over him because he was an Indian and the crime had been committed in "Indian country," see 18 U. S. C. § 1151, such that federal jurisdiction was exclusive. The state appellate court, relying on Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F. 2d 1087 (CA10), cert. denied, 479 U. S. 994, agreed with petitioner's contentions and vacated his conviction. The Utah Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the conviction, ruling that Congress had "diminished" the reservation by opening it to non-Indians, that Myton was outside its boundaries, and thus that petitioner's offense was subject to state crimi- nal jurisdiction. See Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U. S. 463, 467 ("States have jurisdiction over . . . opened lands if the applicable surplus land Act freed that land of its reservation status and thereby diminished the res- ervation boundaries"). Held: Because the Uintah Reservation has been diminished by Congress, the town of Myton is not in Indian country and the Utah courts properly exercised criminal jurisdiction over petitioner. Pp. 409­422. (a) This Court declines to consider whether the State of Utah, which was a party to the Tenth Circuit proceedings in Ute Indian Tribe, should be collaterally estopped from relitigating the reservation boundaries. That argument is not properly before the Court because it was not presented in the petition for a writ of certiorari and was expressly disavowed by petitioner in his response to an amicus brief. Pp. 409­410. (b) Under this Court's traditional approach, as set forth in Solem v. Bartlett, supra, and other cases, whether any given surplus land Act diminished a reservation depends on all the circumstances, including (1) the statutory language used to open the Indian lands, (2) the contempo- raneous understanding of the particular Act, and (3) the identity of the persons who actually moved onto the opened lands. As to the first, the most probative, of these factors, the statutory language must establish an express congressional purpose to diminish, but no particular form of words is prerequisite to a finding of diminishment. Moreover, although 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:28 PAGES OPINPGT 400 HAGEN v. UTAH Syllabus the provision of a sum certain payment to the Indians, when coupled with a statutory expression of intent, can certainly provide additional evidence of diminishment, the lack of such a provision does not lead to the contrary conclusion. Throughout the diminishment inquiry, ambi- guities are resolved in favor of the Indians, and diminishment will not lightly be found. Pp. 410­412. (c) The operative language of the Act of May 27, 1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 263-which provided for allotments of some Uintah Reservation land to Indians, and that "all the unallotted lands within said reservation shall be restored to the public domain" (emphasis added)-evidences a con- gressional purpose to terminate reservation status. See, e. g., Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U. S. 351, 354­355. Solem, supra, at 472­476, distinguished. Contrary to petitioner's argu- ment, this baseline intent to diminish was not changed by the Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat. 1069. Language in that statute demon- strates that Congress clearly viewed the 1902 Act as the basic legisla- tion upon which the 1905 Act and intervening statutes were built. Fur- thermore, the structure of the statutes-which contain complementary, nonduplicative essential provisions-requires that the 1905 and 1902 Acts be read together. Finally, the general rule that repeals by impli- cation are disfavored is especially strong here, because the 1905 Act expressly repealed a provision in the intervening statute passed in 1903; if Congress had meant to repeal any part of any other previous statute, it could easily have done so. Pp. 412­416. (d) The historical evidence-including letters and other statements by Interior Department officials, congressional bills and statements by Members of Congress, and the text of the 1905 Presidential Proclama- tion that actually opened the Uintah Reservation to settlement-clearly indicates the contemporaneous understanding that the reservation would be diminished by the opening of the unallotted lands. This con- clusion is not altered by inconsistent references to the reservation in both the past and present tenses in the post-1905 legislative record. These must be viewed merely as passing references in text, not deliber- ate conclusions about the congressional intent in 1905. Pp. 416­420. (e) Practical acknowledgment that the reservation was diminished is demonstrated by the current population situation in the Uintah Valley, which is approximately 85 percent non-Indian in the opened lands and 93 percent non-Indian in the area's largest city; by the fact that the seat of local tribal government is on Indian trust lands, not opened lands; and by the State of Utah's assumption of jurisdiction over the opened lands from 1905 until the Tenth Circuit decided Ute Indian Tribe. A contrary conclusion would seriously disrupt the justifiable expectations of the people living in the area. Pp. 420­421. 858 P. 2d 925, affirmed. 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 399 (1994) 401 Opinion of the Court O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, J., joined, post, p. 422. Martin E. Seneca, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Daniel H. Israel. Ronald J. Mann argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Flint, Acting Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Edward J. Shawaker, and Martin W. Matzen. Jan Graham, Attorney General of Utah, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Carol Clawson, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Quealy, Assistant Attor- ney General.* Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we decide whether the Uintah Indian Reserva- tion was diminished by Congress when it was opened to non-Indian settlers at the turn of the century. If the reser- vation has been diminished, then the town of Myton, Utah, which lies on opened lands within the historical boundaries of the reservation, is not in "Indian country," see 18 U. S. C. *Robert S. Thompson III, Sandra Hansen, and Jeanne S. Whiteing filed a brief for the Ute Indian Tribe as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of South Dakota et al. by Mark Barnett, Attorney General of South Dakota, and John P. Guhin, Deputy Attorney General, and for the Attorneys Gen- eral of their respective States as follows: Grant Woods of Arizona, Daniel E. Lungren of California, Marc Racicot of Montana, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, and Susan B. Loving of Oklahoma; for Duchesne County, Utah, by Herbert Wm. Gillespie and Jesse C. Trentadue; for Fremont County, Wyoming, et al. by James M. Johnson; for Uintah County, Utah, by Tom D. Tobin and Kenn A. Pugh; and for the Council of State Govern- ments et al. by Richard Ruda and Charles Rothfeld. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Navajo Nation by Paul E. Frye; and for Roosevelt City by Craig M. Bunnell. 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:28 PAGES OPINPGT 402 HAGEN v. UTAH Opinion of the Court § 1151, and the Utah state courts properly exercised criminal jurisdiction over petitioner, an Indian who committed a crime in Myton. I On October 3, 1861, President Lincoln reserved about 2 million acres of land in the Territory of Utah for Indian set- tlement. Executive Order No. 38­1, reprinted in 1 C. Kap- pler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties 900 (1904). Con- gress confirmed the President's action in 1864, creating the Uintah Valley Reservation. Act of May 5, 1864, ch. 77, 13 Stat. 63. According to the 1864 Act, the lands were "set apart for the permanent settlement and exclusive occupation of such of the different tribes of Indians of said territory as may be induced to inhabit the same." Ibid. The present- day Ute Indian Tribe includes the descendants of the Indians who settled on the Uintah Reservation. In the latter part of the 19th century, federal Indian policy changed. See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 127­139 (1982 ed.). Indians were no longer to inhabit com- munally owned reservations, but instead were to be given individual parcels of land; any remaining lands were to be opened for settlement by non-Indians. The General Allot- ment Act, Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, granted the President authority "to allot portions of reservation land to tribal members and, with tribal consent, to sell the surplus lands to [non-Indian] settlers, with the proceeds of these sales being dedicated to the Indians' benefit." DeCoteau v. District County Court for Tenth Judicial District, 420 U. S. 425, 432 (1975). Pursuant to the General Allotment Act, Congress in 1894 directed the President to appoint a commission to negotiate with the Indians for the allotment of Uintah Reservation lands and the "relinquishment to the United States" of all unallotted lands. Act of Aug. 15, 1894, ch. 290, § 22, 28 Stat. 337. That effort did not succeed, and in 1898 Congress di- rected the President to appoint another commission to nego- 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 399 (1994) 403 Opinion of the Court tiate an agreement for the allotment of Uintah Reservation lands and the "cession" of unallotted lands to the United States. Act of June 4, 1898, ch. 376, 30 Stat. 429. The Indi- ans resisted those efforts as well. Various bills that would have opened the reservation unilaterally (i. e., without the consent of the Indians) were subsequently introduced in the Senate but were not enacted into law. See Leasing of In- dian Lands, Hearings before the Senate Committee on In- dian Affairs, S. Doc. No. 212, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1902). In 1902, Congress passed an Act which provided that if a majority of the adult male members of the Uintah and White River Indians consented, the Secretary of the Interior should make allotments by October 1, 1903, out of the Uintah Reservation. Act of May 27, 1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 263.1 The allotments under the 1902 Act were to be 80 acres for each head of a family and 40 acres for each other member of 1 The 1902 Act provided in relevant part: "That the Secretary of the Interior, with the consent thereto of the majority of the adult male Indians of the Uintah and the White River tribes of Ute Indians, to be ascertained as soon as practicable by an inspec- tor, shall cause to be allotted to each head of a family eighty acres of agricultural land which can be irrigated and forty acres of such land to each other member of said tribes, said allotments to be made prior to October first, nineteen hundred and three, on which date all the unallotted lands within said reservation shall be restored to the public domain: Pro- vided, That persons entering any of said land under the homestead law shall pay therefor at the rate of one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre: And provided further, That . . . the proceeds of the sale of the lands so restored to the public domain shall be applied, first, to the reimbursement of the United States for any moneys advanced to said Indians to carry into effect the foregoing provisions; and the remainder, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, shall be used for the benefit of said Indians. And the sum of seventy thousand and sixty-four dollars and forty-eight cents is hereby appropriated, out of any moneys in the Treasury not other- wise appropriated, to be paid to the Uintah and the White River tribes of Ute Indians, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, whenever a majority of the adult male Indians of said tribes shall have consented to the allotment of lands and the restoration of the unallotted lands within said reservation as herein provided." 32 Stat. 263­264. 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:28 PAGES OPINPGT 404 HAGEN v. UTAH Opinion of the Court the Tribes. The Act also provided that when the deadline for allotments passed, "all the unallotted lands within said reservation shall be restored to the public domain" and sub- ject to homesteading at $1.25 per acre. Ibid. The proceeds from the sale of lands restored to the public domain were to be used for the benefit of the Indians. A month after the passage of the 1902 Act, Congress di- rected the Secretary of the Interior to set apart sufficient land to serve the grazing needs of the Indians remaining on the reservation. J. Res. 31, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. (1902), 32 Stat. 744.2 The resolution clarified that $70,000 appro- priated by the 1902 Act was to be paid to the Indians "with- out awaiting their action upon the proposed allotment in sev- eralty of lands in that reservation and the restoration of the surplus lands to the public domain." Id., at 745. In January 1903, this Court held that Congress can unilat- erally alter reservation boundaries. Lone Wolf v. Hitch- cock, 187 U. S. 553, 567­568. On Mar. 3, 1903, Congress di- rected the Secretary to allot the Uintah lands unilaterally if the Indians did not give their consent by June 1 of that year, and deferred the opening of the unallotted lands "as provided by the [1902 Act]" until October 1, 1904. Act of Mar. 3, 1903, 2 The 1902 Joint Resolution provided in relevant part: "In addition to the allotments in severalty to the Uintah and White River Utes of the Uintah Indian Reservation in the State of Utah, the Secretary of the Interior shall, before any of said lands are opened to disposition under any public land law, select and set apart for the use in common of the Indians of that reservation such an amount of non-irrigable grazing lands therein at one or more places as will subserve the reasonable requirements of said Indians for the grazing of live stock. . . . . . "The item of seventy thousand and sixty-four dollars and forty-eight cents appropriated by the Act which is hereby supplemented and modified, to be paid to the Uintah and White River tribes of Ute Indians in satisfaction of certain claims named in said Act, shall be paid to the Indians entitled thereto without awaiting their action upon the proposed allotment in sev- eralty of lands in that reservation and the restoration of the surplus lands to the public domain." 32 Stat. 744­745. 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 399 (1994) 405 Opinion of the Court ch. 994, 32 Stat. 998.3 The 1903 Act also specified that the grazing lands specified in the 1902 Joint Resolution would be limited to 250,000 acres south of the Strawberry River. In 1904, Congress passed another statute that appropriated additional funds to "carry out the purposes" of the 1902 Act, and deferred the opening date "as provided by the [1902 and 1903 Acts]" until Mar. 10, 1905. Act of Apr. 21, 1904, ch. 1402, 33 Stat. 207.4 3 The 1903 Act provided in relevant part: "[Money is hereby appropriated to] enable the Secretary of the Interior to do the necessary surveying and otherwise carry out the purposes of so much of the Act of May twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and two, . . . as provides for the allotment of the . . . Uintah and White River Utes in Utah . . . : Provided, however, That the Secretary of the Interior shall forthwith send an inspector to obtain the consent of the Uintah and White River Ute Indians to an allotment of their lands as directed by the Act of May twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and two, and if their consent, as therein provided, can not be obtained by June first, nineteen hundred and three, then the Secretary of the Interior shall cause to be allotted to each of said Uintah and White River Ute Indians the quantity and character of land named and described in said Act: And provided further, That the grazing lands to be set apart for the use of the Uintah, White River Utes, and other Indians, as provided by public resolution numbered thirty-one, of June nineteenth, nineteen hundred and two, be confined to the lands south of the Strawberry River on said Uintah Reservation, and shall not exceed two hundred and fifty thousand acres: And provided further, That the time for opening the unallotted lands to public entry on said Uintah Reservation, as provided by the Act of May twenty-seventh, nineteen hun- dred and two, be, and the same is hereby, extended to October first, nine- teen hundred and four." 32 Stat. 997­998. 4 The 1904 Act provided in relevant part: "That the time for opening the unallotted lands to public entry on the Uintah Reservation, in Utah, as provided by the Acts of May twenty- seventh, nineteen hundred and two, and March third, nineteen hundred and three, be, and the same is hereby extended to March tenth, nineteen hundred and five, and five thousand dollars is hereby appropriated to en- able the Secretary of the Interior to do the necessary surveying, and oth- erwise carry out the purposes of so much of the Act of May twenty- seventh, nineteen hundred and two, . . . as provides for the allotment of the Indians of the Uintah and White River Utes in Utah." 33 Stat. 207­208. 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:28 PAGES OPINPGT 406 HAGEN v. UTAH Opinion of the Court In 1905, Congress again deferred the opening date, this time until September 1, 1905, unless the President were to establish an earlier date. Act of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat. 1069.5 The 1905 Act repealed the provision of the 1903 Act limiting the grazing lands to areas south of the Straw- berry River. The Act further provided: "[T]he manner of opening [reservation] lands for settle- ment and entry, and for disposing of the same, shall be as follows: That the said unallotted lands . . . shall be 5 The 1905 Act provided in relevant part: "That so much of the Act of March third, nineteen hundred and three, as provides that the grazing lands to be set apart for the use of the Uintah, White River Utes, and other Indians on the Uintah Reservation, as pro- vided by public resolution numbered thirty-one, of June nineteenth, nine- teen hundred and two, shall be confined to the lands south of the Straw- berry River, be, and the same is hereby, repealed. "That the time for opening to public entry the unallotted lands on the Uintah Reservation in Utah having been fixed by law as the tenth day of March, nineteen hundred and five, it is hereby provided that the time for opening said reservation shall be extended to the first of September, nine- teen hundred and five, unless the President shall determine that the same may be opened at an earlier date and that the manner of opening such lands for settlement and entry, and for disposing of the same, shall be as follows: That the said unallotted lands . . . shall be disposed of under the general provisions of the homestead and town-site laws of the United States, and shall be opened to settlement and entry by proclamation of the President, which proclamation shall prescribe the manner in which these lands may be settled upon, occupied, and entered by persons entitled to make entry thereof; and no person shall be permitted to settle upon, occupy, or enter any of said lands, except as prescribed in said proclama- tion, until after the expiration of sixty days from the time when the same are thereby opened to settlement and entry: . . . And provided further, That all lands opened to settlement and entry under this Act remaining undisposed of at the expiration of five years from the taking effect of this Act shall be sold and disposed of for cash, under rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, not more than six hundred and forty acres to any one person. The proceeds of the sale of such lands shall be applied as provided in the Act of Congress of May twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and two, and the Acts amendatory thereof and supple- mental thereto." 33 Stat. 1069­1070. 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 399 (1994) 407 Opinion of the Court disposed of under the general provisions of the home- stead and town-site laws of the United States, and shall be opened to settlement and entry by proclamation of the President, which proclamation shall prescribe the manner in which these lands may be settled upon, occu- pied, and entered by persons entitled to make entry thereof." Ibid. All lands remaining open but unsettled after five years were to be sold for cash, in parcels up to 640 acres. The "proceeds of the sale of such lands" were to be "applied as provided in the [1902 Act] and the Acts amendatory thereof and supple- mental thereto." Id., at 1070. The Government once again failed to obtain the consent of the Indians. On July 14, 1905, President Roosevelt issued the following Proclamation: "Whereas it was provided by the [1902 Act], among other things, that on October first, 1903, the unallotted lands in the Uintah Indian Reservation, in the State of Utah, `shall be restored to the public domain: Provided, That persons entering any of said lands under the home- stead laws shall pay therefor at the rate of [$1.25] per acre.' "And, whereas, the time for the opening of said unal- lotted lands was extended to October 1, 1904, by the [1903 Act], and was extended to March 10, 1905, by the [1904 Act], and was again extended to not later than Sep- tember 1, 1905, by the [1905 Act], which last named act provided, among other things: [`That the said unallotted lands . . . shall be disposed of under the general provi- sions of the homestead and townsite laws of the United States . . . .'] "Now, therefore, I, Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the power in me vested by said Acts of Congress, do hereby declare and make known that all the unallotted lands in said 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:28 PAGES OPINPGT 408 HAGEN v. UTAH Opinion of the Court reservation . . . will on and after the 28th day of August, 1905, in the manner hereinafter prescribed, and not otherwise, be opened to entry, settlement and disposi- tion under the general provisions of the homestead and townsite laws of the United States." 34 Stat. 3119­3120. The Proclamation went on to detail a lottery scheme for the allocation of the lands to settlers. II In 1989, petitioner was charged in Utah state court with distribution of a controlled substance. The offense occurred in the town of Myton, which was established within the origi- nal boundaries of the Uintah Indian Reservation when the reservation was opened to non-Indian settlement in 1905. Petitioner initially pleaded guilty, but subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The basis of the motion was that the Utah state courts lacked jurisdiction over peti- tioner because he was an Indian and the crime had been com- mitted in Indian country. The trial court denied the motion, finding that petitioner is not an Indian. The state appellate court reversed. It concluded that petitioner is an Indian, a determination that is not at issue in this Court. The court also held that Myton is in Indian country, relying on Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F. 2d 1087 (1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 U. S. 994 (1986), in which the Tenth Circuit held that the Uintah Indian Reserva- tion was not diminished when it was opened to settlement in 1905. Because Congress has not granted criminal ju- risdiction to the State of Utah to try crimes committed by Indians in Indian country, cf. Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U. S. 99, 103 (1993); Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U. S. 463, 471­474 (1979), the appellate court held that the state courts lacked jurisdiction over petitioner. The court accordingly vacated petitioner's conviction. 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 399 (1994) 409 Opinion of the Court The Utah Supreme Court reversed on the authority of State v. Perank, 858 P. 2d 927 (1992), in which the court had held (on the same day as the decision in petitioner's case) that the reservation had been diminished and that Myton was outside its boundaries, and thus that petitioner's offense was subject to state criminal jurisdiction. 858 P. 2d 925 (1992); see Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U. S. 463, 467 (1984) ("As a doctrinal matter, the States have jurisdiction over unallotted opened lands if the applicable surplus land Act freed that land of its reservation status and thereby diminished the res- ervation boundaries"). The court accordingly reinstated petitioner's conviction. We granted certiorari, 507 U. S. 1028 (1993), to resolve the direct conflict between these decisions of the Tenth Circuit and the Utah Supreme Court on the question whether the Uintah Reservation has been diminished. III We first address a threshold question: whether the State of Utah, which was a party to the Tenth Circuit proceedings, should be collaterally estopped from relitigating the reserva- tion boundaries. In Perank, the Utah Supreme Court noted that "neither Perank, the Department of Justice, nor the Tribe suggests that the Tenth Circuit's en banc decision in Ute Indian Tribe has res judicata effect in this case." 858 P. 2d, at 931. Because "[r]es judicata is an affirmative de- fense in both criminal and civil cases and therefore is waiva- ble," id., at 931, n. 3, the court went on to consider the merits of the State's claim. Petitioner's only recourse would have been to attack the judgment in Perank on the ground that the Utah Supreme Court failed to give effect sua sponte to the prior determina- tion in Ute Indian Tribe that the reservation had not been diminished. Although that issue is one of federal law, see Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 86 (1982), it was not presented in the petition for a writ of certiorari. It there- 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:28 PAGES OPINPGT 410 HAGEN v. UTAH Opinion of the Court fore is not properly before us. Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 535­536 (1992); see Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U. S. Philips Corp., 510 U. S. 27 (1993) (per cu- riam). Moreover, petitioner disavowed the collateral estop- pel argument at the petition stage, in response to a brief filed by the Ute Indian Tribe: "The question presented in the petition was whether the reservation had been diminished by acts of congress. [This Court's Rule 14.1(a)] does not appear to allow dif- ferent issues to be raised. The Ute Indian Tribe argues that the Supreme Court of the State of Utah should have reached a different decision in [Perank] based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel . . . . Regardless of the opinion held by the Ute Indian Tribe of the Perank decision, the decision has been made and is controlling in petitioner's case." Supplemental Brief for Peti- tioner 2 (filed Dec. 2, 1992) (emphasis added). Because we see no reason to consider an argument that peti- tioner not only failed to raise, but also expressly refused to rely upon in seeking a writ of certiorari, we turn to the merits. IV In Solem v. Bartlett, we recognized: "It is settled law that some surplus land Acts diminished reservations, see, e. g., Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U. S. 584 (1977); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U. S. 425 (1975), and other surplus land Acts did not, see, e. g., Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U. S. 481 (1973); Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U. S. 351 (1962). The effect of any given surplus land Act depends on the language of the Act and the circumstances underlying its passage." 465 U. S., at 469. In determining whether a reservation has been diminished, "[o]ur precedents in the area have established a fairly clean 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 399 (1994) 411 Opinion of the Court analytical structure," id., at 470, directing us to look to three factors. The most probative evidence of diminishment is, of course, the statutory language used to open the Indian lands. Ibid. We have also considered the historical context sur- rounding the passage of the surplus land Acts, although we have been careful to distinguish between evidence of the con- temporaneous understanding of the particular Act and mat- ters occurring subsequent to the Act's passage. Id., at 471. Finally, "[o]n a more pragmatic level, we have recognized that who actually moved onto opened reservation lands is also relevant to deciding whether a surplus land Act dimin- ished a reservation." Ibid. Throughout the inquiry, we re- solve any ambiguities in favor of the Indians, and we will not lightly find diminishment. Id., at 470, 472; see also South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U. S. 679, 687 (1993) (" `[S]tatutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit' " (quoting County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U. S. 251, 269 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted))). The Solicitor General, appearing as amicus in support of petitioner, argues that our cases establish a "clear-statement rule," pursuant to which a finding of diminishment would require both explicit language of cession or other language evidencing the surrender of tribal interests and an uncondi- tional commitment from Congress to compensate the Indi- ans. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 7­8. We disagree. First, although the statutory language must "establis[h] an express congressional purpose to diminish," Solem, 465 U. S., at 475, we have never required any particu- lar form of words before finding diminishment, see Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U. S. 584, 588, and n. 4 (1977). Sec- ond, we noted in Solem that a statutory expression of con- gressional intent to diminish, coupled with the provision of a sum certain payment, would establish a nearly conclusive presumption that the reservation had been diminished. 465 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:28 PAGES OPINPGT 412 HAGEN v. UTAH Opinion of the Court U. S., at 470­471. While the provision for definite payment can certainly provide additional evidence of diminishment, the lack of such a provision does not lead to the contrary conclusion. In fact, the statutes at issue in Rosebud, which we held to have effected a diminishment, did not provide for the payment of a sum certain to the Indians. See 430 U. S., at 596, and n. 18. We thus decline to abandon our traditional approach to diminishment cases, which requires us to exam- ine all the circumstances surrounding the opening of a reservation. A The operative language of the 1902 Act provided for alloca- tions of reservation land to Indians, and that "all the unallot- ted lands within said reservation shall be restored to the pub- lic domain." 32 Stat. 263 (emphasis added). The public domain was the land owned by the Government, mostly in the West, that was "available for sale, entry, and settlement under the homestead laws, or other disposition under the general body of land laws." E. Peffer, The Closing of the Public Domain 6 (1951). "[F]rom an early period in the his- tory of the government it [was] the practice of the President to order, from time to time, . . . parcels of land belonging to the United States to be reserved from sale and set apart for public uses." Grisar v. McDowell, 6 Wall. 363, 381 (1868). This power of reservation was exercised for various pur- poses, including Indian settlement, bird preservation, and military installations, "when it appeared that the public in- terest would be served by withdrawing or reserving parts of the public domain." United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459, 471 (1915). It follows that when lands so reserved were "restored" to the public domain-i. e., once again opened to sale or settle- ment-their previous public use was extinguished. See Sioux Tribe v. United States, 316 U. S. 317, 323 (1942) (Presi- dent ordered lands previously reserved for Indian use " `re- stored to the public domain[,] . . . the same being no longer 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 399 (1994) 413 Opinion of the Court needed for the purpose for which they were withdrawn from sale and settlement' "); United States v. Pelican, 232 U. S. 442, 445­446 (1914). Statutes of the period indicate that Congress considered Indian reservations as separate from the public domain. See, e. g., Act of June 25, 1910, § 6, 36 Stat. 857 (criminalizing forest fires started "upon the public domain, or upon any Indian reservation") (quoted in United States v. Alford, 274 U. S. 264, 266­267 (1927)). Likewise, in DeCoteau we emphasized the distinction between reserva- tion and public domain lands: "That the lands ceded in the other agreements were returned to the public domain, stripped of reservation status, can hardly be questioned . . . . The sponsors of the legislation stated repeatedly that the ratified agreements would return the ceded lands to the `pub- lic domain.' " 420 U. S., at 446 (emphasis added). In Solem, the Court held that an Act which authorized the Secretary of the Interior to " `sell and dispose of' " unallotted reservation lands merely opened the reservation to non- Indian settlement and did not diminish it. 465 U. S., at 472­ 474. Elsewhere in the same statute, Congress had granted the Indians permission to harvest timber on the opened lands " `as long as the lands remain part of the public domain.' " Id., at 475. We recognized that this reference to the public domain "support[ed]" the view that a reservation had been diminished, but that it was "hardly dispositive." Id., at 475. We noted that "even without diminishment, unallotted opened lands could be conceived of as being in the `public domain' inasmuch as they were available for settlement." Id., at 475, n. 17. The Act in Solem, however, did not "re- store" the lands to the public domain. More importantly, the reference to the public domain did not appear in the oper- ative language of the statute opening the reservation lands for settlement, which is the relevant point of reference for the diminishment inquiry. Our cases considering operative language of restoration have uniformly equated it with a con- gressional purpose to terminate reservation status. 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:28 PAGES OPINPGT 414 HAGEN v. UTAH Opinion of the Court In Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Peniten- tiary, 368 U. S. 351 (1962), for example, the question was whether the Colville Reservation, in the State of Washing- ton, had been diminished. The Court noted that an 1892 Act which " `vacated and restored to the public domain' " about one-half of the reservation lands had diminished the reserva- tion as to that half. Id., at 354. As to the other half, Con- gress in 1906 had provided for allotments to the Indians, fol- lowed by the sale of mineral lands and entry onto the surplus lands under the homestead laws. This Court held that the 1906 Act did not result in diminishment: "Nowhere in the 1906 Act is there to be found any language similar to that in the 1892 Act expressly vacating the South Half of the reser- vation and restoring that land to the public domain." Id., at 355. This Court subsequently characterized the 1892 Act at issue in Seymour as an example of Congress' using "clear language of express termination when that result is desired." Mattz, 412 U. S., at 504, n. 22. And in Rosebud, all nine Justices agreed that a statute which " `restored to the public domain' " portions of a reservation would result in diminish- ment. 430 U. S., at 589, and n. 5; id., at 618 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In light of our precedents, we hold that the restoration of unallotted reservation lands to the public domain evidences a congressional intent with respect to those lands inconsist- ent with the continuation of reservation status. Thus, the existence of such language in the operative section of a sur- plus land Act indicates that the Act diminished the reserva- tion. Indeed, we have found only one case in which a Fed- eral Court of Appeals decided that statutory restoration language did not terminate a reservation, Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F. 2d, at 1092, a conclusion the Tenth Circuit has since disavowed as "unexamined and unsupported." Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Yazzie, 909 F. 2d 1387, 1400, cert. denied, 498 U. S. 1012 (1990). 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 399 (1994) 415 Opinion of the Court Until the Ute Indian Tribe litigation in the Tenth Circuit, every court had decided that the unallotted lands were re- stored to the public domain pursuant to the terms of the 1902 Act, with the 1905 Act simply extending the time for opening and providing for a few details. Hanson v. United States, 153 F. 2d 162, 162­163 (CA10 1946); United States v. Boss, 160 F. 132, 133 (Utah 1906); Uintah and White River Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 139 Ct. Cl. 1, 21­23 (1957); Sowards v. Meagher, 108 P. 1112, 1114 (Utah 1910). Peti- tioner argues, however, that the 1905 Act changed the "man- ner" in which the lands were to be opened. That Act speci- fied that the homestead and townsite laws would apply, and so superseded the "restore to the public domain" language of the 1902 Act, language that was not repeated in the 1905 Act. We disagree, because the baseline intent to diminish the reservation expressed in the 1902 Act survived the pas- sage of the 1905 Act. Every congressional action subsequent to the 1902 Act re- ferred to that statute. The 1902 Joint Resolution provided an appropriation prior to the restoration of surplus reserva- tion lands to the public domain. 32 Stat. 744. The 1903 and 1904 Acts simply extended the deadline for opening the res- ervations in order to allow more time for surveying the lands, so that the "purposes" of the 1902 Act could be carried out. 32 Stat. 997; 33 Stat. 207. And the 1905 Act recog- nized that they were all tied together when it provided that the proceeds of the sale of the unallotted lands "shall be ap- plied as provided in the [1902 Act] and the Acts amendatory thereof and supplementary thereto." 33 Stat. 1070. The Congress that passed the 1905 Act clearly viewed the 1902 statute as the basic legislation upon which subsequent Acts were built. Furthermore, the structure of the statutes requires that the 1905 Act and the 1902 Act be read together. Whereas the 1905 Act provided for the disposition of unallotted lands, it was the 1902 Act that provided for allotments to the Indi- 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:28 PAGES OPINPGT 416 HAGEN v. UTAH Opinion of the Court ans. The 1902 Act also established the price for which the unallotted lands were to be sold, and what was to be done with the proceeds of the sales. The 1905 Act did not repeat these essential features of the opening, because they were already spelled out in the 1902 Act. The two statutes-as well as those that came in between-must therefore be read together. Finally, the general rule that repeals by implication are disfavored is especially strong in this case, because the 1905 Act expressly repealed the provision in the 1903 Act concern- ing the siting of the grazing lands; if Congress had meant to repeal any part of any other previous statute, it could easily have done so. Furthermore, the predicate for finding an im- plied repeal is not present in this case, because the opening provisions of the two statutes are not inconsistent: The 1902 Act also provided that the unallotted lands restored to the public domain could be sold pursuant to the homestead laws. Other surplus land Acts which we have held to have effected diminishment similarly provided for initial entry under the homestead and townsite laws. See Rosebud, supra, at 608; DeCoteau, 420 U. S., at 442. B Contemporary historical evidence supports our conclusion that Congress intended to diminish the Uintah Reservation. As we have noted, the plain language of the 1902 Act demon- strated the congressional purpose to diminish the Uintah Reservation. Under the 1902 Act, however, the consent of the Indians was required before the reservation could be di- minished; that consent was withheld by the Indians living on the reservation. After this Court's Lone Wolf decision in 1903, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior to proceed unilaterally. The Acting Commissioner for Indian Affairs in the Department of the Interior directed Indian Inspector James McLaughlin to travel to the Uintah Reser- vation to "endeavor to obtain [the Indians'] consent to the 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:28 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 399 (1994) 417 Opinion of the Court allotment of lands as provided in the law, and to the restora- tion of the surplus lands." Letter from A. C. Tonner to James McLaughlin (Apr. 27, 1903), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 159, 58th Cong., 3d Sess., 9 (1905). The Acting Commis- sioner noted, however, that the effect of the 1903 Act was that "if the [Indians] do not consent to the allotments by the first of June next the allotments are to be made notwith- standing, and the unallotted lands . . . are to be opened to entry" according to the terms of the 1902 Act. Id., at 8­9. Inspector McLaughlin explained the effect of these recent developments to the Indians living on the Reservation: " `By that decision of the Supreme Court, Congress has the legal right to legislate in regard to Indian lands, and Congress has enacted a law which requires you to take your allotments. . . . . . " `You say that [the Reservation boundary] line is very heavy and that the reservation is nailed down upon the border. That is very true as applying to the past many years and up to now, but congress has provided legisla- tion which will pull up the nails which hold down that line and after next year there will be no outside bound- ary line to this reservation.' " Minutes of Councils Held by James McLaughlin, U. S. Indian Inspector, with the Uintah and White River Ute Indians at Uintah Agency, Utah, from May 18 to May 23, 1903, excerpted in App. to Brief for Respondent 4a­5a (emphasis added). Inspector McLaughlin's picturesque phrase reflects the con- temporaneous understanding, by him conveyed to the Indi- ans, that the reservation would be diminished by operation of the 1902 and 1903 Acts notwithstanding the failure of the Indians to give their consent. The Secretary of the Interior informed Congress in Febru- ary 1904 that the necessary surveying could not be com- pleted before the date set for the opening, and requested 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:28 PAGES OPINPGT 418 HAGEN v. UTAH Opinion of the Court that the opening be delayed. Letter from E. A. Hitchcock to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs (Feb. 6, 1904), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 159, supra, at 17. In the 1904 Act, Congress accordingly extended the time for opening until March 10, 1905, and appropriated additional funds "to enable the Secretary of the Interior to do the nec- essary surveying" of the reservation lands. 33 Stat. 207. The Secretary of the Interior subsequently informed Con- gress that a further extension would be necessary because the surveying and allotments could not be completed during the winter. Letter from E. A. Hitchcock to the Chairman of the House Committee on Indian Affairs (Dec. 10, 1904), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 159, supra, at 21. The House of Representatives took up the matter on Janu- ary 21, 1905. The bill on which debate was held provided that "so much of said lands as will be under the provisions of said acts restored to the public domain shall be open to settlement and entry by proclamation of the President of the United States, which proclamation shall prescribe the man- ner in which these lands may be settled upon, occupied, and entered." H. R. 17474, quoted in 39 Cong. Rec. 1180 (1905). Representative Howell of Utah offered as an amendment "[t]hat for one year immediately following the restoration of said lands to the public domain said lands shall be subject to entry only under the homestead, town-site, and mining laws of the United States." Ibid. Significantly, Representative Howell offered his amendment as an addition to, not a re- placement for, the language in the bill that explicitly referred to the lands' restoration to the public domain. He explained: "In the pending bill these lands, when restored to the public domain, are subject to entry under the general land laws of the United States, coupled with such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe. In my humble judgment there should be some provision such as is embodied in my amendment, limiting the lands in the reservation to entry under the homestead, town-site, 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:29 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 399 (1994) 419 Opinion of the Court and mining laws alone for one year from the date of the opening. . . . "Congress should see to it that until such time as those lands easy of access, reclamation, and irrigation are set- tled by actual home makers the provisions of the home- stead law alone shall prevail. This policy is in accord with the dominant sentiment of the time, viz, that the public lands shall be reserved for actual homes for the people." Id., at 1182. Although the amendment was rejected in the House of Representatives, id., at 1186, the Senate substituted the cur- rent version of the 1905 Act, which is similar to the amend- ment offered by Representative Howell but omits the resto- ration language of the House version. Id., at 3522. In the hearings on the Senate bill, Senator Teller of Colorado had stated that "I am not going to agree to any entry of that land except under the homestead and town-site entries," because "I am not going to consent to any speculators getting public land if I can help it." Indian Appropriation Bill, 1906, Hear- ings before the Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Indian Affairs, 58th Cong., 3d Sess., 30 (1905). Thus, al- though we have no way of knowing for sure why the Senate decided to limit the "manner" of opening, it seems likely that Congress wanted to limit land speculation. That objective is not inconsistent with the restoration of the unallotted lands to the public domain: Once the lands became public, Congress could of course place limitations on their entry, sale, and settlement. The Proclamation whereby President Roosevelt actually opened the reservation to settlement makes clear that the 1905 Act did not repeal the restoration language of the 1902 Act. In that document, the President stated that the 1902 Act provided that the unallotted lands were to be restored to the public domain, that the 1903, 1904, and 1905 Acts ex- tended the time for the opening, and that those lands were 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:29 PAGES OPINPGT 420 HAGEN v. UTAH Opinion of the Court now opened for settlement under the homestead laws "by virtue of the power in [him] vested by said Acts of Con- gress." 34 Stat. 3120 (emphasis added). President Roose- velt thus clearly understood the 1905 Act to incorporate the 1902 Act, and specifically the restoration language. This "unambiguous, contemporaneous, statement, by the Nation's Chief Executive," Rosebud, 430 U. S., at 602, is clear evi- dence of the understanding at the time that the Uintah Res- ervation would be diminished by the opening of the unallot- ted lands to non-Indian settlement. The subsequent history is less illuminating than the con- temporaneous evidence. Since 1905, Congress has repeat- edly referred to the Uintah Reservation in both the past and present tenses, reinforcing our longstanding observation that "[t]he views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one." United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 348­349 (1963) (inter- nal quotation marks omitted). The District Court in the Ute Indian Tribe case extensively cataloged these congres- sional references, and we agree with that court's conclusion: "Not only are the references grossly inconsistent when con- sidered together, they . . . are merely passing references in text, not deliberate expressions of informal conclusions about congressional intent in 1905." 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1135 (Utah 1981). Because the textual and contemporaneous evidence of diminishment is clear, however, the confusion in the subse- quent legislative record does nothing to alter our conclusion that the Uintah Reservation was diminished. C Finally, our conclusion that the statutory language and his- tory indicate a congressional intent to diminish is not contro- verted by the subsequent demographics of the Uintah Valley area. We have recognized that "[w]hen an area is predomi- nately populated by non-Indians with only a few surviving pockets of Indian allotments, finding that the land remains 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:29 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 399 (1994) 421 Opinion of the Court Indian country seriously burdens the administration of state and local governments." Solem, 465 U. S., at 471­472, n. 12. Of the original 2 million acres reserved for Indian occupa- tion, approximately 400,000 were opened for non-Indian set- tlement in 1905. Almost all of the non-Indians live on the opened lands. The current population of the area is approxi- mately 85 percent non-Indian. 1990 Census of Population and Housing, Summary Population and Housing Characteris- tics: Utah, 1990 CPH­1­46, Table 17, p. 73. The population of the largest city in the area-Roosevelt City, named for the President who opened the reservation for settlement- is about 93 percent non-Indian. Id., Table 3, p. 13. The seat of Ute tribal government is in Fort Duchesne, which is situated on Indian trust lands. By contrast, we found it significant in Solem that the seat of tribal govern- ment was located on opened lands. 465 U. S., at 480. The State of Utah exercised jurisdiction over the opened lands from the time the reservation was opened until the Tenth Circuit's Ute Indian Tribe decision. That assumption of authority again stands in sharp contrast to the situation in Solem, where "tribal authorities and Bureau of Indian Af- fairs personnel took primary responsibility for policing . . . the opened lands during the years following [the opening in] 1908." 465 U. S., at 480. This "jurisdictional history," as well as the current population situation in the Uintah Valley, demonstrates a practical acknowledgment that the Reserva- tion was diminished; a contrary conclusion would seriously disrupt the justifiable expectations of the people living in the area. Cf. Rosebud, supra, at 604­605. V We conclude that the Uintah Indian Reservation has been diminished by Congress. Accordingly, the town of Myton, where petitioner committed a crime, is not in Indian country and the Utah courts properly exercised criminal jurisdiction 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:29 PAGES OPINPGT 422 HAGEN v. UTAH Blackmun, J., dissenting over him. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Utah Supreme Court. So ordered. Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Souter joins, dissenting. "Great nations, like great men, should keep their word," FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U. S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting), and we do not lightly find that Con- gress has broken its solemn promises to Indian tribes. The Court relies on a single, ambiguous phrase in an Act that never became effective, and which was deleted from the con- trolling statute, to conclude that Congress must have in- tended to diminish the Uintah Valley Reservation. I am un- able to find a clear expression of such intent in either the operative statute or the surrounding circumstances and am compelled to conclude that the original Uintah Valley Reser- vation boundaries remain intact. I A Two rules of construction govern our interpretation of In- dian surplus-land statutes: we must find clear and unequivo- cal evidence of congressional intent to reduce reservation boundaries, and ambiguities must be construed broadly in favor of the Indians.1 Congress alone has authority to di- 1 "The canons of construction applicable in Indian law are rooted in the unique trust relationship between the United States and the Indians," County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y., 470 U. S. 226, 247 (1985), and the Indians' unequal bargaining power when agreements were negotiated, see, e. g., Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U. S. 1, 28 (1886); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U. S. 1, 11 (1899). "[T]reaties were imposed upon [the Indians] and they had no choice but to consent. As a conse- quence, this Court often has held that treaties with the Indians must be interpreted as they would have understood them, . . . and any doubtful expressions in them should be resolved in the Indians' favor." Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U. S. 620, 631 (1970). Because Congress' au- 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:29 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 399 (1994) 423 Blackmun, J., dissenting vest Indians of their land, see United States v. Celestine, 215 U. S. 278, 285 (1909), and "Congress [must] clearly evince an `intent . . . to change . . . boundaries' before diminishment will be found." Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U. S. 463, 470 (1984), quoting Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U. S. 584, 615 (1977); see also DeCoteau v. District County Court for Tenth Judicial District, 420 U. S. 425, 444 (1975); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U. S. 481, 505 (1973). Absent a "plain and unambiguous" statement of congressional intent, United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co., 314 U. S. 339, 346 (1941), we find diminishment only "[w]hen events surrounding the [Act's] passage . . . un- equivocally reveal a widely held, contemporaneous under- standing" that such was Congress' purpose. Solem, 465 U. S., at 471 (emphasis added). In diminishment cases, the rule that "legal ambiguities are resolved to the benefit of the Indians" also must be given "the broadest possible scope." DeCoteau, 420 U. S., at 447; see also Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363, 367 (1930) ("Doubt- ful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the [Indians]"); United States v. Nice, 241 U. S. 591, 599 (1916); United States v. Celestine, 215 U. S., at 290. For more than 150 years,2 we have applied this canon in all areas of Indian law to construe thority to legislate unilaterally on behalf of the Indians derives from the presumption that Congress will act with benevolence, courts "have devel- oped canons of construction that treaties and other federal action should when possible be read as protecting Indian rights and in a manner favor- able to Indians." F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 221 (1982 ed.) (hereinafter Cohen). The principle "has been applied to the particu- lar issue of reservation termination to require that the intent of Congress to terminate be clearly expressed." Id., at 43. 2 The maxim that ambiguous provisions should be construed in favor of the Indians was first articulated by Justice McLean in Worcester v. Geor- gia, 6 Pet. 515, 582 (1832) (concurring opinion) ("The language used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their prejudice"); see also Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665, 675 (1912) ("This rule of construc- tion has been recognized, without exception, for more than a hundred years"). 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:29 PAGES OPINPGT 424 HAGEN v. UTAH Blackmun, J., dissenting congressional ambiguity or silence, in treaties, statutes, ex- ecutive orders, and agreements, to the Indians' benefit.3 Although the majority purports to apply these canons in principle, see ante, at 410­411, it ignores them in practice, resolving every ambiguity in the statutory language, legisla- tive history, and surrounding circumstances in favor of the State and imputing to Congress, where no clear evidence of congressional intent exists, an intent to diminish the Uintah Valley Reservation. B The special canons of construction are particularly rele- vant in the diminishment context because the allotment stat- utes are often ambiguous regarding their effect on tribal jurisdiction and reservation boundaries. During the 19th century, land was considered Indian country and thus subject to tribal jurisdiction "whenever the Indian title had not been extinguished." Bates v. Clark, 95 U. S. 204, 208 (1877). In passing the General Allotment Act of Feb. 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388, and related statutes, Congress no doubt assumed that tribal jurisdiction would terminate with the sale of Indian lands and that the reservations eventually would be abol- 3 The canon has been applied to treaties and statutes to preserve broad tribal water rights, see, e. g., Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U. S., at 631; Winters v. United States, 207 U. S. 564, 576 (1908), hunting and fishing rights, see, e. g., Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U. S. 658, 675 (1979); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U. S. 194, 199­200 (1975); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U. S. 404, 406, n. 2, 413 (1968); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U. S. 681, 684­685 (1942); Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U. S. 78, 89 (1918), and other land rights, see, e. g., County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Na- tion of N. Y., 470 U. S., at 247­248; United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co., 314 U. S. 339, 354 (1941); Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 396 (1902); and to protect tribes from state taxation authority, see, e. g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U. S. 373, 392 (1976); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164, 174 (1973); Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U. S. 1, 6­7 (1956); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363, 366­367 (1930); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S., at 675; The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737, 760 (1867). 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:29 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 399 (1994) 425 Blackmun, J., dissenting ished. See Solem, 465 U. S., at 468. The General Allot- ment Act itself did not terminate the reservation system, however, but was intended to assimilate 4 the Indians by transforming them into agrarians and opening their lands to non-Indians. See Mattz, 412 U. S., at 496. After this goal of the allotment policies proved to be a disastrous failure,5 Congress reversed course with the passage of the Indian Re- organization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 984, as amended, 25 U. S. C. § 461 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. IV), which allowed surplus- opened Indian lands to be restored to tribal ownership. Fi- nally, in 1948 Congress resolved the ensuing jurisdictional conflicts by extending tribal jurisdiction to encompass lands owned by non-Indians within reservation boundaries. See Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 757 (codified as 18 U. S. C. § 1151 (defining "Indian country" as including "all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government")).6 Reservation boundaries, 4 "The theory of assimilation was used to justify the [allotment] legisla- tion as beneficial to Indians. Proponents of assimilation policies main- tained that if Indians adopted the habits of civilized life they would need less land, and the surplus would be available for white settlers. The tak- ing of these lands was justified as necessary for the progress of civilization as a whole." Cohen 128. 5 The 138 million acres held exclusively by Indians in 1887 when the General Allotment Act was passed had been reduced to 52 million acres by 1934. See 2 F. Prucha, The Great Father 896 (1984). John Collier testified before Congress that nearly half of the lands remaining in Indian hands were desert or semidesert, and that 100,000 Indians were "totally landless as a result of allotment." Hearings on H. R. 7902 before the House Committee on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 17 (1934); see also D. Otis, The Dawes Act and the Allotment of Indian Lands 124­155 (Prucha ed. 1973) (discussing results of the allotments by 1900). 6 Congress' extension of tribal jurisdiction to reservation lands owned by non-Indians served pragmatic ends. "[W]here the existence or non- existence of an Indian reservation, and therefore the existence or non- existence of federal jurisdiction, depends upon the ownership of particular parcels of land, law enforcement officers operating in the area will find it necessary to search tract books in order to determine whether criminal jurisdiction over each particular offense . . . is in the State or Federal 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:29 PAGES OPINPGT 426 HAGEN v. UTAH Blackmun, J., dissenting rather than Indian title, thus became the measure of tribal jurisdiction. As a result of the patina history has placed on the allot- ment Acts, the Court is presented with questions that their architects could not have foreseen. It resolves the resulting statutory ambiguities by requiring clear evidence of specific congressional intent to diminish a reservation based on the language and circumstances of each individual land Act. See Solem, 465 U. S., at 469. Accordingly, statutory lan- guage alone of sale and settlement to non-Indians is insuffi- cient to establish diminishment. "The mere fact that a res- ervation has been opened to settlement does not necessarily mean that the opened area has lost its reservation status." Rosebud, 430 U. S., at 586­587; see also DeCoteau, 420 U. S., at 444 ("[R]eservation status may survive the mere opening of a reservation to settlement"). "[S]ome surplus land Acts diminished reservations, . . . and other surplus land Acts did not," Solem, 465 U. S., at 469, and we have refused to find diminishment based on language of opening or sale absent additional unequivocal evidence of a congressional intent to reduce reservation boundaries or divest all Indian interests. Thus, in Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Peniten- tiary, 368 U. S. 351, 355 (1962), the Court found no diminish- ment under a statute providing for the settlement and entry of surplus lands under the homestead laws, and in Mattz, 412 U. S., at 495, the Court concluded that a statute opening the reservation " `subject to settlement, entry, and purchase under the laws of the United States granting homestead rights' " did "not, alone, recite or even suggest that Congress intended thereby to terminate the . . . Reservation," id., at 497. Most recently, in Solem, 465 U. S., at 472, we unani- mously agreed that a statute authorizing the Secretary of Government. Such an impractical pattern of checkerboard jurisdiction was avoided by the plain language of § 1151." Seymour v. Superintend- ent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U. S. 351, 358 (1962) (footnote omitted). 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:29 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 399 (1994) 427 Blackmun, J., dissenting the Interior to " `sell and dispose' " of surplus Indian lands did not diminish the reservation. In contrast, the only two cases in which this Court pre- viously has found diminishment involved statutes and under- lying tribal agreements to " `cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the United States all [the Indians'] claim, right, title, and interest' " in unallotted lands, DeCoteau, 420 U. S., at 439, n. 22, or to " `cede, surrender, grant, and convey to the United States all [the Indians'] claim, right, title, and interest' " in a defined portion of the reservation, Rosebud, 430 U. S., at 591, n. 8. The Court held that in the presence of statutory lan- guage "precisely suited" to diminishment, id., at 597, sup- ported by the express consent of the tribes, "the intent of all parties to effect a clear conveyance of all unallotted lands was evident." DeCoteau, 420 U. S., at 436, n. 16.7 I need hardly add that no such language or underlying Indian con- sent accompanies the statute at issue in this case. II A The majority opinion relies almost exclusively on the fact that the Act of May 27, 1902, 32 Stat. 263, "restored [the unallotted lands] to the public domain" to conclude that the Uintah Valley Reservation was diminished. I do not agree that this ambiguous phrase can carry the weight of evincing a clear congressional purpose. We never authoritatively have defined the public domain, and the phrase "has no offi- cial definition. In its most general application, a public do- main is meant to include all the land owned by a govern- ment-any government, anywhere." E. Peffer, The Closing 7 Other statutes have used express language of geographical termina- tion. See 15 Stat. 221 ("the Smith River reservation is hereby discon- tinued") and 33 Stat. 218 ("the reservation lines . . . are hereby, abolished"). 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:29 PAGES OPINPGT 428 HAGEN v. UTAH Blackmun, J., dissenting of the Public Domain 5 (1951) (footnote omitted).8 Most commonly, the public domain and public lands "have been defined as those lands subject to sale or other disposal under the general land laws." Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U. S. 193, 206 (1987), quoting E. Baynard, Public Land Law and Procedure § 1.1, p. 2 (1986); see also Kindred v. Union Pacific R. Co., 225 U. S. 582, 596 (1912) (the term "public lands" ordinarily was "used to designate such lands as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws"); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Harris, 215 U. S. 386, 388 (1910); Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U. S. 761, 763 (1876) ("The words `pub- lic lands' are habitually used . . . to describe such as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws"). Nothing in our precedents stating that lands reserved from the public domain were "reserved from sale," Grisar v. McDowell, 6 Wall. 363, 381 (1868), or "withdrawn from sale and settlement," Sioux Tribe v. United States, 316 U. S. 317, 323 (1942) (internal quotation marks omitted), however, demonstrates that restoration of those lands to the public domain was "inconsistent" with continued reservation sta- tus, ante, at 416. Under 19th-century Indian-land policies, non-Indians could not purchase, and generally could not enter, lands reserved for exclusive use by Indian tribes. In- dian reservations obviously were not part of the public do- main to the extent that they were reserved from non-Indian purchase. The opening of these lands under the allotment Acts, on the other hand, necessarily restored all such lands to the public domain, in the sense that the lands were made 8 Although the phrase "public domain" appears infrequently in our prec- edents, this Court has used it interchangeably with references to "public land[s]." See, e. g., United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459, 468 (1915). Black's Law Dictionary 1229 (6th ed. 1990) defines the public do- main as "[l]and and water in possession of and owned by the United States and the states individually . . . . See also Public Lands." See Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U. S. 531, 549, n. 15 (1987) ("reject[ing] the assertion that the phrase `public lands,' in and of itself, has a precise mean- ing, without reference to a definitional section or its context in a statute"). 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:29 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 399 (1994) 429 Blackmun, J., dissenting available for entry and sale. Restoration of lands to the public domain thus establishes only that the lands were opened to access by non-Indians and to settlement and pur- chase, a condition "completely consistent with continued res- ervation status." Mattz, 412 U. S., at 497. In our most recent diminishment case, we unanimously re- jected the argument adopted by the majority here-that "Congress would refer to opened lands as being part of the public domain only if the lands had lost all vestiges of reser- vation status." Solem, 465 U. S., at 475. Instead, we ob- served that "even without diminishment, unallotted opened lands could be conceived of as being in the `public domain' inasmuch as they were available for settlement." Id., at 475, n. 17; see also Whether Surplus Lands in Uintah and Ouray Reservation are Indian Lands, 2 Op. Sol. 1205 (1943) ("[R]estored to the public domain" is "only a method of indi- cating that the lands are to be subject to disposition under the public land laws"). Solem concerned an allotment stat- ute that referred to opened lands as "part of the public do- main," 465 U. S., at 475, and as "within the respective reser- vations thus diminished," id., at 474 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court refused to infer diminishment from this language, however, finding "considerable doubt as to what Congress meant in using these phrases." Id., at 475, n. 17. We concluded that when balanced against the applicable statute's stated goal of opening the reservation for sale to non-Indians, "these two phrases cannot carry the burden of establishing an express congressional purpose to diminish." Id., at 475. The majority's focus on the fact that the public domain language in Solem was not in the operative portion of the statute, see ante, at 413, ignores the Solem Court's addi- tional conclusion that the public domain is an ambiguous con- cept that is not incompatible with reservation status. Fur- thermore, the fact that the public domain language in Solem was not operative and did not use the word "restored" should 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:29 PAGES OPINPGT 430 HAGEN v. UTAH Blackmun, J., dissenting be irrelevant under the majority's own analysis, since the character of the lands as "part of the public domain" would be "inconsistent" with their continued reservation status. Ante, at 413, 416. Under the majority's present interpreta- tion, the opened lands could not have been both part of the public domain and part of the reservation. Solem, however, concluded precisely the opposite.9 In light of this Court's unanimous reasoning in Solem and our common interpretation of the public domain as lands "subject to sale . . . under general laws," Kindred, 225 U. S., at 596, therefore, I cannot conclude that the isolated phrase "restored to the public domain" is an "[e]xplicit reference to cession or other language evidencing the present and total surrender of all tribal interests," Solem, 465 U. S., at 470. This language bears no relation to the "plain and unambigu- ous" language that our precedents require or that we found controlling in DeCoteau and Rosebud. Restoration to the public domain simply allowed Indian lands to be sold, some- thing we repeatedly have said is never sufficient to establish an intent to diminish. B Although the Court relies on the negotiation history of the 1902 Act and that of the Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 994, 32 Stat. 998, to support its conclusion, nothing in the negotiations with the Ute Indian Tribe "unequivocally reveal[s] a widely held, contemporaneous understanding" that the Uintah Res- 9 The Court never before has held that an isolated reference to the public domain is sufficient to support a finding of diminishment. In every case relied upon by the majority for this contention, the relevant public domain language was accompanied by express additional language demonstrating such intent. See DeCoteau, 420 U. S., at 446 ("returned to the public do- main, stripped of reservation status") (emphasis added). Three of the cases cited by the majority, in fact, discuss the same statute, 27 Stat. 62. See Seymour, 368 U. S., at 354 (" `vacated and restored to the public do- main' ") (emphasis added); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U. S. 481, 504, n. 22 (1973) (same); United States v. Pelican, 232 U. S. 442, 445 (1914) (same). 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:29 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 399 (1994) 431 Blackmun, J., dissenting ervation boundaries would be diminished. Solem, 465 U. S., at 471. The ever-present Inspector James McLaughlin, who negotiated the Rosebud and DeCoteau agreements that this Court found to contain express language of disestablishment, used no comparable language here.10 Instead, McLaughlin spoke largely in terms of "opening" the reservation to use by non-Indians.11 The Indians similarly responded primarily in terms of "opening" and opposed the proposed sale.12 The Court isolates a single comment by McLaughlin from the six days of negotiations to argue that diminishment was understood. But McLaughlin's "picturesque" state- ment that " `there will be no outside boundary line to this 10 In negotiating the 1901 Agreement, for example, McLaughlin ex- plained to the Rosebud Sioux Indians that " `[t]he cession of Gregory County' by ratification of the Agreement `will leave your reservation a compact, and almost square tract . . . about the size and area of Pine Ridge Reservation.' " Rosebud, 430 U. S., at 591­592. 11 See, e. g., Minutes of Councils Held by Inspector James McLaughlin, U. S. Indian Inspector, with the Uintah and White River Ute Indians, at Uintah Agency, Utah, from May 18 to May 23, 1903, excerpted in App. to Brief for Duchesne County, Utah, as Amicus Curiae 333a, 336a (herein- after Minutes) ("After you have taken your allotments the remaining land is to be opened for settlement"), id., at 342a ("The surplus lands will be opened to settlement"), id., at 354a ("As certainly as the sun rises tomor- row [your reservation] is to be opened"), id., at 358a ("[I]t is not for you to say whether your reservation is to be opened or not"), id., at 359a ("Do not lose sight of the fact that the reservation is to be opened"), id., at 363a ("The reservation will certainly be opened"). 12 See, e. g., id., at 339a ("When they put us on the reservation . . . they were not to open it"), id., at 340a ("The president made this reservation here for the Indians and it ought not to be opened up"), id., at 343a ("I don't want you to talk to us about opening our reservation. . . . We don't want this reservation opened, and we do not want White people coming in among us"), id., at 344a ("[W]e do not want this reservation thrown open"), ibid. ("[T]hey told us that this land would be ours always and that it would never be opened"), id., at 346a ("We are not going to talk about opening our reservation"), ibid. ("[W]e do not want to have the reservation thrown open"), id., at 351a ("I am on this reservation, and I do not want this land thrown open"), id., at 357a ("[T]he Indians do not want the reser- vation opened"). 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:29 PAGES OPINPGT 432 HAGEN v. UTAH Blackmun, J., dissenting reservation,' " ante, at 417, cannot be understood as a state- ment that the reservation itself was being abolished, since the Uintah Valley Reservation unquestionably survived the opening. McLaughlin's discussion, which went on to explain that each Indian "will have a boundary to your individual holdings," Minutes 368a, is more readily understood as a ref- erence to a change in title to the reservation lands, which clearly would have occurred under the Acts, or to the fact that the lands within the reservation boundary would be open to entry by non-Indians. McLaughlin's statements immediately following this pas- sage strongly suggest that some Indian interests survived the opening. In response to Indian concerns regarding lift- ing of the reservation line, McLaughlin stated: "You fear that you are going to be confined to the tract of land allotted. That is not so, and I will explain a little more clearly. . . . Your Agency will be continued just the same as now; the Agent will have full jurisdic- tion just the same as now, to protect your interests." Id., at 368a­369a. Elsewhere, McLaughlin confirmed this statement: "My friends, when you take your allotment you are deprived of no privileges you have at the present time." Id., at 365a. Although the discussions regarding the allotments conced- edly are subject to varying interpretations, none of them provides the type of unequivocal evidence of an intent to diminish boundaries or abolish all Indian interests that we require where statutory intent to diminish the reservation is not express. On their face, the negotiations establish that the 1902 Act would have done "no more than open the way for non-Indian settlers to own land on the reservation." Sey- mour, 368 U. S., at 356. Moreover, the record contains no evidence whatsoever of the Indians' contemporaneous under- standing regarding the Act of Mar. 3, 1905, 33 Stat. 1069, which is the operative Act in this case. 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:29 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 399 (1994) 433 Blackmun, J., dissenting What the negotiations do show is that the Indians over- whelmingly opposed the allotments. After six days of meet- ings between McLaughlin and the Ute Tribe, only 82 of the 280 adult male Utes agreed to sign the allotment agreement, see Letter of May 30, 1903, from McLaughlin to the Secre- tary of the Interior, reprinted in H. Doc. No. 33, 58th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1903), and McLaughlin reported that the Ute Indians were "unanimously opposed to the opening of their reservation." Id., at 7. Although after Lone Wolf v. Hitch- cock, 187 U. S. 553 (1903), Congress unquestionably had au- thority to terminate reservations unilaterally, we relied heavily on the presence of tribal consent in Rosebud and De- Coteau to find a contemporaneous intent to diminish. In Solem, by contrast, we held that the surrounding circum- stances "fail[ed] to establish a clear congressional purpose to diminish the reservation" because the 1908 Act there "did not begin with an agreement between the United States and the Indian Tribes." 465 U. S., at 476. To the extent that the absence of formal tribal consent counseled against a find- ing of diminishment in Solem, therefore, the Ute Indians' persistent withholding of consent requires a similar conclu- sion here. III A Even if the 1902 Act's public domain language were ex- press language of diminishment, I would conclude that the Uintah Valley Reservation was not diminished because that provision did not remain operative in the 1905 Act. It was this latter Act that actually opened the Uintah Valley Reser- vation to sale and settlement, and that Act's language on its face does not support a finding of diminishment. The Act provided in relevant part: "That the time for opening to public entry the unallot- ted lands on the Uintah Reservation in Utah having been fixed by law . . . it is hereby provided that the time 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:29 PAGES OPINPGT 434 HAGEN v. UTAH Blackmun, J., dissenting for opening said reservation shall be extended . . . and that the manner of opening such lands for settlement and entry, and for disposing of the same, shall be as follows: That the said unallotted lands . . . shall be dis- posed of under the general provisions of the homestead and town-site laws of the United States and shall be opened to settlement and entry. . . . And provided fur- ther, That . . . [t]he proceeds of the sale of such lands shall be applied as provided in the Act of Congress of May twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and two, and the Acts amendatory thereof and supplemental thereto." 33 Stat. 1069­1070 (emphasis added in part). This language, which speaks only of opening the lands for entry and settlement, is indistinguishable from that which we previously have concluded "cannot be interpreted to mean that the reservation was to be terminated." Mattz, 412 U. S., at 504; see also Solem, 465 U. S., at 473; and Sey- mour, 368 U. S., at 356. Neither the Court nor the parties dispute this conclusion. Nor did the 1905 Act preserve the 1902 Act's public domain provision. In contrast to the Act of Apr. 21, 1904, 33 Stat. 207, the 1905 Act did not open the lands "as provided by" the 1902 Act, ibid., nor was it passed expressly to "carry out the purposes of" the 1902 Act, as were both the 1903 and 1904 Acts. See 32 Stat. 997 and 33 Stat. 207. On its face, the 1905 Act preserved only one portion of the earlier statute- that portion regarding payment of the proceeds from the un- allotted land sales. Other provisions of the 1902 Act un- questionably were superseded, since the 1905 Act restricted settlement of the opened lands to that under "the general provisions of the homestead and town-site laws," 33 Stat. 1069, rather than under the general laws as provided by the 1902 Act. Thus, the plain language of the 1905 Act, which actually opened the reservation, did not restore the unallot- 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:29 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 399 (1994) 435 Blackmun, J., dissenting ted lands to the public domain, but simply opened the lands for settlement. Nothing in this case suggests that the 1902 Act established a baseline intent to diminish the reservation like that the Court confronted in Rosebud. In that case, an original stat- ute and agreement with the Indians to "cede, surrender, grant, and convey" all their interests in designated lands un- equivocally demonstrated a collective intent to diminish the Great Sioux Reservation. See 430 U. S., at 591, n. 8. Both the legislative history of two subsequent allotment statutes and the presence of majority tribal consent to those land al- lotments established that this original intent to diminish was preserved. All parties agreed that the later statutes "must have diminished [the] reservation if the previous Act did." See Solem, 465 U. S., at 473, n. 15. By contrast, the 1902 Act contains no equivalent language of diminishment, and none of the Acts at issue here were supported by Indian consent. Prior congressional attempts to open the Uintah Valley Reservation demonstrate that the requirement of the "consent thereto of the majority of the adult male Indians of the Uintah and the White River tribes" was central to the 1902 Act. 32 Stat. 263. In 1894, 1896, 1898, and 1902, Congress enacted statutes requiring Indian consent to open the Uintah Valley Reservation, but none of these Acts became effective because that consent was not forthcoming.13 After the passage of the 1903 Act and the 13 The Indian Appropriations Act of Aug. 15, 1894, ch. 290, § 20, 28 Stat. 337, authorized a commission to allot the Uncompahgre Reservation uni- laterally, but required that the same commission "negotiate and treat" with the Uintah Valley Reservation Indians for the relinquishment of their lands, "and if possible, procure [their] consent" to such allotments. See § 22, ibid. A House Report explained that in contrast to the Uncompah- gre Indians, who had "no title to the lands they occupy" and occupied them only temporarily, the Uintah Indians were "the owners of the lands within the reservation, because [the enabling Act] . . . provided that the lands within the Uintah Reservation should be `set apart for the permanent 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:29 PAGES OPINPGT 436 HAGEN v. UTAH Blackmun, J., dissenting decision in Lone Wolf, Congress dispatched Inspector McLaughlin to negotiate the allotments with the Tribe. Throughout this period, the Ute Tribe resisted the allot- ments, twice sending delegations to Washington to voice their opposition. See Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1113, 1125 (Utah 1981). When Congress finally opened the Uintah Reservation to non-Indian settlement in 1905, it removed the public domain language from the open- ing statute and severely restricted non-Indian access to the opened lands. Even if the 1902 Act contained express lan- guage of termination, then, the facts of this case would much more closely mirror those in Mattz, 412 U. S., at 503­504, where Congress ultimately abandoned its prior attempts to "abolish" the reservation in favor of simply opening the lands to entry and settlement. Concededly, nothing in the 1905 Act expressly repealed the 1902 Act's public domain language, and the 1905 Act could settlement and exclusive occupation of the Indians.' " H. R. Rep. No. 660, 53d Cong., 2d Sess., 1, 2­3 (1894), quoting Act of May 5, 1864, ch. 77, 13 Stat. 63. In order to allot the Uintah Reservation lands, therefore, it was "first necessary to obtain the consent of the Indians residing thereon." H. R. Rep. No. 660, at 3. The Act of June 10, 1896, ch. 398, 29 Stat. 341­ 342, and the Act of June 4, 1898, ch. 376, 30 Stat. 429, also conditioned opening of the reservation on Indian consent. See Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1111­1114 (Utah 1981) (discussing pre-1902 ef- forts to open the Uintah Reservation). Congress rebuffed all subsequent attempts to allot the reservation uni- laterally, see Hearings before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, S. Doc. No. 212, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., 111 (1902) (proposal of Rep. Sutherland of Utah), or to sever large portions of the reservation, see S. 145, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. (1902), reproduced in S. Doc. No. 212, at 3­4 (proposal of Sen. Rawlins of Utah). In hearings regarding the reservation in 1902, Indian Affairs Commissioner Jones testified: "There is a sort of feeling among the ignorant Indians that they do not want to lose any of their land. That is all there is to it; and I think before you can get them to agree . . . you have got to use some arbitrary means to open the land." Id., at 5. Congress did not heed this advice, however, but again required the Ute Tribe's consent in the 1902 Act. 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:29 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 399 (1994) 437 Blackmun, J., dissenting be construed as either preserving that provision or replacing it. Ordinarily under these circumstances, the canon that re- peals by implication are disfavored might require us to con- strue the later Act's silence as consistent with the earlier statute. See ante, at 416. The Court's invocation of this canon here, however, "fails to appreciate . . . that the stand- ard principles of statutory construction do not have their usual force in cases involving Indian law." Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U. S. 759, 766 (1985). In Blackfeet Tribe, the Court refused to rely on the rule against repeals by implication under circumstances analo- gous to those presented here. That case involved the ques- tion whether a 1924 provision authorizing States to tax tribal mineral royalties remained in force under a 1938 statute which was silent on the taxation question but which repealed all prior inconsistent provisions. The State argued that be- cause the 1938 statute neither expressly repealed the earlier taxation provision nor was inconsistent with it, the rule against repeals by implication required a finding that the State's taxation power remained intact. The Court rejected this argument as, among other things, inconsistent with two fundamental canons of Indian law: that a State may tax Indi- ans only when Congress has clearly expressed such an intent, and that "statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit." Ibid. Cf. Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363, 366­ 367 (1930); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665, 675 (1912). A similar construction is required here. The 1905 Act does not purport to fulfill the "purposes" of the 1902 Act nor to preserve its public domain language; the Act instead sim- ply opens the lands for settlement under the homestead and townsite laws. Under these circumstances, both the re- quirements that congressional intent must be explicit and that ambiguous provisions must be construed in favor of the Indians compel a resolution in favor of petitioner Hagen. Although a "canon of construction is not a license to disre- 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:29 PAGES OPINPGT 438 HAGEN v. UTAH Blackmun, J., dissenting gard clear expressions of tribal and congressional intent," DeCoteau, 420 U. S., at 447, no such clear expression is evident here. B The legislative history of the 1905 Act supports the conclu- sion that Congress materially altered the operative language in the 1902 Act by deleting the public domain provision. Like the 1902 Act, the House version of the 1905 bill, H. R. 17474, provided "[t]hat so much of said lands as will be under the provisions of said acts restored to the public domain shall be open to settlement and entry" under the general land laws. 39 Cong. Rec. 1180 (1905) (emphasis added). Rep- resentative Howell of Utah, in a proposed amendment that was not ultimately adopted, sought to limit non-Indian entry under this bill "to entry only under the homestead, town-site, and mining laws of the United States." Ibid. Howell's pro- posal, however, would have referred to the public domain in two places: "so much of said lands as will be under the provisions of said acts restored to the public domain shall be open to settlement and entry by proclamation of the President. . . . And further provided, That for one year immediately following the restoration of said lands to the public domain said lands shall be subject to entry only under the homestead, town-site, and mining laws of the United States." Ibid. (emphasis added in part). Senate bills later introduced by Senator Smoot of Utah, S. 6867 and S. 6868, 58th Cong., 3d Sess. (1905) (which ultimately were adopted in relevant part as the 1905 Act), also limited the opening to entry under the homestead and townsite laws but struck the House bill's public domain language. In its place, S. bill 6867 stated "[t]hat the time for opening to public entry the unallot- ted lands having been fixed by law . . . it is hereby pro- vided that the manner of opening such lands for settle- 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:29 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 399 (1994) 439 Blackmun, J., dissenting ment and entry, and for disposing of the same shall be as follows: That the said unallotted lands . . . shall be disposed of under the general provisions of the home- stead and town site laws of the United States" (empha- sis added). No subsequent attempt was made to reintroduce the public domain language into the Senate bills. When the House and Senate bills were submitted to the Conference Committee, the Committee again struck the House version containing the public domain language and replaced it with the Senate bill. See 39 Cong. Rec. 3919 (1905). Congress adopted this conference bill as the 1905 Act. The legislative history thus demonstrates that Congress both removed the public domain language from the 1905 Act and restricted entry to the homestead and townsite laws. Although the Court attempts to dismiss the altered language of the 1905 Act as evidence that "Congress wanted to limit land speculation," ante, at 419, this reasoning explains only the presence of the homestead and townsite limitation; it does not explain Congress' simultaneous deletion of the public domain language. We do not know why this latter change was made. Possibly Congress thought the language had no substantive meaning at all; possibly the deletion was a response to the Indians' continued withholding of consent, or it is possible that opening lands under the homestead and townsite laws was incompatible with their restoration to the public domain and thus to sale "under general laws." See Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U. S., at 763. We do know, however, that we must construe doubt regarding Congress' intent to the Indians' benefit when we are left, as we are here, without the "clear statement of congressional intent to alter reserva- tion boundaries," necessary for a finding of diminishment. Solem, 465 U. S., at 478. President Theodore Roosevelt's Proclamation shed no com- peting light on Congress' intent, but simply summarized the language of the allotment statutes. The operative portion 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:29 PAGES OPINPGT 440 HAGEN v. UTAH Blackmun, J., dissenting of the Proclamation declared that "all the unallotted lands" would "in the manner hereinafter prescribed, and not other- wise, be opened to entry, settlement and disposition under the general provisions of the homestead and townsite laws." 34 Stat. 3120. Thus, the crucial portion of the Proclamation under which the lands actually were opened restricted the opening to the terms of the 1905 Act. Furthermore, all other contemporaneous Presidential Proclamations regard- ing the reservation universally referred to the 1905 Act rather than the 1902 Act as the opening authority. See Presidential Proclamation of July 14, 1905, 34 Stat. 3116 (Uintah forest reserve); Proclamation of Aug. 3, 1905, 34 Stat. 3141 (Uintah reservoir and agricultural lands); Procla- mation of Aug. 14, 1905, 34 Stat. 3143 (townsites); Proclama- tion of Aug. 14, 1905, 34 Stat. 3143­3144 (reservoir lands). C Although contemporary demographics and the historical exercise of jurisdiction may provide "one additional clue as to what Congress expected" in opening reservation lands, Solem, 465 U. S., at 472, in that case, we unanimously agreed: "There are, of course, limits to how far we will go to decipher Congress' intention in any particular surplus land Act. When both an Act and its legislative history fail to provide substantial and compelling evidence of a congressional intention to diminish Indian lands, we are bound by our traditional solicitude for the Indian tribes to rule that diminishment did not take place and that the old reservation boundaries survived the open- ing. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U. S., at 505; Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U. S. 351 (1962)." 465 U. S., at 472 (emphasis added). Absent other plain and unambiguous evidence of a congres- sional intent, we never have relied upon contemporary demo- 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:29 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 399 (1994) 441 Blackmun, J., dissenting graphic or jurisdictional considerations to find diminishment. Cf. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U. S. 584 (1977). While these factors may support a finding of diminishment where congressional intent already is clear, therefore, the Court properly does not contend that they may be control- ling where Congress' purpose is ambiguous. Aside from their tangential relation to historical congres- sional intent, there are practical reasons why we are unwill- ing to rely heavily on such criteria. The history of the west- ern United States has been characterized, in part, by state attempts to exert jurisdiction over Indian lands. Cf. United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 384 (1886) ("[The Indians] owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest ene- mies"). And the exercise of state jurisdiction here has not been uncontested. The Constitution of the Ute Indian Tribe, which was approved by the Secretary of the Interior in 1937, defines the Tribe's jurisdiction as extending "to the territory within the original confines of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation," quoted in Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F. Supp., at 1075. See also Ute Law and Order Code § 1­2­2 (1975), set forth in Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F. Supp., at 1077, n. 8. More than two decades ago, amicus Roosevelt City agreed to the limited exercise of tribal jurisdiction within its city limits. See Memorandum of Agreement between Roo- sevelt City and the Ute Tribe, Jan. 11, 1972, cited in Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F. Supp., at 1077, n. 8. Federal agencies also have provided services to Indians residing in the dis- puted areas for many years. In fact, after reviewing the substantial jurisdictional contradictions and confusion in the record on this question, the District Court in Ute Indian Tribe concluded: "One thing is certain: the jurisdictional history of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation is not one of `unquestioned' exercise of state authority." Id., at 1146. 510us2$u22 06-19-97 22:49:29 PAGES OPINPGT 442 HAGEN v. UTAH Blackmun, J., dissenting IV One hundred thirty years ago, Congress designated the Uintah Valley Reservation "for the permanent settlement and exclusive occupation of" the Ute Indians. Act of May 5, 1864, ch. 77, 13 Stat. 63. The 1905 opening of the reserva- tion constituted a substantial breach of Congress' original promise, but that opening alone is insufficient to extinguish the Ute Tribe's jurisdiction. Nothing in the "face of the Act," its "surrounding circumstances," or its "legislative his- tory" establishes a clear congressional purpose to diminish the Uintah Reservation. DeCoteau, 420 U. S., at 445 (inter- nal quotation marks omitted). I appreciate that jurisdiction often may not be neatly parsed among the States and Indian tribes, but this is the inevitable burden of the path this Na- tion has chosen. Under our precedents, the lands where petitioner's offense occurred are Indian country, and the State of Utah lacked jurisdiction to try him for that crime. See 18 U. S. C. § 1151. I respectfully dissent. 510us2$23K 06-19-97 22:51:47 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1993 443 Syllabus AMERICAN DREDGING CO. v. MILLER certiorari to the supreme court of louisiana No. 91­1950. Argued November 9, 1993-Decided February 23, 1994 After respondent was injured while working as a seaman on a tug operat- ing on the Delaware River and owned by petitioner, a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey, he filed this action in a Louisiana state court pursuant to the "saving to suitors clause," 28 U. S. C. § 1333(1), seeking damages under the Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 688, and relief under general maritime law. The trial court granted petitioner's motion to dismiss under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, holding that it was bound to apply that doctrine by federal maritime law. The Court of Appeal affirmed, but the Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed, holding that a state statute rendering the doctrine of forum non conveniens unavailable in Jones Act and mari- time law cases brought in state court is not pre-empted by federal mari- time law. Held: In admiralty cases filed in a state court under the Jones Act and the "saving to suitors clause," federal law does not pre-empt state law regarding the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Pp. 446­457. (a) In exercising in personam jurisdiction over maritime actions under the "saving to suitors clause," a state court may adopt such reme- dies, and attach to them such incidents, as it sees fit, so long as those remedies do not "wor[k] material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interfer[e] with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations." Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 216. Pp. 446­447. (b) Because forum non conveniens did not originate in admiralty or have exclusive application there, but has long been a doctrine of general application, Louisiana's refusal to apply it does not work "material prej- udice to [a] characteristic featur[e] of the general maritime law" within Jensen's meaning. Pp. 447­450. (c) Nor is forum non conveniens a doctrine whose uniform applica- tion is necessary to maintain "the proper harmony" of maritime law under Jensen, 244 U. S., at 216. The uniformity requirement is not ab- solute; the general maritime law may be changed to some extent by state legislation. See ibid. Forum non conveniens is in two respects quite dissimilar from any other matter that this Court's opinions have held to be pre-empted by federal admiralty law: First, it is a sort of venue rule-procedural in nature-rather than a substantive rule upon 510us2$23K 06-19-97 22:51:47 PAGES OPINPGT 444 AMERICAN DREDGING CO. v. MILLER Syllabus which maritime actors rely in making decisions about how to manage their business. Second, it is most unlikely ever to produce uniform re- sults, since the doctrine vests great discretion in the trial court, see, e. g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U. S. 235, 257, and acknowledges multifarious factors as being relevant to its application, see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, 508­509. Pp. 450­455. (d) The foregoing conclusion is strongly confirmed by examination of federal legislation. The Jones Act permits state courts to apply their local forum non conveniens rules. See 46 U. S. C. App. § 688(a); Mis- souri ex rel. Southern R. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U. S. 1, 5. This supports the view that maritime commerce in general does not require a uniform rule on the subject. The implication of the Court's holding in Bain- bridge v. Merchants & Miners Transp. Co., 287 U. S. 278, 280­281-that although § 688(a) contains a venue provision, Jones Act venue in state court should be determined in accordance with state law-is that federal venue rules in maritime actions are a matter of judicial housekeeping, prescribed only for the federal courts. Pp. 455­457. 595 So. 2d 615, affirmed. Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Blackmun, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, and in Part II­C of which Stevens, J., joined. Souter, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 457. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 458. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 462. Thomas J. Wagner argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Whitney L. Cole. Timothy J. Falcon argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Stephen M. Wiles, John Hunter, and James A. George. John F. Manning argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, and Acting Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler.* *Lizabeth L. Burrell and George W. Healy III filed a brief for the Maritime Law Association of the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. 510us2$23K 06-19-97 22:51:47 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 443 (1994) 445 Opinion of the Court Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether, in admiralty cases filed in a state court under the Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 688, and the "saving to suitors clause," 28 U. S. C. § 1333(1), federal law pre-empts state law regarding the doc- trine of forum non conveniens. I Respondent William Robert Miller, a resident of Missis- sippi, moved to Pennsylvania to seek employment in 1987. He was hired by petitioner American Dredging Company, a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey, to work as a seaman aboard the MV John R., a tug operating on the Delaware River. In the course of that employment respondent was injured. After receiving medical treatment in Pennsylvania and New York, he re- turned to Mississippi where he continued to be treated by local physicians. On December 1, 1989, respondent filed this action in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana. He sought relief under the Jones Act, which authorizes a sea- man who suffers personal injury "in the course of his employ- ment" to bring "an action for damages at law," 46 U. S. C. App. § 688(a), and over which state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction. See Engel v. Davenport, 271 U. S. 33, 37 (1926). Respondent also requested relief under gen- eral maritime law for unseaworthiness, for wages, and for maintenance and cure. See McAllister v. Magnolia Petro- leum Co., 357 U. S. 221, 224 (1958) (setting forth means of recovery available to injured seaman). The trial court granted petitioner's motion to dismiss the action under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, holding that it was bound to apply that doctrine by federal maritime law. The Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Fourth District affirmed. 580 So. 2d 1091 (1991). The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed, holding that Article 123(C) of the Louisi- 510us2$23K 06-19-97 22:51:48 PAGES OPINPGT 446 AMERICAN DREDGING CO. v. MILLER Opinion of the Court ana Code of Civil Procedure, which renders the doctrine of forum non conveniens unavailable in Jones Act and mari- time law cases brought in Louisiana state courts, is not pre- empted by federal maritime law. 595 So. 2d 615 (1992). American Dredging Company filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which we granted. 507 U. S. 1028 (1993). II The Constitution provides that the federal judicial power "shall extend . . . to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." U. S. Const., Art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Federal- court jurisdiction over such cases, however, has never been entirely exclusive. The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided: "That the district courts shall have, exclusively of the courts of the several States . . . exclusive original cogni- zance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime juris- diction . . . within their respective districts as well as upon the high seas; saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it." § 9, 1 Stat. 76­77 (emphasis added). The emphasized language is known as the "saving to suitors clause." This provision has its modern expression at 28 U. S. C. § 1333(1), which reads (with emphasis added): "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: "(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdic- tion, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." We have held it to be the consequence of exclusive federal jurisdiction that state courts "may not provide a remedy in rem for any cause of action within the admiralty jurisdic- tion." Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109, 124 (1924). An in rem suit against a vessel is, we have said, 510us2$23K 06-19-97 22:51:48 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 443 (1994) 447 Opinion of the Court distinctively an admiralty proceeding, and is hence within the exclusive province of the federal courts. The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411, 431 (1867). In exercising in personam jurisdiction, however, a state court may " `adopt such reme- dies, and . . . attach to them such incidents, as it sees fit' so long as it does not attempt to make changes in the `substan- tive maritime law.' " Madruga v. Superior Court of Cal., County of San Diego, 346 U. S. 556, 561 (1954) (quoting Red Cross Line, supra, at 124). That proviso is violated when the state remedy "works material prejudice to the character- istic features of the general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its interna- tional and interstate relations." Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 216 (1917). The issue before us here is whether the doctrine of forum non conveniens is either a "characteristic feature" of admiralty or a doctrine whose uniform application is necessary to maintain the "proper har- mony" of maritime law. We think it is neither.1 A Under the federal doctrine of forum non conveniens, "when an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear [a] case, and when trial in the chosen forum would `establish . . . op- 1 Justice Stevens asserts that we should not test the Louisiana law against the standards of Jensen, a case which, though never explicitly overruled, is in his view as discredited as Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905). See post, at 458­459. Petitioner's pre-emption argument was primarily based upon the principles established in Jensen, as repeated in the later cases (which Justice Stevens also disparages, see post, at 459) of Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149 (1920), and Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U. S. 219 (1924), see Brief for Petitioner 12­13. Respondent did not assert that those principles had been repudiated; nor did the Solicitor General, who, in support of respondent, discussed Jensen at length, see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 5, 11­13, and n. 12. Since we ultimately find that the Louisiana law meets the stand- ards of Jensen anyway, we think it inappropriate to overrule Jensen in dictum, and without argument or even invitation. 510us2$23K 06-19-97 22:51:48 PAGES OPINPGT 448 AMERICAN DREDGING CO. v. MILLER Opinion of the Court pressiveness and vexation to a defendant . . . out of all pro- portion to plaintiff's convenience,' or when the `chosen forum [is] inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court's own administrative and legal problems,' the court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, dismiss the case," even if jurisdiction and proper venue are established. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U. S. 235, 241 (1981) (quoting Kos- ter v. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U. S. 518, 524 (1947)). In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501 (1947), Justice Jackson described some of the multifarious factors relevant to the forum non conveniens determination: "An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most pressed, is the private interest of the litigant. Im- portant considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining at- tendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforcibility [sic] of a judgment if one is obtained. . . . "Factors of public interest also have [a] place in apply- ing the doctrine. Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation. In cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the trial in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the country where they can learn of it by report only. There is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home. There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the case, rather than having a 510us2$23K 06-19-97 22:51:48 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 443 (1994) 449 Opinion of the Court court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself." Id., at 508­509.2 Although the origins of the doctrine in Anglo-American law are murky, most authorities agree that forum non conve- niens had its earliest expression not in admiralty but in Scottish estate cases. See Macmaster v. Macmaster, 11 Sess. Cas. 685, 687 (No. 280) (2d Div. Scot.) (1833); McMorine v. Cowie, 7 Sess. Cas. (2d ser.) 270, 272 (No. 48) (1st Div. Scot.) (1845); La Socie´te´ du Gaz de Paris v. La Socie´te´ Ano- nyme de Navigation "Les Armateurs Franc¸ais," [1926] Sess. Cas. (H. L.) 13 (1925). See generally Speck, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of Law in Admiralty: Time for an Overhaul, 18 J. Mar. L. & Com. 185, 187 (1987); Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 Calif. L. Rev. 380, 386­387 (1947); Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 908, 909 (1947); but see Dainow, The Inap- propriate Forum, 29 Ill. L. Rev. 867, 881, n. 58 (1935) (doc- trine in Scotland was "borrowed" from elsewhere before middle of 19th century). Even within the United States alone, there is no basis for regarding forum non conveniens as a doctrine that origi- nated in admiralty. To be sure, within federal courts it may have been given its earliest and most frequent expression in admiralty cases. See The Maggie Hammond, 9 Wall. 435, 457 (1870); The Belgenland, 114 U. S. 355, 365­366 (1885). 2 Gilbert held that it was permissible to dismiss an action brought in a District Court in New York by a Virginia plaintiff against a defendant doing business in Virginia for a fire that occurred in Virginia. Such a dismissal would be improper today because of the federal venue transfer statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1404(a): "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." By this statute, "[d]istrict courts were given more discretion to transfer . . . than they had to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens." Piper Air- craft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U. S. 235, 253 (1981). As a consequence, the federal doctrine of forum non conveniens has continuing application only in cases where the alternative forum is abroad. 510us2$23K 06-19-97 22:51:48 PAGES OPINPGT 450 AMERICAN DREDGING CO. v. MILLER Opinion of the Court But the doctrine's application has not been unique to admi- ralty. When the Court held, in Gilbert, supra, that forum non conveniens applied to all federal diversity cases, Justice Black's dissent argued that the doctrine had been applied in maritime cases "[f]or reasons peculiar to the special prob- lems of admiralty." Id., at 513. The Court disagreed, recit- ing a long history of valid application of the doctrine by state courts, both at law and in equity. Id., at 504­505, and n. 4. It observed that the problem of plaintiffs' misusing venue to the inconvenience of defendants "is a very old one affecting the administration of the courts as well as the rights of liti- gants, and both in England and in this country the common law worked out techniques and criteria for dealing with it." Id., at 507. Our most recent opinion dealing with forum non conveniens, Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U. S. 235 (1981), recognized that the doctrine "originated in Scotland, and became part of the common law of many States," id., at 248, n. 13 (citation omitted), and treated the forum non conveniens analysis of Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson S. S., Ltd., 285 U. S. 413 (1932), an admiralty case, as binding prec- edent in the nonadmiralty context. In sum, the doctrine of forum non conveniens neither originated in admiralty nor has exclusive application there. To the contrary, it is and has long been a doctrine of general application. Louisiana's refusal to apply forum non conve- niens does not, therefore, work "material prejudice to [a] characteristic featur[e] of the general maritime law." South- ern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S., at 216. B Petitioner correctly points out that the decision here under review produces disuniformity. As the Fifth Circuit noted in Ikospentakis v. Thalassic S. S. Agency, 915 F. 2d 176, 179 (1990), maritime defendants "have access to a forum non conveniens defense in federal court that is not presently rec- ognized in Louisiana state courts." We must therefore con- 510us2$23K 06-19-97 22:51:48 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 443 (1994) 451 Opinion of the Court sider whether Louisiana's rule "interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity" of maritime law, Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, supra, at 216. In The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 575 (1875), Justice Brad- ley, writing for the Court, said of the Article III provision extending federal judicial power "to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction": "One thing . . . is unquestionable; the Constitution must have referred to a system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country. It cer- tainly could not have been the intention to place the rules and limits of maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the several States, as that would have de- feated the uniformity and consistency at which the Con- stitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the States with each other or with foreign states." By reason of this principle, we disallowed in Jensen the ap- plication of state workers' compensation statutes to injuries covered by the admiralty jurisdiction. Later, in Knicker- bocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 163­164 (1920), we held that not even Congress itself could permit such applica- tion and thereby sanction destruction of the constitutionally prescribed uniformity. We have also relied on the uniform- ity principle to hold that a State may not require that a mari- time contract be in writing where admiralty law regards oral contracts as valid, Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U. S. 731 (1961). The requirement of uniformity is not, however, absolute. As Jensen itself recognized: "[I]t would be difficult, if not impossible, to define with exactness just how far the general maritime law may be changed, modified, or affected by state legislation. That this may be done to some extent cannot be denied." 244 U. S., at 216. A later case describes to what breadth this "some extent" extends: 510us2$23K 06-19-97 22:51:48 PAGES OPINPGT 452 AMERICAN DREDGING CO. v. MILLER Opinion of the Court "It is true that state law must yield to the needs of a uniform federal maritime law when this Court finds in- roads on a harmonious system[,] [b]ut this limitation still leaves the States a wide scope. State-created liens are enforced in admiralty. State remedies for wrongful death and state statutes providing for the survival of actions . . . have been upheld when applied to maritime causes of action. . . . State rules for the partition and sale of ships, state laws governing the specific perform- ance of arbitration agreements, state laws regulating the effect of a breach of warranty under contracts of maritime insurance-all these laws and others have been accepted as rules of decision in admiralty cases, even, at times, when they conflicted with a rule of mari- time law which did not require uniformity." Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U. S. 354, 373­374 (1959) (footnotes omitted). It would be idle to pretend that the line separating per- missible from impermissible state regulation is readily dis- cernible in our admiralty jurisprudence, or indeed is even entirely consistent within our admiralty jurisprudence. Compare Kossick, supra (state law cannot require provision of maritime contract to be in writing), with Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U. S. 310 (1955) (state law can determine effect of breach of warranty in marine insurance policy).3 Happily, it is unnecessary to wrestle 3 Whatever might be the unifying theme of this aspect of our admiralty jurisprudence, it assuredly is not what the dissent takes it to be, namely, the principle that the States may not impair maritime commerce, see post, at 463­464, 467. In Fireman's Fund, for example, we did not inquire whether the breach-of-warranty rule Oklahoma imposed would help or harm maritime commerce, but simply whether the State had power to regulate the matter. The no-harm-to-commerce theme that the dissent plays is of course familiar to the ear-not from our admiralty repertoire, however, but from our "negative Commerce Clause" jurisprudence, see 510us2$23K 06-19-97 22:51:48 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 443 (1994) 453 Opinion of the Court with that difficulty today. Wherever the boundaries of per- missible state regulation may lie, they do not invalidate state rejection of forum non conveniens, which is in two respects quite dissimilar from any other matter that our opinions have held to be governed by federal admiralty law: it is procedural rather than substantive, and it is most unlikely to produce uniform results. As to the former point: At bottom, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is nothing more or less than a supervening venue provision, permitting displacement of the ordinary rules of venue when, in light of certain conditions, the trial court thinks that jurisdiction ought to be declined. But venue is a matter that goes to process rather than substan- tive rights-determining which among various competent courts will decide the case. Uniformity of process (beyond the rudimentary elements of procedural fairness) is as- suredly not what the law of admiralty seeks to achieve, since it is supposed to apply in all the courts of the world. Just as state courts, in deciding admiralty cases, are not bound by the venue requirements set forth for federal courts in the United States Code, so also they are not bound by the federal common-law venue rule (so to speak) of forum non conve- niens. Because the doctrine is one of procedure rather than substance, petitioner is wrong to claim support from our de- cision in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U. S. 406 (1953), which held that Pennsylvania courts must apply the admi- Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U. S. 888, 891 (1988). No Commerce Clause challenge is presented in this case. Similarly misdirected is the dissent's complaint that Article 123 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure unfairly discriminates against maritime defendants because it permits application of forum non conveniens in non- maritime cases, see post, at 462­463. The only issue raised and argued in this appeal, and the only issue we decide, is whether state courts must apply the federal rule of forum non conveniens in maritime actions. Whether they may accord discriminatory treatment to maritime actions by applying a state forum non conveniens rule in all except maritime cases is a question not remotely before us. 510us2$23K 06-19-97 22:51:48 PAGES OPINPGT 454 AMERICAN DREDGING CO. v. MILLER Opinion of the Court ralty rule that contributory negligence is no bar to recovery. The other case petitioner relies on, Garrett v. Moore- McCormack Co., 317 U. S. 239, 248­249 (1942), held that the traditional maritime rule placing the burden of proving the validity of a release upon the defendant pre-empts state law placing the burden of proving invalidity upon the plaintiff. In earlier times, burden of proof was regarded as "proce- dural" for choice-of-law purposes such as the one before us here, see, e. g., Levy v. Steiger, 233 Mass. 600, 124 N. E. 477 (1919); Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 595 (1934). For many years, however, it has been viewed as a matter of sub- stance, see Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U. S. 208, 212 (1939)-which is unquestionably the view that the Court took in Garrett, stating that the right of the plaintiff to be free of the burden of proof "inhered in his cause of action," "was a part of the very substance of his claim and cannot be considered a mere incident of a form of procedure." 317 U. S., at 249. Unlike burden of proof (which is a sort of de- fault rule of liability) and affirmative defenses such as con- tributory negligence (which eliminate liability), forum non conveniens does not bear upon the substantive right to re- cover, and is not a rule upon which maritime actors rely in making decisions about primary conduct-how to manage their business and what precautions to take.4 4 It is because forum non conveniens is not a substantive right of the parties, but a procedural rule of the forum, that the dissent is wrong to say our decision will cause federal-court forum non conveniens determi- nations in admiralty cases to be driven, henceforth, by state law-i. e., that the federal court in a State with the Louisiana rule may as well accept jurisdiction, since otherwise the state court will. See post, at 468­469. That is no more true of forum non conveniens than it is of venue. Under both doctrines, the object of the dimissal is achieved whether or not the party can then repair to a state court in the same location. Federal courts will continue to invoke forum non conveniens to decline jurisdiction in appropriate cases, whether or not the State in which they sit chooses to burden its judiciary with litigation better handled elsewhere. 510us2$23K 06-19-97 22:51:48 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 443 (1994) 455 Opinion of the Court But to tell the truth, forum non conveniens cannot really be relied upon in making decisions about secondary con- duct-in deciding, for example, where to sue or where one is subject to being sued. The discretionary nature of the doctrine, combined with the multifariousness of the factors relevant to its application, see the quotation from Gilbert, supra, at 448­449, make uniformity and predictability of out- come almost impossible. "The forum non conveniens de- termination," we have said, "is committed to the sound dis- cretion of the trial court. It may be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion; where the court has considered all relevant public and private interest fac- tors, and where its balancing of these factors is reasonable, its decision deserves substantial deference." Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U. S., at 257. We have emphasized that " `[e]ach case turns on its facts' " and have repeatedly re- jected the use of per se rules in applying the doctrine. Id., at 249; Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U. S., at 527. In such a regime, one can rarely count on the fact that jurisdiction will be declined. C What we have concluded from our analysis of admiralty law in general is strongly confirmed by examination of fed- eral legislation. While there is an established and continu- ing tradition of federal common lawmaking in admiralty, that law is to be developed, insofar as possible, to harmonize with the enactments of Congress in the field. Foremost among those enactments in the field of maritime torts is the Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 688. That legislation, which establishes a uniform federal law that state as well as federal courts must apply to the deter- mination of employer liability to seamen, Garrett, supra, at 244, incorporates by reference "all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or rem- edy in cases of personal injury to railway employees." 46 510us2$23K 06-19-97 22:51:48 PAGES OPINPGT 456 AMERICAN DREDGING CO. v. MILLER Opinion of the Court U. S. C. App. § 688(a). Accordingly, we have held that the Jones Act adopts "the entire judicially developed doctrine of liability" under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 51 et seq. Ker- nan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U. S. 426, 439 (1958). More particularly, we have held that the Jones Act adopts the "uniformity requirement" of the FELA, requiring state courts to apply a uniform federal law. Garrett, supra, at 244. And-to come to the point of this excursus-despite that uniformity requirement we held in Missouri ex rel. Southern R. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U. S. 1, 5 (1950), that a state court presiding over an action pursuant to the FELA "should be freed to decide the availability of the principle of forum non conveniens in these suits according to its own local law." We declared forum non conveniens to be a mat- ter of "local policy," id., at 4, a proposition well substantiated by the local nature of the "public factors" relevant to the forum non conveniens determination. See Reyno, supra, at 241, and n. 6 (quoting Gilbert, 330 U. S., at 509). We think it evident that the rule which Mayfield an- nounced for the FELA applies as well to the Jones Act, which in turn supports the view that maritime commerce in general does not require a uniform rule of forum non conve- niens. Amicus Maritime Law Association of the United States argues that "whether or not it is appropriate to analo- gize from FELA to the Jones Act, Mayfield cannot save the result below because the Louisiana statute abolishes the forum non conveniens doctrine in all maritime cases, not just those arising under the Jones Act." Brief for Maritime Law Association as Amicus Curiae 16. It is true enough that the Mayfield rule does not operate ex proprio vigore beyond the field of the FELA and (by incorporation) the Jones Act. But harmonization of general admiralty law with congressional enactments would have little meaning if we were to hold that, though forum non conveniens is a local matter for purposes of the Jones Act, it is nevertheless a matter of global concern requiring uniformity under gen- 510us2$23K 06-19-97 22:51:48 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 443 (1994) 457 Souter, J., concurring eral maritime law. That is especially so in light of our rec- ognition in McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U. S., at 224­225, that, for practical reasons, a seaman will almost always combine in a single action claims for relief under the Jones Act and general maritime law. It would produce dis- sonance rather than harmony to hold that his claims for un- seaworthiness and maintenance and cure, but not his Jones Act claim, could be dismissed for forum non conveniens. The Jones Act's treatment of venue lends further support to our conclusion. In Bainbridge v. Merchants & Miners Transp. Co., 287 U. S. 278, 280­281 (1932), we held that al- though 46 U. S. C. App. § 688(a) contains a venue provision, "venue [in Jones Act cases brought in state court] should . . . [be] determined by the trial court in accordance with the law of the state." The implication of that holding is that venue under the Jones Act is a matter of judicial housekeeping that has been prescribed only for the federal courts. We noted earlier that forum non conveniens is a sort of supervening venue rule-and here again, what is true for venue under the Jones Act should ordinarily be true under maritime law in general. What we have prescribed for the federal courts with regard to forum non conveniens is not applicable to the States. * * * Amicus the Solicitor General has urged that we limit our holding, that forum non conveniens is not part of the uni- form law of admiralty, to cases involving domestic entities. We think it unnecessary to do that. Since the parties to this suit are domestic entities it is quite impossible for our hold- ing to be any broader. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana is Affirmed. Justice Souter, concurring. I join in the opinion of the Court because I agree that in most cases the characterization of a state rule as substantive 510us2$23K 06-19-97 22:51:48 PAGES OPINPGT 458 AMERICAN DREDGING CO. v. MILLER Opinion of Stevens, J. or procedural will be a sound surrogate for the conclusion that would follow from a more discursive pre-emption analy- sis. The distinction between substance and procedure will, however, sometimes be obscure. As to those close cases, how a given rule is characterized for purposes of determin- ing whether federal maritime law pre-empts state law will turn on whether the state rule unduly interferes with the federal interest in maintaining the free flow of maritime commerce. Justice Stevens, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. It is common ground in the debate between the Court and Justice Kennedy that language from the majority opinion in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205 (1917), cor- rectly defines this Court's power to prevent state tribunals from applying state laws in admiralty cases. See ante, at 447, post, at 463. In my view, Jensen is just as untrustwor- thy a guide in an admiralty case today as Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905), would be in a case under the Due Process Clause. In the Jensen case, five Members of this Court concluded that the State of New York did not have the authority to award compensation to an injured longshoreman because application of the state remedy would interfere with the "proper harmony and uniformity" of admiralty law. 244 U. S., at 216. Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion in Jensen, no less eloquent than his famous dissent in Lochner, scarcely needs embellishment. See 244 U. S., at 218­223.1 None- 1 The central theme of Holmes' dissent was that nothing in the Constitu- tion or in the Judiciary Act's grant of jurisdiction over admiralty cases to the district courts prevented New York from supplementing the "very limited body of customs and ordinances of the sea" with its statutory work- ers' compensation remedy. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 220 (1917). Holmes' Jensen dissent was the source of his famous obser- vations that "judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only inter- stitially," id., at 221, and that "[t]he common law is not a brooding omni- 510us2$23K 06-19-97 22:51:48 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 443 (1994) 459 Opinion of Stevens, J. theless, like Lochner itself, Jensen has never been formally overruled. Indeed, in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149 (1920), the same majority that decided Jensen reached the truly remarkable conclusion that even Congress could not authorize the States to apply their workmen's com- pensation laws in accidents subject to admiralty jurisdiction. See also Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U. S. 219 (1924). As Justice Brandeis stated in dissent in Washington, it takes an extraordinarily long and tenuous "process of deduc- tion" to find in a constitutional grant of judicial jurisdiction a strong federal pre-emption doctrine unwaivable even by Congress. See id., at 230­231. Jensen and its progeny rep- resent an unwarranted assertion of judicial authority to strike down or confine state legislation-even state legisla- tion approved by Act of Congress-without any firm ground- ing in constitutional text or principle. In my view, we should not rely upon and thereby breathe life into this dubi- ous line of cases. Jensen asks courts to determine whether the state law would materially impair "characteristic features" of federal maritime law. 244 U. S., at 216. The unhelpful abstract- ness of those words leaves us without a reliable compass for navigating maritime pre-emption problems. As Justice Kennedy demonstrates, the forum non conveniens doctrine may be classified as a "characteristic feature" of federal ad- miralty jurisprudence even though it did not originate in, nor is it exclusive to, the law of admiralty. Compare ante, at 449­450, with post, at 463­467. There is, however, no respectable judicial authority for the proposition that every "characteristic feature" of federal maritime law must prevail over state law. As Justice Kennedy observes, post, at 462­463, it is not easy to discern a substantial policy justification for Louisi- presence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified," id., at 222. 510us2$23K 06-19-97 22:51:48 PAGES OPINPGT 460 AMERICAN DREDGING CO. v. MILLER Opinion of Stevens, J. ana's selective "open forum" statute, which exempts only fed- eral maritime and Jones Act claims from the State's general forum non conveniens policy. The statute arguably impli- cates concerns about disruptive local restrictions on mari- time commerce that help explain why admiralty has been a federal subject. I am not persuaded, however, that the an- swer to those concerns lies in an extension of the patchwork maritime pre-emption doctrine. If this Court's maritime pre-emption rulings can be arranged into any pattern, it is a most haphazard one. See generally Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess," 1960 S. Ct. Rev. 158. Such a capricious doctrine is unlikely to aid the free flow of commerce, and threatens to have the opposite effect. In order to decide this case, it is enough to observe that maritime pre-emption doctrine allows state courts to use their own procedures in saving clause and Jones Act cases, see Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U. S. 207, 222­ 223 (1986), and that forum non conveniens is, as the Court observes, best classified as a kind of secondary venue rule.2 Equally significant is the fact that Congress, which has un- questioned power to decree uniformity in maritime matters, has declined to set forth a federal forum convenience stand- ard for admiralty cases. Ante, at 455­457. It also appears to have withheld from Jones Act defendants the right of re- moval generally applicable to claims based on federal law. See 28 U. S. C. § 1445(a); 46 U. S. C. App. § 688(a); In re Du- tile, 935 F. 2d 61, 62 (CA5 1991). Congress may "determine whether uniformity of regulation is required or diversity is permissible." Washington, 264 U. S., at 234 (Brandeis, J., 2 Even if we were to impose a forum non conveniens rule on Louisiana, the resulting standard would be altogether different from the federal ver- sion because Louisiana has chosen to bear the various costs of entertaining far-flung claims. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, 508­509 (1947) (forum's own interests must be weighed in forum non conveniens balancing test). Instead, forum non conveniens would operate simply as an admonition to take heed of the inconvenience to the foreign defendant. 510us2$23K 06-19-97 22:51:48 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 443 (1994) 461 Opinion of Stevens, J. dissenting). When relevant federal legislation indicates that Congress has opted to permit state "diversity" in admi- ralty matters, a finding of federal pre-emption is inappropri- ate. Just as in cases involving non-maritime subjects, see, e. g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U. S. 504, 516 (1992), we should not lightly conclude that the federal law of the sea pre-empts a duly enacted state statute. Instead, we should focus on whether the state provision in question con- flicts with some particular substantive rule of federal statu- tory or common law, or, perhaps, whether federal maritime rules, while not directly inconsistent, so pervade the subject as to preclude application of state law. We should jettison Jensen's special maritime pre-emption doctrine and its ab- stract standards of "proper harmony" and "characteristic features." The Jensen decision and its progeny all rested upon the view that a strong pre-emption doctrine was necessary to vindicate the purpose of the Admiralty Clause to protect maritime commerce from the "unnecessary burdens and dis- advantages incident to discordant legislation." Knicker- bocker Ice Co., 253 U. S., at 164. See also Washington, 264 U. S., at 228; Jensen, 244 U. S., at 217. Whether or not this view of the Clause is accurate as a historical matter, see Cas- tro, The Origins of Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction in an Age of Privateers, Smugglers and Pirates, 37 Am. J. Legal Hist. 117, 154 (1993) (original purpose of Clause was to ensure fed- eral jurisdiction over prize, criminal, and revenue cases; pri- vate maritime disputes were viewed as matters for state courts), protection of maritime commerce has been a central theme in our admiralty jurisprudence. While I do not pro- pose that we abandon commerce as a guiding concern, we should recognize that, today, the federal interests in free trade and uniformity are amply protected by other means. Most importantly, we now recognize Congress' broad author- ity under the Commerce Clause to supplant state law with uniform federal statutes. Moreover, state laws that affect 510us2$23K 06-19-97 22:51:48 PAGES OPINPGT 462 AMERICAN DREDGING CO. v. MILLER Kennedy, J., dissenting maritime commerce, interstate and foreign, are subject to judicial scrutiny under the Commerce Clause. And to the extent that the mere assertion of state judicial power may threaten maritime commerce, the Due Process Clause pro- vides an important measure of protection for out-of-state de- fendants, especially foreigners. See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U. S. 102 (1987); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U. S. 408 (1984).3 Extension of the ill-advised doctrine of Jensen is not the appropriate remedy for unreasonable state venue rules. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment and in Part II­C of the opinion of the Court. Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice Thomas joins, dissenting. The Court gives a careful and comprehensive history of the forum non conveniens doctrine but, in my respectful view, draws the wrong conclusions from this account and from our precedents. Today's holding contradicts two just and well-accepted principles of admiralty law: uniformity and the elimination of unfair forum selection rules. When hear- ing cases governed by the federal admiralty and maritime law, the state courts, to be sure, have broad discretion to reject a forum non conveniens motion. They should not be permitted, however, to disregard the objection altogether. With due respect, I dissent. Neither the Court nor respondent is well positioned in this case to contend that the State has some convincing reason to outlaw the forum non conveniens objection. For the fact is, though the Court seems unimpressed by the irony, the State of Louisiana commands its courts to entertain the forum non conveniens objection in all federal civil cases ex- cept for admiralty, the very context in which the rule is most 3 Petitioner asserted such a defense in the trial court, but has not as- serted a personal jurisdiction challenge before this Court. 510us2$23K 06-19-97 22:51:48 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 443 (1994) 463 Kennedy, J., dissenting prominent and makes most sense. Compare La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann., Art. 123(B) (West Supp. 1993) ("Except as pro- vided in Paragraph C, upon the contradictory motion of any defendant in a civil case filed in a district court of this state in which a claim or cause of action is predicated solely upon a federal statute and is based upon acts or omissions origi- nating outside of this state, when it is shown that there ex- ists a more appropriate forum outside of this state, taking into account the location where the acts giving rise to the action occurred, the convenience of the parties and wit- nesses, and the interest of justice, the court may dismiss the suit without prejudice . . .") with Art. 123(C) ("The provi- sions of Paragraph B shall not apply to claims brought pursu- ant to 46 U. S. C. § 688 [the Jones Act] or federal maritime law"). Louisiana's expressed interest is to reach out to keep maritime defendants, but not other types of defendants, within its borders, no matter how inconvenient the forum. This state interest is not the sort that should justify any disuniformity in our national admiralty law. In all events, the Court misapprehends the question it should confront. The issue here is not whether forum non conveniens originated in admiralty law, or even whether it is unique to that subject, but instead whether it is an important feature of the uniformity and harmony to which admiralty aspires. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 216 (1917). From the historical evidence, there seems little doubt to me that forum non conveniens is an essential and salutary feature of admiralty law. It gives shipowners and ship operators a way to avoid vexatious litigation on a dis- tant and unfamiliar shore. By denying this defense in all maritime cases, Louisiana upsets international and inter- state comity and obstructs maritime trade. And by sanc- tioning Louisiana's law, a rule explicable only by some desire to disfavor maritime defendants, the Court condones the forum shopping and disuniformity that the admiralty juris- diction is supposed to prevent. 510us2$23K 06-19-97 22:51:48 PAGES OPINPGT 464 AMERICAN DREDGING CO. v. MILLER Kennedy, J., dissenting In committing their ships to the general maritime trade, owners and operators run an unusual risk of being sued in venues with little or no connection to the subject matter of the suit. A wage dispute between crewman and captain or an accident on board the vessel may erupt into litigation when the ship docks in a faraway port. Taking jurisdiction in these cases, instead of allowing them to be resolved when the ship returns home, disrupts the schedule of the ship and may aggravate relations with the State from which it hales. See Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens As Ap- plied in the Federal Courts in Matters of Admiralty, 35 Cor- nell L. Q. 12, 20­21 (1949) ("[H]olding a ship and its crew in an American port, to which they may have come to do no more than refuel, may, in the eyes of the nation of the flag be deemed an undue interference with her commerce, and a violation of that `comity and delicacy' which in the more courtly days of some of the earlier cases were considered normal among the nations" (footnote omitted)). From the beginning, American admiralty courts have confronted this problem through the forum non conveniens doctrine. As early as 1801, a Pennsylvania District Court declined to take jurisdiction over a wage dispute between a captain and crewman of a Danish ship. Willendson v. Forsoket, 29 F. Cas. 1283 (No. 17,682) (Pa.). "It has been my general rule," explained the court, "not to take cogni- zance of disputes between the masters and crews of foreign ships." Id., at 1284. "Reciprocal policy, and the justice due from one friendly nation to another, calls for such conduct in the courts of either country." Ibid. Dismissals for reasons of comity and forum non conve- niens were commonplace in the 19th century. See, e. g., The Infanta, 13 F. Cas. 37, 39 (No. 7,030) (SDNY 1848) (dismiss- ing claims for wages by two seamen from a British ship: "This court has repeatedly discountenanced actions by for- eign seamen against foreign vessels not terminating their voyages at this port, as being calculated to embarrass com- 510us2$23K 06-19-97 22:51:48 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 443 (1994) 465 Kennedy, J., dissenting mercial transactions and relations between this country and others in friendly relations with it"); The Carolina, 14 F. 424, 426 (La. 1876) (dismissing seaman's claim that he was beaten by his crewmates while on board a British ship; "for courts to entertain this and similar suits during a voyage which the parties had agreed to make at intermediate points at which the vessel might touch, would impose delays which might seriously and uselessly embarrass the commerce of a friendly power"); The Montapedia, 14 F. 427 (ED La. 1882) (dismiss- ing suit by Chinese plaintiffs against a British ship); The Walter D. Wallet, 66 F. 1011 (SD Ala. 1895) (dismissing suit by British seaman against master of British ship for costs of medical care while in a United States marine hospital). The practice had the imprimatur of this Court. See Mason v. Ship Blaireau, 2 Cranch 240, 264 (1804) (Marshall, C. J.) (rec- ognizing forum non conveniens doctrine but not applying it in that case); The Belgenland, 114 U. S. 355, 362­369 (1885) (same); Charter Shipping Co. v. Bowring, Jones & Tidy, Ltd., 281 U. S. 515, 517 (1930) (affirming forum non conveniens dismissal of maritime dispute between British firms). By 1932, Justice Brandeis was able to cite "an unbroken line of decisions in the lower federal courts" exercising "an unquali- fied discretion to decline jurisdiction in suits in admiralty between foreigners." Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson S. S., Ltd., 285 U. S. 413, 421­422, and nn. 2­4 (affirming forum non conveniens dismissal of maritime dispute between Ca- nadian shipping companies). Long-time foreign trading partners also recognize the forum non conveniens doctrine. The Court notes the doc- trine's roots in Scotland. See La Socie´te´ du Gaz de Paris v. La Socie´te´ Anonyme de Navigation "Les Armateurs Fran- c¸ais," [1926] Sess. Cas. 13 (H. L. 1925) (affirming dismissal of breach of contract claim brought by French manufacturer against French shipowner who had lost the manufacturer's cargo at sea). English courts have followed Scotland, al- though most often they stay the case rather than dismiss 510us2$23K 06-19-97 22:51:48 PAGES OPINPGT 466 AMERICAN DREDGING CO. v. MILLER Kennedy, J., dissenting it. See The Atlantic Star, [1974] App. Cas. 436 (H. L. 1973) (staying action between a Dutch barge owner and a Dutch shipowner whose vessels had collided in Belgian waters, pending the outcome of litigation in Antwerp); The Po, [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 418 (Q. B. Adm. 1990) (refusing to stay action between Italian shipowner and American shipowner whose vessels had collided in Brazilian waters); The Lakhta, [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 269 (Q. B. Adm. 1992) (staying title dispute between Latvian plaintiffs and Russian defendant, so that plaintiffs could sue in Russian court). The Canadian Su- preme Court has followed England and Scotland. See An- tares Shipping Corp. v. Delmar Shipping Ltd. (The Capri- corn), [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 180, 185 (1976) (citing Atlantic Star and Socie´te´ du Gaz). From all of the above it should be clear that forum non conveniens is an established feature of the general maritime law. To the main point, it serves objectives that go to the vital center of the admiralty pre-emption doctrine. Comity with other nations and among the States was a primary aim of the Constitution. At the time of the framing, it was es- sential that our prospective foreign trading partners know that the United States would uphold its treaties, respect the general maritime law, and refrain from erecting barriers to commerce. The individual States needed similar assurances from each other. See The Federalist No. 22, pp. 143­145 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (Hamilton); Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, 2 Writings of James Madison 362­363 (G. Hunt ed. 1901). Federal admiralty and mari- time jurisdiction was the solution. See 2 J. Story, Commen- taries on the Constitution of the United States § 1672 (5th ed. 1833); The Federalist No. 80, supra, at 478 (Hamilton). And so, when the States were allowed to provide common- law remedies for in personam maritime disputes through the saving to suitors clause, it did not follow that they were at liberty to set aside the fundamental features of admiralty law. "The confusion and difficulty, if vessels were compelled 510us2$23K 06-19-97 22:51:48 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 443 (1994) 467 Kennedy, J., dissenting to comply with the local statutes at every port, are not diffi- cult to see. . . . [T]he Union was formed with the very definite design of freeing maritime commerce from intolerable re- strictions incident to such control." Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U. S. 219, 228 (1924). Accord, The Lotta- wanna, 21 Wall. 558, 575 (1875); Jensen, 244 U. S., at 215­217. Louisiana's open forum policy obstructs maritime com- merce and runs the additional risk of impairing relations among the States and with our foreign trading partners. These realities cannot be obscured by characterizing the de- fense as procedural. See ante, at 452­454; but see Bickel, 35 Cornell L. Q., at 17 ("[T]he forum non conveniens prob- lem . . . is inescapably connected with the substantive rights of the parties in any given type of suit, rather than . . . `merely' an `administrative' problem"). The reverse-Erie metaphor, while perhaps of use in other contexts, see Off- shore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U. S. 207, 222­223 (1986), is not a sure guide for determining when a specific state law has displaced an essential feature of the general maritime law. See Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo, 817 F. 2d 307, 319 (CA5 1987) ("drawing conclusions from meta- phors is dangerous"). Procedural or substantive, the forum non conveniens defense promotes comity and trade. The States are not free to undermine these goals. It is true that in Missouri ex rel. Southern R. Co. v. May- field, 340 U. S. 1 (1950), we held the state courts free to ig- nore forum non conveniens in Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) cases. But we did not consider the maritime context. Unlike FELA, a domestic statute controlling do- mestic markets, the admiralty law is international in its con- cern. A state court adjudicating a FELA dispute inter- poses no obstacle to our foreign relations. And while the Jones Act in turn makes FELA available to maritime claim- ants, that Act says nothing about forum non conveniens. See 46 U. S. C. App. § 688. 510us2$23K 06-19-97 22:51:48 PAGES OPINPGT 468 AMERICAN DREDGING CO. v. MILLER Kennedy, J., dissenting In any event, the Court's ruling extends well beyond the Jones Act; it covers the whole spectrum of maritime litiga- tion. Courts have recognized the forum non conveniens defense in a broad range of admiralty disputes: breach of marine insurance contract, Calavo Growers of Cal. v. Gener- ali Belgium, 632 F. 2d 963 (CA2 1980); collision, Ocean Shelf Trading, Inc. v. Flota Mercante Grancolumbiana S. A., 638 F. Supp. 249 (SDNY 1986); products liability, Matson Navi- gation Co. v. Stal-Laval Turbin AB, 609 F. Supp. 579 (ND Cal. 1985); cargo loss, The Red Sea Ins. Co. v. S. S. Lucia Del Mar, 1983 A. M. C. 1630 (SDNY 1982), aff'd, 1983 A. M. C. 1631 (CA2 1983); and breach of contract for carriage, Galban Lobo Trading Co. v. Canadian Leader Ltd., 1963 A. M. C. 988 (SDNY 1958), to name a few. See Brief for Maritime Law Association of the United States as Amicus Curiae 12. In all of these cases, federal district courts will now hear forum non conveniens motions in the shadow of state courts that refuse to consider it. Knowing that upon dismissal a maritime plaintiff may turn around and sue in one of these state courts, see Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U. S. 140 (1988), a federal court is now in a most difficult position. May it overrule a forum non conveniens motion it otherwise would have granted, because the state forum is open? See Ikospentakis v. Thalassic S. S. Agency, 915 F. 2d 176, 180 (CA5 1990) (reversing the grant of plaintiff's voluntary dis- missal motion, because the forum non conveniens defense was not available to defendants in the Louisiana court where plaintiff had also sued; refusing "to insist that these foreign appellants become guinea pigs in an effort to overturn Loui- siana's erroneous rule"). Since the Court now makes forum non conveniens something of a derelict in maritime law, per- haps it is unconcerned that federal courts may now be re- quired to alter their own forum non conveniens determina- tions to accommodate the policy of the State in which they sit. Under federal maritime principles, I should have 510us2$23K 06-19-97 22:51:48 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 443 (1994) 469 Kennedy, J., dissenting thought that the required accommodation was the other way around. The Supreme Court of Texas so understood the force of admiralty; it has ruled that its state courts must entertain a forum non conveniens objection despite a Texas statute mandating an open forum. Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo, 1994 A. M. C. 609. The Court does seem to leave open the possibility for a different result if those who raise the forum non conveniens objection are of foreign nationality. The Court is entitled, I suppose, to so confine its holding, but no part in its reasoning gives hope for a different result in a case involving foreign parties. The Court's substance-procedure distinction takes no account of the identity of the litigants, nor does the state- ment that forum non conveniens remains "nothing more or less than a supervening venue provision," ante, at 453. The Court ought to face up to the consequences of its rule in this regard. Though it may be doubtful that a forum non conveniens objection will succeed when all parties are domestic, that conclusion should ensue from a reasoned consideration of all the relevant circumstances, including comity and trade con- cerns. See Anderson v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 411 Mich. 619, 309 N. W. 2d 539 (1981) (dismissing Jones Act claim brought by Florida seaman against Delaware dredge owner for injuries suffered in Florida); Vargas v. A. H. Bull S. S. Co., 44 N. J. Super. 536, 131 A. 2d 39 (1957) (dismissing Jones Act claim brought by Puerto Rican residents against New Jersey shipper for accidents that occurred in Puerto Rico). An Alaskan shipper may find a lawsuit in Louisiana more burdensome than the same suit brought in Canada. It is a virtue, not a vice, that the doctrine preserves discretion for courts to find forum non conveniens in unusual but wor- thy cases. At stake here is whether the defense will be available at all, not whether it has merit in this particular case. Petitioner may not have prevailed on its forum non 510us2$23K 06-19-97 22:51:48 PAGES OPINPGT 470 AMERICAN DREDGING CO. v. MILLER Kennedy, J., dissenting conveniens motion, but it should at least have a principled ruling on its objection. For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment. 510us2$24N 06-19-97 22:55:05 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1993 471 Syllabus FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION v. MEYER certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 92­741. Argued October 4, 1993-Decided February 23, 1994 After the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), as receiver for a failing thrift institution, terminated respondent Meyer from his job as a senior officer of that institution, he filed this suit in the District Court, claiming that his summary discharge deprived him of a property right without due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment. In making this claim, he relied on Bivens v. Six Un- known Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 397, in which the Court implied a cause of action for damages against federal agents who alleg- edly violated the Fourth Amendment. The jury returned a verdict against FSLIC, whose statutory successor, petitioner Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), appealed. The Court of Appeals af- firmed, holding that, although the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) pro- vides the exclusive remedy against the United States for all "claims which are cognizable under [28 U. S. C. § ]1346(b)," Meyer's claim was not so cognizable; that the "sue-and-be-sued" clause contained in FSLIC's organic statute constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity for Meyer's claim and entitled him to maintain an action against FSLIC; and that he had been deprived of due process when he was summarily discharged without notice and a hearing. Held:1. FSLIC's sovereign immunity has been waived. Pp. 475­483. (a) Meyer's constitutional tort claim is not "cognizable" under § 1346(b) because that section does not provide a cause of action for such a claim. A claim is actionable under the section if it alleges, inter alia, that the United States would be liable as "a private person" "in accord- ance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." A claim such as Meyer's could not contain such an allegation because the reference to the "law of the place" means law of the State, see, e. g., Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U. S. 25, 29, n. 4, and, by definition, federal law, not state law, provides the source of liability for a claim alleging the deprivation of a federal constitutional right. Thus, the FTCA does not constitute Meyer's exclusive remedy, and his claim was properly brought against FSLIC. There simply is no basis in the statutory lan- guage for the interpretation suggested by FDIC, which would deem all 510us2$24N 06-19-97 22:55:05 PAGES OPINPGT 472 FDIC v. MEYER Syllabus claims "sounding in tort"-including constitutional torts-"cognizable" under § 1346(b). Pp. 475­479. (b) FSLIC's sue-and-be-sued clause waives sovereign immunity for Meyer's constitutional tort claim. The clause's terms are simple and broad: FSLIC "shall have power . . . [t]o sue and be sued, complain and defend, in any court of competent jurisdiction in the United States." FDIC does not attempt to make the "clear" showing of congressional intent that is necessary to overcome the presumption that such a clause fully waives immunity. See, e. g., Federal Housing Admin. v. Burr, 309 U. S. 242, 245; International Primate Protection League v. Administra- tors of Tulane Ed. Fund, 500 U. S. 72, 86, n. 8. Instead, FDIC argues that the statutory waiver's scope should be limited to cases in which FSLIC would be subjected to liability as a private entity. This cate- gory would not include instances of constitutional tort. The cases on which FDIC relies, Burr, supra, Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U. S. 549, and Franchise Tax Bd. of California v. Postal Service, 467 U. S. 512, do not support the limitation suggested by FDIC. Pp. 480­483. 2. A Bivens cause of action cannot be implied directly against FSLIC. The logic of Bivens itself does not support the extension of Bivens from federal agents to federal agencies. In Bivens, the petitioner sued the agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics who allegedly violated his rights, not the Bureau itself, 403 U. S., at 389­390, and the Court implied a cause of action against the agents in part because a direct action against the Government was not available, id., at 410 (Harlan, J., concur- ring in judgment). In essence, Meyer asks the Court to imply a dam- ages action based on a decision that presumed the absence of that very action. Moreover, if the Court were to imply such an action directly against federal agencies, thereby permitting claimants to bypass the qualified immunity protection invoked by many Bivens defendants, there would no longer be any reason for aggrieved parties to bring dam- ages actions against individual officers, and the deterrent effects of the Bivens remedy would be lost. Finally, there are "special factors coun- selling hesitation" in the creation of a damages remedy against federal agencies. Such a remedy would create a potentially enormous financial burden for the Federal Government, a matter affecting fiscal policy that is better left to Congress. Pp. 483­486. 944 F. 2d 562, reversed. Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Deputy Solicitor General Bender argued the cause for petitioner. On the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Act- 510us2$24N 06-19-97 22:55:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 471 (1994) 473 Opinion of the Court ing Solicitor General Bryson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, James A. Feldman, Barbara L. Herwig, Jacob M. Lewis, Alfred J. T. Byrne, Jack D. Smith, and Jerome A. Madden. Gennaro A. Filice III argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.* Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), we implied a cause of action for damages against federal agents who allegedly violated the Constitu- tion. Today we are asked to imply a similar cause of action directly against an agency of the Federal Government. Be- cause the logic of Bivens itself does not support such an extension, we decline to take this step. I On April 13, 1982, the California Savings and Loan Commissioner seized Fidelity Savings and Loan Association (Fidelity), a California-chartered thrift institution, and ap- pointed the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpora- tion (FSLIC) to serve as Fidelity's receiver under state law. That same day, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board ap- pointed FSLIC to serve as Fidelity's receiver under federal law. In its capacity as receiver, FSLIC had broad authority to "take such action as may be necessary to put [the thrift] in a sound solvent condition." 48 Stat. 1259, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 1729(b)(1)(A)(ii) (repealed 1989). Pursuant to its general policy of terminating the employment of a failed thrift's senior management, FSLIC, through its special rep- resentative Robert L. Pattullo, terminated respondent John H. Meyer, a senior Fidelity officer. Approximately one year later, Meyer filed this lawsuit against a number of defendants, including FSLIC and Pat- *David W. Graves and Gary M. Laturno filed a brief for the National Employment Lawyers Association as amicus curiae urging affirmance. 510us2$24N 06-19-97 22:55:05 PAGES OPINPGT 474 FDIC v. MEYER Opinion of the Court tullo, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. At the time of trial, Meyer's sole claim against FSLIC and Pattullo was that his summary dis- charge deprived him of a property right (his right to contin- ued employment under California law) without due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment. In making this claim, Meyer relied upon Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Nar- cotics Agents, supra, which implied a cause of action for damages against federal agents who allegedly violated the Fourth Amendment. The jury returned a $130,000 verdict against FSLIC, but found in favor of Pattullo on qualified immunity grounds. Petitioner Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), FSLIC's statutory successor,1 appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed. 944 F. 2d 562 (1991). First, the Court of Appeals determined that the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA or Act), 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346(b), 2671­2680, did not provide Meyer's exclusive rem- edy. 944 F. 2d, at 568­572. Although the FTCA remedy is "exclusive" for all "claims which are cognizable under section 1346(b)," 28 U. S. C. § 2679(a), the Court of Appeals decided that Meyer's claim was not cognizable under § 1346(b). 944 F. 2d, at 567, 572. The court then concluded that the "sue- and-be-sued" clause contained in FSLIC's organic statute, 12 U. S. C. § 1725(c)(4) (repealed 1989), constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity for Meyer's claim and entitled him to maintain an action against the agency. 944 F. 2d, at 566, 572. Finally, on the merits, the court affirmed the jury's conclusion that Meyer had been deprived of due process when he was summarily discharged without notice and a hearing. Id., at 572­575. We granted certiorari to consider 1 See 12 U. S. C. § 1821(d) (1988 ed., Supp. IV). After FSLIC was abol- ished by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. 101­73, 103 Stat. 183, FDIC was substi- tuted for FSLIC in this suit. 510us2$24N 06-19-97 22:55:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 471 (1994) 475 Opinion of the Court the validity of the damages award against FSLIC. 507 U. S. 983 (1993).2 II Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit. Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U. S. 549, 554 (1988); Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U. S. 242, 244 (1940). Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature. Indeed, the "terms of [the United States'] consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit." United States v. Sher- wood, 312 U. S. 584, 586 (1941). See also United States v. Mitchell, 463 U. S. 206, 212 (1983) ("It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction"). Therefore, we must first decide whether FSLIC's immunity has been waived. A When Congress created FSLIC in 1934, it empowered the agency "[t]o sue and be sued, complain and defend, in any court of competent jurisdiction." 12 U. S. C. § 1725(c)(4) (re- pealed 1989).3 By permitting FSLIC to sue and be sued, Congress effected a "broad" waiver of FSLIC's immunity from suit. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 34 (1992). In 1946, Congress passed the FTCA, which waived the sovereign immunity of the United States for certain torts committed by federal employees. 28 U. S. C. 2 Meyer filed a cross-appeal challenging the jury's finding that Pattullo was protected by qualified immunity. The Ninth Circuit affirmed this finding. 944 F. 2d, at 575­577. We declined to review this aspect of the case. Meyer v. Pattullo, 507 U. S. 984 (1993). 3 The statute governing FDIC contains a nearly identical sue-and-be- sued clause. See 12 U. S. C. § 1819(a) Fourth (1988 ed., Supp. IV) (FDIC "shall have power . . . [t]o sue and be sued, and complain and defend, in any court of law or equity, State or Federal"). 510us2$24N 06-19-97 22:55:05 PAGES OPINPGT 476 FDIC v. MEYER Opinion of the Court § 1346(b).4 In order to "place torts of `suable' agencies . . . upon precisely the same footing as torts of `nonsuable' agen- cies," Loeffler, supra, at 562 (internal quotation marks omit- ted), Congress, through the FTCA, limited the scope of sue- and-be-sued waivers such as that contained in FSLIC's organic statute. The FTCA limitation provides: "The authority of any federal agency to sue and be sued in its own name shall not be construed to authorize suits against such federal agency on claims which are cognizable under section 1346(b) of this title, and the remedies provided by this title in such cases shall be exclusive." 28 U. S. C. § 2679(a). Thus, if a suit is "cognizable" under § 1346(b) of the FTCA, the FTCA remedy is "exclusive" and the federal agency can- not be sued "in its own name," despite the existence of a sue-and-be-sued clause. The first question, then, is whether Meyer's claim is "cog- nizable" under § 1346(b). The term "cognizable" is not de- fined in the Act. In the absence of such a definition, we construe a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning. Smith v. United States, 508 U. S. 223, 228 (1993). Cognizable ordinarily means "[c]apable of being tried or examined before a designated tribunal; within [the] jurisdiction of [a] court or power given to [a] court to adjudi- cate [a] controversy." Black's Law Dictionary 259 (6th ed. 1990). Under this definition, the inquiry focuses on the ju- risdictional grant provided by § 1346(b). 4 Section 1346(b) provides: "[T]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 510us2$24N 06-19-97 22:55:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 471 (1994) 477 Opinion of the Court Section 1346(b) grants the federal district courts jurisdic- tion over a certain category of claims for which the United States has waived its sovereign immunity and "render[ed]" itself liable. Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 6 (1962). This category includes claims that are: "[1] against the United States, [2] for money damages, . . . [3] for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death [4] caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government [5] while acting within the scope of his office or employment, [6] under circumstances where the United States, if a pri- vate person, would be liable to the claimant in accord- ance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b). A claim comes within this jurisdictional grant-and thus is "cognizable" under § 1346(b)-if it is actionable under § 1346(b). And a claim is actionable under § 1346(b) if it al- leges the six elements outlined above. See Loeffler, supra, at 562 (§ 2679(a) limits the scope of sue-and-be-sued waivers "in the context of suits for which [Congress] provided a cause of action under the FTCA" (emphasis added)).5 Applying these principles to this case, we conclude that Meyer's constitutional tort claim is not "cognizable" under § 1346(b) because it is not actionable under § 1346(b)-that is, § 1346(b) does not provide a cause of action for such a claim. As noted above, to be actionable under § 1346(b), a claim must allege, inter alia, that the United States "would be liable to the claimant" as "a private person" "in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission oc- curred." A constitutional tort claim such as Meyer's could 5 Because we were not asked to define "cognizability" in Loeffler, our language was a bit imprecise. The question is not whether a claim is cognizable under the FTCA generally, as Loeffler suggests, but rather whether it is "cognizable under section 1346(b)." 28 U. S. C. § 2679(a) (emphasis added). 510us2$24N 06-19-97 22:55:05 PAGES OPINPGT 478 FDIC v. MEYER Opinion of the Court not contain such an allegation. Indeed, we have consist- ently held that § 1346(b)'s reference to the "law of the place" means law of the State-the source of substantive liability under the FTCA. See, e. g., Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U. S. 25, 29, n. 4 (1977); United States v. Muniz, 374 U. S. 150, 153 (1963); Richards, supra, at 6­7, 11; Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U. S. 315, 318 (1957). By definition, fed- eral law, not state law, provides the source of liability for a claim alleging the deprivation of a federal constitutional right. To use the terminology of Richards, the United States simply has not rendered itself liable under § 1346(b) for constitutional tort claims. Thus, because Meyer's consti- tutional tort claim is not cognizable under § 1346(b), the FTCA does not constitute his "exclusive" remedy. His claim was therefore properly brought against FSLIC "in its own name." 28 U. S. C. § 2679(a). FDIC argues that by exposing a sue-and-be-sued agency to constitutional tort claims, our interpretation of "cogniza- bility" runs afoul of Congress' understanding that § 2679(a) would place the torts of "suable" and "nonsuable" agencies on the same footing. See Loeffler, 486 U. S., at 562. FDIC would deem all claims "sounding in tort"-including constitu- tional torts-"cognizable" under § 1346(b). Under FDIC's reading of the statute, only the portion of § 1346(b) that de- scribes a "tort"-i. e., "claims against the United States, for money damages, . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government"-would gov- ern cognizability. The remaining portion of § 1346(b) would simply describe a "limitation" on the waiver of sovereign immunity.6 6 FDIC relies upon United States v. Smith, 499 U. S. 160 (1991), for its interpretation of the term "cognizable." In Smith, the "foreign country" exception, 28 U. S. C. § 2680(k), barred plaintiffs' recovery against the Fed- eral Government for injuries allegedly caused by the negligence of a Gov- ernment employee working abroad. 499 U. S., at 165. We held that the 510us2$24N 06-19-97 22:55:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 471 (1994) 479 Opinion of the Court We reject this reading of the statute. As we have already noted, § 1346(b) describes the scope of jurisdiction by refer- ence to claims for which the United States has waived its immunity and rendered itself liable. FDIC seeks to uncou- ple the scope of jurisdiction under § 1346(b) from the scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity under § 1346(b). Under its interpretation, the jurisdictional grant would be broad (covering all claims sounding in tort), but the waiver of sov- ereign immunity would be narrow (covering only those claims for which a private person would be held liable under state law). There simply is no basis in the statutory lan- guage for the parsing FDIC suggests. Section 2679(a)'s ref- erence to claims "cognizable" under § 1346(b) means cogniza- ble under the whole of § 1346(b), not simply a portion of it.7 FTCA provided plaintiffs' "exclusive remedy," even though the FTCA it- self did not provide a means of recovery. Id., at 166. Smith did not in- volve § 2679(a), the provision at issue in this case, but rather § 2679(b)(1), which provides that the FTCA remedy is "exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for money damages . . . against the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim." The Court had no occasion in Smith to address the meaning of the term "cognizable" because § 2679(b)(1) does not contain the term. We therefore find Smith unhelpful in this regard. 7 Nothing in our decision in Hubsch v. United States, 338 U. S. 440 (1949) (per curiam), is to the contrary. In Hubsch, the parties submitted to this Court for approval a settlement agreement under 28 U. S. C. § 2677 (1946 ed., Supp. IV), which at the time provided that the Attorney General, "with the approval of the court," could "settle any claim cognizable under section 1346(b)." 338 U. S., at 440 (emphasis added). We construed § 2677 "as imposing on the District Court the authority and responsibility for passing on proposed compromises," notwithstanding the fact that it had found that the claimant failed to prove the Government employee acted within the scope of his authority (the fifth element of § 1346(b) men- tioned above). Id., at 441. See also Hubsch v. United States, 174 F. 2d 7 (CA5 1949). Our holding in the case recognized that a claim does not lose its cognizability simply because there has been a failure of proof on an element of the claim. In this case there has been no failure of proof; rather, Meyer's claim does not fall within the terms of § 1346(b) in the first instance. 510us2$24N 06-19-97 22:55:05 PAGES OPINPGT 480 FDIC v. MEYER Opinion of the Court B Because Meyer's claim is not cognizable under § 1346(b), we must determine whether FSLIC's sue-and-be-sued clause waives sovereign immunity for the claim. FDIC argues that the scope of the sue-and-be-sued waiver should be lim- ited to cases in which FSLIC would be subjected to liability as a private entity. A constitutional tort claim such as Mey- er's, FDIC argues, would fall outside the sue-and-be-sued waiver because the Constitution generally does not restrict the conduct of private entities. In essence, FDIC asks us to engraft a portion of the sixth element of § 1346(b)-liability "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant"-onto the sue-and- be-sued clause. On its face, the sue-and-be-sued clause contains no such limitation. To the contrary, its terms are simple and broad: FSLIC "shall have power . . . [t]o sue and be sued, complain and defend, in any court of competent jurisdiction in the United States." 12 U. S. C. § 1725(c)(4) (repealed 1989). In the past, we have recognized that such sue-and-be-sued waivers are to be "liberally construed," Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U. S., at 245, notwithstanding the general rule that waivers of sovereign immunity are to be read narrowly in favor of the sovereign. See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S., at 34. Burr makes it clear that sue-and-be-sued clauses cannot be limited by implication unless there has been a "clea[r] show[ing] that certain types of suits are not con- sistent with the statutory or constitutional scheme, that an implied restriction of the general authority is neces- sary to avoid grave interference with the performance of a governmental function, or that for other reasons it was plainly the purpose of Congress to use the `sue and be sued' clause in a narrow sense." 309 U. S., at 245 (footnote omitted). 510us2$24N 06-19-97 22:55:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 510 U. S. 471 (1994) 481 Opinion of the Court See also Loeffler, 486 U. S., at 561; Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Postal Service, 467 U. S. 512, 517­518 (1984). Absent such a showing, agencies "authorized to `sue and be sued' are presumed to have fully waived immunity." International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Ed. Fund, 500 U. S. 72, 86, n. 8 (1991) (describing the holding in Burr). FDIC does not attempt to make the "clear" showing of congressional purpose necessary to overcome the presump- tion that immunity has been waived.8 Instead, it bases its argument solely on language in our cases suggesting that federal agencies should bear the burdens of suit borne by private entities. Typical of these cases is Burr, which stated that "when Congress launche[s] a governmental agency into the commercial world and endow[s] it with au- thority to `sue or be sued,' that agency is not less amenable to judicial process than a private enterprise under like cir- cumstances would be." 309 U. S., at 245 (emphasis added). See also Franchise Tax Bd., supra, at 520 ("[U]nder Burr not only must we liberally construe the sue-and-be-sued clause, but also we must presume that the [Postal] Service's liability is the same as that of any other business") (emphasis added); Loeffler, supra, at 557 (through a sue-and-be-sued clause, "Congress waived [the Postal Service's] immunity from interest awards, authorizing recovery of interest from the Postal Service to the extent that interest is recoverable against a private party as a normal incident of suit" (empha- sis added)). When read in context, however, it is clear that Burr, Fran- chise Tax Board, and Loeffler do not support the limitation FDIC proposes. In these cases, the claimants sought to subject the agencies to a particular suit or incident of suit to which private businesses are amenable as a matter of course. 8 In its brief discussion of the sue-and-be-sued clause, FDIC does not mention-let alone attempt to overcome-the presumption of waiver. See Brief for Petitioner 12­13. 510us2$24N 06-19-97 22:55:05 PAGES OPINPGT 482 FDIC v. MEYER Opin