(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 1999 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus UNITED STATES v. LOCKE, GOVERNOR OF WASHINGTON, ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 98­1701. Argued December 7, 1999- Decided March 6, 2000* After the supertanker Torrey Canyon spilled crude oil off the coast of England in 1967, both Congress, in the Port and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA), and the State of Washington enacted more stringent regulations for tankers and provided for more comprehen- sive remedies in the event of an oil spill. The ensuing question of federal pre-emption of the State's laws was addressed in Ray v. Atlan- tic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151. In 1989, the supertanker Exxon Val- dez ran aground in Alaska, causing the largest oil spill in United States history. Again, both Congress and Washington responded. Congress enacted the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA). The State cre- ated a new agency and directed it to establish standards to provide the "best achievable protection" (BAP) from oil spill damages. That agency promulgated tanker design, equipment, reporting, and oper- ating requirements. Petitioner International Association of Inde- pendent Tanker Owners (Intertanko), a trade association of tanker operators, brought this suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state and local officials responsible for enforcing the BAP regulations. Upholding the regulations, the District Court rejected Intertanko's arguments that the BAP standards invaded an area long pre-empted by the Federal Government. At the appeal stage, the United States intervened on Intertanko's behalf, contending that the District Court's ruling failed to give sufficient weight to the substan- - - - - - - * Together with No. 98­1706, International Association of Independ- ent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Locke, Governor of Washington, et al., also on certiorari to the same court. 2 UNITED STATES v. LOCKE Syllabus tial foreign affairs interests of the Federal Government. The Ninth Circuit held that the State could enforce its laws, save one requiring vessels to install certain navigation and towing equipment, which was "virtually identical to" requirements declared pre-empted in Ray. Held: Washington's regulations regarding general navigation watch procedures, crew English language skills and training, and maritime casualty reporting are pre-empted by the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme governing oil tankers; the case is remanded so the validity of other Washington regulations may be assessed in light of the considerable federal interest at stake. Pp. 6­25. (a) The State has enacted legislation in an area where the federal interest has been manifest since the beginning of the Republic and is now well established. Congress has, beginning with the Tank Vessel Act of 1936, enacted a series of statutes pertaining to maritime tanker transports. These include the PWSA, Title I of which author- izes, but does not require, the Coast Guard to enact measures for con- trolling vessel traffic or for protecting navigation and the marine en- vironment, 33 U. S. C. §1223(a), and Title II of which, as amended, requires the Coast Guard to issue regulations addressing the design, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel qualification, and manning of covered vessels, 46 U. S. C. §3703(a). Congress later enacted OPA, Title I of which, among other things, imposes liability for both removal costs and damages on par- ties responsible for an oil spill, 33 U. S. C. §2702, and includes two saving clauses preserving the States' authority to impose additional liability, requirements, and penalties, §§2718(a) and (c). Congress has also ratified international agreements in this area, including the International Convention of Standards of Training Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW). Pp. 6­11. (b) In Ray, the Court held that the PWSA and Coast Guard regula- tions promulgated under that Act pre-empted Washington's pilotage requirement, limitation on tanker size, and tanker design and con- struction rules. The Ray Court's interpretation of the PWSA is cor- rect and controlling here. Its basic analytic structure explains why federal pre-emption analysis applies to the challenged regulations and allows scope and due recognition for the traditional authority of the States and localities to regulate some matters of local concern. In narrowing the pre-emptive effect given the PWSA in Ray, the Ninth Circuit placed more weight on OPA's saving clauses than they can bear. Like Title I of OPA, in which they are found, the saving clauses are limited to regulations governing liability and compensation for oil pollution, and do not extend to rules regulating vessel operation, de- sign, or manning. Thus, the pre-emptive effect of the PWSA and its regulations is not affected by OPA, and Ray`s holding survives OPA's Cite as: 529 U. S. ____ (2000) 3 Syllabus enactment undiminished. The Ray Court's prefatory observation that an "assumption" that the States' historic police powers were not to be superseded by federal law unless that was the clear and manifest congressional purpose does not mean that a presumption against pre- emption aids the Court's analysis here. An assumption of nonpre- emption is not triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal presence. The Ray Court held, among other things, that Congress, in PWSA Title I, pre- served state authority to regulate the peculiarities of local waters, such as depth and narrowness, if there is no conflict with federal regulatory determinations, see 435 U. S., at 171­172, 178, but fur- ther held that Congress, in PWSA Title II, mandated uniform federal rules on the subjects or matters there specified, id., at 168. Thus, under Ray's interpretation of the Title II provision now found at 46 U. S. C. §3703(a), only the Federal Government may regulate the de- sign, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equip- ping, personnel qualification, and manning of tankers. The Court to- day reaffirms Ray's holding on this point. Congress has left no room for state regulation of these matters. See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141. Although the Ray Court ac- knowledged that the existence of some overlapping coverage between the two PWSA titles may make it difficult to determine whether a pre-emption question is controlled by conflict pre-emption principles, applicable generally to Title I, or by field pre-emption rules, applica- ble generally to Title II, the Court declined to resolve every question by the greater pre-emptive force of Title II. Thus, conflict pre- emption will be applicable in some, although not all, cases. Useful inquiries in determining which title governs include whether the regulation in question is justified by conditions unique to a particular port or waterway, see Ray, supra, at 175, or whether it is of limited extraterritorial effect, not requiring the tanker to modify its primary conduct outside the specific body of water purported to justify the lo- cal rule, see id., at 159­160, 171. Pp. 11­20. (c) The field pre-emption rule surrounding PWSA Title II and 46 U. S. C. §3703(a) and the superseding effect of additional federal statutes are illustrated by the pre-emption of four of Washington's tanker regulations, the attempted reach of which is well demon- strated by the briefs and record. First, the imposition of a series of training requirements on a tanker's crew does not address matters unique to Washington waters, but imposes requirements that control the staffing, operation, and manning of a tanker outside of those wa- ters. The training and drill requirements pertain to "operation" and "personnel qualifications" and so are pre-empted by §3703(a). That training is a field reserved to the Federal Government is further con- 4 UNITED STATES v. LOCKE Syllabus firmed by the circumstance that the STCW Convention addresses crew "training" and "qualification" requirements, and that the United States has enacted crew training regulations. Second, the imposition of English language proficiency requirements on a tanker's crew is not limited to governing local traffic or local peculiarities. It is pre- empted by §3703(a) as a "personnel qualification" and by 33 U. S. C. §1228(a)(7), which requires that any vessel operating in United States waters have at least one licensed deck officer on the naviga- tion bridge who is capable of clearly understanding English. Third, Washington's general requirement that the navigation watch consist of at least two licensed deck officers, a helmsman, and a lookout is pre-empted as an attempt to regulate a tanker's "operation" and "manning" under §3703(a). Fourth, the requirement that vessels in Washington waters report certain marine casualties regardless of where in the world they occurred cannot stand in light of Coast Guard regulations on the same subject that Congress intended be the sole source of a vessel's reporting obligations, see 46 U. S. C. §§6101, 3717(a)(4). On remand, Washington may argue that certain of its regulations, such as its watch requirement in times of restricted visi- bility, are of limited extraterritorial effect, are necessary to address the peculiarities of Puget Sound, and therefore are not subject to Ti- tle II field pre-emption, but should instead be evaluated under Title I conflict pre-emption analysis. Pp. 20­24. (d) It is preferable that petitioners' substantial arguments as to pre-emption of the remaining Washington regulations be considered by the Ninth Circuit or by the District Court within the framework this Court has herein discussed. The United States did not partici- pate in these cases until appeal, and resolution of the litigation would benefit from the development of a full record by all interested parties. If, pending adjudication on remand, Washington threatens to begin enforcing its regulations, the lower courts would weigh any stay ap- plication under the appropriate legal standards in light of the princi- ples discussed herein and with recognition of the national interests at stake. Ultimately, it is largely for Congress and the Coast Guard to confront whether their regulatory scheme, which demands a high de- gree of uniformity, is adequate. States, as well as environmental groups and local port authorities, will participate in the process. See 46 U. S. C. §3703(a). Pp. 24­25. 148 F. 3d 1053, reversed and remanded. KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Cite as: 529 U. S. ____ (2000) 1 Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash- ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ Nos. 98­1701 and 98­1706 _________________ UNITED STATES, PETITIONER 98­1701 v. GARY LOCKE, GOVERNOR OF WASHINGTON, ET AL. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT TANKER OWNERS (INTERTANKO), PETITIONER 98­1706 v. GARY LOCKE, GOVERNOR OF WASHINGTON, ET AL. ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT [March 6, 2000] JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. The maritime oil transport industry presents ever- present, all too real dangers of oil spills from tanker ships, spills which could be catastrophes for the marine env i- ronment. After the supertanker Torrey Canyon spilled its cargo of 120,000 tons of crude oil off the coast of Cornwall, England, in 1967, both Congress and the State of Was h- ington enacted more stringent regulations for these tan k- ers and provided for more comprehensive remedies in the event of an oil spill. The ensuing question of federal pre- emption of the State's laws was addressed by the Court in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151 (1978). In 1989, the supertanker Exxon Valdez ran aground in 2 UNITED STATES v. LOCKE Opinion of the Court Prince William Sound, Alaska, and its cargo of more than 53 million gallons of crude oil caused the largest oil spill in United States history. Again, both Congress and the State of Washington responded. Congress enacted new stat u- tory provisions, and Washington adopted regulations governing tanker operations and design. Today we must determine whether these more recent state laws can stand despite the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme governing oil tankers. Relying on the same federal statute that controlled the analysis in Ray, we hold that some of the State's regulations are pre-empted; as to the balance of the regulations, we remand the case so their validity may be assessed in light of the considerable federal interest at stake and in conformity with the principles we now discuss. I The State of Washington embraces some of the Nation's most significant waters and coastal regions. Its Pacific Ocean seacoast consists, in large part, of wave-exposed rocky headlands separated by stretches of beach. Was h- ington borders as well on the Columbia River estuary, dividing Washington from Oregon. Two other large est u- aries, Grays Harbor and Willapa Bay, are also within Washington's waters. Of special significance in this case is the inland sea of Puget Sound, a 2,500 square mile body of water consisting of inlets, bays, and channels. More than 200 islands are located within the sound, and it sustains fisheries and plant and animal life of immense value to the Nation and to the world. Passage from the Pacific Ocean to the quieter Puget Sound is through the Strait of Juan de Fuca, a channel 12 miles wide and 65 miles long which divides Washington from the Canadian Province of British Columbia. The international boundary is located midchannel. Access to Vancouver, Canada's largest port, is through the strait. Cite as: 529 U. S. ____ (2000) 3 Opinion of the Court Traffic inbound from the Pacific Ocean, whether destined to ports in the United States or Canada, is routed through Washington's waters; outbound traffic, whether from a port in Washington or