(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 1999 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus HILL ET AL. v. COLORADO ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO No. 98­1856. Argued January 19, 2000- Decided June 28, 2000 Colorado Rev. Stat. §18­9­122(3) makes it unlawful for any person within 100 feet of a health care facility's entrance to "knowingly ap- proach" within 8 feet of another person, without that person's con- sent, in order to pass "a leaflet or handbill to, displa[y] a sign to, or engag[e] in oral protest, education, or counseling with [that] per- son . . . ." Claiming that the statute was facially invalid, petitioners sought to enjoin its enforcement in state court. In dismissing the complaint, the District Judge held that the statute imposed content- neutral time, place, and manner restrictions narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest under Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, in that Colorado had not "adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys," id, at 791. The State Court of Appeals affirmed, and the State Supreme Court denied review. This Court vacated that judgment in light of its holding in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western N. Y., 519 U. S. 357, that an injunctive provision creating a speech-free floating buffer zone with a 15-foot radius violated the First Amendment. On remand, the Court of Appeals reinstated its judgment, and the State Supreme Court affirmed, distinguishing Schenck, concluding that the statute was narrowly drawn to further a significant government in- terest, rejecting petitioners' overbreadth challenge, and concluding that ample alternative channels of communication remained open to petitioners. Held: Section 18­9­122(3)'s restrictions on speech-related conduct are constitutional. Pp. 9­30. (a) Each side has legitimate and important concerns. Petitioners' First Amendment interests are clear and undisputed. On the other hand, the State's police powers allow it to protect its citizens' health and safety, and may justify a special focus on access to health care 2 HILL v. COLORADO Syllabus facilities and the avoidance of potential trauma to patients associated with confrontational protests. Moreover, rules providing specific guidance to enforcement authorities serve the interest in evenhanded application of the law. Also, the statute deals not with restricting a speaker's right to address a willing audience, but with protecting lis- teners from unwanted communication. Pp. 9­13. (b) Section 18­9­122(3) passes the Ward content-neutrality test for three independent reasons. First, it is a regulation of places where some speech may occur, not a "regulation of speech." Second, it was not adopted because of disagreement with the message of any speech. Most importantly, the State Supreme Court unequivocally held that the restrictions apply to all demonstrators, regardless of viewpoint, and the statute makes no reference to the content of speech. Third, the State's interests are unrelated to the content of the demonstrators' speech. Petitioners contend that insofar as the statute applies to persons who "knowingly approach" within eight feet of another to engage in "oral protest, education, or counseling," it is "content-based" under Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 462, because it requires examination of the content of a speaker's comments. This Court, however, has never held that it is improper to look at a state- ment's content in order to determine whether a rule of law applies to a course of conduct. Here, it is unlikely that there would often be any need to know exactly what words were spoken in order to determine whether sidewalk counselors are engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling rather than social or random conversation. The statute is easily distinguishable from the one in Carey, which prohibited all picketing except for picketing of a place of employment in a labor dis- pute, thereby according preferential treatment to expression con- cerning one particular subject. In contrast, §18­19­122(3) merely places a minor place restriction on an extremely broad category of communications with unwilling listeners. Pp. 14­21. (c) Section 18­9­122(3) is also a valid time, place, and manner regulation under Ward, for it is "narrowly tailored" to serve the State's significant and legitimate governmental interests and it leaves open ample alternative communication channels. When a con- tent-neutral regulation does not entirely foreclose any means of communication, it may satisfy the tailoring requirement even though it is not the least restrictive or least intrusive means of serving the statutory goal. The 8-foot zone should not have any adverse impact on the readers' ability to read demonstrators' signs. That distance can make it more difficult for a speaker to be heard, but there is no limit on the number of speakers or the noise level. Nor does the stat- ute suffer from the failings of the "floating buffer zone" rejected in Schenck. The zone here allows the speaker to communicate at a Cite as: 530 U. S. ____ (2000) 3 Syllabus "normal conversational distance," 519 U. S., at 377, and to remain in one place while other individuals pass within eight feet. And the "knowing" requirement protects speakers who thought they were at the proscribed distance from inadvertently violating the statute. Whether the 8-foot interval is the best possible accommodation of the competing interests, deference must be accorded to the Colorado Legislature's judgment. The burden on the distribution of handbills is more serious, but the statute does not prevent a leafletter from simply standing near the path of oncoming pedestrians and proffer- ing the material, which pedestrians can accept or decline. See Hef- fron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640. Pp. 21­25. (d) Section 18­9­122(3) is not overbroad. First, the argument that coverage is broader than the specific concern that led to the statute's enactment does not identify a constitutional defect. It is precisely be- cause the state legislature made a general policy choice that the stat- ute is assessed under Ward rather than a stricter standard. Second, the argument that the statute bans virtually the universe of pro- tected expression is based on a misreading of the statute and an in- correct understanding of the overbreadth doctrine. The statute does not ban any forms of communication, but regulates the places where communications may occur; and petitioners have not, as the doctrine requires, persuaded the Court that the statute's impact on the con- duct of other speakers will differ from its impact on their own side- walk counseling, see Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 612, 615. Pp. 25­27. (e) Nor is §18­9­122(3) unconstitutionally vague, either because it fails to provide people with ordinary intelligence a reasonable oppor- tunity to understand what it says or because it authorizes or encour- ages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, Chicago v. Morales, 527 U. S. 41, 56­57. The first concern is ameliorated by §18­9­ 122(3)'s scienter requirement. It is unlikely that anyone would not understand the common words used in the statute, and hypothetical situations not before the Court will not support a facial attack on a statute that is surely valid in the vast majority of its intended applications. The Court is likewise unpersuaded that inadequate direction is given to law enforcement authorities. Indeed, one of §18­ 9­122(3)'s virtues is the specificity of the definitions of the zones. Pp. 27­29. (f) Finally, §18­9­122(3)'s consent requirement does not impose a prior restraint on speech. This argument was rejected in both Schenck and Madsen. Furthermore, "prior restraint" concerns relate to restrictions imposed by official censorship, but the regulations here 4 HILL v. COLORADO Syllabus only apply if the pedestrian does not consent to the approach. Pp. 29­30. 973 P. 2d 1246, affirmed. STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. SOUTER, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which O'CONNOR, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Cite as: 530 U. S. ____ (2000) 1 Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash- ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 98­1856 _________________ LEILA JEANNE HILL, AUDREY HIMMELMANN, AND EVERITT W. SIMPSON, JR., PETITIONERS v. COLORADO ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO [June 28, 2000] JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. At issue is the constitutionality of a 1993 Colorado statute that regulates speech-related conduct within 100 feet of the entrance to any health care facility. The sp e- cific section of the statute that is challenged, Colo. Rev. Stat. §18­9­122(3) (1999), makes it unlawful within the regulated areas for any person to "knowingly approach" within eight feet of another person, without that person's consent, "for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such other person . . . ."1 Although the - - - - - - 1 The entire §18­9­122 reads as follows: "(1) The general assembly recognizes that access to health care fa- cilities for the purpose of obtaining medical counseling and treatment is imperative for the citizens of this state; that the exercise of a person's right to protest or counsel against certain medical procedures must be balanced against another person's right to obtain medical counseling and treatment in an unobstructed manner; and that preventing the willful obstruction of a person's access to medical counseling and treatment at a health care facility is a matter of statewide concern. The general assembly therefore declares that it is appropriate to enact 2 HILL v. COLORADO Opinion of the Court statute prohibits speakers from approaching unwilling listeners, it does not require a standing speaker to move away from anyone passing by. Nor does it place any r e- striction on the content of any message that anyone may wish to communicate to anyone else, either inside or ou t- side the regulated areas. It does, however, make it more difficult to give unwanted advice, particularly in the form of a handbill or leaflet, to persons entering or leaving medical facilities. The question is whether the First Amendment rights of the speaker are abridged by the protection the statute provides for the unwilling li stener. I Five months after the statute was enacted, petitioners filed a complaint in the District Court for Jefferson County, Colorado, praying for a declaration that §18­9­ - - - - - - legislation that prohibits a person from knowingly obstructing another person's entry to or exit from a health care facility. "(2) A person commits a class 3 misdemeanor if such person kno w- ingly obstructs, detains, hinders, impedes, or blocks another person's entry to or exit from a health care facility. "(3) No person shall knowingly approach another person within eight feet of such person, unless such other person consents, for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such other person in the public way or sidewalk area within a radius of one hundred feet from any entrance door to a health care facility. Any person who violates this subsection (3) commits a class 3 mi sdemeanor. "(4) For the purposes of this section, `health care facility' means any entity that is licensed, certified, or otherwise authorized or permitted by law to administer medical treatment in this state. "(5) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a statutory or home rule city or county or city and county from adopting a law for the control of access to health care facilities that is no less restrictive than the provisions of this section. "(6) In addition to, and not in lieu of, the penalties set forth in this section, a person who violates the provisions of this section shall be subject to civil liability, as provided in section 13­21­106.7, C. R. S." Cite as: 530 U. S. ____ (2000) 3 Opinion of the Court 122(3) was facially invalid and seeking an injunction against its enforcement. They stated that prior to the enactment of the statute, they had engaged in "sidewalk counseling" on the public ways and sidewalks within 100 feet of the entrances to facilities where human abortion is practiced or where medical personnel refer women to other facilities for abortions. "Sidewalk counseling" consists of efforts "to educate, counsel, persuade, or inform passersby about abortion and abortion alternatives by means of verbal or written speech, including conversation and/or display of signs and/or distribution of literature."2 They further alleged that such activities frequently entail being within eight feet of other persons and that their fear of prosecution under the new statute caused them "to be chilled in the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights."3 Count 5 of the complaint claimed violations of the right to free speech protected by the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and Count 6 alleged that the i m- pairment of the right to distribute written materials was a violation of the right to a free press.4 The complaint also argued that the statutory consent requirement was invalid as a prior restraint tantamount to a licensing requir e- ment, that the statute was vague and overbroad, and that it was a content-based restriction that was not justified by a compelling state interest. Finally, petitioners contended that §18­9­122(3) was content based for two reasons: The content of the speech must be examined to determine whether it "constitutes oral protest, counseling and educa- - - - - - - 2 App. 17. 3 Id., at 18­19. 4 Counts 1 through 4 alleged violations of the Colorado Constitution, Count 7 alleged a violation of the right to peaceable assembly, and Counts 8 and 9 alleged violations of the Due Process and Equal Prote c- tion Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 HILL v. COLORADO Opinion of the Court tion"; and that it is "viewpoint-based" because the statute "makes it likely that prosecution will occur based on di s- pleasure with the position taken by the speaker."5 In their answers to the complaint, respondents admitted virtually all of the factual allegations. They filed a motion for summary judgment supported by affidavits, which included a transcript of the hearings that preceded the enactment of the statute. It is apparent from the testi- mony of both supporters and opponents of the statute that demonstrations in front of abortion clinics impeded access to those clinics and were often confrontational. 6 Indeed, it was a common practice to provide escorts for persons entering and leaving the clinics both to ensure their access and to provide protection from aggressive counselors who sometimes used strong and abusive language in face-to- face encounters.7 There was also evidence that emotional confrontations may adversely affect a patient's medical care.8 There was no evidence, however, that the "sidewalk - - - - - - 5 Id., at 25­26. 6 The legislature also heard testimony that other types of protests at medical facilities, such as those involving animal rights, create difficu l- ties for persons attempting to enter the facility. App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a. 7 A nurse practitioner testified that some antiabortion protesters " `yell, thrust signs in faces, and generally try to upset the patient as much as possible, which makes it much more difficult for us to provide care in a scary situation anyway.' " Hill v. Thomas, 973 P. 2d 1246, 1250 (Colo. 1999). A volunteer who escorts patients into and out of clinics testified that the protestors " `are flashing their bloody fetus signs. They are yelling, "you are killing your baby." [T]hey are talking about fetuses and babies being dismembered, arms and legs torn off . . . a mother and her daughter . . . were immediately surrounded and yelled at and screamed at . . . .' " Id., at 1250­1251. 8 A witness representing the Colorado Coalition of Persons with Di s- abilities, who had had 35 separate surgeries in the preceding eight years testified: "Each and every one is tough. And the night before and the morning of any medical procedure that's invasive is the toughest part of all. You don't need additional stressors placed on you while Cite as: 530 U. S. ____ (2000) 5 Opinion of the Court counseling" conducted by petitioners in this case was ever abusive or confrontational. The District Judge granted respondents' motion and dismissed the complaint. Because the statute had not actually been enforced against petitioners, he found that they only raised a facial challenge. 9 He agreed with peti- tioners that their sidewalk counseling was conducted in a "quintessential" public forum, but held that the statute permissibly imposed content-neutral "time, place, and manner restrictions" that were narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and left open ample alternative channels of communication. 10 Relying on Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 785 (1989), he noted that " `the principal inquiry in determining content ne u- trality . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.' " He found that the text of the statute "applies to all viewpoints, rather than certain viewpoints," and that the legislative history made it clear that the State had not favored one viewpoint over another. 11 He concluded that the "free zone" created by the statute was narrowly tailored under the test announced in Ward, and that it left open ample alternative means of communication because signs and leaflets may be seen, and speech may be heard, at a distance of eight feet. Noting that the petition- ers had stated in their affidavits that they intended to "continue with their protected First Amendment activi- ties," he rejected their overbreadth challenge because he - - - - - - you're trying to do it. . . . We all know about our own personal faith. You don't need somebody standing in your face screaming at you when you are going in for what may be one of the most traumatic experiences of your life anyway. Why make it more traumatic?" App. 108. 9 App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a. 10 Id., at 32a. 11 Id., at 32a­33a. 6 HILL v. COLORADO Opinion of the Court believed "the statute will do little to deter protected speech."12 Finally, he concluded that the statute was not vague and that the prior restraint doctrine was inapplic a- ble because the "statute requires no license or permit scheme prior to speaking."13 The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed for reasons similar to those given by the District Judge. It noted that even though only seven percent of the patients receiving services at one of the clinics were there to obtain abortion services, all 60,000 of that clinic's patients "were subjected to the same treatment by protesters."14 It also reviewed our then-recent decision in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U. S. 753 (1994), and concluded that Mad- sen's reasoning supported the conclusion that the statute was content neutral.15 In 1996, the Supreme Court of Colorado denied review, 16 and petitioners sought a writ of certiorari from our Court. While their petition was pending, we decided Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western N. Y., 519 U. S. 357 (1997). Because we held in that case that an injunctive provision creating a speech-free "floating buffer zone" with a 15-foot radius violates the First Amendment, we granted certio- rari, vacated the judgment of the Colorado Court of A p- peals, and remanded the case to that court for further consideration in light of Schenck. 519 U. S. 1145 (1997). On remand the Court of Appeals reinstated its judgment upholding the statute. It noted that in Schenck we had "expressly declined to hold that a valid governmental interest in ensuring ingress and egress to a medical clinic may never be sufficient to justify a zone of separation - - - - - - 12 Id., at 35a. 13 Id., at 36a. 14 Hill v. Lakewood, 911 P. 2d 670, 672 (1995). 15 Id., at 673­674. 16 App. to Pet. for Cert. 46a. Cite as: 530 U. S. ____ (2000) 7 Opinion of the Court between individuals entering and leaving the premises and protesters" and that our opinion in Ward provided the standard for assessing the validity of a content-neutral, generally applicable statute. Under that standard, even though a 15-foot floating buffer might preclude protesters from expressing their views from a normal conversational distance, a lesser distance of eight feet was sufficient to protect such speech on a public sidewalk.17 The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. In a tho r- ough opinion, the court began by commenting on certain matters that were not in dispute. It reviewed the history of the statute in detail and concluded that it was intended to protect both the "citizen's `right to protest' or counsel against certain medical procedures" and also to ensure "that government protects `a person's right to obtain medi- cal counseling and treatment.' 18 " It noted that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals had concluded that the statute was content neutral, that petitioners no longer contended otherwise, and that they agreed that the que s- tion for decision was whether the statute was a valid time, place, and manner restriction under the test announced in Ward.19 - - - - - - 17 Hill v. Lakewood, 949 P. 2d 107, 109 (1997). 18 973 P. 2d, at 1249 (quoting §18­9­122(1)). 19 "[P]etitioners concede that the test for a time, place, and manner restriction is the appropriate measure of this statute's constitutionality. See Tape Recording of Oral Argument, Oct. 19, 1998, statement of James M. Henderson, Esq. Petitioners argue that pursuant to the test announced in Ward, the `floating buffer zone' created by section 18­9­ 122(3) is not narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and that section 18­9­122(3) does not provide for ample alternative channels of communication. We di sagree." Id., at 1251. "We note that both the trial court and the court of appeals found that section 18­9­122(3) is content-neutral, and that petitioners do not contend otherwise in this appeal." Id., at 1256. 8 HILL v. COLORADO Opinion of the Court The court identified two important distinctions between this case and Schenck. First, Schenck involved a judicial decree and therefore, as explained in Madsen, posed "greater risks of censorship and discriminatory application than do general ordinances."20 Second, unlike the floating buffer zone in Schenck, which would require a protester either to stop talking or to get off the sidewalk whenever a patient came within 15 feet, the "knowingly approaches" requirement in the Colorado statute allows a protester to stand still while a person moving towards or away from a health care facility walks past her.21 Applying the test in Ward, the court concluded that the statute was narrowly drawn to further a significant government interest. It rejected petitioners' contention that it was not narrow enough because it applied to all health care facilities in the State. In the court's view, the comprehensive coverage of the statute was a factor that supported its con- tent neutrality. Moreover, the fact that the statute was enacted, in part, because the General Assembly "was con- cerned with the safety of individuals seeking wide-ranging health care services, not merely abortion counseling and procedures," added to the substantiality of the government interest that it served.22 Finally, it concluded that ample alternative channels remain open because petitioners, and "indeed, everyone, are still able to protest, counsel, shout, implore, dissuade, persuade, educate, inform, and distribute literature regarding abortion. They just cannot knowingly approach within eight feet of an individual who is within 100 feet of a health care - - - - - - 20 Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U. S. 753, 764 (1994). 21 973 P. 2d, at 1257­1258 ("What renders this statute less restrictive than . . . the injunction in Schenck . . . is that under section 18­9­122(3), there is no duty to withdraw placed upon petitioners even within the eight-foot limited floating buffer zone"). 22 Id., at 1258. Cite as: 530 U. S. ____ (2000) 9 Opinion of the Court facility entrance without that individual's consent. As articulated so well . . . in Ward, [`the fact that §18­9­ 122(3)] may reduce to some degree the potential aud i- ence for [petitioners'] speech is of no consequence, for there has been no showing that the remaining av e- nues of communication are inadequate.' 23 " Because of the importance of the case, we granted ce r- tiorari. 527 U. S. 1068 (1999). We now affirm. II Before confronting the question whether the Colorado statute reflects an acceptable balance between the const i- tutionally protected rights of law-abiding speakers and the interests of unwilling listeners, it is appropriate to exa m- ine the competing interests at stake. A brief review of both sides of the dispute reveals that each has legitimate and important concerns. The First Amendment interests of petitioners are clear and undisputed. As a preface to their legal challenge, petitioners emphasize three propositions. First, they accurately explain that the areas protected by the statute encompass all the public ways within 100 feet of every entrance to every health care facility everywhere in the State of Colorado. There is no disagreement on this point, even though the legislative history makes it clear that its enactment was primarily motivated by activities in the vicinity of abortion clinics. Second, they correctly state that their leafletting, sign displays, and oral communic a- tions are protected by the First Amendment. The fact that the messages conveyed by those communications may be offensive to their recipients does not deprive them of co n- stitutional protection. Third, the public sidewalks, streets, - - - - - - 23 Ibid. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 802 (1989)). 10 HILL v. COLORADO Opinion of the Court and ways affected by the statute are "quintessential" public forums for free speech. Finally, although there is debate about the magnitude of the statutory impediment to their ability to communicate effectively with persons in the regulated zones, that ability, particularly the ability to distribute leaflets, is unquestionably lessened by this statute. On the other hand, petitioners do not challenge the legitimacy of the state interests that the statute is in- tended to serve. It is a traditional exercise of the States' "police powers to protect the health and safety of their citizens." Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 475 (1996). That interest may justify a special focus on uni m- peded access to health care facilities and the avoidance of potential trauma to patients associated with confront a- tional protests. See Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U. S. 753 (1994); NLRB v. Baptist Hospital, Inc., 442 U. S. 773 (1979). Moreover, as with every exercise of a State's police powers, rules that provide specific guidance to enforcement authorities serve the interest in even- handed application of the law. Whether or not those interests justify the particular regulation at issue, they are unquestionably legitimate. It is also important when conducting this interest analysis to recognize the significant difference between state restrictions on a speaker's right to address a willing audience and those that protect listeners from unwanted communication. This statute deals only with the latter. The right to free speech, of course, includes the right to attempt to persuade others to change their views, and may not be curtailed simply because the speaker's message may be offensive to his audience. But the protection a f- forded to offensive messages does not always embrace offensive speech that is so intrusive that the unwilling audience cannot avoid it. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474, 487 (1988). Indeed, "[i]t may not be the content of the Cite as: 530 U. S. ____ (2000) 11 Opinion of the Court speech, as much as the deliberate `verbal or visual assault,' that justifies proscription." Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 210­211, n. 6 (1975) (citation and brackets omit- ted). Even in a public forum, one of the reasons we tole r- ate a protester's right to wear a jacket expressing his opposition to government policy in vulgar language is because offended viewers can "effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes." Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 21 (1971). The recognizable privacy interest in avoiding unwanted communication varies widely in different settings. It is far less important when "strolling through Central Park" than when "in the confines of one's own home," or when persons are "powerless to avoid" it. Id., at 21­22. But even the interest in preserving tranquility in "the Sheep Meadow" portion of Central Park may at times justify official r e- straints on offensive musical expression. Ward, 491 U. S., at 784, 792. More specific to the facts of this case, we have recognized that "[t]he First Amendment does not demand that patients at a medical facility undertake Herculean efforts to escape the cacophony of political protests." Madsen, 512 U. S., at 772­773. The unwilling listener's interest in avoiding unwanted communication has been repeatedly identified in our cases. It is an aspect of the broader "right to be let alone" that one of our wisest Justices characterized as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).24 The right to avoid unwelcome speech has special force in the privacy of the home, Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728, 738 - - - - - - 24 This common-law "right" is more accurately characterized as an "interest" that States can choose to protect in certain situations. See Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 350­351 (1967). 12 HILL v. COLORADO Opinion of the Court (1970), and its immediate surroundings, Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S., at 485, but can also be protected in confronta- tional settings. Thus, this comment on the right to free passage in going to and from work applies equally- or perhaps with greater force- to access to a medical facility: "How far may men go in persuasion and commu- nication, and still not violate the right of those whom they would influence? In going to and from work, men have a right to as free a passage without obstruction as the streets afford, consistent with the right of oth- ers to enjoy the same privilege. We are a social pe o- ple, and the accosting by one of another in an inoffe n- sive way and an offer by one to communicate and discuss information with a view to influencing the other's action, are not regarded as aggression or a violation of that other's rights. If, however, the offer is declined, as it may rightfully be, then persistence, importunity, following and dogging, become unjustif i- able annoyance and obstruction which is likely soon to savor of intimidation. From all of this the person sought to be influenced has a right to be free, and his employer has a right to have him free." American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184, 204 (1921). We have since recognized that the "right to persuade" discussed in that case is protected by the First Amend- ment, Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940), as well as by federal statutes. Yet we have continued to maintain that "no one has a right to press even `good' ideas on an unwilling recipient." Rowan, 397 U. S., at 738. None of our decisions has minimized the enduring importance of "the right to be free" from persistent "importunity, fol- lowing and dogging" after an offer to communicate has been declined. While the freedom to communicate is substantial, "the right of every person `to be let alone' Cite as: 530 U. S. ____ (2000) 13 Opinion of the Court must be placed in the scales with the right of others to communicate." Id., at 736. It is that right, as well as the right of "passage without obstruction," that the Colorado statute legitimately seeks to protect. The restrictions imposed by the Colorado statute only apply to communic a- tions that interfere with these rights rather than those that involve willing listeners. The dissenters argue that we depart from precedent by recognizing a "right to avoid unpopular speech in a public forum," post, at 7 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.); see also post, at 10­14 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). We, of course, are not addressing whether there is such a "right." Rather, we are merely noting that our cases have repeatedly recognized the interests of unwilling listeners in situations where "the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the un- willing viewer or auditor to avoid exposure. See Lehman v. [Shaker Heights, 418 U. S. 298 (1974)]." Erznoznik, 422 U. S., at 209. We explained in Erznoznik that "[t]his Court has considered analogous issues- pitting the First Amen d- ment rights of speakers against the privacy rights of those who may be unwilling viewers or auditors- in a variety of contexts. Such cases demand delicate balancing." Id., at 208 (citations omitted). The dissenters, however, appear to consider recognizing any of the interests of unwilling liste n- ers- let alone balancing those interests against the rights of speakers- to be unconstitutional. Our cases do not support this view.25 - - - - - - 25 Furthermore, whether there is a "right" to avoid unwelcome e x- pression is not before us in this case. The purpose of the Colorado statute is not to protect a potential listener from hearing a particular message. It is to protect those who seek medical treatment from the potential physical and emotional harm suffered when an unwelcome individual delivers a message (whatever its content) by physically approaching an individual at close range, i.e., within eight feet. In offering protection from that harm, while maintaining free access to heath clinics, the State pursues interests constitutionally distinct from 14 HILL v. COLORADO Opinion of the Court III All four of the state court opinions upholding the valid- ity of this statute concluded that it is a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation. Moreover, they all found support for their analysis in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781 (1989).26 It is therefore appropriate to comment on the "content neutrality" of the statute. As we explained in Ward: "The principal inquiry in determining content ne u- trality, in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the gover n- ment has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys." Id., at 791. The Colorado statute passes that test for three indepen d- ent reasons. First, it is not a "regulation of speech." Rather, it is a regulation of the places where some speech may occur. Second, it was not adopted "because of di s- agreement with the message it conveys." This conclusion is supported not just by the Colorado courts' interpretation of legislative history, but more importantly by the State Supreme Court's unequivocal holding that the statute's "restrictions apply equally to all demonstrators, regardless of viewpoint, and the statutory language makes no refe r- ence to the content of the speech."27 Third, the State's interests in protecting access and privacy, and providing - - - - - - the freedom from unpopular speech to which JUSTICE KENNEDY refers. 26 See App. to Pet. for Cert. 32a (Colo. Dist. Ct.); 911 P. 2d, at 673­674 (Colo. Ct. App.); 949 P. 2d, at 109 (Colo. Ct. App.), 973 P. 2d, at 1256 (Colo. Sup. Ct.). 27 Ibid. This observation in Madsen is equally applicable here: "There is no suggestion in this record that Florida law would not equally re- strain similar conduct directed at a target having nothing to do with abortion; none of the restrictions imposed by the court were directed at the contents of petitioner's message." 512 U. S., at 762­763. Cite as: 530 U. S. ____ (2000) 15 Opinion of the Court the police with clear guidelines, are unrelated to the co n- tent of the demonstrators' speech. As we have repeatedly explained, government regulation of expressive activity is "content neutral" if it is justified without reference to the content of regulated speech. See ibid. and cases cited. Petitioners nevertheless argue that the statute is not content neutral insofar as it applies to some oral comm u- nication. The statute applies to all persons who "kno w- ingly approach" within eight feet of another for the pu r- pose of leafletting or displaying signs; for such persons, the content of their oral statements is irrelevant. With respect to persons who are neither leafletters nor sign carriers, however, the statute does not apply unless their approach is "for the purpose of . . . engaging in oral pro- test, education, or counseling." Petitioners contend that an individual near a health care facility who knowingly approaches a pedestrian to say "good morning" or to ra n- domly recite lines from a novel would not be subject to the statute's restrictions.28 Because the content of the oral statements made by an approaching speaker must som e- times be examined to determine whether the knowing approach is covered by the statute, petitioners argue that the law is "content-based" under our reasoning in Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 462 (1980). Although this theory was identified in the complaint, it is not mentioned in any of the four Colorado opinions, all of which concluded that the statute was content neutral. For that reason, it is likely that the argument has been waived. Additionally, the Colorado Attorney General argues that we should assume that the state courts tacitly construed the terms "protest, education, or counseling" to encompass "all communication."29 Instead of relying on - - - - - - 28 See Brief for Petitioners 32, n. 23. 29 "The Colorado Supreme Court's ruling confirms that the statutory 16 HILL v. COLORADO Opinion of the Court those arguments, however, we shall explain why petitio n- ers' contention is without merit and why their reliance on Carey v. Brown is misplaced. It is common in the law to examine the content of a communication to determine the speaker's purpose. Whether a particular statement constitutes a threat, blackmail, an agreement to fix prices, a copyright viol a- tion, a public offering of securities, or an offer to sell goods often depends on the precise content of the statement. We have never held, or suggested, that it is improper to look at the content of an oral or written statement in order to determine whether a rule of law applies to a course of conduct. With respect to the conduct that is the focus of the Colorado statute, it is unlikely that there would often be any need to know exactly what words were spoken in order to determine whether "sidewalk counselors" are engaging in "oral protest, education, or counseling" rather than pure social or random conversation. Theoretically, of course, cases may arise in which it is necessary to review the content of the statements made by a person approaching within eight feet of an unwilling listener to determine whether the approach is covered by the statute. But that review need be no more exten- sive than a determination of whether a general prohibition of "picketing" or "demonstrating" applies to innocuous speech. The regulation of such expressive activities, by definition, does not cover social, random, or other everyday communications. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 600, 1710 (1993) (defining "demonstrate" as "to make a public display of sentiment for or against a person or cause" and "picket" as an effort "to persuade or othe r- - - - - - - language should be interpreted to refer to approaches for all commun i- cation, as Colorado has argued since the beginning of this case." Brief for Respondents 21. Cite as: 530 U. S. ____ (2000) 17 Opinion of the Court wise influence"). Nevertheless, we have never suggested that the kind of cursory examination that might be r e- quired to exclude casual conversation from the coverage of a regulation of picketing would be proble matic.30 In Carey v. Brown we examined a general prohibition of peaceful picketing that contained an exemption for pic k- eting of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute. We concluded that this statute violated the Equal Prote c- tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because it discriminated between lawful and unlawful conduct based on the content of the picketers' messages. That discrimi- nation was impermissible because it accorded preferential treatment to expression concerning one particular subject matter- labor disputes- while prohibiting discussion of all other issues. Although our opinion stressed that "it is the content of the speech that determines whether it is within or without the statute's blunt prohibition," we appended a footnote to that sentence explaining that it was the fact that the statute placed a prohibition on di s- cussion of particular topics, while others were allowed, that was constitutionally repugnant.31 Regulation of the - - - - - - 30 In United States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171 (1983), after examining a federal statute that was "interpreted and applied" as "prohibit[ing] picketing and leafletting, but not other expressive conduct" within the Supreme Court building and grounds, we concluded that "it is clear that the prohibition is facially content-neutral." Id., at 181, n. 10. Similarly, we have recognized that statutes can equally restrict all "picketing." See, e.g., Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 98 (1972) ("This is not to say that all picketing must always be allowed. We have continually recognized that reasonable `time, place, and manner' regulations of picketing may be necessary to further significant governmental inte r- ests"), and cases cited. See also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474 (1988) (upholding a general ban on residential picketing). And our decisions in Schenck and Madsen both upheld injunctions that also prohibited "de m- onstrating." Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western N. Y., 519 U. S. 357, 366, n. 3 (1997); Madsen, 512 U. S., at 759. 31 "It is, of course, no answer to assert that the Illinois statute does 18 HILL v. COLORADO Opinion of the Court subject matter of messages, though not as obnoxious as viewpoint-based regulation, is also an objectionable form of content-based regulation. Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 530, 538 (1980). The Colorado statute's regulation of the location of protests, education, and counseling is easily distinguis h- able from Carey. It places no restrictions on- and clearly does not prohibit- either a particular viewpoint or any subject matter that may be discussed by a speaker. Rather, it simply establishes a minor place restriction on an extremely broad category of communications with unwilling listeners. Instead of drawing distinctions based on the subject that the approaching speaker may wish to address, the statute applies equally to used car salesmen, animal rights activists, fundraisers, environmentalists, and missionaries. Each can attempt to educate unwilling listeners on any subject, but without consent may not approach within eight feet to do so. The dissenters, nonetheless, contend that the statute is not "content neutral." As JUSTICE SCALIA points out, the vice of content-based legislation in this context is that "it lends itself" to being "used for invidious thought-control purposes." Post, at 3. But a statute that restricts certain categories of speech only lends itself to invidious use if there is a significant number of communications, raising the same problem that the statute was enacted to solve, that fall outside the statute's scope, while others fall i n- - - - - - - not discriminate on the basis of the speaker's viewpoint, but only on the basis of the subject matter of his message. `The First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.' " Carey, 447 U. S., at 462, n. 6 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 530, 537 (1980)). Cite as: 53