1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x 3 CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA, AND : 4 BART PETERSON, IN HIS OFFICIAL : 5 CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF THE CITY OF : 6 INDIANAPOLIS, : 7 Petitioners, : 8 v. : No. 99-1030 9 JAMES EDMOND AND JOELL PALMER, ON : 10 THEIR OWN BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF A : 11 CLASS OF THOSE SIMILARLY SITUATED, : 12 Respondent. : 13 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x 14 Washington, D.C. 15 Tuesday, October 3, 2000 16 The above-entitled matter came on for oral 17 argument before the Supreme Court of the United States 18 at 10:00 a.m. 19 APPEARANCES: 20 A. SCOTT CHINN, ESQ., Indianapolis, Indiana; on behalf 21 of the Petitioners. 22 PATRICIA MILLETT, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf 23 of the Petitioners. 24 KENNETH FALK, ESQ., Indianapolis, Indiana; on behalf 25 of the Respondent. 1 1 C O N T E N T S 2 ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAGE 3 A. SCOTT CHINN, ESQ. 4 On behalf of the Petitioner 3 5 PATRICIA MILLETT 6 On behalf of the Petitioner 19 7 KENNETH FALK, ESQ. 8 On behalf of the Respondent 29 9 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF 10 A. SCOTT CHINN, ESQ. 11 On behalf of the Petitioner 58 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 2 1 P R O C E E D I N G S 2 (10:00 a.m.) 3 CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: We'll hear 4 argument on No. 99-1030, the City of Indianapolis 5 versus James Edmond. 6 Mr. Chinn. 7 ORAL ARGUMENT OF A. SCOTT CHINN 8 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER 9 MR. CHINN: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it 10 please the Court: 11 The City of Indianapolis operates roadway 12 checkpoints comprised of conduct that in other relevant 13 contexts this Court has approved. 14 The Court of Appeals declined to apply this 15 Court's Brown versus Texas balancing test to evaluate 16 that conduct because the checkpoints primarily 17 investigate crimes, but the city's checkpoints are 18 constitutional for two independent reasons. First, 19 this Court used the balancing test in upholding other 20 roadway checkpoints where the government's interests 21 was to investigate crimes. Second, the city's 22 checkpoints serve sobriety checking and driving 23 regulation interests that this Court has approved and 24 the city's drug checking conduct adds no additional 25 intrusion to these procedures. The roadway checkpoints 3 1 this Court has previously upheld -- 2 QUESTION: I have just one question about 3 that. I guess on the checkpoints to check for drunk 4 drivers, that's at least related to the condition of 5 the driver of the car, and the Court applied a 6 balancing test and upheld it. 7 Now, is this search more to find drugs being 8 transported in vehicles or is it looking for drivers 9 who are impaired by drug use? 10 MR. CHINN: It's to do both, Your Honor, but 11 primarily to look for drug possession and trafficking 12 in cars. 13 QUESTION: What do the statistics show or do 14 they show about the percentage of people that were 15 arrested that were using drugs and were therefore 16 driving under the influence of drugs? Do the 17 statistics show us that? 18 MR. CHINN: Not in this case. On this 19 record there is no evidence that any driver was 20 arrested because he or she was under the influence of 21 drugs or alcohol. Our statistics show that 4.7 percent 22 of the drivers stopped possessed some sort of 23 narcotics. 24 QUESTION: But does that make this akin to a 25 checkpoint, for instance, to catch burglars in an area 4 1 or a murderer or something of that kind? Is this more 2 for typical law enforcement purposes? And does that 3 affect the balance in some way? 4 MR. CHINN: No, Your Honor, I think it's 5 different than the hypotheticals that you described for 6 this important reason. The relationship between 7 smuggling drugs in cars, of course, and the roadway 8 itself is close. We have found that, obviously, with 9 our high hit rate in Indianapolis. Carrying drugs in 10 cars is important to foster the drug trade in our 11 neighborhoods, both in terms of possession amounts and 12 smuggling amounts, traffic amounts. The ease with 13 which the drugs can be concealed and moved about very 14 easily and enter our neighborhoods is a problem. 15 QUESTION: Well, if there were a high crime 16 area with lots of thefts and burglaries and it was 17 believed that the burglars typically made their getaway 18 in cars, is it appropriate to have roadblocks and check 19 people for that purpose? 20 MR. CHINN: It might be, Your Honor, if that 21 connection was shown. If there was a significant 22 connection shown by the government in that case between 23 that rash of burglaries or whatever the crime may be 24 and the use of the roadway, that would be perhaps 25 available. 5 1 QUESTION: Well, there's always such a 2 connection. I know very few burglars that go on foot. 3 I mean, you're saying yes, then. You're answering the 4 question yes. 5 MR. CHINN: Well, certainly if you have a 6 lot of crime in the neighborhood -- 7 QUESTION: You can stop all cars to see if 8 they have burglary tools? 9 MR. CHINN: Probably not, Your Honor. 10 Certainly a substantial connection can be shown in this 11 case and was shown in Martinez-Fuerte, for example. 12 The Court can easily set the bar at that substantial 13 connection or significant connection that would 14 differentiate between stopping cars for general 15 criminal violations. 16 QUESTION: Why is the connection between 17 burglars, who usually get where they're going by car, 18 not as close as the connection with drug traffickers, 19 who usually engage in their business by car? I mean, 20 everybody almost usually does everything by car. It 21 seems to me I don't see anything special about this. 22 MR. CHINN: It's special, Your Honor, 23 because here the car is used as an instrumentality to 24 secret away the drugs that are then either -- have been 25 just purchased in a neighborhood or may be on their way 6 1 to a neighborhood for sale. 2 QUESTION: Does the record -- does the 3 record tell us how many of these drug arrests involved 4 persons who were selling drugs as opposed to those who 5 might have just been using them themselves? 6 MR. CHINN: It doesn't tell us specifically, 7 Your Honor. What the record does tell us is that in 8 the very first checkpoint that Indianapolis set up 9 there was a sizable distribution amount that was seized 10 in the checkpoint, but our checkpoints are designed to 11 both attack the supply and demand. We think it's 12 important to attack possession amounts as well. 13 QUESTION: Would your case be as strong if 14 the record showed that every one of the persons stopped 15 just happened to be a casual user or something and then 16 had some drugs left in the car? 17 MR. CHINN: Our case would be as strong for 18 two reasons. 19 QUESTION: You don't really -- you don't 20 really have to rely on the fact that some of them may 21 be selling drugs? 22 MR. CHINN: That's correct. It tells you 23 something about our program, but it -- but it need -- 24 we need not have -- 25 QUESTION: Mr. Chinn, I think you answered 7 1 to an earlier question that the dominant reason for 2 this program is to catch people who distribute, unlike 3 the alcohol stops, the sobriety checks, that the 4 dominant purpose is not to catch dangerous drivers, and 5 you have no record of distinguishing between those two, 6 so we have to assume -- well, you have been candid 7 about it. Your purpose is to catch people who are 8 distributing drugs. Is that not so? 9 MR. CHINN: Distributing -- to smuggle 10 drugs. People who smuggle drugs, either for 11 distribution or possession. 12 QUESTION: Well, I don't -- 13 QUESTION: Is that the only purpose? 14 MR. CHINN: For these checkpoints? 15 QUESTION: Yeah. 16 MR. CHINN: Our -- our -- no. We have three 17 interests that are being served here. The drug 18 distribution interest is primary, and we conceded that, 19 but we also, and the record shows this indisputably, 20 check for signs of impairment. So we are interested in 21 catching drivers who are under the influence of drugs 22 or alcohol. And thirdly, we check drivers' license and 23 registrations at each checkpoint. In fact, that's the 24 first thing that the officers do at the checkpoints, 25 and we had a measurable, a sizable hit rate for driving 8 1 violations as well. It was essentially equal to our 2 narcotics hit rate, and both were higher than this 3 Court sustained in Sitz. 4 QUESTION: I suppose given the fact that you 5 don't have a record with respect to finding actual 6 impairment among the people that you stop, I suppose 7 that if we sustain the search here, we would be 8 required to do the same thing if you made a facial 9 showing that in a given neighborhood drug distribution 10 was done on foot. I suppose you would be able to stop 11 pedestrians again on a sort of a random basis according 12 to some set of criteria like this and question every 13 pedestrian. 14 MR. CHINN: Pedestrian stops present a 15 different case, Your Honor, for several reasons. One, 16 this Court certainly hasn't applied, for example, the 17 Brown balancing test to -- 18 QUESTION: Why not? 19 MR. CHINN: Well, I believe because the 20 degree of intrusion and one's expectation of privacy in 21 the pedestrian context is simply higher or different 22 than in the motorist context. 23 QUESTION: Well, the reason that it is is 24 that -- that we -- we have, if not a history, at least 25 some experience with -- with motorist checkpoints, but 9 1 there was a day when we didn't. It had to start 2 somewhere, and I don't know why the same reasoning 3 couldn't be applied to pedestrians and start somewhere 4 there, and after a while we'd have a tradition of 5 stopping pedestrians on the street, too. 6 MR. CHINN: Well, the Court certainly has 7 recognized for some time, for 75 years perhaps since 8 Carroll, that motorists enjoy a diminished expectation 9 of privacy. 10 QUESTION: Yeah, but the original rationale 11 for that was that because the person was in a car, the 12 person could get away easily, and yet that rationale 13 has nothing to do with the rationale that -- that 14 you're advancing here to justify this stop. Your -- 15 your rationale for stopping cars is that people use 16 cars to distribute drugs, and my suggestion is that in 17 a given area if people distribute drugs on foot, the 18 same rationale that would justify what you're doing 19 here would justify pedestrian stops, and the original 20 Carroll justification for an automobile exception 21 so-called doesn't have anything to do with either case. 22 MR. CHINN: Again, I think there are some 23 differences, Your Honor, between the pedestrian context 24 and the motorist context. Certainly there is that 25 expectation of freedom of movement, of liberty interest 10 1 that is different between cars and pedestrians. 2 Pedestrians are much less regulated certainly than 3 cars, much less used to the government telling them 4 that they have to stop. Pedestrians can stop at their 5 own will and proceed down the street and window shop in 6 a way that cars cannot certainly. Cars have to be 7 traveling at speeds dictated by the government in a 8 direction that's dictated by the government, cannot 9 change lanes unless they do it in a way that the 10 government has told them they can. So -- 11 QUESTION: I thought the rationale with the 12 car was a lesser expectation of privacy in a car, say, 13 as opposed to a home, but if you're going to do 14 expectation of privacy, one can't be seen, I suppose 15 the street would be lowest because the car, at least 16 you are sheltered by the car itself. On the street 17 there you are. Everybody can see you, so the rationale 18 that you're offering, I think, would apply at least as 19 much. A high crime area, you have reason to suspect 20 that people are going to get away so that the police 21 are there to check them, and is there a distinction 22 based on the expectation of privacy? I don't see it, 23 but perhaps you can explain it to me. 24 MR. CHINN: I think in this case the 25 expectation is a freedom of movement because here no 11 1 searches are undertaken without probable cause, so 2 really what we're talking about in this case and all 3 respondents have ever challenged about this case is the 4 initial stop of the car. So the point is merely that 5 because people in cars, motorists are used to being 6 stopped, even at the behest of the government for any 7 number of different reasons. It's that expectation 8 that makes these checkpoints in this case the same as 9 the checkpoints that the Court has upheld in Martinez 10 Fuerte and Sitz reasonable under the circumstances. 11 That's simply different than the pedestrian context. 12 QUESTION: I've never heard the concept of 13 expectation of privacy which has been applied to -- to 14 searches applied to seizures, which is what you're now 15 saying. You're saying there's no reasonable 16 expectation of not being seized, right? 17 MR. CHINN: I think that's right, Your 18 Honor. 19 QUESTION: Do you know of any of our cases 20 that ever applied that reasoning to seizures? I mean, 21 after all, you have to stop for a traffic light. You 22 have to stop for, you know, bridges that are up and all 23 sorts of things, so you say, you expect to be stopped 24 or seized by government order frequently while you're 25 in a car, and therefore you have no right not to be. 12 1 MR. CHINN: I think it's inherently part of 2 the Brown balancing test, as this Court applied it in 3 Sitz, for example, it measures in the third element of 4 the Brown test the degree of intrusion on motorists. 5 QUESTION: Yeah, but it doesn't say anything 6 about expectation of being stopped. I mean, this is 7 just a novel, a novel approach to me, to use the 8 expectation rationale with respect to seizures as 9 opposed to searches. 10 MR. CHINN: I think the point remains that 11 cars are stopped in any number of different contexts, 12 even at the government's direction, and so it's 13 reasonable for the Court to conclude that that is a -- 14 presents a lesser degree of intrusion than the 15 pedestrian context. 16 QUESTION: Well, even so, it's somewhat 17 circular. I mean, if we say there is no expectation, 18 then there is going to be no expectation. 19 QUESTION: You're using the expectation. 20 You're using the expectation. It's just -- it's much 21 more -- it's reasonable to stop cars very often, very 22 often for checks, you know, all the things that people 23 have said in prior cases. But the difficulty with your 24 case is it doesn't seem any more reasonable to stop a 25 car just to look for evidence of a crime in general 13 1 than it does to stop a pedestrian to look for evidence 2 of a crime in general. And what you haven't done, at 3 least I haven't heard you do, is to say why there's 4 something special about this that would really justify 5 stopping the car any more than it would justify 6 stopping a pedestrian. So what is it? 7 MR. CHINN: It is reasonable to stop a car 8 because of, again, the connection between the activity 9 that's sought to be regulated here and the roadway. 10 QUESTION: So that's when we go back to 11 Justice Ginsburg who made the point very well, look, 12 people sometimes rob banks on foot. Bank robbers 13 perhaps are poor, they can't afford cars. They walk 14 around. And that happens a certain number of times. 15 So do we stop all the pedestrians? I mean, you heard 16 her question. 17 My problem is, I can't find anything special 18 about being in a car in respect to a general search 19 without suspicion that there's any special crime but 20 just a general effort to stop crime, and I haven't 21 heard you present one. 22 MR. CHINN: Again, we think that the Court 23 could look to the substantial connection between drugs 24 and their trafficking and possession on the roadways. 25 If the Court is not convinced that that presents a 14 1 significantly different context than the pedestrian 2 situation, then of course you could apply Brown in that 3 context. 4 QUESTION: What was the reasoning of the 5 Court in Martinez-Fuerte? There you had a -- a -- a -- 6 a -- a stop with -- without a search, and unless there 7 was probable cause. 8 MR. CHINN: Yes, the Court found on balance 9 the degree of intrusion was not -- did not outweigh the 10 government's interests in that case, and that since 11 Martinez Fuerte, like the case here, is a smuggling 12 case. There the fear was that persons or motorists 13 were smuggling illegal aliens in their cars, and the 14 Court thought it sufficient that a program of the 15 neutral seizures at a checkpoint guarded against 16 arbitrariness and did not outweigh the intrusion caused 17 by -- 18 QUESTION: Mr. Chinn, wasn't there the 19 factor, the locational factor there that the stop, 20 although distant from the border, was on the main -- 21 the road, the highway that you would take if you were 22 going from the Mexican border into the interior because 23 that's where all the traffic flowed. But here you 24 don't have that. It could be any -- anyplace. 25 MR. CHINN: Let me say a few things about 15 1 that if I can, Your Honor. First, that was not part of 2 the Court's decision in Martinez Fuerte. These were 3 stops of persons that there was no reasonable suspicion 4 to believe had just crossed the border. 5 QUESTION: But it was a fact in the case. 6 There wasn't any question it was a main highway that 7 people used, traveling from Mexico. 8 MR. CHINN: Yes, it was a factor in the 9 case, Your Honor, but it didn't appear critical to the 10 Court's holding, nor did the United States argue that 11 that case is sufficiently different from our case. 12 QUESTION: So you think you could stop -- 13 police can stop cars anywhere in the United States just 14 to look for smuggled immigrants? Just stop the car and 15 say, you know, can I see your papers, please? That's 16 sort of scary. 17 MR. CHINN: If a particular government 18 program was not successful, certainly, that is one 19 check against that sort of checkpoint as well. The 20 second element of the Brown balancing test requires 21 essentially that the programs serve the governmental 22 interests at stake, and so a program that didn't do 23 very well certainly wouldn't survive this Court's 24 Fourth Amendment scrutiny. 25 QUESTION: What seems to be your argument, 16 1 the strength of your case depends on the success, your 2 success rate. In other words, you prove it was 3 reasonable by what you find rather than by what you 4 knew before you started. 5 MR. CHINN: I think it's -- I think it's 6 both, Your Honor. We clearly have articulated in this 7 case a substantial interest in interdicting drugs. 8 Respondents haven't really challenged that as an 9 important interest, and it's an interest that this 10 Court has upheld on many occasions. 11 QUESTION: If I read your brief, it's 12 important to your case that 5 percent of the people in 13 Indianapolis apparently don't have their driver's 14 license with them and another 5 percent have some 15 marijuana in the car. If there was only 1 percent, 16 your case would be much weaker. 17 MR. CHINN: It would be weaker, Your Honor. 18 QUESTION: Yeah. 19 MR. CHINN: Although probably -- 20 QUESTION: But you didn't know that until 21 you conducted the searches. 22 MR. CHINN: Well, we knew that we had a 23 problem. 24 QUESTION: Sort of like -- sort of like you 25 found something there, ergo, it was reasonable to look 17 1 for it. 2 MR. CHINN: Well, we certainly knew we had a 3 problem, and our program actually proved that we were 4 correct. 5 QUESTION: The case that everybody begins 6 with in automobile searches is Carroll, the prohibition 7 case, and the Chief Justice in that case writing it 8 said it would be intolerable and unreasonable if a 9 prohibition agent were authorized to stop every 10 automobile on the chance of finding liquor and thus 11 subject all persons lawfully using the highway to the 12 inconvenience and indignity of such a search. That's 13 this case, isn't it? 14 MR. CHINN: It's not for a couple reasons. 15 First, that case was for that quote, and that case was 16 talking about searches, and of course we don't search 17 anyone here. We engage in a pattern of brief roadway 18 seizures. And secondly, this Court's decisions in 19 Martinez Fuerte and Sitz and its suggestion in Delaware 20 versus Prouse shows there are any number of things that 21 a court -- that a government can -- interests that can 22 be served by a checkpoint program. 23 Mr. Chief Justice, I'll reserve my remaining 24 time. Thank you. 25 QUESTION: Very well, Mr. Chinn. 18 1 Ms. Millett, we'll hear from you. 2 ORAL ARGUMENT OF PATRICIA MILLETT 3 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS 4 MS. MILLETT: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it 5 please the Court: 6 Our position is first the petitioner's 7 checkpoints, including their drug detection component, 8 are constitutional under this Court's decisions in 9 Martinez-Fuerte, which upheld a checkpoint designed to 10 intercept alien smuggling, and Sitz, which upheld a 11 sobriety check-in -- checkpoint. 12 Second, petitioner's checkpoints are also 13 constitutional because they advance the government's 14 legitimate interests in assuring that only properly 15 licensed and sober drivers -- 16 QUESTION: On your first point about 17 Martinez, how would you respond to Justice Scalia's 18 question? Would that checkpoint have been legal in 19 Indianapolis? 20 MS. MILLETT: As a constitutional matter, 21 yes. As a statutory matter, no. The Border Patrol -- 22 QUESTION: As a constitutional matter. 23 MS. MILLETT: -- does not have authority to 24 go beyond a hundred miles. 25 As a constitutional matter, if the government, 19 1 Border Patrol was able to show that, for example, in 2 Indianapolis or Kansas or between -- somewhere in 3 Colorado there was a thoroughfare that had a strong 4 nexus to alien smuggling, for example, seasonal workers 5 moving back and forth, then it would be. 6 QUESTION: With what we now know about 7 Indianapolis, just right as of today, do you think it 8 would be legal to have the Martinez-Fuerte's checkpoint 9 in Indianapolis today? 10 MS. MILLETT: I think we would have to show 11 an alien smuggling nexus to the roadways on which we 12 established our checkpoints. 13 QUESTION: Well, then did they have to show 14 them before they conducted these checkpoints here, did 15 the city have to show that 5 percent of the people were 16 driving without licenses or did they find that out 17 after they did it? 18 MS. MILLETT: I think they have to 19 establish -- they have to have a reasonable basis for 20 believing that there will be a problem. Obviously, we 21 have that with the alien checkpoints that the Border 22 Patrol operates, and here the City of Indianapolis 23 focused on crime statistics and was able to determine 24 that particular areas -- 25 QUESTION: The high crime statistics they 20 1 got as a result of the program they instituted. 2 MS. MILLETT: No, no, no, general crime, 3 drug crime statistics, which you obviously will know in 4 advance as a law enforcement agency, just as we know 5 where the primary problems of alien transportation are 6 in the country. 7 QUESTION: Let me follow up on the 8 Indianapolis hypothetical. Why would it have to be 9 alien smuggling? I mean, why couldn't you simply 10 identify an area that has a large -- you know that 11 there are a large number of illegal aliens in this 12 section of Indianapolis that is largely Hispanic, so 13 you simply set up roadblocks, and I'll bet you you'll 14 get a pretty good catch if you stop every car that 15 drives down the street in that section to see if there 16 are illegal aliens in the car. 17 MS. MILLETT: I think as a constitutional 18 matter, if the government were able to show the 19 appropriate nexus and the effect that its checkpoints 20 again were actually effective that it would -- and the 21 intrusion was no more than it was in Martinez-Fuerte, 22 but, yes, the Fourth Amendment applies the same in 23 Indianapolis as it does in Arizona. 24 QUESTION: Then the same result then would 25 be for pedestrian checkpoints? 21 1 MS. MILLETT: No, not at all. 2 QUESTION: Why not? 3 MS. MILLETT: There's a bright line in this 4 Court's decisions between cars and pedestrians. 5 QUESTION: Why should there be? In other 6 words, the rationale that you're advancing and that 7 your brother has been advancing doesn't seem to me to 8 make any particular sense of that distinction. 9 MS. MILLETT: First, it's beneficial. I 10 don't think there's anything about this case that puts 11 us closer to pedestrian checkpoints than 12 Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz, but the rationale has been -- 13 QUESTION: Well, if -- if Martinez-Fuerte 14 can be applied as you have said to Justice Scalia that 15 it may be applied in Indianapolis or the middle of 16 Nebraska somewhere because there is -- there is a -- 17 a -- a general basis in the evidence prior to the 18 search operation, that there is a high incidence of 19 illegal aliens, then to begin with Judge Posner's 20 rationale has nothing, I guess, to do -- much to do 21 with the case, and it doesn't seem to have anything -- 22 it doesn't seem to be key to the use of automobiles, 23 and therefore I don't see why, if we accept your answer 24 to Justice Scalia, we are not well down the road toward 25 pedestrian checkpoints. 22 1 MS. MILLETT: Because cars are different 2 than pedestrians. Cars are highly regulated. This 3 Court has recognized this they are subject to a web of 4 regulation by government, and I think it was Justice 5 Breyer earlier said one has no reasonable expectation 6 within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment that you 7 will not be briefly stopped and asked to show a 8 driver's license, your authority to operate the car, 9 and under Martinez-Fuerte that you are not using the 10 car to smuggle illegal aliens, we see no difference 11 between that and smuggling drugs. 12 And in this case the drug component isn't 13 necessary to explain the seizure. The entire scope of 14 the seizure is independently justifiable. In fact, 15 most of the time is expended on the driver's license 16 checkpoints. 17 The only role of the drug detection component 18 is that they're in a justifiable stop under this 19 Court's precedence for driver's license checkpoint and 20 sobriety checkpoint. They add a canine sniff for dogs. 21 That does not independently cause the seizure, although 22 we do think a drug checkpoint in its own right is 23 constitutional, but it does -- 24 QUESTION: Well, then, on -- excuse me -- on 25 that theory could the police station drug detection 23 1 dogs at every street crossing where the traffic lights 2 require pedestrians to wait until the yellow light 3 comes along? The pedestrians are being stopped in the 4 normal manner in which pedestrian traffic is regulated. 5 The dog is no more intrusive than the dog is when it 6 goes around the car. Could the police do that and have 7 a good search? 8 MS. MILLETT: Yes. I think the police have 9 a right to be on street corners with their dogs or 10 without their dogs, and smell -- the sniff the dog 11 alerts to is odors emanating from -- 12 QUESTION: So if somebody says to the dog, 13 you know, get away from me, the police can say, no, 14 you've got to let the dog search you? 15 MS. MILLETT: No, that then I think would be 16 a seizure of a pedestrian if they won't -- can't get 17 away, but the pedestrian can walk away. It's a big 18 difference. 19 QUESTION: Then why isn't it a seizure of 20 the car for something other than the purposes of 21 checking license plates when the dog goes around the 22 car? Are you telling -- or maybe your answer would be 23 that the driver of the car can say to the police, get 24 the dog away from the car. And the police would have 25 to do it. Would they? 24 1 MS. MILLETT: No, I don't think so. Because 2 the difference between the pedestrian example and this 3 one is that you have a legitimate basis for the seizure 4 independent of the dog. That's the driver's license 5 checkpoint. 6 QUESTION: You have a legitimate basis for 7 stopping the pedestrian until the light turns yellow. 8 The pedestrian is just as validly stopped as the car is 9 for the driver's license check. 10 MS. MILLETT: That -- that -- well, I think 11 it's a separate question whether -- 12 QUESTION: If the pedestrian can tell the 13 police to get the dog away, why can't the car owner? 14 MS. MILLETT: I'm not sure that a traffic 15 light, in fact, effectuates a seizure within the 16 meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 17 QUESTION: Well -- 18 MS. MILLETT: Because pedestrians can turn 19 around and walk away, they can do a U-turn. I'm sorry. 20 QUESTION: Do we know in the facts of this 21 case whether the dog sniffing occurs while the license 22 check is going on or whether the policeman first checks 23 the license and then says, okay, now stay here, I'm 24 done checking your license, but I want to walk around 25 the car with a police dog? 25 1 MS. MILLETT: My understanding is that it's 2 done while the driver's license check is going on. And 3 that's what takes the two to three to five minutes. 4 Dog sniffs take a minute, 90 seconds at the most for a 5 very large vehicle. 6 QUESTION: Suppose the city council 7 authorized this search and had a preamble and said, in 8 order to interdict drug distributors, we are setting up 9 the following checkpoint, and then the case is just 10 like it is, and you have a license, they say that the 11 sole -- the purpose is to interdict drug smuggling. 12 Does that change the case at all? 13 MS. MILLETT: It doesn't -- we have two 14 rationales. Our position is that drug interdiction, 15 drug smuggling checkpoints in their own right are 16 constitutional, so obviously under that theory it would 17 not. But if the Court disagrees with that and says 18 that that is not a legitimate basis for having a 19 checkpoint, then the case would be different if they 20 did the stop and they did not actually effectuate the 21 interests that are served by a driver's license 22 checkpoint, they didn't ask for the licenses, and they 23 didn't act upon license violations. 24 If they, in fact, act upon license violations 25 and serve that interest within the meaning of this 26 1 Court's prior recognition of that as a legitimate 2 interest, then the fact that they also serve another 3 legitimate interest that does not in any way change the 4 nature of the intrusion on the individual, does not 5 enhance the length or duration or intensity of the 6 seizure, then it would not make a difference, and then 7 what the government says or doesn't say in the preamble 8 I don't think would change the Fourth Amendment 9 analysis. 10 QUESTION: In other words, in order to do 11 it, the city has candidly told us it wants it to 12 apprehend drug distributors, it has this pretense of 13 stopping people to check their licenses an also 14 purpose, but it's using that as a gateway to get to 15 what it's really interested in, which is the drug 16 distribution. 17 MS. MILLETT: You mean pretense by the fact 18 that they ask for licenses but don't do anything about 19 it? And I profess to do something -- 20 QUESTION: No, you said that they would have 21 to do that. Mr. Chinn told us -- candidly, I thought, 22 to his credit -- that the primary purpose of doing this 23 is to apprehend drug distributors. So you're saying, 24 yeah, but they couldn't just do that openly or overtly, 25 they need some kind of cover for it. So we do the 27 1 license check. 2 MS. MILLETT: That's not what I mean to say. 3 Our position is that a drug checkpoint in its own right 4 would be constitutional. Border patrols, the drug 5 smuggling, aliens -- 6 QUESTION: So let's take -- then let's take 7 away that. You are saying without the license and 8 registration check this would still be okay, we just 9 stop people because we want to have the dog go around 10 the car. 11 MS. MILLETT: I'm saying two things. We're 12 saying that's our first -- that's our first argument. 13 Our second argument is if the drug interdiction purpose 14 is not in itself a basis for the stop, then as long as 15 the driver's license stop or the sobriety stop is 16 actually being accomplished by the government, those 17 interests are being served, and the drug detection 18 component does not add anything to the length or 19 duration of the seizure, then it would still be 20 constitutional under both of them. And that if both of 21 them are legitimate interests, if the Court doesn't -- 22 as long as -- as long as one legitimate interest is 23 served by the checkpoints and explains the entire -- 24 and justifies the entire scope and duration and 25 intensity of the seizure, the fact that the government 28 1 has other interests, primary or secondary, doesn't 2 matter. 3 QUESTION: Thank you, Ms. Millett. 4 Mr. Falk, we'll hear from you. 5 ORAL ARGUMENT OF KENNETH FALK 6 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 7 MR. FALK: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it 8 please the Court: 9 This case is not Martinez-Fuerte. This case 10 is not Sitz. The Indianapolis roadblocks are criminal 11 investigatory seizures of primarily innocent persons 12 without cause. In Martinez-Fuerte -- 13 QUESTION: Certainly the seizures in 14 Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz were also seizures of 15 primarily entered in. No one claims they had a 51 16 percent harvest there. 17 MR. FALK: That's correct, but this Court 18 recognized, Your Honor, for instance, in Montoya 19 de Hernandez that Martinez-Fuerte was one of a number 20 of cases reflecting the long-standing concern for the 21 protection of the integrity of the border, which has 22 been characterized as a noncriminal investigatory 23 concern. 24 QUESTION: But in Martinez-Fuerte they 25 arrested these people. That's how the case came to 29 1 this Court. 2 MR. FALK: Well, of course, Your Honor, but 3 in Camara back in 1967, violation of the housing codes 4 in issue there were criminal. In New York v. Burger, 5 violation of the regulatory statute turned out to be 6 criminal. This Court in all those cases looked back to 7 see what the programmatic purpose was, and recognized 8 that the programmatic purpose was not for criminal 9 investigation. 10 If, in fact a -- 11 QUESTION: What did the Court say, then in 12 Martinez-Fuerte? What did it say the main purpose, the 13 programmatic purpose, as you call it, was? 14 MR. FALK: Protection, integrity of the 15 borders, Your Honor, have been recognized by this Court 16 since I believe the 1880s in the United States v. Boyd, 17 that the United States has an inherent regulatory right 18 to ensure that people and things that enter this 19 country do so lawfully. That is a regulatory purpose. 20 Similarly, lower courts have recognized through 21 inspection and checking licenses, registrations, and 22 inspection status has recognized a safety-related 23 purpose for traffic stops. 24 QUESTION: And drunk driving. 25 MR. FALK: And drunk driving, Your Honor. 30 1 QUESTION: How about driving while impaired 2 by drug use? If that were the purpose, okay? 3 MR. FALK: If the -- if the City of 4 Indianapolis could show here that there was, indeed, a 5 problem of drugged driving, like there was in Sitz of 6 drunk driving, then of course there could be a 7 regulatory purpose. 8 QUESTION: How could the city show that 9 without having done some investigation? 10 MR. FALK: Well, I think if you looked at 11 Sitz there were reams of statistics introduced there to 12 show what the national and local problem of drunk 13 driving was. Sitz recognized -- I'm sorry? 14 QUESTION: Please, finish your answer. 15 MR. FALK: Sitz recognizes that there is a 16 regulatory right of a state to get an immediately 17 unsafe vehicle off the road. In the same way that a 18 car without brakes is imminently unsafe to innocent 19 persons, so is a car driven by a drunk driver. 20 QUESTION: What about a driver without a 21 driver's license, is that a safety concern? Do you 22 acknowledge that it's okay to make the stops to see 23 that the person behind the wheel has a driver's 24 license? 25 MR. FALK: Arguably, Your Honor, but even 31 1 those stops, even those noncriminal investigatory 2 seizures have to be justified under Brown, there has to 3 be a showing there actually is -- 4 QUESTION: That's fine. Let's assume that 5 that is so justified here. 6 MR. FALK: Yes. 7 QUESTION: What difference does it make that 8 in the course of that search, in the course of that 9 stop the police also send a dog around the car? I 10 mean, in the case of individualized traffic stops, we 11 have innumerable cases where the person who was caught 12 with drugs in his car after a stop for a broken 13 taillight and in the course of interrogating the driver 14 about the broken taillight, the policeman sees 15 something suspicious, and then conducts a full search. 16 And it is often alleged and may well be true 17 that the reason the policeman stopped the car with the 18 broken taillight was that this car looked suspicious 19 and he thought it might have drugs in it, and we have 20 simply rejected that argument. We've said we're not 21 going to go into the subjective motivation of the 22 individual policeman. So long as he had a valid basis 23 for stopping the car, that's enough. 24 MR. FALK: That's correct. 25 QUESTION: Now, why shouldn't that apply in 32 1 gross, just as it applies with respect to individual 2 traffic stops? 3 MR. FALK: Subjective intent is irrelevant 4 provided there is otherwise probable cause. 5 QUESTION: Right, so -- 6 MR. FALK: But there is no cause here, Your 7 Honor, and this Court has insisted -- 8 QUESTION: But there is cause. You've 9 acknowledged that it is okay to stop to check for 10 driver's licenses. 11 MR. FALK: Well, t