(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 1999 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus SHALALA, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL. v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON LONG TERM CARE, INC. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 98­1109. Argued November 8, 1999- Decided February 29, 2000 Under the Medicare Act's special review provisions, a nursing home that is "dissatisfied . . . with a determination described in subsection (b)(2)" is "entitled to a hearing . . . to the same extent as is provided in" the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. §405(b), "and to judicial review of the Secretary's final decision after such hearing as is provided in section 405(g) . . . ." 42 U. S. C. §1395cc(h)(1) (emphasis added). The cross-referenced subsection (b)(2) gives petitioner Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) power to terminate a provider agreement with a home where, for example, she determines that a home has failed to comply substantially with the statute and the regulations. The cross-referenced §405(b) describes the administrative hearing to which a "dissatisfied" home is entitled, and the cross-referenced §405(g) provides that the home may obtain federal district court re- view of the Secretary's "final decision . . . made after a hearing . . . ." Section 405(h), a provision of the Social Security Act incorporated into the Medicare Act by 42 U. S. C. §1395ii, provides that "[n]o ac- tion . . . to recover on any claim arising under" the Medicare laws shall be "brought under [28 U. S. C. §]1331." It channels most, if not all, Medicare claims through this special review system. Respondent, the Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc. (Council), an association of nursing homes, did not rely on these provisions when it filed suit against, inter alios, petitioners (hereinafter Secretary), challenging the validity of Medicare regulations that impose sanctions or reme- dies on nursing homes that violate certain substantive standards. Rather, it invoked federal-question jurisdiction, 28 U. S. C. §1331. In dismissing for lack of jurisdiction, the Federal District Court found 2 SHALALA v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON LONG TERM CARE, INC. Syllabus that 42 U. S. C. §405(h), as interpreted in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, and Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U. S. 602, barred a §1331 suit. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Bowen v. Michigan Acad- emy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, had significantly modified such earlier case law. Held: Section 405(h), as incorporated by §1395ii, bars federal-question jurisdiction here. Pp. 6­21. (a) Section 405(h) purports to make exclusive §405(g)'s judicial re- view method. While its "to recover on any claim arising under" lan- guage plainly bars §1331 review where an individual challenges on any legal ground the agency's denial of a monetary benefit under the Social Security and Medicare Acts, the question here is whether an anticipatory challenge to the lawfulness of a policy, regulation, or statute that might later bar recovery or authorize imposition of a penalty is also an action "to recover on any claim arising under" those Acts. Pp. 6­7. (b) Were the Court not to take account of Michigan Academy, §405(h), as interpreted in Salfi and Ringer, would clearly bar this §1331 lawsuit. The Court found in the latter cases that §405(h) ap- plies where "both the standing and the substantive basis for the presentation" of a claim is the Social Security Act, Salfi, supra, at 760­761, or the Medicare Act, Ringer, 466 U. S., at 615. All aspects of a present or future benefits claim must be channeled though the administrative process. Id., at 621­622. As so interpreted, §405(h)'s bar reaches beyond ordinary administrative law principles of "ripe- ness" and "exhaustion of administrative remedies"- doctrines that normally require channeling a legal challenge through the agency- by preventing the application of exceptions to those doctrines. This nearly absolute channeling requirement assures the agency greater opportunity to apply, interpret, or revise policies, regulations, or statutes without possibly premature interference by individual courts applying "ripeness" and "exhaustion" exceptions case by case. The assurance comes at the price of occasional individual, delay-related hardship, but paying such a price in the context of a massive, com- plex health and safety program such as Medicare was justified in the judgment of Congress as understood in Salfi and Ringer. Salfi and Ringer cannot be distinguished from the instant case. They them- selves foreclose distinctions based upon the "potential future" versus "actual present" nature of the claim, the "general legal" versus the "fact-specific" nature of the challenge, the "collateral" versus the "non-collateral" nature of the issues, or the "declaratory" versus "in- junctive" nature of the relief sought. Nor can the Court accept a dis- tinction that limits §405(h)'s scope to claims for monetary benefits or that involve "amounts," as neither the language nor the purposes of Cite as: 529 U. S. ____ (2000) 3 Syllabus §405 support such a distinction. Neither McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U. S. 479, nor Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, supports the Council's effort to distinguish Salfi and Ringer. The Court's approval of a §1331 suit against the Immigration and Natu- ralization Service in McNary rested on the different language of the immigration statute. And Eldridge was a case in which the respon- dent had complied with, not disregarded, the Social Security Act's special review procedures- specifically the nonwaivable and nonex- cusable requirement that an individual present a claim to the agency before raising it in court. The upshot is that the Council's argument must rest primarily upon Michigan Academy. Pp. 7­12. (c) Michigan Academy did not, contrary to the Court of Appeals' holding, modify the Court's earlier holdings by limiting §405(h)'s scope, as incorporated by §1395ii, to "amount determinations." That case involved the lawfulness of HHS regulations governing proce- dures used to calculate Medicare Part B benefits; and the Medicare statute, as it then existed, did not provide for §405(g) review of such decisions. The Court ruled that this silence did not itself foreclose §1331 review. In response to the argument that §405(h) barred §1331 review, the Court declined to pass in the abstract on the meaning of §405(h) because that section was made applicable to the Medicare Act "to the same extent as" it is applicable to the Social Se- curity Act by virtue of 42 U. S. C. §1395ii. The Court interpreted that phrase to foreclose application of §405(h) where its application would preclude judicial review rather than channeling it through the agency. As limited by the Court of Appeals, Michigan Academy would have overturned or dramatically limited earlier precedents such as Salfi and Ringer, and would have created a hardly justifiable distinction between "amount determinations" and many similar HHS determinations. This Court does not normally overturn, or so dra- matically limit, earlier authority sub silentio, and it did not do so here. Pp. 12­17. (d) The Council's argument that it falls within the Michigan Acad- emy exception because it can obtain no review at all unless it can ob- tain §1331 review is unconvincing. It argues that review is available only after the Secretary terminates a home's provider agreement. But in her brief and regulations, the Secretary offers a legally per- missible interpretation of the statute: that it permits a dissatisfied nursing home to have an administrative hearing on a determination that it has failed to comply substantially with the statute, agree- ments, or regulations, whether termination or some other remedy is imposed. See, e.g., Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources De- fense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843. The Secretary also denies that she engages in any practice that forces a home to submit a corrective 4 SHALALA v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON LONG TERM CARE, INC. Syllabus plan and sacrifice appeal rights in order to avoid termination, or that penalizes more severely a home that chooses to appeal. Because the Council offers no convincing reason to doubt her description of the agency's practice, the Court need not decide whether a practice that forced homes to abandon legitimate challenges could amount to the practical equivalent of a total denial of judicial review. If, as the Council argues, the regulations unlawfully limit the extent to which the agency will provide the administrative review channel leading to judicial review, its members remain free, after following the special review route, to contest in court the lawfulness of the relevant regu- lation or statute. That is true even if the agency does not or cannot resolve the particular contention, because it is the "action" arising under the Medicare Act that must be channeled through the agency. The Council finally argues that, as an association speaking on behalf of its injured members, it has no standing to take advantage of the special review channel. However, it is the members' rights to review that are at stake, and the statutes creating the special review chan- nel adequately protect those rights. Pp. 17­21. 143 F. 3d 1072, reversed. BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., and SCALIA, J., filed dissenting opinions. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS and KENNEDY, JJ., joined, and in which SCALIA, J., joined except as to Part III. Cite as: 529 U. S. ____ (2000) 1 Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash- ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 98­1109 _________________ DONNA E. SHALALA, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON LONG TERM CARE, INC. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT [February 29, 2000] JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. The question before us is one of jurisdiction. An associa- tion of nursing homes sued, inter alios, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) and another federal party (hereinafter Secretary) in Federal District Court claiming that certain Medicare-related regulations vi o- lated various statutes and the Constitution. The associ a- tion invoked the court's federal-question jurisdiction, 28 U. S. C. §1331. The District Court dismissed the suit on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction. It believed that a set of special statutory provisions creates a separate, virtually exclusive, system of administrative and judicial review for denials of Medicare claims; and it held that one of those provisions explicitly barred a §1331 suit. See 42 U. S. C. §1395ii (incorporating to the Medicare Act 4 2 U. S. C. §405(h), which provides that "[n]o action . . . to recover on any claim" arising under the Medicare laws shall be "brought under section 1331 . . . of title 28"). The Court of Appeals, however, reversed. We conclude that the statutory provision at issue, 2 SHALALA v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON LONG TERM CARE, INC. Opinion of the Court §405(h), as incorporated by §1395ii, bars federal-question jurisdiction here. The association or its members must proceed instead through the special review channel that the Medicare statutes create. See 42 U. S. C. §1395cc(h); §1395cc(b)(2)(A); §1395ii; §§405(b), (g), (h). IA We begin by describing the regulations that the associ a- tion's lawsuit attacks. Medicare Act Part A provides payment to nursing homes which provide care to Medicare beneficiaries after a stay in hospital. To receive payment, a home must enter into a provider agreement with the Secretary of HHS, and it must comply with numerous statutory and regulatory requirements. State and federal agencies enforce those requirements through inspections. Inspectors report violations, called "deficiencies." And "deficiencies" lead to the imposition of sanctions or "rem e- dies." See generally §§1395i­3, 1395cc. The regulations at issue focus on the imposition of sanctions or remedies. They were promulgated in 1994, 59 Fed. Reg. 56116, pursuant to a 1987 law that tightened the substantive standards that Medicare (and Medicaid) imposed upon nursing homes and that significantly broa d- ened the Secretary's authority to impose remedies upon violators. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, §§4201­4218, 101 Stat. 1330­160 to 1330­221 (codified as amended at 42 U. S. C. §1395i­3 (1994 ed. and Supp. III)). The remedial regulations (and a related manual) in effect tell Medicare-administering agencies how to impose remedies after inspectors find that a nursing home has violated substantive standards. They divide a nursing home's deficiencies into three categories of seriousness depending upon a deficiency's severity, its prevalence at the home, its relation with other deficiencies, and the home's compliance history. Within each category they list Cite as: 529 U. S. ____ (2000) 3 Opinion of the Court a set of remedies that the agency may, or must, impose. Where, for example, deficiencies "immediately jeopardize the health or safety of . . . residents," the Secretary must terminate the home's provider agreement or appoint new, temporary management. Where deficiencies are less serious, the Secretary may impose lesser remedies, such as civil penalties, transfer of residents, denial of some or all payment, state monitoring, and the like. Where a nursing home, though deficient in some respects, is in "[s]ubstantial compliance," i.e., where its deficiencies do no more than create a "potential for causing minimal harm," the Secretary will impose no sanction or remedy at all. See generally 42 U. S. C. §1395i­3(h); 42 CFR §488.301 (1998); §488.400 et seq.; App. 54, 66 (Manual). The statute and regulations also create various review procedures. 42 U. S. C. §§1395cc(b)(2)(A), (h); 42 CFR §431.151 et seq. (1998); §488.408(g); 42 CFR pt. 498 (1998). The association's complaint filed in Federal District Court attacked the regulations as unlawful in four basic ways. In its view: (1) certain terms, e.g., "substantial compliance" and "minimal harm," are unconstitutionally vague; (2) the regulations and manual, particularly as implemented, violate statutory requirements seeking enforcement consistency, 42 U. S. C. §1395i­3(g)(2)(D), and exceed the legislative mandate of the Medicare Act; (3) the regulations create administrative procedures i n- consistent with the Federal Constitution's Due Process Clause; and (4) the manual and other agency publications create legislative rules that were not promulgated consi s- tent with the Administrative Procedure Act's demands for "notice and comment" and a statement of "basis and pu r- pose," 5 U. S. C. §553. See App. 18­19, 27­38, 43­49 (Amended Complaint). B We next describe the two competing jurisdictional 4 SHALALA v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON LONG TERM CARE, INC. Opinion of the Court routes through which the association arguably might seek to mount its legal attack. The route it has followed, fe d- eral-question jurisdiction, is set forth in 28 U. S. C. §1331, which simply states that "district courts shall have origi- nal jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Co n- stitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." The route that it did not follow, the special Medicare review route, is set forth in a complex set of statutory provisions, which must be read together. See Appendix, infra. The Medicare Act says that a home "dissatisfied . . . with a determination described in subsection (b)(2) . . . shall be entitled to a hearing . . . to the same extent as is provided in [the Social Sec u- rity Act, 42 U. S. C. §]405(b) . . . and to judicial review of the Secretary's final decision after such hearing as is provided in section 405(g) . . . ." 42 U. S. C. §1395cc(h)(1) (emphasis added). The cross-referenced subsection (b)(2) gives the Secr e- tary power to terminate an agreement where, for example, the Secretary "has determined that the provider fails to comply sub- stantially with the provisions [of the Medicare Act] and regulations thereunder . . . ." §1395cc(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). The cross-referenced §405(b) describes the nature of the administrative hearing to which the Medicare Act entitles a home that is "dissatisfied" with the Secretary's "deter- mination." The cross-referenced §405(g) provides that a "dissatisfied" home may obtain judicial review in federal district court of "any final decision of the [Secretary] made after a hearing . . . ." Separate statutes provide for ad- ministrative and judicial review of civil monetary penalty assessments. §1395i­3(h)(2)(B)(ii); §§1320a­7a(c)(2), (e). A related Social Security Act provision, 42 U. S. C. Cite as: 529 U. S. ____ (2000) 5 Opinion of the Court §405(h), channels most, if not all, Medicare claims, through this special review system. It says: "(h) Finality of [Secretary's] decision. "The findings and decision of the [Secretary] after a hearing shall be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such hearing. No findings of fact or decision of the [Secretary] shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided. No action against the United States, the [Secretary], or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under section 1331 or 1346 [federal defe n- dant jurisdiction] of title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter." (Emphasis added.) Title 42 U. S. C. §1395ii makes §405(h) applicable to the Medicare Act "to the same extent as" it applies to the Social Security Act. C The case before us began when the Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc. (Council), an association of about 200 Illinois nursing homes participating in the Medicare (or Medicaid) program, filed the complaint we have d e- scribed, supra, at 3, in Federal District Court. (Medicaid is not at issue in this Court.) The District Court, as we have said, dismissed the complaint for lack of federal-question jurisdiction. No. 96 C 2953 (ND Ill., Mar. 31, 1997), App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a, 15a. In doing so, the court relied upon §405(h) as interpreted by this Court in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975), and Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U. S. 602 (1984). App to Pet. for Cert. 15a­19a. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal. 143 F. 3d 1072 (CA7 1998). In its view, a later case, Bowen v. Michi- gan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667 (1986), had significantly modified this Court's earlier case law. Other Circuits have understood Michigan Academy differ- 6 SHALALA v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON LONG TERM CARE, INC. Opinion of the Court ently. See Michigan Assn. of Homes and Servs. for the Aging v. Shalala, 127 F. 3d 496, 500­501 (CA6 1997); American Academy of Dermatology v. HHS, 118 F. 3d 1495, 1499­1501 (CA11 1997); St. Francis Medical Center v. Shalala, 32 F. 3d 805, 812­813 (CA3 1994), cert. denied, 514 U. S. 1016 (1995); Farkas v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 24 F. 3d 853, 855­860 (CA6 1994); Abbey v. Sullivan, 978 F. 2d 37, 41­44 (CA2 1992); National Kidney Patients Assn. v. Sullivan, 958 F. 2d 1127, 1130­1134 (CADC 1992), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 1049 (1993). We granted certiorari to resolve those differences. II Section 405(h) purports to make exclusive the judicial review method set forth in §405(g). Its second sentence says that "[n]o findings of fact or decision of the [Secr e- tary] shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or go v- ernmental agency except as herein provided." §405(h). Its third sentence, directly at issue here, says that "[n]o action against the United States, the [Secretary], or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under section 1331 or 1346 of title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter." (Emphasis added.) The scope of the italicized language "to recover on any claim arising under" the Social Security (or, as incorp o- rated through §1395ii, the Medicare) Act is, if read alone, uncertain. Those words clearly apply in a typical Social Security or Medicare benefits case, where an individual seeks a monetary benefit from the agency (say a disability payment, or payment for some medical procedure), the agency denies the benefit and the individual challenges the lawfulness of that denial. The statute plainly bars §1331 review in such a case, irrespective of whether the individual challenges the agency's denial on evidentiary, rule-related, statutory, constitutional, or other legal grounds. But does the statute's bar apply when one who Cite as: 529 U. S. ____ (2000) 7 Opinion of the Court might later seek money or some other benefit from (or contest the imposition of a penalty by) the agency cha l- lenges in advance (in a §1331 action) the lawfulness of a policy, regulation, or statute that might later bar recovery of that benefit (or authorize the imposition of the penalty)? Suppose, as here, a group of such individuals, needing advance knowledge for planning purposes, together bring a §1331 action challenging such a rule or regulation on general legal grounds. Is such an action one "to recover on any claim arising under" the Social Security or Medicare Acts? That, in effect, is the question before us. III In answering the question, we temporarily put the case on which the Court of Appeals relied, Michigan Academy, supra, to the side. Were we not to take account of that case, §405(h) as interpreted by the Court's earlier cases of Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, and Heckler v. Ringer, supra, would clearly bar this §1331 lawsuit. In Salfi, a mother and a daughter, filing on behalf of themselves and a class of individuals, brought a §1331 action challenging the constitutionality of a statutory provision that, if valid, would deny them Social Security benefits. See 42 U. S. C. §§416(c)(5), (e)(2) (imposing a duration-of-relationship Social Security eligibility r e- quirement for surviving wives and stepchildren of d e- ceased wage earners). The mother and daughter had appeared before the agency but had not completed its processes. The class presumably included some who had, and some who had not, appeared before the agency; the complaint did not say. This Court held that §405(h) barred §1331 jurisdiction for all members of the class because "it is the Social Security Act which provides both the standing and the substantive basis for the present a- tion of th[e] constitutional contentions." Salfi, supra, at 760­761. The Court added that the bar applies "irrespe c- 8 SHALALA v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON LONG TERM CARE, INC. Opinion of the Court tive of whether resort to judicial processes is necessitated by discretionary decisions of the Secretary or by his no n- discretionary application of allegedly unconstitutional statutory restrictions." 422 U. S., at 762. It also pointed out that the bar did not "preclude constitutional cha l- lenges," but simply "require[d] that they be brought" under the same "jurisdictional grants" and "in conformity with the same standards" applicable "to nonconstitutional claims arising under the Act." Ibid. We concede that the Court also pointed to certain sp e- cial features of the case not present here. The plaintiff class had asked for relief that included a direction to the Secretary to pay Social Security benefits to those entitled to them but for the challenged provision. See id., at 761. And the Court thought this fact helped make clear that the action arose "under the Act whose benefits [were] sought." Ibid. But in a later case, Ringer, the Court reached a similar result despite the absence of any request for such relief. See 466 U. S., at 616, 623. In Ringer, four individuals brought a §1331 action cha l- lenging the lawfulness (under statutes and the Constit u- tion) of the agency's determination not to provide Med i- care Part A reimbursement to those who had undergone a particular medical operation. The Court held that §405(h) barred §1331 jurisdiction over the action, even though the challenge was in part to the agency's procedures, the relief requested amounted simply to a declaration of invalidity (not an order requiring payment), and one plaintiff had as yet no valid claim for reimbursement because he had not even undergone the operation and would likely never do so unless a court set aside as unlawful the challenged agency "no reimbursement" determination. See id., at 614­616, 621­623. The Court reiterated that §405(h) applies where "both the standing and the substantive basis for the pre s- entation" of a claim is the Medicare Act, id., at 615 (quot- ing Salfi, 422 U. S., at 760­761) (internal quotation marks Cite as: 529 U. S. ____ (2000) 9 Opinion of the Court omitted), adding that a "claim for future benefits" is a §405(h) "claim," 466 U. S., at 621­622, and that "all a s- pects" of any such present or future claim must be "cha n- neled" through the administrative process, id., at 614. See also Your Home Visiting Nurse Services, Inc. v. Shalala, 525 U. S. 449, 456 (1999); Califano v. Sanders, 430 U. S. 99, 103­104, n. 3 (1977). As so interpreted, the bar of §405(h) reac hes beyond ordinary administrative law principles of "ripeness" and "exhaustion of administrative remedies," see Salfi, supra, at 757- doctrines that in any event normally require channeling a legal challenge through the agency. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 148­149 (1967) (ripeness); McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 193­196 (1969) (exhaustion). Indeed, in this very case, the Seventh Circuit held that several of respondent's claims were not ripe and remanded for ripeness review of the remainder. 143 F. 3d, at 1077­1078. Doctrines of "rip e- ness" and "exhaustion" contain exceptions, however, which exceptions permit early review when, for example, the legal question is "fit" for resolution and delay means har d- ship, see Abbott Laboratories, supra, at 148­149, or when exhaustion would prove "futile," see McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U. S. 140, 147­148 (1992); McKart, supra, at 197­201. (And sometimes Congress expressly authorizes pre- enforcement review, though not here. See, e.g., 15 U. S. C. §2618(a)(1)(A) (Toxic Substances Control Act).) Insofar as §405(h) prevents application of the "ripeness" and "exhaustion" exceptions, i.e., insofar as it demands the "channeling" of virtually all legal attacks through the agency, it assures the agency greater opportunity to apply, interpret, or revise policies, regulations, or statutes wit h- out possibly premature interference by different individual courts applying "ripeness" and "exhaustion" exceptions case by case. But this assurance comes at a price, namely, occasional individual, delay-related hardship. In the 10 SHALALA v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON LONG TERM CARE, INC. Opinion of the Court context of a massive, complex health and safety program such as Medicare, embodied in hundreds of pages of sta t- utes and thousands of pages of often interrelated regul a- tions, any of which may become the subject of a legal challenge in any of several different courts, paying this price may seem justified. In any event, such was the judgment of Congress as understood in Salfi and Ringer. See Ringer, 466 U. S., at 627; Salfi, supra, at 762. Despite the urging of the Council and supporting amici, we cannot distinguish Salfi and Ringer from the case before us. Those cases themselves foreclose distinctions based upon the "potential future" versus the "actual pre s- ent" nature of the claim, the "general legal" versus the "fact-specific" nature of the challenge, the "collateral" versus "non-collateral" nature of the issues, or the "d e- claratory" versus "injunctive" nature of the relief sought. Nor can we accept a distinction that limits the scope of §405(h) to claims for monetary benefits. Claims for money, claims for other benefits, claims of program elig i- bility, and claims that contest a sanction or remedy may all similarly rest upon individual fact-related circu m- stances, may all similarly dispute agency policy determ i- nations, or may all similarly involve the application, i n- terpretation, or constitutionality of interrelated regulations or statutory provisions. There is no reason to distinguish among them in terms of the language or in terms of the purposes of §405(h). Section 1395ii's blanket incorporation of that provision into the Medicare Act as a whole certainly contains no such distinction. Nor for similar reasons can we here limit those provisions to claims that involve "amounts." The Council cites two other cases in support of its efforts to distinguish Salfi and Ringer: McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U. S. 479 (1991), and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976). In Haitian Refugee Center, the Court held permissible a §1331 challenge to "a group of decisions Cite as: 529 U. S. ____ (2000) 11 Opinion of the Court or a practice or procedure employed in making decisions" despite an immigration statute that barred §1331 cha l- lenges to any Immigration and Naturalization Service " `determination respecting an application for adjustment of status' " under the Special Agricultural Workers' pro- gram. 498 U. S., at 491­498. Haitian Refugee Center's outcome, however, turned on the different language of that different statute. Indeed, the Court suggested that statu- tory language similar to the language at issue here- any claim "arising under" the Medicare or Social Security Acts, §405(h)- would have led it to a different legal conclusion. See id., at 494 (using as an example a statute precluding review of " `all causes . . . arising under any of' " the immi- gration statutes). In Eldridge, the Court held permissible a District Court lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of agency proc e- dures authorizing termination of Social Security disability payments without a pretermination hearing. See 424 U. S., at 326­332. Eldridge, however, is a case in which the Court found that the respondent had followed the special review procedures set forth in §405(g), thereby complying with, rather than disregarding, the strictures of §405(h). See id., at 326­327 (holding jurisdiction available only under §405(g)). The Court characterized the constit u- tional issue the respondent raised as "collateral" to his claim for benefits, but it did so as a basis for requiring the agency to excuse, where the agency would not do so on its own, see Salfi, 422 U. S., at 766­767, some (but not all) of the procedural steps set forth in §405(g). 424 U. S., at 329­332 (identifying collateral nature of the claim and irreparable injury as reasons to excuse §405(g)'s exhau s- tion requirements); see also Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U. S. 467, 483­485 (1986) (noting that Eldridge factors are not to be mechanically applied). The Court nonetheless held that §405(g) contains the nonwaivable and nonexcu s- able requirement that an individual present a claim to the 12 SHALALA v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON LONG TERM CARE, INC. Opinion of the Court agency before raising it in court. See Ringer, supra, at 622; Eldridge, supra, at 329; Salfi, supra, at 763­764. The Council has not done so here, and thus cannot establish jurisdiction under §405(g). The upshot is that without Michigan Academy the Council cannot win. Its precedent-based argument must rest primarily upon that case. IV The Court of Appeals held that Michigan Academy modified the Court's earlier holdings by limiting the scope of "1395ii and therefore §405(h)" to "amount determin a- tions." 143 F. 3d, at 1075­1076. But we do not agree. Michigan Academy involved a §1331 suit challenging the lawfulness of HHS regulations that governed procedures used to calculate benefits under Medicare Part B- which Part provides voluntary supplementary medical insu r- ance, e.g., for doctors' fees. See Michigan Academy, 476 U. S., at 674­675; United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U. S. 201, 202­203 (1982). The Medicare statute, as it then existed, provided for only limited review of Part B dec i- sions. It allowed the equivalent of §405(g) review for "eligibility" determinations. See 42 U. S. C. §1395ff(b) (1)(B) (1982 ed.). It required private insurance carriers (administering the Part B program) to provide a "fair hearing" for disputes about Part B "amount determin a- tions." §1395u(b)(3)(C). But that was all. Michigan Academy first discussed the statute's total silence about review of "challenges mounted against the method by which . . . amounts are to be determined." 476 U. S., at 675. It held that this silence meant that, a l- though review was not available under §405(g), the silence did not itself foreclose other forms of review, say review in a court action brought under §1331. See id., at 674­678. Cf. Erika, supra, at 208 (holding that the Medicare Part B statute's explicit reference to carrier hearings for amount Cite as: 529 U. S. ____ (2000) 13 Opinion of the Court disputes does foreclose all further agency or court review of "amount determinations"). The Court then asked whether §405(h) barred 28 U. S. C. §1331 review of challenges to methodology. Not- ing the Secretary's Salfi/Ringer-based argument that §405(h) barred §1331 review of all challenges arising under the Medicare Act and the respondents' counter- argument that §405(h) barred challenges to "methods" only where §405(g) review was available, see Michigan Academy, 476 U. S., at 679, the Court wrote: "Whichever may be the better reading of Salfi and Ringer, we need not pass on the meaning of §405(h) in the abstract to resolve this case. Section 405(h) does not apply on its own terms to Part B of the Medicare program, but is instead incorporated mutatis mutan- dis by §1395ii. The legislative history of both the sta t- ute establishing the Medicare program and the 1972 amendments thereto provides specific evidence of Congress' intent to foreclose review only of `amount determinations' - i.e., those [matters] . . . remitted fi- nally and exclusively to adjudication by private insu r- ance carriers in a `fair hearing.' By the same token, matters which Congress did not delegate to private carriers, such as challenges to the validity of the Se c- retary's instructions and regulations, are cognizable in courts of law." Id., at 680 (footnote omitted). The Court's words do not limit the scope of §405(h) itself to instances where a plaintiff, invoking §1331, seeks r e- view of an "amount determination." Rather, the Court said that it would "not pass on the meaning of §405(h) in the abstract." Ibid. (emphasis added). Instead it focused upon the Medicare Act's cross-referencing provision, §1395ii, which makes §405(h) applicable "to the same extent as" it is "applicable" to the Social Security Act. (Emphasis added). It interpreted that phrase as applying 14 SHALALA v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON LONG TERM CARE, INC. Opinion of the Court §405(h) "mutatis mutandis," i.e., "[a]ll necessary changes having been made." Black's Law Dictionary 1039 (7th ed. 1999). And it applied §1395ii with one important change of detail- a change produced by not applying §405(h) where its application to a particular category of cases, such as Medicare Part B "methodology" challenges, would not lead to a channeling of review through the agency, but would mean no review at all. The Court added that a " `serious constitutional question' . . . would arise if we construed §1395ii to deny a judicial forum for constit u- tional claims arising under Part B." 476 U. S., at 681, n. 12 (quoting Salfi, 422 U. S., at 762 (citing Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 366­367 (1974))). More than that: Were the Court of Appeals correct in believing that Michigan Academy limited the scope of §405(h) itself to "amount determinations," that case would have significantly affected not only Medicare Part B cases but cases arising under the Social Security Act and Med i- care Part A as well. It accordingly would have overturned or dramatically limited this Court's earlier precedents, such as Salfi and Ringer, which involved, respectively, those programs. It would, moreover, have created a hardly justifiable distinction between "amount determin a- tions" and many other similar HHS determinations, see supra, at 10. And we do not understand why Congress, as JUSTICE STEVENS believes, post, at 1­2 (dissenting opin- ion), would have wanted to compel Medicare patients, but not Medicare providers, to channel their claims through the agency. Cf. Brief for Respondent 7­8, 18­21, 30­31 (apparently conceding the point). This Court does not normally overturn, or so dramatically limit, earlier authority sub silentio. And we agree with those Circuits that have held the Court did not do so in this instance. See Michigan Assn. of Homes and Servs., 127 F. 3d, at 500­ 501; American Academy of Dermatology, 118 F. 3d, at 1499­ 1501; St. Francis Medical Center, 32 F. 3d, at 812; Farkas, Cite as: 529 U. S. ____ (2000) 15 Opinion of the Court 24 F. 3d, at 855­861; Abbey, 978 F. 2d, at 41­44; National Kidney Patients Assn., 958 F. 2d, at 1130­1134. JUSTICE THOMAS maintains that Michigan Academy "must have established," by way of a new interpretation of §1395ii, the critical distinction between a dispute about an agency determination in a particular case and a more general dispute about, for example, the agency's authority to promulgate a set of regulations, i.e, the very distinction that this Court's earlier cases deny. Post, at 7 (dissenting opinion). He says that, in this respect we have mistaken Michigan Academy's "reasoning" (the presumption against preclusion of judicial review) for its "holding." Post, at 8­ 9. And, he finds the holding consistent with earlier cases such as Ringer because, he says, in Ringer everyone sim- ply assumed without argument that §1395ii's channeling provision fully incorporated the whole of §405(h). Post, at 9­10. For one thing, the language to which JUSTICE THOMAS points simply says that "Congres[s] inten[ded] to foreclose review only of `amount determinations' " and not "matters which Congress did not delegate to private carriers, such as challenges to the validity of the Secretary's instructions and regulations," Michigan Academy, supra, at 680 (em- phasis added). That language refers to particular features of the Medicare Part B program- "private carriers" and "amount determinations"- which are not here before us. And its reference to "foreclosure" of review quite obviously cannot be taken to refer to §1395ii because, as we have explained, §1395ii is a channeling requirement, not a foreclosure provision- of "amount determinations" or anything else. In short, it is difficult to reconcile JUSTICE THOMAS' characterization of Michigan Academy as a holding that §1395ii is "trigger[ed]" only by "challenges to . . . particular determinations," post, at 9, with the Michi- gan Academy language to which he points. Regardless, it is more plausible to read Michigan 16 SHALALA v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON LONG TERM CARE, INC. Opinion of the Court Academy as holding that §1395ii does not apply §405(h) where application of §405(h) would not simply channel review through the agency, but would mean no review at all. And contrary to JUSTICE SCALIA's suggestion, post, at 1 (dissenting opinion), that single rule applies to Medicare Part A as much as to Medicare Part B. This latter hold- ing, as we have said, has the virtues of consistency with Michigan Academy's actual language; consistency with the holdings of earlier cases such as Ringer; and consistency with the distinction that this Court has often drawn b e- tween a total preclusion of review and postponement of review. See, e.g., Salfi, supra, at 762 (distinguishing §405(h)'s channeling requirement from the complete pr e- clusion of judicial review at issue in Robison, supra, at 373); Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U. S. 200, 207, n. 8 (1994) (strong presumption against preclusion of review is not implicated by provision postponing review) ; Haitian Refugee Center, 498 U. S., at 496­499 (distinguishing between Ringer and Michigan Academy and finding the case governed by the latter because the statute precluded all meaningful judicial review). JUSTICE THOMAS refers to an "antichanneling" presumption (a "presumption in favor of preenforcement review," post, at 15­16). But any such presumption must be far weaker than a presumption against preclusion of all review in light of the traditional ripeness doctrine, which often requires initial presentation of a claim to an agency. As we have said, supra, at 9­10, Congress may well have concluded that a universal oblig a- tion to present a legal claim first to HHS, though pos t- poning review in some cases, would produce speedier, as well as better, review overall. And this Court crossed the relevant bridge long ago when it held that Congress, in both the Social Security Act and the Medicare Act, insisted upon an initial presentation of the matter to the agency. Ringer, 466 U. S., at 627; Salfi, supra, at 762. Michigan Academy does not require that we reconsider that lon g- Cite as: 529 U. S. ____ (2000) 17 Opinion of the Court standing interpretation. V The Council argues that in any event it falls within the exception that Michigan Academy creates, for here as there, it can obtain no review at all unless it can obtain judicial review in a §1331 action. In other words, the Council contends that application of §1395ii's channeling provision to the portion of the Medicare statute and the Medicare regulations at issue in this case will amount to the "practical equivalent of a total denial of judicial r e- view." Haitian Refugee Center, supra, at 497. The Coun- cil, however, has not convinced us that is so. The Council says that the special review channel that the Medicare statutes create applies only where the Secre- tary terminates a home's provider agreement; it is not available in the more usual case involving imposition of a lesser remedy, say the transfer of patients, the withhol d- ing of payments, or the imposition of a civil monetary penalty. We have set forth the relevant provisions above , supra at 4­5; Appendix, infra. The specific judicial review provi- sion, §405(g), authorizes judicial review of "any final dec i- sion of the [Secretary] made after a [§405(b)] hearing." A further relevant provision, §1395cc(h)(1), authorizes a §405(b) hearing whenever a home is "dissatisfied . . . with a determination described in subsection (b)(2)." (Emphasis added.) And subsection (b)(2) authorizes the Secretary to terminate an agreement, whenever she "has determined that the provider fails to comply substantially with" sta t- utes, agreements, or "regulations." §1395cc(b)(2)(A) (e m- phasis added). The Secretary states in her brief that the relevant "de- termination" that entitles a "dissatisfied" home to review is any determination that a provider has failed to comply substantially with the statute, agreements, or regulations, 18 SHALALA v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON LONG TERM CARE, INC. Opinion of the Court whether termination or "some other remedy is imposed." Reply Brief for Petitioners 14 (emphasis added). The Sec- retary's regulations make clear that she so interprets the statute. See 42 CFR §§498.3(b)(12), 498.1(a)­(b)(1998). The statute's language, though not free of ambiguity, bears that interpretation. And we are aware of no co n- vincing countervailing argument. We conclude that the Secretary's interpretation is legally permissible. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun- cil, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843 (1984); Your Home Visiting Nurse Services, 525 U. S., at 453; see also 42 U. S. C. §1395i3h(2)(B)(ii) (providing a different channel for a d- ministrative and judicial review of decisions imposing civil monetary penalties.) The Council next argues that the regulations, as impl e- mented by the enforcement agencies, deny review in pra c- tice by (1) insisting that a nursing home with deficiencies present a corrective plan, (2) imposing no further sanction or remedy if it does so, but (3) threatening termination if it does not. See 42 CFR §§488.402(d), 488.456(b)(ii) (1998). Because a home cannot risk termination, the Council adds, it must always submit a plan, thereby avoiding imposition of a remedy, but simultaneously losing its opportunity to contest the lawfulness of any remedy- related rules or regulations. See §498.3(b)(12). And, the Council's amici assert, compliance actually harms the home by subjecting it to increased sanctions later on by virtue of the unreviewed deficiency findings, and because the agency makes deficiency findings public on the Inte r- net, §488.325. The short, conclusive answer to these contentions is that the Secretary denies any such practice. She states in her brief that a nursing home with deficiencies can test the lawfulness of her regulations simply by refusing to submit a plan and incurring a minor penalty. Minor penalties, she says, are the norm, for "terminations