(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 1999 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus RAMDASS v. ANGELONE, DIRECTOR, VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 99­7000. Argued April 18, 2000- Decided June 12, 2000 Petitioner Ramdass was sentenced to death in Virginia for the murder of Mohammed Kayani. Under Virginia law, a conviction does not be- come final until the jury returns a verdict and, some time thereafter, the judge enters a final judgment of conviction. At the time of the Kayani sentencing trial, a final judgment had been entered against Ramdass for an armed robbery at a Pizza Hut restaurant and a jury had found him guilty of an armed robbery at a Domino's Pizza res- taurant, but no final judgment had been entered. The prosecutor ar- gued future dangerousness at the Kayani sentencing trial, claiming that Ramdass would commit further violent crimes if released. The jury recommended death. After final judgment was entered on the Domino's conviction, the Kayani judge held a hearing to consider whether to impose the recommended sentence. Arguing for a life sen- tence, Ramdass claimed that his prior convictions made him ineligi- ble for parole under Virginia's three-strikes law, which denies parole to a person convicted of three separate felony offenses of murder, rape, or armed robbery, which were not part of a common act, trans- action, or scheme. The court sentenced Ramdass to death, and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. On remand from this Court, the Virginia Supreme Court again affirmed the sentence, declining to ap- ply the holding of Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U. S. 154, that a jury considering imposing death should be told if the defendant is pa- role ineligible under state law. The court concluded that Ramdass was not parole ineligible when the jury was considering his sentence because the Domino's crime, in which no final judgment had been en- tered, did not count as a conviction for purposes of the three-strikes law. Ultimately, Ramdass sought federal habeas relief. The District 2 RAMDASS v. ANGELONE Syllabus Court granted his petition, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Held: The judgment is affirmed. Pp. 6­21. 187 F. 3d 396, affirmed. JUSTICE KENNEDY, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE SCALIA, and JUSTICE THOMAS, concluded that Ramdass was not entitled to a jury instruction on parole ineligibility under Virginia's three-strikes law. Pp. 6­21. (a) Whether Ramdass may obtain relief under Simmons is gov- erned by the habeas corpus statute, 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1), which forbids relief unless a state-court adjudication of a federal claim is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by this Court. The Virginia Supreme Court's ruling here was neither contrary to Simmons nor an unrea- sonable application of its rationale. Pp. 7­8. (b) Simmons created a workable rule. The parole-ineligibility in- struction is required only when, assuming the jury fixes a life sen- tence, the defendant is ineligible for parole under state law. The in- struction was required in Simmons because it was legally accurate. However, that is not the case here, for the Virginia Supreme Court's authoritative determination is that Ramdass was not parole ineligi- ble when the jury considered his sentence. Material differences exist between this case and Simmons: The Simmons defendant had con- clusively established his parole ineligibility at the time of sentencing and Ramdass had not; a sentence had been imposed for the Simmons defendant's prior conviction and he pleaded guilty, while the Dom- ino's case was tried to a jury and no sentence had been imposed; and the grounds for challenging a guilty plea in the Simmons defendant's State are limited. Ramdass' additional attempts to equate his case with Simmons do not refute the critical point that he was not parole ineligible as a matter of state law at the time of his sentencing trial. Pp. 8­11. (c) Extending Simmons to cover situations where it looks like a de- fendant will turn out to be parole ineligible is neither necessary or workable, and the Virginia Supreme Court was not unreasonable in refusing to do so. Doing so would require courts to evaluate the probability of future events in cases where a three-strikes law is the issue. The States are entitled to some latitude in this field, for the admissibility of evidence at capital sentencing is an issue left to them, subject to federal requirements. Extending Simmons would also give rise to litigation on a peripheral point, since parole eligibil- ity may be only indirectly related to the circumstances of the crime being considered and is of uncertain materiality. The State is enti- tled to some deference in determining the best reference point for making the ineligibility determination. Virginia's rule using judg- Cite as: 530 U. S. ____ (2000) 3 Syllabus ment in the Domino's case to determine parole ineligibility is not ar- bitrary by virtue of Virginia's also allowing the prosecutor to intro- duce evidence of Ramdass' unadjudicated prior bad acts to show fu- ture dangerousness. Public opinion polls showing the likely effect of parole ineligibility on jury verdicts cast no doubt upon the State's rule. Ramdass' claim is based on the contention that it is inevitable that a judgment of conviction would be entered for his Domino's crime, but it is a well-established practice for Virginia courts to con- sider and grant post-trial motions to set aside jury verdicts. Ram- dass' time to file such a motion in the Domino's case had not expired when the jury was deliberating the Kayani sentence. Ramdass com- plains that using the entry of judgment rather than the jury verdict to determine finality is arbitrary because the availability of post- judgment relief renders uncertain the judgment's finality and reli- ability. However, States may take different approaches, and a judg- ment is the usual measure of finality in the trial court. Ramdass' conduct in this litigation confirms the conclusion reached here. He did not indicate at trial that he thought he would never be paroled or mention the three-strikes law at trial, and it appears he did not ar- gue that his parole ineligibility should have been determined based on the date of the Domino's verdict until the Virginia Supreme Court declared that another one of his convictions did not count as a strike. Pp. 11­20. (d) State courts remain free to adopt rules that go beyond the Con- stitution's minimum requirements. In fact, Virginia allows a Sim- mons instruction even where future dangerousness is not at issue; and since it has also eliminated parole for capital defendants sen- tenced to life in prison, all capital defendants now receive the instruc- tion. Pp. 20­21. JUSTICE O'CONNOR agreed that Ramdass is not entitled to habeas relief. The standard of review applicable in federal habeas cases is narrower than that applicable on direct review. Whether a defendant is entitled to inform the jury that he is parole ineligible is ultimately a federal law question, but this Court looks to state law to determine the defendant's parole status. Under Virginia law, Ramdass was not parole ineligible. Were the entry of judgment a purely ministerial act under Virginia law, the facts in this case would have been materially indistinguishable from those in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U. S. 154. Such was not the case here, however, for, under Virginia law, a guilty verdict does not inevitably lead to the entry of a judg- ment order. Consequently, the Virginia Supreme Court's decision was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Sim- mons. Pp. 1­4. KENNEDY, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered 4 RAMDASS v. ANGELONE Syllabus an opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. Cite as: 530 U. S. ____ (2000) 1 Opinion of KENNEDY, J. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash- ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 99­7000 _________________ BOBBY LEE RAMDASS, PETITIONER v. RONALD J. ANGELONE, DIRECTOR, VIRGINIA DEPART- MENT OF CORRECTIONS ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT [June 12, 2000] JUSTICE KENNEDY announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE SCALIA, and JUSTICE THOMAS join. Petitioner received a death sentence in the Commo n- wealth of Virginia for murder in the course of robbery. On review of a decision denying relief in federal habeas co r- pus, he seeks to set aside the death sentence in reliance on Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U. S. 154 (1994). He ar- gues the jury should have been instructed of his parole ineligibility based on prior criminal convictions. We reject his claims and conclude Simmons is inapplicable to peti- tioner since he was not parole ineligible when the jury considered his case, nor would he have been parole ineligible by reason of a conviction in the case then under consider a- tion by the jury. He is not entitled to the relief he seeks. I Sometime after midnight on September 2, 1992, Mo- hammed Kayani was working as a convenience store clerk. Petitioner Bobby Lee Ramdass and his accomplices e n- tered the store and forced the customers to the floor at 2 RAMDASS v. ANGELONE Opinion of KENNEDY, J. gunpoint. While petitioner ordered Kayani to open the store's safe, accomplices took the customers' wallets, money from the cash registers, cigarettes, Kool Aid, and lottery tickets. When Kayani fumbled in an initial a t- tempt to open the safe, petitioner squatted next to him and yelled at him to open the safe. At close range he held the gun to Kayani's head and pulled the trigger. The gun did not fire at first; but petitioner tried again and shot Kayani just above his left ear, killing him. Petitioner stood over the body and laughed. He later inquired of an accomplice why the customers were not killed as well. The murder of Kayani was no isolated incident. Just four months earlier, after serving time for a 1988 robbery conviction, petitioner had been released on parole and almost at once engaged in a series of violent crimes. In July, petitioner committed a murder in Alexandria, Vi r- ginia. On August 25, petitioner and three accomplices committed an armed robbery of a Pizza Hut restaurant, abducting one of the victims. Four days later, petitioner and an accomplice pistol-whipped and robbed a hotel clerk. On the afternoon of August 30, petitioner and two accomplices robbed a taxicab driver, Emanuel Selassie, shot him in the head, and left him for dead. Through major surgery and after weeks of unconsciousness, Sela s- sie survived. The same day as the Selassie shooting, petitioner committed an armed robbery of a Domino's Pizza restaurant. The crime spree ended with petitioner's arrest on Sep- tember 11, 1992, nine days after the Kayani shooting. Petitioner faced a series of criminal prosecutions. For reasons we discuss later, the sequence of events in the criminal proceedings is important to the claim petitioner makes in this Court. Under Virginia law, a conviction does not become final in the trial court until two steps have occurred. First, the jury must return a guilty ver- dict; and, second, some time thereafter, the judge must Cite as: 530 U. S. ____ (2000) 3 Opinion of KENNEDY, J. enter a final judgment of conviction and pronounce se n- tence, unless he or she determines to set the verdict aside. On December 15, 1992, a jury returned a guilty verdict based on the Pizza Hut robbery. On January 7, 1993, a jury rendered a guilty verdict for the Domino's robbery; on January 22, the trial court entered a judgment of convi c- tion on the Pizza Hut verdict; on January 30, the se n- tencing phase of the Kayani murder trial was completed, with the jury recommending that petitioner be sentenced to death for that crime; and on February 18, the trial court entered judgment on the Domino's verdict. After his capital trial for the Kayani killing, petitioner pleaded guilty to the July murder in Alexandria and to the shoo t- ing of Selassie. Thus, at the time of the capital sentencing trial, a final judgment of conviction had been entered for the Pizza Hut crime; a jury had found petitioner guilty of the Domino's crime, but the trial court had not entered a final judgment of conviction; and charges in the Alexa n- dria murder had not yet been filed, and indeed petitioner had denied any role in the crime until sometime after the sentencing phase in the instant case. At the sentencing phase of the capital murder trial for Kayani's murder, the Commonwealth submitted the case to the jury using the future dangerousness aggravating circumstance, arguing that the death penalty should be imposed because Ramdass "would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society." Va. Code Ann. §19.2­264.4(C) (1993). Pet i- tioner countered by arguing that he would never be r e- leased from jail, even if the jury refused to sentence him to death. For this proposition, Ramdass relied on the se n- tences he would receive for the crimes detailed above, including those which had yet to go to trial and those (such as the Domino's crime) for which no judgment had been entered and no sentence had been pronounced. Counsel argued petitioner "is going to jail for the rest of 4 RAMDASS v. ANGELONE Opinion of KENNEDY, J. his life. . . . I ask you to give him life. Life, he will never see the light of day . . . ." App. 85. At another point, counsel argued: " `Ramdass will never be out of jail. Your sentence today will insure that if he lives to be a hundred and twenty two, he will spend the rest of his life in prison.' " 187 F. 3d 396, 400 (CA4 1999). These arg u- ments drew no objection from the Commonwealth. The prosecution's case at sentencing consisted of an account of some of Ramdass' prior crimes, including crimes for which Ramdass had not yet been charged or tried, such as the shooting of Selassie and the assault of the hotel clerk. Investigators of Ramdass' crimes, an accomplice, and two victims provided narrative descriptions of the crime spree preceding the murder, and their evidence of those crimes was the basis for the prosecution's case in the sentencing hearing. Evidence of the crime spree did not depend on formal convictions for its admission. The pros e- cutor, moreover, did not mention the Domino's crime in his opening statement and did not introduce evidence of the crime during the Commonwealth's case in chief. App. 8- 47. Ramdass himself first injected the Domino's crime into the sentencing proceeding, testifying in response to his own lawyer's questions about his involvement in the crime. In closing, the prosecutor argued that Ramdass could not live by the rules of society "either here or in prison." Id., at 86. During the juror deliberations, the jury sent a note to the judge asking: "[I]f the Defendant is given life, is there a possibility of parole at some time before his natural death?" Id., at 88. Petitioner's counsel suggested the following response: " ` "You must not concern yourself with matters that will occur after you impose your sentence, but you may impose [sic] that your sentence will be the legal sentence imposed in the case." ' " Id., at 89. The trial judge refused the instruction, relying on the then-settled Virginia law that parole is not an appropriate factor for Cite as: 530 U. S. ____ (2000) 5 Opinion of KENNEDY, J. the jury to consider, and informed the jury that they " `are not to concern [them]selves with what may happen afte r- wards.' " Id., at 91. The next day the jury returned its verdict recommending the death sentence. Virginia law permitted the judge to give a life sentence despite the jury's recommendation; and two months later the trial court conducted a hearing to decide whether the jury's recommended sentence would be imposed. During the interval between the jury trial and the court's se n- tencing hearing, final judgment had been entered on the Domino's conviction. At the court's sentencing hearing, Ramdass' counsel argued for the first time that his prior convictions rendered him ineligible for parole under Vi r- ginia's three-strikes law, which denies parole to a person convicted of three separate felony offenses of murder, rape, or armed robbery, which were not part of a common act, transaction, or scheme. Va. Code Ann. §53.1­151(B1) (1993). Petitioner's counsel also stated that three jurors contacted by petitioner's counsel after the verdict ex- pressed the opinion that a life sentence would have been imposed had they known Ramdass would not be eligible for parole. These jurors were not identified by name, were not produced for testimony, and provided no formal or sworn statements supporting defense counsel's represe n- tations. App. 95. Rejecting petitioner's arguments for a life sentence, the trial court sentenced petitioner to death. Ramdass appealed, arguing that his parole ineligibility, as he characterized it, should have been disclosed to the jury. The Virginia Supreme Court rejected the claim, applying its settled law "that a jury should not hear ev i- dence of parole eligibility or ineligibility because it is not a relevant consideration in fixing the appropriate sentence." Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 413, 426, 437 S. E. 2d 566, 573 (1993). The court did not address whether Ra m- dass had waived the claim by failing to mention the three- strikes law at trial or by not objecting to the instructions 6 RAMDASS v. ANGELONE Opinion of KENNEDY, J. that were given. Other Virginia capital defendants in Ramdass' position had been raising the issue at trial, despite existing Virginia law to the contrary. E.g., Mick- ens v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 423, 424, 457 S. E. 2d 9, 10 (1995); O'Dell v. Thompson, 502 U. S. 995, 996, n. 3 (1991) (Blackmun, J., respecting denial of certiorari); Mueller v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 386, 408­409, 422 S. E. 2d 380, 394 (1992); Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 244, 397 S. E. 2d 385, 390 (1990). From the State Supreme Court's denial of his claims on direct review, Ramdass filed a petition for a writ of certi o- rari in this Court. One of his arguments was that the judge should have instructed the jury that he was inelig i- ble for parole. While the petition was pending, we decided Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U. S. 154 (1994), which held that where a defendant was parole ineligible under state law at the time of the jury's death penalty deliber a- tions, the jury should have been informed of that fact. We granted Ramdass' petition for certiorari and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Simmons. Ramdass v. Virginia, 512 U. S. 1217 (1994). On remand, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed Ra m- dass' death sentence, concluding that Simmons applied only if Ramdass was ineligible for parole when the jury was considering his sentence. Ramdass v. Common- wealth, 248 Va. 518, 450 S. E. 2d 360 (1994). The court held that Ramdass was not parole ineligible when the jury considered his sentence because the Kayani murder co n- viction was not his third conviction for purposes of the three-strikes law. In a conclusion not challenged here, the court did not count the 1988 robbery conviction as one which qualified under the three-strikes provision. (It appears the crime did not involve use of a weapon.) The court also held the Domino's robbery did not count as a conviction because no final judgment had been entered on the verdict. Thus, the only conviction prior to the Kayani Cite as: 530 U. S. ____ (2000) 7 Opinion of KENNEDY, J. murder verdict counting as a strike at the time of the sentencing trial was for the Pizza Hut robbery. Unless the three-strikes law was operative, Ramdass was eligible for parole because, at the time of his trial, murder convicts became eligible for parole in 25 years. Va. Code Ann. §53.1­151(C) (1993). Under state law, then, Ramdass was not parole ineligible at the time of sentencing; and the Virginia Supreme Court declined to apply Simmons to reverse Ramdass' sentence. Ramdass filed a petition for a writ of certiorari con- tending that the Virginia Supreme Court misapplied Simmons, and we again denied certiorari. Ramdass v. Virginia, 514 U. S. 1085 (1995). After an unsuccessful round of postconviction proceedings in Virginia courts, Ramdass sought habeas corpus relief in federal court. He argued once more that the Virginia Supreme Court erred in not applying Simmons. The District Court granted relief. 28 F. Supp. 2d 343 (ED Va. 1998). The Court of Appeals reversed. 187 F. 3d, at 407. When Ramdass file d a third petition for a writ of certiorari, we stayed his ex e- cution, 528 U. S. 1015 (1999), and granted certiorari, 528 U. S. 1068 (2000). Ramdass contends he was entitled to a jury instruction of parole ineligibility under the Virginia three-strikes law. Rejecting the contention, we now affirm. II Petitioner bases his request for habeas corpus relief on Simmons, supra. The premise of the Simmons case was that, under South Carolina law, the capital defendant would be ineligible for parole if the jury were to vote for a life sentence. Future dangerousness being at issue, the plurality opinion concluded that due process entitled the defendant to inform the jury of parole ineligibility, either by a jury instruction or in arguments by counsel. In our later decision in O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U. S. 151, 166 8 RAMDASS v. ANGELONE Opinion of KENNEDY, J. (1997), we held that Simmons created a new rule for purposes of Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989). O'Dell reaffirmed that the States have some discretion in dete r- mining the extent to which a sentencing jury should be advised of probable future custody and parole status in a future dangerousness case, subject to the rule of Simmons. We have not extended Simmons to cases where parole ineligibility has not been established as a matter of state law at the time of the jury's future dangerousness deli b- erations in a capital case. Whether Ramdass may obtain relief under Simmons is governed by the habeas corpus statute, 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1) (1994 ed., Supp. III), which forbids relief u n- less the state-court adjudication of a federal claim "r e- sulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." As explained in JUSTICE O'CONNOR's opinion for the Court in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. ___, ___ (2000) (slip op., at 15), a state court acts contrary to clearly e s- tablished federal law if it applies a legal rule that contr a- dicts our prior holdings or if it reaches a different result from one of our cases despite confronting indistinguishable facts. The statute also authorizes federal habeas corpus relief if, under clearly established federal law, a state court has been unreasonable in applying the governing legal principle to the facts of the case. A state determin a- tion may be set aside under this standard if, under clearly established federal law, the state court was unreasonable in refusing to extend the governing legal principle to a context in which the principle should have controlled. The Virginia Supreme Court's ruling in the case before us was neither contrary to Simmons nor an unreasonable applic a- tion of its rationale. Petitioner contends his case is indistinguishable from Simmons, making the Virginia Supreme Court's refusal to Cite as: 530 U. S. ____ (2000) 9 Opinion of KENNEDY, J. grant relief contrary to that case. In his view the Pizza Hut conviction and the Domino's guilty verdict classified him, like the Simmons petitioner, as ineligible for parole when the jury deliberated his sentence. He makes this argument even though the Virginia Supreme Court d e- clared that he was not parole ineligible at the time of the sentencing trial because no judgment of conviction had been entered for the Domino's crime. Simmons created a workable rule. The parole- ineligibility instruction is required only when, assuming the jury fixes the sentence at life, the defendant is inelig i- ble for parole under state law. 512 U. S., at 156 (plurality opinion) (limiting holding to situations where "state law prohibits the defendant's release on parole"); id., at 165, n. 5 (relying on fact that Simmons was "ineligible for parole under state law"); id., at 176 (O'CONNOR, J., con- curring) (citing state statutes to demonstrate that for Simmons "the only available alternative sentence to death . . . was life imprisonment without [the] possibility of parole"). The instruction was required in Simmons be- cause it was agreed that "an instruction informing the jury that petitioner is ineligible for parole is legally accurate." Id., at 166. In this case, a Simmons instruction would not have been accurate under the law; for the authoritative determin a- tion of the Virginia Supreme Court is that petitioner was not ineligible for parole when the jury considered his sentence. In Simmons the defendant had "conclusively established" his parole ineligibility at the time of se n- tencing. Id., at 158. Ramdass had not. In Simmons, a sentence had been imposed for the defendant's prior co n- viction and he pleaded guilty. Ramdass' Domino's case was tried to a jury and no sentence had been imposed. While a South Carolina defendant might challenge a guilty plea, the grounds for doing so are limited, see Rivers v. Strickland, 264 S. C. 121, 124, 213 S. E. 2d 97, 98, 10 RAMDASS v. ANGELONE Opinion of KENNEDY, J. (1975) ("The general rule is that a plea of guilty, volunta r- ily and understandingly made, constitutes a waiver of nonjurisdictional defects and defenses, including claims of violation of constitutional rights prior to the plea"); see also Whetsell v. South Carolina, 276 S. C. 295, 296, 277 S. E. 2d 891, 892, (1981), and, in all events, such a motion cannot seek to set aside a jury verdict or be considered a post-trial motion, for there was no trial or jury verdict in the case. 512 U. S., at 156. Simmons further does not indicate that South Carolina law considered a guilty plea and sentence insufficient to render the defendant parole ineligible upon conviction of another crime. Material differences exist between this case and Simmons, and the Virginia Supreme Court's decision is not contrary to the rule Simmons announced. Ramdass makes two arguments to equate his own case with Simmons. Neither contention refutes the critical point that he was not ineligible for parole as a matter of state law at the time of his sentencing trial. First he contends that the Simmons petitioner was not parole ineligible at the time of his sentencing trial. According to Ramdass, a South Carolina prisoner is not parole inelig i- ble until the State Board of Probation makes a formal determination of parole ineligibility and the state board had not done so when the capital sentencing jury fixed Simmons' penalty. This argument is without merit. Virginia does not argue that Ramdass was parole eligible because a parole board had not acted. It argues Ramdass was still parole eligible at the time of the sentencing trial by reason of his then criminal record as it stood under state law. We further note that Ramdass bases his arg u- ment on briefs and the record filed in Simmons. A failure by a state court to glean information from the record of a controlling decision here and to refine further holdings accordingly does not necessarily render the state-court ruling "contrary to, or . . . an unreasonable application of, Cite as: 530 U. S. ____ (2000) 11 Opinion of KENNEDY, J. clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." §2254(d)(1). On review of state decisions in habeas corpus, state courts are responsible for a faithful application of the principles set out in the controlling opinion of the Court. Second, Ramdass argues Simmons allowed a prisoner to obtain a parole-ineligibility instruction even though "hyp o- thetical future events" (such as escape, pardon, or a change in the law) might mean the prisoner would, at some point, be released from prison. This argument is likewise of no assistance to Ramdass. The Simmons peti- tioner was, as a matter of state law, ineligible for parole at the time of the sentencing trial. The State was left to argue that future events might change this status or otherwise permit Simmons to reenter society. Id., at 166. Ramdass' situation is just the opposite. He was eligible for parole at the time of his sentencing trial and is forced to argue that a hypothetical future event (the entry of judgment on the Domino's convictions) would render him parole ineligible under state law, despite his current parole-eligible status. This case is not parallel to Sim- mons on the critical point. The differences between the cases foreclose the conclusion that the Virginia Supreme Court's decision denying Ramdass relief was contrary to Simmons. Ramdass contends the Virginia Supreme Court never- theless was bound to extend Simmons to cover his circum- stances. He urges us to ignore the legal rules dictating his parole eligibility under state law in favor of what he calls a functional approach, under which, it seems, a court evaluates whether it looks like the defendant will turn out to be parole ineligible. We do not agree that the extension of Simmons is either necessary or workable; and we are confident in saying that the Virginia Supreme Court was not unreasonable in refusing the requested extension. Simmons applies only to instances where, as a legal 12 RAMDASS v. ANGELONE Opinion of KENNEDY, J. matter, there is no possibility of parole if the jury decides the appropriate sentence is life in prison. Petitioner's proposed rule would require courts to evaluate the pro b- ability of future events in cases where a three-strikes law is the issue. Among other matters, a court will have to consider whether a trial court in an unrelated proceeding will grant postverdict relief, whether a conviction will be reversed on appeal, or whether the defendant will be prosecuted for fully investigated yet uncharged crimes. If the inquiry is to include whether a defendant will, at some point, be released from prison, even the age or health of a prisoner facing a long period of incarceration would seem relevant. The possibilities are many, the certainties few. If the Simmons rule is extended beyond when a defendant is, as a matter of state law, parole ineligible at the time of his trial, the State might well conclude that the jury would be distracted from the other vital issues in the case. The States are entitled to some latitude in this field, for the admissibility of evidence at capital sentencing was, and remains, an issue left to the States, subject of course to federal requirements, especially, as relevant here, those related to the admission of mitigating evidence. Id., at 168; California v. Ramos, 463 U. S. 992 (1983). By eliminating Simmons' well-understood rule, peti- tioner's approach would give rise to litigation on a perip h- eral point. Parole eligibility may be unrelated to the circumstances of the crime the jury is considering or the character of the defendant, except in an indirect way. Evidence of potential parole ineligibility is of uncertain materiality, as it can be overcome if a jury concludes that even if the defendant might not be paroled, he may escape to murder again, see Garner v. Jones, 529 U. S. ___ (2000); he may be pardoned; he may benefit from a change in parole laws; some other change in the law might operate to invalidate a conviction once thought beyond review, see Bousley v. United States, 523 U. S. 614 (1998); or he may Cite as: 530 U. S. ____ (2000) 13 Opinion of KENNEDY, J. be no less a risk to society in prison, see United States v. Battle, 173 F. 3d 1343 (CA11 1999), cert. denied, 529 U. S. ___ (2000). The Virginia Supreme Court had good reason not to extend Simmons beyond the circumstances of that case, which included conclusive proof of parole ineligibility under state law at the time of sentencing. A jury evaluating future dangerousness un der Virginia law considers all of the defendant's recent criminal hi s- tory, without being confined to convictions. As we have pointed out, the Domino's Pizza conviction was not even a part of the prosecution's main case in the sentencing proceedings. Parole ineligibility, on the other hand, does relate to formal criminal proceedings. The State is ent i- tled to some deference, in the context of its own parole laws, in determining the best reference point for making the ineligibility determination. Given the damaging te s- timony of the criminal acts in the spree Ramdass e m- barked upon in the weeks before the Kayani murder, it is difficult to say just what weight a jury would or should have given to the possibility of parole; and it was not error for the State to insist upon an accurate assessment of the parole rules by using a trial court judgment as the mea s- uring point. As we have explained, the dispositive fact in Simmons was that the defendant conclusively established his parole ineligibility under state law at the time of his trial. Ra m- dass did not because of the judicial determination Virginia uses to establish a conviction's finality under its parole law. We note that Virginia's rule using judgment in the Domino's case to determine parole ineligibility is not arbitrary by virtue of Virginia's also allowing evidence of the defendant's prior criminal history. To demonstrate Ramdass' evil character and his propensity to commit violent acts in the future, the prosecutor used Ramdass' prior criminal conduct, supported in some cases (although not in the Domino's case) by evidence in the form of the 14 RAMDASS v. ANGELONE Opinion of KENNEDY, J. resulting jury verdicts. Virginia law did not require a guilty verdict, a criminal judgment, or the exhaustion of an appeal before prior criminal conduct could be intr o- duced at trial. Virginia law instead permitted unadjud i- cated prior bad acts to be introduced as evidence at trial. See Watkins v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 469, 487, 331 S. E. 2d 422, 435 (1985). For example, the prosecutor was permitted to use the shooting of Selassie in aggravation, even though no verdict had been rendered in that case. The prosecutor likewise asked Ramdass about the July murder in Alexandria. App. 64. (Despite Ramdass' sworn denial, he pleaded guilty to the crime after being se n- tenced to death in this case.) The guilty verdict of the jury in the Domino's case, therefore, was not a necessary pr e- requisite to the admissibility of the conduct underlying the Domino's crime. Ramdass, furthermore, could not object to the Commonwealth's use of the Domino's crime at sentencing, for it was he who introduced the evidence. The Commonwealth did not mention the crime in its opening statement and did not present evidence of the crime in its case in chief. Ramdass used the Domino's crime to argue he would never be out of jail; and he ove r- used the crime even for that purpose. Counsel advised the jury the Domino's crime would result in "at least another life sentence," when in fact the sentence imposed was for 18 years. Id., at 50. The various public opinion polls to which we are pointed cast no doubt upon the rule adopted by the State. We are referred, for example, to a poll whose result is reported in Paduano & Smith, Deathly Errors: Juror Misperceptions Concerning Parole in the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 Colum. Human Rights L. Rev. 211 (1987). The poll is said to permit the conclusion that 67% of potential jurors would be more likely to give a life sentence instead of death if they knew the defendant had to serve at least 25 years in prison before being parole elig ible. Cite as: 530 U. S. ____ (2000) 15 Opinion of KENNEDY, J. The poll is not a proper consideration in this Court. Mere citation of a law review to a court does not suffice to introduce into evidence the truth of the hearsay or the so- called scientific conclusions contained within it. Had the creators of the poll taken the stand in support of the poll's application to Ramdass' case, the poll likely would have been demonstrated to be inadmissible. The poll's repor t- ers concede the poll was limited in scope, surveying 40 individuals eligible for jury service. Id., at 221. The poll was limited to jurors in one Georgia county, jurors who would never serve on a Fairfax County, Virginia, jury. The poll was supervised by the Southern Prisoners' D e- fense Committee, a group having an interest in obtaining life sentences for the inmates it represents. The poll was conducted in the context of ongoing litigation of a partic u- lar defendant's death sentence. The article makes no reference to any independent source confirming the pr o- priety of the sampling methodology. The poll asked but four questions. It failed to ask those who were surveyed why they held the views that they did or to ascertain their reaction to evidence supplied by the prosecution designed to counter the parole information. No data indicates the questions were framed using methodology employed by reliable pollsters. No indication exists regarding the amount of time participants were given to answer. The reporters of the poll contend other similar, limited studies support the results, yet those studies were conducted over the telephone "by defense attorneys in connection with motions for new trials." These, and other, deficiencies have been relied upon by courts with factfinding powers to exclude or minimize survey evidence. E.g., Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F. 2d 252, 264 (CA5 1980) (inadequate survey universe); Dreyfus Fund, Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 525 F. Supp. 1108, 1116 (SDNY 1981) (unreliable sampling technique); General Motors Corp. v. Cadillac Marine & Boat Co., 226 F. Supp. 716, 737 (WD 16 RAMDASS v. ANGELONE Opinion of KENNEDY, J. Mich. 1964 (only 150 people surveyed); Kingsford Products Co. v. Kingsfords, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (Kan. 1989) (sample drawn from wrong area); Conagra, Inc. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 784 F. Supp. 700, 726 (Neb. 1992) (survey failed to ask the reasons why the participant provided the answer he selected); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 792 F. Supp. 1357, 1373 (SDNY 1992) (que s- tions not properly drafted); American Home Products Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 871 F. Supp. 739, 761 (NJ 1994) (respondents given extended time to answer); Gucci v. Gucci Shops, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 916, 926 (SDNY 1988) (surveys should be conducted by recognized independent experts); Schering Corp. v. Schering Aktiengesellschaft, 667 F. Supp 175, 189 (NJ 1987) (attorney contact and interference invalidates poll); see generally Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc., 559 F. Supp 1189 (EDNY 1983) (listing factors to consider in determining whether a survey is reliable). The poll reported in the Columbia Human Rights Law Review should not be co n- sidered by this Court. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U. S. 361, 377 (1989) (plurality opinion ). It is the Virginia Su- preme Court's decision rejecting Ramdass' claims that is under review in this habeas proceeding. It was not r e- quired to consult public opinion polls. Ramdass' claim is based on the contention that it is inevitable that a judgment of conviction would be entered for his Domino's crime. He calls the entry of judgment following a jury verdict a "ministerial act whose perfor m- ance was foreseeable, imminent, and inexorable." Brief for Petitioner 21, 36. Petitioner cites no authority for the proposition that a judicial officer's determination that final judgment should be entered (as opposed to the clerk's noting of the final judgment in the record) is a ministerial act. We are not surprised. We doubt most lawyers would consider a criminal case concluded in the trial court before judgment is entered, for it is judgment which signals that Cite as: 530 U. S. ____ (2000) 17 Opinion of KENNEDY, J. the case has become final and is about to end or reach another stage of proceedings. See Va. Sup. Ct. Rule 1:1, 5A:6 (1999) (requiring notice of appeal to be filed "within 30 days after entry of final judgment"). Post-trial motions are an essential part of Virginia criminal law practice, as discussed in leading treatises such as J. Costello, Virginia Criminal Law and Procedure 829 (2d ed. 1995), and R. Bacigal, Virginia Criminal Pr o- cedure 337 (2d ed. 1989). Under Virginia Supreme Court Rule 3A:15(b) (1999), a verdict of guilty may be set aside "for error committed during the trial or if the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a conviction." A few examples from the reports of Virginia decisions de m- onstrate it to be well-established procedure in Virginia for trial courts to consider and grant motions to set aside jury verdicts. E.g., Floyd v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 575, 576­ 577, 249 S. E. 2d 171, 172 (1978); Payne v. Common- wealth, 220 Va. 601, 602­603, 260 S. E. 2d 247, 248 (1979); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 547, 553, 458 S. E. 2d 599, 601 (1995); Walker v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 286, 291, 356 S. E. 2d 853, 856 (1987); Gorham v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 673, 674, 426 S. E. 2d 493, 494 (1993); Carter v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 507, 509, 393 S. E. 2d 639, 640 (1990); Cullen v. Common- wealth, 13 Va. App. 182, 184, 409 S. E. 2d 487, 488 (1991). The motion to set aside may be filed and resolved before judgment is entered, e.g., Walker, supra, at 291, 356 S. E. 2d, at 856, and trial courts may conduct hearings or allow evidence to be introduced on these motions. Postverdict motions may be granted despite the denial of a motion to strike the evidence made during trial, e.g., Gorham, supra, at 674, 426 S. E. 2d, at 494, or after denial of a pretrial motion to dismiss, Cullen, supra, at 184, 409 S. E. 2d, at 488. Federal judges familiar with Virginia practice have held that postverdict motions give a defendant a full and fair opportunity to raise claims of trial error, Di Paola v. 18 RAMDASS v. ANGELONE Opinion of KENNEDY, J. Riddle, 581 F. 2d 1111, 1113 (CA4 1978). In contexts beyond the three-strikes statute, Virginia courts have held that the possibility of postverdict relief renders a jury verdict uncertain and unreliable until judgment is e n- tered. E.g., Dowel v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1145, 408 S. E. 2d 263, 265 (1991); see also Smith v. Common- wealth, 134 Va. 589, 113 S. E. 707 (1922); Blair v. Com- monwealth, 66 Va. 850, 858, 861 (1874) (availability of postverdict motions mean it is at the defendant's option whether to "let judgment be entered in regular order"). In one recent case, the Virginia Court of Appeals relied on Rule 3A:15 to hold, contrary to petitioner's contention here, that it is an "incorrect statement of the law" to say that the trial court has no concern with the proceedings after the jury's verdict. Davis v. Commonwealth, 2960­ 98­2, 2000 WL 135148, *4, n. 1 (Va. App., Feb. 8, 2000). The time for Ramdass to file a motion to set aside the Domino's verdict had not expired when the jury was deli b- erating on the sentence for Kayani's murder; and he co n- cedes he could have filed post-verdict motions. The Do m- ino's case was pending in a different county from the Kayani murder trial and the record contains no indication that Ramdass' counsel advised the judge in the Kayani case that he would not pursue postverdict relief in the Domino's case. The Virginia Supreme Court was reaso n- able to reject a parole ineligibility instruction for a defe n- dant who would become ineligible only in the event a trial judge in a different county entered final judgment in an unrelated criminal case. Ramdass complains that the Virginia Supreme Court's selection of the entry of judgment rather than the jury verdict is arbitrary. He points out that a trial court may set the judgment aside within 21 days after its entry. Va. Sup. Ct. Rule 1:1 (1999). Appeal is also permitted. We agree with Ramdass that the availability of postjudgment relief in the trial court or on appeal renders uncertain the Cite as: 530 U. S. ____ (2000) 19 Opinion of KENNEDY, J. finality and reliability of even a judgment in the trial court. Our own jurisprudence under Teague v. Lane, for example, does not consider a Virginia-state-court convi c- tion final until the direct review process is completed. O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U. S., at 157. States may take different approaches and we see no support for a rule that would require a State to declare a conviction final for purposes of a three-strikes statute once a verdict has been rendered. Verdicts may be overturned by the state trial court, by a state appellate court, by the state supreme court, by a state court on collateral attack, by a federal court in habeas corpus, or by this Court on review of any of these proceedings. Virginia's approach, which would permit a Simmons instruction despite the availability of postjudgment relief that might, the day after the jury is instructed that the defendant is parole ineligible, undo one of the strikes supporting the instruction, provided Ra m- dass sufficient protection. A judgment, not a verdict, is the usual measure for finality in the trial court. Our conclusion is confirmed by a review of petitioner's conduct in this litigation. The current claim that it was certain at the time of trial that Ramdass would never be released on parole in the event the jury sentenced him to life is belied by