(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 1999 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus MILLER, SUPERINTENDENT, PENDLETON CORREC- TIONAL FACILITY, ET AL. v. FRENCH ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 99­224. Argued April 18, 2000- Decided June 19, 2000* In 1975, prison inmates at the Pendleton Correctional Facility brought a class action, and the District Court issued an injunction, which re- mains in effect, to remedy violations of the Eighth Amendment re- garding conditions of confinement. Congress subsequently enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), which, as relevant here, sets a standard for the entry and termination of prospective re- lief in civil actions challenging prison conditions. Specifically, 18 U. S. C. §3626(b)(2) provides that a defendant or intervenor may move to terminate prospective relief under an existing injunction that does not meet that standard; §3626(b)(3) provides that a court may not terminate such relief if it makes certain findings; and §3626(e)(2) dictates that a motion to terminate such relief "shall operate as a stay" of that relief beginning 30 days after the motion is filed and ending when the court rules on the motion. In 1997, petitioner prison officials (hereinafter State) filed a motion to terminate the remedial order under §3626(b). Respondent prisoners moved to enjoin the op- eration of the automatic stay, arguing that §3626(e)(2) violates due process and separation of powers principles. The District Court en- joined the stay, the State appealed, and the United States intervened to defend §3626(e)(2)'s constitutionality. In affirming, the Seventh Circuit concluded that §3626(e)(2) precluded courts from exercising their equitable powers to enjoin the stay, but that the statute, so con- strued, was unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds. - - - - - - * Together with No. 99­582, United States v. French et al., also on certiorari to the same court. 2 MILLER v. FRENCH Syllabus Held:1. Congress clearly intended to make operation of the PLRA's automatic stay provision mandatory, precluding courts from exercis- ing their equitable power to enjoin the stay. The Government con- tends that (1) the Court should not interpret a statute as displacing courts' traditional equitable authority to preserve the status quo pending resolution on the merits absent the clearest command to the contrary and (2) reading §3626(e)(2) to remove that equitable power would raise serious separation of powers questions, and therefore should be avoided under the canon of constitutional doubt. But where, as here, Congress has made its intent clear, this Court must give effect to that intent. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S. 195, 215. Under §3626(e)(2), a stay is automatic once a state defen- dant has filed a §3626(b) motion, and the command that it "shall op- erate as a stay during" the specified time period indicates that it is mandatory throughout that period. The statute's plain meaning would be subverted were §3626(e)(2) interpreted merely as a burden- shifting mechanism that does not prevent courts from suspending the stay. Viewing the automatic stay provision in the context of §3626 as a whole confirms the Court's conclusion. Section 3626(e)(4) provides for an appeal from an order preventing the automatic stay's opera- tion, not from the denial of a motion to enjoin a stay. This provision's one-way nature only makes sense if the stay is required to operate during a specific time period, such that any attempt by a district court to circumvent the mandatory stay is immediately reviewable. Mandamus is not a more appropriate remedy because it is granted only in the exercise of sound discretion. Given that curbing the courts' equitable discretion was a principal objective of the PLRA, it would have been odd for Congress to have left §3626(e)(2)'s enforce- ment to that discretion. Section 3626(e)(3) also does not support the Government's view, for it only permits the stay's starting point to be delayed for up to 90 days; it does not affect the stay's operation once it begins. While construing §3626(e)(2) to remove courts' equitable discretion raises constitutional questions, the canon of constitutional doubt permits the Court to avoid such questions only where the sav- ing construction is not plainly contrary to Congress' intent. Pp. 6­12. 2. Section 3626(e) does not violate separation of powers principles. The Constitution prohibits one branch of the Government from en- croaching on the central prerogatives of another. Article III gives the Federal Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to de- cide them, subject to review only by superior Article III courts. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U. S. 211, 218­219. Respondents con- tend that §3626(e)(2) violates the separation of powers principle by legislatively suspending a final judgment of an Article III court in Cite as: 530 U. S. ____ (2000) 3 Syllabus violation of Plaut and Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409. Unlike the situa- tion in Hayburn's Case, §3626(e)(2) does not involve direct review of a judicial decision by the Legislative or Executive Branch. Nor does it involve the reopening of a final judgment, as was addressed in Plaut. Plaut was careful to distinguish legislation that attempted to reopen the dismissal of a money damages suit from that altering the pro- spective effect of injunctions entered by Article III courts. Prospec- tive relief under a continuing, executory decree remains subject to al- teration due to changes in the underlying law. Cf. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, 273. This conclusion follows from the Court's decision in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421, 432 (Wheeling Bridge II), that prospective relief it is- sued in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 13 How. 518 (Wheeling Bridge I), became unenforceable after Congress altered the law underlying the ongoing relief. Applied here, the Wheeling Bridge II principles demonstrate that §3626(e)(2)'s automatic stay does not unconstitutionally suspend or reopen an Article III court's judgment. It does not tell judges when, how, or what to do, but reflects the change implemented by §3626(b), which establishes new standards for prospective relief. As Plaut and Wheeling Bridge II instruct, when Congress changes the law underlying the judgment awarding such relief, that relief is no longer enforceable to the extent it is in- consistent with the new law. Although the remedial injunction here is a final judgment for purposes of appeal, it is not the last word of the judicial department, for it is subject to the court's continuing su- pervisory jurisdiction, and therefore may be altered according to sub- sequent changes in the law. For the same reasons, §3626(e)(2) does not violate the separation of powers principle articulated in United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128, where the Court found unconstitutional a statute purporting to prescribe rules of decision to the Federal Ju- diciary in cases pending before it. That §3626(e)(2) does not itself amend the legal standard does not help respondents; when read in the context of §3626 as a whole, the provision does not prescribe a rule of decision but imposes the consequences of the court's applica- tion of the new legal standard. Finally, Congress' imposition of the time limit in §3626(e)(2) does not offend the structural concerns un- derlying the separation of powers. Whether that time is so short that it deprives litigants of an opportunity to be heard is a due process question not before this Court. Nor does the Court have occasion to decide here whether there could be a time constraint on judicial ac- tion that was so severe that it implicated structural separation of powers concerns. Pp. 12­21. 178 F. 3d 437, reversed and remanded. 4 MILLER v. FRENCH Syllabus O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined, and in which SOUTER and GINSBURG, JJ., joined as to Parts I and II. SOUTER, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which GINSBURG, J., joined. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, J., joined. Cite as: 530 U. S. ____ (2000) 1 Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash- ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ Nos. 99­224 and 99­582 _________________ CHARLES B. MILLER, SUPERINTENDENT, PENDLETON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, ET AL., PETITIONERS 99­224 v. RICHARD A. FRENCH ET AL. UNITED STATES, PETITIONER 99­582 v. RICHARD A. FRENCH ET AL. ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT [June 19, 2000] JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) estab- lishes standards for the entry and termination of prospe c- tive relief in civil actions challenging prison conditions. §§801­810, 110 Stat. 1321­66 to 1321­77. If prospective relief under an existing injunction does not satisfy these standards, a defendant or intervenor is entitled to "imm e- diate termination" of that relief. 18 U. S. C. §3626(b)(2) (1994 ed., Supp. IV). And under t he PLRA's "automatic stay" provision, a motion to terminate prospective relief "shall operate as a stay" of that relief during the period beginning 30 days after the filing of the motion (extendable to up to 90 days for "good cause") and ending when the court rules on the motion. §§3626(e)(2), (3). The superintendent 2 MILLER v. FRENCH Opinion of the Court of the Pendleton Correctional Facility, which is currently operating under an ongoing injunction to remedy violations of the Eighth Amendment regarding conditions of confin e- ment, filed a motion to terminate prospective relief under the PLRA. Respondent prisoners moved to enjoin the oper a- tion of the automatic stay provision of §3626(e)(2), arguing that it is unconstitutional. The District Court enjoined the stay, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit af- firmed. We must decide whether a district court may enjoin the operation of the PLRA's automatic stay provi- sion and, if not, whether that provision violates separation of powers principles. IA This litigation began in 1975, when four inmates at what is now the Pendleton Correctional Facility brought a class action under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, on behalf of all persons who were, or would be, confined at the facility against the predecessors in office of petitioners (hereinafter State). 1 Record, Doc. No. 1, p. 2. After a trial, the District Court found that living conditions at the prison violated both state and federal law, including the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and u n- usual punishment, and the court issued an injunction to correct those violations. French v. Owens, 538 F. Supp. 910 (SD Ind. 1982), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 777 F. 2d 1250 (CA7 1985). While the State's appeal was pending, this Court decided Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89 (1984), which held that the Eleventh Amendment deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over claims for injunctive relief against state officials based on state law. Accordingly, the Court of A p- peals for the Seventh Circuit remanded the action to the District Court for reconsideration. 777 F. 2d, at 1251. On remand, the District Court concluded that most of the state Cite as: 530 U. S. ____ (2000) 3 Opinion of the Court law violations also ran afoul of the Eighth Amendment, and it issued an amended remedial order to address those co n- stitutional violations. The order also accounted for i m- provements in living conditions at the Pendleton facility that had occurred in the interim. Ibid. The Court of Appeals affirmed the amended remedial order as to those aspects governing overcrowding and double celling, the use of mechanical restraints, staffing, and the quality of food and medical services, but it vacated those portions pertaining to exercise and recreation, pr o- tective custody, and fire and occupational safety sta n- dards. Id., at 1258. This ongoing injunctive relief has remained in effect ever since, with the last modification occurring in October 1988, when the parties resolved by joint stipulation the remaining issues related to fire and occupational safety standards. 1 Record, Doc. No. 14. B In 1996, Congress enacted the PLRA. As relevant here, the PLRA establishes standards for the entry and termi- nation of prospective relief in civil actions challenging conditions at prison facilities. Specifically, a court "shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of a Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right." 18 U. S. C. §3626(a)(1)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. IV). The same criteria apply to existing injunctions, and a defendant or interv e- nor may move to terminate prospective relief that does not meet this standard. See §3626(b)(2). In particular, §3626(b)(2) provides: "In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, a defendant or intervener shall be entitled to the imm e- diate termination of any prospective relief if the relief was approved or granted in the absence of a finding by 4 MILLER v. FRENCH Opinion of the Court the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means nece s- sary to correct the violation of the Federal right." A court may not terminate prospective relief, however, if it "makes written findings based on the record that prospe c- tive relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is