523BV$spin 03-29-00 08:06:25 UNITED STATES REPORTS 523 OCT. TERM 1997 In Memoriam JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, Jr. 523BV$titl 03-29-00 08:07:14 UNITED STATES REPORTS VOLUME 523 CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT AT OCTOBER TERM, 1997 March 3 Through May 26, 1998 FRANK D. WAGNER reporter of decisions WASHINGTON : 2000 Printed on Uncoated Permanent Printing Paper For sale by the U. S. Government Printing Office Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328 523BV$ Unit: $UII [04-28-00 09:00:43] PGT: FRT Erratum 518 U. S. 557, line 24: "supra, at 532, n. 6" should be "supra, at 546, n. 16". ii 523BV$ Unit: UIII [04-03-00 15:28:37] PGT: FRT J USTICES of the SU PREM E COU RT during the time of these reports WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, Chief Justice. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, Associate Justice. SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, Associate Justice. ANTONIN SCALIA, Associate Justice. ANTHONY M. KENNEDY, Associate Justice. DAVID H. SOUTER, Associate Justice. CLARENCE THOMAS, Associate Justice. RUTH BADER GINSBURG, Associate Justice. STEPHEN BREYER, Associate Justice. retired LEWIS F. POWELL, Jr., Associate Justice. BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice. HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Associate Justice. officers of the court JANET RENO, Attorney General. SETH P. WAXMAN, Solicitor General. WILLIAM K. SUTER, Clerk. FRANK D. WAGNER, Reporter of Decisions. DALE E. BOSLEY, Marshal. SHELLEY L. DOWLING, Librarian. iii 523BV$ Unit: $UIV [04-03-00 15:29:49] PGT: FRT SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Allotment of Justices It is ordered that the following allotment be made of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of this Court among the circuits, pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 42, and that such allotment be entered of record, effective September 30, 1994, viz.: For the District of Columbia Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice. For the First Circuit, David H. Souter, Associate Justice. For the Second Circuit, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate Justice. For the Third Circuit, David H. Souter, Associate Justice. For the Fourth Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice. For the Fifth Circuit, Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice. For the Sixth Circuit, John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice. For the Seventh Circuit, John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice. For the Eighth Circuit, Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice. For the Ninth Circuit, Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice. For the Tenth Circuit, Stephen Breyer, Associate Justice. For the Eleventh Circuit, Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice. For the Federal Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice. September 30, 1994. (For next previous allotment, and modifications, see 502 U. S., p. vi, 509 U. S., p. v, and 512 U. S., p. v.) iv 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT PROCEEDINGS IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES IN MEMORY OF JUSTICE BRENNAN* FRIDAY, MAY 22, 1998 Present: Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter, Justice Thomas, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer. The Chief Justice said: The Court is in special session this afternoon to receive the Resolutions of the Bar of the Supreme Court in tribute to our former colleague and friend, Justice William J. Brennan. The Court recognizes the Solicitor General. Mr. Solicitor General Waxman addressed the Court as follows: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: At a meeting today of the Bar of this Court, Resolutions memorializing our deep respect and affection for Justice Brennan were unanimously adopted. With the Court's leave, I shall summarize the Resolutions and ask that they be set forth in their entirety in the records of the Court. *Justice Brennan, who retired from the Court effective July 20, 1990 (498 U. S. vii), died in Arlington, Virginia, on July 24, 1997 (522 U. S. vii). v 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT vi JUSTICE BRENNAN RESOLUTION William Joseph Brennan, Jr., graced the Supreme Court of the United States for thirty-four extraordinary years. Appointed to the Court on October 15, 1956, by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Justice Brennan's years of Supreme Court service spanned eight Presidencies, seventeen Con- gresses, and one hundred forty-six volumes of the United States Reports. Ill-health forced Justice Brennan to retire from the Court on July 20, 1990, but not before his unique qualities of mind and heart had touched the lives of twenty- two Supreme Court colleagues-one-fifth of the Justices to have served on the Supreme Court; one hundred-twelve law clerks, each of whom became part of Justice Brennan's ex- tended family; the full complement of the Supreme Court's support personnel-from guards to gardeners-all of whom Justice Brennan regarded, and treated, as valued friends; and countless members of the Supreme Court bar who recall with pride and affection their interaction with Justice Bren- nan in the search for justice. Although death stilled Justice Brennan's heart on July 24, 1997, it did not, and could not, still his magnificent voice. Justice Brennan continues to speak to us through his life and his work in the prophetic language of the American dream. Although unanimous agreement with every aspect of a leg- acy as varied and vast as Justice Brennan's is impossible, as members of the Supreme Court bar, we salute his monumen- tal contribution to the cause of individual liberty.1 1 Individual members of the Resolutions Committee have expressed per- sonal admiration for Justice Brennan's life and career. See Floyd Ab- rams, In Memoriam: William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 Harv. L. Rev. 18 (1997); Norman Dorsen, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 104 Harv. L. Rev. 15 (1990); Owen Fiss, A Life Lived Twice, 100 Yale L. J. 1117 (1991); Gerard E. Lynch, William J. Brennan, Jr., American, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1603 (1997); Frank I. Michelman, A Tribute to Justice Brennan, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 22 (1990); Frank I. Michelman, Super Liberal: Romance, Community, and Tradition in William J. Brennan, Jr.s Constitutional Thought, 77 U. Va. L. Rev. 1261 (1991); Robert C. Post, Remembering Justice Brennan: A Eulogy, 37 Washburn L. J. xix (1997); Geoffrey R. Stone, Justice Brennan and "The Freedom of Speech": A First Amend- 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT JUSTICE BRENNAN vii The sweep and power of Justice Brennan's contribution to American law challenges our collective imaginations. As Justice Souter has noted,2 the sheer mass of the Brennan legal legacy exerts an intense gravitational pull on our juris- prudence. In the course of a remarkable tenure that fell short of Chief Justice John Marshall's by a matter of months, Justice Brennan authored 1,573 opinions: 533 opinions for the Court, 694 dissents, and 346 concurrences.3 Justice Bren- nan's opinions shaped our Nation. Our ideal of democracy flows from Justice Brennan's historic opinion for the Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962). The ability of all Americans to participate equally in the democratic process was safeguarded and advanced by Justice Brennan's opinions in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966), and Thorn- burg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30 (1986). Our modern conception of free speech was articulated and defended by Justice Bren- nan's opinions in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), and Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397 (1989), and by his draftsmanship of the Court's per curiam opinion in Branden- burg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969).4 Our understanding of ment Odyssey, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 5, 1333 (1991); Peter L. Strauss, In Memoriam, William J. Brennan, Jr., 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1609 (1997). 2 David H. Souter, In Memoriam: William J. Brennan, Jr., eulogy deliv- ered at the funeral mass for Justice Brennan at St. Matthew's Cathedral, Washington, D. C., on July 29, 1997, reprinted at 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1997). 3 Characteristically, Justice Brennan appears to have underestimated the volume of his judicial output. Justice Brennan's estimate of 1,360 opinions appears to be 213 short when measured against a search con- ducted by the marvels of modern technology. 4 Justice Brennan's role in drafting the Brandenburg opinion is re- counted in Morton J. Horwitz, In Memoriam: William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 Harv. L. Rev. 23 (1997). The Brandenburg opinion had initially been assigned to Justice Fortas. Justice Brennan accepted responsibility for drafting it when Justice Fortas left the bench. See Bernard Schwartz, Justice Brennan and the Brandenburg Decision-A Lawgiver in Action, 79 Judicature 24, 27­28 (1995). Throughout his career, Justice Brennan's intense devotion to the Court as an institution was manifested by his willingness to take on the task of drafting per curiam opinions in appropriate cases. He drafted well over sixty per curiam opinions, including the Court's per curiam opinion in 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT viii JUSTICE BRENNAN freedom of association was shaped by Justice Brennan's opin- ions in NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347 (1976); and Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609 (1984). Our commitment to academic freedom was defined by Justice Brennan in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589 (1967). Our understanding of the limits placed on government's power to condition bene- fits on a waiver of First Amendment rights flows from Jus- tice Brennan's opinions in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958), and FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U. S. 364 (1984). Contemporary protection of the free exercise of reli- gion begins with Justice Brennan's opinion in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963). Our modern understanding of the Establishment Clause, initially propounded in his sepa- rate opinion in Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 230 (1963), was classically restated in Justice Bren- nan's opinion for the Court in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U. S. 578 (1987). Our commitment to equality before the law was deepened and advanced by Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 (1958) (opinion signed by all the Justices),5 Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430 (1968); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U. S. 189 (1973); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973); and Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190 (1976). Our contemporary understanding of procedural fairness was shaped by Justice Brennan's opinions in Jencks v. United States, 353 U. S. 657 (1957); Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968); In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970); and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970). Our approach to col- lective bargaining, and the rights of the individual employee New York Times v. United States, 403 U. S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). See David Rudenstine, The Day the Presses Stopped: A History of the Penta- gon Papers Case, 301-20 (describing Justice Brennan's role in drafting the per curiam opinion). 5 Justice Brennan's central role in drafting the opinion in Cooper v. Aaron is described in Richard S. Arnold, In Memoriam: William J. Bren- nan, Jr., 111 Harv. L. Rev. 5 (1997). See also Richard S. Arnold, A Trib- ute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 26 Harv. C. R.­C. L. L. Rev. 7 (1991). 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT JUSTICE BRENNAN ix in that process, was influenced by Justice Brennan's opinions in Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U. S. 735 (1988), and Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235 (1970). The architecture of our contemporary federal court structure was shaped by Justice Brennan's opinions for the Court in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Coop, 356 U. S. 525 (1958), and United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715 (1966), and our modern understanding of the preeminent role of federal courts as guarantors of indi- vidual liberty is based on Justice Brennan's opinions for the Court in Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 (1963); Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978); Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), and Cooper v. Aaron, supra. When he wrote in dissent, Justice Brennan spoke to the future. His sustained and passionate efforts to persuade the Court that capital punishment cannot survive contemporary moral scrutiny; 6 his concern that non-textual fundamental personal rights inherent in human dignity be respected; 7 his defense of the writ of habeas corpus; 8 his efforts to preserve 6 E. g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227 (1976); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U. S. 279, 320 (1987). Justice Brennan's belief that the death penalty violated the Constitution was so intense that, during the last fifteen years of his tenure, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, expressed per- sonal opposition to the death penalty in every death case, including denials of certiorari. Justice Brennan's last public statement, made to his col- leagues, friends, family, and admirers at the celebration of his 90th birth- day in the Supreme Court chamber, was a plea to continue fighting against the death penalty. 7 E. g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U. S. 110, 136 (1989); Cruzan v. Mis- souri Dept. of Health, 497 U. S. 261, 301 (1990). Justice Brennan was more successful in using the Equal Protection Clause to protect "funda- mental" non-textual rights. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972) (invalidating ban on distribution of contraceptives to unmarried couples as violation of equal protection of the laws); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969) (invalidating durational residence requirement for welfare eligi- bility as a discriminatory interference with the right to travel). 8 E. g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 502 (1976); Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 326 (1989). 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT x JUSTICE BRENNAN the wall between church and state; 9 his defense of free speech in those relatively rare settings when he was unable to persuade a majority of the Court to embrace his vision of the First Amendment; 10 his endorsement of carefully tar- geted affirmative action; 11 his scholarly effort to reinterpret the Eleventh Amendment 12-all stand as reminders of what seemed unfinished business to Justice Brennan. But it would be shortsighted to purport to measure what Justice Brennan has meant, and will mean, to American law merely by cataloguing his immense substantive contribution. A fuller assessment of the Brennan legacy calls for a celebra- tion of the happy confluence of intelligence, legal acumen, political sophistication, and empathy that combined in Justice Brennan to forge the archetype of a Supreme Court Justice intensely committed to the protection of constitutional rights. Justice Brennan's life was the embodiment of the American dream. His judicial career was a sustained effort to allow others to share in that dream. Justice Brennan's Life: Living the American Dream Justice Brennan lived the American dream.13 Fittingly, his life spanned every decade of the American Century. He was born on April 25, 1906, to Irish immigrants, the second 9 E. g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783, 795 (1983) (Justice Brennan's dissent in Marsh is of particular interest as a statement of his belief that the Bill of Rights must be read in the light of contemporary circum- stances); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 694 (1984). 10 E. g., Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U. S. 307, 338 (1967); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726, 762 (1978); Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 170 (1973); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U. S. 720, 740 (1990); Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U. S. 260, 277 (1988); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slayton, 413 U. S. 49, 73 (1973). 11 E. g., Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 324 (1978) (concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). 12 Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 247 (1985). 13 Much of the biographical material in this tribute is drawn from an affectionate and informative biographical sketch of the Justice's life writ- ten by his grandson. William J. Brennan IV, Remembering Justice Bren- nan: A Biographical Sketch, 37 Washburn L. Rev. vii (1997). 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT JUSTICE BRENNAN xi of eight children. Both his parents, William J. Brennan, Sr., and Agnes McDermott, emigrated from County Roscommon to the United States because, as Justice Brennan recalled, they "saw a chance for a better life in America." 14 They met in Newark, New Jersey, at a time when the Irish were not a welcome presence. Job postings often warned, "No Irish Need Apply," and some shop doors bore signs reading, "No Dogs or Irish Allowed." The senior Brennan found work as a coal stoker in the Ballantine Brewery, and quickly became active in the nascent labor union movement. The Justice came of age as his father was organizing workers to fight for better wages and conditions, and rising to local prominence as a powerful and extraordinarily popular re- form politician, becoming Newark's Director of Public Safety. "What got me interested in people's rights and liber- ties," Brennan would later recall, "was the kind of neigh- borhood I was brought up in. I saw all kinds of suffer- ing-people had to struggle. I saw the suffering of my mother, even though we were never without. We al- ways had something to eat, we always had something to wear. But others in the neighborhood had a harder time." 15 Reflecting on his legacy in his last public statement, Justice Brennan summarized his career by pointing out that "these rulings emerged out of every- day human dramas. . . . At the heart of each drama was a person who cried out for nothing more than common human dignity." 16 "Everything I am," Justice Brennan once said, "I am be- cause of my father." 17 "With my dad," Brennan said, "you 14 Sean O Murchu, "Lone Justice: An Interview with Justice William Brennan, Jr.," Irish America (June 1990), at 28. 15 Nat Hentoff, "Profiles: The Constitutionalist," The New Yorker, Mar. 12, 1990, at 46. 16 William J. Brennan, Jr., "My Life on the Court," in Reason & Passion: Justice Brennan's Enduring Legacy 19 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz & Bernard Schwartz eds. 1997). 17 Jeffrey T. Leeds, "A Life on the Court," N. Y. Times Magazine, Oct. 5, 1986, at 26. 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT xii JUSTICE BRENNAN had to be doing something all the time, working at some- thing." 18 It was the elder Brennan's idea that Bill Jr. go into law. "He was going to make a lawyer out of me, by golly," the Justice chuckled many years later.19 Asked once whether his father would have been surprised by his ap- pointment to the Supreme Court, Brennan earnestly replied, "No, he would have expected it." 20 The Justice graduated from Barringer High School in 1924. A high school classmate recalled, "Bill took home so many academic prizes from school, none were left for the rest of us." 21 In 1928, Brennan graduated from the University of Pennsylvania's undergraduate Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, with honors in economics. Just before he graduated, he married Marjorie Leonard, whom he had met during his sophomore year at Wharton at the Cotillion of the East Orange Women's Club, and to whom he was deeply devoted for fifty-four years, until her death in 1982. Fore- shadowing the complex man he was to become, Brennan re- belled against parental authority by secretly eloping with Marjorie, but he made certain that they were very properly married in Baltimore Cathedral. Brennan went off to the Harvard Law School, while Marjo- rie stayed in Newark working to help pay his tuition. At Harvard, Bill Brennan was a workaholic. Quiet, unassum- ing, unknown to classmates who later rose to great promi- nence in academe, Brennan's academic performance earned him acceptance by Harvard's Legal Aid Society, where he represented the poor in a variety of civil cases, an experience that he recalled fondly over the years. It was at the Legal Aid Society that he experienced firsthand the power of the law to affect the lives of the weak. During Brennan's second year of law school, in 1930, his father died suddenly of pneumonia. Brennan contemplated 18 O Murchu, supra, at 28. 19 Leeds, supra, at 26. 20 Leeds, supra, at 26. 21 "An Experienced Judge for the Supreme Court," U. S. News & World Report, Oct. 12, 1956, at 71­72. 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT JUSTICE BRENNAN xiii leaving law school, but Harvard awarded him a scholarship to allow him to finish his studies. He waited tables at a fraternity house and performed odd jobs to make ends meet. It was the height of the Great Depression when Brennan graduated from law school in 1931. His father's sudden death had left the family in financial straits. It fell to the Justice to help support his mother, his wife, and six siblings. Brennan contemplated hanging out a shingle as a union law- yer, but his economic responsibilities made that course im- possible. Instead, he accepted an offer from Pitney, Har- din & Skinner, the most prestigious law firm in Newark, where he had clerked for a summer. Brennan was the first Catholic lawyer hired by the firm. He was assigned to prac- tice labor law, cast in what must have initially seemed the incongruous role of representing management. As he had in law school, Brennan worked long hours, often into the early hours of the morning. He distinguished himself as a talented labor negotiator, and became the firm's first Catholic partner in 1937. In July, 1942, at the advanced age of 36, Brennan volun- teered for the army. Marjorie and his first two children, Bill III and Hugh, moved to the Washington, D. C., area where Brennan's expertise as a labor troubleshooter was needed by the Army's Ordnance Division. He was commissioned a major, but within a year was promoted to lieutenant colonel, and shortly thereafter was appointed chief of the Ordnance Department's Civilian Personnel Division. During 1943­ 1944, Brennan was assigned to Los Angeles, where he over- saw the massive influx of women into civilian defense jobs, organizing a complex support structure of day care, hous- ing, health, and transportation. Despite significant housing shortages in the Los Angeles area, Col. Brennan refused to take the easy route of commandeering the homes of interned Japanese-Americans. In 1945, it was Brennan's responsibil- ity to oversee the furlough of soldiers in Europe after the defeat of Hitler. Despite pressure from industry and from Congress, Brennan refused to favor workers in certain occu- pations over others. In one congressional hearing, Brennan 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT xiv JUSTICE BRENNAN defended his decision, explaining that "to the extent you make an exception for a single soldier there is somebody eli- gible for discharge whose discharge is delayed." 22 Brennan left the Army in 1945 at the rank of full colonel after being awarded the Legion of Merit. The Justice returned to his old law firm, continuing to build his labor law practice at a time when labor strife was mounting. To capitalize on Brennan's growing reputation as a consummate labor lawyer, the firm added his name to the firm's masthead, which became, Pitney, Hardin, Ward & Brennan. Throughout his rapid rise to prominence as a leader of the private bar, Brennan developed a reputation as impeccably fair and gracious. He once asked a judge to postpone a hearing upon learning that his opponent's father had died. "We'll have the hearing another day," Brennan told his flabbergasted opponent.23 Morton Stavis recalled litigating one of his first cases against Brennan: "I . . . was guilty of a number of procedural oversights. Not only did he not take advantage of them, but he went out of his way to help me correct the record so that the case would be tried fairly on the merits." 24 Brennan carried this fair-mindedness into the public arena. Though his livelihood depended upon his management-side labor work, he spoke out in support of the right to strike and in favor of legislation to prohibit employer intimidation of union members. But he also urged labor to "accep[t] its re- sponsibilities not to invade or trample upon the rights of other groups" and vigorously condemned racial discrimina- tion by unions.25 With his prestige within the bar growing, in 1946, Brennan championed the cause of court reform, a charge led by Ar- thur T. Vanderbilt, who was at the time a prominent Newark lawyer and the Dean of New York University School of Law. 22 Hunter R. Clark, Justice Brennan: The Great Conciliator 32 (1995). 23 Kim Isaac Eisler, A Justice For All: William J. Brennan, Jr., and the Decisions that Transformed American 54 (1993). 24 Hentoff, supra, at 48. 25 Clark, supra, at 37. 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT JUSTICE BRENNAN xv Brennan fought hard to develop, and pass into law, a variety of reforms, including adaptation of federal procedural rules to the New Jersey courts, the development of an office to track court statistics, increased accountability of trial judges, and mandatory pretrial discovery and settlement confer- ences. The procedural reforms brought startling results, in- cluding a cleanup of the massive backlog of cases, an increase in settlements, and most importantly to Brennan, a system "assuring that right and justice shall have the most favorable opportunity of prevailing in cases that are tried." 26 When Vanderbilt was appointed Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court, he set his mind to convincing Bren- nan to accept an appointment as a trial judge. After a year of cajoling, Brennan relented. In January 1949, Republican Governor Alfred E. Driscoll appointed Brennan, then 43, to the trial court. The appointment slashed Brennan's salary by two-thirds at a time when he was still helping to support his mother and numerous siblings, as well as Marjorie, his two sons, and a new infant, Nancy. The Justice's rise through the New Jersey courts was meteoric. Shortly after Brennan took the bench, he was appointed assignment judge for Hudson County. Within a year and a half, he was elevated to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court, the state's intermediate court. Two years later, in March 1952, Governor Driscoll appointed Brennan to the New Jersey Supreme Court. It was there that the Justice began to construct his judicial legacy. He dissented in one criminal case when a defendant was denied the right to review his written confession before trial: "To shackle counsel so that they cannot effectively seek out the truth and afford the accused the representation which is not his privilege but his absolute right seriously imperils our bedrock presumption of innocence." 27 He up- held the privilege against self-incrimination as a right that 26 Clark, supra, at 48 (quoting Brennan, "After Eight Years," supra, at 502). 27 State v. Tune, 98 A. 2d 881, 897 (1953). 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT xvi JUSTICE BRENNAN applied against the state, describing the privilege as "pre- cious to free men as a restraint against high-handed and arrogant inquisitorial practices." 28 Brennan's ardor in upholding the self-incrimination privi- lege was no doubt influenced by the activities of Senator Jo- seph McCarthy. In a 1954 St. Patrick's Day speech in Bos- ton, Brennan attacked McCarthy, warning that " we cannot and must not doubt our strength to conserve, without sacri- fice of any, all of the guarantees of justice and fair play and simple human dignity which have made our land what it is." 29 In a later speech, Brennan struck a theme that he would repeat many times. He warned that if we violate individual rights out of fear, we come "perilously close to destroying liberty in liberty's name." 30 In later years, Brennan was proud that the only Senate vote against his confirmation was cast by Senator McCarthy. In one of the extraordinary strokes of fortune that shape our lives, Brennan attended a 1955 conference on court re- form hosted by Attorney General Herbert Brownell. His lucid presentation so impressed Brownell that he marked Brennan for future high office. In 1956, upon the resigna- tion of Justice Sherman Minton, President Dwight D. Eisen- hower, influenced by Vanderbilt's strong endorsement, and Brownell's favorable assessment, appointed William J. Bren- nan, Jr., to the Supreme Court. Brennan himself often noted that the fact that his appointment would be extremely popular with Irish-Catholic voters in a Presidential year did not hurt. At the press conference announcing his recess ap- pointment, Brennan gave a characteristically modest reply to a reporter's question about how he would fare as a Su- preme Court Justice. Brennan predicted he would be like "the mule that was entered in the Kentucky Derby. I don't 28 State v. Fary, 117 A. 2d 499, 501 (1955). 29 Clark, supra, at 68 (quoting William J. Brennan, Jr., Address Before the Charitable Irish Society, Boston, Massachusetts (Mar. 17, 1954)). 30 Clark, supra, at 70 (quoting William J. Brennan, Jr., Address Before the Monmouth Rotary Club, Monmouth, New Jersey (Feb. 23, 1955)). 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT JUSTICE BRENNAN xvii expect to distinguish myself, but I do expect to benefit from the association." Marjorie and their daughter, Nancy, once more moved to Washington and settled into a routine that revolved around family and work. A devoted family man, the Justice would come home for dinner every night. But then, as Nancy re- called, he would "set up a green card table in the middle of the living room and spread all these piles of papers within arm's reach on the rug. He'd work until he was just too tired." 31 For the next twenty-five years, Brennan's life re- volved around his family and his intense dedication to the Court. So devoted was Brennan to his family that his legendary energy level waned only once in his tenure, when Marjorie lost a sustained battle with cancer in 1982. Brennan himself had conquered throat cancer, which almost cost him his voice, but it was Marjorie's death that sent his morale plum- meting. The Justice loved Marjorie so deeply that her death was a terrible blow. His zest for life began to return in 1983 when, after wryly obtaining his daughter Nancy's consent, he married Mary Fowler, his secretary of twenty-six years. He had a new spring in his walk, renewed energy. Brennan and Mary shared a special love-and a lot of history. Justice Brennan's years of retirement were enriched by the kindnesses of his colleagues. While his health permit- ted it, Justice Brennan visited the Court every day. Many of his colleagues, especially his successor, Justice Souter, provided continuing personal warmth and friendship. Jus- tice Souter found time to visit with Brennan almost every day, an event that the retired-Justice often described as the high-point of his day. Justice Brennan particularly savored his 90th birthday celebration in the Supreme Court chamber, the first such celebration since Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., held a similar birthday celebration in 1931. In his parting conversations with friends and admirers that day Justice 31 Donna Haupt, "Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.," Constitution (Winter 1989), at 54­55. 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT xviii JUSTICE BRENNAN Brennan recalled his love for the Court, and his gratitude for a life well lived. Justice Brennan died peacefully in his 92d year. The Brennan personal traits that will be most remembered were the Justice's love of people and his ability to put himself into their shoes. Virtually everyone who encountered Jus- tice Brennan has a story of his kindness. The bus driver who rear-ended Brennan's car in Georgetown on a drizzly day and did not realize that the gentle victim-who assured him that this kind of thing "happens every time there's a rain, and it's nobody's fault at all" 32-was a Supreme Court Justice. The police officer who took Brennan and his son, Bill III, into custody when he found them in the pre-dawn hours, hopelessly lost, wandering on the streets, and was treated to a hearty breakfast of bacon and eggs when they finally convinced him they were who they said they were. Every law clerk, each of whom can tell countless stories of how Brennan could reassure with the characteristic grip on the arm, twinkling eyes, and the word, "Okay, pal"; and how Brennan always asked about the clerk's spouse or latest ro- mance. Every colleague and friend who, in Justice Sou- ter's words, cherished "the man who made us out to be bet- ter than we were, and threw his arms around us in Brennan bear hugs, and who simply gave his love to us as the friends he'd chosen us to be." 33 Every Supreme Court employee who was amazed that Brennan would retain the details of their last conversation and stop in the halls to ask about this problem or that joyous event. As author David Halberstam has put it, "He has been in our lifetime, perhaps more than anyone else . . . , the common man as uncommon man. . . . He is a man defined by his own innate decency and kindness. . . . Bill Brennan has never forgotten the most elemental truth 32 Clark, supra, at 101 (quoting Jack Alexander, "Mr. Justice From Jer- sey," Saturday Evening Post, Sept. 28, 1957, at 133). 33 David H. Souter, In Memoriam: William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1997) (reprinted eulogy at St. Matthew's Cathedral, Washing- ton, D. C.). 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT JUSTICE BRENNAN xix of social relations-in order to gain dignity it is important to bestow it on others." 34 Justice Brennan's Work: Preserving the American Dream for Others Justice Brennan loved this nation. His request that "America the Beautiful" be played at the ceremony of his interment at Arlington National Cemetery reflected the in- tensity of that love. The Justice understood the wonder of a democratic society that could lift the son of a penniless immigrant to the highest Court in the land, and not seem to notice that anything extraordinary had occurred. Because he believed that the essence of American democracy is its commitment to respect the equal, innate dignity of every human being, Justice Brennan dedicated his judicial career to building a legal system that reinforces true democracy by preserving its indispensable building blocks-individuals living in freedom, mutual toleration and respect. One key to the power of the Brennan judicial legacy is the harmony between Justice Brennan's life and his work. Justice Brennan lived, and judged, as a man who loved deeply and well. He was blessed with a devoted and close- knit family. He treated every person he met, regardless of station or class, with heartfelt affection and genuine respect. Through the years of passionate advocacy, in times of heady ascendancy and in anguished dissent, there were rarely harsh words in the Brennan lexicon. He acknowledged his antagonists as he embraced his adherents, as fellow human beings worthy of love, toleration and respect. His capacity for love shaped Justice Brennan's conception of law, and his vision of judicial role. Drawing upon his reli- gious heritage, Justice Brennan believed that every human being is endowed with an inalienable dignity that no earthly power can diminish. He fervently believed in democracy, but distinguished between a true democracy that respects 34 David Halberstam, "The Common Man as Uncommon Man," in Rea- son & Passion, supra, at 25. 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT xx JUSTICE BRENNAN the dignity of the individual, and mere majoritarianism that subordinates individual dignity to group will. He believed that the United States Constitution, especially the Bill of Rights and the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments, was de- signed to assure that the American experiment in democracy does not erode into majoritarian tyranny by ignoring the kernel of individual dignity at the core of every human being. He believed that judges, especially federal judges, and above-all Supreme Court Justices, had, and have, a solemn and unavoidable duty to interpret the majestic generalities of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights in the light of con- temporary circumstances. Finally, he believed that no real conflict exists between vigorous judicial protection of indi- vidual rights, and the American conception of democracy en- visioned by the Founders, a democracy premised on individ- ual dignity and mutual toleration. Indeed, in the absence of vigorous judicial protection of human rights, Justice Brennan feared that the true democracy envisioned by the Founders could not flourish. A second key to the power of Justice Brennan's legal heri- tage was his mastery of the lawyer's art. He was a brilliant legal craftsman. The classic Brennan opinion speaks to us, not in the abstract language of moral philosophy or with the arrogance of government command, but in the logical and institutional cadences of a master lawyer seeking to find the angle of repose between two seemingly irreconcilable posi- tions. Justice Brennan's great individual rights opinions are not assertions of absolute truth; rather, they are institutional blueprints for assuring that only the weightiest assertions of group need can ever restrict the enjoyment of fundamental individual rights. A mark of Justice Brennan's legal genius, and a source of his enduring influence, was his repeated abil- ity to enunciate complex doctrinal formulations designed to establish an institutional balance weighted heavily in favor of individual freedom; a balance that preserves fundamental individual rights in most settings, without making it impossi- ble for the majority to impose narrow restraints when abso- lutely necessary. The "thickness" of Justice Brennan's char- 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT JUSTICE BRENNAN xxi acteristic constitutional analysis was designed to reflect the complexity of the tension between individual right and group need; to erect a sophisticated legal matrix for resolving that tension; and to explain why, in doubtful cases, the resolution should favor the right of the individual over the wishes of the group. Yet another mark of Justice Brennan's mastery of the law- yer's craft was his ability to grasp the interrelationships within an entire body of law. There was no such thing as an ad hoc Brennan decision. He was able to conceive each opinion as part of an institutional whole. Justice Brennan's intense effort to understand the purpose of the statute or constitutional provision before him allowed him to view each case as an opportunity to advance the organic enterprise of which it was a part. The resulting jurisprudence is a work of remarkable coherence. A third key to the power of Justice Brennan's voice was its candid acceptance of responsibility. He embraced the obligation of reading the Constitution in the context of our times. Justice Brennan acknowledged that hard choices ex- isted in deciding the difficult cases before him, but he refused to obfuscate those choices by resort to legal fictions, or to deflect personal criticism by ascribing his decisions to others. He rejected what, to him, was the false comfort of delegating the Constitution's meaning to persons living in other times. He accepted responsibility for interpreting the Constitution in the context of the world in which he lived, and of giving the document's ambiguous words a meaning consistent with evolving notions of human dignity. But his great individual rights opinions were not exercises in subjectivism. They were disciplined efforts to read the Constitution purposively in an effort to advance the document's underlying values in a way that Justice Brennan believed was most faithful to the covenant between the Justices of today and the founding generation. Time and again, Justice Brennan plumbed the manifest purpose underlying a provision of the Bill of Rights, considered how best to advance that purpose in the context of the modern world, and forged brilliant constitutional doc- 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT xxii JUSTICE BRENNAN trine making it possible for millions of contemporary Ameri- cans to find shelter under a tree of liberty planted over two hundred years ago.35 Justice Brennan and the First Amendment When Justice Brennan joined the Court in 1956, the ex- cesses of the McCarthy era were threatening to overwhelm the parchment barriers of the First and Fifth Amendments. Over the next thirty-four years, the Court, led by Justice Brennan, presided over a revolution in First Amendment doctrine, providing effective constitutional protection for the freest market in ideas the world has ever seen. Justice Brennan's characteristic approach to First Amend- ment issues was to ask why the Founders wanted a Free Speech Clause in the Constitution in the first place. His an- swer was twofold. First, Justice Brennan believed that free speech was indispensable to democratic governance. He un- derstood that democratic self-government is imperilled in the absence of robust and uninhibited discussion of issues 35 Justice Brennan left a rich non-judicial record of his judicial philoso- phy. A representative sampling includes William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N. Y. U. L. Rev. (1961); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meikeljohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, the Alexander Meikeljohn Lecture at Brown University, re- printed in 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1965); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Consti- tutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977); William J. Brennan, Jr., Address at the Dedication of the Samuel I. Newhouse Law Center, reprinted in 32 Rutgers L. Rev. 173 (1979); Wil- liam J. Brennan, Jr., Speech Delivered at the Text and Teaching Sympo- sium, Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 1985), reprinted in The Great De- bate: Interpreting Our Written Constitution, 11 (Paul G. Cassell ed. 1986); William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 Hastings L. J. 427 (1986); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 535 (1986); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Equality Princi- ple: A Foundation of American Law, 20 U. C. Davis L. Rev. 673 (1987); William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and the "Progress of the Law," 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 3 (1988); William J. Brennan, Jr., Foreword to the Sym- posium on Capital Punishment, 8 Notre Dame J. of Law, Ethics & Pub. Policy (1994). 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT JUSTICE BRENNAN xxiii of public concern. Second, Justice Brennan recognized that self-expression is an integral element of human dignity. Re- spect for the equal dignity of each human being, Justice Brennan believed requires toleration of individual self- expression, even when the expression is deeply unpopular. Armed with a purposive account of the Free Speech Clause, Justice Brennan proceeded to construct a sophisti- cated institutional structure dedicated to the preservation and advancement of its underlying values. He began halt- ingly in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 (1957). Reject- ing arguments claiming either that sexually explicit speech had virtually no protection, or that it was absolutely pro- tected, Justice Brennan attempted to broker an institutional compromise in Roth by positing a small category of unpro- tected speech-obscenity-that fails to advance any of the underlying purposes of the First Amendment, while provid- ing full First Amendment protection to sexually explicit ma- terial like Ulysses and Fanny Hill. Justice Brennan, the great lawyer, ultimately rejected the attempt of Justice Brennan, the great statesman, to forge an institutional com- promise because it proved impossible to define unprotected obscenity with sufficient precision.36 But the analytic ap- proach pioneered in Roth, an approach that rejects absolutes, that seeks to accommodate seemingly irreconcilable positions by building complex institutional structures designed to pro- tect speech that advances underlying First Amendment val- ues, while permitting narrow regulation when absolutely necessary, became the signature Brennan approach to the First Amendment. The Brennan approach bore more enduring fruit in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), which tailored libel law to the underlying values of the First Amendment. Faced with an effort to use state libel laws to muzzle robust 36 Justice Brennan signaled the abandonment of his effort to define un- protected obscenity in his dissent in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slayton, 413 U. S. 49, 73 (1973). He never was able to persuade a majority of his col- leagues to join him in declaring an end to the experiment. 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT xxiv JUSTICE BRENNAN press coverage of the civil rights movement, Justice Bren- nan, writing for the Court, once again rejected arguments at the extremes claiming either that all libel laws violated the First Amendment, or that libel was a categorical exception to the First Amendment. Instead, the Justice elaborated a complex doctrinal model designed to insulate speech about public figures (and, he believed, public issues) 37 from liability in the absence of "actual malice," while permitting tradi- tional libel law to govern private speech that did not impli- cate democratic governance. The power of the New York Times opinion is twofold. First, Justice Brennan's rejection of absolutist approaches led to the elaboration of a complex institutional structure that seeks to accommodate the com- peting positions, while providing effective First Amendment protection to speech relevant to democratic governance. Second, and more generally, Justice Brennan's lucid explana- tion of the deep purpose of the free speech guaranty per- suaded a generation, providing the intellectual underpin- nings for First Amendment analysis in the years to come. No opinion has been more influential in shaping the reality of our contemporary free speech world, nor more sophisti- cated in bringing the lawyer's art to bear on a First Amend- ment problem. Justice Brennan's mastery of the interplay between First Amendment values and the institutional structures needed to protect them is at the core of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). Brandenburg reflects a classic Brennan effort to develop legal doctrine strongly weighted in favor of individual freedom, but sufficiently flex- ible to permit regulation when absolutely necessary. Gov- ernment restriction of speech is possible, wrote Justice Bren- nan for the Court in Brandenburg, but only if the censor meets an extremely stringent burden of justification. Bran- 37 See Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130, 172 (1967); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 29 (1971); and Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374 (1967), for Justice Brennan's views on speech about "public" or "newsworthy" issues. 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT JUSTICE BRENNAN xxv denburg made clear that casual justifications for censorship rooted in the old "bad tendency" test cannot survive First Amendment scrutiny. While Roth and New York Times provide institutional solutions for specific areas of speech, Brandenburg offers a general theory applicable across the spectrum of free speech analysis that protects speech unless the government can prove an overwhelming need for regula- tion. When in doubt, Brandenburg directs that we err on the side of free speech. Justice Brennan's approach to free speech culminated in his historic opinions for the Court in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397 (1989), and United States v. Eichman, 496 U. S. 310 (1990), upholding the right to burn the American flag as an act of protest. Expressive flag burning must be presump- tively protected, reasoned Justice Brennan, both because it communicates ideas relevant to democratic self-governance, and because it is an act of individual self-expression. If, Jus- tice Brennan continued, the majority wishes to suppress such communicative activity, it must demonstrate an overwhelm- ing social need. Mere disagreement with the message, or anger at the boorishness or offensiveness of the messenger, can never suffice. Justice Brennan's flag burning opinions do more than close a doctrinal cycle that began a half-century earlier in Strom- berg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931). The identities of the five Justices who formed the majority in the Johnson and Eichman cases-Justices Brennan, Marshall, Black- mun, Scalia, and Kennedy-demonstrate that expansive free speech protection is neither a "liberal" idea, nor "con- servative" idea. It is an American idea that is Justice Bren- nan's most enduring gift to the Nation. Justice Brennan was not content with re-defining the sub- stantive elements of free speech protection. As a superb lawyer, he understood that the real world value of free speech protection, however defined, largely depends on the procedural matrix within which the substantive norms are embedded. Like a general deploying troops for battle, Jus- tice Brennan's opinions defend the core of free speech by 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT xxvi JUSTICE BRENNAN building a series of procedural ramparts designed to protect the citadel. He eliminated the threat of criminal libel in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64 (1964). He pioneered the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479 (1965), and Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518 (1972). He explained the special First Amendment dangers of standardless discretion in City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U. S. 451 (1987), and City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U. S. 750 (1988). He warned about the real world consequences of "chilling effect" in Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58 (1963). He insisted on speedy judi- cial review procedures in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51 (1965). He required First Amendment due process in Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717 (1961), and A Quan- tity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U. S. 205 (1964). And, he in- veighed against the danger of prior restraints in his separate opinion in New York Times v. United States, 403 U. S. 713, 724 (1971) (the Pentagon Papers case). Nor was Justice Brennan content to protect speech with- out providing judicial support for the relationships and insti- tutions central to a vibrant First Amendment community. As with his opinions protecting speech itself, Justice Bren- nan resisted the lure of absolutist positions, leaving open the possibility of regulating First Amendment institutions under a rigorous showing of extremely serious social need. Build- ing on Justice Harlan's path-breaking decision in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958), Justice Brennan charted the modern contours of freedom of association. In NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963), writing for the Court, he held that lawyers and clients have a First Amendment right to associate freely in order to pursue litigation to advance a client's interests. In Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347 (1976), and Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U. S. 62 (1990), Justice Brennan wrote for the Court holding that government may not penalize employees for associating with the wrong politi- cal party by allocating non-policymaking jobs on the basis of political affiliation. But, in Roberts v. United States Jay- cees, 468 U. S. 609 (1984), he wrote a classic Brennan individ- 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT JUSTICE BRENNAN xxvii ual rights opinion that asked why we care about freedom to associate in the first place. In Roberts, Justice Brennan held that, properly understood, freedom of association was de- signed to protect close-knit individual or political relation- ships, and did not shield impersonal economic organizations like the Jaycees from laws banning gender discrimination. Justice Brennan viewed the press as critical participants in a system of free expression, but he was reluctant to accord the press preferred legal status. For example, in his dissent in Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U. S. 749, 774 (1985), Justice Brennan rejected the notion that media defendants are entitled to more favorable treatment than non-media defendants in libel cases. Rather than accord the press a preferred legal status, Justice Brennan argued that both the press and the public enjoy a broad First Amend- ment right of access to important public institutions in order to assure an informed public. In his concurrences in Rich- mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U. S. 555, 584 (1980), and Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 572 (1976), Justice Brennan argued that the "structural" role of the First Amendment justified a broad right of access to criminal trials for both the press and public. Similarly, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U. S. 596 (1982), Jus- tice Brennan wrote for the Court in invalidating a law man- dating the closure of criminal trials involving sex offenses against minors. Characteristically, however Justice Bren- nan declined to endorse an absolute right of access, holding open the possibility that, in an appropriate case, "counter- vailing" interests might be sufficiently compelling to reverse the presumption of openness created by the First Amend- ment. In the Justice's final opinion for the Court, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U. S. 547 (1990), he recog- nized the importance to a vibrant First Amendment of en- hancing diversity in ownership and control of the electronic press. Justice Brennan understood that freedom of academic in- quiry is central to the underlying values of the First Amend- ment. In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT xxviii JUSTICE BRENNAN (1967), his opinion for the Court provided the modern ration- ale for intense First Amendment protection of academic free- dom, establishing the constitutional precedent that shields higher education from undue government interference. Justice Brennan recognized that government interference with free speech could take the form of the carrot as well as the stick. Writing for the Court in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958), he pioneered the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, holding that California could not condition the grant of a property tax exemption on the execution of a loy- alty oath. In FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U. S. 364 (1984), he applied the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to invalidate efforts to condition government aid to public tele- vision stations on a waiver of the stations' First Amendment rights to produce privately financed editorials. Justice Brennan also recognized that a vibrant system of free speech must protect listeners as well as speakers. In his path-breaking concurrence in Lamont v. Postmaster Gen- eral, 381 U. S. 301, 307 (1965), the first case to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional under the First Amendment, Justice Brennan explicitly recognized that listeners have a separately cognizable First Amendment right to receive in- formation, even from foreign speakers who enjoy no First Amendment rights of their own. Similarly, in Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U. S. 410 (1971), Justice Brennan, relying on the hearer's independent First Amendment rights, invalidated an excessively broad restriction on receiving information through the mails. Finally, Justice Brennan understood that a robust system of free expression depends on the ability to assemble funds needed for effective speech. In Riley v. National Federa- tion for the Blind, 487 U. S. 781 (1988), Justice Brennan wrote for the Court invalidating an excessively broad regula- tion of charitable solicitation of funds. In a portion of the Court's per curiam in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), authored by Justice Brennan, he insisted that restrictions on campaign financing be analyzed as if they were restrictions 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT JUSTICE BRENNAN xxix on speech itself. In FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U. S. 238 (1986), Justice Brennan wrote for the Court in striking down an effort to limit the campaign spend- ing of a small, antiabortion advocacy group. But, in his con- curring opinion in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Com- merce, 494 U. S. 652, 669 (1990), the Justice supported the constitutionality of a state ban on election spending by profit-making corporations, arguing that a ban on election spending from the corporate treasury was justified to pre- vent organizations amassing great wealth in the economic marketplace from gaining an unfair advantage in the politi- cal marketplace. Justice Brennan treated religious freedom as an integral aspect of his First Amendment vision. In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), he laid the foundation for mod- ern protection of the free exercise of religion by requir- ing government to establish a compelling interest before interfering with religious conscience. Justice Brennan also sought to maintain the "wall" between church and state. In Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U. S. 578 (1987), Justice Brennan wrote for the Court in holding that efforts to mandate the teaching of "Creation Science" in the Louisiana public schools violate the Establishment Clause. His concurring opinion in Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 230 (1963), and his dissents in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783, 795 (1983), and Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 694 (1984), argue for strict separation of church and state in order to preserve a vibrant private religious life free from state interference. Justice Brennan's contribution to contemporary First Amendment law is unparalleled.38 He re-defined its sub- stantive contours, built its procedural ramparts, preserved 38 Justice Brennan's son estimates that his father wrote eighty-two ma- jority opinions in free speech cases. William J. Brennan, III, Brennan on Brennan: The Justice's Views on the Structural Role of the First Amend- ment, New Jersey Lawyer, p. 6 (August/September 1994). 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT xxx JUSTICE BRENNAN its nurturing institutions, and placed its future in densely argued, brilliantly crafted doctrinal formulations linked di- rectly to the underlying values of the First Amendment. When one compares the anemic First Amendment law that Justice Brennan faced in 1956, with the fully-developed sys- tem of free expression that Justice Brennan's opinions be- queath to the nation, it becomes clear how lucky James Madi- son was to have had William Brennan as his lawyer. Justice Brennan and Equality At the heart of Justice Brennan's jurisprudence is a pro- found commitment to the law's obligation to treat each per- son equally. Although that commitment to equality suffuses Justice Brennan's entire judicial career, it finds particular voice in four sets of Brennan opinions: opinions that seek to achieve and defend equal participation in democracy; opinions seeking to enforce racial equality before the law, especially in an educational context; opinions defining and implementing gender equality; and opinions defending af- firmative action. Justice Brennan believed that democracy requires that each citizen be accorded equal political status. He under- stood that rational variants of majority rule exist that treat citizens unequally, but he rejected the notion that the Ameri- can experiment in democracy would adopt such an unequal structure. Accordingly, after years of malapportionment had resulted in a political system where the votes of some counted far more than the votes of others, Justice Brennan viewed the resulting unequal distribution of political status as an affront to democracy. His intense belief in political equality as the organizing principle for a true democracy is the heart of his historic opinion in Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962), paving the way to the "one-person one-vote" doc- trine. Chief Justice Earl Warren believed that Baker v. Carr was the most influential decision handed down during 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT JUSTICE BRENNAN xxxi his tenure because it re-shaped the contours of American democracy.39 Justice Brennan was not content merely to define an ab- stract norm of political equality. He understood the need for institutional reinforcements that would make the equal participation principle a reality for millions of Americans who had been excluded by generations of discrimination from full participation in the democratic process. Unlike the First Amendment area, where Justice Brennan helped forge the supporting institutional structures from the provisions of the Constitution itself, Congress provided crucial institu- tional mechanisms for assuring equal participation in the democratic process by enacting the Voting Rights Acts of 1965 and 1982. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966), Justice Brennan's opinion upheld the constitutionality of portions of the 1965 Act that prohibited literacy tests as a bar to voting, recognizing the imperative of overcoming years of sophisticated resistance to the enfranchisement of racial minorities. The voting rights partnership between Congress and the Court was a brilliant success, leading, for the first time since Reconstruction, to the widespread po- litical participation of African-Americans in the states of the old Confederacy, and to a resurgence of political partici- pation by minority groups throughout the United States. In Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30 (1986), Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court established the ground rules for judi- cial consideration of a claim for vote dilution added in the 1982 Act, beginning the difficult process, still unfinished, of assuring that minority groups enjoy an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. Justice Brennan believed deeply in racial equality. He fought vigorously to defend the majestic principle of equal- 39 Earl Warren, Mr. Justice Brennan, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1966). The special relationship between Justice Brennan and Chief Justice Warren is described in Owen Fiss, A Life Lived Twice, 100 Yale L. J. 1117 (1991). See also Abner J. Mikva, Mr. Justice Brennan and the Political Process: Assessing the Legacy of Baker v. Carr, 1995 U. Ill. L. Rev. 683. 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT xxxii JUSTICE BRENNAN ity before the law underlying Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954). Justice Brennan viewed Brown, not merely as a narrow case involving school segregation, but as the enunciation of a broad principle assuring judicial protec- tion to members of minority groups that had been the target of sustained prejudice. Although he joined the Court two years after Brown, he (along with Justices Harlan and Whit- taker, who also joined the Court after the Brown decision) embraced the Brown opinion explicitly in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 (1958) (signed by all of the Justices). In Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430 (1968), Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, finally provided the institutional mechanism for enforcing Brown, directing the immediate cessation of legally-imposed public school segregation "root and branch." The firmness of Justice Brennan's opinion in Green is widely credited with the widespread elimination of de jure school segregation in the ensuing year. In Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U. S. 189 (1973), Justice Brennan demonstrated that the principle of Brown was applicable to Northern schools, as well, if patterns of government deci- sionmaking had abetted racial segregation. While Justice Brennan was unable to persuade a majority of his colleagues that systematic inequality in financing public education vio- lated the Federal Constitution,40 his talent as a lawyer en- abled him to assemble a majority opinion in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202 (1982), assuring the children of undocumented aliens the right to attend public school. During his wartime service, then-Col. Brennan had orga- nized and observed the extraordinary contribution of women to the nation's civilian defense production effort. Forty years later, he helped chart the Constitutional guaranty of gender equality. Building on Chief Justice Burger's deci- sion in Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971), Justice Brennan, aided in no small part, as he often observed, by the then- Director of the ACLU's Women's Rights Project, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, provided a coherent theoretical basis for the 40 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 62 (1973). 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT JUSTICE BRENNAN xxxiii Court's ban on laws discriminating on the basis of gender.41 In his plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973), Justice Brennan argued that laws discriminating on the basis of gender should be subjected to the same strict scrutiny standard governing challenges to racial discrimina- tion. In Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190 (1976), and Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199 (1977), Justice Brennan persuasively demonstrated why laws based on gender stereotyping were unconstitutional, and enunciated an intermediate standard of scrutiny to assist the lower courts in rooting out unfair gen- der discrimination. Although he did not assemble a major- ity for his "strict scrutiny" position in Frontiero, Justice Brennan's powerful defense of women's rights provided the intellectual blueprint for the systematic eradication of laws discriminating on the basis of gender, a process that culmi- nated, fittingly, in Justice Ginsburg's repeated citation of Justice Brennan in her opinion for the Court in United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515 (1996), invalidating the male-only admissions policy at Virginia Military Institute. Justice Brennan extended the battle against gender stereotyping to the private sphere in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228 (1989), which held that gender stereotyping also violated Title VII. In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U. S. 273 (1987), Justice Brennan's majority opinion extended his efforts to combat stereotyping to persons with conta- gious diseases, holding that a person with a history of infec- tion with a contagious disease was entitled to protection against irrational discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Justice Brennan's equality jurisprudence was rooted in the real world. He knew that despite heroic efforts by the Court to eradicate hundreds of years of racial and gender discrimination, the effects of generations of widespread dis- crimination could not be wiped out overnight. Accordingly, Justice Brennan supported narrowly tailored efforts at af- 41 Justice Ginsburg's affectionate appreciation of Justice Brennan's life appears at 111 Harv. L. Rev. 3 (1997). 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT xxxiv JUSTICE BRENNAN firmative action designed either to redress past wrongs, or to assure the proper functioning of important contemporary institutions. In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747 (1976), his opinion for the Court upheld the use of broad equitable remedies to undo the consequences of past discrimination. In his partial dissent and partial concur- rence in California Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 324 (1978), Justice Brennan noted that educational quality is enhanced by diversity. Accordingly, he argued that volun- tary affirmative action plans by public universities designed to achieve educational diversity are constitutional. In his opinion for the Court in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1978), Justice Brennan argued that Title VII's ban on racial discrimination in employment did not preclude nar- rowly tailored voluntary affirmative action programs by pri- vate employers designed to redress the effects of identifiable past discrimination. In Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers In- ternational Assoc. v. EEOC, 478 U. S. 421 (1986), and Local 93, International Association of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U. S. 501 (1986), Justice Brennan, who had inveighed against racial discrimination by labor unions in the 1940's, authored opinions upholding rigorous affirmative action rem- edies designed to redress the effects of past racial discrimi- nation. In United States v. Paradise, 480 U. S. 149 (1987), Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court upheld rigid hiring quotas designed to redress years of blatant racial discrimina- tion in hiring and promotion. In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U. S. 616 (1987), Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court upheld the use of voluntary affirmative action techniques by a government agency to redress the effects of clearly established past discrimination against women. In his last opinion for the Court, Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U. S. 547 (1990), Justice Brennan defended the constitu- tionality of FCC regulations designed to favor women and minority entrepreneurs seeking broadcast licenses. Justice Brennan understood the complex moral and legal calculus that makes affirmative action such a difficult issue. Not surprisingly, Justice Brennan's affirmative action juris- 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT JUSTICE BRENNAN xxxv prudence remains controversial. But, whatever the short- term fate of Justice Brennan's efforts to defend affirmative action, his affirmative action opinions reflect his consistent concern that abstract constitutional principles like equality and free speech must be translated into the real world if our Constitution is to play its proper role in the American legal system. Justice Brennan and Procedural Fairness Justice Brennan's twin concerns with individual dignity and institutional structure led him to pay extremely close attention to procedural matters, especially in settings where the individual is ranged against the power of the state. He believed that strict adherence to procedural fairness is a precondition to the effective protection of individual rights. One of his early opinions for the Court, Jencks v. United States, 353 U. S. 657 (1957), made the criminal process fairer by requiring prosecutors to provide an accused with prior statements by witnesses. In Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968), he authored an opinion ruling that the Con- frontation Clause precludes the use of the confession of a co-defendant in settings where cross-examination is unavail- able, and, in his dissents in California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149, 189 (1970), and Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56, 77 (1980), the Justice argued that the Confrontation Clause broadly precludes the use in a criminal proceeding of testimony not subject to cross examination. In In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970), Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court held that proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case is a fundamental tenet of due process of law. Justice Brennan understood that the reasonable doubt standard is needed to prevent individual defendants from being overwhelmed by the power of the state. Justice Brennan believed that the guaranty of procedural due process of law advances two basic values: accuracy and individual dignity. Providing a hearing to an individual be- fore significant adverse government action, believed Justice Brennan, not only minimizes the chance of error, it recog- 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT xxxvi JUSTICE BRENNAN nizes the innate dignity of the individual by requiring the state to humanize the bureaucratic process. Justice Bren- nan's respect for individual dignity underlies his most impor- tant procedural decision, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970), finding significant due process requirements applica- ble prior to the suspension of statutory welfare benefits. Goldberg v. Kelly is a classic example of Justice Brennan's ability to knit understanding of statutory purpose, respect for constitutional principle, and empathy for the individual into a compelling opinion. He recognized, as did the parties, that a statutorily enacted welfare benefit constitutes consti- tutional property in some sense. The Justice's real concern was over the timing and nature of the hearing required in connection with its suspension. Evoking the program's pur- pose, and the shattering consequences for individuals on wel- fare of even a temporary suspension, Justice Brennan's opin- ion in Goldberg v. Kelly, requiring an extended due process inquiry before suspension of benefits, expanded the due proc- ess revolution into the civil arena, permitting millions of indi- viduals, ranging from welfare recipients to applicants for a driver's license, to confront the bureaucratic state on more equal terms. Justice Brennan and the Federal Courts Justice Brennan's opinions helped shape the modern fed- eral court system. In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715 (1966), his opinion for the Court developed the mod- ern view of pendent jurisdiction, enabling federal courts to act as efficient fora for the resolution of actions involving state and federal claims. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Coop., 356 U. S. 525 (1958), ruled that trial by jury must be available in virtually all damage actions in the federal courts. In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462 (1985), and in his dissent in World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286, 299 (1980), and his concurrence in Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U. S. 604, 628 (1990), Justice Brennan championed a broad, functional vi- sion of federal in personam jurisdiction. And, in Colorado 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT JUSTICE BRENNAN xxxvii River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U. S. 800 (1976), Justice Brennan's majority opinion clarified the duty of a federal court to resolve controversies within its subject matter jurisdiction. But it was in establishing federal courts as an instrument to enforce individual rights that Justice Brennan left his most enduring mark on the Ar- ticle III courts. Justice Brennan believed that the institu- tional attributes of the federal courts-especially lifetime tenure-rendered federal judges the natural defenders of constitutional rights against majoritarian overreaching. In a series of opinions, Justice Brennan honed the federal courts as effective fora for the enforcement of federal rights. In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978), the Court, extending Justice Douglas' opinion in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), construed the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to permit damage actions in federal court to redress the deprivation of federal constitutional rights by both local officials and government entities. In Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 (1963), Justice Brennan established a similar federal court enforcement presence in the context of writs of habeas corpus. Justice Brennan's expansive conception of the Great Writ permitted the district courts to function effectively for three decades as decentralized arms of the Supreme Court, enforcing the Court's criminal procedure precedents against occasionally recalcitrant state courts. It was in the Court's historic opinion in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 (1958), that Justice Brennan's vision of the federal courts emerges most clearly. In the years immediately fol- lowing Brown v. Board of Education, state and local officials swore "massive resistance" to public school integration. When mobs threatened to prevent the integration of Little Rock High School, the Supreme Court responded with a un- precedented opinion, largely drafted by Justice Brennan, and signed individually by each of the nine Justices, re-affirming the Court's adherence to Brown, and reasserting the pri- macy of the Supreme Court in interpreting the Constitution. Justice Brennan's passionate defense in Cooper of the critical role of the Supreme Court as ultimate interpreter of the 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT xxxviii JUSTICE BRENNAN Constitution and protector of the rights of the weak remains among the most eloquent and expansive defenses of the judi- cial function in our legal heritage. In recalling Justice Brennan's view of the role of federal courts, we should not overlook the heritage of his years on the New Jersey courts, and his strong belief in the impor- tance of state courts as protectors of individual liberties. Justice Brennan believed that every American judge has a duty to protect human rights. Just as in Bivens v. Six Un- known Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), where his opinion for the Court held that federal officials could be held liable, on common law principles, for damages resulting from viola- tions of the Bill of Rights, so he strongly urged state judges to develop independent mechanisms for protecting rights guaranteed under state constitutions. His two forceful ad- dresses on the subject 42 were among his best-known and in- fluential extra-judicial statements. As the only Justice with state court experience for many of his years on the Court, Justice Brennan never forgot the crucial role of state courts in the federal system. Justice Brennan and Labor Law Justice Brennan, the consummate labor lawyer, played a significant role in the evolution of American labor law. His numerous opinions construing the National Labor Relations Act and related statutes reflect both Justice Brennan's in- tense commitment to the individual, and his sophisticated un- derstanding of the collective-bargaining process.43 As with his constitutional opinions, Justice Brennan sought to cap- ture the "spirit" of the National Labor Relations Act, and to develop a coherent body of case law reinforcing its underly- 42 See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 535 (1986). 43 For a survey of Justice Brennan's labor law decisions, see B. Glenn George, Visions of a Labor Lawyer: The Legacy of Justice Brennan, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1123 (1992). 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT JUSTICE BRENNAN xxxix ing goals. In his opinions for the Court in International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740 (1961), and Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U. S. 735 (1988), Justice Brennan reinforced the individual by holding that objecting employees were entitled to pro-rata refunds of portions of their agency shop fees used for political causes they opposed, or for other purposes unconnected with collec- tive bargaining. In NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U. S. 251 (1975), Justice Brennan's opinion reinforced the individ- ual by holding that an employee is entitled to the presence of a union representative at a disciplinary investigation con- ducted by the employer. And, in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U. S. 822 (1984), the Court reinforced the individual by holding that the activities of a single employee in asserting a right rooted in a collective-bargaining agree- ment were protected as a form of "concerted activity". Justice Brennan believed that lasting labor peace could not be obtained by government-imposed solutions. Whether the issue was the right of members of a multi-employer bar- gaining unit to respond to a selective strike with a lock-out,44 the right of union members to engage in slow-downs,45 or the right of an employer to hire replacement workers,46 Justice Brennan sought to allow the parties to reach a freely bar- gained economic solution that reflects their relative economic power by assuring that each is free to use its economic weap- ons without government interference. Where, however, an employer sought to by-pass the bargaining process by impos- ing unilateral conditions,47 or a union sought to ignore no- strike obligations accepted as part of the bargaining proc- ess,48 Justice Brennan wrote for the Court in defending the bargaining process. Justice Brennan believed that the collective-bargaining process would work best if it were shielded from state or federal judicial interference. He 44 NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U. S. 87 (1957). 45 NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U. S. 477 (1960). 46 NLRB v. Brown, 380 U. S. 278 (1965). 47 NLRB v. Katz, 369 U. S. 736 (1962). 48 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235 (1970). 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT xl JUSTICE BRENNAN championed broad preemption of state efforts to regulate union activity which Congress had left to the free play of economic forces,49 and sought to minimize federal judicial in- tervention which would delay the commencement of the bar- gaining process.50 Justice Brennan: Archetype Justice Brennan's contribution to American legal thought transcends even his monumental substantive achievements. It is true that he shaped the First Amendment; sketched the contours of the "one-person one-vote" rule; deepened and defended our commitment to equality; enriched our ideas of procedural fairness; taught us about the special role of the federal courts; and profoundly influenced labor law. It is equally true that his mastery of the lawyers' craft repeatedly enabled him to place his substantive insights in complex doctrinal settings designed to persuade and to deflect error in favor of freedom. But Justice Brennan's contribution is deeper than substantive outcomes or doctrinal innovations. He joins Chief Justice John Marshall and Justice Oliver Wen- dell Holmes, Jr., as archetypes of a conception of judging in a constitutional democracy. Chief Justice Marshall pioneered the use of judicial review. His insight that judges, interpreting the text of a written Constitution, could effectively defend against unconstitu- tional action by the majority establishes Chief Justice Mar- shall as the founding archetype of the modern constitutional judge. Long after his substantive rulings have succumbed to the inevitable erosion of time and change, we will continue to draw inspiration from Chief Justice Marshall's grasp of institutional possibility. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., helped to chart the complex relationship between judicial review and respect for 49 Int'l Assn. of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U. S. 132 (1976). 50 Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U. S. 184, 191 (1958). 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT JUSTICE BRENNAN xli the will of the majority. His lifetime of effort to develop a line between deference to the majority and respect for funda- mental individual rights clarified the modern role of judicial review in a vibrant democracy. Long after Justice Holmes' substantive rulings have been amended by time, we will look to him as the archetype of an even-handed constitutional judge in a functioning democracy. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., adds a third judicial arche- type to our constitutional heritage. Justice Brennan's life- time of passionate effort to deploy a modern, purposive read- ing of the Bill of Rights in defense of the innate dignity of the individual, not as an alienated island, but as a participant in a democracy of equals, has immensely enriched our con- ception of judging. If Justice Holmes reminds us of our duty to democracy, Justice Brennan reminds us that true democ- racy requires us to fulfil our duty to the individual. Healthy debate will continue over the precise role of a constitutional judge in a vibrant democracy. But time and healthy debate can only enhance Justice Brennan's status as the archetype of a Justice passionately devoted to the enforcement of indi- vidual constitutional rights. He taught us that constitu- tional law, brilliantly conceived and courageously enforced, can lift the human spirit. Wherefore, it is accordingly RESOLVED, that we, as representative members of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, express our deep sadness at the death of Justice Brennan, our condo- lences to the Brennan family, and our profound admiration for Justice Brennan's matchless contributions to the cause of human dignity; and it is further RESOLVED, that the Solicitor General be asked to pre- sent these Resolutions to the Court, and that the Attorney General be asked to move that they be inscribed on the Court's permanent records. 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT xlii JUSTICE BRENNAN The Chief Justice said: Thank you, Mr. Solicitor General. I recognize the Attor- ney General of the United States. Attorney General Reno addressed the Court as follows: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Bar of the Court met today to honor the memory of William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice of the Supreme Court from 1956 to 1990. While recognizing Justice Bren- nan's extraordinary contributions to this Court and impact on the legal world in a wide variety of areas, I will limit these remarks to just a few examples of Justice Brennan's contributions to constitutional jurisprudence. Justice Brennan served on this Court for 34 years. His role was central in the Court's expansion during that era of the substance of the Constitution's protection of individual rights, as well as in the Court's strengthening of the reme- dies available for the enforcement of those rights. Justice Brennan's contributions to the development of the law are perhaps most striking in the Court's free speech cases. In his opinion for the Court in Speiser v. Randall, for example, Justice Brennan introduced the concept of the chilling effect. Explaining that the man who knows that he must bring forth proof and persuade another of the lawful- ness of his conduct necessarily must steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if the State must bear these burdens. Six years later came New York Times v. Sullivan, one of the leading free speech cases of this century. Justice Bren- nan articulated the fundamental principle of the opinion, and one of the foundations of this Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. In oft-quoted language, he stated that the Court considers this case against the background of a profound national com- mitment to the principle that debate on public issues should 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT JUSTICE BRENNAN xliii be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on Government and public officials. New York Times v. Sullivan is a characteristic example of Justice Brennan's recognition that the provisions of the Bill of Rights and the Civil War amendments embody core values and principles that remain valid even where their vindication requires significant alteration in hitherto accepted principles of State law. In NAACP v. Button, the Court held that the State of Virginia could not prohibit NAACP lawyers from giving legal advice to citizens of Virginia. Modern conceptions of vagueness and over-breadth trace their roots to Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in this case, which once again relied on the chilling effect rationale he had first elabo- rated in Speiser. In the two flag-burning cases that came before the Court in Justice Brennan's last two Terms, Texas v. Johnson, and United States v. Eichman, Justice Brennan spoke for the Court in holding the statutes unconstitutional. As Justice Brennan explained in Johnson: Our decision is a reaffirmation of the principles of freedom and inclusiveness that the flag best reflects, and of the conviction that our toleration of criti- cisms such as Johnson's is a sign and a source of our strength. Justice Brennan was a leading exponent of the need to maintain separation of church and State under the Estab- lishment Clause, as articulated in his influential concurring opinion in Abington School District v. Schempp. As he explained in that opinion, it is not only the nonbe- liever who fears the injection of sectarian doctrines and con- troversies into the civil polity, but in as high degree it is the devout believer who fears the secularization of a creed which becomes too deeply involved with, and dependent upon, the Government. Justice Brennan also spoke for the Court in a major Free Exercise Clause case, Sherbert v. Verner, which eloquently set forth one side of the debate regarding whether strict gov- 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT xliv JUSTICE BRENNAN ernmental neutrality is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional command of the Clause. The same underlying philosophy provided the founda- tion for Justice Brennan's notable contribution to the juris- prudence of the Equal Protection Clause. As is by now well-known, he wrote most of the opinion, signed by all nine Members of the Court, in Cooper v. Aaron. Justice Brennan's seminal opinion upholding the constitu- tionality of substantive provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in Katzenbach v. Morgan marked a crucial milestone in the struggle for equal voting rights, and in Thornburg v. Gingles, Justice Brennan again wrote for the Court in set- ting forth the basic analytical structure that would govern the interpretation of the amended § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Perhaps even more than in the area of race discrimination, Justice Brennan's application of the Equal Protection Clause in gender discrimination cases has had a lasting impact on the law. In Frontiero v. Richardson, Justice Brennan's plu- rality opinion recognized that statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members. Although he was writing only for a plurality in Frontiero, the Court adopted Justice Brennan's views in Craig v. Boren, as well as his further articulation of the standard governing gender discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. Classifications by gender must serve important govern- mental objectives, and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. In his ground-breaking opinion for the Court in Goldberg v. Kelly, Justice Brennan first applied due process standards to a State's decision to terminate welfare payments. In Shapiro v. Thompson, Justice Brennan spoke for the Court in striking down longstanding State residency re- quirements for welfare as a burden on the right to travel. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, Justice Brennan wrote an impor- tant opinion that was a crucial stepping stone in the develop- 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT JUSTICE BRENNAN xlv ment of the right to privacy, and in Penn Central Transpor- tation Company v. New York City, Justice Brennan set forth for the Court the fundamental analysis that continues to gov- ern the adjudication of claims that Government regulation of private property constitutes a taking. Justice Brennan's contributions were not limited to civil cases. He wrote for the Court in Malloy v. Hogan, holding that the Fifth Amendment's protection against compelled self-incrimination applied to the States. In In re Winship, Justice Brennan, again writing for the Court, articulated the central due process principle of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases. In Bruton v. United States, the Court applied the Confron- tation Clause to defendants who were tried jointly. An important element in Justice Brennan's jurisprudence was his belief that remedial avenues must be available to ensure that constitutional protections can be enforced. For example, in Baker v. Carr, Justice Brennan wrote for the Court, holding that claims of malapportionment in State leg- islatures were justiciable. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bu- reau of Narcotics, Justice Brennan set forth for the Court the principles permitting implication of a cause of action directly under the Constitution. In Monell v. Department of Social Services, Justice Bren- nan wrote an opinion for the Court opening the door to dam- age actions under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against municipal bodies for constitutional violations. Of course, the Court has not always accepted Justice Bren- nan's views and, especially in his later years on the Court, he found himself frequently in dissent. In light of the nu- merous areas of which Justice Brennan's work proved semi- nal in the development of the law in the 20th Century, the fact that the Court has not always agreed with his views should come as no surprise, but it can be safely said that, as the Court continues to address new problems in these areas, it will continue to confront the challenges presented by Jus- tice Brennan. 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT xlvi JUSTICE BRENNAN Justice Brennan's judicial philosophy was based on the need for constant vigilance to apply the principles of human liberty embodied in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to ever new arrangements and new institutions. His vision of the Constitution as embodying a fundamental charter of human liberty will endure and will continue to be reflected in this Court's jurisprudence. Mr. Chief Justice, on behalf of the lawyers of this Na- tion and, in particular, of the Bar of this Court, I respectfully request that the Resolutions presented to you in honor and celebration of the memory of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., be accepted by the Court, and that they, together with the chronicle of these proceedings, be ordered kept for all time in the records of this Court. The Chief Justice said: Thank you, Attorney General Reno, thank you, General Waxman, for your presentations today in memory of our late colleague and friend, William J. Brennan. We also extend to Chairman Burt Neuborne and the mem- bers of the Committee on Resolutions, Chairman Daniel Rez- neck and members of the Arrangements Committee, Judge Abner Mikva, chairman of today's meeting of the Bar, our appreciation for the Resolutions you have read today. Your motion that they be made part of the permanent record of the Court is hereby granted. Bill Brennan's service on this Court and his contributions to American law are an imposing achievement. He took the oath of office as a Justice of this Court on October 16, 1956, at the age of 50. After fulfilling his responsibilities under three Chief Justices and alongside 19 Associate Justices, he retired on July 20, 1990, at the age of 84. His period of service, just a couple of months short of 34 years, is one that has been exceeded by only five other Jus- tices in the 208-year history of this Court's existence, but Justice Brennan's profound influence on American law can't 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT JUSTICE BRENNAN xlvii be measured simply by counting the number of years he sat in one of the chairs behind this bench. An accurate assessment can only be made after one has studied many of the 1,000-plus opinions he authored during his long career, many of them landmark decisions by this Court. His majority opinions alone number well over 400. These opinions, filling thousands of pages of this Court's official reports, demonstrate Justice Brennan's scholarly expertise, as well as his keen reasoning abilities. In Baker v. Carr, for example, which the Resolutions com- ment on, he wrote the opinion that for the first time sub- jected the apportionment of State legislatures to the require- ments of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Before this decision, controversies regarding the radically unequal voting districts that existed at the time came to the Supreme Court under what is called the Republican Guaran- tee Clause. The Supreme Court had declined to decide such cases because the Guarantee Clause lacked judicially man- ageable standards which courts could utilize in cases brought before them. Malapportionment of State legislatures therefore had been considered political questions outside the Federal judiciary's jurisdiction and, while the Federal courts thus declined to address the problem, State legislatures were also unwilling to act, because those who benefited from the existing elec- toral system were the ones who were making the law. Justice Brennan cut this Gordian knot by shifting the issue of the constitutionality of malapportionment from the Guar- antee Clause to the Equal Protection Clause. His opinion in Baker v. Carr took the first step in the direction of the now well-accepted practice and principle of one person, one vote, and in so doing changed the nature of American poli- tics forever. Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in New York Times v. Sullivan, also commented on in the Resolutions, has a stature in our constitutional history equal to that of Baker v. Carr, and as the Resolutions indicate, prior to the Sullivan 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT xlviii JUSTICE BRENNAN decision, slander and libel law were left to the States, with few constitutional restrictions. These rules stifled criticism of public officials, and the result was a less-informed public. The Court in Sullivan, relying on freedom of speech and on what Justice Brennan called our profound national com- mitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, sharply changed these traditional rules of libel law. The Court's opinion held that any public official who was a plaintiff in a libel case had to prove that the statements in question were defamatory, false, and made with actual malice. These developments in libel law altered the rules of the game of American politics, and speech, as a matter of fact, making American public officials more accountable, the American media more watchful, and the American people better informed. I've mentioned just two opinions that Justice Brennan authored that have a special place in our Nation's history. There are others that have been mentioned in the Resolu- tion, and I'm sure still others that have not been mentioned by anyone today, because there were so many of his opinions that played an important role in the development of our law. There are dozens of other significant opinions he wrote for the Court, and yet the great body of law for which he was responsible may be only but half of the contribution he made to this Court. Those of us who had the pleasure of serving with Bill Brennan know what a wonderful human being he was, combining a friendly spirit with a highly analytical mind dedicated to justice. Blessed with such attributes, Justice Brennan was a force for civility and good relationship among his colleagues. During some periods in the Court's history, differences on constitutional questions have affected personal relationships among the Justices and complicated the work of the Court. In contrast, Justice Brennan was a unifying influence on the bench, often guiding the Court to a majority or unanimous opinion. 523BV$ Unit: $$UV [05-01-00 19:42:35] PGT: FRT JUSTICE BRENNAN xlix And when the divisions on the Court on constitutional issues were too deep and broad to be bridged, Justice Bren- nan never allowed such disagreements to affect the way he treated his colleagues. Warm-hearted, polite, courteous, Bill Brennan inspired these same qualities in his colleagues, even those who disagreed with him. His career exemplifies the happy truth that a judge need not be a prima donna to have a lasting influence on our coun- try's laws. He will have a high place in the annals of this Court and in its jurisprudence. Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Note: All undesignated references herein to the United States Code are to the 1994 edition. Cases reported before page 1001 are those decided with opinions of the Court or decisions per curiam. Cases reported on page 1001 et seq. are those in which orders were entered. Page A. v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 A. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Aaron v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Abbott; Bragdon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Abbott Laboratories v. HJB, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Abbott Northwestern Hospital Security; Hughes v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Abidekun v. Commissioner of Social Services of New York City 1098 Abramson; Cullinan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Achusi v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Acosta v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Adams, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Adams v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Adesida v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Aerospace Community Credit Union; Kelleher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Aerospace Corp. v. Campbell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Agadaga v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Agan v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Agostino v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Aguilar v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Aguilar Muniz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Aham-Neze, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Ahmad v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Ahrens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034 Air Line Pilots v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Akin; Dolenz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Akpaeti v. Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District . . . . . 1041 Akpaeti v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Akpaeti v. Terranova Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Aktiebolag; E. J. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Alabama; Cothren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 li Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Alabama; McNair v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Alabama; Pace v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Alabama; Stallworth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Aladekoba v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Alameda County Network of Mental Health Clients; Darden v. . . 1140 Al-Amin v. Seiter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026,1113 Alarcon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Alaska Center for Environment v. Armbrister . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Alberto Munoz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Albright; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420 Alderman; Rutherford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Alexander v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Alex-Bell Oxford Ltd. Partnership; Woods v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Ali v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Ali-Bey v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052,1145 Alix; Total Foods v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Alkazoff v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Allard v. Elo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Allegheny County Children and Youth Services; Derzack v. . . 1004,1106 Allen, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Allen v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Allen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Allen J. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Allied Minority Contractors Assn. v. Eng. Contractors Assn. . . . . 1004 Alls v. Questcare, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Almanzar Duran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Almendarez-Torres v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224 Alphonse v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Alston, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019,1145 Altai, Inc. v. Computer Associates International, Inc. . . . . . . . . . 1106 Altimus v. Department of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Altschul v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Aluminum Co. of America; Eastern Natural Gas Corp. v. . . . . . . . 1118 Alvarez v. Dade County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Alvarez v. Lamadrid Alvarez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Alvord v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 American Broadcasting Cos.; Deteresa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc.; Buckley v. . . . . . 1116 American Cyanamid Co.; Kuiper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 American Express Financial Advisors, Inc.; Makarewicz v. . . . . . 1022 American Medical Assn.; Practice Management Info. Corp. v. . . . . . 1058 American Nat. Bank & Tr. of Sapulpa; Member Serv. Adm'rs v. . . . 1139 American Nat. Bank & Tr. of Sapulpa; Member Servs. Life Ins. v. 1139 American National Can Co.; Papesh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED liii Page American Relocation Network International v. Wal-Mart Stores 1089 American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone 1014 America West Airlines, Inc. v. National Mediation Bd. . . . . . . . . 1021 AmeriSource Corp. v. HJB, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Ameritech Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm'n . . . . . . . . . 1135 Ampofoh; Osei-Afriyie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Amrine v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Anchico-Mosquera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034 Anchorage; Tabbytite v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Anderson; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Anderson v. Edwards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Anderson; Hughes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Anderson v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Anderson; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Anderson; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Anderson v. Prelesnick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Anderson v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Anderson v. United States . . . . . . . . 1030,1033,1036,1072,1111,1132,1143 Anderson; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Anderson Community School Corp.; K. R. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Andrews; Wee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007,1103 Andrew Systems, Inc.; Crawford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Angel v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Angelone; Garrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Angelone; Kendrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Angelone; Muhammad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Angelone; Watkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Anheuser Busch, Inc.; Cameron v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Antonio Davila v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Antonio Jimenez v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Antonio Lujan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Anzoategui v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Apfel; Forney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Appraisal Institute; McDaniel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Aquilar-Avellaveda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 Argueta v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Arias v. Arias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Arizona; Atwood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Arizona; Follett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Arizona; Henry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Arizona; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Arizona; Spreitz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Arizona; Villafuerte v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) liv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Arizona; Villegas Lopez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Arizona Dept. of Revenue v. Blaze Construction Co. . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Arizona State Bar; Merrill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Arkansas; Gooden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Arkansas; Hale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Arkansas; Oliver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Arkansas; Orsini v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Arkansas Christian Educators v. Ozarks Unlimited Resources . . . 1120 Arkansas Educational Television Comm'n v. Forbes . . . . . . . . . . . 666 Arlington Heights; Ricci v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 613,1057 Armbrister; Alaska Center for Environment v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Armstrong v. Rolm A. Siemans Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Arnold v. Boatmen's Trust Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Arnold v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Artuz; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Artuz; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Arvie v. Lastrapes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Arvie v. McHugh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Ashiegbu v. Gray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Ashiegbu v. Siddens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Ashmus; Calderon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 740 Aspelmeier v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Association. For labor union, see name of trade. Association for Local Telecom. Services v. Iowa Utilities Bd. . . . . 1135 Atkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Atlanta; Svay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382 AT&T Corp. v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Attorney General of Ariz.; Boyce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Attorney General of Ariz.; United Mexican States v. . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Attorney General of Fla.; Roe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Attorney General of Kan.; Remeta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Attorney General of Md.; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Attorney General of Mo.; Standish v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Attorney General of Mo.; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050,1145 Attorney General of Mo.; Traina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Attorney General of Wash.; Stearns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Attorney Services Corp.; Kortki v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Atwood v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Auburn Steel Co.; Tolerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Austin v. Bell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Austin; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 "Automatic" Sprinkler Corp.; Plumbers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lv Page Automobile Workers; Caterpillar Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Automobile Workers v. Performance Friction Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Automobile Workers; Textron Lycoming Div., AVCO Corp. v. . . . 653 Avant! Corp. v. Cadence Design Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Avondale Shipyards, Inc.; Bourgeois v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Ayala-Fernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Azeez v. Duncil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Aziz v. Schriro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Azorsky, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Azuz, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 B. v. New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Baade v. Columbia Hospital for Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Babcock & Wilcox Co.; Clements v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023,1133 Bacon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Baeza v. NACCO Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Bagarozy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Bagley v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Bahe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Bailey, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Baird v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Baker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030,1143 Ball v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Balsys; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Bandag, Inc.; Fox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Bandag, Inc.; Steelworkers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Bandrup v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Bankhead v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Bank of Am. Nat. Tr. & Sav. Assn. v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership 1106 Bank One, Tex., National Assn. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Banks v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Banks v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Banks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041,1066 Banos v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Barlow Family Ltd. Partnership v. David M. Munson, Inc. . . . . . 1048 Barnes v. Levitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Barnes v. Logan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Barnes v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Barnes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Barnthouse, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Barr v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Barr v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Barreras; Delgado v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Barreras; Price v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Barrett, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Barrett v. Harrington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Barrier v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Barrier v. Marin General Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Barron v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Barsch v. Brann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Barton, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Baruch v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Basurto-Gomez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Bates v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Bates v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Baughans, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Bavaro v. Pataki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Bayer v. Stanford Univ. School of Medicine/Medical . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Bayliss v. Tulsa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Baze v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410 Beard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Beasley v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Beaven v. McBride . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Becker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Beckwith Machinery Co.; Zerebnick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc. v. Critikon, Inc. . . . . . . . 1071 Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc.; Critikon, Inc. v. . . . . . . . 1071 Beeler v. Calderon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Behr; Burge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Behrens v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Beitzel v. Lazaroff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Belhomme v. Widnall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Bell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Bell v. Austin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Bell; Austin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Bell v. Groseclose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Bell; Morris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Bell v. Rickman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Bell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Bell; Warren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Bellamy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Bellecourt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Belleville v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan; Webster v. . . . . 1022 BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.; Trahan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Bemis v. RMS Lusitania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Benaventa Gamez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Beneficial Cal., Inc.; Viray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lvii Page Benigni v. Cowles Media Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Benitez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Benoit v. Medical Center of Del., Inc., Christiana Hospital . . . . . . 1001 Bentley v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Berg v. Dentists Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Berg v. Shapiro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Berger v. Cuomo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Berger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 Berkowitz v. State of Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062,1134 Bernard v. New York City Health and Hospital Corp. . . . . . . . . . 1140 Berner v. Delahanty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Bernstein, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Berry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131,1143 Berryman v. Colbert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan; Webster v. 1022 Bestfoods; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Betemit v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 Betts v. Container Corp. of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Bevard v. Farmers Ins. Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Beverly Hills; Earthly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Bewry v. Hartford Police Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 BFI Tire Recyclers of MN, Inc.; Salzman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Billemeyer v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Billetter; Luem v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Bilzerian v. HSSM #7 Ltd. Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Bird v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Birmingham v. Morro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Bisbee, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Biscoe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Bishop v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Bivens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Bivins v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Black v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Blackshaw v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Blackwell; Olivier-Ward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Blackwell, Sanders, et al.; Kansas Pub. Retirement System v. . . . 1134 Blanchard v. Tulane Univ. Medical Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Bland v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Blaze Construction Co.; Arizona Dept. of Revenue v. . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Bleasdell; National Medical Enterprises, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Blevins v. Watson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Blodgett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Bloodworth, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Bloom; Calderon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Blumenthal, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Board of Comm'rs, Arapahoe Cty.; Dove Valley Bus. Assoc. v. . . . 1021 Board of Comm'rs, Chatham Cty.; Krippene v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Board of Ed. of Ferguson-Florissant School Dist.; DeBord v. . . . . 1073 Board of Ed. of New York City; Bronx Household of Faith v. . . . . 1074 Board of Revision, Hamilton Cty.; Colerain Hills Investment Co. v. 1137 Boatmen's Trust Co.; Arnold v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Bob Evans Farms, Inc.; Roberts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Bobtail Bear v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Boddie v. Gianger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Bogan v. Scott-Harris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Boggess v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Bogins; Dias v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Bok v. Mutual Assurance, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Bolden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Boone; Watson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Booth; McGraw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Booz v. Shanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Borg; Buckley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Borne v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Borough. See name of borough. Boufford v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Bougle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 Bouie, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Bouldin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Bourgeois v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Bourque v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Bousley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 614 Bowers; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Bowersox; Amrine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Bowersox v. Clemmons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Bowersox; Griffin-El v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014,1015,1042 Bowersox; Hunter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Bowersox; Johns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Bowersox; Sweet v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Boxer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Boyce v. Woods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Boyle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Bozzo; Torbeck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Bradford v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Bradford v. Cambra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Bradford v. Louisiana State Univ. Medical Center . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Bradley; Preston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Bradstreet v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lix Page Bragdon v. Abbott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Branch v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Brandt v. Gygax Realtor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Brandt v. Shop `n Save Warehouse Foods, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Branham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Brann; Barsch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Branson v. Greyhound Lines Retirement Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Braun; Moran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Braunstein's Estate v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. 1119 Brawner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Bray v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Breard, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371 Breard v. Greene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371,1068 Breeze, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Bresnahan v. California Highway Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Brewer v. District Court of Tex., Dallas County . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Brewer v. Southern Pilot Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Brewer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Brewster v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Bridges v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Bristol Bd. of Ed.; Halpern v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Brito v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Britton; Crawford-El v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 574 Brockman v. Sweetwater County School Dist. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Brodeur v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Ed. of New York City . . . . 1074 Brooks v. McKinney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Brotherhood. For labor union, see name of trade. Brown, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Brown v. Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Brown v. Artuz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Brown v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Brown v. General Telephone Co. of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Brown v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Brown v. Ives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Brown v. Kearney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Brown; Kreuzer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Brown v. Metro-North Commuter R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Brown v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Brown; Raz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Brown v. Spectacor Management Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Brown v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012,1013,1090,1131 Brown v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Brown v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Bruce; Rich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Bruce v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034,1105 Brummett; Foley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Brundage; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Brundidge v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Brunswick Corp.; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Bryan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Bryant; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Bryant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Buchanan v. Gilmore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Buchbinder v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024,1134 Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc. . . . . . . 1116 Buckley v. Borg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Buena Park Police Dept.; Fink v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Buenoano, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Buenoano v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Bullock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Bunker; Maalouf v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Bunn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Burge v. Behr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Burgess v. Logan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Burgess v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Burgo v. General Dynamics Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Burgo; General Dynamics Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Burns v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Burnsides v. MJ Optical, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Burrell v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Burton v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Bush; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Butler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Butterworth; Roe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 BVP Management Associates v. Fredette . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Byers v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Bynes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Cabral v. Healy Tibbits Builders, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Cabrera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Caddy v. Good Samaritan Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Cadence Design Systems, Inc.; Avant! Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Caderno v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Cain; Charles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Cain; Glover v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Cain; Pedroso v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Cain; Rochon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxi Page Cain v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 Calderon v. Ashmus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 740 Calderon; Beeler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Calderon v. Bloom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Calderon v. Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Calderon; Kelly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Calderon v. McDowell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Calderon v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 538 Calderon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Caldwell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 California; Anzoategui v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 California; AT&T Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 California; Bandrup v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 California; Bradford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 491 California; Federal Communications Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 California; Galloway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 California; Guardado v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 California; Hines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 California; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 California; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 California; Loeun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 California; Lopez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 California; MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 California; Mills v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 California; Monge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 California; Phillips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 California; Ramos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 California; Reyes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 California; Rodriguez Delgadillo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 California; Saelee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 California; Sandoval Macias v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 California; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 California; Swafford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 California; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 California; Yoshisato v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 California Highway Patrol; Bresnahan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Callaway County Ambulance Dist. v. Peeper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Calle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Cambra; Bradford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Cameron v. Anheuser Busch, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Campbell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Campbell; Aerospace Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Campbell v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Campbell; Fowler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Campbell v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392 Campbell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Cannon, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Cannon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Capital City Press, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Capitol Bankers Life Ins. Co.; Maddox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Caranchini, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Carbarcas-A v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Cardenas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Cardona-Elias v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Cargill v. Turpin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080,1145 Carle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Carlo; Guerra v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Carlson v. General Electric Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Carlson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Carlton; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Carmel; Goichman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Carmel; Kent v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Carpenter v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Carriger; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Carrillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 Carroll v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Carson v. Charter Medical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Carson v. Director, OWCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Carter v. Bush . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Carter v. Curran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Carter v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099,1134 Carter; Minnesota v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Carter v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Carter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Cartwright v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Carver State Bank; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Case Farms of N. C., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . 1077 Cassan Enterprises, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Casselli v. Casselli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Casselli; Madden Casselli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Castaneda, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Castro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Caterpillar Inc. v. Automobile Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Cavanaugh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 CCHC-Golden Glades, Ltd.; Diaz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Cedar Rapids Community School Dist. v. Garret F. . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Cedillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxiii Page Celestine v. Foster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Celestino; Schneider v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Ceminchuk v. Cohen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Center for Study and Application of Black Economic Dev. v. FCC 1076 Central Office Telephone; American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. 1014 Centricut, LLC v. ESAB Group, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Cerceo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Cessna Aircraft Co.; Newco, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Chahil v. Glickman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Champion; Roberts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Champion; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Champion International Corp. v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Chandler v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Chapman v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Chappell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Charles v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Charles v. Charles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Charles Schwab & Co.; Orman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Charlotte Memorial Hospital and Medical Center; Griffin v. . . 1030,1113 Charter Medical; Carson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Chatman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Chaudhuri v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Chemical Distributors, Inc. v. Resure, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Cherry; Rolleston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Chesteen, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Chesterfield-Colonial Heights Dept. of Social Services; Gray v. . . 1051 Chiaramonte v. Fashion Bed Group, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Chicago v. Morales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071,1116 Chicago; Northen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Chicago Housing Authority; Dumas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Chicago Steel & Pickling Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment 83 Chief Justice, Superior Court of Mass.; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Fla.; Teffeteller v. . . . . . . . . 1026,1134 Chilton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Chipman; Florence v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Chittim, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Christian v. St. Anthony's Medical Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Christie, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Christy v. Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Chrysler Corp.; Cassan Enterprises, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Church of Scientology International v. Cult Awareness Network 1020 Circuit Court of Ill., Cook County; Palmer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Circuit Court of Va., Prince William County; Craddock v. . . . . . . 1089 Circuit Judge of Circuit Court of Russell County; Kiker v. . . . . . . 1003 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Citibank, N. A.; Greene v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Citizen v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Citizens for a Better Environment; Chicago Steel & Pickling Co. v. 83 Citizens for a Better Environment; Steel Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 City. See name of city. Claiborne v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Clamont Energy Corp.; Dugas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Clark v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Clark v. St. Paul Police Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Clark v. Synstelien . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Clausntizer; Kimball v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Cleary v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Clement v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Clements v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023,1133 Clemmons; Bowersox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Clermont v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Cleveland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Clewis v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Clinchfield Coal Co.; Mine Workers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Clinton; Meyers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Clinton v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058,1071 Clynes v. Ft. Zumwalt School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Coady; Davenport v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Coates v. Strahan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Cohen; Ceminchuk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Cohen v. de la Cruz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 Cohen v. Morton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Cohen; New v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Cohn, Lifland, Perlman, Hermann & Knopf; Weissman v. . . . . . . . 1122 Colbert; Berryman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Cole, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Cole v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Cole v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Coleman v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Coleman v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Coleman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Colerain Hills Investment Co. v. Board of Revision, Hamilton Cty. 1137 Collagen Corp.; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Collins, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Collins v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Collins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Colorado; Entrup v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Colorado; Hughes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxv Page Colorado; M. A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Colorado v. Romero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Colorado; Tesoro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Colorado Compensation Ins. Authority v. Simon . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Colorado Compensation Ins. Authority; Simon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Columbia Hospital for Women; Baade v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.; Feltner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340 Columbia Steel Casting Co.; Portland General Electric Co. v. . . . 1112 Columbus v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Comenout v. Washington Dept. of Community Development . . . . 1005 Commissioner; Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382 Commissioner; Buchbinder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024,1134 Commissioner; Hamilton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Commissioner; Hoffman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Commissioner; Jamieson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Commissioner; Powell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Commissioner, Dept. of Marine Resources of Me.; Daley v. . . . . . 1023 Commissioner of Ins. of Mich.; Ernst & Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Commissioner of Internal Revenue. See Commissioner. Commissioner of Rev. of Mass.; Kennametal, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Commissioner of Rev. of Mass. v. National Private Truck Council 1137 Commissioner of Social Services of New York City; Abidekun v. 1098 Commonwealth. See name of Commonwealth. Comptroller of Currency; Ghiglieri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Computer Associates International, Inc.; Altai, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . 1106 Compuware Corp. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Concepcion v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . 1079 Conlee Enterprises, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . 1060 Conley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Connecticut; Chapman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Connecticut; Haase v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Connecticut; Hunter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Connecticut; Joyce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Connecticut; Porter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Connecticut Dept. of Children and Families; Elisabeth H. v. . . . . 1137 Connick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Connor v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Conrod v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Consalvo v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Consolidated Rail Corp.; Springston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Consolidation Coal Co.; Newman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Container Corp. of America; Betts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Contaminated Soil Consultants, Inc. v. Joseph Smith & Sons, Inc. 1137 Continental Micronesia, Inc. v. National Mediation Bd. . . . . . . . . 1113 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Cook; Wood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Cook; Woods v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Cooley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Coolman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Coombs v. Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Cooper, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018,1105 Cooper; Mullen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Cooper v. Prunty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052,1146 Cooper v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090,1100 Copeland; Gannon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Corbett; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Corcoran; Harper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Cornish v. Court of Appeals of Md. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Corrections Commissioner. See name of commissioner. Cossett, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Cossett Construction Co., In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Cothren v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Couch v. Federal Paper Bd. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Couch v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 County. See name of county. Coupe v. Federal Express Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Courshon; Pollak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Court of Appeals. See U. S. Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals of Md.; Cornish v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Court of Common Pleas of Ohio, Montgomery County; Karasek v. 1082 Cousino v. Elliott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Cowles Media Co.; Benigni v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Cox v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Crabtree; Jacks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Craddock v. Circuit Court of Va., Prince William County . . . . . . . 1089 Craig v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Craig v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Crane Co.; United States ex rel. Rabushka v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Crase v. Huskey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Crawford v. Andrew Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Crawford & Co. v. Sonnier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Crawford-El v. Britton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 574 Crawley v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Criffield v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Crist; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc. . . . . . . . 1071 Critikon, Inc.; Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc. v. . . . . . . . 1071 Crochiere v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Crochran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxvii Page Crocker; Union Security Life Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Cromartie; Hunt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068 Crompton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Crooks v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Cropp v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Crosby; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Cross v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Crow Tribe of Indians; Montana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 696 Crozier; Horne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 CSX Transportation, Inc.; O'Steen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Cullen v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Cullinan v. Abramson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Cult Awareness Network; Church of Scientology International v. 1020 Cunningham v. Kitzhaber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Cunningham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Cunningham v. Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Cunningham v. Woods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Cuomo; Berger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Curran; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Cutcliffe v. Jenne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Cuthbert v. District Court of Appeal of Fla., Fifth Dist. . . . . . . . 1109 Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp. v. Nelson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Dade County; Alvarez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Dal Bello; Hoffman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Daley v. Commissioner, Dept. of Marine Resources of Me. . . . . . . 1023 Dalton; Evans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Dalton; Hashimoto v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Dalton; Longest v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Dalton; Stowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Daly v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Damer v. State Bar of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Dameron Hospital Assn.; Mason-Neubarth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Damm v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Dancy v. Hyster Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Darden, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Darden v. Alameda County Network of Mental Health Clients . . 1140 Darne v. Weber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Darne v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Darnell v. First Federal of Ala. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Datillo; Garcia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Davenport v. Coady . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Davenport v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 David M. Munson, Inc.; James Barlow Family Ltd. Partnership v. 1048 Davidson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Davila v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Davis; Conrod v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Davis; Dove v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Davis v. DuBois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Davis v. Hollywood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Davis v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Davis v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Davis v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Davis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034,1130,1144 Daxor Corp. v. New York State Dept. of Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Day; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Day; Liberty National Life Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 DeBlase v. Roth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 DeBord v. Board of Ed. of Ferguson-Florissant School Dist. . . . . 1073 Decator v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Decker v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Dedhia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Deep Sea Research, Inc.; California v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 491 de la Cruz; Cohen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 Delahanty; Berner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Delaware; Righter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Delecki; Wold-Giorgis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Delgadillo v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Delgado v. Barreras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Delgado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.; Monterey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 DeLorean v. Morganroth & Morganroth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Denard v. Terhune . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Denney v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Dentists Ins. Co.; Berg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Department of Air Force; Powell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084,1146 Department of Army; Roman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Department of Army; Schultz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Department of Children and Families; Gutermuth v. . . . . . . . . . . 1068 Department of Children and Family Services; J. G. v. . . . . . . . . . 1110 Department of Defense; Altimus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Department of Housing and Urban Development; Hughes v. . . . . 1013 Department of Justice; Ali-Bey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052,1145 Department of Justice; Fraley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Derbigny v. Glickman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Derzack v. Allegheny County Children and Youth Services . . 1004,1106 Desdune v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034 DeTella; Gonzalez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Deteresa v. American Broadcasting Cos. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxix Page Dever v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 DeWig v. Stewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 DeWitt v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 DeWoskin; Snyder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 DeYoung v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . 1020 Dias v. Bogins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Diaz v. CCHC-Golden Glades, Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Diaz v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Diaz Sanchez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034 Dierling v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Diesslin; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029,1113 Director, OWCP; Carson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Director, OWCP; Meehan Seaway Service Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Director, OWCP; Mitchell & Neeley, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Director, OWCP; Shell Offshore, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Director of penal or correctional institution. See name or title of director. Discon, Inc.; NYNEX Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 District Court. See U. S. District Court. District Court of Appeal of Fla., Fifth Dist.; Cuthbert v. . . . . . . . 1109 District Court of Nev., Clark County; Roberts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 District Court of Tex., Dallas County; Brewer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 District Court of Tex., Harris County; Walkoviak v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 District Judge. See U. S. District Judge. District Judge, Cotton County, Okla.; Blevins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 District of Columbia Court of Appeals; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . 1077 Dixon v. Marion Police Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Dixon v. Stewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Dixon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 D & M Contracting Co. v. First Union National Bank . . . . . . . . . 1120 Dobra; Martinez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Dobrovolny v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Dody; Hettler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Doe, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105,1115 Doe; Belleville v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Doe v. Mississippi Blood Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Doe v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Doe #102 v. Georgia Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Dolenc v. Sobina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Dolenz v. Akin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Dominguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Domino's Pizza, Inc.; Baughans, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Donnelley & Sons Co.; North Tex. Steel Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Donovan v. Strack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032,1134 Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Dormire; Umphrey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Doss v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Dove v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Dove Valley Business Park Assoc. v. County Comm'rs of Arapahoe 1021 Dowd v. Hinchman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Doyle, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Doyle v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Dragon Medical & Scientific Communications, Inc.; Softel, Inc. v. 1020 Dragovich; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 DuBois; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 DuBuc v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Duffy v. Wolle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Dugas v. Clamont Energy Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Dumas v. Chicago Housing Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Dumas v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Dumers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Duncan; Tatlis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Duncan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Duncil; Azeez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Dunn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Du Pont de Nemours & Co.; Stafford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Duran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061,1078 Dye v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Dyer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Earthly v. Beverly Hills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Eastaugh; Zok v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Eastern Ky. Resources v. Fiscal Court of Magoffin County . . . . . 1072 Eastern Natural Gas Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of America . . . . . . . 1118 East Lycoming School Dist.; Lawvere v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . 1094 Eaton v. Gerdes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Edwards; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Edwards v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 511,1115 Eggersdorf v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.; Stafford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Seibert v. . . . . . . . 1009 E. J. Co. v. Sandvik Aktiebolag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Elam Construction, Inc.; Regional Transportation Dist. v. . . . . . . 1047 Electronic Plating Co. v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Elewski v. Syracuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxi Page Eli Lilly & Co.; Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Elisabeth H. v. Connecticut Dept. of Children and Families . . . . . 1137 Elkem Holding, Inc.; Midland Export, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Ellerth; Burlington Industries, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Elliott; Cousino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Elliott v. United Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Ellis v. Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Elmore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Elo; Allard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Endicott; Sasnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Engels v. Waldrup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Engineering Contractors Assn. of S. Fla.; Dade County v. . . . . . . 1004 Engineering Contractors Assn. of S. Fla.; Minority Contractors v. 1004 Englert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 English v. Page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028,1134 Enigwe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Enoch v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Enterprise; Gore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Entertainment Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis Creative Group . . . 1021 Entrup v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Erdheim v. Thaler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Erdman v. Stegall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Ernst & Young v. Commissioner of Ins. of Mich. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 ESAB Group, Inc.; Centricut, LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Escobar; Florida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072,1088 Escobar-Venzor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Eshenbaugh; Tarr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Espinosa v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Espinoza v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Espiritu Villegas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Esposito v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Estate. See name of estate. E. Steeves Smith, P. C.; Patzlaff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027,1134 Estrada Rueda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Evans v. Dalton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Evans v. Hartwig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083,1108 Evans; Lawrence v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007,1103 Evans; Mark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Evans v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Evans-Bey v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Evans Farms, Inc.; Roberts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Everette v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034 F.; Cedar Rapids Community School Dist. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Fabric v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Fairfax County; Levy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Fairport Int'l Exploration, Inc. v. Shipwrecked Vessel Known as Captain Lawrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Fajemirokun v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Fallis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Fallon Community Health Plan, Inc.; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Fall River; Scott-Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Farber; West v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Farmer; Ratelle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Farmer v. University and Community College System of Nev. . . . 1004 Farmers Ins. Exchange; Bevard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Farrakhan v. N. Y. P. Holdings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Farrell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Fashion Bed Group, Inc.; Chiaramonte v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Faulkner County Sheriff's Dept.; Gooden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Fayette County Bd. of Ed. v. L. G. P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Fayetteville State Univ. Bd. of Trustees; Viswanathan v. . . . . . . . 1106 Fazio v. San Francisco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Federal Adjustment Bureau, Inc.; Lusk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Federal Aviation Administration; Professional Pilots Federation v. 1117 Federal Bureau of Investigation; Christy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Federal Bureau of Investigation; Kucernak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Federal Bureau of Prisons; Smalley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 FCC; Ameritech Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 FCC v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 FCC; Center for Study and Application of Black Economic Dev. v. 1076 FCC; GTE Midwest Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 FCC v. Iowa Utilities Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 FCC; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 FCC; Southern New England Telephone Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 FCC; U S WEST, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 FCC; Virginia State Corp. Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Garner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Hess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Federal Express; Marshall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Federal Express Corp.; Coupe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Federal Express Corp.; Ruff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 FLRA; Patent Office Professional Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Federal National Mortgage Assn.; Ring v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Federal Paper Bd. Co.; Couch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Feeney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Feltmann v. Plaza Motors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Feltmann v. Sieben, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxiii Page Ferguson v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Ferguson; Weldon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Ferranti v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Fey, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Ficalora v. International Business Machines Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Fiddes, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Fields; Calderon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Fields v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Fierer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Figueroa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Figueroa-Lopez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Finck v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Findler; Joligard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Finesilver; Rogers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Fink v. Buena Park Police Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Finley; National Endowment for Arts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Finova Capital Corp. v. Lifecare X-Ray, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 First American National Bank; Phinney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046,1133 First Federal of Ala.; Darnell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 First Union National Bank; D & M Contracting Co. v. . . . . . . . . . 1120 First Union National Bank; McDuffie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 First Union National Bank of Fla.; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Fiscal Court of Magoffin County; Eastern Ky. Resources v. . . . . . 1072 Fisher, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Fisher v. Vassar College . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Fitzen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 Fitzgerald; Goodroad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Fitzgerald v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Fitzhugh; Little Rock Newspapers, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Flanagan v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Flanagan v. Wells Fargo Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Fletcher v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Flibotte v. Pennsylvania Truck Lines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Flint; Reid v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Florence v. Chipman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Florez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Florida; Alvord v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Florida; Antonio Jimenez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Florida; Banks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Florida; Boufford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Florida; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Florida; Buenoano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Florida; Campbell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Florida; Chandler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Florida; Cole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Florida; Consalvo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Florida; Cullen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Florida v. Escobar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072,1088 Florida v. Franqui . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Florida; Franqui v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Florida v. Gonzalez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Florida; Gonzalez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Florida; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014,1040,1041 Florida; Kimbrough v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Florida; Milian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Florida; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Florida; Remeta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Florida; Rivera v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Florida; Sanchez-Velasco v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Florida; Shellito v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Florida; Simpson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Florida v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Florida; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Florida; Stano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Florida; Wainwright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Florida Bar; Smania v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Florida Dept. of Bus. & Pro. Reg. v. Rochambeau Wines & Liquors 1067 Florida Dept. of Corrections; Villarreal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District; Akpaeti v. . . . . 1041 Florida Power Corp.; Panda-Kathleen, L. P. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Flory-Outten v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Flowers, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071,1146 Flynn, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Foley v. Brummett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Foley v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Follett, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Follett v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Fonoimoana; Valdez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Fontaine v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Forbes; Arkansas Educational Television Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . . . 666 Ford Motor Co.; Mostek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Ford Motor Co. v. Sperau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Foreman v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Forney v. Apfel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Foroohar v. Supreme Court of Ill. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Forrest; Rudd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025,1134 Forrett v. Richardson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Fort v. Howes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxv Page Fort Dearborn Life Ins. Co.; Jozaitis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Fort Lee; 440 Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Foster; Celestine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Foster v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 440 Co. v. Fort Lee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Fowler v. Campbell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Fox v. Bandag, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Fraley v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Francis v. Franklin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Francis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Francisco Acosta v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Franklin; Francis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Franklin; Scandinavian Health Spa, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Franklin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Franqui v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Franqui; Florida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Frazier v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Frazier; Waters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Fredette; BVP Management Associates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Freedom Communications, Inc. v. Mancias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 French; Gaither v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Frescas v. Loral Vought Systems Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Ft. Zumwalt School Dist.; Clynes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Fuentes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Fuller v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 G. v. Department of Children and Family Services . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Gaerttner v. Love . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Gaither v. French . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Gallant; Johnston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Gallardo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Gallego; McDaniel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Galloway v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Gamb v. Hilton Hotels Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Gamez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Gammons, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Gangler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Gangopadhyay v. Gangopadhyay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Gannon v. Copeland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Garces v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Garcia v. Datillo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Garcia Perez v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Garcia-Rosell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Garcia-Torres v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Garcia Trevino v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Gardner, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Garlick v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Garner v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Garret F.; Cedar Rapids Community School Dist. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Garrett v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Garrett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Garrison; Haddle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Gasero v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Gaskell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Gates v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Gaytan-Carranza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Gee; Horton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Geiger; Kawaauhau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Geissal v. Moore Medical Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Gendreau v. Gendreau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 General Dynamics Corp. v. Burgo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 General Dynamics Corp.; Burgo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 General Electric Co.; Carlson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 General Electric Co.; Hopkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 General Electric Co.; Schudel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 General Mills Restaurants, Inc.; Nwosun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 General Motors Corp., In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 General Motors Corp. v. Grear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 General Motors Corp.; Greb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 General Telephone Co. of Cal.; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Genesis Creative Group, Inc.; Entertainment Research Group v. 1021 Georgia; Bishop v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Georgia; Bridges v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Georgia; DeYoung v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Georgia; Jenkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Georgia; Raulerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Georgia; Robertson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Georgia; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Georgia; Thomason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Georgia Dept. of Corrections; Hutchins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Georgia Dept. of Corrections; Jane Doe #102 v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Georgia-Pacific Corp.; Walden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Gerard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Gerdes; Eaton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Germain, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Ghiglieri v. Ludwig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Ghiglieri v. Sun World National Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxvii Page Gianger; Boddie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Gibbs International, Inc. v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . . . . . . 1072 Gibson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Gibson v. National Transportation Safety Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Gibson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Gilbert v. Moody . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Gilbert v. Sandage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Gilbert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Gilbert v. Woods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Gilchrist v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Gillard v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Gilmore; Buchanan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Gilmore; Porter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Gilmore; Republic of Paraguay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371,1067 Gilmour v. Rogerson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Glass v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Gleason v. Noyes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Glendora v. Porzio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 Glickman; Chahil v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Glickman; Derbigny v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Global Securities Trust Co.; Heimermann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Glover v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Glover v. McCaughtry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Goff v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Goichman v. Carmel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Golden v. Gulfport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Golden Rule Ins. Co.; Painter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Goldflam, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Golia-Paladin v. Nevada State Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Gollapudi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Gomez; Garlick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Gomez v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Gomez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Gonzales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034 Gonzalez v. DeTella . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Gonzalez v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Gonzalez; Florida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Gonzalez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 Gonzalez-Diaz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034 Gonzalez Figueroa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Gonzalez-Jimenez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034 Gonzalez Robles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Gonzalez Trading, Inc. v. Yale Materials Handling Corp. . . . . . . . 1055 Goode v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Gooden v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Gooden v. Faulkner County Sheriff's Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Good News Communications v. U. S. Patent and Trademark Office 1096 Goodroad v. Fitzgerald . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Good Samaritan Hospital; Caddy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Goodwin; Hesterlee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Goodwin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Goodyear Auto Service Center; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Gordon; Greenberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Gordon's Estate v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Gore v. Enterprise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Gornick v. Page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Goss; O'Hare v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Gotcher; Matsumoto v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Gottlieb, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Governor of Ga.; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Governor of Ga.; Newby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Governor of La.; Celestine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Governor of N. C. v. Cromartie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068 Governor of N. C.; Hoffman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Governor of Ohio; Quilter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Governor of Ohio v. Women's Medical Professional Corp. . . . . . . . 1036 Governor of Okla.; Herrera v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Governor of Ore.; Cunningham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Governor of Tenn.; Rhoden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Governor of Tex.; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Governor of Va.; Buchanan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Governor of Va.; Republic of Paraguay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371,1067 Goy; Zankich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Grant v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Gravens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 Graves v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Gravette v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Gray; Ashiegbu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Gray v. Chesterfield-Colonial Heights Dept. of Social Services . . . 1051 Gray; Holt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Gray v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 Gray v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Gray v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Grear; General Motors Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Greb v. General Motors Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Green, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Green v. Carver State Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Green v. Roe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxix Page Green v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Greenberg v. Gordon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Greene; Breard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371,1068 Greene v. Citibank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Green Tree Financial Servicing Corp.; Smithwick v. . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Greer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Gregoire; Stearns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Gretzler v. Stewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Greyhound Lines Amal. Retirement & Disab. Plan; Branson v. . . 1047 Greyson v. Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Griffin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Griffin v. Charlotte Memorial Hospital and Medical Center . . 1030,1113 Griffin v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Griffin v. Tampa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Griffin-El, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Griffin-El v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014,1015,1042 Grimes; Teffeteller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026,1134 Grizzle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Groseclose; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Gross v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034 Grubbs v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Grzelak v. U. S. Postal Service Designee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Grzesczuk v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 GSF Investment Co.; Hoffmann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 GTE Midwest Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n . . . . . . . . 1135 GTE North, Inc.; Simmons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Guardado v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Guerra v. Carlo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Guerrieri v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Guess v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Guillory v. Revis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Gulf Industries, Inc.; Rosman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Gulf Park Water Co. v. Mississippi Public Service Comm'n . . . . . 1096 Gulfport; Golden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Gupton, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Gurstel, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Gustus v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Gutermuth v. Department of Children and Families . . . . . . . . . . . 1068 Gutierrez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096,1102 Gutierrez-Alba v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Gutierrez-Daniez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 Guzman v. Miley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Guzzey; Titus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Gygax Realtor; Brandt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page H. v. Connecticut Dept. of Children and Families . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Haake v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Haase v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Haddle v. Garrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Hadji-Elias v. Los Angeles County Superior Court . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Hadji-Elias v. Shahbaz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Hale v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Hall, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Hall v. First Union National Bank of Fla. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Hall v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Hall v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Hall v. Shelby County Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026,1145 Halpern v. Bristol Bd. of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Halpin v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Hamedani; Remington Investments, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Hamilton v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Hamilton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Hammons; McDonald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Hampton v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Hantman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Hapgood v. Warren . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Hardeman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Hardin; Simeon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Hardwell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Hargus v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Harmon v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Harms v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Harper v. Corcoran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Harrell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Harrington; Barrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Harris v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Harris v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Harris v. Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Harris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.; Pro-Football, Inc. v. . . . . . . . 1077 Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.; Washington Redskins v. . . . 1077 Hartford Police Dept.; Bewry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Hartsell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030,1113 Hartwig; Evans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083,1108 Harvey; Lovilia Coal Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059,1115 Harvey; Phillips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Hasbro, Inc.; Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Haselow v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Hashimoto v. Dalton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxi Page Hastings v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060,1122 Havner v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Hawaii; Greyson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Hawkins v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Hawkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Hawthorne Associates, Inc.; Hunt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Hayes v. Western Weighing and Inspection Bureau . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Haynes v. Kepka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Haynes v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Haynsworth v. Lloyd's of London . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Hazel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066,1134 Healy Tibbits Builders, Inc.; Cabral v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Heard v. Iowa Finance Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Heaton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Hebert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Hee; Lincoln v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Heilig-Meyers Furniture Co.; Mangrum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Heimermann v. Global Securities Trust Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Heinsohn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Heintz; Jenkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Helm v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Henderson; Land & Lakes Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Henderson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Henigman; Tapia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Henman; Venegas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Henry v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Henry v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Henry v. Langner & Associates, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Henry v. Stinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036,1087 Hernandez-Arias v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Hernandez-Jasso v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Herrera v. Keating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Herrera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Herzog; Rawles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Hess v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Hesterlee v. Goodwin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Hettler v. Dody . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Hetzel v. Prince William County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp. . . . . . . 1022 Hibbs v. San Buenaventura . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Hickey, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068 Hickman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 Hicks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Higgins v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Hightower v. Kendall Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Hill; Ellis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Hill; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Hill v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Hill v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010,1012,1102 Hilton Hotels Corp.; Gamb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Himber v. Powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Hinchliffe v. Prudential Home Mortgage Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Hinchman; Dowd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Hindin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Hinebaugh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Hines v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 HJB, Inc.; Abbott Laboratories v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 HJB, Inc.; AmeriSource Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Hoadley; Polyak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Hochschild v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Hoffman v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Hoffman v. Dal Bello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Hoffman v. Hunt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Hoffmann v. GSF Investment Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Hogan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Hogue v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Holland v. Louisiana Secretary of Revenue and Taxation . . . . . . . 1062 Hollingsworth v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Hollingsworth & Vose Co. v. Horowitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Holloway v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Hollowell v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Hollywood; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Holman v. Page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Holt v. Gray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Holt; Nichols v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Hopkins v. General Electric Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Hopkins v. Reeves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Horne v. Crozier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Horowitz; Hollingsworth & Vose Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Horowitz; Lorillard, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Horton v. Gee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Hoskinson v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Hotchkiss v. Supreme Court of U. S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Houston, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Houston v. Woods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Howard v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Howes; Fort v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxiii Page Hoyle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Hozaifeh v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 HSSM #7 Ltd. Partnership; Bilzerian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Huber, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Hudgins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Huereque-Mercado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Hufnagel v. Medical Bd. of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Hughes v. Abbott Northwestern Hospital Security . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Hughes v. Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Hughes v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Hughes v. Department of Housing and Urban Development . . . . . 1013 Hughes v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Hughes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006,1013 Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Hughey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Hughley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Hugl; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Hunt v. Cromartie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068 Hunt v. Hawthorne Associates, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Hunt; Hoffman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Hunter v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Hunter v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Hurd v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Hurst v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Huskey; Crase v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Hutchins v. Georgia Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Hutchins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018,1123 Hyster Co.; Dancy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Idaho; Porter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Ide v. Lehman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Illinois; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Illinois; Aspelmeier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Illinois; Dumas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Illinois; Electronic Plating Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Illinois; Enoch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Illinois; Foreman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Illinois; Henry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Illinois; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Illinois; Kidd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Illinois; Kosyla v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Illinois; Lindsey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Illinois; Madej v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Illinois; McDonald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Illinois; McIntosh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Illinois; Miranda v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Illinois; M. L. Mc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Illinois; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Illinois; Spann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Illinois Dept. of Public Aid; Tarkowski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Image Technical Services, Inc.; Eastman Kodak Co. v. . . . . . . . . . 1094 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Achusi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Agadaga v. . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Concepcion v. . . . . . . . . 1079 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Martinez v. . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Ohuegbe v. . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Osunlana v. . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Parker v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Paz-Delgado v. . . . . . . . 1128 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Vicente-Guzman v. . . . . 1041 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Volkova v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Independent School Dist. No. 640; Stark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Indiana; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Indiana; Hoskinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Indiana; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Industrial Comm'n of Ariz.; Vogel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 In re. See name of party. Interkal, Inc.; UIS, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Internal Revenue Service; Gibbs International, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . 1072 Internal Revenue Service; Nadeau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Internal Revenue Service; Perry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Internal Revenue Service; Piljak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 International. For labor union, see name of trade. International Business Machines Corp.; Ficalora v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Iowa; Knowles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Iowa Finance Authority; Heard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Pro. Ethics and Conduct; Kirlin v. . . 1095 Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Pro. Ethics and Conduct; Wherry v. 1021,1133 Iowa Utilities Bd.; Association for Local Telecom. Services v. . . . 1135 Iowa Utilities Bd.; AT&T Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Iowa Utilities Bd.; Federal Communications Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . 1135 Iowa Utilities Bd.; MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . 1135 Iriarte-Ortega v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Irons, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Isgro v. New York State Freshwater Wetland Appeals Bd. . . . . . 1076 Israel; Berkowitz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062,1134 Ives; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 J. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxv Page Jacks v. Crabtree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Jackson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068,1114 Jackson v. Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Jackson v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Jackson v. Day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Jackson v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Jackson v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Jackson v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Jackson v. Ray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Jackson v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Jackson v. Walker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Jacobson; Hughes Aircraft Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 James v. Lamar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 James Barlow Family Ltd. Partnership v. David M. Munson, Inc. 1048 James River Petroleum, Inc.; Petro Stopping Centers, L. P. v. . . . 1095 Jamieson v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Jamison, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Jane Doe #102 v. Georgia Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Jaquez; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Jarrett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Jarvi v. McCarthy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Jefferson County; Lindsay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Jeffress v. Johnston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Jenkins v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Jenkins v. Heintz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Jenkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066,1144 Jenne; Cutcliffe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Jett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 J. G. v. Department of Children and Family Services . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Jimenez v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 John Conlee Enterprises, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . 1060 Johns v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Johns; Minnesota v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Johns v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Johnson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015,1019,1105 Johnson; Bagley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Johnson; Banos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Johnson; Barrier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Johnson; Beasley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Johnson; Bivins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Johnson; Boggess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Johnson v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Johnson; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099,1134 Johnson; Citizen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Johnson v. Crist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Johnson; Decker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Johnson; Frazier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Johnson; Fuller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Johnson; Garcia Perez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Johnson; Gasero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Johnson; Goff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Johnson; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Johnson v. Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Johnson; Hogue v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Johnson; Hollowell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Johnson; Howard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Johnson v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Johnson v. Kalokathis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Johnson; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Johnson; Logan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Johnson v. Martin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Johnson; Martinez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Johnson; McFarland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103,1104 Johnson; Monroe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Johnson; Muniz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Johnson; Nobles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Johnson v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Johnson; Randall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Johnson; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Johnson; Scales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Johnson; Shaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Johnson v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Johnson; Teel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Johnson v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Johnson; Todd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Johnson; Tolbert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Johnson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033,1057,1087,1088,1128 Johnson v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Johnson v. Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Johnson v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Johnson; Whitfield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044,1116 Johnson v. Wyoming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Johnson Brothers Wholesale Liquor Co. v. NLRB . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Johnston v. Gallant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Johnston; Jeffress v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Joligard v. Findler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Jones, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Jones; Barr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxvii Page Jones; Bates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Jones; Columbus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Jones v. Crosby . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Jones; Denney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Jones; DeWitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Jones v. Federal Communications Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Jones; Ferguson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Jones v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014,1040,1041 Jones v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Jones v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Jones v. United States . . . . . . . 1031,1045,1049,1054,1058,1086,1121,1144 Joost v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Joplin; Lomax v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Jordan v. Playtex Family Products, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Jordan v. Rouse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Jordan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Jorgenson v. Ratelle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Joseph Smith & Sons, Inc.; Contaminated Soil Consultants, Inc. v. 1137 Joshua v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Joslin; Walton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Joyce v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Jozaitis v. Fort Dearborn Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Judge, District Court of Neb., Thayer Cty.; Davenport v. . . . . . . . 1119 Judge, 93rd Jud. Dist. Court of Hidalgo Cty.; Freedom Com., Inc. v. 1107 Judge, 93rd Jud. Dist. Court of Hidalgo Cty.; The Monitor v. . . . . 1107 Judge, Superior Court of Me.; Berner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Jury v. Stewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Juvenile A v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Kabir v. Silicon Valley Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Kaimowitz v. Orlando . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Kaiser Permanente Medical Group, Inc.; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Kalokathis; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Kaluna v. Kaneshiro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Kaneshiro; Kaluna v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Kansas; Landers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Kansas Pub. Employees Retirement Sys. v. Blackwell et al. . . . . 1134 Kantor, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Karagianes v. Karagianes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Karasek v. Court of Common Pleas of Ohio, Montgomery County 1082 Karriem v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Kawaauhau v. Geiger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Kawerak Reindeer Herders Assn. v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Keane; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Keane; McLamb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Keane; West v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Kearney; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Keating; Herrera v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Keeper, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Keith v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Kelleher v. Aerospace Community Credit Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Kelly v. Calderon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Kelsey; McPherson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Kemna; Spencer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Kendall Co.; Hightower v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Kendrick v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Kendrick v. Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Kennametal, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue of Mass. . . . . . . . . 1059 Kennedy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Kent v. Carmel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Kentucky; Akpaeti v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Kentucky; Baze v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Kentucky; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Kentucky; Foley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Kentucky; Sommers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Kentucky; Stringer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Kepka; Haynes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Kerby; Lucero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Keselica v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Kevin B. v. New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Key v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086,1112 Kibler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Kidd v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Kiker v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Killoran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Kimball v. Clausntizer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Kimbrough v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 King v. Bryant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 King v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 King v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 King County; Koskela v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 King County; Scannell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Kingry; Propst v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. . . . . 751,1070 Kirlin v. Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Pro. Ethics and Conduct . . 1095 Kitzhaber; Cunningham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Knibbs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 Knight v. Youmans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Knowles v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxix Page Korean Air Lines Co.; Dooley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Korean Air Lines Co.; Oldham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Korotki v. Attorney Services Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Koskela v. King County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Kosyla v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 K. R. v. Anderson Community School Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Kramer; Villacres v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Kreiger v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Kreuzer v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Krippene v. Board of Comm'rs of Chatham County . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Kritzman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Krupa, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Kucernak v. Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Kuiper v. American Cyanamid Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Kukes, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Kunzman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Labankoff v. U. S. Bankruptcy Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Labor Union. See name of trade. Laconia; Shaughnessy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Lacy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Laessig v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Lago Vista Independent School Dist.; Gebser v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Lamadrid Alvarez v. Lamadrid Alvarez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Lamar; James v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Lambright v. U. S. Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Lambrix v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Landers v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Land & Lakes Co. v. Henderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Langley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Langner & Associates, Inc.; Henry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Lanier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 L'anza Research International; Quality King Distributors v. . . . . 135 Larry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 LaRue v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Lastrapes; Arvie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Lateef v. Virginia Parole Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Latouf v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Laughlin v. Perot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Lawrence v. Evans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007,1103 Lawrence v. Parke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Lawvere v. East Lycoming School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Layne v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Layton City; Longcrier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Lazaroff; Beitzel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xc TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Lazarus, Inc.; Okparaocha v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Leach v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Leandre v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Lechner; Mayles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Ledesma Aguilar v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Ledford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Lee v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Lee v. Kyler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Lee; Quintero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Lefkowitz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Lehman; Ide v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Lemons v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Levine; Lloyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Levine v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Levitt; Barnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Levy v. Fairfax County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Levy; Paul v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Lewinson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Lewis, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Lewis v. Brunswick Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Lewis v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Lewis; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Lewis v. Keane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Lewis; Sacramento County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Lewis v. Terhune . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Lewis v. Textron Automotive Interiors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Lewis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155,1015,1108 Lewis v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach . . . . . . . 26 L. G. P.; Fayette County Bd. of Ed. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Liberty National Life Ins. Co. v. Day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Lifecare X-Ray, Inc.; Finova Capital Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Lilly & Co. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Lilly & Co.; Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Lincoln v. Hee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Lindsay v. Jefferson County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Lindsey v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Linney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Liporace v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Little Rock Newspapers, Inc. v. Fitzhugh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Litton Industrial Automation Systems v. Nationwide Power Corp. 1003 Litzenberg, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Litzenberg v. Litzenberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Lloyd v. Levine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xci Page Lloyd's of London; Haynsworth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Local. For labor union, see name of trade. Lock; Sharp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Lockett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Loeun v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Logan; Barnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Logan; Burgess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Logan v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Lomax v. Joplin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Longcrier v. Layton City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Longenette, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Longest v. Dalton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Long Island Univ.; Maher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Lopez v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Lopez v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Lopez v. Monterey County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Lopez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Lopez-Rodriguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Loral Vought Systems Corp.; Frescas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Lorillard, Inc. v. Horowitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Los Angeles County Dept. of Children and Family Servs.; Sands v. 1010 Los Angeles County, Office of District Attorney; Walls v. . . . . . . 1059 Los Angeles County Superior Court; Hadji-Elias v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Los Angeles Police Dept. v. Perry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Louisiana; Behrens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Louisiana; Borne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Louisiana; Bourque v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Louisiana; Campbell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392 Louisiana; Poullard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Louisiana; Sullivan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Louisiana Secretary of Revenue and Taxation; Holland v. . . . . . . 1062 Louisiana State Univ. Medical Center; Bradford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Love; Gaerttner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Love v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Lovilia Coal Co. v. Harvey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059,1115 Lowery v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Loza Romo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Lucero v. Kerby . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Ludwig; Ghiglieri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Luem v. Billetter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Lugman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Lujan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Lundgren v. Steele . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Lusk v. Federal Adjustment Bureau, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xcii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Lussier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Lyler; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Lynch v. Office of Mayor of N. Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Lynn; Stone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Lynn; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Lyons Township High School; Treece v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Lytle; Smouse v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 M. A. v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Maalouf v. Bunker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Maass v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Macias v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Maciel v. Terhune . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Maciel v. Yarborough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 MacKenzie v. Owens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029,1134 Macri v. Magna Community Development Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Madden v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Madden Casselli v. Casselli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Maddox v. Capitol Bankers Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Madej v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Magistrate Judge, U. S. District Court; Wilkinson v. . . . . . . . 1028,1090 Magna Community Development Corp.; Macri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Mahdavi v. One Hundred State, County, and City Officials . . . . . . 1126 Maher v. Long Island Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Mahoney; Walters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Maine; Coombs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Maine; Michaud v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Makarewicz v. American Express Financial Advisors, Inc. . . . . . . 1022 Makowski; Sharp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009,1090 Mallett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Malone, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Malumphy v. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Mancias; Freedom Communications, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Mancias; The Monitor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Manges v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Mangrum v. Heilig-Meyers Furniture Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Manning v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Manns, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Manor v. Nestle Food Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Manson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.; Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. . . . . 751,1070 Marceau v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Marchington; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Marin-Castaneda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Marinelli v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xciii Page Marin General Hospital; Barrier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Marion Police Dept.; Dixon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Mark v. Evans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Marks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Maroney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Marquette Univ.; Rheams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Marsh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Marshall v. Federal Express . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Marshall; Peace & Love, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Marshall; Redd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Marshall Construction; Peace & Love, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Martin v. Goodyear Auto Service Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Martin; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Martinez v. Dobra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Martinez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Martinez v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Martinez-Villareal; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 637 Maryland; Clermont v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Maryland; Grant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Maryland; Gray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 Maryland; Rahman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Maryland; Warren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Maryland Comptroller of Treasury; Schlossberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Maryland National Capital Park and Planning Comm'n; Smith v. 1021 Mason-Neubarth v. Dameron Hospital Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Massie; Wingfield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Mass Transit Administration; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006,1134 Matsumoto v. Gotcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Mattei v. Mattei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Matthews; Singleton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Matthews v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Maxwell v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Mayles v. Lechner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Mays, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Mays v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Mazurkiewicz; Palmer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Mc. v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie & Kirkland; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 McBride; Beaven v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 McBride v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 McBroom v. Public Utilities Comm'n of Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 McCarthy; Jarvi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 McCaughtry; Glover v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xciv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page McCaughtry; Oimen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 McCaughtry; Rogers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 McClain v. Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 McCloud v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 McCord v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 McCowan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 McCoy v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 McCoy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 McDaniel v. Appraisal Institute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 McDaniel v. Gallego . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 McDaniels; McDonald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 McDermott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 McDonald v. Hammons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 McDonald v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 McDonald v. McDaniels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 McDonald v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 McDonald v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 McDonald v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 McDowell; Calderon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 McDuffie v. First Union National Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 McFarland v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103,1104 McFarlin v. Trent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 McGee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 McGhee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 McGowen, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 McGraw v. Booth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 McGriff v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 McHugh; Arvie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 McIntosh v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034 MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd. . . . . . . . . . . 1135 McKenney v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 McKinney; Brooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 McKinney; Sommers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 McKinnon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 McLamb v. Keane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 McLaud v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 McLavey v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 McMillan; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 McNair v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 McNeil v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 McPherson v. Kelsey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 McPherson v. Vandlen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 McQuown v. Safeway, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064,1142,1146 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xcv Page Medical Bd. of Cal.; Hufnagel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Medical Center of Del., Inc., Christiana Hospital; Benoit v. . . . . . 1001 Meehan Seaway Service Co. v. Director, OWCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Mejia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Melgar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Member Serv. Admin'rs v. American Nat. Bank of Sapulpa . . . . . 1139 Member Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. American Nat. Bank of Sapulpa . . . 1139 Mendiola v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Mendoza v. SSC&B Lintas, N. Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Mendoza-Rojas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Mequon-Thiensville School Dist.; Omegbu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Merit Systems Protection Bd.; Patterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030,1134 Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; Havner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Merrill v. Arizona State Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc.; Braunstein's Estate v. 1119 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc.; Owen-Williams v. . . 1027 Merritt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Messam v. Morton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Messina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Metro-North Commuter R. Co.; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Metropolitan Dade County v. Eng. Contractors Assn. of S. Fla. . . 1004 Metropolitan Govt., Nashville & Davidson Cty. v. Waste Mgmt. of Tenn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Metzger; Walters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Meyer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Meyers v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Michaud v. Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Michigan; Cartwright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Michigan; Roof v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Michigan; Ross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Michigan; Savage v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Michigan Public Service Comm'n; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Midland Export, Ltd. v. Elkem Holding, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Mifflin County; Weyman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Miglio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Miguel-Cruz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Mikko v. Pitcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach; Lexecon Inc. v. . . . . . . 26 Miley; Guzman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Milian v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Miller; Air Line Pilots v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866 Miller v. Albright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420 Miller; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Miller v. Hugl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xcvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Miller; Kiker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Miller; Newby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Miller; Nicholas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Miller; Tatta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Miller v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017,1094 Millet v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Millet v. Woodward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Mills v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Millson v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Mine Workers v. Clinchfield Coal Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Minnesota; Branch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Minnesota; Byers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Minnesota v. Carter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Minnesota v. Johns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Minnesota; Philip Morris Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Minniecheske v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Miranda v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Mississippi; Bankhead v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Mississippi; Doss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Mississippi; Higgins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Mississippi; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Mississippi; Stokes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Mississippi Blood Services, Inc.; Doe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Mississippi Public Service Comm'n; Gulf Park Water Co. v. . . . . . 1096 Missouri; Billemeyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Missouri; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Missouri; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Missouri; Hampton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Missouri; Sweet v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Mitchell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Mitchell v. Artuz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Mitchell v. Collagen Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Mitchell v. Mulligan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Mitchell v. Rees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Mitchell & Neeley, Inc. v. Director, OWCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Mizell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005,1103 MJ Optical, Inc.; Burnsides v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 M. L. Mc. v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Mobley; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Modglin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Monge v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Monge Viveros, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Monitor v. Mancias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Monroe v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xcvii Page Monroe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Montague, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 696 Montana; Roche v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Monterey County; Lopez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Moody; Gilbert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Moomchi v. New Mexico Corrections Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Moore, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Moore v. Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Moore; Arnold v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Moore; Dobrovolny v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Moore v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Moore v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Moore v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Moore v. Parke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Moore; Plath v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Moore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006,1032,1034,1067,1088 Moore v. Westminster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006,1113 Moore; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Moore Medical Corp.; Geissal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Morales; Chicago v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071,1116 Mora-Medrano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 Moran v. Braun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Moran v. Moran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Moran Trade Corp., Del.; National Shipping Co., Saudi Arabia v. 1021 Morgan v. Rabun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Morganroth & Morganroth; DeLorean v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Morris, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Morris v. Bell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Morris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Morris Inc. v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Morrison Entity; Youssef v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Morro; Birmingham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Morton; Cohen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Morton; Messam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Mosley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Mostek v. Ford Motor Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Moudy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Muhammad v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Mulderig v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Mullen v. Cooper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Mulligan; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Muniz v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xcviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Muniz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Munkatchy v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Munoz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Munson, Inc.; James Barlow Family Ltd. Partnership v. . . . . . . . 1048 Murphy v. Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Murray v. University of Md. Medical Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081,1146 Muscarello v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 Muschette v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Mutual Assurance, Inc.; Bok v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Muzakkir, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 NACCO Industries, Inc.; Baeza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Nadeau v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Najera-Ojeda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Narron v. Vance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Nash; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 NAACP; North Bergen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 National Endowment for Arts v. Finley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 NLRB; Case Farms of N. C., Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 NLRB; Compuware Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 NLRB; Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 NLRB; John Conlee Enterprises, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 NLRB; Johnson Brothers Wholesale Liquor Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 NLRB; Pace Industries, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 NLRB; Precision Industries, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 NLRB; Yen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 National Mediation Bd.; America West Airlines, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . 1021 National Mediation Bd.; Continental Micronesia, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . 1113 National Medical Enterprises, Inc. v. Bleasdell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 National Private Truck Council; Commissioner of Rev. of Mass. v. 1137 National Shipping Co., Saudi Arabia v. Moran Trade Corp., Del. 1021 National Steel & Shipbuilding Co. v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 National Transportation Safety Bd.; Gibson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Nationwide Power; Litton Industrial Automation Systems v. . . . . 1003 Nattier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Nelson v. Corbett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Nelson; Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Nesbitt v. West Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Nestle Food Co.; Manor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Nevada; Flanagan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Nevada; McDonald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Nevada; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Nevada State Bar; Golia-Paladin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 New v. Cohen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Newby v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xcix Page Newco, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 New Hampshire; Kevin B. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 New Jersey; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 New Jersey; Doe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 New Jersey v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 767 New Jersey; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Newman v. Consolidation Coal Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Newman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 New Mexico Bd. of Pharmacy; Novosad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025,1145 New Mexico Corrections Dept.; Moomchi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 New York; Esposito v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 New York; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 New York; Millson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 New York; New Jersey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 767 New York City; Bentley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 New York City; Brodeur v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 New York City; Clinton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058,1071 New York City Health and Hospital Corp.; Bernard v. . . . . . . . . . 1140 New York Life Ins. Co.; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 New York State Dept. of Health; Daxor Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 New York State Freshwater Wetland Appeals Bd.; Isgro v. . . . . . 1076 Nguyen; Remington Investments, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Nicholas v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Nichols v. Holt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Niehoff; Surgidev Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Nik-Khah v. Zandi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Nimrod v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Niobrara County Memorial Hospital; Yearous v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Nixon; Standish v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Nixon; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050,1145 Nixon; Traina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Nobles v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Noriega v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Norman T. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Norris; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Norris; McCoy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 North Bergen v. NAACP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 North Carolina; Banks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 North Carolina; Barnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 North Carolina; Gray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 North Carolina; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 North Carolina; Hurst v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 North Carolina; Sidden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 North Carolina; Tucker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) c TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page North Carolina; Warren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 North Dakota; Rieger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051,1067 Northen v. Chicago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 North Tex. Steel Co. v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co. . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Norwood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Novosad v. New Mexico Bd. of Pharmacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025,1145 Noyes; Gleason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Nunes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Nunez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Nunez Gutierrez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Nussbaum; Sayman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Nwaneri v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Nwosun v. General Mills Restaurants, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 N. Y. P. Holdings; Farrakhan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Ochoa Ochoa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Ocwen Federal Bank; Beach v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410 Oddino v. Oddino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021,1133 Office of Disciplinary Counsel; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Office of Mayor of N. Y.; Lynch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Office of Personnel Management; Flory-Outten v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Office of Personnel Management; Wulff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 O'Hare v. Goss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Ohio; Alexander v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Ohio; Blackshaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Ohio; Brundidge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Ohio; Carpenter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Ohio; Dever v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Ohio; Gillard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Ohio; Keith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Ohio; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Ohio; Waddy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Ohio; Warner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272 Ohio Forestry Assn., Inc. v. Sierra Club . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 726 Ohuegbe v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Oimen v. McCaughtry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 O'Keefe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Oklahoma; Cleary v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Oklahoma; DuBuc v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Oklahoma; Harmon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Oklahoma; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Oklahoma; Sampson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Oklahoma; Shabazz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED ci Page Oklahoma; Stouffer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Okoro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Okparaocha v. Lazarus, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Oldham v. Korean Air Lines Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Old Republic Union Ins. Co. v. Tillis Trucking Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Oliver v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Olivier-Ward v. Blackwell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Omegbu v. Mequon-Thiensville School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 One Hundred State, County, and City Officials; Mahdavi v. . . . . . 1126 One Juvenile Male v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007,1103 O'Regan, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Oregon; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Oregon; McLavey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Oregon; Wheatley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Oriakhi v. Parsons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Orlando; Kaimowitz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Orman v. Charles Schwab & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Orsini v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Ortega Ramirez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Ortiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Osei-Afriyie v. Ampofoh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 O'Steen v. CSX Transportation, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Osunlana v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Owens; MacKenzie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029,1134 Owens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Owen-Williams v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. . . . 1027 Ozarks Unlimited Resources; Arkansas Christian Educators v. . . 1120 P.; Fayette County Bd. of Ed. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Pace v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Pace Design & Fab, Inc.; Stoughton Trailers, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Pace Industries, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . . 1020 Pace West Division; Watson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Padilla-Gallardo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Page; English v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028,1134 Page; Gornick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Page; Holman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Painter v. Golden Rule Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Pairo, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Paladin Enterprises, Inc. v. Rice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Paladin Press v. Rice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Palmdale; Riddle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Palmer v. Circuit Court of Ill., Cook County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Palmer v. Mazurkiewicz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Palmer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Panda-Kathleen, L. P. v. Florida Power Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Papesh v. American National Can Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Pappadopoulos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Paraguay v. Gilmore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371,1067 Paralyzed Veterans of America; Pollin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Parke; Lawrence v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Parke; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Parker v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Parker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Parker v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Parker v. Wakelin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Parker v. Ward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Parks v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Parks v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Parsons; Oriakhi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Pastrano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Pataki; Bavaro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Patent Office Professional Assn. v. FLRA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Patterson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Patterson v. Merit Systems Protection Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030,1134 Patterson v. Teamsters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Patzlaff, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019,1134 Patzlaff v. E. Steeves Smith, P. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027,1134 Paul v. Levy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Paz-Delgado v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . 1128 Peace & Love, Inc. v. Marshall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Peace & Love, Inc. v. R. K. Marshall Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Pearson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003,1113 Peden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Pedroso v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Peeper; Callaway County Ambulance Dist. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Pellegrino v. South Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Pena v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Penaloza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Pennsylvania; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Pennsylvania; Collins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Pennsylvania; Couch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Pennsylvania; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Pennsylvania; Hawkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Pennsylvania; Marinelli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Pennsylvania; McNeil v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Pennsylvania; Parks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Pennsylvania; Reynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED ciii Page Pennsylvania; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006,1123 Pennsylvania; Woo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018,1070 Pennsylvania Public School Employees' Retirement Bd.; Worley v. 1095 Pennsylvania Truck Lines, Inc.; Flibotte v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Peralta-Reyes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Perez v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Performance Friction Corp.; Automobile Workers v. . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Perkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Perkins; West Covina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Perlman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Perot; Laughlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Perry v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Perry; Los Angeles Police Dept. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Peterson v. Wisconsin Dept. of Ind., Labor and Human Relations 1076 Petrillo; Tellier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Petro Stopping Centers, L. P. v. James River Petroleum, Inc. . . . 1095 Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Philip Morris Inc. v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 Phillips, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Phillips v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Phillips v. Harvey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Phillips; Simpson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Phillips v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031,1066,1087,1111,1143 Phinney v. First American National Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046,1133 Phoenix; Wexler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Phoenix Cardiologists; Zankich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Pickrel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Piljak v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Pina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Pineiro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Pirina Argueta v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Pitcher; Mikko v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Pitt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Pizza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Plain v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Plaisance Dragline & Dredging Co. v. Verdin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Plano Bank & Trust; Russell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Platero-Umanzor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Plath v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Playtex Family Products, Inc.; Jordan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Plaza Motors; Feltmann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Plumbers v. "Automatic" Sprinkler Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Plummer v. Purkett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) civ TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Pobiner, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044,1068 Poland v. Stewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Policy Management Systems Corp.; Cleveland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Polis v. Weld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Pollak v. Courshon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Pollard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Pollin v. Paralyzed Veterans of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Polyak v. Hoadley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Pomona Fairplex; Shephard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Ponce-Bran v. Sacramento Natural Foods Cooperative, Inc. . . . . . 1127 Poole v. Whitehurst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Poreda, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Porter v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Porter v. Gilmore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Porter v. Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Porter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Portland General Electric Co. v. Columbia Steel Casting Co. . . . . 1112 Portland Taxi Cab Co.; Taha v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Porzio; Glendora v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 Postmaster General; Said v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Postmaster General; Sligh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Poullard v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Powell v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Powell v. Department of Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084,1146 Powell; Stivender v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Powell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Powers; Himber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Powers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Practice Management Information Corp. v. AMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058 Pratt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Precision Industries, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . 1020 Prelesnick; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Prescott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 President of U. S.; Meyers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 President of U. S. v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1058,1071 Preston v. Bradley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Price, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Price v. Barreras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Price; McClain v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Price; Rocha v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Princeton Baptist Medical Center; Walton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Prince William County; Hetzel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208 Probert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Prochaska; Toegemann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cv Page Professional Pilots Federation v. Federal Aviation Administration 1117 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. . . . . . . . 1077 Propst v. Kingry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co.; Fabric v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co.; Shephard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Prudential Home Mortgage Co.; Hinchliffe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Prunty; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052,1146 Prunty; Wilkerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Public Utilities Comm'n of Ohio; McBroom v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Purkett; Plummer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Quality King Distributors v. L'anza Research International . . . . . 135 Quarterman v. Quarterman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Queen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Questcare, Inc.; Alls v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Quilter v. Voinovich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Quinn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Quint, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Quintero v. Lee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 R. v. Anderson Community School Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Rabun; Morgan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Rabushka v. Crane Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 Rahman v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Ramirez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Ramirez; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Ramirez Sanchez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Ramos v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Randall v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Ratelle v. Farmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Ratelle; Jorgenson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Raulerson v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Ravenswood Village Nursing Home; Ward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Rawles v. Herzog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Rawson v. Tosco Refining Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Ray; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Raz v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Rea v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Redd v. Marshall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Reed v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Rees; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Reese v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Reeves; Hopkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Reevis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Regans v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Regents of Univ. of Cal.; Eli Lilly & Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Regional Transportation Dist. v. Elam Construction, Inc. . . . . . . 1047 Reid v. Flint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Remeta, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Remeta v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Remeta v. Stovall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Remington Investments, Inc. v. Hamedani . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Remington Investments, Inc. v. Xep Nguyen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Reno; Terrall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp.; Hewlett-Packard Co. v. . . . . . 1022 Republic of Paraguay v. Gilmore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371,1067 Restrepo-Valencia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Resure, Inc.; Chemical Distributors, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Revis; Guillory v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Reyes v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Reyna v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Reynero-Lopez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Reynolds v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Reynolds v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Rheams v. Marquette Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Rhoden v. Sundquist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Rhoden v. Wyatt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Ricci v. Arlington Heights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 613,1057 Rice; Paladin Enterprises, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Rice; Paladin Press v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Rice v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Rich v. Bruce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Rich v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047,1088 Richards, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Richardson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Richardson v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Richardson; Forrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Richardson v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Richmond v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Rickman; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Ricks v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Riddle v. Palmdale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Rieger v. North Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051,1067 Righter v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Riley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Ring v. Federal National Mortgage Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Rivera v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Rivera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065,1066 R. K. Marshall Construction; Peace & Love, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cvii Page RMS Lusitania; Bemis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Roberson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019,1112 Roberts v. Bob Evans Farms, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Roberts v. Champion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Roberts v. District Court of Nev., Clark County . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Roberts v. Unidynamics Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Robertson v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Robinson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071,1136 Robinson v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Robinson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Robles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Rocha v. Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Rochambeau Wines & Liquors; Fla. Dept. of Bus. & Pro. Reg. v. . . . 1067 Roche v. Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Rochelle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 Rochon v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Rochon; Whitley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Rockwell International Corp. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Roditis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Rodriguez v. Sabatino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Rodriguez v. Watts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Rodriguez-Aviles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Rodriguez Delgadillo v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Rodriguez Ortiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Roe v. Butterworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Roe; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Rogers v. Finesilver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Rogers v. McCaughtry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Rogers; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Rogerson; Gilmour v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Rolleston v. Cherry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Rolm A. Siemans Co.; Armstrong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Roman v. Department of Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Romani; Stephen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Romani's Estate; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517 Rome, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Romero; Colorado v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Romero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Romero-Calderon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Romero-Molina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Romo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 Rondeau, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018 Roof v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Rosado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Rosman v. Gulf Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Ross v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Roth; DeBlase v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Rothman v. University of Mass. Medical Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Rothwell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Rotter, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Rouse; Jordan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Rowe, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co.; North Tex. Steel Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Rubio-Barrero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Ruck v. Transportation Union, Executive Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Rudd v. Forrest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025,1134 Rueda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Ruff v. Federal Express Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Ruiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Rummel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Runyon; Said v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Runyon; Sligh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Ruotolo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Russell v. Plano Bank & Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Russell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Rutherford v. Alderman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Ryan; Malumphy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 S. A. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Saavedra v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Sabatino; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Sablan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Sacramento County v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833 Sacramento Natural Foods Cooperative, Inc.; Ponce-Bran v. . . . . 1127 Sadler, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069 Saelee v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Safeway, Inc.; McQuown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064,1142,1146 Sai, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019,1133 Said v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 St. Anthony's Medical Center; Christian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 St. Louis Southwestern R. Co.; McDonald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 St. Paul Police Dept.; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Salazar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Salazar-Navarro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Salinas Brito v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Sallas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Salvo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Salzman v. BFI Tire Recyclers of MN, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Sampson v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cix Page Sanborn, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 San Buenaventura; Hibbs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Sanchez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034,1044,1046,1139 Sanchez Melgar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Sanchez-Velasco v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Sancho v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Sandage; Gilbert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Sanders, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Sanders; Stetler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059,1134 Sanders v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Sandoval Macias v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Sands v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children and Family Servs. 1010 Sandvik Aktiebolag; E. J. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 San Francisco; Fazio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 San Francisco; Timehin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Sanin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Santa Barbara County; Sinclair Oil Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Santucci v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Sarich v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Sasnett v. Endicott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Sather v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Saucedo-Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Savage v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Sayman v. Nussbaum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 S­B Power Tool (Skil Corp.); Summit v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Scales v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Scandinavian Health Spa, Inc. v. Franklin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Scannell v. King County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Schaner, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 Scheffer; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303 Scherzer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Schlei v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Schlossberg v. Maryland Comptroller of Treasury . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Schmidt v. Sheet Metal Workers' National Pension Fund . . . . . . . 1073 Schmitz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Schneider v. Celestino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 School Administrative Unit No. 30; Shaughnessy v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 School Bd. of Leon County; Weaver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Schouman v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Schriro; Aziz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Schudel v. General Electric Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Schwab & Co.; Orman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Schwalbe v. Walker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Schwarz v. Woodruff, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Sciarrotta v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 Scott v. Brundage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Scott v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Scott; Tyler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Scott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Scott-Harris; Bogan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Scott-Harris v. Fall River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Screen Actors Guild, Inc.; Marquez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 SDDS, Inc.; South Dakota v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Sealed Appellant; Sealed Appellee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Sealed Appellee v. Sealed Appellant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Sears, Roebuck & Co.; Plain v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Secretary of Agriculture; Chahil v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Secretary of Agriculture; Derbigny v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Secretary of Air Force; Belhomme v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Secretary of Army; Bray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Secretary of Defense; Ceminchuk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Secretary of Defense; New v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Secretary of Health and Human Services; Wallace v. . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Secretary of Housing and Urban Development; Berger v. . . . . . . 1138 Secretary of Navy; Evans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Secretary of Navy; Hashimoto v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Secretary of Navy; Longest v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Secretary of Navy; Stowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Secretary of State; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420 Secretary of State of Cal.; Bates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Secretary of State of Colo. v. American Const. Law Foundation . . . 1116 Secretary of State of Neb.; Dobrovolny v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Securities and Exchange Comm'n; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Securities and Exchange Comm'n; Schouman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 Segien v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Seibert v. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County . . . . . . . . 1009 Seiter; Al-Amin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026,1113 Self v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Shabazz v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Shahbaz; Hadji-Elias v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Shalala; Wallace v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Shanks; Booz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Shapiro; Berg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Sharp v. Lock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Sharp v. Makowski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009,1090 Shaughnessy v. Laconia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Shaughnessy v. School Administrative Unit No. 30 . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Shaw v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxi Page Shearer; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Sheesley; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009,1103 Sheet Metal Workers' National Pension Fund; Schmidt v. . . . . . . 1073 Shelby County Government; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026,1145 Sheldrake, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Sheline v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Shellito v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Director, OWCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Shephard v. Pomona Fairplex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Shephard v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Shepherd v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Shetty v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Shifman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Shipwrecked Vessel Captain Lawrence; Fairport Int'l Explor. v. 1091 Shop `n Save Warehouse Foods, Inc.; Brandt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Shultz v. Department of Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Sidden v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Siddens; Ashiegbu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Sieben, Inc.; Feltmann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Siemans Co.; Armstrong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Siemens Rolm Communications, Inc.; Torain v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Sierra Club; Ohio Forestry Assn., Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 726 Silicon Valley Bank; Kabir v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Simeon v. Hardin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Simmons v. GTE North, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Simmons v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Simon v. Colorado Compensation Ins. Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Simon; Colorado Compensation Ins. Authority v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Simons v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Simpson v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Simpson v. Phillips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Santa Barbara County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059 Singletary; Craig v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Singletary; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Singletary; Griffin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Singletary; Grubbs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Singletary; Haake v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Singletary; Halpin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Singletary; Haynes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Singletary; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Singletary; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Singletary; Lambrix v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Singletary; Summers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Singletary; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Singleton v. Matthews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Sjogren v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Skil Corp.; Summit v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Skinner v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Skuratowicz v. Tracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Sligh v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Smalley v. Federal Bureau of Prisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Smania v. Florida Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Smiley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Smith; Baruch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Smith; Champion International Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Smith v. Dragovich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Smith v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Smith; Florida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Smith v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Smith v. Kaiser Permanente Medical Group, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Smith v. Maryland National Capital Park and Planning Comm'n 1021 Smith v. McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie & Kirkland . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Smith; National Steel & Shipbuilding Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 Smith v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Smith v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Smith; Tilli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Smith v. United States . . . . . . . 1011,1023,1033,1035,1036,1085,1087,1100 Smith; Winslow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Smith; Zehner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Smith & Sons, Inc.; Contaminated Soil Consultants, Inc. v. . . . . . 1137 Smith-Stewart v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Smithwick v. Green Tree Financial Servicing Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Smouse v. Lytle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Snider v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Snyder v. DeWoskin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Sobina; Dolenc v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Sofamor Danek Group, Inc.; Murphy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Medical & Scientific Communications, Inc. 1020 Solis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Somerville; Tunstall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Sommers v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Sommers v. McKinney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Sonnier; Crawford & Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Soto-Silva v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Soumphonphankdy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Southard, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056 South Carolina; Burgess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 South Carolina; Crawley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:20] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxiii Page South Carolina; Hughes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 South Carolina; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 South Carolina; Whitner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 South Dakota; Pellegrino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 South Dakota v. SDDS, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Southern New England Telephone Co. v. FCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Southern Pilot Ins. Co.; Brewer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.; West v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Spann v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Sparkman v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Speaker Pro Tem., Ohio House of Representatives v. Voinovich . . 1043 Spectacor Management Group; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Speers, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Spence v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Spencer v. Kemna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Spencer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Sperau; Ford Motor Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Spindle v. Tillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012,1134 Spreitz v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Springer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 Springston v. Consolidated Rail Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 SSC&B Lintas, N. Y.; Mendoza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Stabler; Thurston County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Stafford v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Stalder; Velez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Stallworth v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Standish v. Nixon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Stanford Univ. School of Medicine/Medical; Bayer v. . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Stano v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 Stark v. Independent School Dist. No. 640 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094 State. See name of State. State Bar of Cal.; Damer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Staton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Stearns v. Gregoire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 Steele; Lundgren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Steelworkers v. Bandag, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Steeves Smith, P. C.; Patzlaff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027,1134 Stegall; Erdman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Stein, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Stenson v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Stephen v. Romani . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Stephen v. U. S. Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:21] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Stetler v. Sanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1059,1134 Steuer; Viray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Stewart, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Stewart v. Carriger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Stewart; DeWig v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 Stewart; Dixon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Stewart; Gretzler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Stewart; Jury v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 637 Stewart; Poland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Stewart; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Stinson; Henry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Stivender v. Powell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Stokes v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Stokes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Stone v. Lynn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Story v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Stouffer v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Stoughton Trailers, Inc. v. Pace Design & Fab, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Stovall; Remeta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Stowe v. Dalton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Strack; Donovan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032,1134 Strahan; Coates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Stringer v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Sullivan v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Summers v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Summerville; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Summit v. S­B Power Tool (Skil Corp.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Sumner; Wilkinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028,1090 Sunbeam Products, Inc.; West Bend Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.; Oncale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Sundquist; Rhoden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Sun World National Assn.; Ghiglieri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Superintendent of penal or correctional institution. See name or title of superintendent. Supreme Court of Ill.; Foroohar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Supreme Court of U. S.; Hotchkiss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Surgidev Corp. v. Niehoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Svay v. Atlanta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Swafford v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Sweet v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Sweet v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Sweetwater County School Dist. 1; Brockman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Swidler & Berlin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045,1057 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:21] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxv Page Swint v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Synstelien; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Syracuse; Elewski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 Szloboda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 T. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Tabbytite v. Municipality of Anchorage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Taha v. Portland Taxi Cab Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Tamez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Tampa; Griffin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Tapia v. Henigman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Tarkowski v. Illinois Dept. of Public Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011 Tarr v. Eshenbaugh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Tate v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Tate; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009,1103 Tatlis v. Duncan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Tatta v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Taub, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057 Tavakoli-Nouri v. Washington Hospital Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Tax Comm'r of Ohio; Skuratowicz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Taylor; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Taylor v. Jaquez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Taylor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007,1032 Teamsters; Patterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Teel v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Teffeteller v. Grimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026,1134 Tellier v. Petrillo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Tenet; Whitehead v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Tennessee; Bland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Tennessee; Burrell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Tennessee; Chaudhuri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024 Tennessee; McDonald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Tennessee; Sheline v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Tenzer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Terhune; Denard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Terhune; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Terhune; Maciel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Terrall v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Terranova Corp.; Akpaeti v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Terry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Terry v. Vance County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Tesoro v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Texas; Altschul v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001 Texas; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Texas; Angel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:21] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Texas; Clewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Texas; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 Texas; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Texas; Espinoza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Texas; Francisco Acosta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Texas; Gomez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 Texas; Hozaifeh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Texas; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Texas; Ledesma Aguilar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Texas; McBride v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Texas; Munkatchy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Texas; Skinner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Texas; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Texas; Sparkman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Texas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296 Texas Lottery Comm'n v. Wenner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Textron Automotive Interiors; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Division, AVCO Corp. v. Automobile Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 653 Thaler; Erdheim v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Thatsaphone v. Weber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Thomas v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Thomas; Ricks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Thomas; Saavedra v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Thomason v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Thompson; Calderon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 538 Thompson v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Thompson v. Nixon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050,1145 Thompson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077,1139 Thompson; Vaughn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Thrasher; Watkis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Thurston County v. Stabler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Tillery; Spindle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012,1134 Tilli v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Tillis Trucking Co.; Old Republic Union Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Timehin v. San Francisco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Tinder v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034 Tinker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Titus v. Guzzey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Todd v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Toegemann v. Prochaska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Tolbert v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Tolerson v. Auburn Steel Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:21] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxvii Page Tompkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Torain v. Siemens Rolm Communications, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 Torbeck v. Bozzo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Torres-Montalvo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 Torres-Servin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Tosco Refining Co.; Rawson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Total Foods v. Alix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Town. See name of town. Tracy; Skuratowicz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Trahan v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Traina v. Nixon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Trammell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068 Transportation Union, Executive Bd.; Ruck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078 Trans World Airlines, Inc.; Travellers International AG v. . . . . . . 1138 Travellers International AG v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. . . . . . . 1138 Travis-Barker v. U. S. Bank of Wash. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Treece v. Lyons Township High School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Trent; McFarlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Trevino v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Trujillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Tseng; El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Tsui Yuan Tseng; El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Tucker v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Tulane Univ. Medical Center; Blanchard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Tulsa; Baylis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Tunstall v. Somerville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Turk; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Turner, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071,1136 Turner v. Champion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Turner v. Fallon Community Health Plan, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072 Turner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Turner v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Turpin; Cargill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080,1145 203 North LaSalle St. Partnership; Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Tyler v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Udell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 UIS, Inc. v. Interkal, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Umphfrey v. Dormire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Unidynamics Corp.; Roberts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Union. For labor union, see name of trade. Union Security Life Ins. Co. v. Crocker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 United Center; Elliott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:21] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page United Mexican States v. Woods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 United States. See name of other party. U. S. Bank of Wash.; Travis-Barker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 U. S. Bankruptcy Court; Labankoff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 U. S. Court of Appeals; Lambright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 U. S. Court of Appeals; Stephen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 U. S. District Court; Connor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 U. S. District Court; Craig v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025 U. S. District Court; Gates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 U. S. District Court; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 U. S. District Court; Maxwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 U. S. District Court; Parks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 U. S. District Court; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 U. S. District Judge; Mayles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 U. S. Parole Comm'n; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 U. S. Patent and Trademark Office; Good News Communications v. 1096 U. S. Postal Service Designee; Grzelak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 United States Shoe Corp.; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360 United We Stand America; United We Stand, America, N. Y. v. 1076 United We Stand, America, N. Y. v. United We Stand America 1076 University and Community College System of Nev.; Farmer v. . . 1004 University of Louisville; Willis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 University of Md. Medical Systems; Murray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081,1146 University of Mass. Medical Center; Rothman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 University of Mich. Regents; Yohn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Urena-Collado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 U S WEST, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Utah; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Valdez v. Fonoimoana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Valdez v. Zions Securities Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Vance; Narron v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 Vance County; Terry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Vandlen; McPherson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Van Hoorelbeke, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Vann v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Van Pelt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Vargas-Villa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Vasquez-Cruz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 Vassar College; Fisher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Vaughn; Agan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Vaughn; Diaz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Vaughn; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Vaughn; Laessig v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Vaughn v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:21] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxix Page Velez v. Stalder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023 Venegas v. Henman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Ventimiglia v. Watter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027,1134 Ventura v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087 Ventura County; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Verbeck, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Verdin; Plaisance Dragline & Dredging Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Vicente-Guzman v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . 1041 Villacres v. Kramer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Villafuerte, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Villafuerte v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 Village. See name of village. Villarreal v. Florida Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Villegas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Villegas Lopez v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Viray v. Beneficial Cal., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Viray v. Steuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Virginia; Fontaine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Virginia; Keselica v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Virginia; Kreiger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Virginia; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Virginia; Parker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 Virginia; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners; Clement v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Virginia Parole Bd.; Lateef v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Virginia State Corp. Comm'n v. Federal Communications Comm'n 1046 Viswanathan v. Fayetteville State Univ. Bd. of Trustees . . . . . . . 1106 Viveros, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Vogel v. Industrial Comm'n of Ariz. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Voinovich; Quilter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Voinovich v. Women's Medical Professional Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Volkova v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Volkswagen of America, Inc.; Doyle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020 Wacaster v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Wacker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035,1053 Waddy v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 Wagner, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093 Wainwright v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Wakelin; Parker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Walden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Waldrip v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Waldrup; Engels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Walker; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:21] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Walker v. Michigan Public Service Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Walker; Schwalbe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Walker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Walkoviak v. District Court of Tex., Harris County . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Wallace v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Wallace v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087,1144 Walls v. Los Angeles County, Office of District Attorney . . . . . . . 1059 Wal-Mart Stores; American Relocation Network International v. 1089 Walters v. Mahoney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Walters v. Metzger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Walton v. Joslin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Walton v. Princeton Baptist Medical Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Ward; Parker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Ward v. Ravenswood Village Nursing Home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Warden. See name of warden. Warner v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063 Warren v. Bell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Warren; Hapgood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 Warren v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Warren v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Washington; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007 Washington; Burton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082 Washington v. Diesslin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029,1113 Washington; Evans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Washington; Evans-Bey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Washington v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006,1123 Washington; Sather v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098 Washington; Stenson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Washington v. Summerville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Washington; Winsett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Washington Dept. of Community Development; Comenout v. . . . . 1005 Washington Hospital Center; Tavakoli-Nouri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 Washington Redskins v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. . . . . 1077 Waste Mgmt. of Tenn.; Metro. Govt. of Nashville & Davidson Cty. v. 1094 Waters v. Frazier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Watkins v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Watkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067 Watkis v. Thrasher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Watson; Blevins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Watson v. Boone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Watson v. Pace West Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Watson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Watter; Ventimiglia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027,1134 Watts; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:21] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxi Page Weaver v. School Bd. of Leon County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Weber; Darne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Weber; Thatsaphone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Webster v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan 1022 Wee v. Andrews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007,1103 Weissman v. Cohn, Lifland, Perlman, Hermann & Knopf . . . . . . . 1122 Weld; Polis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Weldon v. Ferguson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Wellons, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 Wells v. Wells . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089 Wells Electronics, Inc.; Pfaff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003 Wells Fargo Bank; Flanagan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 Wenner; Texas Lottery Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 West; Bray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 West v. Farber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 West v. Keane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 West; Madden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046 West v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 West Bend Co. v. Sunbeam Products, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 West Covina v. Perkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Western Lake Superior San. Dist.; Zenith/Kremer Waste Sys. v. 1145 Western Weighing and Inspection Bureau; Hayes v. . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Westminster; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006,1113 Westmoreland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 West Virginia; Nesbitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 West Windsor Township; Yadav v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Wexler v. Phoenix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Weyman v. Mifflin County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Wheatley v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083 Wherry v. Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Pro. Ethics and Conduct 1021,1133 Whitaker v. Whitaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 White, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 White; Gray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 White v. McMillan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 White v. Shearer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 White v. Sheesley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009,1103 White v. Tate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009,1103 Whitehead v. Tenet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Whitehurst; Poole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041 Whitfield v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044,1116 Whitley v. Rochon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Whitner v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Wicks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088 Widnall; Belhomme v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:21] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Wiggins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Wilkerson v. Prunty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Wilkinson v. Sumner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028,1090 Williams, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Williams v. Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Williams v. Bowers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Williams v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 Williams v. Carlton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Williams; Crooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Williams; Espinosa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070 Williams; Fletcher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Williams; Kawerak Reindeer Herders Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Williams; McKenney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Williams v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Williams v. Turk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047 Williams v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034,1065,1067,1088,1100 Williams v. U. S. Parole Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Williams v. Ventura County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052 Williams v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Williams Lewis, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Willis v. University of Louisville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055 Wilson; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085 Wilson v. Marchington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Wilson v. Rogers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096 Wilson v. Stewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Wilson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Wingfield v. Massie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Winsett v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017 Winslow v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Wisconsin; Darne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042 Wisconsin; Dye v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Wisconsin; Minniecheske v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031 Wisconsin Dept. of Ind., Labor and Human Relations; Peterson v. 1076 Wise v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079 Wolde-Giorgis v. Delecki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Wolle; Duffy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Women's Medical Professional Corp.; Voinovich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Woo v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Wood v. Cook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Wood; Cunningham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Woodard; Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272 Woodruff, Inc.; Schwarz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029 Woods v. Alex-Bell Oxford Ltd. Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Woods; Boyce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:21] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxiii Page Woods v. Cook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062 Woods; Cunningham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Woods; Gilbert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Woods; Houston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080 Woods; United Mexican States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Woods v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 Woodward; Millet v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Wooten v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065 Worley v. Pennsylvania Public School Employees' Retirement Bd. 1095 Wright v. Mass Transit Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006,1134 Wright v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 Wronko v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Wrubel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Wulff v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Wyatt, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045 Wyatt; Rhoden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 Wynn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Wyoming; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Xep Nguyen; Remington Investments, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005 Yadav v. West Windsor Township . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077 Yale Materials Handling Corp.; Gonzalez Trading, Inc. v. . . . . . . . 1055 Yanez Penaloza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064 Yankton Sioux Tribe; South Dakota v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044 Yarborough; Maciel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 Yates v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 Yearous v. Niobrara County Memorial Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074 Yellow Freight Systems, Inc.; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 Yen v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Yeskey; Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018,1070 Yohn v. University of Mich. Regents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076 Yoshisato v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021 Youmans; Knight v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061 Young; Kendrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Young v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 Young v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Young v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Younger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054 Youssef v. Morrison Entity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Yuan Tseng; El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Zandi; Nik-Khah v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081 Zankich v. Goy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049 Zankich v. Phoenix Cardiologists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 Zehner v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073 Zenith/Kremer Waste Sys. v. Western Lake Superior San. Dist. . 1145 Job: 523REP Unit: $UBV [04-05-00 21:03:21] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) cxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Zerebnick v. Beckwith Machinery Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Zions Securities Corp.; Valdez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 Zok v. Eastaugh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075 Zorio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066 523US1 Unit: $U30 [05-01-00 12:15:11] PAGES PGT: OPIN CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AT OCTOBER TERM, 1997 SPENCER v. KEMNA, SUPERINTENDENT, WESTERN MISSOURI CORRECTIONAL CENTER, et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit No. 96­7171. Argued November 12, 1997-Decided March 3, 1998 On October 17, 1990, petitioner began serving concurrent 3-year sentences for convictions of felony stealing and burglary, due to expire on October 16, 1993. On April 16, 1992, he was released on parole, but on Septem- ber 24, 1992, that parole was revoked and he was returned to prison. Thereafter, he sought to invalidate the parole revocation, first filing ha- beas petitions in state court, and then the present federal habeas peti- tion. Before the District Court addressed the merits of the habeas pe- tition, petitioner's sentence expired, and so the District Court dismissed the petition as moot. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Held: The expiration of petitioner's sentence has caused his petition to be moot because it no longer presents an Article III case or controversy. Pp. 7­18. (a) An incarcerated convict's (or a parolee's) challenge to his convic- tion always satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement because the incarceration (or the restriction imposed by the terms of parole) consti- tutes a concrete injury caused by the conviction and redressable by the conviction's invalidation. Once the sentence has expired, however, the petitioner must show some concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration (or parole)-some "collateral consequence" of the conviction-if the suit is to be maintained. In recent decades, this Court has presumed that a wrongful conviction has continuing col- 1 523US1 Unit: $U30 [05-01-00 12:15:11] PAGES PGT: OPIN 2 SPENCER v. KEMNA Syllabus lateral consequences (or, what is effectively the same, has counted collat- eral consequences that are remote and unlikely to occur). Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 55­56. However, in Lane v. Williams, 455 U. S. 624, the Court refused to extend this presumption of collateral conse- quences to the revocation of parole. The Court adheres to that refusal, which leaves only the question whether petitioner has demonstrated collateral consequences. Pp. 7­14. (b) Petitioner's asserted injuries-in-fact do not establish collateral consequences sufficient to state an Article III case or controversy. That his parole revocation could be used to his detriment in a future parole proceeding is merely a possibility rather than a certainty or a probability. That the revocation could be used to increase his sentence in a future sentencing proceeding is, like a similar claim rejected in Lane, contingent on petitioner's violating the law, being caught and con- victed. Likewise speculative are petitioner's other allegations of collat- eral consequence-that the parole revocation could be used to impeach him should he appear as a witness in future proceedings, and that it could be used directly against him should he appear as a defendant in a criminal proceeding. Pp. 14­16. (c) The Court finds no merit in petitioner's remaining arguments- that since he is foreclosed from pursuing a damages action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 unless he can establish his parole revocation's invalidity, see Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, his action to establish that invalid- ity cannot be moot; that this case falls within the exception to the moot- ness doctrine for cases that are "capable of repetition, yet evading re- view"; and that the mootness of his case should be ignored because it was caused by the dilatory tactics of the state attorney general's office and by District Court delays. Pp. 17­18. 91 F. 3d 1114, affirmed. Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 18. Ginsburg, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 21. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 22. John William Simon, by appointment of the Court, 520 U. S. 1227, argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. James R. Layton, Chief Deputy Attorney General of Mis- souri, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General, pro 523US1 Unit: $U30 [05-01-00 12:15:11] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 1 (1998) 3 Opinion of the Court se, and Stephen D. Hawke, Stacy L. Anderson, and Michael J. Spillane, Assistant Attorneys General.* Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Randy G. Spen- cer seeks to invalidate a September 24, 1992, order revoking his parole. Because Spencer has completed the entire term of imprisonment underlying the parole revocation, we must decide whether his petition is moot. I On October 17, 1990, petitioner began serving concurrent 3-year sentences in Missouri on convictions of felony stealing and burglary. On April 16, 1992, he was released on parole, but on September 24, 1992, the Missouri Board of Probation and Parole, after hearing, issued an Order of Revocation re- voking the parole. The order concluded that petitioner had violated three of the conditions, set forth in Missouri's Code of Regulations, Title 14, § 80­3.010 (1992), that a Missouri inmate must comply with in order to remain on parole: "NOW, THEREFORE, after careful consideration of ev- idence presented, said charges which warrant revocation are sustained, to wit: *A brief of amici curiae was filed for the State of California et al. by Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass, Senior Assistant At- torney General, and Morris Beatus and Peggy S. Ruffra, Deputy Attor- neys General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Grant Woods of Arizona, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, Jeffrey A. Modisett of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Scott Harshbarger of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, D. Michael Fisher of Penn- sylvania, Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, and Jan Graham of Utah. 523US1 Unit: $U30 [05-01-00 12:15:11] PAGES PGT: OPIN 4 SPENCER v. KEMNA Opinion of the Court "#1­LAWS: I will obey all federal and state laws, munic- ipal and county ordinances. I will report all arrests to my Probation and Parole Officer within 48 hours. "#6­DRUGS: I will not have in my possession or use any controlled substance except as prescribed for me by a licensed medical practitioner. "#7­WEAPONS: I will, if my probation or parole is based on a misdemeanor involving firearms or explo- sives, or any felony charge, not own, possess, purchase, receive, sell or transport any firearms, ammunition or explosive device or any dangerous weapon as defined by federal, state or municipal laws or ordinances." App. 55­56. The specific conduct that violated these conditions was de- scribed only by citation of the parole violation report that the board used in making its determination: "Evidence relied upon for violation is from the Initial Violation Report dated 7­27­92." Id., at 56. That report, prepared by State Probation and Parole Offi- cer Jonathan Tintinger, summarized a June 3, 1992, police report prepared by the Kansas City, Missouri Police Depart- ment, according to which a woman had alleged that peti- tioner, after smoking crack cocaine with her at a local crack house and later at his own home, pressed a screwdriver against her side and raped her. According to the Kansas City report, petitioner had admitted smoking crack cocaine with the woman, but claimed that the sexual intercourse be- tween them had been consensual. Officer Tintinger's report then described his own interview with petitioner, at which petitioner again admitted smoking crack cocaine with the woman, denied that he had pressed a screwdriver to her side, and did not respond to the allegation of rape. Finally, after noting that "Spencer [was] a registered sex offender, having been given a five-year prison sentence for Sodomy in 1983," id., at 75, Officer Tintinger's report tentatively recom- mended that petitioner's parole be continued, but that he be 523US1 Unit: $U30 [05-01-00 12:15:11] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 1 (1998) 5 Opinion of the Court placed in a drug treatment center. The report withheld making "an ultimate recommendation based on the alleged [rape and dangerous weapon] violations" until the prosecut- ing attorney's office had a chance to dispose of those charges. Id., at 76. "In the event formal charges are ultimately filed," it said, "a separate recommendation will be forthcom- ing." Ibid. Petitioner was never charged, but a September 14, 1992, followup report prepared by Institutional Parole Officer Peggy McClure concluded that "there [did] appear to be significant evidence that Spencer ha[d] violated the condi- tions of his parole as stated," and recommended that peti- tioner's parole be revoked. Id., at 64. Officer McClure's report is not mentioned in the Order of Revocation. On being returned to prison, petitioner began his efforts to invalidate the Order of Revocation. He first sought relief in the Missouri courts, but was rejected by the Circuit Court of De Kalb County, the Missouri Court of Appeals, and, fi- nally, the Missouri Supreme Court. Then, on April 1, 1993, just over six months before the expiration of his 3-year sen- tence, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, see 28 U. S. C. § 2254, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, alleging that he had not received due process in the parole revocation proceedings.1 1 Specifically, according to petitioner's brief, he contended: "1. The Board denied him his right to a preliminary revocation hearing on the armed criminal action accusation. . . . "2. The Board denied him a hearing on the cancellation of his conditional release date. "3. The Board . . . : "a. . . . denied him the right to confront and cross-examine any of the witnesses against him. . . . "b. . . . gave him no notice that the entire case for revoking his parole would be the out-of-court statements in the violation report. "c. . . . denied him the right to representation by a person of his choice. "4. The Board failed to apprise him of the fact of its decision to revoke his parole, and of the evidence it relied on in doing so, for four months, when its regulations required that . . . the parolee be provided [such a] 523US1 Unit: $U30 [05-01-00 12:15:11] PAGES PGT: OPIN 6 SPENCER v. KEMNA Opinion of the Court Over petitioner's objections, the District Court granted the State two requested extensions of time to respond to the petition, deferring the deadline from June 2, 1993, until July 7, 1993. On July 14, 1993, after receiving the State's re- sponse, petitioner filed a lengthy "Motion and Request for Final Disposition of this Matter," in which he requested that the District Court expedite decision on his case in order to prevent his claim from becoming moot. Before the District Court responded to this motion, however, on August 7, 1993, petitioner was re-released on parole, and, two months after that, on October 16, 1993, the term of his imprisonment ex- pired. On February 3, 1994, the District Court "noted" peti- tioner's July motion, stating that "[t]he resolution of this case will not be delayed beyond the requirements of this Court's docket." App. 127. Then, on August 23, 1995, the District Court dismissed petitioner's habeas petition. "Because," it said, "the sentences at issue here have expired, petitioner is no longer `in custody' within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 2254(a), and his claim for habeas corpus relief is moot." Id., at 130. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment,2 concluding that, under our decision in Lane v. Williams, 455 U. S. 624, 632 (1982), petitioner's claim had become moot because he suf- fered no "collateral consequences" of the revocation order. 91 F. 3d 1114 (1996). (It acknowledged that this interpreta- tion of Lane did not accord with that of the Second and Ninth Circuits in United States v. Parker, 952 F. 2d 31 (CA2 1991), statement within ten working days from the date of the decision." See Brief for Petitioner 5­6. 2 By the time the case reached the Eighth Circuit, petitioner was once again in prison, this time serving a 7-year sentence for attempted felony stealing. He is still there, and the State informs us that he is scheduled to be released on parole on January 24, 1999. See Brief for Respondents 8, n. 4. 523US1 Unit: $U30 [05-01-00 12:15:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 1 (1998) 7 Opinion of the Court and Robbins v. Christianson, 904 F. 2d 492 (CA9 1990).) We granted certiorari. 520 U. S. 1165 (1997). II The District Court's conclusion that Spencer's release from prison caused his petition to be moot because it no longer satisfied the "in custody" requirement of the habeas statute was in error. Spencer was incarcerated by reason of the parole revocation at the time the petition was filed, which is all the "in custody" provision of 28 U. S. C. § 2254 requires. See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234, 238 (1968); Maleng v. Cook, 490 U. S. 488, 490­491 (1989) (per curiam). The more substantial question, however, is whether petitioner's subse- quent release caused the petition to be moot because it no longer presented a case or controversy under Article III, § 2, of the Constitution. "This case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate. . . . The parties must continue to have a `personal stake in the outcome' of the lawsuit." Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U. S. 472, 477­478 (1990). See also Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401 (1975). This means that, throughout the litigation, the plaintiff "must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury trace- able to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favor- able judicial decision." Lewis, supra, at 477. An incarcerated convict's (or a parolee's) challenge to the validity of his conviction always satisfies the case-or- controversy requirement, because the incarceration (or the restriction imposed by the terms of the parole) constitutes a concrete injury, caused by the conviction and redressable by invalidation of the conviction. Once the convict's sentence has expired, however, some concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration or parole-some "collateral consequence" of the conviction-must exist if the suit is to be maintained. See, e. g., Carafas, supra, at 237­ 523US1 Unit: $U30 [05-01-00 12:15:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN 8 SPENCER v. KEMNA Opinion of the Court 238. In recent decades, we have been willing to presume that a wrongful criminal conviction has continuing collateral consequences (or, what is effectively the same, to count col- lateral consequences that are remote and unlikely to occur). See Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 55­56 (1968). The present petitioner, however, does not attack his con- victions for felony stealing and burglary, which he concedes were lawful; he asserts only the wrongful termination of his parole status. The reincarceration that he incurred as a result of that action is now over, and cannot be undone. Subsistence of the suit requires, therefore, that continuing "collateral consequences" of the parole revocation be either proved or presumed. And the first question we confront is whether the presumption of collateral consequences which is applied to criminal convictions will be extended as well to revocations of parole. To answer that question, it is helpful to review the origins of and basis for the presumption. Originally, we required collateral consequences of convic- tion to be specifically identified, and we accepted as sufficient to satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement only concrete disadvantages or disabilities that had in fact occurred, that were imminently threatened, or that were imposed as a mat- ter of law (such as deprivation of the right to vote, to hold office, to serve on a jury, or to engage in certain businesses). Thus, in St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U. S. 41 (1943) (per curiam), one of the first cases to recognize collateral conse- quences of conviction as a basis for avoiding mootness, we refused to allow St. Pierre's challenge to a contempt citation after he had completed his 5-month sentence, because "peti- tioner [has not] shown that under either state or federal law further penalties or disabilities can be imposed on him as a result of the judgment which has now been satisfied," id., at 43. We rejected St. Pierre's argument that the possibility that "the judgment [could] impair his credibility as [a] wit- ness in any future legal proceeding" was such a penalty or disability, because "the moral stigma of a judgment which no 523US1 Unit: $U30 [05-01-00 12:15:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 1 (1998) 9 Opinion of the Court longer affects legal rights does not present a case or contro- versy for appellate review." Ibid. Similarly, in Carafas v. LaVallee, we permitted an individual to continue his chal- lenge to a criminal conviction only after identifying specific, concrete collateral consequences that attached to the convic- tion as a matter of law: "It is clear that petitioner's cause is not moot. In conse- quence of his conviction, he cannot engage in certain businesses; he cannot serve as an official of a labor union for a specified period of time; he cannot vote in any elec- tion held in New York State; he cannot serve as a juror." 391 U. S., at 237 (footnotes and citation omitted). See also Fiswick v. United States, 329 U. S. 211, 221­223 (1946) (conviction rendered petitioner liable to deportation and denial of naturalization, and ineligible to serve on a jury, vote, or hold office); United States v. Morgan, 346 U. S. 502 (1954) (conviction had been used to increase petitioner's cur- rent sentence under state recidivist law); Parker v. Ellis, 362 U. S. 574, 576 (1960) (Harlan, J., concurring) (since petition- er's other, unchallenged convictions took away the same civil rights as the conviction under challenge, the challenge was moot); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 633, n. 2 (1968) (conviction rendered petitioner liable to revocation of his li- cense to operate luncheonette business). Cf. Tannenbaum v. New York, 388 U. S. 439 (1967) (per curiam); Jacobs v. New York, 388 U. S. 431 (1967) (per curiam). The gateway to abandonment of this fastidious approach to collateral consequences was Pollard v. United States, 352 U. S. 354 (1957). There, in allowing a convict who had al- ready served his time to challenge the length of his sentence, we said, almost offhandedly, that "[t]he possibility of conse- quences collateral to the imposition of sentence [was] suffi- ciently substantial to justify our dealing with the merits," id., at 358-citing for that possibility an earlier case involv- ing consequences for an alien (which there is no reason to 523US1 Unit: $U30 [05-01-00 12:15:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN 10 SPENCER v. KEMNA Opinion of the Court believe Pollard was), see Pino v. Landon, 349 U. S. 901 (1955). In Sibron v. New York, we relied upon this opinion to support the conclusion that our jurisprudence had "aban- doned all inquiry into the actual existence of collateral conse- quences and in effect presumed that they existed." 392 U. S., at 55 (citing Pollard, supra).3 Thereafter, and in sum- mary fashion, we proceeded to accept the most generalized and hypothetical of consequences as sufficient to avoid moot- ness in challenges to conviction. For example, in Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U. S. 387 (1985), we held that respondent's habeas challenge had not become moot despite the expiration of his sentence and despite the fact that "his civil rights, including suffrage and the right to hold public office, [had been] re- stored," id., at 391, n. 4. Since he had not been pardoned, we said, "some collateral consequences of his conviction re- main, including the possibility that the conviction would be used to impeach testimony he might give in a future proceed- ing and the possibility that it would be used to subject him to persistent felony offender prosecution if he should go to trial on any other felony charges in the future." Ibid. See also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784, 790­791 (1969); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, 108, n. 3 (1977) (per curiam); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U. S. 366 (1993). There are several relevant observations to be made re- garding these developments: First, it must be acknowledged that the practice of presuming collateral consequences (or of accepting the remote possibility of collateral consequences as adequate to satisfy Article III) sits uncomfortably beside the "long-settled principle that standing cannot be `inferred ar- gumentatively from averments in the pleadings,' but rather 3 Sibron also purported to rely on United States v. Morgan, 346 U. S. 502 (1954), and Fiswick v. United States, 329 U. S. 211 (1946), as establish- ing that a "mere possibility" of collateral consequences suffices, see 392 U. S., at 54­55, but as we have described, those cases involved much more than that. 523US1 Unit: $U30 [05-01-00 12:15:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 1 (1998) 11 Opinion of the Court `must affirmatively appear in the record,' " and that "it is the burden of the `party who seeks the exercise of jurisdic- tion in his favor,' `clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dis- pute.' " FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U. S. 215, 231 (1990) (citations omitted). The practice of presuming collateral con- sequences developed during an era in which it was thought that the only function of the constitutional requirement of standing was "to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues," Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962). Sibron appears in the same volume of the United States Reports as Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 (1968), which said: "The question whether a particular person is a proper party to maintain the action does not, by its own force, raise separation of powers problems related to improper judicial interference in areas committed to other branches of the Federal Government. Such problems arise, if at all, only from the substantive issues the in- dividual seeks to have adjudicated. Thus, in terms of Article III limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the question of standing is related only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution." Id., at 100­101. See Benton v. Maryland, supra, at 790­791 ("Although this possibility [of collateral consequences] may well be a remote one, it is enough to give this case an adversary cast and make it justiciable"). That parsimonious view of the function of Article III standing has since yielded to the acknowledg- ment that the constitutional requirement is a "means of `defin[ing] the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power,' " Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 523US1 Unit: $U30 [05-01-00 12:15:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN 12 SPENCER v. KEMNA Opinion of the Court 454 U. S. 464, 474 (1982),4 and "a part of the basic charter . . . provid[ing] for the interaction between [the federal] govern- ment and the governments of the several States," id., at 476. See also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 559­560 (1992). And finally, of particular relevance to the question whether the practice of presuming collateral consequences should be extended to challenges of parole termination: In the context of criminal conviction, the pre- sumption of significant collateral consequences is likely to comport with reality. As we said in Sibron, it is an "obvious fact of life that most criminal convictions do in fact entail adverse collateral legal consequences." 392 U. S., at 55. The same cannot be said of parole revocation. For these reasons, perhaps, we have hitherto refused to extend our presumption of collateral consequences (or our willingness to accept hypothetical consequences) to the area of parole revocation. In Lane v. Williams, 455 U. S. 624 (1982), we rejected the contention of convicted felons who had completed their sentences that their challenges to their sentences of three years' mandatory parole at the conclusion of their fixed terms of incarceration (which parole they had violated) were not moot because the revocations of parole could be used to their detriment in future parole proceedings should they ever be convicted of other crimes. We said: "The doctrine of Carafas and Sibron is not applicable in this case. No civil disabilities such as those present in Carafas result from a finding that an individual has vio- lated his parole." Id., at 632. "[Carafas] concerned existing civil disabilities; as a result of the petitioner's conviction, he was presently 4 The internal quotation is from a portion of Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 95 (1968), which recited this to be the second purpose of the case-or- controversy requirement in general. The opinion later said that the con- stitutionally required minimum of standing relates to the first purpose alone. Id., at 100­101, quoted in text. 523US1 Unit: $U30 [05-01-00 12:15:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 1 (1998) 13 Opinion of the Court barred from holding certain offices, voting in state elec- tions, and serving as a juror. This case involves no such disability." Id., at 632­633, n. 13. It was not enough that the parole violations found by the revocation decision would enable the parole board to deny respondents parole in the future, see id., at 639­640 (Mar- shall, J., dissenting) (quoting Illinois rules governing denial of parole). For such violations "[did] not render an individ- ual ineligible for parole under Illinois law[,] [but were] sim- ply one factor, among many, that may be considered by the parole authority . . . ." Id., at 633, n. 13. And, in any event, "[t]he parole violations that remain a part of respondents' records cannot affect a subsequent parole determination un- less respondents again violate state law, are returned to prison, and become eligible for parole. Respondents them- selves are able-and indeed required by law-to prevent such a possibility from occurring." Ibid. In addition, we rejected as collateral consequences sufficient to keep the con- troversy alive the possibility that the parole revocations would affect the individuals' "employment prospects, or the sentence imposed [upon them] in a future criminal pro- ceeding." Id., at 632. These "nonstatutory consequences" were dependent upon "[t]he discretionary decisions . . . made by an employer or a sentencing judge," which are "not gov- erned by the mere presence or absence of a recorded viola- tion of parole," but can "take into consideration, and are more directly influenced by, the underlying conduct that formed the basis for the parole violation." Id., at 632­633.5 5 The Court pointed out in Lane that respondents were attacking only their parole sentences, and not their convictions, see 455 U. S., at 631. That was evidently for the purpose of excluding direct application of Sib- ron. The Court also pointed out, near the conclusion of its opinion, that respondents were not attacking "the finding that they violated the terms of their parole." 455 U. S., at 633. This is not framed as an independent ground for the decision, and if it were such most of the opinion would have 523US1 Unit: $U30 [05-01-00 12:15:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN 14 SPENCER v. KEMNA Opinion of the Court We adhere to the principles announced in Lane, and de- cline to presume that collateral consequences adequate to meet Article III's injury-in-fact requirement resulted from petitioner's parole revocation. The question remains, then, whether petitioner demonstrated such consequences. III Petitioner asserts four concrete injuries-in-fact attribut- able to his parole revocation. First, he claims that the revocation could be used to his detriment in a future parole proceeding. This possibility is no longer contingent on petitioner's again violating the law; he has already done so, and is currently serving a 7-year term of imprisonment. But it is, nonetheless, still a possibility rather than a cer- tainty or even a probability. Under Missouri law, as under the Illinois law addressed in Lane, a prior parole revocation "[does] not render an individual ineligible for parole[,] [but is] simply one factor, among many, that may be considered by the parole authority in determining whether there is a substantial risk that the parole candidate will not conform to reasonable conditions of parole." 455 U. S., at 633, n. 13. Under Missouri law, "[w]hen in its opinion there is reasonable probability that an offender . . . can be released without det- riment to the community or himself, the board may in its discretion release or parole such person." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 217.690 (1996). The Missouri Supreme Court has said that this statute "giv[es] the Board `almost unlimited discretion' in whether to grant parole release." Shaw v. Missouri Board of Probation and Parole, 937 S. W. 2d 771, 772 (1997). been unnecessary. The Court did not contest the dissenters' contention that "respondents . . . seek to have the parole term declared void, or ex- punged," id., at 635 (Marshall, J., dissenting), which "would have the effect of removing respondents' parole-violation status and would relieve re- spondents of the collateral consequences flowing from this status," id., at 636, n. 1. 523US1 Unit: $U30 [05-01-00 12:15:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 1 (1998) 15 Opinion of the Court Petitioner's second contention is that the Order of Revoca- tion could be used to increase his sentence in a future sen- tencing proceeding. A similar claim was likewise consid- ered and rejected in Lane, because it was contingent upon respondents' violating the law, getting caught, and being con- victed. "Respondents themselves are able-and indeed re- quired by law-to prevent such a possibility from occurring." Lane, supra, at 633, n. 13. We of course have rejected anal- ogous claims to Article III standing in other contexts. "[W]e are . . . unable to conclude that the case-or- controversy requirement is satisfied by general asser- tions or inferences that in the course of their activities respondents will be prosecuted for violating valid crimi- nal laws. We assume that respondents will conduct their activities within the law and so avoid prosecution and conviction." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 497 (1974). See also Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 102­103 (1983). For similar reasons, we reject petitioner's third and fourth contentions, that the parole revocation (and, specifically, the "finding of a parole violation for forcible rape and armed criminal action," see Brief for Petitioner 34) could be used to impeach him should he appear as a witness or litigant in a future criminal or civil proceeding; or could be used against him directly, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 405 6 (or Missouri's state-law equivalent, see Durbin v. Cassalo, 321 S. W. 2d 23, 26 (Mo. App. 1959)) or Federal Rule of Evidence 413,7 should he appear as a defendant in a criminal proceed- 6 Federal Rule of Evidence 405 provides, in relevant part, that "[i]n cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an essential ele- ment of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may . . . be made of specific instances of that person's conduct." 7 Federal Rule of Evidence 413 provides, in relevant part, that "[i]n a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or of- 523US1 Unit: $U30 [05-01-00 12:15:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN 16 SPENCER v. KEMNA Opinion of the Court ing. It is purely a matter of speculation whether such an appearance will ever occur. See O'Shea, supra, at 496­497. Moreover, as to the possibility that petitioner (or a witness appearing on his behalf) would be impeached with the parole revocation, it is far from certain that a prosecutor or examin- ing counsel would decide to use the parole revocation (a "dis- cretionary decision" similar to those of the sentencing judge and employer discussed in Lane, supra, at 632­633); and, if so, whether the presiding judge would admit it, particularly in light of the far more reliable evidence of two past criminal convictions that would achieve the same purpose of impeach- ment, see State v. Comstock, 647 S. W. 2d 163, 165 (Mo. App. 1983). Indeed, it is not even clear that a Missouri court could legally admit the parole revocation to impeach peti- tioner. See State v. Newman, 568 S. W. 2d 276, 278­282 (Mo. App. 1978). And as to the possibility that the parole revoca- tion could be used directly against petitioner should he be the object of a criminal prosecution, it is at least as likely that the conduct underlying the revocation, rather than the revocation itself (which does not recite the specific conduct constituting the parole violation) would be used.8 fenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may be considered for its bear- ing on any matter to which it is relevant." 8 The dissent asserts that "a finding that an individual has committed a serious felony" renders the "interest in vindicating . . . reputation . . . constitutionally [s]ufficient" to avoid mootness. Post, at 23, 24. We have obviously not regarded it as sufficient in the past-even when the finding was not that of a parole board, but the much more solemn condemnation of a full-dress criminal conviction. For that would have rendered entirely unnecessary the inquiry into concrete collateral consequences of conviction in many of our cases, see, e. g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784, 790­791 (1969); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234, 237­238 (1968); Fiswick, 329 U. S., at 220­222, and unnecessary as well (at least as to felony convictions) Sibron's presumption of collateral consequences, see supra, at 8­10. Of course there is no reason in principle for limiting the dissent's novel theory to felonies: If constitutionally adequate damage to reputation is produced by a parole board's finding of one more felony by a current inmate who 523US1 Unit: $U30 [05-01-00 12:15:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 1 (1998) 17 Opinion of the Court IV Petitioner raises three more arguments, none of which seems to us well taken. First, he contends that since our decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477 (1994), would foreclose him from pursuing a damages action under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, unless he can establish the invalidity of his parole revocation, his action to establish that invalidity cannot be moot. This is a great non sequitur, un- less one believes (as we do not) that a § 1983 action for dam- ages must always and everywhere be available. It is not certain, in any event, that a § 1983 damages claim would be foreclosed. If, for example, petitioner were to seek damages "for using the wrong procedures, not for reaching the wrong result," see Heck, 512 U. S., at 482­483, and if that proce- dural defect did not "necessarily imply the invalidity of" the revocation, see id., at 487, then Heck would have no applica- tion all. See also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U. S. 641, 645­649 (1997); id., at 649­650 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Secondly, petitioner argues in his reply brief that this case falls within the exception to the mootness doctrine for cases that are "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Reply Brief for Petitioner 5. "[T]he capable-of-repetition doctrine applies only in exceptional situations," Lyons, supra, at 109, "where the following two circumstances [are] simultaneously present: ` "(1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same com- plaining party [will] be subject to the same action again," ' " Lewis, 494 U. S., at 481 (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U. S. 478, 482 (1982) (per curiam), in turn quoting Weinstein v. has spent six of the last seven years in custody on three separate felony convictions, surely it is also produced by the criminal misdemeanor convic- tion of a model citizen. Perhaps for obvious reasons, the damage to repu- tation upon which the dissent would rest its judgment has not been as- serted before us by petitioner himself. 523US1 Unit: $U30 [05-01-00 12:15:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN 18 SPENCER v. KEMNA Souter, J., concurring Bradford, 423 U. S. 147, 149 (1975) (per curiam)); see also Norman v. Reed, 502 U. S. 279, 288 (1992). Petitioner's case satisfies neither of these conditions. He has not shown (and we doubt that he could) that the time between parole revoca- tion and expiration of sentence is always so short as to evade review. Nor has he demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that he will once again be paroled and have that parole revoked. Finally, petitioner argues that, even if his case is moot, that fact should be ignored because it was caused by the dilatory tactics of the state attorney general's office and the delay of the District Court. But mootness, however it may have come about, simply deprives us of our power to act; there is nothing for us to remedy, even if we were disposed to do so. We are not in the business of pronouncing that past actions which have no demonstrable continuing effect were right or wrong. As for petitioner's concern that law enforcement officials and district judges will repeat with im- punity the mootness-producing abuse that he alleges oc- curred here: We are confident that, as a general matter, dis- trict courts will prevent dilatory tactics by the litigants and will not unduly delay their own rulings; and that, where ap- propriate, corrective mandamus will issue from the courts of appeals. * * * For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It is so ordered. Justice Souter, with whom Justice O'Connor, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, concurring. I join the Court's opinion as well as the judgment, though I do so for an added reason that the Court does not reach, but which I spoke to while concurring in a prior case. One of Spencer's arguments for finding his present interest ade- 523US1 Unit: $U30 [05-01-00 12:15:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 1 (1998) 19 Souter, J., concurring quate to support continuing standing despite his release from custody is, as he says, that he may not now press his claims of constitutional injury by action against state officers under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. He assumes that Heck v. Hum- phrey, 512 U. S. 477 (1994), held or entails that conclusion, with the result that holding his habeas claim moot would leave him without any present access to a federal forum to show the unconstitutionality of his parole revocation. If Spencer were right on this point, his argument would pro- vide a reason, whether or not dispositive, to recognize contin- uing standing to litigate his habeas claim. But he is wrong; Heck did not hold that a released prisoner in Spencer's cir- cumstances is out of court on a § 1983 claim, and for reasons explained in my Heck concurrence, it would be unsound to read either Heck or the habeas statute as requiring any such result. For all that appears here, then, Spencer is free to bring a § 1983 action, and his corresponding argument for continuing habeas standing falls accordingly. The petitioner in Heck was an inmate with a direct appeal from his conviction pending, who brought a § 1983 action for damages against state officials who were said to have acted unconstitutionally in arresting and prosecuting him. Draw- ing an analogy to the tort of malicious prosecution, we ruled that an inmate's § 1983 claim for damages was unavailable because he could not demonstrate that the underlying crimi- nal proceedings had terminated in his favor. To be sure, the majority opinion in Heck can be read to suggest that this favorable-termination requirement is an element of any § 1983 action alleging unconstitutional con- viction, whether or not leading to confinement and whether or not any confinement continued when the § 1983 action was filed. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S., at 483­484, 486­487. Indeed, although Heck did not present such facts, the major- ity acknowledged the possibility that even a released pris- oner might not be permitted to bring a § 1983 action implying 523US1 Unit: $U30 [05-01-00 12:15:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN 20 SPENCER v. KEMNA Souter, J., concurring the invalidity of a conviction or confinement without first satisfying the favorable-termination requirement. Id., at 490, n. 10. Concurring in the judgment in Heck, I suggested a differ- ent rationale for blocking an inmate's suit with a require- ment to show the favorable termination of the underlying proceedings. In the manner of Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475 (1973), I read the "general" § 1983 statute in light of the "specific" federal habeas statute, which applies only to persons "in custody," 28 U. S. C. § 2254(a), and requires them to exhaust state remedies, § 2254(b). Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S., at 497. I agreed that "the statutory scheme must be read as precluding such attacks," id., at 498, not because the favorable-termination requirement was necessarily an el- ement of the § 1983 cause of action for unconstitutional con- viction or custody, but because it was a "simple way to avoid collisions at the intersection of habeas and § 1983." Ibid. I also thought we were bound to recognize the apparent scope of § 1983 when no limitation was required for the sake of honoring some other statute or weighty policy, as in the instance of habeas. Accordingly, I thought it important to read the Court's Heck opinion as subjecting only inmates seeking § 1983 damages for unconstitutional conviction or confinement to "a requirement analogous to the malicious- prosecution tort's favorable-termination requirement," id., at 500, lest the plain breadth of § 1983 be unjustifiably limited at the expense of persons not "in custody" within the mean- ing of the habeas statute. The subsequent case of Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U. S. 641 (1997), was, like Heck itself, a suit by a prisoner and so for present purposes left the law where it was after Heck. Now, as then, we are forced to recognize that any application of the favorable-termination require- ment to § 1983 suits brought by plaintiffs not in custody would produce a patent anomaly: a given claim for relief from unconstitutional injury would be placed beyond the scope of 523US1 Unit: $U30 [05-01-00 12:15:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 1 (1998) 21 Ginsburg, J., concurring § 1983 if brought by a convict free of custody (as, in this case, following service of a full term of imprisonment), when ex- actly the same claim could be redressed if brought by a for- mer prisoner who had succeeded in cutting his custody short through habeas.* The better view, then, is that a former prisoner, no longer "in custody," may bring a § 1983 action establishing the un- constitutionality of a conviction or confinement without being bound to satisfy a favorable-termination requirement that it would be impossible as a matter of law for him to satisfy. Thus, the answer to Spencer's argument that his habeas claim cannot be moot because Heck bars him from relief under § 1983 is that Heck has no such effect. After a prisoner's release from custody, the habeas statute and its exhaustion requirement have nothing to do with his right to any relief. Justice Ginsburg, concurring. The Court held in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477 (1994), that a state prisoner may not maintain an action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 if the direct or indirect effect of granting relief would be to invalidate the state sentence he is serving. I joined the Court's opinion in Heck. Mindful of "real-life ex- ample[s]," among them this case, cf. 512 U. S., at 490, n. 10, I have come to agree with Justice Souter's reasoning: Indi- viduals without recourse to the habeas statute because they are not "in custody" (people merely fined or whose sentences have been fully served, for example) fit within § 1983's "broad reach." See id., at 503 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment); cf. Henslee v. Union Planters Nat. Bank & Trust *The convict given a fine alone, however onerous, or sentenced to a term too short to permit even expeditious litigation without continuances before expiration of the sentence, would always be ineligible for § 1983 relief. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 500 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring in judgment). 523US1 Unit: $U30 [05-01-00 12:15:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN 22 SPENCER v. KEMNA Stevens, J., dissenting Co., 335 U. S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late."). On that under- standing of the state of the law, I join both the Court's opin- ion and Justice Souter's concurring opinion in this case. Justice Stevens, dissenting. An official determination that a person has committed a crime may cause two different kinds of injury. It may re- sult in tangible harms such as imprisonment, loss of the right to vote or to bear arms, and the risk of greater punishment if another crime is committed. It may also severely injure the person's reputation and good name. In holding that petitioner's case is moot, the Court relies heavily on our opinion in Lane v. Williams, 455 U. S. 624 (1982) (opinion of Stevens, J.). See ante, at 12­16. Lane, however, is inapposite. In Lane, the respondents did not seek to challenge the factual findings underlying their parole revocations. 455 U. S., at 633. Instead, they simply sought to challenge their sentences; yet because they had been re- leased by the time the case reached us, the case was moot. Id., at 631. "Through the mere passage of time, respondents ha[d] obtained all the relief that they sought." Id., at 633. In this case, petitioner challenges the factual findings on which his parole revocation was based. His parole was re- voked based on an official determination that he committed the crime of forcible rape.1 Assuming, as the Court does, 1 Throughout the parole revocation proceedings, it was alleged that peti- tioner violated three parole conditions: Parole Condition #1, because he allegedly was guilty of rape; Parole Condition #6, because he allegedly used or possessed crack cocaine; and Parole Condition #7, because he alleg- edly used or possessed a dangerous weapon (i. e., the screwdriver alleg- edly used during the rape). App. 60­64 (alleging violations of Conditions #1, #6, and #7); id., at 72­76 (same); id., at 112­114 (alleging violations of Conditions #1 and #6). Thus, when the parole revocation board declared, "after careful consideration of evidence presented," that petitioner vio- 523US1 Unit: $U30 [05-01-00 12:15:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 1 (1998) 23 Stevens, J., dissenting that he had standing to bring that challenge while he re- mained in prison, the mootness question, as framed by the Court, is whether he continues to have " `a "personal stake in the outcome" of the lawsuit' " that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Ante, at 7.2 Given the serious character of a finding that petitioner is guilty of forcible rape, that question must be answered af- firmatively. It may well be true that many prisoners have already caused so many self-inflicted wounds to their good names that an additional finding of guilt may have only a de minimis impact on their reputations. I do not believe, however, that one can say that about a finding that an indi- vidual has committed a serious felony.3 Moreover, even if one may question the wisdom of providing a statutory rem- edy to redress such an injury, I surely cannot accept the view lated Parole Conditions #1, #6, and #7, id., at 55­56, it found that petitioner was guilty of forcible rape. See also Brief for Respondents 1 ("Spencer violated condition #1 by committing the crime of rape"). In addition, even apart from the rape finding, it is undisputed that the board found that petitioner used or possessed drugs, and that he used or possessed a dan- gerous weapon (which was only alleged to have been used during the rape). App. 55­56. 2 The "personal stake in the outcome" formulation of the test, which has been repeatedly quoted in our cases, was first articulated in this excerpt from the Court opinion in Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962): "Have the appellants alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the con- troversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the pres- entation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions? This is the gist of the question of standing." 3 See, e. g., Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F. 2d 1563, 1568 (CADC 1984) (opinion of Scalia, J.) ("It is shameful that Benedict Arnold was a traitor; but he was not a shoplifter to boot, and one should not have been able to make that charge while knowing its falsity with impunity. . . . Even the public outcast's remaining good reputation, limited in scope though it may be, is not inconsequential"), vacated and remanded, on other grounds, 477 U. S. 242 (1986). 523US1 Unit: $U30 [05-01-00 12:15:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN 24 SPENCER v. KEMNA Stevens, J., dissenting that an interest in vindicating one's reputation is constitu- tionally insufficient 4 to qualify as a "personal stake in the outcome." 5 Indeed, in light of the fact that we have held 4 While an individual may not have a "property" or "liberty" interest in his or her reputation so as to trigger due process protections, Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693, 712 (1976), that question is obviously distinct from whether an interest in one's reputation is sufficient to defeat a claim of mootness. 5 As we have stated: "[T]he individual's right to the protection of his own good name `reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.' " Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 341 (1974) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U. S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stew- art, J., concurring)); see also Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U. S. 1, 12 (1990) (" `[H]e that filches from me my good name/Robs me of that which not enriches him, And makes me poor indeed' " (quoting W. Shake- speare, Othello, act III, sc. 3)); Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S., at 706 ("The Court has recognized the serious damage that could be inflicted by branding a government employee as `disloyal,' and thereby stigmatizing his good name"); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433, 437 (1971) (emphasiz- ing the importance of "a person's good name, reputation, honor, [and] in- tegrity"; holding that respondent was entitled to due process before no- tices were posted stating that he was prohibited from buying or receiving alcohol); In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 363­364 (1970) ("[B]ecause of the certainty that [one found guilty of criminal behavior] would be stigmatized by the conviction . . . , a society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt"); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 190­191 (1952) ("There can be no dispute about the conse- quences visited upon a person excluded from public employment on disloy- alty grounds. In the view of the community, the stain is a deep one; indeed, it has become a badge of infamy"). Indeed, vindicating one's reputation is the main interest at stake in a defamation case, and that interest has always been held to constitute a sufficient "personal stake." See, e. g., Paul, 424 U. S., at 697 ("[R]espond- ent's complaint would appear to state a classical claim for defamation actionable in the courts of virtually every State. Imputing criminal be- havior to an individual is generally considered defamatory per se, and actionable without proof of special damages"); Gertz, 418 U. S., at 349­350 ("We need not define `actual injury' . . . . Suffice it to say that actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the more customary 523US1 Unit: $U30 [05-01-00 12:15:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 1 (1998) 25 Stevens, J., dissenting that an interest in one's reputation is sufficient to confer standing,6 it necessarily follows that such an interest is suf- ficient to defeat a claim of mootness.7 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.8 types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering"); L. Eldredge, Law of Defamation § 53, pp. 293­294 (1978) ("There is no doubt about the historical fact that the interest in one's good name was considered an important interest requir- ing legal protection more than a thousand years ago; and that so far as Anglo-Saxon history is concerned this interest became a legally protected interest comparatively soon after the interest in bodily integrity was given legal protection"). 6 Meese v. Keene, 481 U. S. 465, 472­477 (1987). 7 There are compelling reasons for a court to consider petitioner's chal- lenge to the parole board's findings sooner rather than later. As we stated in a related context: "The question of the validity of a criminal conviction can arise in many contexts, and the sooner the issue is fully litigated the better for all con- cerned. It is always preferable to litigate a matter when it is directly and principally in dispute, rather than in a proceeding where it is collateral to the central controversy. Moreover, litigation is better conducted when the dispute is fresh and additional facts may, if necessary, be taken without a substantial risk that witnesses will die or memories fade. And it is far better to eliminate the source of a potential legal disability than to require the citizen to suffer the possibly unjustified consequences of the disability itself for an indefinite period of time before he can secure adjudication of the State's right to impose it on the basis of some past action." Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 56­57 (1968) (citation omitted). I also believe that, on the facts of this case, there are sufficient tangible consequences to the parole board's findings so as to defeat a claim of mootness. 8 Given the Court's holding that petitioner does not have a remedy under the habeas statute, it is perfectly clear, as Justice Souter explains, that he may bring an action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. 523US1 Unit: $U31 [04-29-00 19:51:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 26 OCTOBER TERM, 1997 Syllabus LEXECON INC. et al. v. MILBERG WEISS BERSHAD HYNES & LERACH et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 96­1482. Argued November 10, 1997-Decided March 3, 1998 Petitioners, a law and economics consulting firm and one of its principals (collectively, Lexecon), were defendants in a class action brought against Charles Keating and the American Continental Corporation in connec- tion with the failure of Lincoln Savings and Loan. It and other actions arising out of that failure were transferred for pretrial proceedings to the District of Arizona under 28 U. S. C. § 1407(a), which authorizes the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to transfer civil actions with common issues of fact "to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings," but provides that the Panel "shall" remand any such action to the original district "at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings." Before the pretrial proceedings ended, the plaintiffs and Lexecon reached a "resolution," and the claims against Lexecon were dismissed. Subsequently, Lexecon brought this diver- sity action in the Northern District of Illinois against respondent law firms (hereinafter Milberg and Cotchett), claiming several torts, in- cluding defamation, arising from the firms' conduct as counsel for the class-action plaintiffs. Milberg and Cotchett moved for, and the Panel ordered, a § 1407(a) transfer to the District of Arizona. After the remaining parties to the Lincoln Savings litigation reached a final settle- ment, Lexecon moved the Arizona District Court to refer the case back to the Panel for remand to the Northern District of Illinois. The law firms filed a countermotion requesting the Arizona District Court to invoke § 1404(a) to "transfer" the case to itself for trial. With only the defamation claim against Milberg remaining after a summary judgment ruling, the court assigned the case to itself for trial and denied Lexecon's motion to request the Panel to remand. The Ninth Circuit then denied Lexecon's petition for mandamus, refusing to vacate the self-assignment order and require remand because Lexecon would have the opportunity to obtain relief from the transfer order on direct appeal. After Milberg won a judgment on the defamation claim, Lexecon again appealed the transfer order. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the ground that permit- ting the transferee court to assign a case to itself upon completion of its pretrial work was not only consistent with the statutory language but conducive to efficiency. 523US1 Unit: $U31 [04-29-00 19:51:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 26 (1998) 27 Syllabus Held: A district court conducting pretrial proceedings pursuant to § 1407(a) has no authority to invoke § 1404(a) to assign a transferred case to itself for trial. Pp. 32­43. (a) Two sources of ostensible authority for Milberg's espousal of self- assignment authority are that the Panel has explicitly authorized such assignments in Panel Rule 14(b), which it issued in reliance on its rule- making authority; and that § 1407(a)'s limitations on a transferee court's authority to the conduct of "coordinated or consolidated" proceedings and to "pretrial proceedings" raise no obvious bar to a transferee's re- tention of a case under § 1404. Beyond this point, however, the textual pointers reverse direction, for § 1407 not only authorizes the Panel to transfer for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings, but obli- gates the Panel to remand any pending case to its originating court when, at the latest, those pretrial proceedings end. The Panel's remand instruction comes in terms of the mandatory "shall," which normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion. Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U. S. 482, 485. Reading the statute whole, this Court has to give effect to this plain command, see Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 476, even if that will reverse the longstand- ing practice under the statute and the rule, see Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 515 U. S. 291, 300. Pp. 32­37. (b) None of Milberg's additional arguments based on the statute's lan- guage and legislative history can unsettle § 1407's straightforward lan- guage imposing the Panel's responsibility to remand, which bars recog- nizing any self-assignment power in a transferee court and consequently entails the invalidity of the Panel's Rule 14(b). Pp. 37­41. (c) Milberg errs in arguing that a remedy for Lexecon can be omitted under the harmless-error doctrine. That § 1407's strict remand require- ment creates an interest too substantial to be left without a remedy is attested by a congressional judgment that no discretion is to be left to a court faced with an objection to a statutory violation. The § 1407 mandate would lose all meaning if a party who continuously objected to an uncorrected categorical violation of the mandate could obtain no re- lief at the end of the day. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U. S. 61, distin- guished. Pp. 41­43. 102 F. 3d 1524, reversed and remanded. Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, which was unanimous except insofar as Scalia, J., did not join Part II­C. Michael K. Kellogg argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Mark C. Hansen, Sean A. Lev, 523US1 Unit: $U31 [04-29-00 19:51:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 28 LEXECON INC. v. MILBERG WEISS BERSHAD HYNES & LERACH Opinion of the Court Stephen M. Shapiro, Michele L. Odorizzi, and Kenneth S. Geller. Jerold S. Solovy argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondents Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach et al. were Ronald L. Marmer, C. John Koch, Jeffrey T. Shaw, Paul M. Smith, Thomas J. Perrelli, Arthur R. Miller, and Michael Meehan. Gerald Maltz filed a brief for respondents Cotchett et al.* Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. Title 28 U. S. C. § 1407(a) authorizes the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to transfer civil actions with common issues of fact "to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings," but imposes a duty on the Panel to remand any such action to the original district "at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings." Ibid. The issue here is whether a district court conducting such "pre- trial proceedings" may invoke § 1404(a) to assign a trans- ferred case to itself for trial. We hold it has no such authority. I In 1992, petitioners, Lexecon Inc., a law and economics consulting firm, and one of its principals (collectively, Lexe- con), brought this diversity action in the Northern District of *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Regents of the University of California by Shirley M. Hufstedler, Harold J. Mc- Elhinny, and P. Martin Simpson, Jr.; and for the Washington Legal Foun- dation by Daniel J. Popeo. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Aerospace Industries Association of America, Inc., by Thomas J. McLaughlin and Mac S. Dunaway; for the American Council of Life Insurance et al. by Theodore B. Olson, Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Phillip E. Stano, Craig Berrington, and Phillip Schwartz; for Eli Lilly and Co. by Charles E. Lipsey; for Owens-Illinois, Inc., by James D. Miller; and for Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. et al. by Joseph T. McLaughlin and Monroe Sonnenborn. Justice Scalia joins this opinion, except as to Part II­C. 523US1 Unit: $U31 [04-29-00 19:51:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 26 (1998) 29 Opinion of the Court Illinois against respondents, the law firms of Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach (Milberg) and Cotchett, Illston & Pitre (Cotchett), claiming malicious prosecution, abuse of process, tortious interference, commercial disparagement, and defamation. The suit arose out of the firms' conduct as counsel in a prior class action brought against Charles Keat- ing and the American Continental Corporation for violations of the securities and racketeering laws. Lexecon also was a defendant, charged with giving federal and state banking regulators inaccurate and misleading reports about the fi- nancial condition of the American Continental Corporation and its subsidiary Lincoln Savings and Loan. Along with other actions arising out of the failure of Lincoln Savings, the case against Lexecon was transferred under § 1407(a) for pretrial proceedings before Judge Bilby in the District of Arizona, where the matters so consolidated were known as the Lincoln Savings litigation. Before those proceedings were over, the class-action plaintiffs and Lexecon reached what they termed a "resolution," under which the claims against Lexecon were dismissed in August 1992. Lexecon then filed this case in the Northern District of Illinois charging that the prior class action terminated in its favor when the respondent law firms' clients voluntarily dismissed their claims against Lexecon as meritless, amount- ing to nothing more, according to Lexecon, than a vendetta. When these allegations came to the attention of Judge Bilby, he issued an order stating his understanding of the terms of the resolution agreement between Lexecon and the class- action plaintiffs. 102 F. 3d 1524, 1529, and n. 2 (CA9 1996). Judge Bilby's characterization of the agreement being mark- edly at odds with the allegations in the instant action, Lexe- con appealed his order to the Ninth Circuit. Milberg, joined by Cotchett, then filed a motion under § 1407(a) with the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation seeking transfer of this case to Judge Bilby for consolidation with the Lincoln Savings litigation. Although the judge en- 523US1 Unit: $U31 [04-29-00 19:51:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 30 LEXECON INC. v. MILBERG WEISS BERSHAD HYNES & LERACH Opinion of the Court tered a recusal because of the order he had taken it upon himself to issue, the law firms nonetheless renewed their motion for a § 1407(a) transfer. The Panel ordered a transfer in early June 1993 and as- signed the case to Judge Roll, noting that Lexecon's claims "share questions of fact with an as yet unapproved settle- ment involving Touche Ross, Lexecon, Inc. and the investor plaintiffs in the Lincoln Savings investor class actions in MDL­834." App. 18. The Panel observed that "i) a mas- sive document depository is located in the District of Arizona and ii) the Ninth Circuit has before it an appeal of an order [describing the terms of Lexecon's dismissal from the Lin- coln Savings litigation] in MDL­834 which may be relevant to the Lexecon claims." Ibid. Prior to any dispositive ac- tion on Lexecon's instant claims in the District of Arizona, the Ninth Circuit appeal mentioned by the Panel was dis- missed, and the document depository was closed down. In November 1993, Judge Roll dismissed Lexecon's state- law malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims, apply- ing a "heightened pleading standard," 845 F. Supp. 1377, 1383 (Ariz. 1993). Although the law firms then moved for sum- mary judgment on the claims remaining, the judge deferred action pending completion of discovery, during which time the remaining parties to the Lincoln Savings litigation reached a final settlement, on which judgment was entered in March 1994. In August 1994, Lexecon moved that the District Court refer the case back to the Panel for remand to the Northern District of Illinois, thus heeding the point of Multidistrict Litigation Rule 14(d), which provides that "[t]he Panel is re- luctant to order remand absent a suggestion of remand from the transferee district court." The law firms opposed a re- mand because discovery was still incomplete and filed a coun- termotion under § 1404(a) requesting the District of Arizona to "transfer" the case to itself for trial. Judge Roll deferred decision on these motions as well. 523US1 Unit: $U31 [04-29-00 19:51:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 26 (1998) 31 Opinion of the Court In November 1994, Lexecon again asked the District Court to request the Panel to remand the case to the North- ern District of Illinois. Again the law firms objected and requested a § 1404 transfer, and Judge Roll deferred ruling once more. On April 24, 1995, however, he granted sum- mary judgment in favor of the law firms on all remaining claims except one in defamation brought against Milberg, and at the same time he dismissed Milberg's counterclaims. 884 F. Supp. 1388, 1397 (Ariz. 1995). Cotchett then made a request for judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Lexecon objected to the exercise of Rule 54(b) discre- tion, but did not contest the authority of the District Court in Arizona to enter a final judgment in Cotchett's favor. On June 7, 1995, the court granted respondent Cotchett's Rule 54(b) request. In the meantime, the Arizona court had granted the law firms' § 1404(a) motions to assign the case to itself for trial, and simultaneously had denied Lexecon's motions to request the Panel to remand under § 1407(a). Lexecon sought imme- diate review of these last two rulings by filing a petition for mandamus in the Ninth Circuit. After argument, a major- ity of the Circuit panel, over the dissent of Judge Kozinski, denied Lexecon's requests to vacate the self-assignment order and require remand to the Northern District of Illi- nois. The Circuit so ruled even though the majority was "not prepared to say that [Lexecon's] contentions lack merit" and went so far as to note the conflict between "what appears to be a clear statutory mandate [of § 1407 and § 1404]" and Multidistrict Litigation Rule 14(b), which explicitly author- izes a transferee court to assign an action to itself for trial. Lexecon v. Milberg Weiss, No. 95­70380 (CA9, July 21, 1995), p. 4. The majority simply left that issue for another day, relying on its assumption that Lexecon would have an oppor- tunity to obtain relief from the transfer order on direct ap- peal: "[t]he transfer order can be appealed immediately along 523US1 Unit: $U31 [04-29-00 19:51:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 32 LEXECON INC. v. MILBERG WEISS BERSHAD HYNES & LERACH Opinion of the Court with other issues in the event the petitioners lose on the merits [at trial]." Id., at p. 3. Trial on the surviving defamation claim then went forward in the District of Arizona, ending in judgment for Milberg, from which Lexecon appealed to the Ninth Circuit. It again appealed the denial of its motion for a suggestion that the Panel remand the matter to the Northern District of Illinois, and it challenged the dismissal of its claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process, and the entry of final judg- ment in favor of Cotchett. Lexecon took no exception to the Arizona court's jurisdiction (as distinct from venue) and pursued no claim of error in the conduct of the trial. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, relying on the Panel's Rule 14 and appellate and District Court deci- sions in support of the District Court's refusal to support remand under § 1407(a) and its decision to assign the case to itself under § 1404(a). 102 F. 3d, at 1532­1535. While the majority indicated that permitting the transferee court to assign a case to itself upon completion of its pretrial work was not only consistent with the statutory language but con- ducive to efficiency, Judge Kozinski again dissented, relying on the texts of §§ 1407(a) and 1404(a) and a presumption in favor of a plaintiff's choice of forum. We granted certiorari, 520 U. S. 1227 (1997), to decide whether § 1407(a) does permit a transferee court to entertain a § 1404(a) transfer motion to keep the case for trial. II A In defending the Ninth Circuit majority, Milberg may claim ostensible support from two quarters. First, the Panel has itself sanctioned such assignments in a rule issued in reliance on its rulemaking authority under 28 U. S. C. § 1407(f). The Panel's Rule 14(b) provides that "[e]ach transferred action that has not been terminated in the trans- feree district court shall be remanded by the Panel to the 523US1 Unit: $U31 [04-29-00 19:51:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 26 (1998) 33 Opinion of the Court transferor district for trial, unless ordered transferred by the transferee judge to the transferee or other district under 28 U. S. C. § 1404(a) or 28 U. S. C. § 1406." Thus, out of the 39,228 cases transferred under § 1407 and terminated as of September 30, 1995, 279 of the 3,787 ultimately requir- ing trial were retained by the courts to which the Panel had transferred them. Administrative Office of the United States, L. Mecham, Judicial Business of the United States Courts: 1995 Report of the Director 32. Although the Pan- el's rule and the practice of self-assignment have not gone without challenge, see, e. g., 15 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3866, p. 619 (2d ed. 1986) (hereinafter Wright, Miller, & Cooper); Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 779, 809 (1985); Levy, Complex Multidistrict Litigation and the Federal Courts, 40 Ford. L. Rev. 41, 64­65 (1972), federal courts have treated such transfers with approval, be- ginning with the Second Circuit's decision in Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F. 2d 122, 124­125 (1971) (per curiam) (upholding MDL Rule 15(d), the precursor to Rule 14(b)). See, e. g., In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 685 F. 2d 810, 820, and n. 7 (CA3 1982); In re Air Crash Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport, 737 F. Supp. 391, 393­394 (ED Mich. 1989); In re Viatron Computer Sys. Corp., 86 F. R. D. 431, 432 (Mass. 1980). The second source of ostensible authority for Milberg's espousal of the self-assignment power here is a portion of text of the multidistrict litigation statute itself: "When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings." 28 U. S. C. § 1407(a). Although the statute limits a transferee court's authority to the conduct of "coordinated or consolidated" proceedings and 523US1 Unit: $U31 [04-29-00 19:51:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 34 LEXECON INC. v. MILBERG WEISS BERSHAD HYNES & LERACH Opinion of the Court to those that are "pretrial," these limitations alone raise no obvious bar to a transferee's retention of a case under § 1404. If "consolidated" proceedings alone were authorized, there would be an argument that self-assignment of one or some cases out of many was not contemplated, but because the proceedings need only be "coordinated," no such narrow limi- tation is apparent. While it is certainly true that the in- stant case was not "consolidated" with any other for the purpose literally of litigating identical issues on common evidence, it is fair to say that proceedings to resolve pretrial matters were "coordinated" with the conduct of earlier cases sharing the common core of the Lincoln Savings debacle, if only by being brought before judges in a district where much of the evidence was to be found and overlapping issues had been considered. Judge Bilby's recusal following his deci- sion to respond to Lexecon's Illinois pleadings may have lim- ited the prospects for coordination, but it surely did not elim- inate them. Hence, the requirement that a transferee court conduct "coordinated or consolidated" proceedings did not preclude the transferee Arizona court from ruling on a mo- tion (like the § 1404 request) that affects only one of the cases before it. Likewise, at first blush, the statutory limitation to "pre- trial" proceedings suggests no reason that a § 1407 transferor court could not entertain a § 1404(a) motion. Section 1404(a) authorizes a district court to transfer a case in the interest of justice and for the convenience of the parties and wit- nesses. See § 1404(a). Such transfer requests are typically resolved prior to discovery, see Wright, Miller, & Cooper § 3866, at 620, and thus are classic "pretrial" motions. Beyond this point, however, the textual pointers reverse direction, for § 1407 not only authorizes the Panel to transfer for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings, but ob- ligates the Panel to remand any pending case to its originat- ing court when, at the latest, those pretrial proceedings have run their course. 523US1 Unit: $U31 [04-29-00 19:51:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 26 (1998) 35 Opinion of the Court "Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial pro- ceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated." § 1407(a) (proviso without application here omitted). The Panel's instruction comes in terms of the mandatory "shall," which normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion. Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U. S. 482, 485 (1947). In the absence of any indication that there might be circumstances in which a transferred case would be neither "terminated" nor subject to the remand obligation, then, the statutory instruction stands flatly at odds with reading the phrase "coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings" so broadly as to reach its literal limits, allowing a transferee court's self-assignment to trump the provision imposing the Panel's remand duty. If we do our job of reading the statute whole, we have to give effect to this plain command, see Es- tate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 476 (1992), even if doing that will reverse the longstanding prac- tice under the statute and the rule, see Metropolitan Steve- dore Co. v. Rambo, 515 U. S. 291, 300 (1995) (" `Age is no antidote to clear inconsistency with a statute' " (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U. S. 115, 122 (1994))). As the Ninth Circuit panel majority saw it, however, the inconsistency between an expansive view of "coordinated or consolidated pretrial" proceedings and the uncompromising terms of the Panel's remand obligation disappeared as merely an apparent conflict, not a real one. The "focus" of § 1407 was said to be constituting the Panel and defining its authority, not circumscribing the powers of district courts under § 1404(a). 102 F. 3d, at 1533. Milberg presses this point in observing that § 1407(a) does not, indeed, even apply to transferee courts, being concerned solely with the Panel's duties, whereas § 1407(b), addressed to the transferee courts, says nothing about the Panel's obligation to remand. But this analysis fails to persuade, for the very reason that it 523US1 Unit: $U31 [04-29-00 19:51:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 36 LEXECON INC. v. MILBERG WEISS BERSHAD HYNES & LERACH Opinion of the Court rejects that central tenet of interpretation, that a statute is to be considered in all its parts when construing any one of them. To emphasize that § 1407(b) says nothing about the Panel's obligation when addressing a transferee court's pow- ers is simply to ignore the necessary consequence of self- assignment by a transferee court: it conclusively thwarts the Panel's capacity to obey the unconditional command of § 1407(a). A like use of blinders underlies the Circuit majority's con- clusion that the Panel was not even authorized to remand the case under its Rule 14(c), the terms of which condition the remand responsibility on a suggestion of the transferee court, a motion filed directly with the Panel, or the Panel's sua sponte decision to remand. None of these conditions was fulfilled, according to the Court of Appeals, which partic- ularly faulted Lexecon for failing to file a remand motion directly with the Panel, as distinct from the transferee court.1 This analysis, too, is unpersuasive; it just ignores the fact that the statute places an obligation on the Panel to 1 The Ninth Circuit stopped short of expressly inferring a waiver from Lexecon's failure to file a motion for remand directly with the Panel, and any inference of waiver would surely have been unsound. Although the Panel's Rule 14(c)(i) does authorize a party to file such a motion, Rule 14(d) comes close to saying that only under extraordinary circumstances will such a motion be granted without a suggestion of remand by the trans- feree court. (The Rule reads: "The Panel is reluctant to order remand absent a suggestion of remand from the transferee district court.") Therefore, even if a party may waive the § 1407 remand requirement by failing to request remand from the transferor court, see 28 U. S. C. § 1406(b), Rule 14(d) precludes an inference of waiver from mere failure to request remand from the Panel. In this case, moreover, one can say categorically that a motion before the Panel would have failed; the transferee court denied Lexecon's motion for a remand suggestion simultaneously with an order assigning the case to itself for trial, thus exercising the authority that the Panel's Rule 14(b) expressly purported to recognize. Under the Panel's own rules, in sum, Lexecon never had a chance to waive a thing. 523US1 Unit: $U31 [04-29-00 19:51:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 26 (1998) 37 Opinion of the Court remand no later than the conclusion of pretrial proceedings in the transferee court, and no exercise in rulemaking can read that obligation out of the statute. See 28 U. S. C. § 1407(f) (express requirement that rules be consistent with statute). B Milberg proffers two further arguments for overlooking the tension between a broad reading of a court's pretrial au- thority and the Panel's remand obligation. First, it relies on a subtle reading of the provision of § 1407(a) limiting the Panel's remand obligation to cases not "previously termi- nated" during the pretrial period. To be sure, this excep- tion to the Panel's remand obligation indicates that the Panel is not meant to issue ceremonial remand orders in cases al- ready concluded by summary judgment, say, or dismissal. But according to Milberg, the imperative to remand is also inapplicable to cases self-assigned under § 1404, because the self-assignment "terminates" the case insofar as its venue depends on § 1407. When the § 1407 character of the action disappears, Milberg argues, the strictures of § 1407 fall away as well, relieving the Panel of any further duty in the case. The trouble with this creative argument, though, is that the statute manifests no such subtlety. Section 1407(a) speaks not in terms of imbuing transferred actions with some new and distinctive venue character, but simply in terms of "civil actions" or "actions." It says that such an action, not its acquired personality, must be terminated before the Panel is excused from ordering remand. The language is straight- forward, and with a straightforward application ready to hand, statutory interpretation has no business getting metaphysical. Second, Milberg tries to draw an inference in its favor from the one subsection of § 1407 that does authorize the Panel to transfer a case for trial as well as pretrial proceed- ings. Subsection (h) provides that, 523US1 Unit: $U31 [04-29-00 19:51:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 38 LEXECON INC. v. MILBERG WEISS BERSHAD HYNES & LERACH Opinion of the Court "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 1404 or sub- section (f) of this section, the judicial panel on multi- district litigation may consolidate and transfer with or without the consent of the parties, for both pretrial pur- poses and for trial, any action brought under section 4C of the Clayton Act." Milberg fastens on the introductory language explicitly over- riding the "provisions of section 1404 or subsection (f)," which would otherwise, respectively, limit a district court to transferring a case "to any other district or division where it might have been brought," § 1404(a), and limit the Panel to prescribing rules "not inconsistent with Acts of Congress," § 1407(f). On Milberg's reasoning, these overrides are re- quired because the cited provisions would otherwise conflict with the remainder of subsection (h) authorizing the Panel to order trial of certain Clayton Act cases in the transferee court. The argument then runs that since there is no over- ride of subsection (a) of § 1407, subsection (a) must be con- sistent with a transfer for trial as well as pretrial matters. This reasoning is fallacious, however. Subsections (a) and (h) are independent sources of transfer authority in the Panel; each is apparently written to stand on its own feet. Subsection (h) need not exclude the application of subsection (a), because nothing in (a) would by its terms limit any provi- sion of (h). Subsection (h) is not merely valueless to Milberg, however; it is ammunition for Lexecon. For the one point that sub- section (h) does demonstrate is that Congress knew how to distinguish between trial assignments and pretrial proceed- ings in cases subject to § 1407. Although the enactment of subsection (a), Act of Apr. 29, 1968, 82 Stat. 109, preceded the enactment of subsection (h), Act of Sept. 30, 1976, § 303, 90 Stat. 1394, 1396, the fact that the later section dis- tinguishes trial assignments from pretrial proceedings generally is certainly some confirmation for our conclu- sion, on independent grounds, that the subjects of pretrial 523US1 Unit: $U31 [04-29-00 19:51:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 26 (1998) 39 Opinion of the Court proceedings in subsections (a) and (b) do not include self- assignment orders.2 C There is, finally, nothing left of Milberg's position beyond an appeal to legislative history, some of which turns out to ignore the question before us, and some of which may sup- port Lexecon. Milberg cites a House Report on the bill that became § 1407, which addresses the question of trial transfer in multidistrict litigation cases by saying that, "[o]f course, 28 U. S. C. 1404, providing for changes of venue generally, is available in those instances where transfer of a case for all purposes is desirable." H. R. Rep. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4 (1968) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.), cited in Brief for Respondents Milberg et al. 25. But the question is not whether a change of venue may be ordered in a case consoli- dated under § 1407(a); on any view of § 1407(a), if an order may be made under § 1404(a),3 it may be made after remand of the case to the originating district court. The relevant question for our purposes is whether a transferee court, and not a transferor court, may grant such a motion, and on this point, the language cited by Milberg provides no guidance. If it has anything to say to us here, the legislative history tends to confirm that self-assignment is beyond the scope of the transferee court's authority. The same House Report that spoke of the continued vitality of § 1404 in § 1407 cases also said this: 2 It is well to note the limitations of a related argument. It may be tempting to say that the incompatibility of a self-assignment under § 1404(a) with the Panel's mandate is confirmed by the authority of a trans- feror court to assign a case to a § 1407(a) transferee district for trial if that would be appropriate following pretrial proceedings under § 1407(a). But there is one circumstance in which a transferor court would be unable to do that. As noted, transfers under § 1407 are not limited by general venue statutes; those under § 1404 are. 3 See n. 2, supra. 523US1 Unit: $U31 [04-29-00 19:51:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 40 LEXECON INC. v. MILBERG WEISS BERSHAD HYNES & LERACH Opinion of the Court "The proposed statute affects only the pretrial stages in multidistrict litigation. It would not affect the place of trial in any case or exclude the possibility of transfer under other Federal statutes. . . . . . "The subsection requires that transferred cases be re- manded to the originating district at the close of coordi- nated pretrial proceedings. The bill does not, there- fore, include the trial of cases in the consolidated proceedings." H. R. Rep., at 3­4. The comments of the bill's sponsors further suggest that application of § 1407 (before the addition of subsection (h)) would not affect the place of trial. See, e. g., Multidistrict Litigation: Hearings on S. 3815 and S. 159 before the Sub- committee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, p. 110 (1967) (Sen. Tydings) ("[W]hen the deposition and dis- covery is completed, then the original litigation is remanded to the transferor district for the trial"). Both the House and the Senate Reports stated that Congress would have to amend the statute if it determined that multidistrict litiga- tion cases should be consolidated for trial. S. Rep. No. 454, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 5 (1967). D In sum, none of the arguments raised can unsettle the straightforward language imposing the Panel's responsibil- ity to remand, which bars recognizing any self-assignment power in a transferee court and consequently entails the in- validity of the Panel's Rule 14(b). See 28 U. S. C. § 1407(f). Milberg may or may not be correct that permitting trans- feree courts to make self-assignments would be more desir- able than preserving a plaintiff's choice of venue (to the degree that § 1407(a) does so), but the proper venue for re- solving that issue remains the floor of Congress. See Am- 523US1 Unit: $U31 [04-29-00 19:51:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 26 (1998) 41 Opinion of the Court chem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U. S. 591, 628­629 (1997); Finley v. United States, 490 U. S. 545, 556 (1989).4 III The remaining question goes to the remedy, which Milberg argues may be omitted under the harmless-error doctrine. Milberg posits a distinction between a first category of cases erroneously litigated in a district in which (absent waiver) venue may never be laid under the governing statute, see Olberding v. Illinois Central R. Co., 346 U. S. 338, 340 (1953), and a second category, in which the plaintiff might originally have chosen to litigate in the trial forum to which it was unwillingly and erroneously carried, as by a transfer under § 1404. In the first, reversal is necessary; in the second, af- firmance is possible if no independent and substantial right was violated in a trial whose venue was determined by a discretionary decision. Since Lexecon could have brought suit in the Arizona district consistently with the general venue requirements of 28 U. S. C. § 1391, and since the trans- fer for trial was made on the authority of § 1404(a), Milberg argues, this case falls within the second category and should escape reversal because none of Lexecon's substantial rights was prejudicially affected, see § 2111. Assuming the dis- tinction may be drawn, however, we think this case bears closer analogy to those in the first category, in which reversal with new trial is required because venue is precluded by the governing statute. Milberg's argument assumes the only kind of statute enti- tled to respect in accordance with its uncompromising terms is a statute that categorically limits a plaintiff's initial choice of forum. But there is no apparent reason why courts 4 Because we find that the statutory language of § 1407 precludes a transferee court from granting any § 1404(a) motion, we have no need to address the question whether § 1404(a) permits self-transfer given that the statute explicitly provides for transfer only "to any other district." 28 U. S. C. § 1404(a). 523US1 Unit: $U31 [04-29-00 19:51:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN 42 LEXECON INC. v. MILBERG WEISS BERSHAD HYNES & LERACH Opinion of the Court should not be equally bound by a venue statute that just as categorically limits the authority of courts (and special pan- els) to override a plaintiff's choice. If the former statute creates interests too substantial to be denied without a rem- edy, the latter statute ought to be recognized as creating interests equally substantial. In each instance the substan- tiality of the protected interest is attested by a congressional judgment that in the circumstances described in the statute no discretion is to be left to a court faced with an objection to a statutory violation. To render relief discretionary in either instance would be to allow uncorrected defiance of a categorical congressional judgment to become its own justi- fication. Accordingly, just as we agree with Milberg that the strict limitation on venue under, say, § 1391(a) (diversity action "may . . . be brought only . . .") is sufficient to establish the substantial character of any violation, Brief for Respond- ents Milberg et al. 43 (citing Olberding, supra), the equally strict remand requirement contained in § 1407 should suffice to establish the substantial significance of any denial of a plaintiff's right to a remand once the pretrial stage has been completed. Nor is Milberg correct that our recent decision in Caterpil- lar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U. S. 61 (1996), is to the contrary.5 In 5 In its brief to this Court, Milberg suggests that any decision rejecting multidistrict litigation courts' practice of ruling on § 1404 transfer motions should be applied only prospectively under Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U. S. 97, 106­107 (1971). Because this argument was not presented below, see Brief for Milberg Defendants in No. 95­16403 et al. (CA9), or to this Court when Milberg opposed petitioners' petition for certiorari, see Brief in Opposition for Respondents Milberg et al., it is unnecessary for us to consider it here. Milberg's brief also argues that petitioners are not entitled to relief because the only claim that survived for trial should have been dismissed during pretrial proceedings. We do not address the propriety of the Dis- trict Court's decision to allow this claim to go forward; the issue falls outside the question on which we granted certiorari. See this Court's Rule 14.1(a) ("Only the questions set forth in the petition, or fairly in- cluded therein, will be considered by the Court"). 523US1 Unit: $U31 [04-29-00 19:51:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 26 (1998) 43 Opinion of the Court that case, which got no new trial, the jurisdictional defect (a lack of complete diversity) had been cured by subsequent events. While the statutory error (failure to comply with the § 1441(a) requirement that the case be fit for federal adju- dication when the removal petition is filed) "remained in the unerasable history of the case," id., at 73, in the sense that it had not been cured within the statutory period, it had otherwise been cured by the time judgment was entered. The instant case is different from that one, inasmuch as there was no continuing defiance of the congressional condition in Caterpillar, but merely an untimely compliance. It was on this understanding that we held that considerations of "fi- nality, efficiency, and economy" trumped the error, id., at 75. After Caterpillar, therefore, since removal is permissible only where original jurisdiction exists at the time of removal or at the time of the entry of final judgment, the condition contained in the removal statute retains significance. But the § 1407(a) mandate would lose all meaning if a party who continuously objected to an uncorrected categorical violation of the mandate could obtain no relief at the end of the day.6 Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. 6 Although Cotchett's request for an order of dismissal under Rule 54(b) was not granted until after the Arizona court had assigned the case to itself for trial, there is no reason to reconsider that dismissal order. It was perfectly proper as a pretrial order and, for that matter, was merely the formal reflection of the Arizona court's decision on the merits of the claims that had been resolved prior to that court's decision on the § 1404 transfer. 523us1$32Z 12-18-98 18:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT 44 OCTOBER TERM, 1997 Syllabus BOGAN et al. v. SCOTT-HARRIS certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the first circuit No. 96­1569. Argued December 3, 1997-Decided March 3, 1998 Respondent Scott-Harris filed suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against the city of Fall River, Massachusetts, petitioners Bogan (the city's mayor) and Roderick (the vice president of the city council), and other officials, al- leging that the elimination of the city department in which Scott-Harris was the sole employee was motivated by racial animus and a desire to retaliate against her for exercising her First Amendment rights in filing a complaint against another city employee. The District Court twice denied petitioners' motions to dismiss on the ground of absolute immu- nity from suit. The jury returned a verdict in favor of all defendants on the racial discrimination charge, but found the city and petitioners liable on respondent's First Amendment claim. The First Circuit set aside the verdict against the city but affirmed the judgments against Roderick and Bogan. Although concluding that petitioners have abso- lute immunity from civil liability for damages arising out of their per- formance of legitimate legislative activities, that court held that their conduct in introducing, voting for, and signing the ordinance that elimi- nated respondent's office was not "legislative." Relying on the jury's finding that respondent's constitutionally sheltered speech was a sub- stantial or motivating factor underlying petitioners' conduct, the court reasoned that the conduct was administrative, rather than legislative, because Roderick and Bogan relied on facts relating to a particular indi- vidual, respondent, in the decisionmaking calculus. Held:1. Local legislators are entitled to the same absolute immunity from civil liability under § 1983 for their legislative activities as has long been accorded to federal, state, and regional legislators. See, e. g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 372, 372­376; Amy v. Supervisors, 11 Wall. 136, 138, distinguished. Such immunity finds pervasive support not only in common-law cases and older treatises, but also in reason. See Tenney, 341 U. S., at 376. The rationales for according absolute immu- nity to federal, state, and regional legislators apply with equal force to local legislators. Regardless of the level of government, the exercise of legislative discretion should not be inhibited by judicial interference or distorted by the fear of personal liability. See, e. g., id., at 377. Fur- thermore, the time and energy required to defend against a lawsuit are 523us1$32Z 12-18-98 18:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 523 U. S. 44 (1998) 45 Syllabus of particular concern at the local level, where the part-time citizen- legislator remains commonplace. See ibid. And the threat of liability may significantly deter service in local government, where prestige and pecuniary rewards may pale in comparison to the threat of civil liabil- ity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 827 (Burger, C. J., dissent- ing). Moreover, certain deterrents to legislative abuse may be greater at the local level than at other levels of government, including the avail- ability of municipal liability for constitutional violations, e. g., Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 405, n. 29, and the ultimate check on legislative abuse, the elec- toral process, cf. Tenney, supra, at 378. Indeed, any argument that the rationale for absolute immunity does not extend to local legislators is implicitly foreclosed by Lake Country Estates, supra, at 401­402. Pp. 48­54. 2. Petitioners' actions in this case were protected by absolute immu- nity, which attaches to all acts taken "in the sphere of legitimate legisla- tive activity." Tenney, 341 U. S., at 376. The First Circuit erroneously relied on petitioners' subjective intent in resolving whether their acts so qualified. Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act itself, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it. Id., at 370, 377. This Court has little trouble concluding that, stripped of all considerations of intent and motive, petitioners' actions were legislative. Most evidently, petitioner Roderick's acts of voting for the ordinance eliminating respondent's office were, in form, quintes- sentially legislative. Petitioner Bogan's introduction of a budget that proposed the elimination of city jobs and his signing the ordinance into law also were formally legislative, even though he was an executive official. Officials outside the legislative branch are entitled to legisla- tive immunity when they perform legislative functions, see Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U. S. 719, 731­334; Bogan's actions were legislative because they were integral steps in the legislative process. Cf., e. g., Edwards v. United States, 286 U. S. 482, 490. Furthermore, this particular ordinance, in substance, bore all the hallmarks of traditional legislation: It reflected a discretion- ary, policymaking decision implicating the city's budgetary priorities and its services to constituents; it involved the termination of a position, which, unlike the hiring or firing of a particular employee, may have prospective implications that reach well beyond the particular occupant of the office; and, in eliminating respondent's office, it governed in a field where legislators traditionally have power to act, Tenney, supra, at 379. Pp. 54­56. 134 F. 3d 427, reversed. 523us1$32Z 12-18-98 18:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT 46 BOGAN v. SCOTT-HARRIS Opinion of the Court Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Charles Rothfeld argued the cause for petitioners. On the briefs were Thomas E. Shirley, Bruce A. Assad, and Robert J. Marchand. Harvey A. Schwartz argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Siobhan M. Sweeney and Eric Schnapper.* Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. It is well established that federal, state, and regional legis- lators are entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability for their legislative activities. In this case, petitioners argue that they, as local officials performing legislative func- tions, are entitled to the same protection. They further argue that their acts of introducing, voting for, and signing an ordinance eliminating the government office held by re- spondent constituted legislative activities. We agree on both counts and therefore reverse the judgment below. I Respondent Janet Scott-Harris was administrator of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for the city of Fall River, Massachusetts, from 1987 to 1991. In 1990, respondent received a complaint that Dorothy Bilt- cliffe, an employee serving temporarily under her supervi- sion, had made repeated racial and ethnic slurs about her colleagues. After respondent prepared termination charges against Biltcliffe, Biltcliffe used her political connections to press her case with several state and local officials, including *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the City of Fall River, Massachusetts, by Thomas F. McGuire, Jr., and Mary E. O'Neil; for the Massachusetts Municipal Association et al. by George J. Leontire; and for the National League of Cities et al. by Richard Ruda and Charles Rothfeld. 523us1$32N 12-18-98 18:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 523 U. S. 44 (1998) 47 Opinion of the Court petitioner Marilyn Roderick, the vice president of the Fall River City Council. The city council held a hearing on the charges against Biltcliffe and ultimately accepted a settle- ment proposal under which Biltcliffe would be suspended without pay for 60 days. Petitioner Daniel Bogan, the mayor of Fall River, thereafter substantially reduced the punishment. While the charges against Biltcliffe were pending, Mayor Bogan prepared his budget proposal for the 1992 fiscal year. Anticipating a 5 to 10 percent reduction in state aid, Bogan proposed freezing the salaries of all municipal employees and eliminating 135 city positions. As part of this package, Bogan called for the elimination of DHHS, of which respond- ent was the sole employee. The city council ordinance committee, which was chaired by Roderick, approved an ordinance eliminating DHHS. The city council thereafter adopted the ordinance by a vote of 6 to 2, with petitioner Roderick among those voting in favor. Bogan signed the ordinance into law. Respondent then filed suit under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, against the city, Bogan, Roderick, and several other city officials. She alleged that the elimination of her position was motivated by racial animus and a desire to re- taliate against her for exercising her First Amendment rights in filing the complaint against Biltcliffe. The District Court denied Bogan's and Roderick's motions to dismiss on the ground of legislative immunity, and the case pro- ceeded to trial. Scott-Harris v. City of Fall River, et al., Civ. 91­12057­PBS (Mass., Jan. 27, 1995), App. to Pet. for Cert. 1. The jury returned a verdict in favor of all defendants on the racial discrimination charge, but found the city, Bogan, and Roderick liable on respondent's First Amendment claim, concluding that respondent's constitutionally protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the elimina- 523us1$32N 12-18-98 18:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT 48 BOGAN v. SCOTT-HARRIS Opinion of the Court tion of her position.1 On a motion for judgment notwith- standing the verdict, the District Court again denied Bogan's and Roderick's claims of absolute legislative immunity, rea- soning that "the ordinance amendment passed by the city council was an individually-targeted administrative act, rather than a neutral, legislative elimination of a position which incidentally resulted in the termination of plaintiff." Id., at 20. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit set aside the verdict against the city but affirmed the judg- ments against Roderick and Bogan. Scott-Harris v. Fall River, 134 F. 3d 427 (1997).2 Although the court concluded that petitioners have "absolute immunity from civil liability for damages arising out of their performance of legitimate legislative activities," id., at 440, it held that their challenged conduct was not "legislative," id., at 441. Relying on the jury's finding that "constitutionally sheltered speech was a substantial or motivating factor" underlying petitioners' con- duct, the court reasoned that the conduct was administra- tive, rather than legislative, because Roderick and Bogan "relied on facts relating to a particular individual [respond- ent] in the decisionmaking calculus." Ibid. We granted certiorari. 520 U. S. 1263 (1997). II The principle that legislators are absolutely immune from liability for their legislative activities has long been recog- nized in Anglo-American law. This privilege "has taproots 1 Respondent dropped several other defendants from the suit, and the District Court directed a verdict in favor of defendant Robert Connors, the Fall River City Administrator. Only the city, Bogan, and Roderick were appellants in the Court of Appeals, and only the latter two are peti- tioners in this Court. 2 The court held that the city was not liable because the jury could rea- sonably infer unlawful intent only as to two of the city council members, and municipal liability could not rest "on so frail a foundation." 134 F. 3d, at 440. 523us1$32N 12-18-98 18:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 523 U. S. 44 (1998) 49 Opinion of the Court in the Parliamentary struggles of the Sixteenth and Seven- teenth Centuries" and was "taken as a matter of course by those who severed the Colonies from the Crown and founded our Nation." Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 372 (1951). The Federal Constitution, the Constitutions of many of the newly independent States, and the common law thus protected legislators from liability for their legislative activi- ties. See U. S. Const., Art. I, § 6; Tenney, supra, at 372­375. Recognizing this venerable tradition, we have held that state and regional legislators are entitled to absolute immu- nity from liability under § 1983 for their legislative activities. See Tenney, supra (state legislators); Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391 (1979) (regional legislators); 3 see also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 202­204 (1881) (interpreting the federal Speech and Debate Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 6, to provide similar immunity to Members of Congress). We explained that leg- islators were entitled to absolute immunity from suit at com- mon law and that Congress did not intend the general lan- guage of § 1983 to "impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history and reason." Tenney, supra, at 376. Because the common law accorded local legislators the same absolute im- munity it accorded legislators at other levels of government, and because the rationales for such immunity are fully appli- cable to local legislators, we now hold that local legislators are likewise absolutely immune from suit under § 1983 for their legislative activities. The common law at the time § 1983 was enacted deemed local legislators to be absolutely immune from suit for their legislative activities. New York's highest court, for exam- ple, held that municipal aldermen were immune from suit for 3 The "regional" legislature in Lake Country Estates was the governing body of an agency created by a compact between two States to coordinate and regulate development in a region encompassing portions of both States. Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S., at 394. 523us1$32N 12-18-98 18:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT 50 BOGAN v. SCOTT-HARRIS Opinion of the Court their discretionary decisions. Wilson v. New York, 1 Denio 595 (1845). The court explained that when a local legislator exercises discretionary powers, he "is exempt from all re- sponsibility by action for the motives which influence him, and the manner in which such duties are performed. If cor- rupt, he may be impeached or indicted, but the law will not tolerate an action to redress the individual wrong which may have been done." Id., at 599.4 These principles, according to the court, were "too familiar and well settled to require illustration or authority." Id., at 599­600. Shortly after § 1983 was enacted, the Mississippi Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion, holding that town alder- men could not be held liable under state law for their role in the adoption of an allegedly unlawful ordinance. Jones v. Loving, 55 Miss. 109, 30 Am. Rep. 508 (1877). The court explained that "[i]t certainly cannot be argued that the mo- tives of the individual members of a legislative assembly, in voting for a particular law, can be inquired into, and its sup- porters be made personally liable, upon an allegation that they acted maliciously towards the person aggrieved by the passage of the law." Id., at 111, 30 Am. Rep., at 509. The court thus concluded that "[w]henever the officers of a munic- ipal corporation are vested with legislative powers, they hold and exercise them for the public good, and are clothed with 4 The court distinguished "discretionary" duties, which were protected absolutely, and "ministerial" duties, which were not. Although the court described the former as "judicial" in nature, it was merely using the term broadly to encompass the "discretionary" acts of officials. See 1 Denio, at 599 ("[I]f his powers are discretionary, to be exerted or withheld, accord- ing to his own view of what is necessary and proper, they are in their nature judicial"). The legislators' actions in Wilson were unquestionably legislative in both form and substance. Thus, Wilson was widely, and correctly, cited as a leading case regarding legislative immunity. See, e. g., T. Cooley, Law of Torts 377, n. 1 (1880) (hereinafter Cooley); F. Mechem, Law of Public Offices and Officers § 644, p. 431, n. 1 (1890) (here- inafter Mechem); M. Throop, Law Relating to Public Officers § 709, p. 671, n. 1 (1892). 523us1$32N 12-18-98 18:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 523 U. S. 44 (1998) 51 Opinion of the Court all the immunities of government, and are exempt from all liability for their mistaken use." Ibid. Treatises of that era confirm that this was the pervasive view. A leading treatise on municipal corporations ex- plained that "[w]here the officers of a municipal corporation are invested with legislative powers, they are exempt from individual liability for the passage of any ordinance within their authority, and their motives in reference thereto will not be inquired into." 1 J. Dillon, Law of Municipal Corpo- rations § 313, pp. 326­327 (3d ed. 1881) (emphasis in original). Thomas Cooley likewise noted in his influential treatise on the law of torts that the "rightful exemption" of legislators from liability was "very plain" and applied to members of "inferior legislative bodies, such as boards of supervisors, county commissioners, city councils, and the like." Cooley 376; see also J. Bishop, Commentaries on the Non-Contract Law § 744 (1889) (noting that municipal legislators were im- mune for their legislative functions); Mechem §§ 644­646 (same); Throop, supra n. 4, § 709, at 671 (same). Even the authorities cited by respondent are consistent with the view that local legislators were absolutely immune for their legislative, as distinct from ministerial, duties. In the few cases in which liability did attach, the courts empha- sized that the defendant officials lacked discretion, and the duties were thus ministerial. See, e. g., Morris v. The Peo- ple, 3 Denio 381, 395 (N. Y. 1846) (noting that the duty was "of a ministerial character only"); Caswell v. Allen, 7 Johns. 63, 68 (N. Y. 1810) (holding supervisors liable because the act was "mandatory" and "[n]o discretion appear[ed] to [have been] given to the supervisors"). Respondent's heavy reli- ance on our decision in Amy v. Supervisors, 11 Wall. 136 (1871), is misguided for this very reason. In that case, we held that local legislators could be held liable for violating a court order to levy a tax sufficient to pay a judgment, but only because the court order had created a ministerial duty. Id., at 138 ("The rule is well settled, that where the law re- 523us1$32N 12-18-98 18:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT 52 BOGAN v. SCOTT-HARRIS Opinion of the Court quires absolutely a ministerial act to be done by a public officer, and he neglects or refuses to do such act, he may be compelled to respond in damages to the extent of the injury arising from his conduct"). The treatises cited by respond- ent confirm that this distinction between legislative and min- isterial duties was dispositive of the right to absolute immu- nity. See, e. g., Cooley 377 (stating that local legislators may be held liable only for their "ministerial" duties); Mechem § 647 (same). Absolute immunity for local legislators under § 1983 finds support not only in history, but also in reason. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S., at 376 (stating that Congress did not intend for § 1983 to "impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history and reason"). The rationales for according abso- lute immunity to federal, state, and regional legislators apply with equal force to local legislators. Regardless of the level of government, the exercise of legislative discretion should not be inhibited by judicial interference or distorted by the fear of personal liability. See Spallone v. United States, 493 U. S. 265, 279 (1990) (noting, in the context of addressing local legislative action, that "any restriction on a legislator's freedom undermines the `public good' by interfering with the rights of the people to representation in the democratic proc- ess"); see also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S., at 201­204 (federal legislators); Tenney, supra, at 377 (state legislators); Lake Country Estates, 440 U. S., at 405 (regional legislators). Furthermore, the time and energy required to defend against a lawsuit are of particular concern at the local level, where the part-time citizen-legislator remains commonplace. See Tenney, supra, at 377 (citing "the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial"). And the threat of liability may significantly deter service in local government, where pres- tige and pecuniary rewards may pale in comparison to the threat of civil liability. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 816 (1982). 523us1$32N 12-18-98 18:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 523 U. S. 44 (1998) 53 Opinion of the Court Moreover, certain deterrents to legislative abuse may be greater at the local level than at other levels of government. Municipalities themselves can be held liable for constitu- tional violations, whereas States and the Federal Govern- ment are often protected by sovereign immunity. Lake Country Estates, supra, at 405, n. 29 (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658 (1978)). And, of course, the ultimate check on legislative abuse-the elec- toral process-applies with equal force at the local level, where legislators are often more closely responsible to the electorate. Cf. Tenney, supra, at 378 (stating that "[s]elf- discipline and the voters must be the ultimate reliance for discouraging or correcting such abuses"). Any argument that the rationale for absolute immunity does not extend to local legislators is implicitly foreclosed by our opinion in Lake Country Estates. There, we held that members of an interstate regional planning agency were entitled to absolute legislative immunity. Bereft of any his- torical antecedent to the regional agency, we relied almost exclusively on Tenney's description of the purposes of legisla- tive immunity and the importance of such immunity in ad- vancing the "public good." Although we expressly noted that local legislators were not at issue in that case, see Lake Country Estates, 440 U. S., at 404, n. 26, we considered the regional legislators at issue to be the functional equivalents of local legislators, noting that the regional agency was "comparable to a county or municipality" and that the func- tion of the regional agency, regulation of land use, was "tra- ditionally a function performed by local governments." Id., at 401­402.5 Thus, we now make explicit what was implicit 5 It is thus not surprising that several Members of this Court have rec- ognized that the rationale of Lake Country Estates essentially settled the question of immunity for local legislators. See Owen v. Independence, 445 U. S. 622, 664, n. 6 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 407­408 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting in part); see also Spallone v. United States, 493 523us1$32N 12-18-98 18:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT 54 BOGAN v. SCOTT-HARRIS Opinion of the Court in our precedents: Local legislators are entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for their legislative activities. III Absolute legislative immunity attaches to all actions taken "in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity." Tenney, supra, at 376. The Court of Appeals held that petitioners' conduct in this case was not legislative because their actions were specifically targeted at respondent. Relying on the jury's finding that respondent's constitutionally protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor behind peti- tioners' conduct, the court concluded that petitioners neces- sarily "relied on facts relating to a particular individual" and "devised an ordinance that targeted [respondent] and treated her differently from other managers employed by the City." 134 F. 3d, at 441. Although the Court of Appeals did not suggest that intent or motive can overcome an immunity de- fense for activities that are, in fact, legislative, the court erroneously relied on petitioners' subjective intent in resolv- ing the logically prior question of whether their acts were legislative. Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official per- forming it. The privilege of absolute immunity "would be of little value if [legislators] could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclu- sion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a jury's speculation as to motives." Ten- U. S. 265, 278 (1990) (explaining that the same considerations underlying Tenney and Lake Country Estates applied to contempt sanctions against local legislators). In fact, the argument for absolute immunity for local legislators may be stronger than for the regional legislators in Lake Coun- try Estates, because immunity was historically granted to local legislators and because the legislators in Lake Country Estates were unelected and thus less directly accountable to the public. See Lake Country Estates, supra, at 407 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). 523us1$32N 12-18-98 18:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 523 U. S. 44 (1998) 55 Opinion of the Court ney, 341 U. S., at 377 (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, it simply is "not consonant with our scheme of government for a court to inquire into the motives of legisla- tors." Ibid. We therefore held that the defendant in Ten- ney had acted in a legislative capacity even though he alleg- edly singled out the plaintiff for investigation in order "to intimidate and silence plaintiff and deter and prevent him from effectively exercising his constitutional rights." Id., at 371 (internal quotation marks omitted). This leaves us with the question whether, stripped of all considerations of intent and motive, petitioners' actions were legislative. We have little trouble concluding that they were. Most evidently, petitioner Roderick's acts of voting for an ordinance were, in form, quintessentially legislative. Petitioner Bogan's introduction of a budget and signing into law an ordinance also were formally legislative, even though he was an executive official. We have recognized that offi- cials outside the legislative branch are entitled to legislative immunity when they perform legislative functions, see Su- preme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U. S. 719, 731­734 (1980); Bogan's actions were leg- islative because they were integral steps in the legislative process. Cf. Edwards v. United States, 286 U. S. 482, 490 (1932) (noting "the legislative character of the President's function in approving or disapproving bills"); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355, 372­373 (1932) (recognizing that a Gov- ernor's signing or vetoing of a bill constitutes part of the legislative process). Respondent, however, asks us to look beyond petitioners' formal actions to consider whether the ordinance was legisla- tive in substance. We need not determine whether the for- mally legislative character of petitioners' actions is alone suf- ficient to entitle petitioners to legislative immunity, because here the ordinance, in substance, bore all the hallmarks of traditional legislation. The ordinance reflected a discre- tionary, policymaking decision implicating the budgetary pri- 523us1$32N 12-18-98 18:44:13 PAGES OPINPGT 56 BOGAN v. SCOTT-HARRIS Opinion of the Court orities of the city and the services the city provides to its constituents. Moreover, it involved the termination of a position, which, unlike the hiring or firing of a particular em- ployee, may have prospective implications that reach well beyond the particular occupant of the office. And the city council, in eliminating DHHS, certainly governed "in a field where legislators traditionally have power to act." Tenney, supra, at 379. Thus, petitioners' activities were undoubt- edly legislative. * * * For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.6 It is so ordered. 6 Because of our conclusion that petitioners are entitled to absolute legis- lative immunity, we need not address the third question on which we granted certiorari: whether petitioners proximately caused an injury cog- nizable under § 1983. 523US1 Unit: $U33 [04-29-00 19:53:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1997 57 Syllabus KAWAAUHAU et vir v. GEIGER certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit No. 97­115. Argued January 21, 1998-Decided March 3, 1998 When petitioner Kawaauhau sought treatment for her injured foot, re- spondent Dr. Geiger examined and hospitalized her to attend to the risk of infection. Although Geiger knew that intravenous penicillin would have been more effective, he prescribed oral penicillin, explaining in his testimony that he understood his patient wished to minimize treatment costs. Geiger then departed on a business trip, leaving Kawaauhau in the care of other physicians, who decided she should be transferred to an infectious disease specialist. When Geiger returned, he canceled the transfer and discontinued all antibiotics because he believed the infec- tion had subsided. Kawaauhau's condition deteriorated, requiring am- putation of her leg below the knee. After trial in the malpractice suit brought by Kawaauhau and her husband, the jury found Geiger liable and awarded the Kawaauhaus approximately $355,000 in damages. Geiger, who carried no malpractice insurance, moved to Missouri, where his wages were garnished by the Kawaauhaus. Geiger then petitioned for bankruptcy. The Kawaauhaus requested the Bankruptcy Court to hold the malpractice judgment nondischargeable under 11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(6), which provides that a "discharge [in bankruptcy] . . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt . . . for willful and malicious injury . . . to another." Concluding that Geiger's treatment fell far below the appropriate standard of care and therefore ranked as "willful and malicious," that court held the debt nondischargeable. The District Court affirmed, but the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that § 523(a)(6)'s exemption from discharge is confined to debts for an inten- tional tort, so that a debt for malpractice remains dischargeable because it is based on negligent or reckless conduct. Held: Because a debt arising from a medical malpractice judgment attrib- utable to negligent or reckless conduct does not fall within the § 523(a)(6) exception, the debt is dischargeable in bankruptcy. Sec- tion 523(a)(6)'s words strongly support the Eighth Circuit's reading that only acts done with the actual intent to cause injury fall within the exception's scope. The section's word "willful" modifies the word "in- jury," indicating that nondischargeability takes a deliberate or inten- tional injury, not merely, as the Kawaauhaus urge, a deliberate or inten- tional act that leads to injury. Had Congress meant to exempt debts 523US1 Unit: $U33 [04-29-00 19:53:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN 58 KAWAAUHAU v. GEIGER Syllabus resulting from unintentionally inflicted injuries, it might have described instead "willful acts that cause injury" or selected an additional word or words, i. e., "reckless" or "negligent," to modify "injury." Moreover, § 523(a)(6)'s formulation triggers in the lawyer's mind the category "in- tentional torts," which generally require that the actor intend the conse- quences of an act, not simply the act itself. The Kawaauhaus' more encompassing interpretation could place within the excepted category a wide range of situations in which an act is intentional, but injury is unintended, i. e., neither desired nor in fact anticipated by the debtor. A construction so broad would be incompatible with the well-known guide that exceptions to discharge should be confined to those plainly expressed, and would render superfluous the exemptions from discharge set forth in §§ 523(a)(9) and 523(a)(12). The Kawaauhaus rely on Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473, which held that a damages award for the tort of "criminal conversation" survived bankruptcy under the 1898 Bank- ruptcy Act's exception from discharge for judgments in civil actions for " `willful and malicious injuries.' " The Tinker opinion repeatedly rec- ognized that at common law the tort in question ranked as trespass vi et armis, akin to a master's " `action of trespass and assault . . . for the battery of his servant.' " Tinker placed criminal conversation solidly within the traditional intentional tort category, and this Court so con- fines its holding; that decision provides no warrant for departure from the current statutory instruction that, to be nondischargeable, the judg- ment debt must be "for willful and malicious injury." See, e. g., Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U. S. 328, 332. The Kawaauhaus' argu- ment that, as a policy matter, malpractice judgments should be excepted from discharge, at least when the debtor acted recklessly or carried no malpractice insurance, should be addressed to Congress. Debts aris- ing from reckless or negligently inflicted injuries do not fall within § 523(a)(6)'s compass. Pp. 60­64. 113 F. 3d 848, affirmed. Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Norman W. Pressman argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Teresa A. Generous, Ronald J. Mann, and Edward B. Greensfelder. Laura K. Grandy argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.* *Gary Klein filed a brief for the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys as amicus curiae urging affirmance. 523US1 Unit: $U33 [04-29-00 19:53:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 57 (1998) 59 Opinion of the Court Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a debt "for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another" is not dischargeable. 11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(6). The question before us is whether a debt arising from a medical malpractice judgment, attributable to negligent or reckless conduct, falls within this statutory exception. We hold that it does not and that the debt is dischargeable. I In January 1983, petitioner Margaret Kawaauhau sought treatment from respondent Dr. Paul Geiger for a foot injury. Geiger examined Kawaauhau and admitted her to the hospi- tal to attend to the risk of infection resulting from the injury. Although Geiger knew that intravenous penicillin would have been more effective, he prescribed oral penicillin, ex- plaining in his testimony that he understood his patient wished to minimize the cost of her treatment. Geiger then departed on a business trip, leaving Kawaau- hau in the care of other physicians, who decided she should be transferred to an infectious disease specialist. When Geiger returned, he canceled the transfer and discontinued all antibiotics because he believed the infection had subsided. Kawaauhau's condition deteriorated over the next few days, requiring the amputation of her right leg below the knee. Kawaauhau, joined by her husband Solomon, sued Geiger for malpractice. After a trial, the jury found Geiger liable and awarded the Kawaauhaus approximately $355,000 in damages.1 Geiger, who carried no malpractice insurance,2 1 The jury awarded Margaret Kawaauhau $203,040 in special damages and $99,000 in general damages. In re Geiger, 172 B. R. 916, 919 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Mo. 1994). In addition, the jury awarded Solomon Kawaauhau $18,000 in general damages for loss of consortium and $35,000 for emo- tional distress. Ibid. 2 Although the record is not clear on this point, it appears that Dr. Gei- ger was not required by state law to carry medical malpractice insurance. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 19. 523US1 Unit: $U33 [04-29-00 19:53:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN 60 KAWAAUHAU v. GEIGER Opinion of the Court moved to Missouri, where his wages were garnished by the Kawaauhaus. Geiger then petitioned for bankruptcy. The Kawaauhaus requested the Bankruptcy Court to hold the malpractice judgment nondischargeable on the ground that it was a debt "for willful and malicious injury" excepted from discharge by 11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(6). The Bankruptcy Court concluded that Geiger's treatment fell far below the appro- priate standard of care and therefore ranked as "willful and malicious." Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court held the debt nondischargeable. In re Geiger, 172 B. R. 916, 922­923 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Mo. 1994). In an unpublished order, the District Court affirmed. App. to Pet. for Cert. A­18 to A­22. A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, 93 F. 3d 443 (1996), and a divided en banc court adhered to the panel's position, 113 F. 3d 848 (1997) (en banc). Section 523(a)(6)'s exemption from discharge, the en banc court held, is confined to debts "based on what the law has for generations called an intentional tort." Id., at 852. On this view, a debt for malpractice, because it is based on conduct that is negligent or reckless, rather than intentional, remains dischargeable. The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that its interpretation of § 523(a)(6) diverged from previous holdings of the Sixth and Tenth Circuits. See id., at 853 (citing Perkins v. Scharffe, 817 F. 2d 392, 394 (CA6), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 853 (1987), and In re Franklin, 726 F. 2d 606, 610 (CA10 1984)). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 521 U. S. 1153 (1997), and now affirm the Eighth Circuit's judgment. II Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code provides: "(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt- 523US1 Unit: $U33 [04-29-00 19:53:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 57 (1998) 61 Opinion of the Court . . . . . "(6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity." The Kawaauhaus urge that the malpractice award fits within this exception because Dr. Geiger intentionally rendered in- adequate medical care to Margaret Kawaauhau that neces- sarily led to her injury. According to the Kawaauhaus, Gei- ger deliberately chose less effective treatment because he wanted to cut costs, all the while knowing that he was pro- viding substandard care. Such conduct, the Kawaauhaus assert, meets the "willful and malicious" specification of § 523(a)(6). We confront this pivotal question concerning the scope of the "willful and malicious injury" exception: Does § 523(a)(6)'s compass cover acts, done intentionally,3 that cause injury (as the Kawaauhaus urge), or only acts done with the actual intent to cause injury (as the Eighth Circuit ruled)? The words of the statute strongly support the Eighth Circuit's reading. The word "willful" in (a)(6) modifies the word "injury," in- dicating that nondischargeability takes a deliberate or inten- tional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury. Had Congress meant to exempt debts re- sulting from unintentionally inflicted injuries, it might have described instead "willful acts that cause injury." Or, Con- gress might have selected an additional word or words, i. e., "reckless" or "negligent," to modify "injury." Moreover, as the Eighth Circuit observed, the (a)(6) formulation triggers in the lawyer's mind the category "intentional torts," as dis- tinguished from negligent or reckless torts. Intentional torts generally require that the actor intend "the conse- 3 The word "willful" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as "volun- tary" or "intentional." Black's Law Dictionary 1434 (5th ed. 1979). Con- sistently, legislative reports note that the word "willful" in § 523(a)(6) means "deliberate or intentional." See S. Rep. No. 95­989, p. 79 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95­595, p. 365 (1977). 523US1 Unit: $U33 [04-29-00 19:53:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN 62 KAWAAUHAU v. GEIGER Opinion of the Court quences of an act," not simply "the act itself." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A, Comment a, p. 15 (1964) (emphasis added). The Kawaauhaus' more encompassing interpretation could place within the excepted category a wide range of situations in which an act is intentional, but injury is unintended, i. e., neither desired nor in fact anticipated by the debtor. Every traffic accident stemming from an initial intentional act-for example, intentionally rotating the wheel of an automobile to make a left-hand turn without first checking oncoming traffic-could fit the description. See 113 F. 3d, at 852. A "knowing breach of contract" could also qualify. See ibid. A construction so broad would be incompatible with the "well-known" guide that exceptions to discharge "should be confined to those plainly expressed." Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U. S. 558, 562 (1915). Furthermore, "we are hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a congressional enactment which renders superfluous another portion of that same law." Mackey v. Lanier Col- lection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825, 837 (1988). Reading § 523(a)(6) as the Kawaauhaus urge would obviate the need for § 523(a)(9), which specifically exempts debts "for death or personal injury caused by the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle if such operation was unlawful because the debtor was intoxicated from using alcohol, a drug, or another substance." 11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(9); see also § 523(a)(12) (ex- empting debts for "malicious or reckless failure" to fulfill cer- tain commitments owed to a federal depository institutions regulatory agency).4 The Kawaauhaus heavily rely on Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473 (1904), which presented this question: Does an award of damages for "criminal conversation" survive bank- ruptcy under the 1898 Bankruptcy Act's exception from 4 Sections 523(a)(9) and (12) were added to the Bankruptcy Code in 1984 and 1990 respectively. See Pub. L. 98­353, 98 Stat. 364 (1984), and Pub. L. 101­647, 104 Stat. 4865 (1990). 523US1 Unit: $U33 [04-29-00 19:53:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 57 (1998) 63 Opinion of the Court discharge for judgments in civil actions for " `willful and ma- licious injuries to the person or property of another' "? Id., at 480. The Tinker Court held such an award a nondis- chargeable debt. The Kawaauhaus feature certain state- ments in the Tinker opinion, in particular: "[An] act is willful . . . in the sense that it is intentional and voluntary" even if performed "without any particular malice," id., at 485; an act that "necessarily causes injury and is done intentionally, may be said to be done willfully and maliciously, so as to come within the [bankruptcy discharge] exception," id., at 487. See also id., at 486 (the statute exempts from discharge lia- bility for " `a wrongful act, done intentionally, without just cause or excuse' ") (quoting from definition of malice in Bro- mage v. Prosser, 4 Barn. & Cress. 247, 107 Eng. Rep. 1051 (K. B. 1825)). The exposition in the Tinker opinion is less than crystal- line. Counterbalancing the portions the Kawaauhaus em- phasize, the Tinker Court repeatedly observed that the tort in question qualified in the common law as trespassory. In- deed, it ranked as "trespass vi et armis." 193 U. S., at 482, 483. Criminal conversation, the Court noted, was an action akin to a master's "action of trespass and assault . . . for the battery of his servant," id., at 482. Tinker thus placed criminal conversation solidly within the traditional inten- tional tort category, and we so confine its holding. That de- cision, we clarify, provides no warrant for departure from the current statutory instruction that, to be nondischarge- able, the judgment debt must be "for willful and malicious injury." Subsequent decisions of this Court are in accord with our construction. In McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U. S. 138 (1916), a broker "deprive[d] another of his property forever by deliberately disposing of it without semblance of author- ity." Id., at 141. The Court held that this act constituted an intentional injury to property of another, bringing it within the discharge exception. But in Davis v. Aetna Ac- 523US1 Unit: $U33 [04-29-00 19:53:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN 64 KAWAAUHAU v. GEIGER Opinion of the Court ceptance Co., 293 U. S. 328 (1934), the Court explained that not every tort judgment for conversion is exempt from dis- charge. Negligent or reckless acts, the Court held, do not suffice to establish that a resulting injury is "wilful and mali- cious." See id., at 332. Finally, the Kawaauhaus maintain that, as a policy matter, malpractice judgments should be excepted from discharge, at least when the debtor acted recklessly or carried no mal- practice insurance. Congress, of course, may so decide. But unless and until Congress makes such a decision, we must follow the current direction § 523(a)(6) provides. * * * We hold that debts arising from recklessly or negligently inflicted injuries do not fall within the compass of § 523(a)(6). For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is Affirmed. 523US1 Unit: $U34 [04-29-00 19:54:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1997 65 Syllabus UNITED STATES v. RAMIREZ certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 96­1469. Argued January 13, 1998-Decided March 4, 1998 Based on a reliable confidential informant's statement that he had seen a person he believed to be Alan Shelby, a dangerous escaped prisoner, at respondent's home, and on a federal agent's subsequent observation of a man resembling Shelby outside that home, the Government obtained a "no-knock" warrant to enter and search the home. Having gathered in the early morning hours to execute the warrant, officers announced over a loud speaker system that they had a search warrant. Simultane- ously, they broke a single window in respondent's garage and pointed a gun through the opening, hoping thereby to dissuade occupants from rushing to the weapons stash the informant had told them was in the garage. Awakened by the noise and fearful that his house was being burglarized, respondent grabbed a pistol and fired it into the garage ceiling. When the officers shouted "police," respondent surrendered and was taken into custody. After he admitted that he had fired the weapon, that he owned both that gun and another in the house, and that he was a convicted felon, respondent was indicted on federal charges of being a felon in possession of firearms. The District Court granted his motion to suppress evidence regarding weapons possession, ruling that the officers had violated both the Fourth Amendment and 18 U. S. C. § 3109 because there were "insufficient exigent circumstances" to justify their destruction of property in executing the warrant. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Held:1. The Fourth Amendment does not hold officers to a higher standard when a "no-knock" entry results in the destruction of property. It is obvious from the holdings in Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U. S. 927, 934, 936, and Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U. S. 385, that such an entry's law- fulness does not depend on whether property is damaged in the course of the entry. Under Richards, a no-knock entry is justified if police have a "reasonable suspicion" that knocking and announcing their pres- ence before entering would "be dangerous or futile, or . . . inhibit the effective investigation of the crime." Id., at 394. Whether such a reasonable suspicion exists does not depend on whether police must de- stroy property in order to enter. This is not to say that the Fourth Amendment does not speak to the manner of executing a warrant. 523US1 Unit: $U34 [04-29-00 19:54:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN 66 UNITED STATES v. RAMIREZ Syllabus Such execution is governed by the general touchstone of reasonableness that applies to all Fourth Amendment analysis. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, 108­109. Excessive or unnecessary property destruction during a search may violate the Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful and the fruits of the search not subject to suppression. Applying these principles to the facts at hand demon- strates that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred. The police cer- tainly had a "reasonable suspicion" that knocking and announcing their presence might be dangerous to themselves or others, in that a reliable informant had told them that Alan Shelby might be in respondent's home, an officer had confirmed this possibility, and Shelby had a violent past and possible access to a large supply of weapons and had vowed that he "would not do federal time." Moreover, the manner in which the entry was accomplished was clearly reasonable, in that the police broke but a single window in the garage to discourage Shelby, or anyone else, from rushing to the weapons that the informant had told them were there. Pp. 70­72. 2. The officers executing the warrant did not violate § 3109, which provides: "The officer may break open any . . . window . . . to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance . . . ." Contrary to respondent's contention, that statute does not specify the only circumstances under which an officer executing a warrant may damage property. By its terms § 3109 pro- hibits nothing, but merely authorizes officers to damage property in certain instances. Even accepting, arguendo, that it implicitly forbids some of what it does not expressly permit, it is of no help to respondent. In both Miller v. United States, 357 U. S. 301, 313, and Sabbath v. United States, 391 U. S. 585, 591, n. 8, this Court noted that § 3109's prior notice requirement codified a common-law tradition. The Court now makes clear that § 3109 also codified the exceptions to the common-law re- quirement of notice before entry. Because that is the case, and because the common law informs the Fourth Amendment, Wilson and Richards serve as guideposts in construing the statute. In Wilson, the Court concluded that the common-law announcement principle is an element of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry, but noted that the principle was never stated as an inflexible rule requiring announcement under all circumstances. 514 U. S., at 934. In Richards, the Court articulated the test used to determine whether exigent circumstances justify a particular no-knock entry. 520 U. S., at 394. Thus, § 3109 in- cludes an exigent circumstances exception and that exception's applica- bility in a given instance is measured by the same standard articulated in Richards. The police met that standard here. Pp. 72­74. 91 F. 3d 1297, reversed and remanded. 523US1 Unit: $U34 [04-29-00 19:54:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 65 (1998) 67 Opinion of the Court Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. David C. Frederick argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Dep- uty Solicitor General Dreeben, and J. Douglas Wilson. Michael R. Levine argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.* Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. In Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U. S. 385, 394 (1997), we held that so-called "no-knock" entries are justified when po- lice officers have a "reasonable suspicion" that knocking and announcing their presence before entering would "be dan- gerous or futile, or . . . inhibit the effective investigation of *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. by Richard M. Weintraub, Ber- nard J. Farber, Fred E. Inbau, Wayne W. Schmidt, and James P. Manak; and for the State of Ohio et al. by Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of Ohio, Jeffrey S. Sutton, State Solicitor, and Elise Porter, Assistant At- torney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdic- tions as follows: William H. Pryor, Jr., of Alabama, Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Daniel E. Lungren of California, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert Butterworth of Florida, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, J. Joseph Cur- ran, Jr., of Maryland, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Jeremiah W. Nixon of Missouri, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Jose Fuentes Agostini of Puerto Rico, Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, Mark Barnett of South Dakota, Jan Graham of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, Richard Cullen of Virginia, and Christine O. Gregoire of Washington. John Wesley Hall, Jr., and Lisa Kemler filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging affirmance. 523US1 Unit: $U34 [04-29-00 19:54:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN 68 UNITED STATES v. RAMIREZ Opinion of the Court the crime." In this case, we must decide whether the Fourth Amendment holds officers to a higher standard than this when a "no-knock" entry results in the destruction of property. We hold that it does not. Alan Shelby was a prisoner serving concurrent state and federal sentences in the Oregon state prison system. On November 1, 1994, the Tillamook County Sheriff's Office took temporary custody of Shelby, expecting to transport him to the Tillamook County Courthouse, where he was scheduled to testify. On the way to the courthouse, Shelby slipped his handcuffs, knocked over a deputy sheriff, and escaped from custody. It was not the first time Shelby had attempted escape. In 1991 he struck an officer, kicked out a jail door, assaulted a woman, stole her vehicle, and used it to ram a police vehicle. Another time he attempted escape by using a rope made from torn bedsheets. He was reported to have made threats to kill witnesses and police officers, to have tortured people with a hammer, and to have said that he would " `not do federal time.' " App. to Pet. for Cert. 38a. It was also thought that Shelby had had access to large supplies of weapons. Shortly after learning of Shelby's escape, the authorities sent out a press release, seeking information that would lead to his recapture. On November 3, a reliable confidential informant told Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Agent George Kim that on the previous day he had seen a person he believed to be Shelby at respondent Hernan Rami- rez's home in Boring, Oregon. Kim and the informant then drove to an area near respondent's home, from where Kim observed a man working outside who resembled Shelby. Based on this information, a Deputy United States Mar- shal sought and received a "no-knock" warrant granting per- mission to enter and search Ramirez's home. Around this time, the confidential informant also told authorities that respondent might have a stash of guns and drugs hidden in 523US1 Unit: $U34 [04-29-00 19:54:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 65 (1998) 69 Opinion of the Court his garage. In the early morning of November 5, approxi- mately 45 officers gathered to execute the warrant. The of- ficers set up a portable loudspeaker system and began an- nouncing that they had a search warrant. Simultaneously, they broke a single window in the garage and pointed a gun through the opening, hoping thereby to dissuade any of the occupants from rushing to the weapons the officers believed might be in the garage. Respondent and his family were asleep inside the house at the time this activity began. Awakened by the noise, re- spondent believed that they were being burglarized. He ran to his utility closet, grabbed a pistol, and fired it into the ceiling of his garage. The officers fired back and shouted "police." At that point respondent realized that it was law enforcement officers who were trying to enter his home. He ran to the living room, threw his pistol away, and threw him- self onto the floor. Shortly thereafter, he, his wife, and their child left the house and were taken into police custody. Re- spondent waived his Miranda rights, and then admitted that he had fired the weapon, that he owned both that gun and another gun that was inside the house, and that he was a convicted felon. Officers soon obtained another search war- rant, which they used to return to the house and retrieve the two guns. Shelby was not found. Respondent was subsequently indicted for being a felon in possession of firearms. 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1). The District Court granted his motion to suppress evidence regarding his possession of the weapons, ruling that the police officers had violated both the Fourth Amendment and 18 U. S. C. § 3109 because there were "insufficient exigent circumstances" to justify the police officers' destruction of property in their execution of the warrant. App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 91 F. 3d 1297 (1996). Applying Circuit precedent, that court concluded that while a "mild exigency" is sufficient to justify a no-knock entry that can be accomplished without the de- 523US1 Unit: $U34 [04-29-00 19:54:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN 70 UNITED STATES v. RAMIREZ Opinion of the Court struction of property, " `more specific inferences of exigency are necessary' " when property is destroyed. Id., at 1301. It held that this heightened standard had not been met on the facts of this case. We granted certiorari and now re- verse. 521 U. S. 1103 (1997). In two recent cases we have considered whether and to what extent "no-knock" entries implicate the protections of the Fourth Amendment. In Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U. S. 927 (1995), we reviewed the Arkansas Supreme Court's hold- ing that the common-law requirement that police officers knock and announce their presence before entering played no role in Fourth Amendment analysis. We rejected that conclusion, and held instead that "in some circumstances an officer's unannounced entry into a home might be unreason- able under the Fourth Amendment." Id., at 934. We were careful to note, however, that there was no rigid rule requir- ing announcement in all instances, and left "to the lower courts the task of determining the circumstances under which an unannounced entry is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Id., at 934, 936. In Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U. S. 385 (1997),1 the Wis- consin Supreme Court held that police officers executing search warrants in felony drug investigations were never re- quired to knock and announce their presence. We concluded that this blanket rule was overly broad and held instead that "[i]n order to justify a `no-knock' entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dan- gerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investi- gation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence." Id., at 394. Neither of these cases explicitly addressed the question whether the lawfulness of a no-knock entry depends on whether property is damaged in the course of the entry. It 1 It should be noted that our opinion in Richards came down after the Court of Appeals issued its opinion in this case. 523US1 Unit: $U34 [04-29-00 19:54:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 65 (1998) 71 Opinion of the Court is obvious from their holdings, however, that it does not. Under Richards, a no-knock entry is justified if police have a "reasonable suspicion" that knocking and announcing would be dangerous, futile, or destructive to the purposes of the investigation. Whether such a "reasonable suspicion" exists depends in no way on whether police must destroy property in order to enter. This is not to say that the Fourth Amendment speaks not at all to the manner of executing a search warrant. The general touchstone of reasonableness which governs Fourth Amendment analysis, see Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, 108­109 (1977) (per curiam), governs the method of exe- cution of the warrant. Excessive or unnecessary destruc- tion of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful and the fruits of the search are not subject to suppression. Applying these principles to the facts at hand, we conclude that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred. A reliable confidential informant had notified the police that Alan Shelby might be inside respondent's home, and an officer had confirmed this possibility. Shelby was a prison escapee with a violent past who reportedly had access to a large supply of weapons. He had vowed that he would " `not do federal time.' " The police certainly had a "reasonable suspicion" that knocking and announcing their presence might be dan- gerous to themselves or to others.2 As for the manner in which the entry was accomplished, the police here broke a single window in respondent's garage. They did so because they wished to discourage Shelby, or any other occupant of the house, from rushing to the weap- ons that the informant had told them respondent might have 2 It is of no consequence that Shelby was not found. "[I]n determining the lawfulness of entry and the existence of probable cause we may con- cern ourselves only with what the officers had reason to believe at the time of their entry." Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 40­41, n. 12 (1963) (opinion of Clark, J.) (emphasis in original). 523US1 Unit: $U34 [04-29-00 19:54:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN 72 UNITED STATES v. RAMIREZ Opinion of the Court kept there. Their conduct was clearly reasonable and we conclude that there was no Fourth Amendment violation.3 Respondent also argues, however, that suppression is ap- propriate because the officers executing the warrant violated 18 U. S. C. § 3109. This statutory argument fares no better. Section 3109 provides: "The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant." Respondent contends that the statute specifies the only cir- cumstances under which an officer may damage property in executing a search warrant, and that it therefore forbids all other property-damaging entries. But by its terms § 3109 prohibits nothing. It merely au- thorizes officers to damage property in certain instances. Even accepting, arguendo, that the statute implicitly forbids some of what it does not expressly permit, it is of no help to respondent. In Miller v. United States, 357 U. S. 301, 313 (1958), we noted that § 3109's "requirement of prior notice . . . before forcing entry . . . codif[ied] a tradition embedded in Anglo-American law." We repeated this point in Sabbath v. United States, 391 U. S. 585, 591, n. 8 (1968) (referring to § 3109 as "codification" of the common law). In neither of 3 After concluding that the Fourth Amendment had been violated in this case, the Ninth Circuit further concluded that the guns should be excluded from evidence. Because we conclude that there was no Fourth Amend- ment violation, we need not decide whether, for example, there was suffi- cient causal relationship between the breaking of the window and the dis- covery of the guns to warrant suppression of the evidence. Cf. Nix v. Williams, 467 U. S. 431 (1984); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963). 523US1 Unit: $U34 [04-29-00 19:54:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 65 (1998) 73 Opinion of the Court these cases, however, did we expressly hold that § 3109 also codified the exceptions to the common-law requirement of notice before entry. In Miller the Government made "no claim . . . of the existence of circumstances excusing compli- ance" and the question was accordingly not before us. 357 U. S., at 309. In Sabbath the Government did make such a claim, but because the record did "not reveal any substantial basis for the failure of the agents . . . to announce their au- thority" we did not decide the question. We did note, how- ever, that "[e]xceptions to any possible constitutional rule relating to announcement and entry have been recognized . . . and there is little reason why those limited exceptions might not also apply to § 3109, since they existed at common law, of which the statute is a codification." 391 U. S., at 591, n. 8. In this case the question is squarely presented. We re- move whatever doubt may remain on the subject and hold that § 3109 codifies the exceptions to the common-law an- nouncement requirement. If § 3109 codifies the common law in this area, and the common law in turn informs the Fourth Amendment, our decisions in Wilson and Richards serve as guideposts in construing the statute. In Wilson v. Arkan- sas, 514 U. S. 927 (1995), we concluded that the common-law principle of announcement is "an element of the reasonable- ness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment," but noted that the principle "was never stated as an inflexible rule requir- ing announcement under all circumstances." Id., at 934. In Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U. S. 385 (1997), we articulated the test used to determine whether exigent circumstances justify a particular no-knock entry. Id., at 394. We there- fore hold that § 3109 includes an exigent circumstances ex- ception and that the exception's applicability in a given in- stance is measured by the same standard we articulated in Richards. The police met that standard here and § 3109 was therefore not violated. 523US1 Unit: $U34 [04-29-00 19:54:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN 74 UNITED STATES v. RAMIREZ Opinion of the Court We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for further proceedings con- sistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 523US1 Unit: $U35 [04-29-00 19:56:27] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1997 75 Syllabus ONCALE v. SUNDOWNER OFFSHORE SERVICES, INC., et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit No. 96­568. Argued December 3, 1997-Decided March 4, 1998 Petitioner Oncale filed a complaint against his employer, respondent Sun- downer Offshore Services, Inc., claiming that sexual harassment di- rected against him by respondent co-workers in their workplace consti- tuted "discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex" prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e­2(a)(1). Relying on Fifth Circuit precedent, the District Court held that Oncale, a male, had no Title VII cause of action for harassment by male co-workers. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Held: Sex discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual harassment is ac- tionable under Title VII. Title VII's prohibition of discrimination "be- cause of . . . sex" protects men as well as women, Newport News Ship- building & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U. S. 669, 682, and in the related context of racial discrimination in the workplace this Court has rejected any conclusive presumption that an employer will not discriminate against members of his own race, Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 482, 499. There is no justification in Title VII's language or the Court's precedents for a categorical rule barring a claim of discrimination "be- cause of . . . sex" merely because the plaintiff and the defendant (or the person charged with acting on behalf of the defendant) are of the same sex. Recognizing liability for same-sex harassment will not transform Title VII into a general civility code for the American workplace, since Title VII is directed at discrimination because of sex, not merely con- duct tinged with offensive sexual connotations; since the statute does not reach genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men and women routinely interact with members of the same, and the opposite, sex; and since the objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position, considering all the circumstances. Pp. 78­82. 83 F. 3d 118, reversed and remanded. Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 82. 523US1 Unit: $U35 [04-29-00 19:56:27] PAGES PGT: OPIN 76 ONCALE v. SUNDOWNER OFFSHORE SERVICES, INC. Opinion of the Court Nicholas Canaday III argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Andre P. LaPlace and Eric Schnapper. Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. On the brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Act- ing Assistant Attorney General Pinzler, Deputy Solicitor General Waxman, Beth S. Brinkmann, C. Gregory Stewart, J. Ray Terry, Jr., Gwendolyn Young Reams, and Carolyn L. Wheeler. Harry M. Reasoner argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were John H. Smither, Marie R. Yeates, Thomas H. Wilson, and Samuel Issacharoff.* Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether workplace harass- ment can violate Title VII's prohibition against "discrimina- t[ion] . . . because of . . . sex," 42 U. S. C. § 2000e­2(a)(1), when the harasser and the harassed employee are of the same sex. I The District Court having granted summary judgment for respondents, we must assume the facts to be as alleged by petitioner Joseph Oncale. The precise details are irrelevant *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Ellen Simon Sacks and Christopher P. Thorman; for the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. by Beatrice Dohrn, John Davidson, Ruth Harlow, Steven R. Shapiro, Sara L. Mandelbaum, and Minna J. Kotkin; for the National Employment Law- yers Association by Margaret A. Harris and Anne Golden; for the Na- tional Organization on Male Sexual Victimization, Inc., by Catharine A. MacKinnon; and for Law Professors by Nan D. Hunter. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Equal Em- ployment Advisory Council by Robert E. Williams and Ann Elizabeth Reesman; and for the Texas Association of Business & Chambers of Com- merce by Jeffrey C. Londa and Linda Ottinger Headley. 523US1 Unit: $U35 [04-29-00 19:56:27] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 75 (1998) 77 Opinion of the Court to the legal point we must decide, and in the interest of both brevity and dignity we shall describe them only generally. In late October 1991, Oncale was working for respondent Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., on a Chevron U. S. A., Inc., oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico. He was employed as a roustabout on an eight-man crew which included re- spondents John Lyons, Danny Pippen, and Brandon Johnson. Lyons, the crane operator, and Pippen, the driller, had su- pervisory authority, App. 41, 77, 43. On several occasions, Oncale was forcibly subjected to sex-related, humiliating actions against him by Lyons, Pippen, and Johnson in the presence of the rest of the crew. Pippen and Lyons also physically assaulted Oncale in a sexual manner, and Lyons threatened him with rape. Oncale's complaints to supervisory personnel produced no remedial action; in fact, the company's Safety Compliance Clerk, Valent Hohen, told Oncale that Lyons and Pippen "picked [on] him all the time too," and called him a name suggesting homosexuality. Id., at 77. Oncale eventually quit-asking that his pink slip reflect that he "voluntarily left due to sexual harassment and verbal abuse." Id., at 79. When asked at his deposition why he left Sundowner, Oncale stated: "I felt that if I didn't leave my job, that I would be raped or forced to have sex." Id., at 71. Oncale filed a complaint against Sundowner in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging that he was discriminated against in his employment because of his sex. Relying on the Fifth Circuit's decision in Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, 28 F. 3d 446, 451­452 (1994), the District Court held that "Mr. Oncale, a male, has no cause of action under Title VII for harassment by male co-workers." App. 106. On appeal, a panel of the Fifth Circuit concluded that Garcia was binding Circuit precedent, and affirmed. 83 F. 3d 118 (1996). We granted certiorari. 520 U. S. 1263 (1997). 523US1 Unit: $U35 [04-29-00 19:56:27] PAGES PGT: OPIN 78 ONCALE v. SUNDOWNER OFFSHORE SERVICES, INC. Opinion of the Court II Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides, in rele- vant part, that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi- leges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 78 Stat. 255, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e­2(a)(1). We have held that this not only covers "terms" and "conditions" in the narrow contractual sense, but "evinces a congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment." Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U. S. 57, 64 (1986) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "When the workplace is permeated with discrimi- natory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment, Title VII is violated." Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U. S. 17, 21 (1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Title VII's prohibition of discrimination "because of . . . sex" protects men as well as women, Newport News Ship- building & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U. S. 669, 682 (1983), and in the related context of racial discrimination in the workplace we have rejected any conclusive presumption that an employer will not discriminate against members of his own race. "Because of the many facets of human motiva- tion, it would be unwise to presume as a matter of law that human beings of one definable group will not discriminate against other members of their group." Castaneda v. Par- tida, 430 U. S. 482, 499 (1977). See also id., at 515­516, n. 6 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U. S. 616 (1987), a male employee claimed that his employer discriminated against him because of his sex when it preferred a female employee for promotion. Al- 523US1 Unit: $U35 [04-29-00 19:56:27] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 75 (1998) 79 Opinion of the Court though we ultimately rejected the claim on other grounds, we did not consider it significant that the supervisor who made that decision was also a man. See id., at 624­625. If our precedents leave any doubt on the question, we hold today that nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination "because of . . . sex" merely because the plain- tiff and the defendant (or the person charged with acting on behalf of the defendant) are of the same sex. Courts have had little trouble with that principle in cases like Johnson, where an employee claims to have been passed over for a job or promotion. But when the issue arises in the context of a "hostile environment" sexual harassment claim, the state and federal courts have taken a bewildering variety of stances. Some, like the Fifth Circuit in this case, have held that same-sex sexual harassment claims are never cognizable under Title VII. See also, e. g., Goluszek v. H. P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (ND Ill. 1988). Other decisions say that such claims are actionable only if the plaintiff can prove that the harasser is homosexual (and thus presumably moti- vated by sexual desire). Compare McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, 72 F. 3d 1191 (CA4 1996), with Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, 99 F. 3d 138 (CA4 1996). Still others suggest that workplace harassment that is sexual in content is always actionable, regardless of the harasser's sex, sexual orientation, or motivations. See Doe v. Belle- ville, 119 F. 3d 563 (CA7 1997). We see no justification in the statutory language or our precedents for a categorical rule excluding same-sex harass- ment claims from the coverage of Title VII. As some courts have observed, male-on-male sexual harassment in the work- place was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was con- cerned with when it enacted Title VII. But statutory prohi- bitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed. Title VII prohibits "discrimina- 523US1 Unit: $U35 [04-29-00 19:56:27] PAGES PGT: OPIN 80 ONCALE v. SUNDOWNER OFFSHORE SERVICES, INC. Opinion of the Court t[ion] . . . because of . . . sex" in the "terms" or "conditions" of employment. Our holding that this includes sexual har- assment must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the statutory requirements. Respondents and their amici contend that recognizing lia- bility for same-sex harassment will transform Title VII into a general civility code for the American workplace. But that risk is no greater for same-sex than for opposite-sex harassment, and is adequately met by careful attention to the requirements of the statute. Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace; it is di- rected only at "discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex." We have never held that workplace harassment, even harass- ment between men and women, is automatically discrimina- tion because of sex merely because the words used have sex- ual content or connotations. "The critical issue, Title VII's text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed." Harris, supra, at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Courts and juries have found the inference of discrimina- tion easy to draw in most male-female sexual harassment situations, because the challenged conduct typically involves explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity; it is reason- able to assume those proposals would not have been made to someone of the same sex. The same chain of inference would be available to a plaintiff alleging same-sex harass- ment, if there were credible evidence that the harasser was homosexual. But harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex. A trier of fact might reasonably find such discrimination, for example, if a female victim is harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another woman as to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in the workplace. A same-sex harassment plaintiff may also, of course, offer di- 523US1 Unit: $U35 [04-29-00 19:56:27] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 75 (1998) 81 Opinion of the Court rect comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace. Whatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses to follow, he or she must always prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but ac- tually constituted "discrimina[tion] . . . because of . . . sex." And there is another requirement that prevents Title VII from expanding into a general civility code: As we empha- sized in Meritor and Harris, the statute does not reach genu- ine but innocuous differences in the ways men and women routinely interact with members of the same sex and of the opposite sex. The prohibition of harassment on the basis of sex requires neither asexuality nor androgyny in the work- place; it forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the "conditions" of the victim's employment. "Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objec- tively hostile or abusive work environment-an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title VII's purview." Harris, 510 U. S., at 21, citing Meritor, 477 U. S., at 67. We have always regarded that requirement as crucial, and as sufficient to ensure that courts and juries do not mistake ordinary socializing in the work- place-such as male-on-male horseplay or intersexual flirta- tion-for discriminatory "conditions of employment." We have emphasized, moreover, that the objective sever- ity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position, considering "all the circumstances." Harris, supra, at 23. In same-sex (as in all) harassment cases, that inquiry requires careful consideration of the social context in which particular behav- ior occurs and is experienced by its target. A professional football player's working environment is not severely or per- vasively abusive, for example, if the coach smacks him on the buttocks as he heads onto the field-even if the same behav- ior would reasonably be experienced as abusive by the coach's secretary (male or female) back at the office. The 523US1 Unit: $U35 [04-29-00 19:56:27] PAGES PGT: OPIN 82 ONCALE v. SUNDOWNER OFFSHORE SERVICES, INC. Thomas, J., concurring real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed. Common sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social con- text, will enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing among members of the same sex, and conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would find severely hostile or abusive. III Because we conclude that sex discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Thomas, concurring. I concur because the Court stresses that in every sexual harassment case, the plaintiff must plead and ultimately prove Title VII's statutory requirement that there be dis- crimination "because of . . . sex." 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1997 83 Syllabus STEEL CO., aka CHICAGO STEEL & PICKLING CO. v. CITIZENS FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit No. 96­643. Argued October 6, 1997-Decided March 4, 1998 Alleging that petitioner manufacturer had violated the Emergency Plan- ning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA) by failing to file timely toxic- and hazardous-chemical storage and emission reports for past years, respondent environmental protection organization filed this private enforcement action for declaratory and injunctive relief under EPCRA's citizen-suit provision, 42 U. S. C. § 11046(a)(1). The District Court held that, because petitioner had brought its filings up to date by the time the complaint was filed, the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain a suit for a present violation; and that, because EPCRA does not allow suit for a purely historical violation, respondent's alle- gation of untimely filing was not a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding that EPCRA au- thorizes citizen suits for purely past violations. Held: Because none of the relief sought would likely remedy respondent's alleged injury in fact, respondent lacks standing to maintain this suit, and this Court and the lower courts lack jurisdiction to entertain it. Pp. 88­110. (a) The merits issue in this case-whether § 11046(a) permits citizen suits for purely past violations-is not also "jurisdictional," and so does not occupy the same status as standing to sue as a question that must be resolved first. It is firmly established that a district court's subject- matter jurisdiction is not defeated by the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action, see, e. g., Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 682. Subject-matter jurisdiction exists if the right to recover will be sus- tained under one reading of the Constitution and laws and defeated under another, id., at 685, unless the claim clearly appears to be immate- rial, wholly insubstantial and frivolous, or otherwise so devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy, see, e. g., Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y. v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661, 666. Here, respondent wins under one construction of EPCRA and loses under another, and its claim is not frivolous or immaterial. It is unreasonable to read § 11046(c)- which provides that "[t]he district court shall have jurisdiction in ac- tions brought under subsection (a) . . . to enforce [an EPCRA] require- ment . . . and to impose any civil penalty provided for violation of that requirement"-as making all the elements of the § 11046(a) cause of ac- 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 84 STEEL CO. v. CITIZENS FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENT Syllabus tion jurisdictional, rather than as merely specifying the remedial powers of the court. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Founda- tion, Inc., 484 U. S. 49, as well as cases deciding a statutory standing question before a constitutional standing question, distinguished. In no case has this Court called the existence of a cause of action "jurisdic- tional," and decided that question before resolving a dispute concerning the existence of an Article III case or controversy. Such a principle would turn every statutory question in an EPCRA citizen suit into a question of jurisdiction that this Court would have to consider-indeed, raise sua sponte-even if not raised below. Pp. 88­93. (b) This Court declines to endorse the "doctrine of hypothetical juris- diction," under which several Courts of Appeals have found it proper to proceed immediately to the merits question, despite jurisdictional objections, at least where (1) the merits question is more readily re- solved, and (2) the prevailing party on the merits would be the same as the prevailing party were jurisdiction denied. That doctrine carries the courts beyond the bounds of authorized judicial action and thus offends fundamental separation-of-powers principles. In a long and venerable line of cases, this Court has held that, without proper juris- diction, a court cannot proceed at all, but can only note the jurisdictional defect and dismiss the suit. See, e. g., Capron v. Van Noorden, 2 Cranch 126; Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U. S. 43, 73. Bell v. Hood, supra; National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of Railroad Passengers, 414 U. S. 453, 465, n. 13; Norton v. Ma- thews, 427 U. S. 524, 531; Secretary of Navy v. Avrech, 418 U. S. 676, 678 (per curiam); United States v. Augenblick, 393 U. S. 348; Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U. S. 707, 721; and Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit, 398 U. S. 74, 86­88, distinguished. For a court to pronounce upon a law's meaning or constitutionality when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, an ultra vires act. Pp. 93­102. (c) Respondent lacks standing to sue. Standing is the "irreducible constitutional minimum" necessary to make a justiciable "case" or "con- troversy" under Article III, § 2. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560. It contains three requirements: injury in fact to the plaintiff, causation of that injury by the defendant's complained-of con- duct, and a likelihood that the requested relief will redress that injury. E. g., ibid. Even assuming, as respondent asserts, that petitioner's fail- ure to report EPCRA information in a timely manner, and the lingering effects of that failure, constitute a concrete injury in fact to respondent and its members that satisfies Article III, cf. id., at 578, the complaint nevertheless fails the redressability test: None of the specific items of relief sought-a declaratory judgment that petitioner violated EPCRA; 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 83 (1998) 85 Opinion of the Court injunctive relief authorizing respondent to make periodic inspections of petitioner's facility and records and requiring petitioner to give re- spondent copies of its compliance reports; and orders requiring peti- tioner to pay EPCRA civil penalties to the Treasury and to reimburse respondent's litigation expenses-and no conceivable relief under the complaint's final, general request, would serve to reimburse respondent for losses caused by petitioner's late reporting, or to eliminate any ef- fects of that late reporting upon respondent. Pp. 102­109. 90 F. 3d 1237, vacated and remanded. Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined, and in which Breyer, J., joined as to Parts I and IV. O'Connor, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Kennedy, J., joined, post, p. 110. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 111. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Sou- ter, J., joined as to Parts I, III, and IV, and Ginsburg, J., joined as to Part III, post, p. 112. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 134. Sanford M. Stein argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Leo P. Dombrowski. David A. Strauss argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were James D. Brusslan and Stefan A. Noe. Irving L. Gornstein argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Wal- lace, James A. Feldman, Edward J. Shawaker, and Mark R. Haag.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Forest & Paper Association, Inc., et al. by Jan S. Amundson and Quentin Riegel; for the American Iron & Steel Institute et al. by Scott M. DuBoff, Valerie J. Ughetta, Robin S. Conrad, and J. Walker Henry; for the Chemi- cal Manufacturers Association by James W. Conrad, Christina Franz, and Carter G. Phillips; for the Clean Air Implementation Project by William H. Lewis, Jr., and Michael A. McCord; for the Mid-America Legal Founda- tion et al. by James T. Harrington, William F. Moran III, and Gregory 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 86 STEEL CO. v. CITIZENS FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENT Opinion of the Court Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a private enforcement action under the citizen-suit provision of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA), 100 Stat. 1755, 42 U. S. C. § 11046(a)(1). The case presents the merits ques- tion, answered in the affirmative by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, whether EPCRA author- izes suits for purely past violations. It also presents the jurisdictional question whether respondent, plaintiff below, has standing to bring this action. I Respondent, an association of individuals interested in en- vironmental protection, sued petitioner, a small manufac- turing company in Chicago, for past violations of EPCRA. EPCRA establishes a framework of state, regional, and local agencies designed to inform the public about the presence of hazardous and toxic chemicals, and to provide for emergency response in the event of health-threatening release. Central to its operation are reporting requirements compelling users of specified toxic and hazardous chemicals to file annual R. McClintock; for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Robin L. Rivett and M. Reed Hopper; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Barry M. Hartman, Daniel J. Popeo, and Paul D. Kamenar. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of New York et al. by Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General of New York, Barbara G. Billet, Solicitor General, Peter H. Schiff, Deputy Solicitor General, and Maureen F. Leary, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys Gen- eral for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Calvin E. Holloway, Sr., of Guam, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, Pamela Fanning Carter of Indiana, Scott Harshbarger of Massachusetts, Jeremiah W. Nixon of Missouri, Philip T. McLaughlin of New Hampshire, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Wil- liam H. Sorrell of Vermont, James S. Gilmore III of Virginia, and Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia; and for the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al. by James M. Hecker. 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 83 (1998) 87 Opinion of the Court "emergency and hazardous chemical inventory forms" and "toxic chemical release forms," which contain, inter alia, the name and location of the facility, the name and quantity of the chemical on hand, and, in the case of toxic chemicals, the waste-disposal method employed and the annual quan- tity released into each environmental medium. 42 U. S. C. §§ 11022 and 11023. The hazardous-chemical inventory forms for any given calendar year are due the following March 1st, and the toxic-chemical release forms the following July 1st. §§ 11022(a)(2) and 11023(a). Enforcement of EPCRA can take place on many fronts. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the most powerful enforcement arsenal: it may seek criminal, civil, or administrative penalties. § 11045. State and local govern- ments can also seek civil penalties, as well as injunctive re- lief. §§ 11046(a)(2) and (c). For purposes of this case, how- ever, the crucial enforcement mechanism is the citizen-suit provision, § 11046(a)(1), which likewise authorizes civil penal- ties and injunctive relief, see § 11046(c). This provides that "any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf against . . . [a]n owner or operator of a facility for failure," among other things, to "[c]omplete and submit an inventory form under section 11022(a) of this title . . . [and] section 11023(a) of this title." § 11046(a)(1). As a prerequisite to bringing such a suit, the plaintiff must, 60 days prior to filing his complaint, give notice to the Administrator of the EPA, the State in which the alleged violation occurs, and the alleged violator. § 11046(d). The citizen suit may not go forward if the Administrator "has commenced and is dili- gently pursuing an administrative order or civil action to enforce the requirement concerned or to impose a civil pen- alty." § 11046(e). In 1995 respondent sent a notice to petitioner, the Admin- istrator, and the relevant Illinois authorities, alleging-accu- rately, as it turns out-that petitioner had failed since 1988, the first year of EPCRA's filing deadlines, to complete and 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 88 STEEL CO. v. CITIZENS FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENT Opinion of the Court to submit the requisite hazardous-chemical inventory and toxic-chemical release forms under §§ 11022 and 11023. Upon receiving the notice, petitioner filed all of the overdue forms with the relevant agencies. The EPA chose not to bring an action against petitioner, and when the 60-day wait- ing period expired, respondent filed suit in Federal District Court. Petitioner promptly filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6), contending that, because its filings were up to date when the complaint was filed, the court had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for a present violation; and that, because EPCRA does not allow suit for a purely historical violation, respondent's allegation of untimeliness in filing was not a claim upon which relief could be granted. The District Court agreed with petitioner on both points. App. to Pet. for Cert. A24­A26. The Court of Appeals re- versed, concluding that citizens may seek penalties against EPCRA violators who file after the statutory deadline and after receiving notice. 90 F. 3d 1237 (CA7 1996). We granted certiorari, 519 U. S. 1147 (1997). II We granted certiorari in this case to resolve a conflict be- tween the interpretation of EPCRA adopted by the Seventh Circuit and the interpretation previously adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. United Musical Instruments, U. S. A., Inc., 61 F. 3d 473 (1995)-a case relied on by the District Court, and acknowl- edged by the Seventh Circuit to be "factually indistinguish- able," 90 F. 3d, at 1241­1242. Petitioner, however, both in its petition for certiorari and in its briefs on the merits, has raised the issue of respondent's standing to maintain the suit, and hence this Court's jurisdiction to entertain it. Though there is some dispute on this point, see Part III, infra, this would normally be considered a threshold question that must be resolved in respondent's favor before proceeding to the 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 83 (1998) 89 Opinion of the Court merits. Justice Stevens' opinion concurring in the judg- ment, however, claims that the question whether § 11046(a) permits this cause of action is also "jurisdictional," and so has equivalent claim to being resolved first. Whether that is so has significant implications for this case and for many others, and so the point warrants extended discussion. It is firmly established in our cases that the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not impli- cate subject-matter jurisdiction, i. e., the courts' statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case. See generally 5A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350, p. 196, n. 8 and cases cited (2d ed. 1990). As we stated in Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 682 (1946), "[j]urisdic- tion . . . is not defeated . . . by the possibility that the aver- ments might fail to state a cause of action on which petition- ers could actually recover." Rather, the district court has jurisdiction if "the right of the petitioners to recover under their complaint will be sustained if the Constitution and laws of the United States are given one construction and will be defeated if they are given another," id., at 685, unless the claim "clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous." Id., at 682­683; see also Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U. S. 263, 285 (1993); The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U. S. 22, 25 (1913). Dismissal for lack of subject-matter ju- risdiction because of the inadequacy of the federal claim is proper only when the claim is "so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal con- troversy." Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y. v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661, 666 (1974); see also Romero v. Inter- national Terminal Operating Co., 358 U. S. 354, 359 (1959). Here, respondent wins under one construction of EPCRA and loses under another, and Justice Stevens does not argue that respondent's claim is frivolous or immaterial- 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 90 STEEL CO. v. CITIZENS FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENT Opinion of the Court in fact, acknowledges that the language of the citizen-suit provision is ambiguous. Post, at 131. Justice Stevens relies on our treatment of a similar issue as jurisdictional in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U. S. 49 (1987). Post, at 114. The statute at issue in that case, however, after cre- ating the cause of action, went on to say that "[t]he district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties," to pro- vide various forms of relief. 33 U. S. C. § 1365(a) (emphasis added). The italicized phrase strongly suggested (perhaps misleadingly) that the provision was addressing genuine subject-matter jurisdiction. The corresponding provision in the present case, however, reads as follows: "The district court shall have jurisdiction in actions brought under subsection (a) of this section against an owner or operator of a facility to enforce the require- ment concerned and to impose any civil penalty pro- vided for violation of that requirement." 42 U. S. C. § 11046(c). It is unreasonable to read this as making all the elements of the cause of action under subsection (a) jurisdictional, rather than as merely specifying the remedial powers of the court, viz., to enforce the violated requirement and to impose civil penalties. "Jurisdiction," it has been observed, "is a word of many, too many, meanings," United States v. Van- ness, 85 F. 3d 661, 663, n. 2 (CADC 1996), and it is common- place for the term to be used as it evidently was here. See, e. g., 7 U. S. C. § 13a­1(d) ("In any action brought under this section, the Commission may seek and the court shall have jurisdiction to impose . . . a civil penalty in the amount of not more than the higher of $100,000 or triple the monetary gain to the person for each violation"); 15 U. S. C. § 2622(d) ("In actions brought under this subsection, the district courts shall have jurisdiction to grant all appropriate relief, 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 83 (1998) 91 Opinion of the Court including injunctive relief and compensatory and exemplary damages"); 42 U. S. C. § 7622(d) ("In actions brought under this subsection, the district courts shall have jurisdiction to grant all appropriate relief including, but not limited to, in- junctive relief, compensatory, and exemplary damages"). It is also the case that the Gwaltney opinion does not dis- play the slightest awareness that anything turned upon whether the existence of a cause of action for past violations was technically jurisdictional-as indeed nothing of sub- stance did. The District Court had statutory jurisdiction over the suit in any event, since continuing violations were also alleged. See 484 U. S., at 64. It is true, as Justice Stevens points out, that the issue of Article III standing which is addressed at the end of the opinion should techni- cally have been addressed at the outset if the statutory ques- tion was not jurisdictional. But that also did not really mat- ter, since Article III standing was in any event found. The short of the matter is that the jurisdictional character of the elements of the cause of action in Gwaltney made no sub- stantive difference (nor even any procedural difference that the Court seemed aware of), had been assumed by the par- ties, and was assumed without discussion by the Court. We have often said that drive-by jurisdictional rulings of this sort (if Gwaltney can even be called a ruling on the point rather than a dictum) have no precedential effect. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U. S. 343, 352, n. 2 (1996); Federal Elec- tion Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U. S. 88, 97 (1994); United States v. L. A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U. S. 33, 38 (1952). But even if it is authoritative on the point as to the distinctive statute there at issue, it is fanciful to think that Gwaltney revised our established jurispru- dence that the failure of a cause of action does not automati- cally produce a failure of jurisdiction, or adopted the expan- sive principle that a statute saying "the district court shall have jurisdiction to remedy violations [in specified ways]" 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 92 STEEL CO. v. CITIZENS FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENT Opinion of the Court renders the existence of a violation necessary for subject- matter jurisdiction. Justice Stevens' concurrence devotes a large portion of its discussion to cases in which a statutory standing ques- tion was decided before a question of constitutional stand- ing. See post, at 115­117. They also are irrelevant here, because it is not a statutory standing question that Justice Stevens would have us decide first. He wishes to resolve, not whether EPCRA authorizes this plaintiff to sue (it assuredly does), but whether the scope of the EPCRA right of action includes past violations. Such a question, we have held, goes to the merits and not to statutory standing. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, 510 U. S. 355, 365 (1994) ("The question whether a federal statute creates a claim for relief is not jurisdictional"); Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., supra, at 359; Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U. S. 246, 249 (1951). Though it is replete with extensive case discussions, case citations, rationalizations, and syllogoids, see post, at 120, n. 12, and n. 2, infra, Justice Stevens' opinion conspicu- ously lacks one central feature: a single case in which this Court has done what he proposes, to wit, call the existence of a cause of action "jurisdictional," and decide that question before resolving a dispute concerning the existence of an Ar- ticle III case or controversy. Of course, even if there were not solid precedent contradicting Justice Stevens' posi- tion, the consequences are alone enough to condemn it. It would turn every statutory question in an EPCRA citizen suit into a question of jurisdiction. Under Justice Ste- vens' analysis, § 11046(c)'s grant of "jurisdiction in actions brought under [§ 11046(a)]" withholds jurisdiction over claims involving purely past violations if past violations are not in fact covered by § 11046(a). By parity of reasoning, if there is a dispute as to whether the omission of a particular item constituted a failure to "complete" the form; or as to 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 83 (1998) 93 Opinion of the Court whether a particular manner of delivery complied in time with the requirement to "submit" the form; and if the court agreed with the defendant on the point; the action would not be "brought under [§ 11046(a)]," and would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction rather than decided on the merits. Moreover, those statutory arguments, since they are "juris- dictional," would have to be considered by this Court even though not raised earlier in the litigation-indeed, this Court would have to raise them sua sponte. See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 278­279 (1977); Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U. S. 449, 453 (1900). Congress of course did not create such a strange scheme. In referring to actions "brought under" § 11046(a), § 11046(c) means suits contending that § 11046(a) contains a certain requirement. If Justice Stevens is correct that all cause-of-action questions may be regarded as jurisdic- tional questions, and thus capable of being decided where there is no genuine case or controversy, it is hard to see what is left of that limitation in Article III. III In addition to its attempt to convert the merits issue in this case into a jurisdictional one, Justice Stevens' con- currence proceeds, post, at 117­124, to argue the bolder point that jurisdiction need not be addressed first anyway. Even if the statutory question is not "fram[ed] . . . in terms of `jurisdiction,' " but is simply "characterize[d] . . . as whether respondent's complaint states a `cause of action,' " "it is also clear that we have the power to decide the statutory ques- tion first." Post, at 117­118. This is essentially the posi- tion embraced by several Courts of Appeals, which find it proper to proceed immediately to the merits question, de- spite jurisdictional objections, at least where (1) the merits question is more readily resolved, and (2) the prevailing party on the merits would be the same as the prevailing party were jurisdiction denied. See, e. g., SEC v. American 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 94 STEEL CO. v. CITIZENS FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENT Opinion of the Court Capital Investments, Inc., 98 F. 3d 1133, 1139­1142 (CA9 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Shelton v. Barnes, 520 U. S. 1185 (1997); Smith v. Avino, 91 F. 3d 105, 108 (CA11 1996); Clow v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 948 F. 2d 614, 616, n. 2 (CA9 1991); Cross-Sound Ferry Services, Inc. v. ICC, 934 F. 2d 327, 333 (CADC 1991); United States v. Parcel of Land, 928 F. 2d 1, 4 (CA1 1991); Browning-Ferris Industries v. Muszynski, 899 F. 2d 151, 154­159 (CA2 1990). The Ninth Circuit has denominated this practice-which it characterizes as "assuming" jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the merits-the "doctrine of hypothetical jurisdic- tion." See, e. g., United States v. Troescher, 99 F. 3d 933, 934, n. 1 (1996).1 We decline to endorse such an approach because it carries the courts beyond the bounds of authorized judicial action and thus offends fundamental principles of separation of powers. This conclusion should come as no surprise, since it is reflected in a long and venerable line of our cases. "Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause." Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1869). "On every writ of error or appeal, the first and fundamental question is that of jurisdiction, first, of this court, and then of the court from which the record comes. This question the court is bound to ask and answer for itself, even when not otherwise sug- gested, and without respect to the relation of the parties to it." Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, supra, at 453. The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter "spring[s] from the nature and limits of 1 Our disposition makes it appropriate to address the approach taken by this substantial body of Court of Appeals precedent. The fact that Jus- tice Stevens' concurrence takes essentially the same approach makes his contention that this discussion is an "excursion," and "unnecessary to an explanation" of our decision, post, at 121, particularly puzzling. 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 83 (1998) 95 Opinion of the Court the judicial power of the United States" and is "inflexible and without exception." Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 382 (1884). This Court's insistence that proper jurisdiction appear begins at least as early as 1804, when we set aside a judg- ment for the defendant at the instance of the losing plaintiff who had himself failed to allege the basis for federal juris- diction. Capron v. Van Noorden, 2 Cranch 126 (1804). Just last Term, we restated this principle in the clearest fashion, unanimously setting aside the Ninth Circuit's merits deci- sion in a case that had lost the elements of a justiciable controversy: " `[E]very federal appellate court has a special obligation to `satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review,' even though the parties are prepared to concede it. Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U. S. 237, 244 (1934). See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S. 327, 331­332 (1977) (standing). `And if the record discloses that the lower court was without jurisdiction this court will notice the defect, although the parties make no contention concerning it. [When the lower federal court] lack[s] jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction on appeal, not of the merits but merely for the purpose of correcting the error of the lower court in entertaining the suit.' United States v. Corrick, 298 U. S. 435, 440 (1936) (footnotes omitted).' " Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U. S. 43, 73 (1997), quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U. S. 534, 541 (1986) (brackets in original). Justice Stevens' arguments contradicting all this ju- risprudence-and asserting that a court may decide the cause of action before resolving Article III jurisdiction-are readily refuted. First, his concurrence seeks to convert Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678 (1946), into a case in which the cause- of-action question was decided before an Article III stand- 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 96 STEEL CO. v. CITIZENS FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENT Opinion of the Court ing question. Post, at 118­119, n. 8. "Bell," Justice Ste- vens asserts, "held that we have jurisdiction to decide [whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of action] even when it is unclear whether the plaintiff's injuries can be redressed." Post, at 118. The italicized phrase (the italics are his own) invites the reader to believe that Article III redressability was at issue. Not only is this not true, but the whole point of Bell was that it is not true. In Bell, which was decided before Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Nar- cotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), the District Court had dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds because it be- lieved that (what we would now call) a Bivens action would not lie. This Court held that the nonexistence of a cause of action was no proper basis for a jurisdictional dismissal. Thus, the uncertainty about "whether the plaintiff's injuries can be redressed" to which Justice Stevens refers is sim- ply the uncertainty about whether a cause of action ex- isted-which is precisely what Bell holds not to be an Article III "redressability" question. It would have been a differ- ent matter if the relief requested by the plaintiffs in Bell (money damages) would not have remedied their injury in fact; but it of course would. Justice Stevens used to un- derstand the fundamental distinction between arguing no cause of action and arguing no Article III redressability, hav- ing written for the Court that the former argument is "not squarely directed at jurisdiction itself, but rather at the ex- istence of a remedy for the alleged violation of . . . federal rights," which issue is " `not of the jurisdictional sort which the Court raises on its own motion.' " Lake Country Es- tates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 398 (1979) (Stevens, J.), (quoting Mt. Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S., at 279). Justice Stevens also relies on National Railroad Pas- senger Corp. v. National Assn. of Railroad Passengers, 414 U. S. 453 (1974). Post, at 119­120. But in that case, we did not determine whether a cause of action existed before de- 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 83 (1998) 97 Opinion of the Court termining that the plaintiff had Article III standing; there was no question of injury in fact or effectiveness of the requested remedy. Rather, National Railroad Passenger Corp. determined whether a statutory cause of action existed before determining whether (if so) the plaintiff came within the "zone of interests" for which the cause of action was available. 414 U. S., at 465, n. 13. The latter question is an issue of statutory standing. It has nothing to do with whether there is case or controversy under Article III. 2 2 Justice Stevens thinks it illogical that a merits question can be given priority over a statutory standing question (National Railroad Passenger Corp.) and a statutory standing question can be given priority over an Article III question (the cases discussed post, at 115­117), but a merits question cannot be given priority over an Article III question. See post, at 120, n. 12. It seems to us no more illogical than many other "broken circles" that appear in life and the law: that Executive agreements may displace state law, for example, see United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324, 330­331 (1937), and that unilateral Presidential action (renunciation) may displace Executive agreements, does not produce the "logical" conclu- sion that unilateral Presidential action may displace state law. The rea- sons for allowing merits questions to be decided before statutory standing questions do not support allowing merits questions to be decided before Article III questions. As National Railroad Passenger Corp. points out, the merits inquiry and the statutory standing inquiry often "overlap," 414 U. S., at 456. The question whether this plaintiff has a cause of action under the statute, and the question whether any plaintiff has a cause of action under the statute are closely connected-indeed, depending upon the asserted basis for lack of statutory standing, they are sometimes iden- tical, so that it would be exceedingly artificial to draw a distinction be- tween the two. The same cannot be said of the Article III requirement of remediable injury in fact, which (except with regard to entirely frivolous claims) has nothing to do with the text of the statute relied upon. More- over, deciding whether any cause of action exists under a particular stat- ute, rather than whether the particular plaintiff can sue, does not take the court into vast, uncharted realms of judicial opinion giving; whereas the proposition that the court can reach a merits question when there is no Article III jurisdiction opens the door to all sorts of "generalized griev- ances," Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 217 (1974), that the Constitution leaves for resolution through the politi- cal process. 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 98 STEEL CO. v. CITIZENS FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENT Opinion of the Court Much more extensive defenses of the practice of deciding the cause of action before resolving Article III jurisdiction have been offered by the Courts of Appeals. They rely principally upon two cases of ours, Norton v. Mathews, 427 U. S. 524 (1976), and Secretary of Navy v. Avrech, 418 U. S. 676 (1974) (per curiam). Both are readily explained, we think, by their extraordinary procedural postures. In Nor- ton, the case came to us on direct appeal from a three-judge District Court, and the jurisdictional question was whether the action was properly brought in that forum rather than in an ordinary district court. We declined to decide that jurisdictional question, because the merits question was de- cided in a companion case, Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495 (1976), with the consequence that the jurisdictional question could have no effect on the outcome: If the three-judge court had been properly convened, we would have affirmed, and if not, we would have vacated and remanded for a fresh decree from which an appeal could be taken to the Court of Appeals, the outcome of which was foreordained by Lucas. Norton v. Mathews, supra, at 531. Thus, Norton did not use the pretermission of the jurisdictional question as a device for reaching a question of law that otherwise would have gone unaddressed. Moreover, the Court seems to have regarded the merits judgment that it entered on the basis of Lucas as equivalent to a jurisdictional dismissal for failure to present a substantial federal question. The Court said: "This dis- position [Lucas] renders the merits in the present case a decided issue and thus one no longer substantial in the ju- risdictional sense." 427 U. S., at 530­531. We think it clear that this peculiar case, involving a merits issue dispositively resolved in a companion case, was not meant to overrule, sub silentio, two centuries of jurisprudence affirming the necessity of determining jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits. See Clow, 948 F. 2d, at 627 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting). Avrech also involved an instance in which an intervening Supreme Court decision definitively answered the merits 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 83 (1998) 99 Opinion of the Court question. The jurisdictional question in the case had been raised by the Court sua sponte after oral argument, and sup- plemental briefing had been ordered. Secretary of Navy v. Avrech, supra, at 677. Before the Court came to a decision, however, the merits issue in the case had been conclusively resolved in Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733 (1974), a case ar- gued the same day as Avrech. The Court was unwilling to decide the jurisdictional question without oral argument, 418 U. S., at 677, but acknowledged (with some understatement) that "even the most diligent and zealous advocate could find his ardor somewhat dampened in arguing a jurisdictional issue where the decision on the merits is . . . foreordained," id., at 678. Accordingly, the Court disposed of the case on the basis of the intervening decision in Parker, in a minimal- ist two-page per curiam opinion. The first thing to be ob- served about Avrech is that the supposed jurisdictional issue was technically not that. The issue was whether a court- martial judgment could be attacked collaterally by a suit for backpay. Although Avrech, like the earlier case of United States v. Augenblick, 393 U. S. 348 (1969), characterized this question as jurisdictional, we later held squarely that it was not. See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U. S. 738, 753 (1975). In any event, the peculiar circumstances of Avrech hardly permit it to be cited for the precedent-shattering general proposition that an "easy" merits question may be decided on the assumption of jurisdiction. To the contrary, the fact that the Court ordered briefing on the juris- dictional question sua sponte demonstrates its adherence to traditional and constitutionally dictated requirements. See Cross-Sound Ferry Services, Inc. v. ICC, 934 F. 2d, at 344­ 345, and n. 10 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in denial of petition for review). Other cases sometimes cited by the lower courts to sup- port "hypothetical jurisdiction" are similarly distinguishable. United States v. Augenblick, as we have discussed, did not involve a jurisdictional issue. In Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U. S. 707, 721 (1975), the jurisdictional question was whether, 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 100 STEEL CO. v. CITIZENS FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENT Opinion of the Court in a suit under 28 U. S. C. § 1343(3) against the Commissioner of the Vermont Department of Social Welfare for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law by denying pay- ments under a federally funded welfare program, the plain- tiff could join a similar claim against the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. The merits issue of statutory con- struction involved in the claim against the Secretary was precisely the same as that involved in the claim against the Commissioner, and the Secretary (while challenging jurisdic- tion) assured the Court that he would comply with any judg- ment entered against the Commissioner. The Court's dispo- sition of the case was to dismiss the Secretary's appeal under what was then this Court's Rule 40(g), for failure to brief the jurisdictional question adequately. Normally, the Court acknowledged, its obligation to inquire into the jurisdiction of the District Court might prevent this disposition. But here, the Court concluded, "the substantive issue decided by the District Court would have been decided by that court even if it had concluded that the Secretary was not properly a party," and "the only practical difference that resulted . . . was that its injunction was directed against him as well as against [the Commissioner]," which the Secretary "has [not] properly contended to be wrongful before this Court." 421 U. S., at 721­722. And finally, in Chandler v. Judicial Coun- cil of Tenth Circuit, 398 U. S. 74 (1970), we reserved the question whether we had jurisdiction to issue a writ of prohi- bition or mandamus because the petitioner had not ex- hausted all available avenues before seeking relief under the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651, and because there was no record to review. 398 U. S., at 86­88. The exhaustion question itself was at least arguably jurisdictional, and was clearly treated as such. Id., at 86.3 3 Justice Stevens adds three cases to the list of those that might sup- port "hypothetical jurisdiction." Post, at 121­122, and n. 15. They are all inapposite. In Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693 (1973), we declined to decide whether a federal court's pendent jurisdiction extended 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 83 (1998) 101 Opinion of the Court While some of the above cases must be acknowledged to have diluted the absolute purity of the rule that Article III jurisdiction is always an antecedent question, none of them even approaches approval of a doctrine of "hypothetical ju- risdiction" that enables a court to resolve contested ques- tions of law when its jurisdiction is in doubt. Hypothetical jurisdiction produces nothing more than a hypothetical judg- ment-which comes to the same thing as an advisory opin- ion, disapproved by this Court from the beginning. Musk- rat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 362 (1911); Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792). Much more than legal niceties are at stake here. The statutory and (especially) constitutional elements of jurisdiction are an essential ingredient of separa- tion and equilibration of powers, restraining the courts from acting at certain times, and even restraining them from act- ing permanently regarding certain subjects. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166, 179 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 227 (1974). For a court to pronounce upon the meaning or the constitutionality of a state or federal law when it has no ju- to state-law claims against a new party, because we agreed with the Dis- trict Court's discretionary declination of pendent jurisdiction. Id., at 715­ 716. Thus, the case decided not a merits question before a jurisdictional question, but a discretionary jurisdictional question before a nondiscre- tionary jurisdictional question. Similarly in Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U. S. 426, 436 (1975), the "authoritative ground of decision" upon which the District Court relied in lieu of determining whether there was a case or contro- versy was Younger abstention, which we have treated as jurisdictional. And finally, the issue pretermitted in Neese v. Southern R. Co., 350 U. S. 77 (1955) (per curiam), was not Article III jurisdiction at all, but the substantive question whether the Seventh Amendment permits an appel- late court to review the district court's denial of a motion for new trial on the ground that the verdict was excessive. We declined to consider that question because we agreed with the District Court's decision to deny the motion on the facts in the record. The more numerous the look-alike- but-inapposite cases Justice Stevens cites, the more strikingly clear it becomes: His concurrence cannot identify a single opinion of ours deciding the merits before a disputed question of Article III jurisdiction. 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 102 STEEL CO. v. CITIZENS FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENT Opinion of the Court risdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court to act ultra vires. IV Having reached the end of what seems like a long front walk, we finally arrive at the threshold jurisdictional ques- tion: whether respondent, the plaintiff below, has standing to sue. Article III, § 2, of the Constitution extends the "ju- dicial Power" of the United States only to "Cases" and "Con- troversies." We have always taken this to mean cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to, and re- solved by, the judicial process. Muskrat v. United States, supra, at 356­357. Such a meaning is fairly implied by the text, since otherwise the purported restriction upon the ju- dicial power would scarcely be a restriction at all. Every criminal investigation conducted by the Executive is a "case," and every policy issue resolved by congressional leg- islation involves a "controversy." These are not, however, the sort of cases and controversies that Article III, § 2, refers to, since "the Constitution's central mechanism of separation of powers depends largely upon common understanding of what activities are appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and to courts." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 559­560 (1992). Standing to sue is part of the common understanding of what it takes to make a justiciable case. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155 (1990).4 The "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing" con- tains three requirements. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 4 Our opinion is not motivated, as Justice Stevens suggests, by the more specific separation-of-powers concern that this citizen's suit "some- how interferes with the Executive's power to `take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,' Art. II, § 3," post, at 129. The courts must stay within their constitutionally prescribed sphere of action, whether or not exceeding that sphere will harm one of the other two branches. This case calls for nothing more than a straightforward application of our standing jurisprudence, which, though it may sometimes have an impact on Presi- dential powers, derives from Article III and not Article II. 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 83 (1998) 103 Opinion of the Court supra, at 560. First and foremost, there must be alleged (and ultimately proved) an "injury in fact"-a harm suffered by the plaintiff that is "concrete" and "actual or imminent, not `conjectural' or `hypothetical.' " Whitmore v. Arkansas, supra, at 149, 155 (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 101­102 (1983)). Second, there must be causation-a fairly traceable connection between the plaintiff's injury and the complained-of conduct of the defendant. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 41­42 (1976). And third, there must be redressability-a likelihood that the requested relief will redress the alleged injury. Id., at 45­46; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 505 (1975). This triad of injury in fact, causation, and re- dressability 5 constitutes the core of Article III's case-or- 5 Contrary to Justice Stevens' belief that redressability "is a judicial creation of the past 25 years," post, at 124, the concept has been ingrained in our jurisprudence from the beginning. Although we have packaged the requirements of constitutional "case" or "controversy" somewhat dif- ferently in the past 25 years-an era rich in three-part tests-the point has always been the same: whether a plaintiff "personally would benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention." Warth, 422 U. S., at 508. For example, in Marye v. Parsons, 114 U. S. 325, 328­329 (1885), we held that a bill in equity should have been dismissed because it was a clear case of "damnum absque injuria ." Although the complainant alleged a breach of contract by the State, the complainant "asks no relief as to that, for there is no remedy by suit to compel the State to pay its debts. . . . The bill as framed, therefore, calls for a declaration of an abstract character." Because courts do not "si[t] to determine questions of law in thesi," we remanded with directions to dismiss the bill. Id., at 328­330. Also contrary to Justice Stevens' unprecedented suggestion, post, at 125, redressability-like the other prongs of the standing inquiry-does not depend on the defendant's status as a governmental entity. There is no conceivable reason why it should. If it is true, as Justice Stevens claims, that all of the cases in which the Court has denied standing because of a lack of redressability happened to involve government action or inac- tion, that would be unsurprising. Suits that promise no concrete benefit to the plaintiff, and that are brought to have us "determine questions of law in thesi," Marye, supra, at 330, are most often inspired by the psycho- logical smart of perceived official injustice, or by the government-policy 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 104 STEEL CO. v. CITIZENS FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENT Opinion of the Court controversy requirement, and the party invoking federal ju- risdiction bears the burden of establishing its existence. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U. S. 215, 231 (1990). We turn now to the particulars of respondent's complaint to see how it measures up to Article III's requirements. This case is on appeal from a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss on the pleadings, so we must presume that the general alle- gations in the complaint encompass the specific facts neces- sary to support those allegations. Lujan v. National Wild- life Federation, 497 U. S. 871, 889 (1990). The complaint contains claims "on behalf of both [respondent] itself and its members." 6 App. 4. It describes respondent as an organi- zation that seeks, uses, and acquires data reported under EPCRA. It says that respondent "reports to its members and the public about storage and releases of toxic chemicals into the environment, advocates changes in environmental regulations and statutes, prepares reports for its members and the public, seeks the reduction of toxic chemicals and further seeks to promote the effective enforcement of envi- ronmental laws." Id., at 5. The complaint asserts that re- spondent's "right to know about [toxic-chemical] releases and its interests in protecting and improving the environment and the health of its members have been, are being, and will be adversely affected by [petitioner's] actions in failing to provide timely and required information under EPCRA." Ibid. The complaint also alleges that respondent's mem- bers, who live in or frequent the area near petitioner's facil- ity, use the EPCRA-reported information "to learn about preferences of political activists. But the principle of redressability has broader application than that. 6 EPCRA states that "any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf . . . ." 42 U. S. C. § 11046(a)(1) (emphasis added). "[P]erson" includes an association, see § 11049(7), so it is arguable that the statute permits respondent to vindicate only its own interests as an organization, and not the interests of its individual members. Since it makes no differ- ence to our disposition of the case, we assume without deciding that the interests of individual members may be the basis of suit. 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 83 (1998) 105 Opinion of the Court toxic chemical releases, the use of hazardous substances in their communities, to plan emergency preparedness in the event of accidents, and to attempt to reduce the toxic chemi- cals in areas in which they live, work and visit." Ibid. The members' "safety, health, recreational, economic, aesthetic and environmental interests" in the information, it is claimed, "have been, are being, and will be adversely af- fected by [petitioner's] actions in failing to file timely and required reports under EPCRA." Ibid. As appears from the above, respondent asserts petitioner's failure to provide EPCRA information in a timely fashion, and the lingering effects of that failure, as the injury in fact to itself and its members. We have not had occasion to decide whether being deprived of information that is sup- posed to be disclosed under EPCRA-or at least being de- prived of it when one has a particular plan for its use-is a concrete injury in fact that satisfies Article III. Cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S., at 578. And we need not reach that question in the present case because, assuming injury in fact, the complaint fails the third test of standing, redressability. The complaint asks for (1) a declaratory judgment that petitioner violated EPCRA; (2) authorization to inspect peri- odically petitioner's facility and records (with costs borne by petitioner); (3) an order requiring petitioner to provide re- spondent copies of all compliance reports submitted to the EPA; (4) an order requiring petitioner to pay civil penalties of $25,000 per day for each violation of §§ 11022 and 11023; (5) an award of all respondent's "costs, in connection with the investigation and prosecution of this matter, including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees, as authorized by Section 326(f) of [EPCRA]"; and (6) any such further relief as the court deems appropriate. App. 11. None of the specific items of relief sought, and none that we can envi- sion as "appropriate" under the general request, would serve to reimburse respondent for losses caused by the late re- 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 106 STEEL CO. v. CITIZENS FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENT Opinion of the Court porting, or to eliminate any effects of that late reporting upon respondent.7 The first item, the request for a declaratory judgment that petitioner violated EPCRA, can be disposed of summarily. There being no controversy over whether petitioner failed to file reports, or over whether such a failure constitutes a violation, the declaratory judgment is not only worthless to respondent, it is seemingly worthless to all the world. See Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U. S. 472, 479 (1990). Item (4), the civil penalties authorized by the statute, see § 11045(c), might be viewed as a sort of compensation or re- dress to respondent if they were payable to respondent. But they are not. These penalties-the only damages au- thorized by EPCRA-are payable to the United States Treasury. In requesting them, therefore, respondent seeks not remediation of its own injury-reimbursement for the costs it incurred as a result of the late filing-but vindica- tion of the rule of law-the "undifferentiated public interest" in faithful execution of EPCRA. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, supra, at 577; see also Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U. S. 126, 129­130 (1922). This does not suffice. Justice Stevens thinks it is enough that respondent will be gratified by seeing petitioner punished for its infractions and that the 7 Justice Stevens claims that redressability was found lacking in our prior cases because the relief required action by a party not before the Court. Post, at 125­126. Even if that were so, it would not prove that redressability is lacking only when relief depends on the actions of a third party. But in any event, Justice Stevens has overlooked deci- sions that destroy his premise. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 105 (1983); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 495­496 (1974). He also seems to suggest that redressability always exists when the defendant has directly injured the plaintiff. If that were so, the redressability require- ment would be entirely superfluous, since the causation requirement asks whether the injury is "fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] resul[t] [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court." Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 41­42 (1976). 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 83 (1998) 107 Opinion of the Court punishment will deter the risk of future harm. Post, at 127­128. If that were so, our holdings in Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614 (1973), and Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26 (1976), are inex- plicable. Obviously, such a principle would make the re- dressability requirement vanish. By the mere bringing of his suit, every plaintiff demonstrates his belief that a favor- able judgment will make him happier. But although a suitor may derive great comfort and joy from the fact that the United States Treasury is not cheated, that a wrongdoer gets his just deserts, or that the Nation's laws are faithfully en- forced, that psychic satisfaction is not an acceptable Article III remedy because it does not redress a cognizable Article III injury. See, e. g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 754­755 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 482­ 483 (1982). Relief that does not remedy the injury suffered cannot bootstrap a plaintiff into federal court; that is the very essence of the redressability requirement. Item (5), the "investigation and prosecution" costs "as authorized by Section 326(f)," would assuredly benefit re- spondent as opposed to the citizenry at large. Obviously, however, a plaintiff cannot achieve standing to litigate a substantive issue by bringing suit for the cost of bringing suit. The litigation must give the plaintiff some other bene- fit besides reimbursement of costs that are a byproduct of the litigation itself. An "interest in attorney's fees is . . . insufficient to create an Article III case or controversy where none exists on the merits of the underlying claim." Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., supra, at 480 (citing Dia- mond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54, 70­71 (1986)). Respondent asserts that the "investigation costs" it seeks were incurred prior to the litigation, in digging up the emissions and stor- age information that petitioner should have filed, and that respondent needed for its own purposes. See Brief for Re- spondent 37­38. The recovery of such expenses unrelated 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 108 STEEL CO. v. CITIZENS FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENT Opinion of the Court to litigation would assuredly support Article III standing, but the problem is that § 326(f), which is the entitlement to monetary relief that the complaint invokes, covers only the "costs of litigation." 8 § 11046(f). Respondent finds itself, in other words, impaled upon the horns of a dilemma: For the expenses to be reimbursable under the statute, they must be costs of litigation; but reimbursement of the costs of litiga- tion cannot alone support standing.9 The remaining relief respondent seeks (item (2), giving respondent authority to inspect petitioner's facility and rec- ords, and item (3), compelling petitioner to provide respond- ent copies of EPA compliance reports) is injunctive in nature. It cannot conceivably remedy any past wrong but is aimed at deterring petitioner from violating EPCRA in the future. See Brief for Respondent 36. The latter objective can of course be "remedial" for Article III purposes, when threat- ened injury is one of the gravamens of the complaint. If respondent had alleged a continuing violation or the immi- nence of a future violation, the injunctive relief requested would remedy that alleged harm. But there is no such alle- gation here-and on the facts of the case, there seems no basis for it. Nothing supports the requested injunctive re- lief except respondent's generalized interest in deterrence, 8 Section 326(f) reads: "The court, in issuing any final order in any action brought pursuant to this section, may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to the prevailing or the sub- stantially prevailing party whenever the court determines such an award is appropriate." 42 U. S. C. § 11046(f). 9 Justice Stevens contends, post, at 123­124, n. 16, that this argument involves us in a construction of the statute, and thus belies our insistence that jurisdictional issues be resolved first. It involves us in a construction of the statute only to the extent of rejecting as frivolous the contention that costs incurred for respondent's own purposes, not in preparation for litigation (and hence sufficient to support Article III standing), are none- theless "costs of litigation" under the statute. As we have described earlier, our cases make clear that frivolous claims are themselves a juris- dictional defect. See supra, at 89. 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 83 (1998) 109 Opinion of the Court which is insufficient for purposes of Article III. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S., at 111. The United States, as amicus curiae, argues that the in- junctive relief does constitute remediation because "there is a presumption of [future] injury when the defendant has voluntarily ceased its illegal activity in response to litiga- tion," even if that occurs before a complaint is filed. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27­28, and n. 11. This makes a sword out of a shield. The "presumption" the Gov- ernment refers to has been applied to refute the assertion of mootness by a defendant who, when sued in a complaint that alleges present or threatened injury, ceases the complained-of activity. See, e. g., United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 632 (1953). It is an immense and unacceptable stretch to call the presumption into service as a substitute for the allegation of present or threatened injury upon which initial standing must be based. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, supra, at 109. To accept the Government's view would be to overrule our clear precedent requiring that the allegations of future injury be particular and concrete. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 496­497 (1974). "Past ex- posure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unac- companied by any continuing, present adverse effects." Id., at 495­496; see also Renne v. Geary, 501 U. S. 312, 320 (1991) ("[T]he mootness exception for disputes capable of repetition yet evading review . . . will not revive a dispute which be- came moot before the action commenced"). Because re- spondent alleges only past infractions of EPCRA, and not a continuing violation or the likelihood of a future violation, injunctive relief will not redress its injury. * * * Having found that none of the relief sought by respondent would likely remedy its alleged injury in fact, we must con- clude that respondent lacks standing to maintain this suit, 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 110 STEEL CO. v. CITIZENS FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENT O'Connor, J., concurring and that we and the lower courts lack jurisdiction to enter- tain it. However desirable prompt resolution of the merits EPCRA question may be, it is not as important as observing the constitutional limits set upon courts in our system of sep- arated powers. EPCRA will have to await another day. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to direct that the complaint be dismissed. It is so ordered. Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Kennedy joins, concurring. I join the Court's opinion. I agree that our precedent sup- ports the Court's holding that respondent lacks Article III standing because its injuries cannot be redressed by a judg- ment that would, in effect, require only the payment of pen- alties to the United States Treasury. As the Court notes, ante, at 108, had respondent alleged a continuing or immi- nent violation of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA), 42 U. S. C. § 11046, the requested injunctive relief may well have redressed the asserted injury. I also agree with the Court's statement that federal courts should be certain of their jurisdiction before reaching the merits of a case. As the Court acknowledges, however, sev- eral of our decisions "have diluted the absolute purity of the rule that Article III jurisdiction is always an antecedent question." Ante, at 101. The opinion of the Court ade- quately describes why the assumption of jurisdiction was de- fensible in those cases, see ante, at 98­100, and why it is not in this case, see ante, at 92­93. I write separately to note that, in my view, the Court's opinion should not be read as cataloging an exhaustive list of circumstances under which federal courts may exercise judgment in "reserv[ing] difficult questions of . . . jurisdiction when the case alternatively 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 83 (1998) 111 Opinion of Breyer, J. could be resolved on the merits in favor of the same party," Norton v. Mathews, 427 U. S. 524, 532 (1976). Justice Breyer, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I agree with the Court that the respondent in this case lacks Article III standing. I further agree that federal courts often, and typically should, decide standing questions at the outset of a case. That order of decision (first jurisdic- tion then the merits) helps better to restrict the use of the federal courts to those adversarial disputes that Article III defines as the federal judiciary's business. But my qualify- ing words "often" and "typically" are important. The Con- stitution, in my view, does not require us to replace those words with the word "always." The Constitution does not impose a rigid judicial "order of operations," when doing so would cause serious practical problems. This Court has previously made clear that courts may "re- serv[e] difficult questions of . . . jurisdiction when the case alternatively could be resolved on the merits in favor of the same party." Norton v. Mathews, 427 U. S. 524, 532 (1976). That rule makes theoretical sense, for the difficulty of the jurisdictional question makes reasonable the court's juris- dictional assumption. And that rule makes enormous prac- tical sense. Whom does it help to have appellate judges spend their time and energy puzzling over the correct an- swer to an intractable jurisdictional matter, when (assum- ing an easy answer on the substantive merits) the same party would win or lose regardless? More importantly, to insist upon a rigid "order of operations" in today's world of federal-court caseloads that have grown enormously over a generation means unnecessary delay and consequent added cost. See L. Mecham, Judicial Business of the United States Courts: 1996 Report of the Director 16, 18, 23; Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 112 STEEL CO. v. CITIZENS FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENT Stevens, J., concurring in judgment 106, 115, 143 (1971) (indicating that between 1971 and 1996, annual appellate court caseloads increased from 132 to 311 cases filed per judgeship, and district court caseloads in- creased from 341 to 490 cases filed per judgeship). It means a more cumbersome system. It thereby increases, to at least a small degree, the risk of the "justice delayed" that means "justice denied." For this reason, I would not make the ordinary sequence an absolute requirement. Nor, even though the case before us is ordinary, not exceptional, would I simply reserve judg- ment about the matter. Ante, at 110­111 (O'Connor, J., concurring). I therefore join only Parts I and IV of the Court's opinion. Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter joins as to Parts I, III, and IV, and with whom Justice Ginsburg joins as to Part III, concurring in the judgment. This case presents two questions: (1) whether the Emer- gency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA), 42 U. S. C. § 11001 et seq., confers federal jurisdic- tion over citizen suits for wholly past violations; and (2) if so, whether respondent has standing under Article III of the Constitution. The Court has elected to decide the constitu- tional question first and, in doing so, has created new consti- tutional law. Because it is always prudent to avoid passing unnecessarily on an undecided constitutional question, see Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 345­348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), the Court should answer the statutory ques- tion first. Moreover, because EPCRA, properly construed, does not confer jurisdiction over citizen suits for wholly past violations, the Court should leave the constitutional question for another day. I The statutory issue in this case can be viewed in one of two ways: whether EPCRA confers "jurisdiction" over citi- zen suits for wholly past violations, or whether the statute 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 83 (1998) 113 Stevens, J., concurring in judgment creates such a "cause of action." Under either analysis, the Court has the power to answer the statutory question first. EPCRA frames the question in terms of "jurisdiction." Section 326(c) states: "The district court shall have jurisdiction in actions brought under [§ 326(a)] against an owner or operator of a facility to enforce the requirement concerned and to impose any civil penalty provided for violation of that requirement." 42 U. S. C. § 11046(c). Thus, if § 326(a) authorizes citizen suits for wholly past viola- tions, the district court has jurisdiction over these actions; if it does not, the court lacks jurisdiction. Given the text of the statute, it is not surprising that the parties and the District Court framed the question in juris- dictional terms. Respondent's complaint alleged that the District Court had "subject matter jurisdiction under Sec- tion 326(a) of EPCRA, 42 U. S. C. § 11046(a)." App. 3. The merits questions that were raised by respondent's complaint were whether Steel Company violated EPCRA and, if so, what relief should be granted. The District Court, however, made no ruling on the merits when it granted Steel Com- pany's motion to dismiss. It held that dismissal was re- quired because respondent had merely alleged "a failure to timely file the required reports, a violation of the Act for which there is no jurisdiction for a citizen suit." App. to Pet. for Cert. A26.1 Steel Company has also framed the 1 See also Don't Waste Arizona, Inc. v. McLane Foods, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 972, 977­978 (Ariz. 1997) ("[T]his Court has jurisdiction to hear this citizen suit brought pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 11046(a) for a wholly past violation of the EPCRA"); Delaware Valley Toxics Coalition v. Kurz-Hastings, 813 F. Supp. 1132, 1141 (ED Pa. 1993) ("This court concludes that 42 U. S. C. § 11046(a)(1) does provide the federal courts with jurisdiction for wholly past violations of the EPCRA"); Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Whiting Roll-Up Door Manufacturing Corp., 772 F. Supp. 745, 750 (WDNY 1991) ("The plain language of EPCRA's reporting, enforcement and civil penalty provisions, when logically viewed together, compel a con- 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 114 STEEL CO. v. CITIZENS FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENT Stevens, J., concurring in judgment question as a jurisdictional one in its briefs before this Court.2 The threshold issue concerning the meaning of § 326 is vir- tually identical to the question that we decided in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U. S. 49 (1987). In that case, we considered whether § 505(a) of the Clean Water Act allows suits for wholly past viola- tions.3 We unanimously characterized that question as a matter of "jurisdiction": "In this case, we must decide whether § 505(a) of the Clean Water Act, also known as the Federal Water Pol- lution Control Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1365(a), confers federal jurisdiction over citizen suits for wholly past violations." Id., at 52. See also Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S. 340, 353, n. 4 (1984) (citing National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of Railroad Passengers, 414 U. S. 453, 456, 465, n. 13 (1974)). If we resolve the comparable statutory issue in the same way in this case, federal courts will have no jurisdiction to address the merits in future simi- lar cases. Thus, this is not a case in which the choice be- tween resolving the statutory question or the standing question first is a choice between a merits issue and a juris- clusion that EPCRA confers federal jurisdiction over citizen lawsuits for past violations"). 2 Brief for Petitioner 12 ("A statute conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts should . . . be strictly construed, and any doubts resolved against jurisdiction. Here there are serious doubts that Congress intended citi- zens to sue for past EPCRA violations, and all citizen plaintiffs can high- light is a slight difference in language and attempt to stretch that differ- ence into federal jurisdiction"); see also id., at 26, 30. 3 Gwaltney contended that "because its last recorded violation occurred several weeks before respondents filed their complaint, the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over respondents' action." Gwaltney, 484 U. S., at 55. 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 83 (1998) 115 Stevens, J., concurring in judgment dictional issue; rather, it is a choice between two jurisdic- tional issues. We have routinely held that when presented with two ju- risdictional questions, the Court may choose which one to answer first. In Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727 (1972), for example, we were presented with a choice between a statutory jurisdictional question and a question of Article III standing. In that case, the United States, as respondent, argued that petitioner lacked standing under the Adminis- trative Procedure Act and under the Constitution.4 Rather than taking up the constitutional issue, the Court stated: "Where . . . Congress has authorized public officials to perform certain functions according to law, and has pro- vided by statute for judicial review of those actions under certain circumstances, the inquiry as to standing must begin with a determination of whether the statute in question authorizes review at the behest of the plain- tiff." Id., at 732 (emphasis added). The Court concluded that petitioner lacked standing under the statute, id., at 732­741, and, therefore, did not need to 4 405 U. S., at 753­755 (App. to opinion of Douglas, J., dissenting) (Ex- tract from Oral Argument of the Solicitor General); Brief for Respondent in Sierra Club v. Morton, O. T. 1970, No. 70­34, p. 18 ("The irreducible minimum requirement of standing reflects the constitutional limitation of judicial power to `Cases' and `Controversies'-`whether the party invoking federal court jurisdiction has "a personal stake in the outcome of the con- troversy" . . . and whether the dispute touches upon the "legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests." ' Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 101 [(1968)]"); see also Brief for County of Tulare as Amicus Curiae in Sierra Club v. Morton, O. T. 1970, No. 70­34, pp. 13­14 ("This Court long ago held that to have standing . . . a party must show he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury . . . and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people gen- erally. This is an outgrowth of Article III of the Constitution which limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to cases and controversies. U. S. Const., art. III, § 2" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 116 STEEL CO. v. CITIZENS FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENT Stevens, J., concurring in judgment decide whether petitioner had suffered a sufficient injury under Article III. Similarly, in Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S. 340 (1984), the Court was faced with a choice between a statutory jurisdictional issue and a question of Article III standing. The Court of Appeals had held that the respond- ents had standing under both the statute and the Constitu- tion. 698 F. 2d 1239, 1244­1252 (CADC 1983). On writ of certiorari to this Court, the United States, as petitioner, ar- gued both issues: that the respondents did not come within the "zone of interests" of the statute, and that they did not have standing under Article III of the Constitution.5 A unanimous Court bypassed the constitutional standing ques- tion in order to decide the statutory question. It therefore construed the statute, and concluded that respondents could not bring suit under the statute. The only mention of the constitutional question came in a footnote at the end of the opinion: "Since congressional preclusion of judicial review is in effect jurisdictional, we need not address the standing issue decided by the Court of Appeals in this case." Block, 467 U. S., at 353, n. 4 (citing National Railroad Passenger Corp., 414 U. S., at 456, 465, and n. 13). Finally, in Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91 (1979), we were also faced with a choice between a statutory and constitutional jurisdictional question. Id., at 93 ("This case presents both statutory and constitutional questions concerning standing to sue under Title VIII"). The statutory question was whether respondents had stand- ing to sue under § 812 of the Fair Housing Act. The Court, 5 Brief for Petitioners in Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, O. T. 1983, No. 83­458, pp. 32­50 (arguing that respondents failed to meet the injury-in-fact and redressability requirements of Article III); see also Brief for Respondents in Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, O. T. 1983, No. 83­458, pp. 17­28; Reply Brief for Petitioners in Block v. Com- munity Nutrition Institute, O. T. 1983, No. 83­458, pp. 15­17. 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 83 (1998) 117 Stevens, J., concurring in judgment reluctant to address the constitutional question, opted to de- cide the statutory question first so as to avoid the constitu- tional question if possible: "The issue [of the meaning of § 812] is a critical one, for if the District Court correctly understood and applied § 812 [in denying respondents standing under the stat- ute], we do not reach the question whether the minimum requirements of Art. III have been satisfied. If the Court of Appeals is correct [in holding that respondents have statutory standing], however, then the constitu- tional question is squarely presented." Id., at 101. See also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U. S. 154, 164 (1997) (footnote omitted) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (stating that "[t]he first ques- tion in the present case is whether the [Endangered Species Act's] citizen-suit provision . . . negates the zone-of-interests test," and turning to the constitutional standing question only after determining that standing existed under the stat- ute); Food and Commercial Workers v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U. S. 544, 548­550 (1996) (analyzing the statutory ques- tion before turning to the constitutional standing question); Cross-Sound Ferry Services, Inc. v. ICC, 934 F. 2d 327, 341 (CADC 1991) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in denial of petition for review) (courts exceed the scope of their power "only if the ground passed over is jurisdictional and the ground rested upon is non-jurisdictional, for courts properly rest on one jurisdictional ground instead of an- other"). Thus, our precedents clearly support the proposi- tion that, given a choice between two jurisdictional ques- tions-one statutory and the other constitutional-the Court has the power to answer the statutory question first. Rather than framing the question in terms of "jurisdic- tion," it is also possible to characterize the statutory issue in this case as whether respondent's complaint states a "cause 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 118 STEEL CO. v. CITIZENS FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENT Stevens, J., concurring in judgment of action." 6 Framed this way, it is also clear that we have the power to decide the statutory question first. As our holding in Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 681­685 (1946), demon- strates, just as a court always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction, United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 290 (1947), a federal court also has jurisdiction to decide whether a plaintiff who alleges that she has been injured by a violation of federal law has stated a cause of action.7 In- deed, Bell held that we have jurisdiction to decide this ques- tion even when it is unclear whether the plaintiff's injuries can be redressed.8 Thus, Bell demonstrates that the Court 6 As Justice Cardozo stated, " ` "cause of action" may mean one thing for one purpose and something different for another.' " Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228, 237 (1979) (quoting United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U. S. 62, 67­68 (1933)). Under one meaning of the term, it is clear that citizens have a "cause of action" to sue under the statute. Under that meaning, "cause of action is a question of whether a particular plaintiff is a member of the class of litigants that may, as a matter of law, appropri- ately invoke the power of the court." Davis, 442 U. S., at 240, and n. 18 (emphasis deleted); see also id., at 239 ("The concept of a `cause of action' is employed specifically to determine who may judicially enforce the statu- tory rights or obligations" (emphasis added)). Since EPCRA expressly gives citizens the right to sue, 42 U. S. C. § 11046(a)(1), there is no question that citizens are "member[s] of the class of litigants that may, as a matter of law, appropriately invoke the power of the court," Davis, 442 U. S., at 240, and n. 18. 7 "Jurisdiction . . . is not defeated . . . by the possibility that the aver- ments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actu- ally recover." Bell, 327 U. S., at 682. 8 In Bell, a precursor to Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), petitioners brought suit in federal court "to recover damages in excess of $3,000 from . . . agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation" for allegedly violating their Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. 327 U. S., at 679. The question whether petitioners' injuries were redressable-"whether federal courts can grant money recovery for damages said to have been suffered as a result of federal officers violating the Fourth and Fifth Amendments"-was an open one, id., at 684 (which the Court did not decide until Bivens, 403 U. S., at 389). Nonetheless, 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 83 (1998) 119 Stevens, J., concurring in judgment has the power to decide whether a cause of action exists even when it is unclear whether the plaintiff has standing.9 National Railroad Passenger Corp. also makes it clear that we have the power to decide this question before ad- dressing other threshold issues. In that case, we were faced with the interrelated questions of "whether the Amtrak Act can be read to create a private right of action to enforce compliance with its provisions; whether a federal district court has jurisdiction under the terms of the Act to entertain such a suit [under 28 U. S. C. § 1337 10]; and whether respond- ent has [statutory] standing to bring such a suit." 414 U. S., at 455­456. In choosing its method of analysis, the Court stated: even though it was unclear whether there was a remedy, the Court held that federal courts have jurisdiction to determine whether a cause of action exists. 327 U. S., at 685. 9 The Court incorrectly states that I "used to understand the fundamen- tal distinction between arguing no cause of action and arguing no Article III redressability," ante, at 96. The Court gives me too much credit. I have never understood any fundamental difference between arguing: (1) plaintiff's complaint does not allege a cause of action because the law does "not provide a remedy" for the plaintiff's injury; and (2) plaintiff's injury is "not redressable." In Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 398 (1979), we stated that the absence of a remedy, i. e., the lack of redressability, was not the sort of jurisdictional issue that the Court raises on its own motion. That was the law when that case was decided, and it would still be the law today if the Court had not supplemented the standing analysis set forth in Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962), with its current fascination with "redressability." What has changed is not the admittedly imperfect state of my understand- ing, but rather the state of the Court's standing doctrine. 10 Section 1337 states, in relevant part: "[D]istrict courts shall have orig- inal jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies." 28 U. S. C. § 1337(a); see also Potomac Pas- sengers Assn. v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 475 F. 2d 325, 339 (CADC 1973), rev'd on other grounds, National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of Railroad Passengers, 414 U. S. 453 (1974). 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 120 STEEL CO. v. CITIZENS FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENT Stevens, J., concurring in judgment "[H]owever phrased, the threshold question clearly is whether the Amtrak Act or any other provision of law creates a cause of action whereby a private party such as the respondent can enforce duties and obligations im- posed by the Act; for it is only if such a right of action exists that we need consider whether the respondent had standing to bring the action and whether the Dis- trict Court had jurisdiction to entertain it." Id., at 456 (emphasis added).11 After determining that there was no cause of action under the statute, the Court concluded: "Since we hold that no right of action exists, questions of standing and jurisdiction become immaterial." Id., at 465, n. 13.12 Thus, regardless of whether we characterize this issue in terms of "jurisdiction" or "causes of action," the Court clearly has the power to address the statutory question first. Gwaltney itself powerfully demonstrates this point. As noted, that case involved a statutory question virtually iden- tical to the one presented here-whether the statute permit- ted citizens to sue for wholly past violations. While the Court framed the question as one of "jurisdiction," supra, at 114, it could also be said that the case presented the question whether the plaintiffs had a "cause of action." Regardless of the label, the Court resolved the statutory question with- out pausing to consider whether the plaintiffs had standing 11 The Court distinguished this "threshold question" from respondent's claim "on the merits," id., at 455, n. 3. 12 In insisting that the Article III standing question must be answered first, the Court finds itself in a logical dilemma. For if "A" (whether a cause of action exists) can be decided before "B" (whether there is statu- tory standing), id., at 456, 465, n. 13; and if "B" (whether there is statutory standing) can be decided before "C" (whether there is Article III stand- ing), e. g., Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S. 340, 353, n. 4 (1984); then logic dictates that "A" (whether a cause of action exists) can be decided before "C" (whether there is Article III standing)-precisely the issue of this case. 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 83 (1998) 121 Stevens, J., concurring in judgment to sue for wholly past violations.13 Of course, the fact that we did not discuss standing in Gwaltney does not establish that the plaintiffs had standing there. Nonetheless, it sup- ports the proposition that-regardless of how the issue is characterized-the Court has the power to address the vir- tually identical statutory question in this case as well. The Court disagrees, arguing that the standing question must be addressed first. Ironically, however, before "first" addressing standing, the Court takes a long excursion that entirely loses sight of the basic reason why standing is a matter of such importance to the proper functioning of the judicial process. The "gist of the question of standing" is whether plaintiffs have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete ad- verseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of diffi- cult constitutional questions." 14 The Court completely dis- regards this core purpose of standing in its discussion of "hypothetical jurisdiction." Not only is that portion of the Court's opinion pure dictum because it is entirely unneces- sary to an explanation of the Court's decision; it is also not informed by any adversary submission by either party. Neither the topic of "hypothetical jurisdiction," nor any of the cases analyzed, distinguished, and criticized in Part III, was the subject of any comment in any of the briefs submit- ted by the parties or their amici. It therefore did not bene- fit from the "concrete adverseness" that the standing doc- trine is meant to ensure. The discussion, in short, "comes 13 In Gwaltney, in addition to answering the question whether the stat- ute confers jurisdiction over citizen suits for wholly past violations, we considered whether the allegation of ongoing injury sufficed to support jurisdiction. The fact that we discussed "standing" in connection with that secondary issue, 484 U. S., at 65­66, adds significance to the omission of even a passing reference to any standing issue in connection with the principal holding. 14 Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S., at 204. 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 122 STEEL CO. v. CITIZENS FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENT Stevens, J., concurring in judgment to the same thing as an advisory opinion, disapproved by this Court from the beginning." Ante, at 101; see also Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 362 (1911) (stressing that Ar- ticle III limits federal courts to "deciding cases or controver- sies arising between opposing parties").15 15 The Court boldly distinguishes away no fewer than five of our prece- dents. In each of these five cases, the Court avoided deciding a jurisdic- tional issue by assuming that jurisdiction existed for the purpose of that case. In Norton v. Mathews, 427 U. S. 524, 532 (1976), for example, we stated: "It . . . is evident that, whichever disposition we undertake, the effect is the same. It follows that there is no need to decide the theoretical question of jurisdiction in this case. In the past, we similarly have re- served difficult questions of our jurisdiction when the case alternatively could be resolved on the merits in favor of the same party. See Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U. S. 676 (1974). The Court has done this even when the original reason for granting certiorari was to resolve the jurisdictional issue. See United States v. Augenblick, 393 U. S. 348, 349­ 352 (1969). . . . Making the assumption, then, without deciding, that our jurisdiction in this cause is established, we affirm the judgment in favor of the Secretary . . . ." See also Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U. S. 707, 720­722 (1975) (opinion of Rehnquist, J.) (declining to reach "subtle and complex" jurisdictional issue and assuming that jurisdiction existed); Secretary of Navy v. Avrech, 418 U. S. 676, 677­678 (1974) (per curiam) ("[a]ssuming, arguendo, that the District Court had jurisdiction"; leaving "to a future case the resolution of the jurisdictional issue"); Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit, 398 U. S. 74, 89 (1970) ("Whether the Council's action was administrative action not reviewable in this Court, or whether it is reviewable here, plainly petitioner has not made a case for the extraordinary relief of man- damus or prohibition"); United States v. Augenblick, 393 U. S. 348, 351­352 (1969) (assuming, arguendo, that jurisdiction existed). Moreover, in addition to the five cases that the Court distinguishes, there are other cases that support the notion that a court can assume jurisdiction. See, e. g., Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693, 715 (1973) ("Whether there exists judicial power to hear the state law claims against the County is, in short, a subtle and complex question with far- reaching implications. But we do not consider it appropriate to resolve this difficult issue in the present case, for we have concluded that even assuming, arguendo, the existence of power to hear the claim, the District Court [did not err]"); Neese v. Southern R. Co., 350 U. S. 77 (1955) (per 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 83 (1998) 123 Stevens, J., concurring in judgment The doctrine of "hypothetical jurisdiction" is irrelevant because this case presents us with a choice between two threshold questions that are intricately interrelated-as there is only a standing problem if the statute confers juris- diction over suits for wholly past violations. The Court's opinion reflects this fact, as its analysis of the standing issue is predicated on the hypothesis that § 326 may be read to confer jurisdiction over citizen suits for wholly past viola- tions. If, as I think it should, the Court were to reject that hypothesis and construe § 326,16 the standing discussion curiam) ("We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals without reaching the constitutional challenge to that court's jurisdiction . . . . Even assuming such appellate power to exist . . . , [the Court of Appeals erred]"); see also Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U. S. 426, 436 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("While it would have been more in keeping with conventional adjudication had [the District Court] first inquired as to the existence of a case or controversy, . . . I cannot fault the District Court for disposing of the case on what it quite properly regarded at that time as an authori- tative ground of decision. Indeed, this Court has on occasion followed essentially the same practice"). Because this case involves a choice between two threshold questions that are intricately interrelated, I do not take a position on the propriety of courts assuming jurisdiction. Nonetheless, I strongly disagree with the Court's decision to reach out and decide this question, especially in light of the fact that we have not had the benefit of briefing and argument. See Philbrook, 421 U. S., at 721 (opinion of Rehnquist, J.) (declining to answer a "complex question of federal jurisdiction" because of "the ab- sence of substantial aid from the briefs of either of the parties"); Avrech, 418 U. S., at 677 ("Without the benefit of further oral argument, we are unwilling to decide the difficult jurisdictional issue which the parties have briefed"); ante, at 99 (noting that the Avrech Court "was unwilling to de- cide the jurisdictional question without oral argument" and emphasizing the importance of zealous advocacy to sharpen issues). 16 Indeed, the Court acknowledges-as it must-that the Court has the power to construe the statute, as it is impossible to resolve the standing issue without construing some provisions of EPCRA. Thus, in order to determine whether respondent's investigation and prosecution costs are sufficient to confer standing, the Court construes § 326(f) of EPCRA, which authorizes the district court to "award costs of litigation" to the prevailing party. Ante, at 107­108. Yet if § 326(f) were construed to 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 124 STEEL CO. v. CITIZENS FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENT Stevens, J., concurring in judgment would be entirely unnecessary. Thus, ironically, the Court is engaged in a version of the "hypothetical jurisdiction" that it has taken pains to condemn at some length. II There is an important reason for addressing the statutory question first: to avoid unnecessarily passing on an undecided constitutional question. New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U. S. 568, 582­583 (1979); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 345­348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).17 Whether correct or incorrect, the Court's constitutional hold- ing represents a significant extension of prior case law. The Court's conclusion that respondent does not have standing comes from a mechanistic application of the "re- dressability" aspect of our standing doctrine. "Redressabil- ity," of course, does not appear anywhere in the text of the Constitution. Instead, it is a judicial creation of the past 25 years, see Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organiza- tion, 426 U. S. 26, 38, 41­46 (1976); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617­618 (1973)-a judicial interpretation of the "Case" requirement of Article III, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 559­561 (1992).18 cover the cost of the investigation that preceded the filing of respondent's complaint, even under the Court's reasoning respondent would have al- leged a "redressable" injury and would have standing. See ibid. 17 There are two other reasons that counsel in favor of answering the statutory question first. First, it is the statutory question that has di- vided the courts of appeals and that we granted certiorari to resolve. See Pet. for Cert. i. Second, the meaning of the statute is a matter of general and national importance, whereas the Court's answer to the constitutional question depends largely on a construction of the allegations of this partic- ular complaint, ante, at 104 ("We turn now to the particulars of respond- ent's complaint to see how it measures up to Article III's requirements"). 18 In an attempt to demonstrate that redressability has always been a component of the standing doctrine, the Court cites our decision in Marye v. Parsons, 114 U. S. 325 (1885), a case in which neither the word "stand- ing" nor the word "redressability" appears. 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 83 (1998) 125 Stevens, J., concurring in judgment In every previous case in which the Court has denied standing because of a lack of redressability, the plaintiff was challenging some governmental action or inaction. Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U. S. 83, 85­87 (1981) (per curiam) (suit against Director of the Department of Corrections and an- other prison official); Simon, 426 U. S., at 28 (suit against the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 493 (1975) (suit against the town of Penfield and members of Penfield's Zon- ing, Planning, and Town Boards); Linda R. S., 410 U. S., at 615­616, 619 (suit against prosecutor); see also Renne v. Geary, 501 U. S. 312, 314 (1991) (suit against the city and County of San Francisco, its board of supervisors, and other local officials).19 None of these cases involved an attempt by one private party to impose a statutory sanction on another private party.20 In addition, in every other case in which this Court has held that there is no standing because of a lack of redress- ability, the injury to the plaintiff by the defendant was indi- rect (e. g., dependent on the action of a third party). This is true in the two cases that the Court cites for the "redress- ability" prong, ante, at 103; see also Simon, 426 U. S., at 40­46 ("[T]he `case or controversy' limitation of Art. III . . . requires that a federal court act only to redress injury that fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, 19 Although the Court discussed redressability, Renne did not in fact turn on that issue. While the Court stated that "[t]here is reason to doubt . . . that the injury alleged . . . can be redressed" by the relief sought, 501 U. S., at 319, it then went on to hold that the claims were nonjusticiable because "respondents have not demonstrated a live contro- versy ripe for resolution by the federal courts," id., at 315, 320­324. 20 This distinction is significant, as our standing doctrine is rooted in separation-of-powers concerns. E. g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 573­578 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 750 (1984); see also infra, at 129­130. 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 126 STEEL CO. v. CITIZENS FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENT Stevens, J., concurring in judgment and not injury that results from the independent action of some third party not before the court" (emphasis added)); Warth, 422 U. S., at 504­508 (stating that "the indirectness of the injury . . . may make it substantially more difficult to meet the minimum requirement of Art. III," and holding that the injury at issue was too indirect to be redressable), as well as in every other case in which the Court denied stand- ing because of a lack of redressability, Leeke, 454 U. S., at 86­87 (injury indirect because it turned on the action of a prosecutor, a party not before the Court); Linda R. S., 410 U. S., at 617­618 (stating that "[t]he party who invokes [judi- cial] power must be able to show . . . that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury" (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); in- jury indirect because it turned on the action of the father, a party not before the Court); see also 3 K. Davis & R. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise 30 (3d ed. 1994).21 Thus, as far as I am aware, the Court has never held-until today-that a plaintiff who is directly injured 22 by a defendant lacks standing to sue because of a lack of redressability.23 21 "It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legisla- tive action he must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action . . . ." Ex parte Le´vitt, 302 U. S. 633, 634 (1937). 22 Assuming that EPCRA authorizes suits for wholly past violations, then Congress has created a legal right in having EPCRA reports filed on time. Although this is not a traditional injury: "[W]e must be sensitive to the articulation of new rights of action that do not have clear analogs in our common-law tradition. . . . Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before . . . ." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S., at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); see also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U. S. 363, 373­374 (1982); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 500 (1975). 23 In another context, the Court has specified that there is a critical dis- tinction between whether a defendant is directly or indirectly harmed. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, a case involving a challenge to Execu- tive action, the Court stated: 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 83 (1998) 127 Stevens, J., concurring in judgment The Court acknowledges that respondent would have had standing if Congress had authorized some payment to re- spondent. Ante, at 106 ("[T]he civil penalties authorized by the statute . . . might be viewed as a sort of compensation or redress to respondent if they were payable to respondent"). Yet the Court fails to specify why payment to respondent- even if only a peppercorn-would redress respondent's inju- ries, while payment to the Treasury does not. Respondent clearly believes that the punishment of Steel Company, along with future deterrence of Steel Company and others, re- dresses its injury, and there is no basis in our previous stand- ing holdings to suggest otherwise. When one private party is injured by another, the injury can be redressed in at least two ways: by awarding compen- satory damages or by imposing a sanction on the wrongdoer that will minimize the risk that the harm-causing conduct will be repeated. Thus, in some cases a tort is redressed by an award of punitive damages; even when such damages are payable to the sovereign, they provide a form of redress for the individual as well. History supports the proposition that punishment or deterrence can redress an injury. In past centuries in England,24 in the American Colonies, and in the United "When the suit is one challenging the legality of government action or inaction, the nature and extent of facts that must be averred (at the sum- mary judgment stage) or proved (at the trial stage) in order to establish standing depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue. If he is, there is ordi- narily little question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it. When, however, as in this case, a plaintiff's asserted injury arises from the gov- ernment's allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, much more is needed. In that circumstance, causation and redress- ability ordinarily hinge on the response of the regulated (or regulable) third party to the government action or inaction-and perhaps on the response of others as well." 504 U. S., at 561­562 (emphasis in original). 24 "Several scholars have attempted to trace the historical origins of pri- vate prosecution in the United States. Without exception, these scholars have determined that the notion of private prosecutions originated in 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 128 STEEL CO. v. CITIZENS FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENT Stevens, J., concurring in judgment States,25 private persons regularly prosecuted criminal cases. The interest in punishing the defendant and deter- ring violations of law by the defendant and others was suffi- cient to support the "standing" of the private prosecutor even if the only remedy was the sentencing of the defendant to jail or to the gallows. Given this history, the Framers of Article III surely would have considered such proceedings to be "Cases" that would "redress" an injury even though the party bringing suit did not receive any monetary compensation.26 The Court's expanded interpretation of the redressabil- ity requirement has another consequence. Under EPCRA, early common law England, where the legal system primarily relied upon the victim or the victim's relatives or friends to bring a criminal to justice. According to these historians, private prosecutions developed in England as a means of facilitating private vengeance." Bessler, The Public Inter- est and the Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors, 47 Ark. L. Rev. 511, 515 (1994) (footnotes omitted). 25 "American citizens continued to privately prosecute criminal cases in many locales during the nineteenth century. In Philadelphia, for example, all types of cases were privately prosecuted, with assault and battery prosecutions being the most common. However, domestic disputes short of assault also came before the court. Thus, `parents of young women prosecuted men for seduction; husbands prosecuted their wives' par- amours for adultery; wives prosecuted their husbands for desertion.' Al- though many state courts continued to sanction the practice of private prosecutions without significant scrutiny during the nineteenth century, a few state courts outlawed the practice." Id., at 518­519 (footnotes omit- ted); A. Steinberg, The Transformation of Criminal Justice: Philadelphia, 1800­1880, p. 5 (1989) ("Private prosecution and the minor judiciary were firmly rooted in Philadelphia's colonial past. Both were examples of the creative American adaptation of the English common law. By the 17th century, private prosecution was a fundamental part of English common law"); see also F. Goodnow, Principles of the Administrative Law of the United States 412­413 (1905). 26 When such a party obtains a judgment that imposes sanctions on the wrongdoer, it is proper to presume that the wrongdoer will be less likely to repeat the injurious conduct that prompted the litigation. The lessen- ing of the risk of future harm is a concrete benefit. 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 83 (1998) 129 Stevens, J., concurring in judgment Congress gave enforcement power to state and local gov- ernments. 42 U. S. C. § 11046(a)(2). Under the Court's rea- soning, however, state and local governments would not have standing to sue for past violations, as a payment to the Treasury would no more "redress" the injury of these governments than it would redress respondent's injury. This would be true even if Congress explicitly granted state and local governments this power. Such a conclusion is unprecedented. It could be argued that the Court's decision is rooted in another separation-of-powers concern: that this citizen suit somehow interferes with the Executive's power to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," Art. II, § 3. It is hard to see, however, how EPCRA's citizen-suit provision impinges on the power of the Executive. As an initial mat- ter, this is not a case in which respondent merely possesses the " `undifferentiated public interest' " in seeing EPCRA en- forced. Ante, at 106; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wild- life, 504 U. S., at 577. Here, respondent-whose members live near Steel Company-has alleged a sufficiently particu- larized injury under our precedents. App. 5 (complaint al- leges that respondent's members "reside, own property, en- gage in recreational activities, breathe the air, and/or use areas near [Steel Company's] facility"). Moreover, under the Court's own reasoning, respondent would have had standing if Congress had authorized some payment to respondent. Ante, at 106 ("[T]he civil penalties authorized by the statute . . . might be viewed as a sort of compensation or redress to respondent if they were payable to respondent"). This conclusion is unexceptional given that respondent has a more particularized interest than a plaintiff in a qui tam suit, an action that is deeply rooted in our his- tory. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U. S. 537, 541, n. 4 (1943) (" `Statutes providing for actions by a com- mon informer, who himself has no interest whatever in the controversy other than that given by statute, have been in 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 130 STEEL CO. v. CITIZENS FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENT Stevens, J., concurring in judgment existence for hundreds of years in England, and in this coun- try ever since the foundation of our Government' " (quoting Marvin v. Trout, 199 U. S. 212, 225 (1905)); Adams v. Woods, 2 Cranch 336, 341 (1805) (opinion of Marshall, C. J.) ("Almost every fine or forfeiture under a penal statute, may be recov- ered by an action of debt [qui tam] as well as by information [by a public prosecutor]"); 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 160 (1768); Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Ac- tions, 99 Yale L. J. 341, 342, and n. 3 (1989) (describing qui tam actions authorized by First Congress); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S., at 572­573. Yet it is unclear why the separation-of-powers question should turn on whether the plaintiff receives monetary com- pensation. In either instance, a private citizen is enforcing the law. If separation of powers does not preclude standing when Congress creates a legal right that authorizes compen- sation to the plaintiff, it is unclear why separation of powers should dictate a contrary result when Congress has created a legal right but has directed that payment be made to the Federal Treasury. Indeed, in this case (assuming for present purposes that respondent correctly reads the statute) not only has Con- gress authorized standing, but the Executive Branch has also endorsed its interpretation of Article III. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 7­30. It is this Court's decision, not anything that Congress or the Executive has done, that encroaches on the domain of other branches of the Federal Government.27 27 Ironically, although the Court insists that the standing question must be answered first, it relies on the merits when it answers the standing question. Proof that Steel Company repeatedly violated the law by fail- ing to file EPCRA reports for eight years should suffice to establish the District Court's power to impose sanctions, or at least to decide what sanction, if any, is appropriate. Evidence that Steel Company was igno- rant of the law and has taken steps to avoid future violations is highly relevant to the merits of the question whether any remedy is necessary, but surely does not deprive the District Court of the power to decide the 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 83 (1998) 131 Stevens, J., concurring in judgment It is thus quite clear that the Court's holding today rep- resents a significant new development in our constitutional jurisprudence. Moreover, it is equally clear that the Court has the power to answer the statutory question first. It is, therefore, not necessary to reject the Court's resolution of the standing issue in order to conclude that it would be pru- dent to answer the question of statutory construction before announcing new constitutional doctrine. III EPCRA's citizen-suit provision states, in relevant part: "[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own behalf against . . . [a]n owner or operator of a facility for failure to do any of the following: . . . Complete and submit an inventory form under section 11022(a) of this title . . . [or] [c]omplete and submit a toxic chemical re- lease form under section 11023(a) of this title." 42 U. S. C. §§ 11046(a)(1)(A)(iii)­(iv). Unfortunately, this language is ambiguous. It could mean, as the Sixth Circuit has held, that a citizen only has the right to sue for a "failure . . . to complete and submit" the required forms. Under this reading, once the owner or operator has filed the forms, the district court no longer has jurisdiction. Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. United Musical, 61 F. 3d 473, 475 (1995). Alternatively, it could be, as the Seventh Circuit held, that the phrases "under section 11022(a)" and "under section 11023(a)" incorporate the re- quirements of those sections, including the requirement that the reports be filed by particular dates. 90 F. 3d 1237, 1243 (1996). remedy issue. Cf. United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 633 (1953) ("Here the defendants told the court that the interlocks no longer existed and disclaimed any intention to revive them. Such a profession does not suffice to make a case moot although it is one of the factors to be considered in determining the appropriateness of granting an injunction against the now-discontinued acts"). 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 132 STEEL CO. v. CITIZENS FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENT Stevens, J., concurring in judgment Although the language of the citizen-suit provision is am- biguous, other sections of EPCRA indicate that Congress did not intend to confer jurisdiction over citizen suits for wholly past violations. First, EPCRA requires the private litigant to give the alleged violator notice at least 60 days before bringing suit. 42 U. S. C. § 11046(d)(1).28 In Gwaltney, we considered the import of a substantially identical notice re- quirement, and concluded that it indicated a congressional intent to allow suit only for ongoing and future violations: "[T]he purpose of notice to the alleged violator is to give it an opportunity to bring itself into complete compliance with the Act and thus likewise render unnecessary a citizen suit. If we assume, as respondents urge, that citizen suits may target wholly past violations, the re- quirement of notice to the alleged violator becomes gratuitous. Indeed, respondents, in propounding their interpretation of the Act, can think of no reason for Con- gress to require such notice other than that `it seemed right' to inform an alleged violator that it was about to be sued. Brief for Respondents 14." 484 U. S., at 60. Second, EPCRA places a ban on citizen suits once EPA has commenced an enforcement action. 42 U. S C. § 11046(e).29 In Gwaltney, we considered a similar provision and con- cluded that it indicated a congressional intent to prohibit citi- zen suits for wholly past violations: 28 "No action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(A) of this sec- tion prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged violation to the Administrator, the State in which the alleged violation occurs, and the alleged violator. Notice under this paragraph shall be given in such manner as the Administrator shall prescribe by regulation." 29 "No action may be commenced under subsection (a) of this section against an owner or operator of a facility if the Administrator has com- menced and is diligently pursuing an administrative order or civil action to enforce the requirement concerned or to impose a civil penalty under this Act with respect to the violation of the requirement." 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 83 (1998) 133 Stevens, J., concurring in judgment "The bar on citizen suits when governmental enforce- ment action is under way suggests that the citizen suit is meant to supplement rather than supplant govern- mental action. . . . Permitting citizen suits for wholly past violations of the Act could undermine the supple- mentary role envisioned for the citizen suit. This dan- ger is best illustrated by an example. Suppose that the Administrator identified a violator of the Act and issued a compliance order . . . . Suppose further that the Ad- ministrator agreed not to assess or otherwise seek civil penalties on the condition that the violator take some extreme corrective action, such as to install particularly effective but expensive machinery, that it otherwise would not be obliged to take. If citizens could file suit, months or years later, in order to seek the civil penalties that the Administrator chose to forgo, then the Adminis- trator's discretion to enforce the Act in the public inter- est would be curtailed considerably. The same might be said of the discretion of state enforcement authori- ties. Respondents' interpretation of the scope of the citizen suit would change the nature of the citizens' role from interstitial to potentially intrusive." 484 U. S., at 60­61. Finally, even if these two provisions did not resolve the issue, our settled policy of adopting acceptable constructions of statutory provisions in order to avoid the unnecessary ad- judication of constitutional questions-here, the unresolved standing question-strongly supports a construction of the statute that does not authorize suits for wholly past viola- tions. As we stated in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Flor- ida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988): "This cardinal principle has its roots in Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court in Murray v. Schoo- ner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804), and has for so long been applied by this Court that it is beyond debate." See also NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490, 523US1 Unit: $U36 [05-01-00 12:16:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 134 STEEL CO. v. CITIZENS FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENT Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment 500­501 (1979); Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740, 749­750 (1961); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932); Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U. S. 573, 577 (1929); Panama R. Co. v. John- son, 264 U. S. 375, 390 (1924); United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 407­408 (1909); Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 448­449 (1830) (opin- ion of Story, J.). IV For these reasons, I concur in the Court's judgment, but do not join its opinion. Justice Ginsburg, concurring in the judgment. Congress has authorized citizen suits to enforce the Emer- gency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986, 42 U. S. C. § 11001 et seq. Does that authorization, as Con- gress designed it, permit citizen suits for wholly past viola- tions? For the reasons stated by Justice Stevens in Part III of his opinion, I agree that the answer is "No." I would follow the path this Court marked in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U. S. 49, 60­61 (1987), and resist expounding or offering advice on the con- stitutionality of what Congress might have done, but did not do. 523US1 Unit: $U37 [04-29-00 20:15:33] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1997 135 Syllabus QUALITY KING DISTRIBUTORS, INC. v. L'ANZA RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL, INC. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 96­1470. Argued December 8, 1997-Decided March 9, 1998 Respondent L'anza, a California manufacturer, sells its hair care products in this country exclusively to distributors who have agreed to resell within limited geographic areas and only to authorized retailers. L'anza promotes its domestic sales with extensive advertising and spe- cial retailer training. In foreign markets, however, it does not engage in comparable advertising or promotion; its foreign prices are substan- tially lower than its domestic prices. It appears that after L'anza's United Kingdom distributor arranged for the sale of several tons of L'anza products, affixed with copyrighted labels, to a distributor in Malta, that distributor sold the goods to petitioner, which imported them back into this country without L'anza's permission and then resold them at discounted prices to unauthorized retailers. L'anza filed suit, alleging that petitioner's actions violated L'anza's exclusive rights under the Copyright Act of 1976 (Act), 17 U. S. C. §§ 106, 501, and 602, to repro- duce and distribute the copyrighted material in the United States. The District Court rejected petitioner's "first sale" defense under § 109(a) and entered summary judgment for L'anza. Concluding that § 602(a), which gives copyright owners the right to prohibit the unauthorized importation of copies, would be "meaningless" if § 109(a) provided a defense, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Held: The first sale doctrine endorsed in § 109(a) is applicable to imported copies. Pp. 140­154. (a) In Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 349­350, this Court held that the exclusive right to "vend" under the copyright statute then in force applied only to the first sale of a copyrighted work. Con- gress subsequently codified Bobbs-Merrill's first sale doctrine in the Act. Section 106(3) gives the copyright holder the exclusive right "to distribute copies . . . by sale or other transfer of ownership," but § 109(a) provides: "Notwithstanding . . . [§ ]106(3), the owner of a particular copy . . . lawfully made under this title . . . is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy . . . ." Although the first sale doctrine prevents L'anza from treating unauthorized resales by its domestic distributors as an infringe- ment of the exclusive right to distribute, L'anza claims that § 602(a), properly construed, prohibits its foreign distributors from reselling 523US1 Unit: $U37 [04-29-00 20:15:33] PAGES PGT: OPIN 136 QUALITY KING DISTRIBUTORS, INC. v. L'ANZA RESEARCH INT'L, INC. Syllabus its products to American vendors unable to buy from its domestic dis- tributors. Pp. 140­143. (b) The statutory language clearly demonstrates that the right granted by § 602(a) is subject to § 109(a). Significantly, § 602(a) does not categorically prohibit the unauthorized importation of copyrighted materials, but provides that, with three exceptions, such "[i]mporta- tion . . . is an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute . . . under [§ ]106 . . . ." Section 106 in turn expressly states that all of the exclu- sive rights therein granted-including the distribution right granted by subsection (3)-are limited by §§ 107 through 120. One of those limita- tions is provided by § 109(a), which expressly permits the owner of a lawfully made copy to sell that copy "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of [§ ]106(3)." After the first sale of a copyrighted item "lawfully made under this title," any subsequent purchaser, whether from a domestic or a foreign reseller, is obviously an "owner" of that item. Read literally, § 109(a) unambiguously states that such an owner "is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell" that item. Moreover, since § 602(a) merely provides that unauthorized importation is an in- fringement of an exclusive right "under [§ ]106," and since that limited right does not encompass resales by lawful owners, § 602(a)'s literal text is simply inapplicable to both domestic and foreign owners of L'anza's products who decide to import and resell them here. Pp. 143­145. (c) The Court rejects L'anza's argument that § 602(a), and particu- larly its exceptions, are superfluous if limited by the first sale doc- trine. The short answer is that this argument does not adequately explain why the words "under [§ ]106" appear in § 602(a). Moreover, there are several flaws in L'anza's reasoning that, because § 602(b) already prohibits the importation of unauthorized or "piratical" copies, § 602(a) must cover nonpiratical ("lawfully made") copies sold by the copyright owner. First, even if § 602(a) applied only to piratical cop- ies, it at least would provide a private remedy against the importer, whereas § 602(b)'s enforcement is vested in the Customs Service. Sec- ond, because § 109(a)'s protection is available only to the "owner" of a lawfully made copy, the first sale doctrine would not provide a defense to a § 602(a) action against a nonowner such as a bailee. Third, § 602(a) applies to a category of copies that are neither piratical nor "lawfully made under this title": those that are "lawfully made" under another country's law. Pp. 145­149. (d) Also rejected is L'anza's argument that because § 501(a) defines an "infringer" as one "who violates . . . [§ ]106 . . . , or who imports . . . in violation of [§ ]602," a violation of the latter type is distinct from one of the former, and thus not subject to § 109(a). This argument's force is outweighed by other statutory considerations, including the fact that 523US1 Unit: $U37 [04-29-00 20:15:33] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 135 (1998) 137 Syllabus § 602(a) unambiguously states that the prohibited importation is an infringement "under [§ ]106," thereby identifying § 602 violations as a species of § 106 violations. More important is the fact that the § 106 rights are subject to all of the provisions of "[§§ ]107 through 120." If § 602(a) functioned independently, none of those sections would limit its coverage. Pp. 149­151. (e) The Court finds unpersuasive the Solicitor General's argument that "importation" describes an act that is not protected by § 109(a)'s authorization to a subsequent owner "to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of" a copy. An ordinary interpretation of that lan- guage includes the right to ship the copy to another person in another country. More important, the Solicitor General's cramped reading is at odds with § 109(a)'s necessarily broad reach. The whole point of the first sale doctrine is that once the copyright owner places a copyrighted item in the stream of commerce by selling it, he has exhausted his ex- clusive statutory right to control its distribution. There is no reason to assume that Congress intended § 109(a) to limit the doctrine's scope. Pp. 151­152. (f) The wisdom of protecting domestic copyright owners from the un- authorized importation of validly copyrighted copies of their works, and the fact that the Executive Branch has recently entered into at least five international trade agreements apparently intended to do just that, are irrelevant to a proper interpretation of the Act. Pp. 153­154. 98 F. 3d 1109, reversed. Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Ginsburg, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 154. Allen R. Snyder argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Jonathan S. Franklin, William T. Rintala, and J. Larson Jaenicke. Raymond H. Goettsch argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Wax- man, Assistant Attorneys General Hunger and Klein, Patri- cia A. Millett, Michael Jay Singer, and Irene M. Solet.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Free Trade Association by Gilbert Lee Sandler and Jorge Espinosa; for Cosco Companies, Inc., et al. by Michael D. Sandler, Peter J. Kadzik, Rich- 523US1 Unit: $U37 [04-29-00 20:15:33] PAGES PGT: OPIN 138 QUALITY KING DISTRIBUTORS, INC. v. L'ANZA RESEARCH INT'L, INC. Opinion of the Court Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 106(3) of the Copyright Act of 1976 (Act), 17 U. S. C. § 106(3), gives the owner of a copyright the exclu- sive right to distribute copies of a copyrighted work. That exclusive right is expressly limited, however, by the provi- sions of §§ 107 through 120. Section 602(a) gives the copy- right owner the right to prohibit the unauthorized impor- tation of copies. The question presented by this case is whether the right granted by § 602(a) is also limited by §§ 107 through 120. More narrowly, the question is whether the "first sale" doctrine endorsed in § 109(a) is applicable to im- ported copies. I Respondent, L'anza Research International, Inc. (L'anza), is a California corporation engaged in the business of manu- facturing and selling shampoos, conditioners, and other hair care products. L'anza has copyrighted the labels that are affixed to those products. In the United States, L'anza sells exclusively to domestic distributors who have agreed to re- sell within limited geographic areas and then only to au- thorized retailers such as barber shops, beauty salons, and professional hair care colleges. L'anza has found that the American "public is generally unwilling to pay the price charged for high quality products, such as L'anza's products, when they are sold along with the less expensive lower qual- ity products that are generally carried by supermarkets and ard Kelly, and Robert J. Verdisco; and for Jan-Bell Marketing, Inc., by Michael J. Gaertner. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Intellectual Property Law Association by Arthur J. Levine and John N. O'Shea; for the Beauty and Barber Supply Institute Inc. et al. by Deborah M. Lodge; for the National Consumers League et al. by Charles E. Buffon, Caroline M. Brown, Jan S. Amundson, Quentin Riegel, and Daniel F. O'Keefe, Jr.; for the Recording Industry Association of America et al. by Theodore B. Olson and Preeta D. Bansal; and for Swarovski America Lim- ited by Werner Kronstein. 523US1 Unit: $U37 [04-29-00 20:15:33] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 135 (1998) 139 Opinion of the Court drug stores." App. 54 (declaration of Robert Hall). L'anza promotes the domestic sales of its products with extensive advertising in various trade magazines and at point of sale, and by providing special training to authorized retailers. L'anza also sells its products in foreign markets. In those markets, however, it does not engage in comparable ad- vertising or promotion; its prices to foreign distributors are 35% to 40% lower than the prices charged to domestic distributors. In 1992 and 1993, L'anza's distributor in the United Kingdom arranged the sale of three shipments to a distributor in Malta; 1 each shipment contained several tons of L'anza products with copyrighted labels affixed.2 The record does not establish whether the initial purchaser was the distributor in the United Kingdom or the distributor in Malta, or whether title passed when the goods were deliv- ered to the carrier or when they arrived at their destination, but it is undisputed that the goods were manufactured by L'anza and first sold by L'anza to a foreign purchaser. It is also undisputed that the goods found their way back to the United States without the permission of L'anza and were sold in California by unauthorized retailers who had purchased them at discounted prices from Quality King Dis- tributors, Inc. (petitioner). There is some uncertainty about the identity of the actual importer, but for the purpose of our decision we assume that petitioner bought all three ship- ments from the Malta distributor, imported them, and then resold them to retailers who were not in L'anza's authorized chain of distribution. After determining the source of the unauthorized sales, L'anza brought suit against petitioner and several other de- fendants.3 The complaint alleged that the importation and 1 See App. 64 (declaration of Robert De Lanza). 2 See id., at 70­83. 3 L'anza's claims against the retailer defendants were settled. The Malta distributor apparently never appeared in this action and a default judgment was entered against it. 523US1 Unit: $U37 [04-29-00 20:15:33] PAGES PGT: OPIN 140 QUALITY KING DISTRIBUTORS, INC. v. L'ANZA RESEARCH INT'L, INC. Opinion of the Court subsequent distribution of those products bearing copy- righted labels violated L'anza's "exclusive rights under 17 U. S. C. §§ 106, 501 and 602 to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted material in the United States." App. 32. The District Court rejected petitioner's defense based on the "first sale" doctrine recognized by § 109 and entered sum- mary judgment in favor of L'anza. Based largely on its con- clusion that § 602 would be "meaningless" if § 109 provided a defense in a case of this kind, the Court of Appeals affirmed. 98 F. 3d 1109, 1114 (CA9 1996). Because its decision created a conflict with the Third Circuit, see Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F. 2d 1093 (1988), we granted the petition for certiorari. 520 U. S. 1250 (1997). II This is an unusual copyright case because L'anza does not claim that anyone has made unauthorized copies of its copy- righted labels. Instead, L'anza is primarily interested in protecting the integrity of its method of marketing the prod- ucts to which the labels are affixed. Although the labels themselves have only a limited creative component, our in- terpretation of the relevant statutory provisions would apply equally to a case involving more familiar copyrighted materi- als such as sound recordings or books. Indeed, we first en- dorsed the first sale doctrine in a case involving a claim by a publisher that the resale of its books at discounted prices infringed its copyright on the books. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339 (1908).4 In that case, the publisher, Bobbs-Merrill, had inserted a notice in its books that any retail sale at a price under 4 The doctrine had been consistently applied by other federal courts in earlier cases. See Kipling v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 120 F. 631, 634 (CA2 1903); Doan v. American Book Co., 105 F. 772, 776 (CA7 1901); Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill & Co., 61 F. 689, 691 (CA2 1894); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Snellenburg, 131 F. 530, 532 (ED Pa. 1904); Clemens v. Estes, 22 F. 899, 900 (Mass. 1885); Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 206­207 (ED Pa. 1853). 523US1 Unit: $U37 [04-29-00 20:15:33] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 135 (1998) 141 Opinion of the Court $1 would constitute an infringement of its copyright. The defendants, who owned Macy's department store, dis- regarded the notice and sold the books at a lower price with- out Bobbs-Merrill's consent. We held that the exclusive statutory right to "vend" 5 applied only to the first sale of the copyrighted work: "What does the statute mean in granting `the sole right of vending the same'? Was it intended to create a right which would permit the holder of the copyright to fasten, by notice in a book or upon one of the articles mentioned within the statute, a restriction upon the subsequent alienation of the subject-matter of copyright after the owner had parted with the title to one who had acquired full dominion over it and had given a satisfac- tory price for it? It is not denied that one who has sold a copyrighted article, without restriction, has parted with all right to control the sale of it. The purchaser of a book, once sold by authority of the owner of the copy- right, may sell it again, although he could not publish a new edition of it. "In this case the stipulated facts show that the books sold by the appellant were sold at wholesale, and pur- chased by those who made no agreement as to the con- trol of future sales of the book, and took upon them- selves no obligation to enforce the notice printed in the book, undertaking to restrict retail sales to a price of one dollar per copy." Id., at 349­350. The statute in force when Bobbs-Merrill was decided pro- vided that the copyright owner had the exclusive right to "vend" the copyrighted work.6 Congress subsequently cod- 5 In 1908, when Bobbs-Merrill was decided, the copyright statute pro- vided that copyright owners had "the sole liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, completing, copying, executing, finishing, and vending" their copyrighted works. Copyright Act of 1891, § 4952, 26 Stat. 1107 (empha- sis added). 6 See n. 5, supra. 523US1 Unit: $U37 [04-29-00 20:15:33] PAGES PGT: OPIN 142 QUALITY KING DISTRIBUTORS, INC. v. L'ANZA RESEARCH INT'L, INC. Opinion of the Court ified our holding in Bobbs-Merrill that the exclusive right to "vend" was limited to first sales of the work.7 Under the 1976 Act, the comparable exclusive right granted in 17 U. S. C. § 106(3) is the right "to distribute copies . . . by sale or other transfer of ownership." 8 The comparable limita- tion on that right is provided not by judicial interpreta- tion, but by an express statutory provision. Section 109(a) provides: "Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord. . . ." 9 7 Congress codified the first sale doctrine in § 41 of the Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1084, and again in § 27 of the 1947 Act, ch. 391, 61 Stat. 660. 8 The full text of § 106 reads as follows: "§ 106. Exclusive rights in copyrighted works "Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: "(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; "(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; "(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; "(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; "(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the indi- vidual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and "(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission." 17 U. S. C. § 106 (1994 ed., Supp. I). 9 The comparable section in the 1909 and 1947 Acts provided that "noth- ing in this Act shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer 523US1 Unit: $U37 [04-29-00 20:15:33] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 135 (1998) 143 Opinion of the Court The Bobbs-Merrill opinion emphasized the critical distinc- tion between statutory rights and contract rights.10 In this case, L'anza relies on the terms of its contracts with its do- mestic distributors to limit their sales to authorized retail outlets. Because the basic holding in Bobbs-Merrill is now codified in § 109(a) of the Act, and because those domestic distributors are owners of the products that they purchased from L'anza (the labels of which were "lawfully made under this title"), L'anza does not, and could not, claim that the statute would enable L'anza to treat unauthorized resales by its domestic distributors as an infringement of its exclusive right to distribute copies of its labels. L'anza does claim, however, that contractual provisions are inadequate to pro- tect it from the actions of foreign distributors who may resell L'anza's products to American vendors unable to buy from L'anza's domestic distributors, and that § 602(a) of the Act, properly construed, prohibits such unauthorized competition. To evaluate that submission, we must, of course, consider the text of § 602(a). III The most relevant portion of § 602(a) provides: "Importation into the United States, without the author- ity of the owner of copyright under this title, of copies or phonorecords of a work that have been acquired out- side the United States is an infringement of the exclu- of any copy of a copyrighted work the possession of which has been law- fully obtained." Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 41, 35 Stat. 1084; see also Copyright Act of 1947, ch. 391, § 27, 61 Stat. 660. It is noteworthy that § 109(a) of the 1978 Act does not apply to "any copy"; it applies only to a copy that was "lawfully made under this title." 10 "We do not think the statute can be given such a construction, and it is to be remembered that this is purely a question of statutory construc- tion. There is no claim in this case of contract limitation, nor license agreement controlling the subsequent sales of the book." Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 350 (1908). 523US1 Unit: $U37 [04-29-00 20:15:33] PAGES PGT: OPIN 144 QUALITY KING DISTRIBUTORS, INC. v. L'ANZA RESEARCH INT'L, INC. Opinion of the Court sive right to distribute copies or phonorecords under section 106, actionable under section 501. . . ." 11 It is significant that this provision does not categorically pro- hibit the unauthorized importation of copyrighted materials. Instead, it provides that such importation is an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies "under section 106." Like the exclusive right to "vend" that was construed in Bobbs-Merrill, the exclusive right to distribute is a lim- ited right. The introductory language in § 106 expressly states that all of the exclusive rights granted by that sec- tion-including, of course, the distribution right granted by subsection (3)-are limited by the provisions of §§ 107 through 120.12 One of those limitations, as we have noted, is provided by the terms of § 109(a), which expressly permit the owner of a lawfully made copy to sell that copy "[n]ot- withstanding the provisions of section 106(3)." 13 11 The remainder of § 602(a) reads as follows: "This subsection does not apply to- "(1) importation of copies or phonorecords under the authority or for the use of the Government of the United States or of any State or political subdivision of a State, but not including copies or phonorecords for use in schools, or copies of any audiovisual work imported for purposes other than archival use; "(2) importation, for the private use of the importer and not for distri- bution, by any person with respect to no more than one copy or phonorec- ord of any one work at any one time, or by any person arriving from outside the United States with respect to copies or phonorecords forming part of such person's personal baggage; or "(3) importation by or for an organization operated for scholarly, educa- tional, or religious purposes and not for private gain, with respect to no more than one copy of an audiovisual work solely for its archival purposes, and no more than five copies or phonorecords of any other work for its library lending or archival purposes, unless the importation of such copies or phonorecords is part of an activity consisting of systematic reproduction or distribution, engaged in by such organization in violation of the provi- sions of section 108(g)(2)." 12 See n. 8, supra. 13 See text accompanying n. 9, supra. 523US1 Unit: $U37 [04-29-00 20:15:33] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 135 (1998) 145 Opinion of the Court After the first sale of a copyrighted item "lawfully made under this title," any subsequent purchaser, whether from a domestic or from a foreign reseller, is obviously an "owner" of that item. Read literally, § 109(a) unambiguously states that such an owner "is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell" that item. Moreover, since § 602(a) merely provides that unauthorized importation is an in- fringement of an exclusive right "under section 106," and since that limited right does not encompass resales by lawful owners, the literal text of § 602(a) is simply inapplicable to both domestic and foreign owners of L'anza's products who decide to import them and resell them in the United States.14 Notwithstanding the clarity of the text of §§ 106(3), 109(a), and 602(a), L'anza argues that the language of the Act sup- ports a construction of the right granted by § 602(a) as "dis- tinct from the right under Section 106(3) standing alone," and thus not subject to § 109(a). Brief for Respondent 15. Otherwise, L'anza argues, both the § 602(a) right itself and its exceptions 15 would be superfluous. Moreover, supported by various amici curiae, including the Solicitor General of the United States, L'anza contends that its construction is supported by important policy considerations. We consider these arguments separately. IV L'anza advances two primary arguments based on the text of the Act: (1) that § 602(a), and particularly its three excep- tions, are superfluous if limited by the first sale doctrine; and (2) that the text of § 501 defining an "infringer" refers 14 Despite L'anza's contention to the contrary, see Brief for Respondent 26­27, the owner of goods lawfully made under the Act is entitled to the protection of the first sale doctrine in an action in a United States court even if the first sale occurred abroad. Such protection does not require the extraterritorial application of the Act any more than § 602(a)'s "ac- quired abroad" language does. 15 See n. 11, supra. 523US1 Unit: $U37 [04-29-00 20:15:33] PAGES PGT: OPIN 146 QUALITY KING DISTRIBUTORS, INC. v. L'ANZA RESEARCH INT'L, INC. Opinion of the Court separately to violations of § 106, on the one hand, and to im- ports in violation of § 602. The short answer to both of these arguments is that neither adequately explains why the words "under section 106" appear in § 602(a). The Solicitor General makes an additional textual argument: he contends that the word "importation" in § 602(a) describes an act that is not protected by the language in § 109(a) authorizing a subsequent owner "to sell or otherwise dispose of the posses- sion of" a copy. Each of these arguments merits separate comment. The Coverage of § 602(a) Prior to the enactment of § 602(a), the Act already prohib- ited the importation of "piratical," or unauthorized, copies.16 Moreover, that earlier prohibition is retained in § 602(b) of the present Act.17 L'anza therefore argues (as do the Solici- tor General and other amici curiae) that § 602(a) is super- fluous unless it covers nonpiratical ("lawfully made") copies sold by the copyright owner, because importation nearly always implies a first sale. There are several flaws in this argument. First, even if § 602(a) did apply only to piratical copies, it at least would provide the copyright holder with a private remedy against the importer, whereas the enforcement of § 602(b) is vested in the Customs Service.18 Second, because the protection afforded by § 109(a) is available only to the "owner" of a lawfully made copy (or someone authorized by the owner), the first sale doctrine would not provide a de- 16 See 17 U. S. C. §§ 106, 107 (1970). 17 Section 602(b) provides in relevant part: "In a case where the making of the copies or phonorecords would have constituted an infringement of copyright if this title had been applicable, their importation is prohibited. . . ." The first sale doctrine of § 109(a) does not protect own- ers of piratical copies, of course, because such copies were not "lawfully made." 18 See n. 17, supra. 523US1 Unit: $U37 [04-29-00 20:15:33] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 135 (1998) 147 Opinion of the Court fense to a § 602(a) action against any nonowner such as a bailee, a licensee, a consignee, or one whose possession of the copy was unlawful.19 Third, § 602(a) applies to a category of copies that are neither piratical nor "lawfully made under this title." That category encompasses copies that were "lawfully made" not under the United States Copyright Act, but instead, under the law of some other country. The category of copies produced lawfully under a foreign copyright was expressly identified in the deliberations that led to the enactment of the 1976 Act. We mention one ex- ample of such a comment in 1961 simply to demonstrate that the category is not a merely hypothetical one. In a report to Congress, the Register of Copyrights stated, in part: "When arrangements are made for both a U. S. edition and a foreign edition of the same work, the publishers frequently agree to divide the international markets. The foreign publisher agrees not to sell his edition in the United States, and the U. S. publisher agrees not to sell his edition in certain foreign countries. It has been suggested that the import ban on piratical copies should be extended to bar the importation of the foreign edi- tion in contravention of such an agreement." Copy- right Law Revision: Report of the Register of Copy- rights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 125­126 (H. R. Judiciary Comm. Print 1961). 19 In its opinion in this case, the Court of Appeals quoted a statement by a representative of the music industry expressing the need for pro- tection against the importation of stolen motion picture prints: "We've had a similar situation with respect to motion picture prints, which are sent all over the world-legitimate prints made from the authentic negative. These prints get into illicit hands. They're stolen, and there's no contrac- tual relationship. . . . Now those are not piratical copies." Copyright Law Revision Part 2: Discussion and Comments on Report of the Register of Copyrights on General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 213 (H. R. Judiciary Comm. Print 1963) (statement of Mr. Sar- goy), quoted in 98 F. 3d 1109, 1116 (CA9 1996). 523US1 Unit: $U37 [04-29-00 20:15:33] PAGES PGT: OPIN 148 QUALITY KING DISTRIBUTORS, INC. v. L'ANZA RESEARCH INT'L, INC. Opinion of the Court Even in the absence of a market allocation agreement be- tween, for example, a publisher of the United States edition and a publisher of the British edition of the same work, each such publisher could make lawful copies. If the author of the work gave the exclusive United States distribution rights-enforceable under the Act-to the publisher of the United States edition and the exclusive British distribution rights to the publisher of the British edition,20 however, pre- sumably only those made by the publisher of the United States edition would be "lawfully made under this title" within the meaning of § 109(a). The first sale doctrine would not provide the publisher of the British edition who decided to sell in the American market with a defense to an action under § 602(a) (or, for that matter, to an action under § 106(3), if there was a distribution of the copies). The argument that the statutory exceptions to § 602(a) are superfluous if the first sale doctrine is applicable rests on the assumption that the coverage of that section is coextensive with the coverage of § 109(a). But since it is, in fact, broader because it encompasses copies that are not subject to the first sale doctrine-e. g., copies that are lawfully made under the law of another country-the exceptions do protect the traveler who may have made an isolated purchase of a copy of a work that could not be imported in bulk for purposes of resale. As we read the Act, although both the first sale doc- trine embodied in § 109(a) and the exceptions in § 602(a) may 20 A participant in a 1964 panel discussion expressed concern about this particular situation. Copyright Law Revision Part 4: Further Discussion and Comments on Preliminary Draft for Revised U. S. Copyright Law, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 119 (H. R. Judiciary Comm. Print 1964) (statement of Mrs. Pilpel) ("For example, if someone were to import a copy of the British edition of an American book and the author had transferred ex- clusive United States and Canadian rights to an American publisher, would that British edition be in violation so that this would constitute an infringement under this section?"); see also id., at 209 (statement of Mr. Manges) (describing similar situation as "a troublesome problem that confronts U. S. book publishers frequently"). 523US1 Unit: $U37 [04-29-00 20:15:33] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 135 (1998) 149 Opinion of the Court be applicable in some situations, the former does not sub- sume the latter; those provisions retain significant independ- ent meaning. Section 501's Separate References to §§ 106 and 602 The text of § 501 does lend support to L'anza's submission. In relevant part, it provides: "(a) Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 118 or of the author as provided in section 106A(a), or who imports copies or phonorecords into the United States in violation of section 602, is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as the case may be. . . ." The use of the words "or who imports," rather than words such as "including one who imports," is more consistent with an interpretation that a violation of § 602 is distinct from a violation of § 106 (and thus not subject to the first sale doc- trine set out in § 109(a)) than with the view that it is a species of such a violation. Nevertheless, the force of that inference is outweighed by other provisions in the statutory text. Most directly relevant is the fact that the text of § 602(a) itself unambiguously states that the prohibited importation is an infringement of the exclusive distribution right "under section 106, actionable under section 501." Unlike that phrase, which identifies § 602 violations as a species of § 106 violations, the text of § 106A, which is also cross-referenced in § 501, uses starkly different language. It states that the author's right protected by § 106A is "independent of the exclusive rights provided in Section 106." The contrast between the relevant language in § 602 and that in § 106A strongly implies that only the latter describes an independ- ent right.21 21 The strength of the implication created by the relevant language in § 106A is not diminished by the fact that Congress enacted § 106A more 523US1 Unit: $U37 [04-29-00 20:15:33] PAGES PGT: OPIN 150 QUALITY KING DISTRIBUTORS, INC. v. L'ANZA RESEARCH INT'L, INC. Opinion of the Court Of even greater importance is the fact that the § 106 rights are subject not only to the first sale defense in § 109(a), but also to all of the other provisions of "sections 107 through 120." If § 602(a) functioned independently, none of those sections would limit its coverage. For example, the "fair use" defense embodied in § 107 22 would be unavailable to im- porters if § 602(a) created a separate right not subject to the limitations on the § 106(3) distribution right. Under L'anza's interpretation of the Act, it presumably would be unlawful for a distributor to import copies of a British newspaper that contained a book review quoting excerpts from an American recently than § 602(a), which is part of the Copyright Act of 1976. Sec- tion 106A was passed as part of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 in order to protect the moral rights of certain visual artists. Section 106A is analogous to Article 6bis of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, but its coverage is more limited. See 2 P. Goldstein, Copyright § 5.12, p. 5:225 (2d ed. 1996) (§ 106A encompasses aspects of the moral rights guaranteed by Article 6bis of the Berne Con- vention, "but effectively gives these rights a narrow subject matter and scope"). 22 Title 17 U. S. C. § 107 provides as follows: "§ 107. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use "Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include- "(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; "(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; "(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and "(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. "The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors." 523US1 Unit: $U37 [04-29-00 20:15:33] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 135 (1998) 151 Opinion of the Court novel protected by a United States copyright.23 Given the importance of the fair use defense to publishers of scholarly works, as well as to publishers of periodicals, it is difficult to believe that Congress intended to impose an absolute ban on the importation of all such works containing any copying of material protected by a United States copyright. In the context of this case, involving copyrighted labels, it seems unlikely that an importer could defend an infringe- ment as a "fair use" of the label. In construing the statute, however, we must remember that its principal purpose was to promote the progress of the "useful Arts," U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, by rewarding creativity, and its principal function is the protection of original works, rather than ordi- nary commercial products that use copyrighted material as a marketing aid. It is therefore appropriate to take into account the impact of the denial of the fair use defense for the importer of foreign publications. As applied to such publications, L'anza's construction of § 602 "would merely inhibit access to ideas without any countervailing benefit." Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417, 450­451 (1984).24 Does an importer "sell or otherwise dispose" of copies as those words are used in § 109(a)? Whether viewed from the standpoint of the importer or from that of the copyright holder, the textual argument advanced by the Solicitor General 25-that the act of "im- 23 The § 602(a) exceptions, which are substantially narrower than § 107, would not permit such importation. See n. 11, supra. 24 L'anza's reliance on § 602(a)(3)'s reference to § 108(g)(2), see n. 11, supra, to demonstrate that all of the other limitations set out in §§ 107 through 120-including the first sale and fair use doctrines-do not apply to imported copies is unavailing for the same reasons. 25 See also Brief for Recording Industry Association of America et al. 19­21. 523US1 Unit: $U37 [04-29-00 20:15:33] PAGES PGT: OPIN 152 QUALITY KING DISTRIBUTORS, INC. v. L'ANZA RESEARCH INT'L, INC. Opinion of the Court portation" is neither a sale nor a disposal of a copy under § 109(a)-is unpersuasive. Strictly speaking, an importer could, of course, carry merchandise from one country to another without surrendering custody of it. In a typical commercial transaction, however, the shipper transfers "pos- session, custody, control and title to the products" 26 to a dif- ferent person, and L'anza assumes that petitioner's importa- tion of the L'anza shipments included such a transfer. An ordinary interpretation of the statement that a person is entitled "to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession" of an item surely includes the right to ship it to another person in another country. More important, the Solicitor General's cramped reading of the text of the statutes is at odds not only with § 602(a)'s more flexible treatment of unauthorized importation as an infringement of the distribution right (even when there is no literal "distribution"), but also with the necessarily broad reach of § 109(a). The whole point of the first sale doctrine is that once the copyright owner places a copyrighted item in the stream of commerce by selling it, he has exhausted his exclusive statutory right to control its distribution. As we have recognized, the codification of that doctrine in § 109(a) makes it clear that the doctrine applies only to copies that are "lawfully made under this title," but that was also true of the copies involved in the Bobbs-Merrill case, as well as those involved in the earlier cases applying the doctrine. There is no reason to assume that Congress intended either § 109(a) or the earlier codifications of the doctrine to limit its broad scope.27 In sum, we are not persuaded by either L'anza's or the Solicitor General's textual arguments. 26 App. 87. 27 See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 79 (1979) ("Section 109(a) restates and confirms" the first sale doctrine established by prior case law); S. Rep. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 71 (1975) (same). 523US1 Unit: $U37 [04-29-00 20:15:33] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 135 (1998) 153 Opinion of the Court V The parties and their amici have debated at length the wisdom or unwisdom of governmental restraints on what is sometimes described as either the "gray market" or the prac- tice of "parallel importation." 28 In K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U. S. 281 (1988), we used those terms to refer to the importation of foreign-manufactured goods bearing a valid United States trademark without the consent of the trade- mark holder. Id., at 285­286. We are not at all sure that those terms appropriately describe the consequences of an American manufacturer's decision to limit its promotional efforts to the domestic market and to sell its products abroad at discounted prices that are so low that its foreign distribu- tors can compete in the domestic market.29 But even if they do, whether or not we think it would be wise policy to pro- vide statutory protection for such price discrimination is not a matter that is relevant to our duty to interpret the text of the Copyright Act. Equally irrelevant is the fact that the Executive Branch of the Government has entered into at least five international trade agreements that are apparently intended to protect do- mestic copyright owners from the unauthorized importation of copies of their works sold in those five countries.30 The earliest of those agreements was made in 1991; none has been ratified by the Senate. Even though they are of course 28 Compare, for example, Gorelick & Little, The Case for Parallel Impor- tation, 11 N. C. J. Int'l L. & Comm. Reg. 205 (1986), with Gordon, Gray Market Is Giving Hair-Product Makers Gray Hair, N. Y. Times, July 13, 1997, section 1, p. 28, col. 1. 29 Presumably L'anza, for example, could have avoided the consequences of that competition either (1) by providing advertising support abroad and charging higher prices, or (2) if it was satisfied to leave the promotion of the product in foreign markets to its foreign distributors, to sell its products abroad under a different name. 30 The Solicitor General advises us that such agreements have been made with Cambodia, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Ecuador, and Sri Lanka. 523US1 Unit: $U37 [04-29-00 20:15:33] PAGES PGT: OPIN 154 QUALITY KING DISTRIBUTORS, INC. v. L'ANZA RESEARCH INT'L, INC. Ginsburg, J., concurring consistent with the position taken by the Solicitor General in this litigation, they shed no light on the proper interpreta- tion of a statute that was enacted in 1976.31 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. Justice Ginsburg, concurring. This case involves a "round trip" journey, travel of the copies in question from the United States to places abroad, then back again. I join the Court's opinion recognizing that we do not today resolve cases in which the allegedly in- fringing imports were manufactured abroad. See W. Patry, Copyright Law and Practice 166­170 (1997 Supp.) (comment- ing that provisions of Title 17 do not apply extraterritorially unless expressly so stated, hence the words "lawfully made under this title" in the "first sale" provision, 17 U. S. C. § 109(a), must mean "lawfully made in the United States"); see generally P. Goldstein, Copyright § 16.0, pp. 16:1­16:2 (2d ed. 1998) ("Copyright protection is territorial. The rights granted by the United States Copyright Act extend no far- ther than the nation's borders."). 31 We also note that in 1991, when the first of the five agreements was signed, the Third Circuit had already issued its opinion in Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F. 2d 1093 (1988), adopting a position contrary to that subsequently endorsed by the Executive Branch. 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1997 155 Syllabus LEWIS v. UNITED STATES certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit No. 96­7151. Argued November 12, 1997-Decided March 9, 1998 A federal indictment charged petitioner Lewis and her husband with beat- ing and killing his 4-year-old daughter while they lived at an Army base in Louisiana. Relying on the federal Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), 18 U. S. C. § 13(a)-which provides that "[w]hoever within . . . any [federal enclave] is guilty of any act or omission which, although not made punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punish- able . . . within the jurisdiction of the State . . . in which such place is situated, . . . shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to like pun- ishment"-the indictment charged the defendants under a Louisiana statute defining first-degree murder to include "killing . . . [w]hen the offender has the specific intent to kill or . . . harm . . . a victim under the age of twelve . . . ." Upon her conviction of Louisiana first-degree murder, the District Court sentenced Lewis to life imprisonment with- out parole. The Fifth Circuit held that the Louisiana statute was not assimilated into federal law under the ACA because the federal second- degree murder statute applicable to federal enclaves, 18 U. S. C. § 1111 (1988 ed.), governed the crime at issue. The court nonetheless affirmed Lewis' conviction on the ground that, in finding her guilty of the state charge, the jury had necessarily found all of the requisite elements of federal second-degree murder. And it affirmed her sentence on the ground that it was no greater than the maximum sentence (life) permit- ted by § 1111. Held:1. Because the ACA does not make Louisiana's first-degree murder statute part of federal law, the federal second-degree murder statute, § 1111, governs the crime at issue. Pp. 159­172. (a) The basic question before this Court is the meaning of the ACA phrase "not made punishable by any enactment of Congress." (Em- phasis added.) The Court rejects an absolutely literal reading of the italicized words because that would dramatically separate the ACA from its basic purpose of borrowing state law to fill gaps in the federal crimi- nal law applicable on federal enclaves, and would conflict with the ACA's history and features. See, e. g., Williams v. United States, 327 U. S. 711, 718­719. On the other hand, the Court cannot find a convincing justification in language, purpose, or precedent for the Government's 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 156 LEWIS v. UNITED STATES Syllabus narrow interpretation that "any enactment" refers, with limited excep- tions, only to federal enactments that share the same statutory elements as the relevant state law. Id., at 717, distinguished. Rather, the ACA's language and its gap-filling purpose taken together indicate that, to determine whether a particular state statute is assimilated, a court must first ask the question that the ACA's language requires: Is the defendant's "act or omission . . . made punishable by any enactment of Congress." (Emphasis added.) If the answer is "no," that will nor- mally end the matter because the ACA presumably would assimilate the state statute. If the answer is "yes," however, the court must ask the further question whether the federal statutes that apply to the "act or omission" reveal a legislative intent to preclude application of the state law in question, say, because the federal statutes reveal an intent to occupy so much of a field as would exclude use of the particular state statute, see, e. g., id., at 724. Pp. 159­166. (b) Application of these principles to this case reveals that federal law does not assimilate the child murder provision of Louisiana's first- degree murder statute. Among other things, § 1111 defines first-degree murder to include "willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated kill- ing," as well as certain listed felony murders and instances of trans- ferred intent, and says that "murder in the second degree" is "any other murder" and is punishable by imprisonment for "any term of years or for life." In contrast, the Louisiana statute defines first-degree murder as, inter alia, the killing of someone under 12 with a "specific intent to kill or . . . harm," and makes it punishable by "death or life imprison- ment" without parole. Here, the defendant's "act or omission" is "made punishable by a[n] enactment of Congress" because § 1111 makes Lewis' "act . . . punishable" as second-degree murder. Moreover, applicable federal law indicates an intent to punish conduct such as the defendant's to the exclusion of the state statute at issue. Even though the two statutes cover different forms of behavior, other § 1111 features, taken together, demonstrate Congress' intent to completely cover all types of federal enclave murder as an integrated whole. These features include the fact that § 1111 is drafted in a detailed manner to cover all variants of murder; the way in which its "first-degree" and "second-degree" pro- visions are linguistically interwoven; the fact that its "first-degree" list is detailed; the fact that that list sets forth several circumstances at the same level of generality as does the Louisiana law; and the ex- treme breadth of the possible federal sentences, ranging all the way from any term of years, to death. Also supporting preclusive intent are the circumstances that Congress has recently focused directly sev- eral times upon the § 1111 first-degree list's content, subtracting certain specified felonies or adding others; that, by drawing the line between 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 155 (1998) 157 Syllabus first and second degree, Congress has carefully decided just when it does, and does not, intend for murder to be punishable by death, a major way in which the Louisiana statute (which provides the death penalty) differs from the federal second-degree provision (which does not); that, when writing and amending the ACA, Congress has referred to murder as an example of a crime covered by, not as an example of a gap in, federal law; that § 1111 applies only on federal enclaves, so that assimila- tion of Louisiana law would treat enclave residents differently from those living elsewhere in that State, by subjecting them to two sets of "territorial" criminal laws in addition to the general federal criminal laws that apply nationwide; and that there apparently is not a single reported case in which a federal court has used the ACA to assimilate a state murder law. Given all these considerations, there is no gap for Louisiana's statute to fill. Pp. 166­172. 2. Lewis is entitled to resentencing. As she argues and the Govern- ment concedes, the Fifth Circuit erred in affirming her life sentence because § 1111, unlike the Louisiana statute, does not make such a sen- tence mandatory for second-degree murder, but provides for a sentence of "any term of years or life." Moreover, the federal Sentencing Guide- lines provide for a range of 168 to 210 months' imprisonment for a first- time offender like her who murders a "vulnerable victim." Although a judge could impose a higher sentence by departing from the Guidelines range, it is for the District Court to make such a determination in the first instance. Pp. 172­173. 92 F. 3d 1371, vacated and remanded. Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 173. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 180. Frank Granger argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor Gen- eral Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Deborah Watson.* *John Lanahan and Barbara E. Bergman filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae. 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 158 LEWIS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. The federal Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA or Act) assimi- lates into federal law, and thereby makes applicable on fed- eral enclaves such as Army bases, certain criminal laws of the State in which the enclave is located. It says: "Whoever within or upon any [federal enclave] is guilty of any act or omission which, although not made punish- able by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State . . . in which such place is situated, . . . shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to like punishment." 18 U. S. C. § 13(a). The question in this case is whether the ACA makes appli- cable on a federal Army base located in Louisiana a state first-degree murder statute that defines first-degree murder to include the "killing of a human being . . . [w]hen the of- fender has the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon a victim under the age of twelve . . . ." La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:30(A)(5) (West 1986 and Supp. 1997). We hold that the ACA does not make the state provision part of federal law. A federal murder statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1111, therefore governs the crime at issue-the killing of a 4-year-old child "with malice aforethought" but without "premeditation." Under that statute this crime is second- degree, not first-degree, murder. I A federal grand jury indictment charged that petitioner, Debra Faye Lewis, and her husband James Lewis, beat and killed James' 4-year-old daughter while all three lived at Fort Polk, a federal Army base in Louisiana. Relying on the ACA, the indictment charged a violation of Louisiana's first-degree murder statute. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:30 (West 1986 and Supp. 1993). Upon her conviction, the Dis- 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 155 (1998) 159 Opinion of the Court trict Court sentenced Debra Lewis to life imprisonment without parole. See § 14:30(C) (West 1986). On appeal the Fifth Circuit held that Louisiana's stat- ute did not apply at Fort Polk. 92 F. 3d 1371 (1996). It noted that the Act made state criminal statutes applicable on federal enclaves only where the wrongful " `act or omis- sion' " was " `not made punishable by any enactment of Con- gress.' " Id., at 1373­1374 (citing 18 U. S. C. § 13). Because Congress made Lewis' acts "punishable" as federal second- degree murder, and the federal and state laws were directed at roughly the same sort of conduct, the Fifth Circuit rea- soned that the ACA did not permit the application of Loui- siana's first-degree murder statute to petitioner's acts. 92 F. 3d, at 1375­1377. The court nonetheless affirmed Lewis' conviction on the ground that in convicting her of the state charge the jury had necessarily found all of the requisite elements of federal second-degree murder. Id., at 1378; cf. Rutledge v. United States, 517 U. S. 292, 305­306 (1996). And it affirmed the sentence on the ground that it was no greater than the maximum sentence (life) permitted by the federal second-degree murder statute. 92 F. 3d, at 1379­ 1380. We granted certiorari primarily to consider the Fifth Circuit's ACA determination. We conclude that the hold- ing was correct, though we also believe that Lewis is enti- tled to resentencing on the federal second-degree murder conviction. II The ACA applies state law to a defendant's acts or omis- sions that are "not made punishable by any enactment of Congress." 18 U. S. C. § 13(a) (emphasis added). The basic question before us concerns the meaning of the italicized phrase. These words say that the ACA does not assimilate a state statute if the defendant's "act" or "omission" is pun- ished by "any [federal] enactment." If the words are taken literally, Louisiana's law could not possibly apply to Lewis, 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 160 LEWIS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court for there are several federal "enactments" that make Lewis' acts punishable, for example, the federal (second-degree) murder statute, § 1111, and the federal assault law, § 113. We agree with the Government, however, that this is not a sensible interpretation of this language, since a literal read- ing of the words "any enactment" would dramatically sepa- rate the statute from its intended purpose. The ACA's basic purpose is one of borrowing state law to fill gaps in the federal criminal law that applies on federal enclaves. See Williams v. United States, 327 U. S. 711, 718­ 719 (1946) (ACA exists "to fill in gaps" in federal law where Congress has not "define[d] the missing offenses"); United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U. S. 286, 289 (1958) (ACA repre- sents congressional decision of "adopting for otherwise unde- fined offenses the policy of general conformity to local law"); United States v. Press Publishing Co., 219 U. S. 1, 9­10 (1911) (state laws apply to crimes "which were not previously provided for by a law of the United States"); Franklin v. United States, 216 U. S. 559, 568 (1910) (assimilation occurs where state laws "not displaced by specific laws enacted by Congress"). In the 1820's, when the ACA began its life, federal statu- tory law punished only a few crimes committed on federal enclaves, such as murder and manslaughter. See 1 Stat. 113. The federal courts lacked the power to supplement these few statutory crimes through the use of the common law. See United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812). Consequently James Buchanan, then a Congressman, could point out to his fellow House Members a "palpable defect in our system," namely, that "a great variety of actions, to which a high degree of moral guilt is attached, and which are punished . . . at the common law, and by every State . . . may be committed with impunity" on federal enclaves. 40 Annals of Cong. 930 (1823). Daniel Webster sought to cure this palpable defect by introducing a bill that both increased the number of federal crimes and also made "the residue" 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 155 (1998) 161 Opinion of the Court criminal, see 1 Cong. Deb. 338 (1825), by assimilating state law where federal statutes did not provide for the "punish- ment" of an "offence." 4 Stat. 115. This law, with only a few changes, has become today's ACA. See Williams, supra, at 719­723 (describing history of ACA). Two features of the Act indicate a congressional intent to confine the scope of the words "any enactment" more nar- rowly than (and hence extend the Act's reach beyond what) a literal reading might suggest. First, a literal interpreta- tion of the words "any enactment" would leave federal crimi- nal enclave law subject to gaps of the very kind the Act was designed to fill. The Act would be unable to assimilate even a highly specific state law aimed directly at a serious, nar- rowly defined evil, if the language of any federal statute, however broad and however clearly aimed at a different kind of harm, were to cover the defendant's act. Were there only a state, and no federal, law against murder, for example, a federal prohibition of assault could prevent the state statute from filling the obvious resulting gap. At the same time, prior to its modern amendment the ACA's language more clearly set limits upon the scope of the word "any." The original version of the ACA said that assimilation of a relevant state law was proper when "any offence shall be committed . . . the punishment of which of- fence is not specially provided for by any law of the United States." 4 Stat. 115 (emphasis added); see also 30 Stat. 717 (later reenactment also using "offense"). The word "of- fense" avoided the purpose-thwarting interpretation of the Act discussed above, for it limited the relevant federal "en- actment" to an enactment that punished offenses of the same kind as those punished by state law. Presumably, a federal assault statute would not have provided punishment for the "offense" that state murder law condemned. Congress changed the Act's language in 1909, removing the word "of- fense" and inserting the words "act or thing," 35 Stat. 1145, which later became the current "act or omission." But Con- 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 162 LEWIS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court gress did so for reasons irrelevant here, see H. R. Rep. No. 2, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., 25 (1908) (stating that, technically speaking, conduct otherwise not forbidden by law was not an "offense"), and did not intend to alter the basic meaning of the Act. See Williams, supra, at 722­723. For these or similar reasons, many lower courts have interpreted the words "any enactment" more narrowly than a literal reading might suggest. And they have applied the Act to assimilate state statutes in circumstances they thought roughly similar to those suggested by our assault/ murder example above. See, e. g., United States v. Kauf- man, 862 F. 2d 236, 238 (CA9 1988) (existence of federal law punishing the carrying of a gun does not prevent assimilation of state law punishing threatening someone with a gun); Fields v. United States, 438 F. 2d 205, 207­208 (CA2 1971) (assimilation of state malicious shooting law proper despite existence of federal assault statute); United States v. Brown, 608 F. 2d 551, 553­554 (CA5 1979) (child abuse different in kind from generic federal assault, and so state law could be assimilated). But see United States v. Chaussee, 536 F. 2d 637, 644 (CA7 1976) (stating a more literal test). Like the Government, we conclude that Congress did not intend the relevant words-"any enactment"-to carry an absolutely literal meaning. On the other hand, we cannot accept the narrow inter- pretation of the relevant words (and the statute's conse- quently broader reach) that the Solicitor General seems to urge. Drawing on our language in Williams, supra, at 717, some lower courts have said that the words "any en- actment" refer only to federal enactments that make crimi- nal the same "precise acts" as those made criminal by the relevant state law. See, e. g., United States v. Johnson, 967 F. 2d 1431, 1436 (CA10 1992). The Government apparently interprets this test to mean that, with limited exceptions, the ACA would assimilate a state law so long as that state law defines a crime in terms of at least one element that does 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 155 (1998) 163 Opinion of the Court not appear in the relevant federal enactment. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 27 ("[I]n the great majority of cases the question of whether the State law offense has been made punishable by an enactment of Congress can be resolved by asking, is there a Federal statute that contains precisely the same es- sential elements as the State statute"). But this interpreta- tion of federal "enactments" is too narrow. The Government's view of the "precise acts" test-which comes close to a "precise elements" test-would have the ACA assimilate state law even where there is no gap to fill. Suppose, for example, that state criminal law (but not fed- eral criminal law) makes possession of a state bank charter an element of an offense it calls "bank robbery"; or suppose that state law makes purse snatching criminal under a stat- ute that is indistinguishable from a comparable federal law but for a somewhat different definition of the word "purse." Where, one might ask, is the gap? As Congress has enacted more and more federal statutes, including many that are ap- plicable only to federal enclaves, see, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 113 (assault); § 1460 (possession with intent to sell obscene mate- rials), such possibilities become more realistic. And to that extent the Government's broad view of assimilation threat- ens not only to fill nonexistent gaps, but also to rewrite each federal enclave-related criminal law in 50 different ways, de- pending upon special, perhaps idiosyncratic, drafting circum- stances in the different States. See Williams, 327 U. S., at 718 (ACA may not be used to "enlarg[e] . . . modif[y] or re- pea[l] existing provisions of the Federal Code"). It would also leave residents of federal enclaves randomly subject to three sets of criminal laws (special federal territorial crimi- nal law, general federal criminal law, and state criminal law) where their state counterparts would be subject only to the latter two types. Nothing in the Act's language or in its purpose warrants imposing such narrow limits upon the words "any enact- ment" and thereby so significantly broadening the statute's 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 164 LEWIS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court reach. Nor does the use by this Court of the words "precise acts" in the leading case in which this Court has applied the Act, Williams, 327 U. S., at 717, help the Government in this respect. In Williams, the Court held that the ACA did not assimilate a State's "statutory rape" crime (with a cut-off age of 18) both because federal adultery and fornication statutes covered the defendant's "precise acts," and because the poli- cies underlying a similar federal statute (with a cutoff age of 16) made clear there was no gap to fill. Id., at 724­725. The Court's opinion refers to both of these circumstances and does not decide whether the Act would, or would not, have applied in the absence of only one. We cannot find a con- vincing justification in language, purpose, or precedent for the Government's interpretation. Hence, we conclude that, just as a literal interpretation would produce an ACA that is too narrow, see supra, at 161­162, so the Government's interpretation would produce an ACA that is too broad. In our view, the ACA's language and its gap-filling pur- pose taken together indicate that a court must first ask the question that the ACA's language requires: Is the defend- ant's "act or omission . . . made punishable by any enactment of Congress." 18 U. S. C. § 13(a) (emphasis added). If the answer to this question is "no," that will normally end the matter. The ACA presumably would assimilate the statute. If the answer to the question is "yes," however, the court must ask the further question whether the federal statutes that apply to the "act or omission" preclude application of the state law in question, say, because its application would interfere with the achievement of a federal policy, see John- son v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321 U. S. 383, 389­390 (1944), because the state law would effectively rewrite an offense definition that Congress carefully considered, see Williams, 327 U. S., at 718, or because federal statutes reveal an intent to occupy so much of a field as would exclude use of the particular state statute at issue, see id., at 724 (no assimila- tion where Congress has "covered the field with uniform fed- 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 155 (1998) 165 Opinion of the Court eral legislation"). See also Franklin, 216 U. S., at 568 (as- similation proper only where state laws "not displaced by specific laws enacted by Congress"). There are too many different state and federal criminal laws, applicable in too many different kinds of circumstances, bearing too many different relations to other laws, to common-law tradition, and to each other, for a touchstone to provide an automatic general answer to this second question. Still, it seems fairly obvious that the Act will not apply where both state and federal statutes seek to punish approxi- mately the same wrongful behavior-where, for example, differences among elements of the crimes reflect jurisdic- tional, or other technical, considerations, or where differ- ences amount only to those of name, definitional language, or punishment. See, e. g., United States v. Adams, 502 F. Supp. 21, 25 (SD Fla. 1980) (misdemeanor/felony difference did not justify assimilation). The Act's basic purpose makes it similarly clear that as- similation may not rewrite distinctions among the forms of criminal behavior that Congress intended to create. Wil- liams, supra, at 717­718 (nothing in the history or lan- guage of the ACA to indicate that once Congress has "de- fined a penal offense, it has authorized such definition to be enlarged" by state law). Hence, ordinarily, there will be no gap for the Act to fill where a set of federal enact- ments taken together make criminal a single form of wrong- ful behavior while distinguishing (say, in terms of serious- ness) among what amount to different ways of committing the same basic crime. At the same time, a substantial difference in the kind of wrongful behavior covered (on the one hand by the state statute, on the other, by federal enactments) will ordinarily indicate a gap for a state statute to fill-unless Congress, through the comprehensiveness of its regulation, cf. Wis- consin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U. S. 597, 604­605 (1991), or through language revealing a conflicting policy, see 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 166 LEWIS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court Williams, supra, at 724­725, indicates to the contrary in a particular case. See also Johnson v. Yellow Cab, supra, at 389­390; Blackburn v. United States, 100 F. 3d 1426, 1435 (CA9 1996). The primary question (we repeat) is one of leg- islative intent: Does applicable federal law indicate an intent to punish conduct such as the defendant's to the exclusion of the particular state statute at issue? III We must now apply these principles to this case. The rel- evant federal murder statute-applicable only on federal enclaves-read as follows in 1993, the time of petitioner's crime: "§ 1111. Murder "(a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing; or com- mitted in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, escape, murder, kidnapping, treason, espio- nage, sabotage, aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse, burglary, or robbery; or perpetrated from a pre- meditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being other than him who is killed, is murder in the first degree. "Any other murder is murder in the second degree. "(b) Within the special maritime and territorial juris- diction of the United States, "Whoever is guilty of murder in the first degree, shall suffer death unless the jury qualifies its verdict by add- ing thereto `without capital punishment', in which event he shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life; "Whoever is guilty of murder in the second degree, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life." 18 U. S. C. § 1111 (1988 ed.). 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 155 (1998) 167 Opinion of the Court This statute says that "murder in the first degree" shall be punished by death or life imprisonment. It says that "murder in the second degree" shall be punished by impris- onment for "any term of years or for life." It defines first- degree murder as a "willful, deliberate, malicious, and pre- meditated killing," and also adds certain kinds of felony murder (i. e., murder occurring during the commission of other crimes) and certain instances of transferred intent (i. e., D's killing of A, while intending to murder B). It de- fines second-degree murder as "[a]ny other murder." Louisiana's statute says the following: "A. First degree murder is the killing of a human being: "(1) When the offender has specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and is engaged in the perpe- tration or attempted perpetration of aggravated kid- napping, second degree kidnapping, aggravated escape, aggravated arson, aggravated rape, forcible rape, aggra- vated burglary, armed robbery, drive-by shooting, first degree robbery, or simple robbery. "(2) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon a fireman or peace officer engaged in the performance of his lawful duties; "(3) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person; or "(4) When the offender has specific intent to kill or in- flict great bodily harm and has offered, has been of- fered, has given, or has received anything of value for the killing. "(5) When the offender has the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon a victim under the age of twelve or sixty-five years of age or older. "(6) When the offender has the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm while engaged in the distri- bution, exchange, sale, or purchase, or any attempt thereof, of a controlled dangerous substance listed in 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 168 LEWIS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court Schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law. "(7) When the offender has specific intent to kill and is engaged in the activities prohibited by R. S. 14:107.1(C)(1). . . . . . "C. Whoever commits the crime of first degree murder shall be punished by death or life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence in accordance with the determination of the jury." La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:30 (West 1986 and Supp. 1997) (emphasis added). This statute says that murder in the first degree shall be punished by "death or life imprisonment" without parole. It defines first-degree murder as the "killing of a human being" with a "specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm" where the "offender" is committing certain other fel- onies or has been paid for the crime or kills more than one victim, or kills a fireman, a peace officer, someone over the age of 64, or someone under the age of 12. In this case, the jury found that the defendant killed a child under the age of 12 with a "specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm" upon that child. In deciding whether the ACA assimilates Louisiana's law, we first ask whether the defendant's "act or omission" is "made punishable by any enactment of Congress." 18 U. S. C. § 13(a) (emphasis added); see supra, at 164. The an- swer to this question is "yes." An "enactment of Congress," namely, § 1111, makes the defendant's "act . . . punishable" as second-degree murder. This answer is not conclusive, how- ever, for reasons we have pointed out. Rather, we must ask a second question. See supra, at 164­165. Does applicable federal law indicate an intent to punish conduct such as the defendant's to the exclusion of the particular state statute at issue? 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 155 (1998) 169 Opinion of the Court We concede at the outset the Government's claim that the two statutes cover different forms of behavior. The federal second-degree murder statute covers a wide range of con- duct; the Louisiana first-degree murder provision focuses upon a narrower (and different) range of conduct. We also concede that, other things being equal, this consideration argues in favor of assimilation. Yet other things are not equal; and other features of the federal statute convince us that Congress has intended that the federal murder statute preclude application of a first-degree murder statute such as Louisiana's to a killing on a federal enclave. The most obvious such feature is the detailed manner in which the federal murder statute is drafted. It purports to make criminal a particular form of wrongful behavior, namely, "murder," which it defines as "the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought." It covers all variants of murder. It divides murderous behavior into two parts: a specifically defined list of "first-degree" murders and all "other" murders, which it labels "second-degree." This fact, the way in which "first-degree" and "second-degree" provisions are linguistically interwoven; the fact that the "first-degree" list is detailed; and the fact that the list sets forth several circumstances at the same level of generality as does Louisiana's statute, taken together, indicate that Congress intended its statute to cover a particular field- namely, "unlawful killing of a human being with malice afore- thought"-as an integrated whole. The complete coverage of the federal statute over all types of federal enclave mur- der is reinforced by the extreme breadth of the possible sen- tences, ranging all the way from any term of years, to death. There is no gap for Louisiana's statute to fill. Several other circumstances offer support for the conclu- sion that Congress' omissions from its "first-degree" murder list reflect a considered legislative judgment. Congress, for example, has recently focused directly several times upon the content of the "first-degree" list, subtracting certain speci- 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 170 LEWIS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court fied circumstances or adding others. See Pub. L. 99­646, 100 Stat. 3623 (substituting "aggravated sexual abuse or sex- ual abuse" for "rape"); Pub. L. 98­473, 98 Stat. 2138 (adding "escape, murder, kidnaping, treason, espionage," and "sabo- tage" to first-degree list). By drawing the line between first and second degree, Congress also has carefully decided just when it does, and when it does not, intend for murder to be punishable by death-a major way in which the Louisi- ana first-degree murder statute (which provides the death penalty) differs from the federal second-degree provision (which does not). 18 U. S. C. § 1111(b); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:30(C) (West Supp. 1997). The death penalty is a matter that typically draws specific congressional attention. See, e. g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103­322, § 60003, 108 Stat. 1968 (section entitled "Specific Offenses For Which [the] Death Penalty Is Author- ized"). As this Court said in Williams, "[w]here offenses have been specifically defined by Congress and the public has been guided by such definitions for many years," it is unusual for Congress through general legislation like the ACA "to amend such definitions or the punishments prescribed for such offenses, without making clear its intent to do so." 327 U. S., at 718 (footnote omitted). Further, Congress when writing and amending the ACA has referred to the conduct at issue here-murder-as an example of a crime covered by, not as an example of a gap in, federal law. See H. R. Rep. No. 1584, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 1 (1940) ("Certain of the major crimes . . . such . . . as murder" are "expressly defined" by Congress; assimilation of state law is proper as to "other offenses"); 1 Cong. Deb. 338 (1825) (Daniel Webster explaining original assimilation provision as a way to cover "the residue" of crimes not "pro- vide[d] for" by Congress; at the time federal law contained a federal enclave murder provision, see 1 Stat. 113); see also United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U. S., at 289, and n. 5 (citing 18 U. S. C. § 1111 for proposition that Congress has 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 155 (1998) 171 Opinion of the Court increasingly "enact[ed] for the enclaves specific criminal stat- utes" and "to that extent, [has] excluded the state laws from that field"). Finally, the federal criminal statute before us applies only on federal enclaves. § 1111(b). Hence, there is a sense in which assimilation of Louisiana law would treat those living on federal enclaves differently from those living elsewhere in Louisiana, for it would subject them to two sets of "terri- torial" criminal laws in addition to the general federal crimi- nal laws that apply nationwide. See supra, at 163. Given all these considerations, it is perhaps not surprising that we have been unable to find a single reported case in which a federal court has used the ACA to assimilate a state murder law to fill a supposed "gap" in the federal murder statute. The Government, arguing to the contrary, says that Loui- siana's provision is a type of "child protection" statute, fill- ing a "gap" in federal enclave-related criminal law due to the fact that Congress left "child abuse," like much other domestic relations law, to the States. See Brief for United States 23, 29­30. The fact that Congress, when writing various criminal statutes, has focused directly upon "child protection" weakens the force of this argument. See, e. g., 21 U. S. C. §§ 859(a)­(b) (person selling drugs to minors is subject to twice the maximum sentence as one who deals to adults, and repeat offenders who sell to children subject to three times the normal maximum); 18 U. S. C. § 1201(g) ("special rule" for kidnaping offenses involving minors, with enhanced penalties in certain cases); §§ 2241(c) and 2243 (pro- hibiting sexual abuse of minors); § 2251 (prohibiting sex- ual exploitation of children); § 2251A (selling and buying of children); § 2258 (failure to report child abuse). And, with- out expressing any view on the merits of lower court cases that have assimilated state child abuse statutes despite the presence of a federal assault law, § 113, see, e. g., United States v. Brown, 608 F. 2d, at 553­554; United States v. Fesler, 781 F. 2d 384, 390­391 (CA5 1986), we note that the 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 172 LEWIS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court federal assault prohibition is less comprehensive than the federal murder statute, and the relevant statutory relation- ships are less direct than those at issue here. We conclude that the consideration to which the Government points is not strong enough to open a child-related "gap" in the compre- hensive effort to define murder on federal enclaves. For these reasons we agree with the Fifth Circuit that federal law does not assimilate the child victim provision of Louisiana's first-degree murder statute. IV The Fifth Circuit affirmed petitioner's conviction on the ground that the jury, in convicting petitioner under the Louisiana statute, necessarily found all of the requisite ele- ments of the federal second-degree murder offense. 92 F. 3d, at 1379; cf. Rutledge v. United States, 517 U. S., at 305­ 306. Petitioner does not contest the legal correctness of this conclusion. Petitioner, however, does argue that the Fifth Circuit was wrong to affirm her sentence (life imprisonment). She points out that the federal second-degree murder statute, un- like Louisiana's first-degree murder statute, does not make a life sentence mandatory. See 18 U. S. C. § 1111(b) (sen- tence of "any term of years or for life"). Moreover, the Sen- tencing Guidelines provide for a range of 168 to 210 months' imprisonment for a first-time offender who murders a "vul- nerable victim," United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §§ 2A1.2, 3A1.1, and ch. 5, pt. A (Nov. 1994), although a judge could impose a higher sentence by departing from the Guidelines range. See id., ch. 5, pt. K; see also Koon v. United States, 518 U. S. 81, 92­96 (1996) (describing circumstances for departures). The Government concedes petitioner's point. The Solici- tor General writes: "If the jury had found petitioner guilty of second degree murder under federal law, the district court would have 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 155 (1998) 173 Scalia, J., concurring in judgment been required to utilize the Sentencing Guidelines pro- visions applicable to that offense, and the court might have imposed a sentence below the statutory maximum. An upward departure from that range, if appropriate, could reach the statutory maximum of a life sentence, but it is for the district court in the first instance to make such a determination. Resentencing under the Guidelines is therefore appropriate if this Court vacates petitioner's conviction on the assimilated state offense and orders entry of a judgment of conviction for fed- eral second degree murder." Brief for United States 38 (footnote and citations omitted). We consequently vacate the Fifth Circuit's judgment in respect to petitioner's sentence and remand the case for resentencing. It is so ordered. Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in the judgment. As the proliferation of opinions indicates, this is a most difficult case. I agree with the Court's conclusion that the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), 18 U. S. C. § 13(a), does not incorporate Louisiana's first-degree murder statute into the criminal law governing federal enclaves in that State. I write separately because it seems to me that the Court's manner of reaching that result turns the language of the ACA into an empty vessel, and invites the lower courts to fill it with free-ranging speculation about the result that Congress would prefer in each case. Although I agree that the ACA is not a model of legislative draftsmanship, I be- lieve we have an obligation to search harder for its meaning before abandoning the field to judicial intuition. The Court quotes the text of the ACA early in its opinion, but then identifies several policy reasons for leaving it be- hind. The statutory language is deceptively simple. 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 174 LEWIS v. UNITED STATES Scalia, J., concurring in judgment "Whoever within or upon any [federal enclave] is guilty of any act or omission which, although not made pun- ishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punish- able if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State . . . in which such place is situated, . . . shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to a like punish- ment." § 13(a). At first glance, this appears to say that state law is not as- similated if the defendant can be prosecuted under any fed- eral statute. The Court acknowledges this, but concludes that "a literal reading of the words `any enactment' would dramatically separate the statute from its intended pur- pose," ante, at 160, because, for example, a general federal assault statute would prevent assimilation of a state pro- hibition against murder. It seems to me that the term "any enactment" is not the text that poses the difficulty. Whether a federal assault statute (which is assuredly an "enactment") prevents assimi- lation of a state murder statute to punish an assault that results in death depends principally upon whether fatal as- sault constitutes the same "act or omission" that the assault statute punishes. Many hypotheticals posing the same issue can readily be conceived of. For example, whether a state murder statute is barred from assimilation by a federal double-parking prohibition, when the behavior in question consists of the defendant's stopping and jumping out of his car in the traffic lane to assault and kill the victim. The federal parking prohibition is sure enough an "enactment," but the issue is whether the "act or omission" to which it applies is a different one. So also with a federal statute punishing insurance fraud, where the murderer kills in order to collect a life insurance policy on the victim. Many lower courts have analyzed situations like these under what they call the "precise acts" test, see, e. g., United States v. Kaufman, 862 F. 2d 236 (CA9 1988), which in prac- tice is no test at all but an appeal to vague policy intuitions. 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 155 (1998) 175 Scalia, J., concurring in judgment See, e. g., United States v. Brown, 608 F. 2d 551 (CA5 1979) (striking a child is not the same "precise act" for purposes of a federal assault law and a state law against child abuse). I am skeptical of any interpretation which leaves a statute doing no real interpretive work in most of the hard cases which it was drafted to resolve. On that score, however, the Court's solution is no improvement. After rejecting pro- posals from the petitioner and from the United States that would have given the ACA more definite content (on the pol- icy grounds that they would produce too little, and too much, assimilation, respectively), the Court invites judges to specu- late about whether Congress would approve of assimilation in each particular case. "[T]he court must ask . . . whether the federal statutes that apply to the `act or omission' preclude application of the state law in question, say, because its application would interfere with the achievement of a federal policy, because the state law would effectively rewrite an of- fense definition that Congress carefully considered, or because federal statutes reveal an intent to occupy so much of a field as would exclude use of the particular state statute at issue . . . . The primary question (we repeat) is one of legislative intent: Does applicable fed- eral law indicate an intent to punish conduct such as the defendant's to the exclusion of the particular state stat- ute at issue?" Ante, at 164, 166 (citations omitted). Those questions simply transform the ACA into a mirror that reflects the judge's assessment of whether assimilation of a particular state law would be good federal policy. I believe that the statutory history of the ACA supports a more principled and constraining interpretation of the current language. The original version of the ACA pro- vided for assimilation whenever "any offence shall be com- mitted . . . , the punishment of which offence is not specially provided for by any law of the United States." 4 Stat. 115. 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 176 LEWIS v. UNITED STATES Scalia, J., concurring in judgment Subsequent amendments replaced the word "offence" with "act or thing," 35 Stat. 1145, and eventually the present formulation, "act or omission." But we held in Williams v. United States, 327 U. S. 711, 722­723 (1946), that those amendments were designed to respond to a perceived tech- nical deficiency, and that they did not intend to change the meaning of the Act. Williams reached that conclusion by studying the legisla- tive history of the ACA amendments. Although I am not prepared to endorse that particular methodology, reading the ACA against the backdrop of its statutory predecessors does shed some light on its otherwise puzzling language. An "act or omission . . . made punishable by [law]" is the very definition of a criminal "offense," and certainly might have been another way to express that same idea. In addi- tion, the ACA still provides that a defendant charged with an assimilated state crime "shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to a like punishment." 18 U. S. C. § 13(a) (em- phasis added). Since an interpretation that ascribes greater substantive significance to the amendments would produce such a vague and unhelpful statute, I think that Williams's reading of the ACA was essentially correct. A defendant may therefore be prosecuted under the ACA for an "offense" which is "like" the one defined by state law if, and only if, that same "offense" is not also defined by federal law. That interpretation would hardly dispel all of the confu- sion surrounding the ACA, because courts would still have to decide whether the assimilated state offense is "the same" as some crime defined by federal law. As Justice Ken- nedy points out in dissent, "[t]here is a methodology at hand for this purpose, and it is the Blockburger test we use in double jeopardy law." Post, at 182. Two offenses are dif- ferent, for double jeopardy purposes, whenever each contains an element that the other does not. See, e. g., Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299, 304 (1932). That test can be 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 155 (1998) 177 Scalia, J., concurring in judgment easily and mechanically applied, and has the virtue of pro- ducing consistent and predictable results. The Blockburger test, however, establishes what consti- tutes the "same offence" for purposes of the traditional prac- tice that underlies the Double Jeopardy Clause, U. S. Const., Amdt. 5. That constitutional guarantee not only assumes a scheme of "offences" much more orderly than those referred to by the ACA (since they are the offenses designed by a single sovereign), but also pursues policy concerns that are entirely different. When it is fair to try a defendant a sec- ond time has little to do with when it is desirable to subject a defendant to two separate criminal prohibitions. Thus, for example, double jeopardy law treats greater and lesser in- cluded offenses as the same, see, e. g., Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U. S. 682 (1977) (per curiam), so that a person tried for felony murder cannot subsequently be prosecuted for the armed robbery that constituted the charged felony. That is fair enough; but it is assuredly not desirable that a jurisdic- tion (the federal enclave) which has an armed robbery law not have a felony-murder law. Contrariwise, as the Court's opinion points out, ante, at 163, Blockburger's emphasis on the formal elements of crimes causes it to deny the "same- ness" of some quite similar offenses because of trivial dif- ferences in the way they are defined. In other words, the Blockburger test gives the phrase "same offence" a technical meaning that reflects our double jeopardy traditions, see Grady v. Corbin, 495 U. S. 508, 528­536 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting), but that is neither a layman's understanding of the term nor a meaning that produces sensible results for purposes of "gap filling." There is no reason to assume, it seems to me, that Congress had the term of art in the Double Jeopardy Clause in mind when it enacted the ACA. Justice Kennedy contends that all of these concerns can be accommodated through adjustments to the Blockburger test. In his view, for example, "the existence of a lesser included federal offense does not prevent the assimilation of 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 178 LEWIS v. UNITED STATES Scalia, J., concurring in judgment a greater state offense under the ACA, or vice versa." Post, at 183. He proposes that courts should "look beyond slight differences in wording and jurisdictional elements to discern whether, as a practical matter, the elements of the two crimes are the same." Post, at 182. In order to avoid over- ruling Williams, he also suggests that assimilation is im- proper when "Congress . . . adverts to a specific element of an offense and sets it at a level different from the level set by state law." Post, at 183. I admire Justice Kennedy's effort to construct an interpretation of the ACA that yields more certain and predictable results, but the modifications he proposes largely dispel the virtues of familiarity, clarity, and predictability that would make Blockburger the means to such an end. Ultimately, moreover, those modifications are driven by a view of the policies underlying the Act which I do not share. Justice Kennedy contends that the ACA is primarily about federalism, and that respect for that prin- ciple requires a strong presumption in favor of assimilation. Post, at 181­182. To the extent that we can divine anything about the ACA's "purpose" from the historical context which produced it, I agree with the Court that the statute was apparently designed "to fill gaps in the federal criminal law" at a time when there was almost no federal criminal law. Ante, at 160; see also Williams, supra, at 718­719. Rejecting Blockburger's elements test leaves me without an easy and mechanical answer to the question of when a state and federal offense are the "same" under the ACA. But the language of the original 1825 ACA suggests that the focus of that inquiry should be on the way that crimes were traditionally defined and categorized at common law. It provided that ". . . if any offence shall be committed in [an enclave], the punishment of which offence is not specially provided for by any law of the United States, such offence shall . . . receive the same punishment as the laws of the state . . . 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 155 (1998) 179 Scalia, J., concurring in judgment provide for the like offence when committed within the body of any county of such state." 4 Stat. 115. Congress did not provide any methodology for determining whether an "offence" under state law is "provided for by any law of the United States"; the statute appears, instead, to presume the reader's familiarity with a set of discrete "of- fence[s]" existing apart from the particular provisions of either state or federal statutory law. In my opinion, the legal community of that day could only have regarded such language as a reference to the tradi- tional vocabulary and categories of the common law. In- deed, the original ACA was at least in part a response to our decision in United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32 (1812), which held that the federal courts could not recognize and punish common-law crimes in the absence of a specific federal statute. The common law's taxonomy of criminal behavior developed over the centuries through the interplay of stat- utes and judicial decisions, and its basic categories of crimi- nal offenses remain familiar today: murder, rape, assault, burglary, larceny, fraud, forgery, and so on. I believe that a contemporary reader of the original ACA would have under- stood it to apply if, and only if, the federal criminal statutes simply failed to cover some significant "offence" category generally understood to be part of the common law. Since 1825, of course, state and federal legislatures have created a tremendous variety of new statutory crimes that both cut across and expand the old common-law categories. Some of those new "offences" may have become so well es- tablished in our common legal culture that their absence from the federal criminal law would now represent a signifi- cant gap in its coverage-a gap of the sort the ACA was designed to fill. That possibility introduces an unavoidable element of judgment and discretion into the application of the ACA, and to that extent my interpretation is subject to the same criticisms I have leveled at the approaches taken by the Court and by Justice Kennedy. But I think that 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 180 LEWIS v. UNITED STATES Kennedy, J., dissenting danger is more theoretical than practical. The structure of the criminal law, like the basic categories of human vice, has remained quite stable over the centuries. There have been a few genuine innovations recently; I have in mind, for exam- ple, antitrust or securities crimes which did not exist in 1825. But Congress has been the principal innovator in most of those areas, and I doubt that courts will confront many new "offence" candidates that are not already covered by the fed- eral criminal law. Regardless, the approach outlined above would produce more predictable results than the majority's balancing test, and has the additional virtue of being more firmly grounded in the text and statutory history. It also produces a clear answer in this case. Ms. Lewis's conduct is not just punishable under some federal criminal statute; it is punishable as murder under 18 U. S. C. § 1111. Louisiana's murder statutes are structured somewhat dif- ferently from their federal counterparts, but they are still unquestionably murder statutes. Because that "offence" is certainly "made punishable by any enactment of Congress," there is no gap for the ACA to fill. That remains true even if the common-law category at the appropriate level of gen- erality is instead murder in the first degree. That "offence" is also defined and punished by the federal criminal law, although the prosecutors in this case apparently did not be- lieve that they could establish its elements. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment, and in Part IV of the majority's opinion. Justice Kennedy, dissenting. As the majority recognizes, the touchstone for inter- preting the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA) is the intent of Congress. Ante, at 166. One of Congress' purposes in enacting the ACA was to fill gaps in federal criminal law. Ante, at 160. The majority fails to weigh, however, a sec- ond, countervailing policy behind the ACA: the value of fed- eralism. The intent of Congress was to preserve state law 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 155 (1998) 181 Kennedy, J., dissenting except where it is "displaced by specific laws enacted by Con- gress." Franklin v. United States, 216 U. S. 559, 568 (1910). In other words, the ACA embodies Congress' "policy of gen- eral conformity to local law." United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U. S. 286, 289 (1958). The majority quotes these pas- sages with approval, ante, at 160, yet ignores the principles of federalism upon which they rest. A central tenet of federalism is concurrent jurisdiction over many subjects. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 425, 435 (1819). One result of concurrent jurisdiction is that, outside federal enclaves, citizens can be subject to the criminal laws of both state and federal sovereigns for the same act or course of conduct. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U. S. 82, 88­89 (1985). The ACA seeks to mirror the results of concurrent jurisdiction in enclaves where, but for its pro- visions, state laws would be suspended in their entirety. Congress chose this means to recognize and respect the power of both sovereigns. We should implement this princi- ple by assimilating state law except where Congress has manifested a contrary intention in "specific [federal] laws." Franklin, supra, at 568. But see ante, at 163 (suggesting that persons within federal enclaves should not be "randomly subject" to state as well as federal law, even though both sovereigns regulate those outside enclaves). The majority recognizes that assimilation is not barred simply because the conduct at issue could be punished under a federal statute. It is correct, then, to assume that assimila- tion depends on whether Congress has proscribed the same of- fense. Ante, at 161­162. Yet in trying to define the same offense, the majority asks whether assimilation would inter- fere with a federal policy, rewrite a federal offense, or in- trude upon a field occupied by the Federal Government. Ante, at 164­165. The majority's standards are a round- about way to ask whether specific federal laws conflict with state laws. The standards take too little note of the value of federalism and the concomitant presumption in favor of 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 182 LEWIS v. UNITED STATES Kennedy, J., dissenting assimilation. And for many concrete cases, they are too vague to be of help. A more serious problem with the majority's approach, however, is that it undervalues the best indicia of congres- sional intent: the words of the criminal statutes in question and the factual elements they define. There is a methodol- ogy at hand for this purpose, and it is the Blockburger test we use in double jeopardy law. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299 (1932); see also Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U. S. 359, 366­367 (1983) (Blockburger is a rule for divining congressional intent). Under Blockburger, we examine whether "[e]ach of the offenses created requires proof of a different element." 284 U. S., at 304. In other words, does "each provision requir[e] proof of a fact which the other does not"? Ibid. The same-elements test turns on the texts of the statutes in question, the clearest and most certain indicators of the will of Congress. The test is straightforward, and courts and Congress are already familiar with its dynamic. Fol- lowing Blockburger, a same-elements approach under the ACA would respect federalism by allowing a broad scope for assimilation of state law. The majority rejects this ap- proach, however, because federal and state statutes may have trivial differences in wording or may differ in jurisdic- tional elements. Ante, at 163, 165. It would be simpler and more faithful to federalism to use a same-elements inquiry as the starting point for the ACA analysis. Courts could use this standard and still accommo- date the majority's concerns. Under this view, we would look beyond slight differences in wording and jurisdictional elements to discern whether, as a practical matter, the ele- ments of the two crimes are the same. The majority frets that a small difference in the definitions of purses in federal and state purse-snatching laws would by itself permit assimi- lation. Ante, at 163. But a slight difference in definition need not by itself allow assimilation. See Amar & Marcus, 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 155 (1998) 183 Kennedy, J., dissenting Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 38­44 (1995) (advocating a similar approach for double jeopardy claims involving combinations of federal and state offenses). The majority also wonders whether one could assimilate state laws forbidding robbery of state-chartered banks because a federal bank-robbery law did not require a state charter. Ante, at 163. But again, a jurisdictional element need not by itself allow assimilation, if all substan- tive elements of the offenses are identical. Because the purposes of the ACA and double jeopardy law differ, some other adjustments to Blockburger may be neces- sary. For instance, Blockburger treats greater and lesser included offenses as the same to protect the finality of a sin- gle prosecution, but finality is not the purpose of the ACA. Congress chooses to allow greater and lesser included of- fenses to coexist at the federal level, though a particular offender cannot be convicted of both. So too the existence of a lesser included federal offense does not prevent the as- similation of a greater state offense under the ACA, or vice versa. See ante, at 171 (citing cases finding federal assault statute does not prevent assimilation of state child-abuse laws). Another way in which the ACA differs from double jeop- ardy law is compelled by our own precedent interpreting the ACA. See Williams v. United States, 327 U. S. 711 (1946). Congress sometimes adverts to a specific element of an of- fense and sets it at a level different from the level set by state law. When the federal and state offenses have other- wise identical elements, assimilation is not proper. In the Williams case, for example, a state statutory-rape law set the age of majority at 18. Id., at 716. Congress had enacted a federal carnal-knowledge statute, setting the age of majority at 16. Id., at 714, n. 6. Once Congress had ad- verted to and set the age of majority, state law could not be used to rewrite and broaden this particular element. See id., at 717­718, 724­725. Because Congress had manifested 523US1 Unit: $U38 [04-29-00 20:21:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 184 LEWIS v. UNITED STATES Kennedy, J., dissenting a clear intent to the contrary, assimilation was improper. The same would be true if a state grand-larceny law required a theft of at least $200, while a federal grand-larceny law required a theft of $250 or more. Congress could have defined first-degree murder to include the killing of children younger than 3, even though state law set the requisite age at 12. Had Congress done so, Wil- liams would apply and assimilation of state law would be improper if all other elements were the same. Here, on the other hand, Congress has not taken a victim's age into ac- count at all in defining first-degree murder. The state of- fense includes a substantive age element missing from the federal statute, so the two do not share the same elements and assimilation is proper. The majority's analysis is more obscure and leads it to an incorrect conclusion. For these reasons, and with all respect, I dissent. 523US1 Unit: $U39 [04-29-00 20:26:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1997 185 Syllabus GRAY v. MARYLAND certiorari to the court of appeals of maryland No. 96­8653. Argued December 8, 1997-Decided March 9, 1998 Anthony Bell confessed to the police that he, petitioner Gray, and another man participated in the beating that caused Stacey Williams' death. After the third man died, a Maryland grand jury indicted Bell and Gray for murder, and the State tried them jointly. When the trial judge permitted the State to introduce a redacted version of Bell's confession, the detective who read it to the jury said "deleted" or "deletion" when- ever the name of Gray or the third participant appeared. Immediately after that reading, however, the detective answered affirmatively when the prosecutor asked, "after [Bell] gave you that information, you subse- quently were able to arrest . . . Gray; is that correct?" The State also introduced a written copy of the confession with the two names omitted, leaving in their place blanks separated by commas. The judge in- structed the jury that the confession could be used as evidence only against Bell, not Gray. The jury convicted both defendants. Mary- land's intermediate appellate court held that Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, prohibited use of the confession and set aside Gray's conviction. Maryland's highest court disagreed and reinstated that conviction. Held: The confession here at issue, which substituted blanks and the word "delete" for Gray's proper name, falls within the class of statements to which Bruton's protective rule applies. Pp. 189­197. (a) Bruton also involved two defendants tried jointly for the same crime, with the confession of one of them incriminating both himself and the other. This Court held that, despite a limiting instruction that the jury should consider the confession as evidence only against the confess- ing codefendant, the introduction of such a confession at a joint trial violates the nonconfessing defendant's Sixth Amendment right to cross- examine witnesses. The Court explained that this situation, in which the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial, is one of the contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow limit- ing instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so devastat- ing to the defendant, that the introduction of the evidence cannot be allowed. See 391 U. S., at 135­136. Bruton's scope was limited by Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U. S. 200, 211, in which the Court held that the Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a nontesti- 523US1 Unit: $U39 [04-29-00 20:26:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 186 GRAY v. MARYLAND Syllabus fying codefendant's confession with a proper limiting instruction when the confession is redacted to eliminate not only that defendant's name, but any reference to his or her existence. Pp. 189­191. (b) Unlike Richardson's redacted confession, the confession here re- fers directly to Gray's "existence." Redactions that simply replace a name with an obvious blank space or a word such as "deleted" or a symbol or other similarly obvious indications of alteration leave state- ments that, considered as a class, so closely resemble Bruton's unre- dacted statements as to warrant the same legal results. For one thing, a jury will often react similarly to an unredacted confession and a con- fession redacted as here, for it will realize that the confession refers specifically to the defendant, even when the State does not blatantly link the defendant to the deleted name, as it did below by asking the detective whether Gray was arrested on the basis of information in Bell's confession. For another thing, the obvious deletion may well call the jurors' attention specially to the removed name. By encouraging the jury to speculate about the reference, the redaction may overempha- size the importance of the confession's accusation-once the jurors work out the reference. Finally, Bruton's protected statements and state- ments redacted to leave a blank or some other similarly obvious alter- ation, function the same way grammatically: They point directly to, and accuse, the nonconfessing codefendant. Pp. 192­195. (c) Although Richardson placed outside Bruton's scope statements that incriminate inferentially, 481 U. S., at 208, and the jury must use inference to connect Bell's statements with Gray, Richardson does not control the result here. Inference pure and simple cannot make the critical difference. If it did, then Richardson would also place outside Bruton's scope confessions that use, e. g., nicknames and unique descrip- tions, whereas this Court has assumed that such identifiers fall inside Bruton's protection, see Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250, 253. Thus, Richardson must depend in significant part upon the kind of, not the simple fact of, inference. Richardson's inferences involved state- ments that did not refer directly to the defendant himself, but became incriminating "only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial." 481 U. S., at 208. In contrast, the inferences here involve statements that, despite redaction, obviously refer directly to someone, often obvi- ously to Gray, and involve inferences that a jury ordinarily could make immediately, even were the confession the very first item introduced at trial. Richardson's policy reasons for its conclusion-that application of Bruton's rule would force prosecutors to abandon use either of the confession or of a joint trial in instances where adequate redaction would "not [be] possible," 481 U. S., at 209, and would lead to those same 523US1 Unit: $U39 [04-29-00 20:26:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 185 (1998) 187 Syllabus results, or provoke mistrials, because of the difficulty of predicting, be- fore introduction of all the evidence, whether Bruton barred use of a particular confession that incriminated "by connection," see ibid.-are inapplicable in the circumstances here. Pp. 195­197. 344 Md. 417, 687 A. 2d 660, vacated and remanded. Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dis- senting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 200. Arthur A. DeLano, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Stephen E. Harris and Nancy S. Forster. Carmen M. Shepard, Deputy Attorney General of Mary- land, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, and Gary E. Bair and Mary Ellen Barbera, Assistant Attor- neys General. Roy W. McLeese III argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, and Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben.* *David Reiser and Barbara E. Bergman filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of New York et al. by Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General of New York, Barbara G. Billet, Solicitor General, Peter H. Schiff, Deputy Solicitor General, and Marlene O. Tuczinski, Assistant Attorney General, John M. Balley, Chief State's Attorney of Connecticut, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Ne- vada, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Jan Graham of Utah, and William H. Sorrell of Vermont; and for the Criminal Justice Legal Foun- dation by Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson. 523US1 Unit: $U39 [04-29-00 20:26:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 188 GRAY v. MARYLAND Opinion of the Court Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue in this case concerns the application of Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968). Bruton involved two defendants accused of participating in the same crime and tried jointly before the same jury. One of the defendants had confessed. His confession named and incriminated the other defendant. The trial judge issued a limiting instruc- tion, telling the jury that it should consider the confession as evidence only against the codefendant who had confessed and not against the defendant named in the confession. Bruton held that, despite the limiting instruction, the Constitution forbids the use of such a confession in the joint trial. The case before us differs from Bruton in that the prose- cution here redacted the codefendant's confession by substi- tuting for the defendant's name in the confession a blank space or the word "deleted." We must decide whether these substitutions make a significant legal difference. We hold that they do not and that Bruton's protective rule applies. I In 1993, Stacey Williams died after a severe beating. An- thony Bell gave a confession, to the Baltimore City police, in which he said that he (Bell), Kevin Gray, and Jacquin "Tank" Vanlandingham had participated in the beating that resulted in Williams' death. Vanlandingham later died. A Maryland grand jury indicted Bell and Gray for murder. The State of Maryland tried them jointly. The trial judge, after denying Gray's motion for a separate trial, permitted the State to introduce Bell's confession into evidence at trial. But the judge ordered the confession re- dacted. Consequently, the police detective who read the confession into evidence said the word "deleted" or "dele- tion" whenever Gray's name or Vanlandingham's name ap- peared. Immediately after the police detective read the redacted confession to the jury, the prosecutor asked, "after he gave you that information, you subsequently were able 523US1 Unit: $U39 [04-29-00 20:26:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 185 (1998) 189 Opinion of the Court to arrest Mr. Kevin Gray; is that correct?" The officer re- sponded, "That's correct." App. 12. The State also intro- duced into evidence a written copy of the confession with those two names omitted, leaving in their place blank white spaces separated by commas. See Appendix, infra. The State produced other witnesses, who said that six persons (including Bell, Gray, and Vanlandingham) participated in the beating. Gray testified and denied his participation. Bell did not testify. When instructing the jury, the trial judge specified that the confession was evidence only against Bell; the instruc- tions said that the jury should not use the confession as evi- dence against Gray. The jury convicted both Bell and Gray. Gray appealed. Maryland's intermediate appellate court accepted Gray's argument that Bruton prohibited use of the confession and set aside his conviction. 107 Md. App. 311, 667 A. 2d 983 (1995). Maryland's highest court disagreed and reinstated the conviction. 344 Md. 417, 687 A. 2d 660 (1997). We granted certiorari in order to consider Bruton's application to a redaction that replaces a name with an obvious blank space or symbol or word such as "deleted." II In deciding whether Bruton's protective rule applies to the redacted confession before us, we must consider both Bruton and a later case, Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U. S. 200 (1987), which limited Bruton's scope. We shall briefly sum- marize each of these two cases. Bruton, as we have said, involved two defendants-Evans and Bruton-tried jointly for robbery. Evans did not tes- tify, but the Government introduced into evidence Evans' confession, which stated that both he (Evans) and Bruton together had committed the robbery. 391 U. S., at 124. The trial judge told the jury it could consider the confession 523US1 Unit: $U39 [04-29-00 20:26:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 190 GRAY v. MARYLAND Opinion of the Court as evidence only against Evans, not against Bruton. Id., at 125. This Court held that, despite the limiting instruction, the introduction of Evans' out-of-court confession at Bruton's trial had violated Bruton's right, protected by the Sixth Amendment, to cross-examine witnesses. Id., at 137. The Court recognized that in many circumstances a limiting in- struction will adequately protect one defendant from the prejudicial effects of the introduction at a joint trial of evi- dence intended for use only against a different defendant. Id., at 135. But it said: "[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defend- ant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. Such a context is presented here, where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused side- by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial. Not only are the in- criminations devastating to the defendant but their credibility is inevitably suspect . . . . The unreliability of such evidence is intolerably compounded when the alleged accomplice, as here, does not testify and cannot be tested by cross-examination." Id., at 135­136 (cita- tions omitted). The Court found that Evans' confession constituted just such a "powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statemen[t]," and that its introduction into evidence, insulated from cross- examination, violated Bruton's Sixth Amendment rights. Id., at 135. In Richardson v. Marsh, supra, the Court considered a redacted confession. The case involved a joint murder trial of Marsh and Williams. The State had redacted the confes- sion of one defendant, Williams, so as to "omit all reference" 523US1 Unit: $U39 [04-29-00 20:26:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 185 (1998) 191 Opinion of the Court to his codefendant, Marsh-"indeed, to omit all indication that anyone other than . . . Williams" and a third person had "participated in the crime." Id., at 203 (emphasis in origi- nal). The trial court also instructed the jury not to consider the confession against Marsh. Id., at 205. As redacted, the confession indicated that Williams and the third person had discussed the murder in the front seat of a car while they traveled to the victim's house. Id., at 203­204, n. 1. The redacted confession contained no indication that Marsh-or any other person-was in the car. Ibid. Later in the trial, however, Marsh testified that she was in the back seat of the car. Id., at 204. For that reason, in context, the confession still could have helped convince the jury that Marsh knew about the murder in advance and therefore had participated knowingly in the crime. The Court held that this redacted confession fell outside Bruton's scope and was admissible (with appropriate limiting instructions) at the joint trial. The Court distinguished Evans' confession in Bruton as a confession that was "in- criminating on its face," and which had "expressly impli- cat[ed]" Bruton. 481 U. S., at 208. By contrast, Williams' confession amounted to "evidence requiring linkage" in that it "became" incriminating in respect to Marsh "only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial." Ibid. The Court held "that the Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a nontestifying codefendant's confession with a proper limiting instruction when, as here, the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defend- ant's name, but any reference to his or her existence." Id., at 211. The Court added: "We express no opinion on the admissibil- ity of a confession in which the defendant's name has been replaced with a symbol or neutral pronoun." Id., at 211, n. 5. 523US1 Unit: $U39 [04-29-00 20:26:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 192 GRAY v. MARYLAND Opinion of the Court III Originally, the codefendant's confession in the case before us, like that in Bruton, referred to, and directly implicated, another defendant. The State, however, redacted that con- fession by removing the nonconfessing defendant's name. Nonetheless, unlike Richardson's redacted confession, this confession refers directly to the "existence" of the noncon- fessing defendant. The State has simply replaced the non- confessing defendant's name with a kind of symbol, namely, the word "deleted" or a blank space set off by commas. The redacted confession, for example, responded to the question "Who was in the group that beat Stacey," with the phrase, "Me, , and a few other guys." See Appendix, infra, at 199. And when the police witness read the confession in court, he said the word "deleted" or "dele- tion" where the blank spaces appear. We therefore must decide a question that Richardson left open, namely, whether redaction that replaces a defendant's name with an obvious indication of deletion, such as a blank space, the word "deleted," or a similar symbol, still falls within Bruton's protective rule. We hold that it does. Bruton, as interpreted by Richardson, holds that certain "powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a co- defendant"-those naming another defendant-considered as a class, are so prejudicial that limiting instructions cannot work. Richardson, 481 U. S., at 207; Bruton, 391 U. S., at 135. Unless the prosecutor wishes to hold separate trials or to use separate juries or to abandon use of the confession, he must redact the confession to reduce significantly or to eliminate the special prejudice that the Bruton Court found. Redactions that simply replace a name with an obvious blank space or a word such as "deleted" or a symbol or other simi- larly obvious indications of alteration, however, leave state- ments that, considered as a class, so closely resemble Bru- ton's unredacted statements that, in our view, the law must require the same result. 523US1 Unit: $U39 [04-29-00 20:26:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 185 (1998) 193 Opinion of the Court For one thing, a jury will often react similarly to an unre- dacted confession and a confession redacted in this way, for the jury will often realize that the confession refers specifi- cally to the defendant. This is true even when the State does not blatantly link the defendant to the deleted name, as it did in this case by asking whether Gray was arrested on the basis of information in Bell's confession as soon as the officer had finished reading the redacted statement. Con- sider a simplified but typical example, a confession that reads "I, Bob Smith, along with Sam Jones, robbed the bank." To replace the words "Sam Jones" with an obvious blank will not likely fool anyone. A juror somewhat familiar with criminal law would know immediately that the blank, in the phrase "I, Bob Smith, along with , robbed the bank," refers to defendant Jones. A juror who does not know the law and who therefore wonders to whom the blank might refer need only lift his eyes to Jones, sitting at counsel table, to find what will seem the obvious answer, at least if the juror hears the judge's instruction not to consider the confes- sion as evidence against Jones, for that instruction will pro- vide an obvious reason for the blank. A more sophisticated juror, wondering if the blank refers to someone else, might also wonder how, if it did, the prosecutor could argue the confession is reliable, for the prosecutor, after all, has been arguing that Jones, not someone else, helped Smith commit the crime. For another thing, the obvious deletion may well call the jurors' attention specially to the removed name. By encour- aging the jury to speculate about the reference, the redaction may overemphasize the importance of the confession's accu- sation-once the jurors work out the reference. That is why Judge Learned Hand, many years ago, wrote in a similar instance that blacking out the name of a codefendant not only "would have been futile. . . . [T]here could not have been the slightest doubt as to whose names had been blacked out," but "even if there had been, that blacking out itself would 523US1 Unit: $U39 [04-29-00 20:26:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 194 GRAY v. MARYLAND Opinion of the Court have not only laid the doubt, but underscored the answer." United States v. Delli Paoli, 229 F. 2d 319, 321 (CA2 1956), aff'd, 352 U. S. 232 (1957), overruled by Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968). See also Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401, 430 (1945) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (describing substitution of names in confession with "X" or "Y" and other similar redactions as "devices . . . so obvious as per- haps to emphasize the identity of those they purported to conceal"). Finally, Bruton's protected statements and statements redacted to leave a blank or some other similarly obvious al- teration function the same way grammatically. They are directly accusatory. Evans' statement in Bruton used a proper name to point explicitly to an accused defendant. And Bruton held that the "powerfully incriminating" effect of what Justice Stewart called "an out-of-court accusation," 391 U. S., at 138 (concurring opinion), creates a special, and vital, need for cross-examination-a need that would be im- mediately obvious had the codefendant pointed directly to the defendant in the courtroom itself. The blank space in an obviously redacted confession also points directly to the defendant, and it accuses the defendant in a manner similar to Evans' use of Bruton's name or to a testifying codefend- ant's accusatory finger. By way of contrast, the factual statement at issue in Richardson-a statement about what others said in the front seat of a car-differs from directly accusatory evidence in this respect, for it does not point directly to a defendant at all. We concede certain differences between Bruton and this case. A confession that uses a blank or the word "delete" (or, for that matter, a first name or a nickname) less obvi- ously refers to the defendant than a confession that uses the defendant's full and proper name. Moreover, in some in- stances the person to whom the blank refers may not be clear: Although the followup question asked by the State in this case eliminated all doubt, the reference might not be 523US1 Unit: $U39 [04-29-00 20:26:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 185 (1998) 195 Opinion of the Court transparent in other cases in which a confession, like the present confession, uses two (or more) blanks, even though only one other defendant appears at trial, and in which the trial indicates that there are more participants than the con- fession has named. Nonetheless, as we have said, we be- lieve that, considered as a class, redactions that replace a proper name with an obvious blank, the word "delete," a symbol, or similarly notify the jury that a name has been deleted are similar enough to Bruton's unredacted confes- sions as to warrant the same legal results. IV The State, in arguing for a contrary conclusion, relies heavily upon Richardson. But we do not believe Richard- son controls the result here. We concede that Richardson placed outside the scope of Bruton's rule those statements that incriminate inferentially. 481 U. S., at 208. We also concede that the jury must use inference to connect the statement in this redacted confession with the defendant. But inference pure and simple cannot make the critical dif- ference, for if it did, then Richardson would also place out- side Bruton's scope confessions that use shortened first names, nicknames, descriptions as unique as the "red-haired, bearded, one-eyed man-with-a-limp," United States v. Grin- nell Corp., 384 U. S. 563, 591 (1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting), and perhaps even full names of defendants who are always known by a nickname. This Court has assumed, however, that nicknames and specific descriptions fall inside, not out- side, Bruton's protection. See Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250, 253 (1969) (assuming Bruton violation where confessions describe codefendant as the "white guy" and gives a description of his age, height, weight, and hair color). The Solicitor General, although supporting Maryland in this case, concedes that this is appropriate. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18­19, n. 8. 523US1 Unit: $U39 [04-29-00 20:26:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 196 GRAY v. MARYLAND Opinion of the Court That being so, Richardson must depend in significant part upon the kind of, not the simple fact of, inference. Richard- son's inferences involved statements that did not refer di- rectly to the defendant himself and which became incrimi- nating "only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial." 481 U. S., at 208. The inferences at issue here in- volve statements that, despite redaction, obviously refer di- rectly to someone, often obviously the defendant, and which involve inferences that a jury ordinarily could make immedi- ately, even were the confession the very first item introduced at trial. Moreover, the redacted confession with the blank prominent on its face, in Richardson's words, "facially in- criminat[es]" the codefendant. Id., at 209 (emphasis added). Like the confession in Bruton itself, the accusation that the redacted confession makes "is more vivid than inferential in- crimination, and hence more difficult to thrust out of mind." 481 U. S., at 208. Nor are the policy reasons that Richardson provided in support of its conclusion applicable here. Richardson ex- pressed concern lest application of Bruton's rule apply where "redaction" of confessions, particularly "confessions incriminating by connection," would often "not [be] possi- ble," thereby forcing prosecutors too often to abandon use either of the confession or of a joint trial. 481 U. S., at 209. Additional redaction of a confession that uses a blank space, the word "delete," or a symbol, however, normally is possi- ble. Consider as an example a portion of the confession be- fore us: The witness who read the confession told the jury that the confession (among other things) said, "Question: Who was in the group that beat Stacey? "Answer: Me, deleted, deleted, and a few other guys." App. 11. Why could the witness not, instead, have said: "Question: Who was in the group that beat Stacey? "Answer: Me and a few other guys." 523US1 Unit: $U39 [04-29-00 20:26:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 185 (1998) 197 Opinion of the Court Richardson itself provides a similar example of this kind of redaction. The confession there at issue had been "redacted to omit all reference to respondent-indeed, to omit all indi- cation that anyone other than Martin and Williams partici- pated in the crime," 481 U. S., at 203 (emphasis deleted), and it did not indicate that it had been redacted. But cf. post, at 203 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Court has "never before endorsed . . . the redaction of a statement by some means other than the deletion of certain words, with the fact of the deletion shown"). The Richardson Court also feared that the inclusion, within Bruton's protective rule, of confessions that incrimi- nated "by connection" too often would provoke mistrials, or would unnecessarily lead prosecutors to abandon the confes- sion or joint trial, because neither the prosecutors nor the judge could easily predict, until after the introduction of all the evidence, whether or not Bruton had barred use of the confession. 481 U. S., at 209. To include the use of blanks, the word "delete," symbols, or other indications of redaction, within Bruton's protections, however, runs no such risk. Their use is easily identified prior to trial and does not de- pend, in any special way, upon the other evidence introduced in the case. We also note that several Circuits have inter- preted Bruton similarly for many years, see, e. g., United States v. Garcia, 836 F. 2d 385 (CA8 1987); Clark v. Maggio, 737 F. 2d 471 (CA5 1984), yet no one has told us of any sig- nificant practical difficulties arising out of their administra- tion of that rule. For these reasons, we hold that the confession here at issue, which substituted blanks and the word "delete" for the petitioner's proper name, falls within the class of statements to which Bruton's protections apply. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 523US1 Unit: $U39 [04-29-00 20:26:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 198 GRAY v. MARYLAND Appendix to opinion of the Court APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT [Typewritten Version of Handwritten Redacted Statement, State's Exhibit 5B] (REDACTED STATEMENT) This is a statement of Anthony Bell, taken on 1­4­94 at 0925 hrs in the small interview room. Statement taken by Det. Pennington and Det. Ritz. (Q) Is your name Anthony Bell (A) Yes (Q) Are 19 years old and your date of Birth is 6­17­74 (A) Yes (Q) Can you read and write (A) Yes (Q) Are you under the influence of alcohol or drugs (A) No (Q) You were explained your Explanation of Rights, do you fully understand them (A) Yes (Q) Are you willing to answer questions without an attor- ney present at this time (A) Yes Anthony Bell [Page -2-] Bell, Anthony (Q) Has anyone promised you anything if you answer questions (A) No (Q) What can you tell me about the beating of Stacey Williams that occurred on 10 November 1993 (A) An argument broke out between and Stacey in the 500 blk of Louden Ave Stacey got smacked and then ran into Wildwood Parkway. Me , and a few other guys ran after Stacey. We caught up to him on Wild- 523US1 Unit: $U39 [04-29-00 20:26:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 185 (1998) 199 Appendix to opinion of the Court wood Parkway. We beat Stacey up. After we beat Stacey up, we walked him back to Louden Ave I then walked over and used the phone. Stacey and the others walked down Louden (Q) When Stacey was beaten on Wildwood Parkway, how was he beaten Anthony Bell [Page -3-] Bell, Anthony (A) Hit, kicked (Q) Who hit and kicked Stacey (A) I hit Stacey, he was kicked but I don't know who kicked him (Q) Who was in the group that beat Stacey (A) Me, , and a few other guys (Q) Do you have the other guys names (A) , and me, I don't remember who was out there (Q) Did anyone pick Stacey up and drop him to the ground (A) No when I was there. (Q) What was the argument over between Stacey and Anthony Bell [Page -4-] Bell, Anthony (A) Some money that Stacey owed (Q) How many guys were hitting on Stacey (A) About six guys (Q) Do you have a black jacket with Park Heights written on the back (A) Yeh (Q) Who else has these jacket. (A) , 523US1 Unit: $U39 [04-29-00 20:26:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 200 GRAY v. MARYLAND Scalia, J., dissenting (Q) After reading this statement would you sign it (A) Yes Anthony Bell Det. William F. Ritz Det. Homer Pennington Justice Scalia, with whom The Chief Justice, Jus- tice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas join, dissenting. In Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U. S. 200 (1987), we declined to extend the "narrow exception" of Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968), beyond confessions that facially in- criminate a defendant. Today the Court "concede[s] that Richardson placed outside the scope of Bruton's rule those statements that incriminate inferentially," ante, at 195, and "concede[s] that the jury must use inference to connect the statement in this redacted confession with the defendant," ibid., but nonetheless extends Bruton to confessions that have been redacted to delete the defendant's name. Be- cause I believe the line drawn in Richardson should not be changed, I respectfully dissent. The almost invariable assumption of the law is that jurors follow their instructions. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S. 307, 324­325, n. 9 (1985). This rule "is a pragmatic one, rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in the belief that it represents a reasonable practi- cal accommodation of the interests of the state and the defendant in the criminal justice process." Richardson, supra, at 211. We have held, for example, that the state may introduce evidence of a defendant's prior convictions for the purpose of sentencing enhancement, or statements elic- ited from a defendant in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), for the purpose of impeachment, so long as the jury is instructed that such evidence may not be con- sidered for the purpose of determining guilt. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554 (1967); Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971). The same applies to codefendant confessions: 523US1 Unit: $U39 [04-29-00 20:26:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 185 (1998) 201 Scalia, J., dissenting "[A] witness whose testimony is introduced at a joint trial is not considered to be a witness `against' a defendant if the jury is instructed to consider that testimony only against a codefendant." Richardson, supra, at 206. In Bruton, we recognized a "narrow exception" to this rule: "We held that a defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right of con- frontation when the facially incriminating confession of a nontestifying codefendant is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider the confession only against the codefendant." 481 U. S., at 207. We declined in Richardson, however, to extend Bruton to confessions that incriminate only by inference from other evidence. When incrimination is inferential, "it is a less valid generalization that the jury will not likely obey the instruction to disregard the evidence." 481 U. S., at 208. Today the Court struggles to decide whether a confession redacted to omit the defendant's name is incriminating on its face or by inference. On the one hand, the Court "concede[s] that the jury must use inference to connect the statement in this redacted confession with the defendant," ante, at 195, but later asserts, on the other hand, that "the redacted con- fession with the blank prominent on its face . . . `facially incriminat[es]' " him, ante, at 196. The Court should have stopped with its concession: The statement "Me, deleted, de- leted, and a few other guys" does not facially incriminate anyone but the speaker. The Court's analogizing of "de- leted" to a physical description that clearly identifies the defendant (which we have assumed Bruton covers, see Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250, 253 (1969)) does not survive scrutiny. By "facially incriminating," we have meant incriminating independent of other evidence intro- duced at trial. Richardson, supra, at 208­209. Since the defendant's appearance at counsel table is not evidence, the description "red-haired, bearded, one-eyed man-with-a- limp," ante, at 195, would be facially incriminating-unless, of course, the defendant had dyed his hair black and shaved 523US1 Unit: $U39 [04-29-00 20:26:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 202 GRAY v. MARYLAND Scalia, J., dissenting his beard before trial, and the prosecution introduced evi- dence concerning his former appearance. Similarly, the statement "Me, Kevin Gray, and a few other guys" would be facially incriminating, unless the defendant's name set forth in the indictment was not Kevin Gray, and evidence was in- troduced to the effect that he sometimes used "Kevin Gray" as an alias. By contrast, the person to whom "deleted" re- fers in "Me, deleted, deleted, and a few other guys" is not apparent from anything the jury knows independent of the evidence at trial. Though the jury may speculate, the state- ment expressly implicates no one but the speaker. Of course the Court is correct that confessions redacted to omit the defendant's name are more likely to incriminate than confessions redacted to omit any reference to his exist- ence. But it is also true-and more relevant here-that con- fessions redacted to omit the defendant's name are less likely to incriminate than confessions that expressly state it. The latter are "powerfully incriminating" as a class, Bruton, supra, at 124, n. 1, 135; the former are not so. Here, for in- stance, there were two names deleted, five or more partici- pants in the crime, and only one other defendant on trial. The jury no doubt may "speculate about the reference," ante, at 193, as it speculates when evidence connects a defendant to a confession that does not refer to his existence. The issue, however, is not whether the confession incriminated peti- tioner, but whether the incrimination is so "powerful" that we must depart from the normal presumption that the jury fol- lows its instructions. Richardson, supra, at 208, n. 3. I think it is not-and I am certain that drawing the line for de- parting from the ordinary rule at the facial identification of the defendant makes more sense than drawing it anywhere else. The Court's extension of Bruton to name-redacted confes- sions "as a class" will seriously compromise "society's com- pelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law." Moran v. Burbine, 475 U. S. 412, 426 523US1 Unit: $U39 [04-29-00 20:26:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 185 (1998) 203 Scalia, J., dissenting (1986) (citation omitted). We explained in Richardson that forgoing use of codefendant confessions or joint trials was "too high" a price to ensure that juries never disregard their instructions. 481 U. S., at 209­210. The Court minimizes the damage that it does by suggesting that "[a]dditional re- daction of a confession that uses a blank space, the word `delete,' or a symbol . . . normally is possible." In the pres- ent case, it asks, why could the police officer not have testi- fied that Bell's answer was "Me and a few other guys"? Ante, at 196. The answer, it seems obvious to me, is be- cause that is not what Bell said. Bell's answer was "Me, Tank, Kevin and a few other guys." Introducing the state- ment with full disclosure of deletions is one thing; introduc- ing as the complete statement what was in fact only a part is something else. And of course even concealed deletions from the text will often not do the job that the Court de- mands. For inchoate offenses-conspiracy in particular- redaction to delete all reference to a confederate would often render the confession nonsensical. If the question was "Who agreed to beat Stacey?", and the answer was "Me and Kevin," we might redact the answer to "Me and [deleted]," or perhaps to "Me and somebody else," but surely not to just "Me"-for that would no longer be a confession to the conspiracy charge, but rather the foundation for an insanity defense. To my knowledge we have never before en- dorsed-and to my strong belief we ought not endorse-the redaction of a statement by some means other than the dele- tion of certain words, with the fact of the deletion shown.1 The risk to the integrity of our system (not to mention the increase in its complexity) posed by the approval of such 1 The Court is mistaken to suggest that in Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U. S. 200 (1987), we endorsed rewriting confessions as a proper method of redaction. See ante, at 197. There the parties agreed to the method of redaction, App. in Richardson v. Marsh, O. T. 1986, No. 85­1433, pp. 100, 107­108, and we had no occasion to address the propriety of editing confes- sions without showing the nature of the editing. 523US1 Unit: $U39 [04-29-00 20:26:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 204 GRAY v. MARYLAND Scalia, J., dissenting freelance editing seems to me infinitely greater than the risk posed by the entirely honest reproduction that the Court disapproves. The United States Constitution guarantees, not a perfect system of criminal justice (as to which there can be consider- able disagreement), but a minimum standard of fairness. Lest we lose sight of the forest for the trees, it should be borne in mind that federal and state rules of criminal proce- dure-which can afford to seek perfection because they can be more readily changed-exclude nontestifying-codefendant confessions even where the Sixth Amendment does not. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (and Mary- land's), a trial court may order separate trials if joinder will prejudice a defendant. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 14; Md. Crim. Rule 4­253(c) (1998). Maryland courts have described the term "prejudice" as a "term of art," which "refers only to prejudice resulting to the defendant from the reception of evidence that would have been inadmissible against that defendant had there been no joinder." Ogonowski v. State, 589 A. 2d 513, 520, cert. denied, 593 A. 2d 1127 (1991). The Federal Rule expressly contemplates that in ruling on a sev- erance motion the court will inspect "in camera any state- ments or confessions made by the defendants which the government intends to introduce in evidence at the trial." Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 14. Federal and most state trial courts (including Maryland's) also have the discretion to ex- clude unfairly prejudicial (albeit probative) evidence. Fed. Rule Evid. 403; Md. Rule Evid. 5­403 (1998). Here, peti- tioner moved for a severance on the ground that the admis- sion of Bell's confession would be unfairly prejudicial. The trial court denied the motion, explaining that where a con- fession names two others, and the evidence is that five or six others participated, redaction of petitioner's name would not leave the jury with the "unavoidable inference" that Bell implicated Gray. App. 8. 523US1 Unit: $U39 [04-29-00 20:26:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 185 (1998) 205 Scalia, J., dissenting I do not understand the Court to disagree that the redac- tion itself left unclear to whom the blank referred.2 See ante, at 194­195. That being so, the rule set forth in Rich- ardson applies, and the statement could constitutionally be admitted with limiting instruction. This remains, insofar as the Sixth Amendment is concerned, the most "reasonable practical accommodation of the interests of the state and the defendant in the criminal justice process." Richardson, 481 U. S., at 211. For these reasons, I would affirm the judg- ment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland. 2 The Court does believe, however, that the answer to a "followup ques- tion"-"All right, now, officer, after he gave you that information, you subsequently were able to arrest Mr. Kevin Gray; is that correct?" ("That's correct")-"eliminated all doubt" as to the subject of the redaction. Ante, at 189, 194. That is probably not so, and is certainly far from clear. Tes- timony that preceded the introduction of Bell's confession had already es- tablished that Gray had become a suspect in the case, and that a warrant had been issued for his arrest, before Bell confessed. Brief for Respond- ent 26, n. 10. Respondent contends that, given this trial background, and in its context, the prosecutor's question did not imply any connection be- tween Bell's confession and Gray's arrest, and was simply a means of mak- ing the transition from Bell's statement to the next piece of evidence, Gray's statement. Ibid. That is at least arguable, and an appellate court is in a poor position to resolve such a contextual question de novo. That is why objections to trial testimony are supposed to be made at the time- so that trial judges, who hear the testimony in full, live context, can make such determinations in the first instance. But if the question did bring the redaction home to the defendant, surely that shows the impropriety of the question rather than of the redaction-and the question was not objected to. The failure to object deprives petitioner of the right to com- plain of some incremental identifiability added to the redacted statement by the question and answer. Of course the Court's reliance upon this testimony belies its contention that name-redacted confessions are power- fully incriminating "as a class," ante, at 195. 523US1 Unit: $U40 [04-29-00 20:28:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN 206 OCTOBER TERM, 1997 Per Curiam GLENDORA v. PORZIO et al. on motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis No. 97­7300. Decided March 9, 1998 Held: Abusive filer's motion to proceed in forma pauperis is denied; and for the reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1, she is barred from filing any further certiorari petitions in noncriminal matters unless she first pays the required dock- eting fee and submits her petition in compliance with Rule 33.1. Motion denied. Per Curiam. Pro se petitioner Glendora seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Second Circuit. The District Court dismissed petitioner's claims alleging violation of her due process rights and a con- spiracy to violate her due process rights under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and 42 U. S. C. § 1985, respectively. The claims, which arose out of a dispute with her landlord, were based on purported "sewer service" used by her land- lord's lawyers and acceptance of the affidavits of service by the state-court trial judge. The Second Circuit denied peti- tioner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed her appeal as frivolous. We deny petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis. She is allowed until March 30, 1998, to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38 and to submit her petition in compliance with Rule 33.1. For the reasons discussed below, we also direct the Clerk of the Court not to accept any further peti- tions for certiorari in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless she first pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits her petition in compliance with Rule 33.1. Petitioner has filed 14 petitions with this Court since 1994. All have been denied without recorded dissent. In 1997, we invoked Rule 39.8 to deny petitioner in forma pauperis sta- 523US1 Unit: $U40 [04-29-00 20:28:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 206 (1998) 207 Stevens, J., dissenting tus. Glendora v. DiPaola, 522 U. S. 965. Petitioner never- theless has filed another frivolous petition with this Court. In her petition, Glendora asserts that the state trial court judge who presided over her dispute with her landlord sanc- tioned "sewer service" by her landlord's lawyers, and that the District Court and Court of Appeals sanctioned this con- duct. She does not address the District Court's reasons for dismissing her complaint. Accordingly, we enter this order barring prospective in forma pauperis filings by petitioner in noncriminal cases for the reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). It is so ordered. Justice Stevens, dissenting. For reasons previously stated, see Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1, 4 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting), and cases cited, I respectfully dissent. 523US1 Unit: $U41 [04-29-00 20:28:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN 208 OCTOBER TERM, 1997 Per Curiam HETZEL v. PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY, VIRGINIA, et al. on petition for writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit No. 97­954. Decided March 23, 1998 A jury awarded petitioner $750,000 on her claims against respondent county under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but the District Court reduced the damages to $500,000. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the liability finding, but set aside the damages award as grossly exces- sive and remanded for recalculation. The District Court then awarded petitioner $50,000. She filed a motion for a new trial in which she de- clined the award, arguing that, in reducing her damages, the Fourth Circuit had effectively offered her a remittitur, which entitled her to a new trial under the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial. The District Court agreed, concluding that when a court finds a jury's verdict excessive and reduces it, the plaintiff has a right either to accept the reduced award or to have a new trial on the damages issue. The Fourth Circuit then granted respondents' mandamus petition and stayed the scheduled retrial, noting that its prior decision had ordered the Dis- trict Court to recalculate the damages "and to enter final judgment thereon." Held: The Fourth Circuit violated petitioner's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. Because the Amendment prohibits the reexamination of facts determined by a jury, a court has no authority, upon a motion for a new trial, "according to its own estimate of the amount of damages which the plaintiff ought to have recovered, to enter an absolute judg- ment for any other sum than that assessed by the jury." Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U. S. 22, 29. In determining that the evidence did not sup- port the jury's general damages award and in ordering the District Court to recalculate the damages, the appeals court imposed a remit- titur. The District Court correctly afforded petitioner the option of a new trial when it entered judgment for the reduced damages. Certiorari granted; reversed. Per Curiam. A jury in the Eastern District of Virginia found for peti- tioner Hetzel on her claims against respondent County of Prince William under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 523US1 Unit: $U41 [04-29-00 20:28:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 208 (1998) 209 Per Curiam of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., and Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The District Court reduced the damages from $750,000 to $500,000, on the grounds that one of the claims supporting the award was legally insufficient. On re- spondents' appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, that court affirmed the finding of liability, but held that the damages award was grossly excessive because it was unsupported by the limited evidence of harm presented at trial. Hetzel v. County of Prince William, 89 F. 3d 169, cert. denied, 519 U. S. 1028 (1996). The court "set aside the damage award and remand[ed] the case to the district court for the recalculation of the award of damages for emotional distress." 89 F. 3d, at 173. On remand, the District Court recalculated the damages and awarded petitioner $50,000. Petitioner filed a motion for a new trial in which she declined the award. She argued that in reducing her damages, the Court of Appeals in effect had offered her a remittitur, and that she was therefore en- titled to a new trial under the Seventh Amendment's guaran- tee of a right to trial by jury. Respondents agreed that the Court of Appeals' decision functioned as a remittitur, but contended that the decision did not allow petitioner the op- tion of a new trial. In a memorandum opinion, the District Court determined that although the Court of Appeals' man- date clearly reversed the judgment and remanded for recal- culation of damages, it did not address the Seventh Amend- ment issue, which had not arisen until petitioner rejected the recalculated damages award and sought a new trial. Con- cluding that Circuit precedent was clear that when a court finds a jury's verdict excessive and reduces it, the plaintiff has a right either to accept the reduced award or to have a new trial, the court granted petitioner's motion for a new trial on the issue of damages. Respondents petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus, contending that the District Court did not have authority under its prior decision to order a new trial. In 523US1 Unit: $U41 [04-29-00 20:28:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN 210 HETZEL v. PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY Per Curiam an unpublished order, the Court of Appeals granted the peti- tion and stayed the scheduled retrial. It stated that its prior decision had ordered the District Court to recalculate the damages "and to enter final judgment thereon." It also reiterated that pursuant to its earlier mandate, the District Court should closely examine two cases it had previously noted as comparable to what would be an appropriate award in petitioner's case.1 Petitioner contends that this action of the Court of Ap- peals violated her Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.2 We agree. The Seventh Amendment provides that "the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." U. S. Const., Amdt. 7. 1 After the Court of Appeals issued its mandamus order, the District Court again recalculated the damages and entered judgment for petitioner in the amount of $15,000, which was the greater of the amounts awarded in the two cases noted by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner's appeal from that judgment is pending in the Court of Appeals. We do not think it appropriate to stay our decision, however, since the Court of Appeals, at the time it issued its writ of mandamus, was presented with petitioner's Seventh Amendment claim in the District Court's memorandum opinion granting a new trial. 2 Respondents argue that we should not consider petitioner's Seventh Amendment claim because she failed to raise it in her prior petition for certiorari. Hetzel v. County of Prince William, 89 F. 3d 169 (CA4), cert. denied, 519 U. S. 1028 (1996). We think it apparent, however, that peti- tioner did not raise this claim at that time because she reasonably con- strued the Court of Appeals' decision as not depriving her of the option of a new trial if she were to reject the remitted damages award. The Court of Appeals' decision ordered only that the judgment be reversed and the case remanded to the District Court for recalculation of damages. 83 F. 3d, at 173. To interpret that decision as precluding the option of a new trial would require petitioner to assume a deviation from normal prac- tice and an action by the Court of Appeals that at minimum implicated constitutional concerns. We agree with the District Court that the origi- nal mandate was not so explicit as to compel that interpretation. 523US1 Unit: $U41 [04-29-00 20:28:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 208 (1998) 211 Per Curiam In Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U. S. 22, 27­28 (1889), the plain- tiff won a general damages verdict for $20,000, and the trial court denied a motion for a new trial. On appeal, the Su- preme Court of the Territory of Montana reduced the ver- dict to $10,000 on the grounds that the evidence was insuffi- cient to sustain such a high damages award, and affirmed the judgment for that amount. Ibid. This Court concluded that the judgment reducing the amount of the verdict "with- out submitting the case to another jury, or putting the plain- tiff to the election of remitting part of the verdict before rendering judgment for the rest, was irregular, and, so far as we are informed, unprecedented." Ibid. It noted that in accord with the Seventh Amendment's prohibition on the reexamination of facts determined by a jury, a court has no authority, upon a motion for a new trial, "according to its own estimate of the amount of damages which the plaintiff ought to have recovered, to enter an absolute judgment for any other sum than that assessed by the jury." Id., at 29. In determining that the evidence did not support the jury's general damages award and in ordering the District Court to recalculate the damages, the Court of Appeals in this case imposed a remittitur. The District Court correctly afforded petitioner the option of a new trial when it entered judgment for the reduced damages. The Court of Appeals' writ of mandamus, requiring the District Court to enter judgment for a lesser amount than that determined by the jury without allowing petitioner the option of a new trial, cannot be squared with the Seventh Amendment. See id., at 29­30; see also Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474, 486 (1935) (reaf- firming the practice of conditionally remitting damages, but noting that where a verdict is set aside as grossly inadequate or excessive, both parties remain entitled to have a jury de- termine the issues of liability and the extent of injury); Gas- perini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U. S. 415, 433 (1996) (the trial judge's discretion includes "overturning 523US1 Unit: $U41 [04-29-00 20:28:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN 212 HETZEL v. PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY Per Curiam verdicts for excessiveness and ordering a new trial with- out qualification, or conditioned on the verdict winner's refusal to agree to a reduction (remittitur)"); id., at 462­ 463 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Respondents contend that the action of the Court of Ap- peals here is supported by Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U. S. 317, 329­330 (1967). But that case dealt with the application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(d) in a situation where the Court of Appeals had held that the evi- dence was insufficient to support a finding of liability. It did not involve overturning an award of damages where the evidence was found sufficient to support a finding of liability. We therefore grant the petition for certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals issuing a writ of man- damus to the District Court. Reversed. 523US1 Unit: $U42 [04-29-00 20:29:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1997 213 Syllabus COHEN v. de la CRUZ et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the third circuit No. 96­1923. Argued January 20, 1998-Decided March 24, 1998 After the local rent control administrator ordered petitioner to refund $31,382.50 in excessive rents he had charged respondent tenants, he sought to discharge his debts under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code (Code). The tenants filed an adversary proceeding, arguing that the debt owed to them was nondischargeable under 11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(2)(A) of the Code, which excepts from discharge "any debt . . . for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . . actual fraud." They also sought treble dam- ages, attorney's fees, and costs under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. The Bankruptcy Court ruled in their favor, finding that petitioner had committed "actual fraud" within the meaning of § 523(a)(2)(A) and that his conduct violated the New Jersey law. The court therefore awarded the tenants treble damages totaling $94,147.50, plus attorney's fees and costs. The District Court affirmed, as did the Third Circuit, which held that debts resulting from fraud are nondischargeable in their entirety under § 523(a)(2)(A), and that the award of treble damages (plus attorney's fees and costs) in this case was therefore nondischargeable. Held: Because § 523(a)(2)(A) excepts from discharge all liability arising from fraud, treble damages (plus attorney's fees and costs) awarded on account of the debtor's fraud fall within the scope of the exception. The most straightforward reading of § 523(a)(2)(A) is that it prevents discharge of "any debt" respecting "money, property, services, or . . . credit" that the debtor has fraudulently obtained. See Field v. Mans, 516 U. S. 59, 61, 64. First, an obligation to pay treble damages satisfies the threshold condition that it constitute a "debt." That word is defined as liability on a "claim," § 101(12), which in turn is defined as a "right to payment," § 101(5)(A), which this Court has said means an enforceable obligation, Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U. S. 552, 559. An award of treble damages is an enforceable obligation of the debtor, and the creditor has a corresponding right to payment. Moreover, the phrase "to the extent obtained by" in § 523(a)(2)(A) mod- ifies "money, property, services, or . . . credit"-not "any debt"-so that the exception encompasses "any debt . . . for money, property, [etc.], to the extent [that the money, property, etc., is] obtained by" fraud. The phrase thereby makes clear that the share of money, property, etc., so 523US1 Unit: $U42 [04-29-00 20:29:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN 214 COHEN v. de la CRUZ Opinion of the Court obtained gives rise to a nondischargeable debt. Once it is established that specific money or property has been obtained by fraud, however, "any debt" arising therefrom is excepted from discharge. The Court rejects petitioner's argument that a "debt for" money, property, etc., is necessarily limited to the value of the "money, property, services, or . . . credit" the debtor obtained by fraud, such that a restitu- tionary ceiling would be imposed on the extent to which a debtor's liabil- ity for fraud is nondischargeable. That argument is at odds with the meaning of "debt for" in parallel exceptions to discharge set forth in § 523(a), which use "debt for" to mean "debt as a result of," "debt with respect to," "debt by reason of," and the like. The Court's reading of § 523(a)(2)(A) is also reinforced by the fraud exception's history. More- over, § 523(a)'s various exceptions from discharge reflect Congress' con- clusion that the creditors' interest in recovering full payment of debts in these categories outweighs the debtors' interest in a complete fresh start, see Grogan v. Garner, 498 U. S. 279, 287. But petitioner's con- struction of the fraud exception would leave creditors short of being made whole whenever the loss to the creditor from the fraud exceeds the value obtained by the debtor. Because, under New Jersey law, the debt for fraudulently obtaining $31,382.50 in rent payments includes tre- ble damages and attorney's fees and costs, petitioner's entire debt of $94,147.50 (plus attorney's fees and costs) is nondischargeable in bank- ruptcy. Pp. 217­223. 106 F. 3d 52, affirmed. O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Donald B. Ayer argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were James E. Anklam, Howard J. Bash- man, and John Francis Gough. Gregory G. Diebold argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Brian Wolfman. Jeffrey A. Lamken argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney Gen- eral Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, William Kanter, and Alisa B. Klein. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code (Code) ex- cepts from discharge in bankruptcy "any debt . . . for money, 523US1 Unit: $U42 [04-29-00 20:29:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 213 (1998) 215 Opinion of the Court property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . . false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud." 11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(2)(A). The issue in this case is whether § 523(a)(2)(A) bars the dis- charge of treble damages awarded on account of the debtor's fraudulent acquisition of "money, property, services, or . . . credit," or whether the exception only encompasses the value of the "money, property, services, or . . . credit" the debtor obtains through fraud. We hold that § 523(a)(2)(A) prevents the discharge of all liability arising from fraud, and that an award of treble damages therefore falls within the scope of the exception. I Petitioner owned several residential properties in and around Hoboken, New Jersey, one of which was subject to a local rent control ordinance. In 1989, the Hoboken Rent Control Administrator determined that petitioner had been charging rents above the levels permitted by the ordi- nance, and ordered him to refund to the affected tenants, who are respondents in this Court, $31,382.50 in excess rents charged. Petitioner did not comply with the order. Petitioner subsequently filed for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, seeking to discharge his debts. The tenants filed an adversary proceeding against petitioner in the Bankruptcy Court, arguing that the debt owed to them arose from rent payments obtained by "actual fraud" and that the debt was therefore nondischargeable under 11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(2)(A). They also sought treble damages and attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the New Jersey Con- sumer Fraud Act. See N. J. Stat. Ann. §§ 56:8­2, 56:8­19 (West 1989). Following a bench trial, the Bankruptcy Court ruled in the tenants' favor. In re Cohen, 185 B. R. 171 (1994); 185 B. R. 180 (1995). The court found that petitioner had committed "actual fraud" within the meaning of 11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and that his conduct amounted to an "unconscionable com- 523US1 Unit: $U42 [04-29-00 20:29:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN 216 COHEN v. de la CRUZ Opinion of the Court mercial practice" under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. As a result, the court awarded the tenants treble dam- ages totaling $94,147.50, plus reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Noting that courts had reached conflicting conclu- sions on whether § 523(a)(2)(A) excepts from discharge pu- nitive damages (such as the treble damages at issue here), the Bankruptcy Court sided with those decisions holding that § 523(a)(2)(A) encompasses all obligations arising out of fraudulent conduct, including both punitive and compensa- tory damages.* 185 B. R., at 188­189. The District Court affirmed. 191 B. R. 599 (1996). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in a divided opinion. In re Cohen, 106 F. 3d 52 (1997). After accepting the finding of the Bankruptcy Court that peti- tioner had committed fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A) and the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, the Court of Appeals turned to whether the treble damages portion of petitioner's lia- bility represents a "debt . . . for money, property, services, or . . . credit, to the extent obtained by . . . actual fraud." § 523(a)(2)(A). The court observed that the term "debt," defined in the Code as a "right to payment," § 101(5)(A), plainly encompasses all liability for fraud, whether in the form of punitive or compensatory damages. And the phrase "to the extent obtained by," the court reasoned, modifies "money, property, services, or . . . credit," and therefore dis- tinguishes not between compensatory and punitive damages awarded for fraud but instead between money or property obtained through fraudulent means and money or property obtained through nonfraudulent means. Id., at 57. Here, the court concluded, the entire award of $94,147.50 (plus attorney's fees and costs) resulted from money obtained *The Bankruptcy Court characterized an award of treble damages under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act as punitive in nature, see 185 B. R., at 188, and the Court of Appeals assumed as much without deciding the question, In re Cohen, 106 F. 3d 52, 55, n. 2 (CA3 1997). That issue does not affect our analysis, and we have no occasion to revisit it here. 523US1 Unit: $U42 [04-29-00 20:29:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 213 (1998) 217 Opinion of the Court through fraud and is therefore nondischargeable. Id., at 59. Judge Greenberg dissented, concluding that treble damages are not encompassed by § 523(a)(2)(A) because they "do not reflect money, property, or services the debtor `obtained.' " Id., at 60. As the Court of Appeals recognized, id., at 56, its inter- pretation of § 523(a)(2)(A) is in accord with that of the Elev- enth Circuit but in conflict with that of the Ninth Circuit. Compare In re St. Laurent, 991 F. 2d 672, 677­681 (CA11 1993), with In re Levy, 951 F. 2d 196, 198­199 (CA9 1991). Bankruptcy courts have likewise reached differing conclu- sions on whether § 523(a)(2)(A) prevents the discharge in bankruptcy of punitive damages awarded on account of fraud. Compare In re George, 205 B. R. 679, 682 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Conn. 1997) (punitive damages not dischargeable); In re Spicer, 155 B. R. 795, 801 (Bkrtcy. Ct. DC) (same), aff 'd, 57 F. 3d 1152 (CADC 1995), cert. denied, 516 U. S. 1043 (1996); In re Winters, 159 B. R. 789, 790 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Ky. 1993) (same), with In re Bozzano, 173 B. R. 990, 997­999 (Bkrtcy. Ct. MDNC 1994) (punitive damages dischargeable); In re Sciscoe, 164 B. R. 86, 89 (Bkrtcy. Ct. SD Ind. 1993) (same); In re Brady, 154 B. R. 82, 85 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Mo. 1993) (same). We noted the issue without resolving it in Grogan v. Garner, 498 U. S. 279, 282, n. 2 (1991). We granted cer- tiorari to address the conflict in the lower courts, 521 U. S. 1152 (1997), and we now affirm. II The Bankruptcy Code has long prohibited debtors from discharging liabilities incurred on account of their fraud, embodying a basic policy animating the Code of affording relief only to an "honest but unfortunate debtor." Grogan v. Garner, 498 U. S., at 287 (internal quotation marks omit- ted); see id., at 290; Brown v. Felsen, 442 U. S. 127, 138 (1979). Section 523(a)(2)(A) continues the tradition, except- ing from discharge "any debt . . . for money, property, serv- 523US1 Unit: $U42 [04-29-00 20:29:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN 218 COHEN v. de la CRUZ Opinion of the Court ices, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . . false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud." The most straightforward reading of § 523(a)(2)(A) is that it prevents discharge of "any debt" respecting "money, prop- erty, services, or . . . credit" that the debtor has fraudu- lently obtained, including treble damages assessed on ac- count of the fraud. See Field v. Mans, 516 U. S. 59, 61, 64 (1995) (describing § 523(a)(2)(A) as barring discharge of debts "resulting from" or "traceable to" fraud). First, an obli- gation to pay treble damages satisfies the threshold condi- tion that it constitute a "debt." A "debt" is defined in the Code as "liability on a claim," § 101(12), a "claim" is defined in turn as a "right to payment," § 101(5)(A), and a "right to payment," we have said, "is nothing more nor less than an enforceable obligation." Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U. S. 552, 559 (1990). Those definitions "reflec[t] Congress' broad . . . view of the class of obligations that qualify as a `claim' giving rise to a `debt,' " id., at 558, and they plainly encompass treble damages: An award of treble damages is an "enforceable obligation" of the debtor, and the creditor has a corresponding "right to payment." Moreover, the phrase "to the extent obtained by" in § 523(a)(2)(A), as the Court of Appeals recognized, does not impose any limitation on the extent to which "any debt" aris- ing from fraud is excepted from discharge. "[T]o the extent obtained by" modifies "money, property, services, or . . . credit"-not "any debt"-so that the exception encompasses "any debt . . . for money, property, services, or . . . credit, to the extent [that the money, property, services, or . . . credit is] obtained by" fraud. The phrase thereby makes clear that the share of money, property, etc., that is obtained by fraud gives rise to a nondischargeable debt. Once it is established that specific money or property has been obtained by fraud, however, "any debt" arising therefrom is excepted from dis- 523US1 Unit: $U42 [04-29-00 20:29:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 213 (1998) 219 Opinion of the Court charge. In this case, petitioner received rent payments from respondents for a number of years, of which $31,382.50 was obtained by fraud. His full liability traceable to that sum-$94,147.50 plus attorney's fees and costs-thus falls within the exception. Petitioner does not dispute that the term "debt" encom- passes treble damages or that the phrase "to the extent obtained by" modifies "money, property, services, or . . . credit." He nonetheless contends that "any debt . . . for money, property, services, or . . . credit, to the extent ob- tained by" fraud does not include treble damages awarded in a fraud action. Petitioner submits that § 523(a)(2)(A) ex- cepts from discharge only the portion of the damages award in a fraud action corresponding to the value of the "money, property, services, or . . . credit" the debtor obtained by fraud. The essential premise of petitioner's argument is that a "debt for" money, property, or services obtained by fraud is necessarily limited to the value of the money, prop- erty, or services received by the debtor. Petitioner, in this sense, interprets "debt for"-or alternatively, "liability on a claim for"-in § 523(a)(2)(A) to mean "liability on a claim to obtain," i. e., "liability on a claim to obtain the money, prop- erty, services, or credit obtained by fraud," thus imposing a restitutionary ceiling on the extent to which a debtor's liabil- ity for fraud is nondischargeable. Petitioner's reading of "debt for" in § 523(a)(2)(A), how- ever, is at odds with the meaning of the same phrase in paral- lel provisions. Section 523(a) defines several categories of liabilities that are excepted from discharge, and the words "debt for" introduce many of them, viz., "debt . . . for a tax or a customs duty . . . with respect to which a return . . . was not filed," § 523(a)(1)(B)(i), "debt . . . for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or lar- ceny," § 523(a)(4), "debt . . . for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity," § 523(a)(6), and "debt . . . for death or personal injury caused by the debtor's op- 523US1 Unit: $U42 [04-29-00 20:29:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN 220 COHEN v. de la CRUZ Opinion of the Court eration of a motor vehicle if such operation was unlawful because the debtor was intoxicated," § 523(a)(9). None of these use "debt for" in the restitutionary sense of "liability on a claim to obtain"; it makes little sense to speak of "lia- bility on a claim to obtain willful and malicious injury" or "liability on a claim to obtain fraud or defalcation." Instead, "debt for" is used throughout to mean "debt as a result of," "debt with respect to," "debt by reason of," and the like, see American Heritage Dictionary 709 (3d ed. 1992); Black's Law Dictionary 644 (6th ed. 1990), connoting broadly any liability arising from the specified object, see Davenport, supra, at 563 (characterizing § 523(a)(7), which excepts from discharge certain debts "for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture" as encompass- ing "debts arising from a `fine, penalty, or forfeiture' "). Because each use of "debt for" in § 523(a) serves the identi- cal function of introducing a category of nondischargeable debt, the presumption that equivalent words have equivalent meaning when repeated in the same statute, e. g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U. S. 135, 143 (1994), has particular resonance here. And contrary to petitioner's submission, it is of no moment that "debt for" in § 523(a)(2)(A) has as its immediate object a commodity (money, property, etc.), but in some of the other exceptions has as its immediate object a description of misconduct, e. g., § 523(a)(4) ("debt for fraud or defalcation [by a] fiduciary"). Section 523(a)(2)(A) also describes misconduct ("false pretenses, a false representa- tion, or actual fraud"), even if it first specifies the result of that conduct (money, property, etc., obtained). The excep- tion in § 523(a)(9) is framed in the same way, initially specify- ing an outcome as the immediate object of "debt for" ("death or personal injury"), and subsequently describing the mis- conduct giving rise to that outcome ("operation of a motor vehicle [while] intoxicated"). It is clear that "debt for" in that provision means "debt arising from" or "debt on account of," and it follows that "debt for" has the same meaning in § 523(a)(2)(A). When construed in the context of the statute 523US1 Unit: $U42 [04-29-00 20:29:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 213 (1998) 221 Opinion of the Court as a whole, then, § 523(a)(2)(A) is best read to prohibit the discharge of any liability arising from a debtor's fraudulent acquisition of money, property, etc., including an award of treble damages for the fraud. The history of the fraud exception reinforces our read- ing of § 523(a)(2)(A). The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 prohib- ited discharge of "judgments in actions for frauds, or obtain- ing property by false pretenses or false representations," § 17, 30 Stat. 550, and an award of punitive damages for fraud plainly fits in the category of "judgments in actions for fraud." The exception was broadened in 1903 to include all "liabilities for obtaining property by false pretenses or false representations," § 5, 32 Stat. 798, language that, a fortiori, encompasses liability for punitive damages. See Brown, 442 U. S., at 138 (interpreting the provision as pro- hibiting discharge of "all debts arising out of conduct speci- fied" therein); In re St. Laurent, 991 F. 2d, at 679 (noting "practice of holding debts for punitive damages nondis- chargeable" under this exception "if the compensatory dam- ages . . . were themselves nondischargeable"). And the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 enacted a "substantially similar" provision, Brown, supra, at 129, n. 1, barring discharge of "any debt . . . for obtaining money, property, services, or . . . credit, by . . . false pretenses, a false representation, or ac- tual fraud." 11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (1982 ed.). As the result of a slight amendment to the language in 1984, referred to in the legislative history only as a "stylistic change," see S. Rep. No. 98­65, p. 80 (1983), § 523(a)(2)(A) now excepts from discharge "any debt . . . for money, prop- erty, services, or . . . credit, to the extent obtained by . . . false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud." We, however, "will not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Con- gress intended such a departure," Davenport, 495 U. S., at 563, and the change to the language of § 523(a)(2)(A) in 1984 in no way signals an intention to narrow the established 523US1 Unit: $U42 [04-29-00 20:29:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN 222 COHEN v. de la CRUZ Opinion of the Court scope of the fraud exception along the lines suggested by petitioner. If, as petitioner contends, Congress wished to limit the exception to that portion of the debtor's liability representing a restitutionary-as opposed to a compensatory or punitive-recovery for fraud, one would expect Congress to have made unmistakably clear its intent to distinguish among theories of recovery in this manner. See, e. g., § 523(a)(7) (barring discharge of debts "for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to . . . a governmental unit," but only if the debt "is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss"). The conclusion that § 523(a)(2)(A) bars the discharge of all liability arising from fraud is further borne out by the impli- cations of petitioner's alternative construction. The various exceptions to discharge in § 523(a) reflect a conclusion on the part of Congress "that the creditors' interest in recovering full payment of debts in these categories outweigh[s] the debtors' interest in a complete fresh start." Grogan, 498 U. S., at 287. But if, as petitioner would have it, the fraud exception only barred discharge of the value of any money, property, etc., fraudulently obtained by the debtor, the objec- tive of ensuring full recovery by the creditor would be ill served. Limiting the exception to the value of the money or property fraudulently obtained by the debtor could pre- vent even a compensatory recovery for losses occasioned by fraud. For instance, if a debtor fraudulently represents that he will use a certain grade of shingles to roof a house and is paid accordingly, the cost of repairing any resulting water damage to the house could far exceed the payment to the debtor to install the shingles. See In re Church, 69 B. R. 425, 427 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ND Tex. 1987). The United States, as amicus curiae, posits another example along these lines, in- volving "a debtor who fraudulently represents to aircraft manufacturers that his steel bolts are aircraft quality [and] obtains sales of $5,000" for the bolts, but "the fraud causes a multi-million dollar airplane to crash." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 21. 523US1 Unit: $U42 [04-29-00 20:29:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 213 (1998) 223 Opinion of the Court As petitioner acknowledges, his gloss on § 523(a)(2)(A) would allow the debtor in those situations to discharge any liability for losses caused by his fraud in excess of the amount he initially received, leaving the creditor far short of being made whole. And the portion of a creditor's recovery that exceeds the value of the money, property, etc., fraudu- lently obtained by the debtor-and that hence would be dis- chargeable under petitioner's view-might include compen- sation not only for losses brought about by fraud but also for attorney's fees and costs of suit associated with establishing fraud. But see § 523(d) (allowing award of attorney's fees and costs to the debtor where a creditor requests discharge- ability determination under § 523(a)(2) for a consumer debt that is ultimately found to be dischargeable). Those sorts of results would not square with the intent of the fraud ex- ception. As we have observed previously in addressing dif- ferent issues surrounding the scope of that exception, it is "unlikely that Congress . . . would have favored the interest in giving perpetrators of fraud a fresh start over the interest in protecting victims of fraud." Grogan, supra, at 287. In short, the text of § 523(a)(2)(A), the meaning of parallel provisions in the statute, the historical pedigree of the fraud exception, and the general policy underlying the exceptions to discharge all support our conclusion that "any debt . . . for money, property, services, or . . . credit, to the extent ob- tained by" fraud encompasses any liability arising from money, property, etc., that is fraudulently obtained, including treble damages, attorney's fees, and other relief that may exceed the value obtained by the debtor. Under New Jer- sey law, the debt for fraudulently obtaining $31,382.50 in rent payments includes treble damages and attorney's fees and costs, and consequently, petitioner's entire debt of $94,147.50 (plus attorney's fees and costs) is nondischargeable in bank- ruptcy. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It is so ordered. 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN 224 OCTOBER TERM, 1997 Syllabus ALMENDAREZ-TORRES v. UNITED STATES certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit No. 96­6839. Argued October 14, 1997-Decided March 24, 1998 Title 8 U. S. C. § 1326(a) makes it a crime for a deported alien to return to the United States without special permission and authorizes a maximum prison term of two years. In 1988, Congress added subsection (b)(2), which authorizes a maximum prison term of 20 years for "any alien described" in subsection (a), if the initial "deportation was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony." Petitioner pleaded guilty to violating § 1326, admitting that he had been deported, that he had unlawfully returned, and that the earlier deportation had taken place pursuant to three convictions for aggravated felonies. The District Court sentenced him under the applicable Sentencing Guideline range to 85 months' imprisonment, rejecting his argument that, since his indictment failed to mention his aggravated felony convictions, the court could not sentence him to more than the maximum imprisonment authorized by § 1326(a). The Fifth Circuit also rejected his argument, holding that subsection (b)(2) is a penalty provision which simply per- mits the imposition of a higher sentence when the unlawfully returning alien also has a record of prior convictions. Held: Subsection (b)(2) is a penalty provision, which simply authorizes an enhanced sentence. Since it does not create a separate crime, the Government is not required to charge the fact of an earlier conviction in the indictment. Pp. 228­248. (a) An indictment must set forth each element of the crime that it charges, Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 117, but it need not set forth factors relevant only to the sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime. Within limits, see McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U. S. 79, 84­91, the question of which factors are which is normally a matter for Congress. See Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600, 604. Pp. 228­229. (b) That Congress intended subsection (b)(2) to set forth a sentenc- ing factor is reasonably clear from a number of considerations. Its sub- ject matter is a typical sentencing factor, and the lower courts have almost uniformly interpreted statutes that authorize higher sentences for recidivists as setting forth sentencing factors, not as creating sepa- rate crimes. In addition, the words "subject to subsection (b)" at the beginning of subsection (a) and "[n]otwithstanding subsection (a)" at 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 224 (1998) 225 Syllabus the beginning of subsection (b) have a meaning that is neither obscure nor pointless if subsection (b) is interpreted to provide additional penal- ties, but not if it is intended to set forth substantive crimes. Moreover, the circumstances of subsection (b)'s adoption support this reading of the statutory text. The title of the 1988 amendment-"Criminal penal- ties for reentry of certain deported aliens," 102 Stat. 4471 (emphasis added)-also signals a provision that deals with penalties for a substan- tive crime, and it is reinforced by a legislative history that speaks only about the creation of new penalties. Finally, interpreting the subsec- tion to create a separate offense risks unfairness, for the introduction at trial of evidence of a defendant's prior crimes risks significant prejudice. See, e. g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554, 560. Pp. 229­235. (c) Additional arguments supporting a contrary interpretation-that the magnitude of the increase in the maximum authorized sentence shows a congressional intent to create a separate crime, that statutory language added after petitioner's conviction offers courts guidance on how to interpret subsection (b)(2), and that the doctrine of constitutional doubt requires this Court to interpret the subsection as setting forth a separate crime-are rejected. Pp. 235­239. (d) There is not sufficient support, in this Court's precedents or else- where, for petitioner's claim that the Constitution requires Congress to treat recidivism as an element of the offense irrespective of Congress' contrary intent. At most, In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 364; Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 704; Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197; and Specht v. Patterson, 386 U. S. 605, taken together, yield the broad proposition that sometimes the Constitution does require (though some- times it does not require) the State to treat a sentencing factor as an element of the crime, but they offer no more support than that for peti- tioner's position. And a legislature's decision to treat recidivism, in particular, as a sentencing factor rather than an element of the crime does not exceed constitutional limits on the legislature's power to define the elements of an offense. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, supra, distin- guished. Petitioner's additional arguments-that courts have a tradi- tion of treating recidivism as an element of the related crime, and that this Court should simply adopt a rule that any significant increase in a statutory maximum sentence would trigger a constitutional "elements" requirement-are rejected. Pp. 239­247. (e) The Court expresses no view on whether some heightened stand- ard of proof might apply to sentencing determinations bearing sig- nificantly on the severity of sentence. Cf. United States v. Watts, 519 U. S. 148, 156, and n. 2 (per curiam). Pp. 247­248. 113 F. 3d 515, affirmed. 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN 226 ALMENDAREZ-TORRES v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, post, p. 248. Peter Fleury argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Timothy Crooks. Beth S. Brinkmann argued the cause for the United States. With her on the brief were Acting Solicitor Gen- eral Dellinger, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and William C. Brown.* Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. Subsection (a) of 8 U. S. C. § 1326 defines a crime. It for- bids an alien who once was deported to return to the United States without special permission, and it authorizes a prison term of up to, but no more than, two years. Subsection (b)(2) of the same section authorizes a prison term of up to, but no more than, 20 years for "any alien described" in subsection (a), if the initial "deportation was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony." The question before us is whether this latter provision de- fines a separate crime or simply authorizes an enhanced pen- alty. If the former, i. e., if it constitutes a separate crime, then the Government must write an indictment that men- tions the additional element, namely, a prior aggravated fel- ony conviction. If the latter, i. e., if the provision simply authorizes an enhanced sentence when an offender also has an earlier conviction, then the indictment need not mention that fact, for the fact of an earlier conviction is not an ele- ment of the present crime. We conclude that the subsection is a penalty provision, which simply authorizes a court to increase the sentence for a recidivist. It does not define a separate crime. Conse- quently, neither the statute nor the Constitution requires the *Stephen R. Sady and Barbara E. Bergman filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae. 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 224 (1998) 227 Opinion of the Court Government to charge the factor that it mentions, an earlier conviction, in the indictment. I In September 1995, a federal grand jury returned an in- dictment charging petitioner, Hugo Almendarez-Torres, with having been "found in the United States . . . after being de- ported" without the "permission and consent of the Attorney General" in "violation of . . . Section 1326." App. 3. In De- cember 1995, Almendarez-Torres entered a plea of guilty. At a hearing, before the District Court accepted his plea, Almendarez-Torres admitted that he had been deported, that he had later unlawfully returned to the United States, and that the earlier deportation had taken place "pursuant to" three earlier "convictions" for aggravated felonies. Id., at 10­14. In March 1996, the District Court held a sentencing hear- ing. Almendarez-Torres pointed out that an indictment must set forth all the elements of a crime. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 117 (1974). He added that his indictment had not mentioned his earlier aggravated felony convictions. And he argued that, consequently, the court could not sentence him to more than two years imprison- ment, the maximum authorized for an offender without an earlier conviction. The District Court rejected this argu- ment. It found applicable a Sentencing Guideline range of 77 to 96 months, see United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2; ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table) (Nov. 1995) (USSG), and it imposed a sentence of 85 months' imprisonment. App. 17. On appeal the Fifth Circuit also rejected petitioner's argu- ment. 113 F. 3d 515 (1996). Like seven other Circuits, it has held that subsection (b)(2) is a penalty provision that simply permits a sentencing judge to impose a higher sen- tence when the unlawfully returning alien also has a record of prior convictions. United States v. Vasquez-Olvera, 999 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN 228 ALMENDAREZ-TORRES v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court F. 2d 943, 945­947 (CA5 1993); see United States v. Forbes, 16 F. 3d 1294, 1297­1300 (CA1 1994); United States v. DeLeon-Rodriguez, 70 F. 3d 764, 765­767 (CA3 1995); United States v. Crawford, 18 F. 3d 1173, 1176­1178 (CA4 1994); United States v. Munoz-Cerna, 47 F. 3d 207, 210, n. 6 (CA7 1995); United States v. Haggerty, 85 F. 3d 403, 404­405 (CA8 1996); United States v. Valdez, 103 F. 3d 95, 97­98 (CA10 1996); United States v. Palacios-Casquete, 55 F. 3d 557, 559­ 560 (CA11 1995); cf. United States v. Cole, 32 F. 3d 16, 18­19 (CA2 1994) (reaching same result with respect to 8 U. S. C. § 1326(b)(1)). The Ninth Circuit, however, has reached the opposite conclusion. United States v. Gonzalez-Medina, 976 F. 2d 570, 572 (1992) (subsection (b)(2) constitutes separate crime). We granted certiorari to resolve this difference among the Circuits. II An indictment must set forth each element of the crime that it charges. Hamling v. United States, supra, at 117. But it need not set forth factors relevant only to the sentenc- ing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime. Within limits, see McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U. S. 79, 84­91 (1986), the question of which factors are which is normally a matter for Congress. See Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600, 604 (1994) (definition of a criminal offense entrusted to the legislature, " `particularly in the case of federal crimes, which are solely creatures of statute' ") (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U. S. 419, 424 (1985)). We therefore look to the statute before us and ask what Congress intended. Did it intend the factor that the statute mentions, the prior aggravated felony conviction, to help define a separate crime? Or did it intend the presence of an earlier conviction as a sentencing factor, a factor that a sentencing court might use to increase punishment? In answering this question, we look to the statute's language, structure, subject matter, con- text, and history-factors that typically help courts deter- mine a statute's objectives and thereby illuminate its text. 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 224 (1998) 229 Opinion of the Court See, e. g., United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, 490­492 (1997); Garrett v. United States, 471 U. S. 773, 779 (1985). The directly relevant portions of the statute as it existed at the time of petitioner's conviction included subsection (a), which Congress had enacted in 1952, and subsection (b), which Congress added in 1988. See 8 U. S. C. § 1326 (1952 ed.), as enacted June 27, 1952, § 276, 66 Stat. 229; 8 U. S. C. § 1326 (1988 ed.) (reflecting amendments made by § 7345(a), 102 Stat. 4471). We print those portions of text below: "§ 1326. Reentry of deported alien; criminal penalties for reentry of certain deported aliens. "(a) Subject to subsection (b) of this section, any alien who- "(1) has been . . . deported . . . , and thereafter "(2) enters . . . , or is at any time found in, the United States [without the Attorney General's consent or the legal equivalent], "shall be fined under title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both. "(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, in the case of any alien described in such subsection- "(1) whose deportation was subsequent to a convic- tion for commission of [certain misdemeanors], or a fel- ony (other than an aggravated felony), such alien shall be fined under title 18, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both; or "(2) whose deportation was subsequent to a convic- tion for commission of an aggravated felony, such alien shall be fined under such title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both." 8 U. S. C. § 1326. A Although the statute's language forces a close reading of the text, as well as consideration of other interpretive circumstances, see Wells, supra, we believe that the answer 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN 230 ALMENDAREZ-TORRES v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court to the question presented-whether Congress intended sub- section (b)(2) to set forth a sentencing factor or a separate crime-is reasonably clear. At the outset, we note that the relevant statutory subject matter is recidivism. That subject matter-prior commis- sion of a serious crime-is as typical a sentencing factor as one might imagine. See, e. g., USSG §§ 4A1.1, 4A1.2 (Nov. 1997) (requiring sentencing judge to consider an offender's prior record in every case); 28 U. S. C. § 994(h) (instructing Commission to write Guidelines that increase sentences dra- matically for serious recidivists); 18 U. S. C. § 924(e) (Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984) (imposing significantly higher sentence for felon-in-possession violation by serious recidi- vists); 21 U. S. C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)­(D) (same for drug distribu- tion); United States Sentencing Commission, 1996 Source- book of Federal Sentencing Statistics 35, 49 (for year ending Sept. 30, 1996, 20.3% of all federal cases involved offenders with substantial criminal records (criminal history categories IV­VI); 44.2% of drug cases involved offenders with prior convictions). Perhaps reflecting this fact, the lower courts have almost uniformly interpreted statutes (that authorize higher sentences for recidivists) as setting forth sentencing factors, not as creating new crimes (at least where the con- duct, in the absence of the recidivism, is independently un- lawful). E. g., United States v. McGatha, 891 F. 2d 1520, 1525 (CA11 1990) (18 U. S. C. § 924(e)); United States v. Arango-Montoya, 61 F. 3d 1331, 1339 (CA7 1995) (21 U. S. C. § 841(b)); United States v. Jackson, 824 F. 2d 21, 25, and n. 6 (CADC 1987). And we have found no statute that clearly makes recidivism an offense element in such circumstances. But cf. 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1) (prior felony conviction an ele- ment but conduct not otherwise unlawful). With recidivism as the subject matter in mind, we turn to the statute's language. In essence, subsection (a) says that "any alien" once "deported," who reappears in the United 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 224 (1998) 231 Opinion of the Court States without appropriate permission, shall be fined or "im- prisoned not more than 2 years." Subsection (b) says that "any alien described in" subsection (a), "whose deportation was subsequent to a conviction" for a minor, or for a major, crime, may be subject to a much longer prison term. The statute includes the words "subject to subsection (b)" at the beginning of subsection (a), and the words "[n]otwith- standing subsection (a)" at the beginning of subsection (b). If Congress intended subsection (b) to set forth substantive crimes, in respect to which subsection (a) would define a lesser included offense, see Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299, 304 (1932), what are those words doing there? The dissent believes that the words mean that the substan- tive crime defined by "subsection (a) is inapplicable to an alien covered by subsection (b)," post, at 264, hence the words represent an effort to say that a defendant cannot be punished for both substantive crimes. But that is not what the words say. Nor has Congress ever (to our knowledge) used these or similar words anywhere else in the federal criminal code for such a purpose. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 113 (aggravated and simple assault); §§ 1111, 1112 (murder and manslaughter); § 2113 (bank robbery and incidental crimes); §§ 2241, 2242 (aggravated and simple sexual abuse). And this should come as no surprise since, for at least 60 years, the federal courts have presumed that Congress does not intend for a defendant to be cumulatively punished for two crimes where one crime is a lesser included offense of the other. See Whalen v. United States, 445 U. S. 684, 691­693 (1980); Blockburger, supra. If, however, Congress intended subsection (b) to provide additional penalties, the mystery disappears. The words "subject to subsection (b)" and "[n]otwithstanding subsection (a)" then are neither obscure nor pointless. They say, with- out obscurity, that the crime set forth in subsection (a), which both defines a crime and sets forth a penalty, is "sub- 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN 232 ALMENDAREZ-TORRES v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court ject to" subsection (b)'s different penalties (where the alien is also a felon or aggravated felon). And (b)'s higher maximum penalties may apply to an offender who violates (a) "notwith- standing" the fact that (a) sets forth a lesser penalty for one who has committed the same substantive crime. Nor is it pointless to specify that (b)'s punishments, not (a)'s punish- ment, apply whenever an offender commits (a)'s offense in a manner set forth by (b). Moreover, the circumstances of subsection (b)'s adoption support this reading of the statutory text. We have exam- ined the language of the statute in 1988, when Congress added the provision here at issue. That original language does not help petitioner. In 1988, the statute read as follows (with the 1988 amendment underscored): "§ 1326. Reentry of deported alien; criminal penalties for reentry of certain deported aliens. "(a) Subject to subsection (b) of this section, any alien who- "(1) has been . . . deported . . . , and thereafter "(2) enters . . . , or is at any time found in, the United States [without the Attorney General's consent or the legal equivalent], "shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment of not more than two years, or by a fine of not more than $1,000, or both. "(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, in the case of any alien described in such subsection- "(1) whose deportation was subsequent to a convic- tion for commission of a felony (other than an aggra- vated felony), such alien shall be fined under title 18, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both; or "(2) whose deportation was subsequent to a convic- tion for commission of an aggravated felony, such alien shall be fined under such title, imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both." 8 U. S. C. § 1326 (1988 ed.) (em- phasis added). 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 224 (1998) 233 Opinion of the Court Thus, at the time of the amendment, the operative language of subsection (a)'s ordinary reentering-alien provision said that a reentering alien "shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment of not more than two years, or by a fine of not more than $1,000." The 1988 amendment, subsection (b), by way of contrast, re- ferred only to punishment-an increased punishment for the felon, or the aggravated felon, whom subsection (a) has "de- scribed." Although one could read the language, "any alien described in [subsection (a)]," standing alone, as importing subsection (a)'s elements into new offenses defined in subsec- tion (b), that reading seems both unusual and awkward when taken in context, for the reasons just given. Linguistically speaking, it seems more likely that Congress simply meant to "describe" an alien who, in the words of the 1988 statute, was "guilty of a felony" defined in subsection (a) and "con- vict[ed] thereof." As the dissent points out, post, at 265, Congress later struck from subsection (a) the words just quoted, and added in their place the words, "shall be fined under title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years." See Immigration Act of 1990 (1990 Act), § 543(b)(3), 104 Stat. 5059. But this amendment was one of a series in the 1990 Act that uni- formly updated and simplified the phrasing of various, dis- parate civil and criminal penalty provisions in the Immigra- tion and Naturalization Act. See, e. g., 1990 Act, § 543(b)(1) (amending 8 U. S. C. § 1282(c)); § 543(b)(2)(C) (amending 8 U. S. C. § 1325); § 543(b)(4) (amending 8 U. S. C. § 1327); § 543(b)(5) (amending 8 U. S. C. § 1328). The section of the Act that contained the amendment is titled "Increase in Fine Levels; Authority of the INS to Collect Fines," and the rele- vant subsection, simply "Criminal Fine Levels." 1990 Act, § 543(b), 104 Stat. 5057, 5059. Although the 1990 amend- ment did have the effect of making the penalty provision in subsection (a) (which had remained unchanged since 1952) parallel with its counterparts in later enacted subsection (b), 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN 234 ALMENDAREZ-TORRES v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court neither the amendment's language, nor the legislative his- tory of the 1990 Act, suggests that in this housekeeping measure, Congress intended to change, or to clarify, the fun- damental relationship between the two subsections. We also note that "the title of a statute and the heading of a section" are "tools available for the resolution of a doubt" about the meaning of a statute. Trainmen v. Balti- more & Ohio R. Co., 331 U. S. 519, 528­529 (1947); see also INS v. National Center for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 502 U. S. 183, 189 (1991). The title of the 1988 amendment is "Criminal penalties for reentry of certain deported aliens." § 7345, 102 Stat. 4471 (emphasis added). A title that con- tains the word "penalties" more often, but certainly not always, see post, at 266­267, signals a provision that deals with penalties for a substantive crime. In this instance the amendment's title does not reflect careless, or mistaken, drafting, for the title is reinforced by a legislative history that speaks about, and only about, the creation of new penalties. See S. 973, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), 133 Cong. Rec. 8771 (1987) (original bill titled, "A bill to provide for additional criminal penalties for deported aliens who reenter the United States, and for other pur- poses"); 134 Cong. Rec. 27429 (1988) (section-by-section anal- ysis referring to Senate bill as increasing penalties for un- lawful reentry); id., at 27445 (remarks of Sen. D'Amato) (law would "increas[e] current penalties for illegal reentry after deportation"); id., at 27462 (remarks of Sen. Chiles) (law would "impose stiff penalties" against deported aliens pre- viously convicted of drug offenses); 133 Cong. Rec. 28840­ 28841 (1987) (remarks of Rep. Smith) (corresponding House bill creates three-tier penalty structure). The history, to our knowledge, contains no language at all that indicates Congress intended to create a new substantive crime. Finally, the contrary interpretation-a substantive crimi- nal offense-risks unfairness. If subsection (b)(2) sets forth a separate crime, the Government would be required to 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 224 (1998) 235 Opinion of the Court prove to the jury that the defendant was previously deported "subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony." As this Court has long recognized, the introduction of evidence of a defendant's prior crimes risks significant prejudice. See, e. g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554, 560 (1967) (evidence of prior crimes "is generally recognized to have potentiality for prejudice"). Even if a defendant's stip- ulation were to keep the name and details of the previous offense from the jury, see Old Chief v. United States, 519 U. S. 172, 178­179 (1997), jurors would still learn, from the indictment, the judge, or the prosecutor, that the defendant had committed an aggravated felony. And, as we said last Term, "there can be no question that evidence of the . . . nature of the prior offense," here, that it was "aggravated" or serious, "carries a risk of unfair prejudice to the defend- ant." Id., at 185 (emphasis added). Like several lower courts, we do not believe, other things being equal, that Con- gress would have wanted to create this kind of unfairness in respect to facts that are almost never contested. See, e. g., United States v. Forbes, 16 F. 3d, at 1298­1300; United States v. Rumney, 867 F. 2d 714, 718­719 (CA1 1989); United States v. Brewer, 853 F. 2d 1319, 1324­1325 (CA6 1988) (en banc); United States v. Jackson, 824 F. 2d, at 25­26; Government of Virgin Islands v. Castillo, 550 F. 2d 850, 854 (CA3 1977). In sum, we believe that Congress intended to set forth a sentencing factor in subsection (b)(2) and not a separate criminal offense. B We must also consider several additional arguments that have been or might be made for a contrary interpretation of the statute. First, one might try to derive a congres- sional intent to establish a separate crime from the magni- tude of the increase in the maximum authorized sentence. The magnitude of the change that Congress made in 1988, however, proves little. That change-from a 2-year maxi- mum to 5- and 15-year maximums-is well within the range 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN 236 ALMENDAREZ-TORRES v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court set forth in other statutes that the lower courts have gen- erally interpreted as providing for sentencing enhance- ments. Compare 8 U. S. C. § 1326 (1988 ed.) with 21 U. S. C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B) and (D) (distributing less than 50 kilograms of marijuana, maximum 5 years; distributing 100 or more kilo- grams of marijuana, 5 to 40 years), §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and (C) (distributing less than 100 grams of heroin, maximum 20 years; distributing 1 kilogram or more of heroin, maximum of life imprisonment), § 841(b)(1)(B) (distributing 500 grams or more of cocaine, 5 to 40 years; same, with prior drug fel- ony conviction, 10 years to life); § 962 (doubling maximum term for second and subsequent violations of drug importa- tion laws); 18 U. S. C. § 844 (using or carrying explosive de- vice during commission of felony, maximum 10 years; subse- quent offense, maximum 20 years); § 2241(c) (sexual abuse of children, maximum life; second offense, mandatory life); § 2320(a) (trafficking in counterfeit goods, maximum 10 years; subsequent offense, maximum 20 years). Congress later amended the statute, increasing the maximums to 10 and to 20 years, respectively. Violent Crime Control and Law En- forcement Act of 1994, §§ 130001(b)(1)(B) and (b)(2), 108 Stat. 2023. But nothing suggests that, in doing so, Congress in- tended to transform that statute's basic nature. And the later limits are close to the range suggested by other stat- utes regardless. Second, petitioner and the dissent point, in part, to statu- tory language that did not exist when petitioner was con- victed in 1995. Petitioner, for example, points out that in 1996, Congress added two new subsections, (b)(3) and (b)(4), which, petitioner says, created new substantive crimes. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, § 401(c), 110 Stat. 1267 (adding subsection (b)(3)); Illegal Im- migration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), § 305(b), 110 Stat. 3009­606 to 3009­607 (adding subsection (b)(4)). Both petitioner and the dissent also refer to another 1996 statutory provision in which Congress used 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 224 (1998) 237 Opinion of the Court the word "offense" to refer to the subsection now before us. See IIRIRA, § 334, 110 Stat. 3009­635. These later enacted laws, however, are beside the point. They do not declare the meaning of earlier law. Cf. Federal Housing Administration v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U. S. 84, 90 (1958). They do not seek to clarify an earlier enacted general term. Cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 380­381 (1969). They do not depend for their ef- fectiveness upon clarification, or a change in the meaning of an earlier statute. Cf. Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U. S. 572, 595­596 (1980). They do not reflect any direct focus by Congress upon the meaning of the earlier enacted provisions. Cf. ibid.; Darlington, supra, at 86. Consequently, we do not find in them any forward looking legislative mandate, guidance, or direct suggestion about how courts should interpret the earlier provisions. Regardless, it is not obvious that the two new subsections to which petitioner points create new crimes (a matter on which we express no view) nor, in adding them, did Congress do more than leave the legal question here at issue where it found it. The fact that Congress used a technical, crime- suggesting word-"offense"-eight years later in a different, and minor, statutory provision proves nothing-not least be- cause it is more than offset by different words in the same later statute that suggest with greater force the exact oppo- site, namely, the precise interpretation of the relation of sub- section (b) to subsection (a) that we adopt. See IIRIRA, § 321(c), 110 Stat. 3009­628 (stating that a new definition of "aggravated felony" applies "under" subsection (b) "only to violations" of subsection (a)). Finally, petitioner and the dissent argue that the doctrine of "constitutional doubt" requires us to interpret subsection (b)(2) as setting forth a separate crime. As Justice Holmes said long ago: "A statute must be construed, if fairly possi- ble, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconsti- tutional but also grave doubts upon that score." United 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN 238 ALMENDAREZ-TORRES v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U. S. 394, 401 (1916) (citing United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hud- son Co., 213 U. S. 366, 408 (1909)); see also Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). "This canon is followed out of respect for Congress, which we assume legislates in the light of constitutional limitations." Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U. S. 173, 191 (1991); see also FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298, 305­307 (1924). The doctrine seeks in part to minimize disagreement between the branches by preserving congressional enactments that might otherwise founder on constitutional objections. It is not designed to aggravate that friction by creating (through the power of precedent) statutes foreign to those Congress intended, simply through fear of a constitutional difficulty that, upon analysis, will evaporate. Thus, those who invoke the doctrine must believe that the alternative is a serious likelihood that the statute will be held unconstitutional. Only then will the doctrine serve its basic democratic func- tion of maintaining a set of statutes that reflect, rather than distort, the policy choices that elected representatives have made. For similar reasons, the statute must be genuinely susceptible to two constructions after, and not before, its complexities are unraveled. Only then is the statutory con- struction that avoids the constitutional question a "fair" one. Unlike the dissent, we do not believe these conditions are met in the present case. The statutory language is some- what complex. But after considering the matter in context, we believe the interpretative circumstances point signifi- cantly in one direction. More important, even if we were to assume that petitioner's construction of the statute is "fairly possible," Jin Fuey Moy, supra, at 401, the constitutional questions he raises, while requiring discussion, simply do not lead us to doubt gravely that Congress may authorize courts to impose longer sentences upon recidivists who commit a particular crime. The fact that we, unlike the dissent, do 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 224 (1998) 239 Opinion of the Court not gravely doubt the statute's constitutionality in this re- spect is a crucial point. That is because the "constitutional doubt" doctrine does not apply mechanically whenever there arises a significant constitutional question the answer to which is not obvious. And precedent makes clear that the Court need not apply (for it has not always applied) the doc- trine in circumstances similar to those here-where a consti- tutional question, while lacking an obvious answer, does not lead a majority gravely to doubt that the statute is constitu- tional. See, e. g., Rust, 500 U. S., at 190­191 (declining to apply doctrine although petitioner's constitutional claims not "without some force"); id., at 204­207 (Blackmun, J., dissent- ing); United States v. Monsanto, 491 U. S. 600, 611 (1989); id., at 636 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); United States v. Locke, 471 U. S. 84, 95 (1985); id., at 120 (Stevens, J., dissenting). III Invoking several of the Court's precedents, petitioner claims that the Constitution requires Congress to treat recid- ivism as an element of the offense-irrespective of Congress' contrary intent. Moreover, petitioner says, that require- ment carries with it three subsidiary requirements that the Constitution mandates in respect to ordinary, legislatively intended, elements of crimes. The indictment must state the "element." See, e. g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S., at 117. The Government must prove that "element" to a jury. See, e. g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 149 (1968). And the Government must prove the "element" beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e. g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197, 210 (1977). We cannot find sufficient support, however, in our precedents or elsewhere, for peti- tioner's claim. This Court has explicitly held that the Constitution's Due Process Clause "protects the accused against conviction ex- cept upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact nec- essary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN 240 ALMENDAREZ-TORRES v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 364 (1970). But Winship, the case in which the Court set forth this proposition of constitu- tional law, does not decide this case. It said that the Consti- tution entitles juveniles, like adults, to the benefit of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in respect to the elements of the crime. It did not consider whether, or when, the Constitu- tion requires the Government to treat a particular fact as an element, i. e., as a "fact necessary to constitute the crime," even where the crime-defining statute does not do so. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 (1975), provides peti- tioner with stronger support. The Court there struck down a state homicide statute under which the State presumed that all homicides were committed with "malice," punishable by life imprisonment, unless the defendant proved that he had acted in the heat of passion. Id., at 688. The Court wrote that "if Winship were limited to those facts that con- stitute a crime as defined by state law, a State could under- mine many of the interests that decision sought to protect" just by redefining "the elements that constitut[ed] different crimes, characterizing them as factors that bear solely on the extent of punishment." Id., at 698. It simultaneously held that the prosecution must establish "beyond a reasonable doubt" the nonexistence of "heat of passion"-the fact that, under the State's statutory scheme, distinguished a homicide punishable by a life sentence from a homicide punishable by a maximum of 20 years. Id., at 704. Read literally, this language, we concede, suggests that Congress cannot permit judges to increase a sentence in light of recidivism, or any other factor, not set forth in an indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court's later case, Patterson v. New York, supra, however, makes absolutely clear that such a reading of Mul- laney is wrong. The Court, in Patterson, pointed out that the State in Mullaney made the critical fact-the absence of "heat of passion"-not simply a potential sentencing factor, but also a critical part of the definition of "malice afore- 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 224 (1998) 241 Opinion of the Court thought," which was itself in turn "part of" the statute's definition of "homicide," the crime in question. Patterson, 432 U. S., at 215­216. (The Maine Supreme Court, in defin- ing the crime, had said that "malice" was "presumed" unless "rebutted" by the defendant's showing of "heat of passion." Id., at 216.) The Court found this circumstance extremely important. It said that Mullaney had considered (and held "impermissible") the shifting of a burden of proof "with respect to a fact which the State deems so important that it must be either proved or presumed." 432 U. S., at 215 (emphasis added). And the Court then held that similar burden shifting was permissible with respect to New York's homicide-related sentencing factor "extreme emotional dis- turbance." Id., at 205­206. That factor was not a factor that the state statute had deemed "so important" in relation to the crime that it must be either "proved or presumed." Id., at 205­206, 215. The upshot is that Mullaney's language, if read literally, suggests that the Constitution requires that most, if not all, sentencing factors be treated as elements. But Patterson suggests the exact opposite, namely, that the Constitution requires scarcely any sentencing factors to be treated in that way. The cases, taken together, cannot significantly help petitioner, for the statute here involves a sentencing factor- the prior commission of an aggravated felony-that is nei- ther "presumed" to be present, nor need be "proved" to be present, in order to prove the commission of the relevant crime. See 8 U. S. C. § 1326(a) (defining offense elements). Indeed, as we have said, it involves one of the most fre- quently found factors that affects sentencing-recidivism. Nor does Specht v. Patterson, 386 U. S. 605 (1967), which petitioner cites, provide significant additional help, for Specht was decided before Patterson (indeed before Win- ship); it did not consider the kind of matter here at issue; and, as this Court later noted, the Colorado defendant in Specht was "confronted with `a radically different situation' 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN 242 ALMENDAREZ-TORRES v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court from the usual sentencing proceeding." McMillan v. Penn- sylvania, 477 U. S., at 89. At most, petitioner might read all these cases, taken together, for the broad proposition that sometimes the Constitution does require (though sometimes it does not require) the State to treat a sentencing factor as an element. But we do not see how they can help petitioner more than that. We turn then to the case upon which petitioner must pri- marily rely, McMillan v. Pennsylvania. The Court there considered a Pennsylvania statute that set forth a sentenc- ing factor-"visibly possessing a firearm"-the presence of which required the judge to impose a minimum prison term of five years. The Court held that the Constitution did not require the State to treat the factor as an element of the crime. In so holding, the Court said that the State's "link- [ing] the `severity of punishment' to `the presence or absence of an identified fact' " did not automatically make of that fact an "element." Id., at 84 (quoting Patterson v. New York, supra, at 214). It said, citing Patterson, that "the state leg- islature's definition of the elements of the offense is usually dispositive." 477 U. S., at 85. It said that it would not "de- fine precisely the constitutional limits" of a legislature's power to define the elements of an offense. Id., at 86. And it held that, whatever those limits might be, the State had not exceeded them. Ibid. Petitioner must therefore con- cede that "firearm possession" (in respect to a mandatory minimum sentence) does not violate those limits. And he must argue that, nonetheless, "recidivism" (in respect to an authorized maximum) does violate those limits. In assessing petitioner's claim, we have examined McMil- lan to determine the various features of the case upon which the Court's conclusion arguably turned. The McMillan Court pointed out: (1) that the statute plainly "does not transgress the limits expressly set out in Patterson," ibid.; (2) that the defendant (unlike Mullaney's defendant) did not face " `a differential in sentencing ranging from a nominal 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 224 (1998) 243 Opinion of the Court fine to a mandatory life sentence,' " 477 U. S., at 87 (quoting Mullaney, 421 U. S., at 700); (3) that the statute did not "alte[r] the maximum penalty for the crime" but "operates solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it," 477 U. S., at 87­88; (4) that the statute did not "creat[e] a separate offense calling for a separate penalty," id., at 88; and (5) that the statute gave "no impression of having been tailored to per- mit the visible possession finding to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense," but, to the contrary, "simply took one factor that has always been considered by sentenc- ing courts to bear on punishment . . . and dictated the precise weight to be given that factor," id., at 88, 89­90. This case resembles McMillan in respect to most of these factors. But it is different in respect to the third factor, for it does "alte[r] the maximum penalty for the crime," id., at 87; and it also creates a wider range of appropriate punish- ments than did the statute in McMillan. We nonetheless conclude that these differences do not change the constitu- tional outcome for several basic reasons. First, the sentencing factor at issue here-recidivism-is a traditional, if not the most traditional, basis for a sentencing court's increasing an offender's sentence. See, e. g., Parke v. Raley, 506 U. S. 20, 26 (1992) (Recidivism laws "have a long tradition in this country that dates back to colonial times" and currently are in effect in all 50 States); U. S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Statutes Requiring the Use of Criminal History Record Information 17­41 (June 1991) (50-state survey); USSG §§ 4A1.1, 4A1.2 (Nov. 1997) (requiring sentencing court to consider defendant's prior rec- ord in every case). Consistent with this tradition, the Court said long ago that a State need not allege a defendant's prior conviction in the indictment or information that alleges the elements of an underlying crime, even though the conviction was "necessary to bring the case within the statute." Gra- ham v. West Virginia, 224 U. S. 616, 624 (1912). That con- 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN 244 ALMENDAREZ-TORRES v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court clusion followed, the Court said, from "the distinct nature of the issue," and the fact that recidivism "does not relate to the commission of the offense, but goes to the punishment only, and therefore . . . may be subsequently decided." Id., at 629 (emphasis added). The Court has not deviated from this view. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U. S. 448, 452 (1962) (due process does not require advance notice that trial for substantive offense will be followed by accusation that the defendant is a habitual offender); Parke, supra, at 27 ("[A] charge under a recidivism statute does not state a separate offense, but goes to punishment only"). And, as we said before, supra, at 230, Congress, reflecting this tradition, has never, to our knowledge, made a defendant's recidivism an element of an offense where the conduct proscribed is other- wise unlawful. See United States v. Jackson, 824 F. 2d 21, 25, and n. 6 (CADC 1987) (opinion of R. Ginsburg, J.) (re- ferring to fact that few, if any, federal statutes make "prior criminal convictions . . . elements of another criminal offense to be proved before the jury"). Although these precedents do not foreclose petitioner's claim (because, for example, the state statute at issue in Graham and Oyler provided for a jury determination of disputed prior convictions), to hold that the Constitution requires that recidivism be deemed an "element" of petitioner's offense would mark an abrupt de- parture from a longstanding tradition of treating recidivism as "go[ing] to the punishment only." Graham, supra, at 629. Second, the major difference between this case and Mc- Millan consists of the circumstance that the sentencing fac- tor at issue here (the prior conviction) triggers an increase in the maximum permissive sentence, while the sentencing factor at issue in McMillan triggered a mandatory minimum sentence. Yet that difference-between a permissive maxi- mum and a mandatory minimum-does not systematically, or normally, work to the disadvantage of a criminal defendant. To the contrary, a statutory minimum binds a sentencing judge; a statutory maximum does not. A mandatory mini- 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 224 (1998) 245 Opinion of the Court mum can, as Justice Stevens dissenting in McMillan pointed out, "mandate a minimum sentence of imprisonment more than twice as severe as the maximum the trial judge would otherwise have imposed." 477 U. S., at 95. It can eliminate a sentencing judge's discretion in its entirety. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 2241(c) (authorizing maximum term of life imprisonment for sexual abuse of children; mandating life imprisonment for second offense). And it can produce unfairly disproportionate impacts on certain kinds of offend- ers. See United States Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System 26­34 (Aug. 1991) (discussing "tariff" and "cliff" effects of mandatory minimums). In sum, the risk of unfairness to a particular defendant is no less, and may well be greater, when a mandatory minimum sentence, rather than a permis- sive maximum sentence, is at issue. Although McMillan pointed to a difference between mandatory minimums and higher authorized maximums, it neither "rested its judgment" on that difference, nor "re- jected" the above analysis, as the dissent contends, post, at 254. Rather, McMillan said that the petitioners' argu- ment in that case would have had "more superficial appeal" if the sentencing fact "exposed them to greater or additional punishment." 477 U. S., at 88 (emphasis added). For the reasons just given, and in light of the particular sentencing factor at issue in this case-recidivism-we should take Mc- Millan's statement to mean no more than it said, and there- fore not to make a determinative difference here. Third, the statute's broad permissive sentencing range does not itself create significantly greater unfairness. Judges (and parole boards) have typically exercised their discretion within broad statutory ranges. See, e. g., supra, at 232, 236 (statutory examples); National Institute of Jus- tice, Sentencing Reform in the United States (Aug. 1985) (survey of sentencing laws in the 50 States); L. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History 159­163 (1993) 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN 246 ALMENDAREZ-TORRES v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court (history of indeterminate sentencing). And the Sentencing Guidelines have recently sought to channel that discretion using "sentencing factors" which no one here claims that the Constitution thereby makes "elements" of a crime. Finally, the remaining McMillan factors support the con- clusion that Congress has the constitutional power to treat the feature before us-prior conviction of an aggravated felony-as a sentencing factor for this particular offense (illegal entry after deportation). The relevant statutory provisions do not change a pre-existing definition of a well- established crime, nor is there any more reason here, than in McMillan, to think Congress intended to "evade" the Constitution, either by "presuming" guilt or "restructuring" the elements of an offense. Cf. McMillan, supra, at 86­87, 89­90. For these reasons, we cannot find in McMillan (a case holding that the Constitution permits a legislature to require a longer sentence for gun possession) significant support for the proposition that the Constitution forbids a legislature to authorize a longer sentence for recidivism. Petitioner makes two basic additional arguments in re- sponse. He points to what he calls a different "tradition"- that of courts having treated recidivism as an element of the related crime. See, e. g., Massey v. United States, 281 F. 293, 297­298 (CA8 1922); Singer v. United States, 278 F. 415, 420 (CA3 1922); People v. Sickles, 51 N. E. 288, 289 (N. Y. 1898); see also post, at 256­257 (citing authority). We do not find this claim convincing, however, for any such tradi- tion is not uniform. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S., at 566 ("The method for determining prior convictions varies . . . between jurisdictions affording a jury trial on this issue . . . and those leaving that question to the court"); Note, Recidi- vist Procedures, 40 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 332, 347 (1965) (as of 1965, eight States' recidivism statutes provide for determi- nation of prior convictions by judge, not jury). Nor does it appear modern. Compare State v. Thorne, 129 Wash. 2d 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 224 (1998) 247 Opinion of the Court 736, 776­784, 921 P. 2d 514, 533­538 (1996) (upholding state recidivism law against federal constitutional challenge), with State v. Furth, 5 Wash. 2d 1, 11­19, 104 P. 2d 925, 930­933 (1940). And it nowhere (to our knowledge) rested upon a federal constitutional guarantee. See, e. g., Massey v. United States, supra, at 297 (applying federal law, noting jury determination of prior offense applied "unless the stat- ute designates a different mode of procedure"). Petitioner also argues, in essence, that this Court should simply adopt a rule that any significant increase in a statu- tory maximum sentence would trigger a constitutional "ele- ments" requirement. We have explained why we believe the Constitution, as interpreted in McMillan and earlier cases, does not impose that requirement. We add that such a rule would seem anomalous in light of existing case law that permits a judge, rather than a jury, to determine the existence of factors that can make a defendant eligible for the death penalty, a punishment far more severe than that faced by petitioner here. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639, 647 (1990) (rejecting capital defendant's argument that every finding of fact underlying death sentence must be made by a jury); Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U. S. 638, 640­641 (1989) (per curiam) (judge may impose death penalty based on his finding of aggravating factor because such factor is not element of offense to be determined by jury); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U. S. 447, 465 (1984) (same). And we would also find it difficult to reconcile any such rule with our prece- dent holding that the sentencing-related circumstances of recidivism are not part of the definition of the offense for double jeopardy purposes. Graham, 224 U. S., at 623­624. For these reasons, we reject petitioner's constitutional claim that his recidivism must be treated as an element of his offense. IV We mention one final point. Petitioner makes no sepa- rate, subsidiary, standard of proof claims with respect to his 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN 248 ALMENDAREZ-TORRES v. UNITED STATES Scalia, J., dissenting sentencing, perhaps because he admitted his recidivism at the time he pleaded guilty and would therefore find it diffi- cult to show that the standard of proof could have made a difference to his case. Accordingly, we express no view on whether some heightened standard of proof might apply to sentencing determinations that bear significantly on the severity of sentence. Cf. United States v. Watts, 519 U. S. 148, 156, and n. 2 (1997) (per curiam) (acknowledging, but not resolving, "divergence of opinion among the Circuits" as to proper standard for determining the existence of "relevant conduct" that would lead to an increase in sentence). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting. Because Hugo Roman Almendarez-Torres illegally re- entered the United States after having been convicted of an aggravated felony, he was subject to a maximum pos- sible sentence of 20 years' imprisonment. See 8 U. S. C. § 1326(b)(2). Had he not been convicted of that felony, he would have been subject to a maximum of only two years. See 8 U. S. C. § 1326(a). The Court today holds that § 1326(b)(2) does not set forth a separate offense, and that conviction of a prior felony is merely a sentencing enhance- ment for the offense set forth in § 1326(a). This causes the Court to confront the difficult question whether the Consti- tution requires a fact which substantially increases the maxi- mum permissible punishment for a crime to be treated as an element of that crime-to be charged in the indictment, and found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. Until the Court said so, it was far from obvious that the answer to this ques- tion was no; on the basis of our prior law, in fact, the answer was considerably doubtful. In all our prior cases bearing upon the issue, however, we confronted a criminal statute or state-court criminal ruling 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 224 (1998) 249 Scalia, J., dissenting that unambiguously relieved the prosecution of the burden of proving a critical fact to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U. S. 79 (1986), the statute provided that " `visibl[e] possess[ion] [of] a fire- arm' " " `shall not be an element of the crime,' " but shall be determined at sentencing by " `[t]he court . . . by a pre- ponderance of the evidence,' " id., at 81, n. 1 (quoting 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9712 (1982)). In In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970), it provided that determinations of criminal ac- tion in juvenile cases " `must be based on a preponderance of the evidence,' " id., at 360 (quoting N. Y. Family Court Act § 744(b)). In Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977), the statute provided that extreme emotional disturbance " `is an affirmative defense,' " id., at 198, n. 2 (quoting N. Y. Penal Law § 125.25 (McKinney 1975)). And in Mullaney v. Wil- bur, 421 U. S. 684 (1975), Maine's highest court had held that in murder cases malice aforethought was presumed and had to be negated by the defendant, id., at 689 (citing State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d 647 (1973)). In contrast to the provisions involved in these cases, 8 U. S. C. § 1326 does not, on its face, place the constitutional issue before us: It does not say that subsection (b)(2) is merely a sentencing enhancement. The text of the statute supports, if it does not indeed demand, the conclusion that subsection (b)(2) is a separate offense that includes the viola- tion described in subsection (a) but adds the additional ele- ment of prior felony conviction. I therefore do not reach the difficult constitutional issue in this case because I adopt, as I think our cases require, that reasonable interpretation of § 1326 which avoids the problem. Illegal reentry simplic- iter (§ 1326(a)) and illegal reentry after conviction of an ag- gravated felony (§ 1326(b)(2)) are separate criminal offenses. Prior conviction of an aggravated felony being an element of the latter offense, it must be charged in the indictment. Since it was not, petitioner's sentence must be set aside. 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN 250 ALMENDAREZ-TORRES v. UNITED STATES Scalia, J., dissenting I "[W]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter." United States ex rel. Attor- ney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 408 (1909). This "cardinal principle," which "has for so long been applied by this Court that it is beyond debate," Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988), requires merely a determination of serious constitutional doubt, and not a determination of unconstitutionality. That must be so, of course, for otherwise the rule would "mea[n] that our duty is to first decide that a statute is unconstitutional and then proceed to hold that such ruling was unnecessary because the statute is susceptible of a meaning, which causes it not to be repugnant to the Constitution." United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., supra, at 408. The Court contends that neither of the two conditions for application of this rule is present here: that the constitu- tional question is not doubtful, and that the statute is not susceptible of a construction that will avoid it. I shall ad- dress the former point first.1 1 The Court asserts that we have declined to apply the doctrine "in cir- cumstances similar to those here-where a constitutional question, while lacking an obvious answer, does not lead a majority gravely to doubt that the statute is constitutional." Ante, at 239. The cases it cites, however, do not support this contention. In Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U. S. 173 (1991), the Court believed that "[t]here [was] no question but that the statutory prohibition . . . [was] constitutional," id., at 192 (emphasis added). And in United States v. Locke, 471 U. S. 84 (1985), the Court found the doctrine inapplicable not because of lack of constitutional doubt, but because the statutory language did not permit an interpretation that would "avoid a constitutional question," id., at 96. Similarly, in United States v. Mon- santo, 491 U. S. 600 (1989), "the language of [the statute was] plain and unambiguous," id., at 606. 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 224 (1998) 251 Scalia, J., dissenting That it is genuinely doubtful whether the Constitution per- mits a judge (rather than a jury) to determine by a mere preponderance of the evidence (rather than beyond a reason- able doubt) a fact that increases the maximum penalty to which a criminal defendant is subject is clear enough from our prior cases resolving questions on the margins of this one. In In re Winship, supra, we invalidated a New York statute under which the burden of proof in a juvenile delin- quency proceeding was reduced to proof by a preponderance of the evidence. We held that "the Due Process Clause pro- tects the accused against conviction except upon proof be- yond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged," 397 U. S., at 364, and that the same protection extends to "a juvenile . . . charged with an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult," id., at 359. Five years later, in Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, we unani- mously extended Winship's protections to determinations that went not to a defendant's guilt or innocence, but simply to the length of his sentence. We invalidated Maine's homi- cide law, under which all intentional murders were presumed to be committed with malice aforethought (and, as such, were punishable by life imprisonment), unless the defendant could rebut this presumption with proof that he acted in the heat of passion (in which case the conviction would be reduced to manslaughter and the maximum sentence to 20 years). We acknowledged that "under Maine law these facts of in- tent [were] not general elements of the crime of felonious homicide[, but] [i]nstead, [bore] only on the appropriate pun- ishment category." 421 U. S., at 699. Nonetheless, we re- jected this distinction between guilt and punishment. "[I]f Winship," we said, "were limited to those facts that consti- tute a crime as defined by state law, a State could undermine many of the interests that decision sought to protect without effecting any substantive change in its law. It would only be necessary to redefine the elements that constitute differ- 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN 252 ALMENDAREZ-TORRES v. UNITED STATES Scalia, J., dissenting ent crimes, characterizing them as factors that bear solely on the extent of punishment." Id., at 697­698. In Patterson v. New York, we cut back on some of the broader implications of Mullaney. Although that case con- tained, we acknowledged, "some language . . . that ha[d] been understood as perhaps construing the Due Process Clause to require the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any fact affecting `the degree of criminal culpability,' " we denied that we "intend[ed] . . . such far-reaching effect." 432 U. S., at 214­215, n. 15. Accordingly, we upheld in Patterson New York's law casting upon the defendant the burden of proving as an "affirmative defense" to second- degree murder that he " `acted under the influence of ex- treme emotional disturbance for which there was a rea- sonable explanation or excuse,' " id., at 198­199, n. 2, which defense would reduce his crime to manslaughter. We ex- plained that "[p]roof of the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses has never been constitutionally required," id., at 210, and that the State need not "prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact, the existence or nonexistence of which it is willing to recognize as an exculpatory or mitigating circum- stance affecting the degree of culpability or the severity of the punishment." Id., at 207. We cautioned, however, that while our decision might "seem to permit state legislatures to reallocate burdens of proof by labeling as affirmative de- fenses at least some elements of the crimes now defined in their statutes[,] . . . there are obviously constitutional limits beyond which the States may not go in this regard." Id., at 210. Finally, and most recently, in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U. S., at 81, we upheld Pennsylvania's Mandatory Mini- mum Sentencing Act, which prescribed a mandatory mini- mum sentence of five years upon a judge's finding by a pre- ponderance of the evidence that the defendant "visibly possessed a firearm" during the commission of certain enu- merated offenses which all carried maximum sentences of 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 224 (1998) 253 Scalia, J., dissenting more than five years. We observed that "we [had] never attempted to define precisely the constitutional limits noted in Patterson, i. e., the extent to which due process forbids the reallocation or reduction of burdens of proof in criminal cases," but explained that, whatever those limits, Pennsylva- nia's law did not transgress them, id., at 86, primarily be- cause it "neither alter[ed] the maximum penalty for the crime committed nor create[d] a separate offense calling for a separate penalty; it operate[d] solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range al- ready available to it without the special finding of visible possession of a firearm," id., at 87­88. The feebleness of the Court's contention that here there is no serious constitutional doubt is evidenced by the degree to which it must ignore or distort the analysis of McMillan. As just described, that opinion emphasized-and emphasized repeatedly-that an increase of the maximum penalty was not at issue. Beyond that, it specifically acknowledged that the outcome might have been different (i. e., the statute might have been unconstitutional) if the maximum sentence had been affected: "Petitioners' claim that visible possession under the Pennsylvania statute is `really' an element of the of- fenses for which they are being punished-that Pennsyl- vania has in effect defined a new set of upgraded felon- ies-would have at least more superficial appeal if a finding of visible possession exposed them to greater or additional punishment, cf. 18 U. S. C. § 2113(d) (providing separate and greater punishment for bank robberies accomplished through `use of a dangerous weapon or device'), but it does not." Id., at 88. The opinion distinguished one of our own precedents on this very ground, noting that the Colorado Sex Offenders Act in- validated in Specht v. Patterson, 386 U. S. 605 (1967), in- creased a sex offender's sentence from a 10-year maximum 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN 254 ALMENDAREZ-TORRES v. UNITED STATES Scalia, J., dissenting to an indefinite term up to and including life imprisonment. 477 U. S., at 88. Despite all of that, the Court would have us believe that the present statute's alteration of the maximum permissible sentence-which it acknowledges is "the major difference between this case and McMillan," ante, at 244-militates in favor of, rather than against, this statute's constitutionality, because an increase of the minimum sentence (rather than the permissible maximum) is more disadvantageous to the defendant. Ibid. That is certainly an arguable position (it was argued, as the Court has the temerity to note, by the dissent in McMillan). But it is a position which McMillan not only rejected, but upon the converse of which McMillan rested its judgment. In addition to inverting the consequence of this distinction (between statutes that prescribe a minimum sentence and those that increase the permissible maximum sentence) the Court seeks to minimize the importance of the distinction by characterizing it as merely one of five factors relied on in McMillan, and asserting that the other four factors here are the same. Ante, at 242­243. In fact, however, McMillan did not set forth any five-factor test; the Court selectively recruits "factors" from various parts of the discussion. Its first factor, for example, that " `the statute plainly does not transgress the limits expressly set out in Patterson,' " ante, at 242, quoting McMillan, 477 U. S, at 86-viz., that it does not "discar[d] the presumption of innocence" or "relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving guilt," id., at 87-merely narrows the issue to the one before the Court, rather than giving any clue to the resolution of that issue. It is no more a factor in solving the constitutional problem before us than is the observation that § 1326 is not an ex post facto law and does not effect an unreasonable search or seizure. The Court's second, fourth, and part of its fifth "factors" are in fact all subparts of the crucial third factor (the one that is absent here), since they are all culled from the general dis- 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 224 (1998) 255 Scalia, J., dissenting cussion in McMillan of how the Pennsylvania statute simply limited a sentencing judge's discretion. We said that, whereas in Mullaney the State had imposed " `a differential in sentencing ranging from a nominal fine to a mandatory life sentence' " (the Court's "second" factor), Pennsylvania's law "neither alter[ed] the maximum penalty for the crime committed [the Court's `third' factor] nor create[d] a separate offense calling for a separate penalty [the Court's `fourth' factor]; it operate[d] solely to limit the sentencing court's dis- cretion in selecting a penalty within the range already avail- able to it without the special finding of visible possession of a firearm [the Court's `third' factor]. . . . The statute gives no impression of having been tailored to permit the visible possession finding to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense [part of the Court's `fifth' factor]." 477 U. S., at 87­88. The Court's recruitment of "factors" is, as I have said, se- lective. Omitted, for example, is McMillan's statement that "petitioners do not contend that the particular factor made relevant [by the statute] . . . has historically been treated `in the Anglo-American legal tradition' as requiring proof be- yond a reasonable doubt." Id., at 90, quoting Patterson, 432 U. S., at 226. Petitioner does make such an assertion in the present case-correctly, as I shall discuss. But even with its selective harvesting, the Court is incorrect in its assertion that "most" of the "factors" it recites, ante, at 243 (and in its implication that all except the third of them) exist in the present case as well. The second of them contrasted the consequence of the fact assumed in Mullaney (extension of the permissible sentence from as little as a nominal fine to as much as a mandatory life sentence) with the consequence of the fact at issue in McMillan (no extension of the permis- sible sentence at all, but merely a "limit[ation of] the sen- tencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available," 477 U. S., at 88). The present case resembles Mullaney rather than McMillan in this regard, 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN 256 ALMENDAREZ-TORRES v. UNITED STATES Scalia, J., dissenting since the fact at issue increases the permissible sentence ten- fold. And the only significant part of the fifth "factor"- that the statute in McMillan " `dictated the precise weight to be given [the statutory] factor,' " ante, at 243, quoting Mc- Millan, supra, at 89­90-is likewise a point of difference and not of similarity. But this parsing of various factors is really beside the point. No one can read our pre-McMillan cases, and espe- cially Mullaney (whose limits were adverted to in Patterson but never precisely described), without entertaining a seri- ous doubt as to whether the statute as interpreted by the Court in the present case is constitutional. And no one can read McMillan, our latest opinion on the point, without per- ceiving that the determinative element in our validation of the Pennsylvania statute was the fact that it merely limited the sentencing judge's discretion within the range of penalty already available, rather than substantially increasing the available sentence. And even more than that: No one can read McMillan without learning that the Court was open to the argument that the Constitution requires a fact which does increase the available sentence to be treated as an ele- ment of the crime (such an argument, it said, would have "at least . . . superficial appeal," 477 U. S., at 88). If all that were not enough, there must be added the fact that many State Supreme Courts have concluded that a prior conviction which increases maximum punishment must be treated as an element of the offense under either their State Constitutions, see, e. g., State v. McClay, 146 Me. 104, 112, 78 A. 2d 347, 352 (1951); Tuttle v. Commonwealth, 68 Mass. 505, 506 (1854) (prior conviction increasing maximum sentence must be set forth in indictment); State v. Furth, 5 Wash. 2d 1, 11­19, 104 P. 2d 925, 930­933 (1940); State ex rel. Lockmiller v. Mayo, 88 Fla. 96, 98­99, 101 So. 228, 229 (1924); Roberson v. State, 362 P. 2d 1115, 1118­1119 (Okla. Crim. App. 1961), or as a matter of common law, see, e. g., People ex rel. Cosgriff v. Craig, 195 N. Y. 190, 194­195, 88 N. E. 38, 39 (1909); People 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 224 (1998) 257 Scalia, J., dissenting v. McDonald, 233 Mich. 98, 102, 105, 206 N. W. 516, 518, 519 (1925); State v. Smith, 129 Iowa 709, 710­715, 106 N. W. 187, 188­189 (1906) ("By the uniform current of authority, the fact of the prior convictions is to be taken as part of the offense instantly charged, at least to the extent of aggravating it and authorizing an increased punishment"); State v. Pennye, 102 Ariz. 207, 208­209, 427 P. 2d 525, 526­527 (1967); State v. Waterhouse, 209 Ore. 424, 428­433, 307 P. 2d 327, 329­331 (1957); Robbins v. State, 219 Ark. 376, 380­381, 242 S. W. 2d 640, 643 (1951); State v. Eichler, 248 Iowa 1267, 1270­1273, 83 N. W. 2d 576, 577­579 (1957).2 In the end, the Court cannot credibly argue that the question whether a fact which increases maximum permis- sible punishment must be found by a jury beyond a reason- able doubt is an easy one. That, perhaps, is why the Court stresses, and stresses repeatedly, the limited subject matter that § 1326(b) addresses-recidivism. It even tries, with utter lack of logic, to limit its rejection of the fair reading of McMillan to recidivism cases. "For the reasons just given," it says, "and in light of the particular sentencing factor at issue in this case-recidivism-we should take 2 It would not be, as the Court claims, "anomalous" to require jury trial for a factor increasing the maximum sentence, "in light of existing case law that permits a judge, rather than a jury, to determine the existence of factors that can make a defendant eligible for the death penalty . . . ." Ante, at 247, citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990); Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U. S. 638 (1989) (per curiam); and Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U. S. 447 (1984). Neither the cases cited, nor any other case, permits a judge to determine the existence of a factor which makes a crime a capital offense. What the cited cases hold is that, once a jury has found the defendant guilty of all the elements of an offense which carries as its maximum penalty the sentence of death, it may be left to the judge to decide whether that maximum penalty, rather than a lesser one, ought to be imposed-even where that decision is constrained by a stat- utory requirement that certain "aggravating factors" must exist. The person who is charged with actions that expose him to the death pen- alty has an absolute entitlement to jury trial on all the elements of the charge. 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN 258 ALMENDAREZ-TORRES v. UNITED STATES Scalia, J., dissenting McMillan's statement [regarding the "superficial appeal" the defendant's argument would have had if the factor at issue increased his maximum sentence] to mean no more than it said, and therefore not to make a determinative difference here." Ante, at 245 (emphasis added). It is impossible to understand how McMillan could mean one thing in a later case where recidivism is at issue, and something else in a later case where some other sentencing factor is at issue. One might say, of course, that recidivism should be an excep- tion to the general rule set forth in McMillan-but that more forthright characterization would display how doubtful the constitutional question is in light of our prior case law. In any event, there is no rational basis for making recid- ivism an exception. The Court is of the view that recidi- vism need not be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (a view that, as I shall discuss, is precisely contrary to the common-law tradition) because it " `goes to the punish- ment only.' " It relies for this conclusion upon our opinion in Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U. S. 616 (1912). See ante, at 243, quoting Graham, supra, at 624; see also ante, at 247. The holding of Graham provides no support for the Court's position. It upheld against due process and double jeopardy objections a state recidivism law under which a defendant's prior convictions were charged and tried in a separate pro- ceeding after he was convicted of the underlying offense. As the Court notes, ante, at 243, the prior convictions were not charged in the same indictment as the underlying of- fense; but they were charged in an "information" before the defendant was tried for the prior convictions, and, more im- portantly, the law explicitly preserved his right to a jury determination on the recidivism question. See Graham, supra, at 622­623; see also Oyler v. Boles, 368 U. S. 448, 453 (1962) (same). It is true, however, that if the basis for Gra- ham's holding were accepted, one would have to conclude that recidivism need not be tried to the jury and found be- yond a reasonable doubt. The essence of Graham's reason- 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 224 (1998) 259 Scalia, J., dissenting ing was that in the recidivism proceeding the defendant "was not held to answer for an offense," 224 U. S., at 624, since the recidivism charge " `goes to the punishment only,' " ibid., quoting McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U. S. 311, 313 (1901). But that basis for dispensing with the protections of jury trial and findings beyond a reasonable doubt was explicitly rejected in Mullaney, which accorded these protections to facts that were "not general elements of the crime of feloni- ous homicide . . . [but bore] only on the appropriate pun- ishment category," 421 U. S., at 699. Whatever else Mulla- ney stands for, it certainly stands for the proposition that what Graham used as the line of demarcation for double jeopardy and some due process purposes (the matter "goes only to the punishment") is not the line of demarcation for purposes of the right to jury trial and to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. So also does McMillan, which even while narrowing Mullaney made it very clear that the mere fact that a certain finding "goes only to the penalty" does not end the inquiry. The Court is certainly correct that the dis- tinctive treatment of recidivism determinations for double jeopardy purposes takes some explaining; but it takes some explaining for the Court no less than for me. And the expla- nation assuredly is not (what the Court apparently suggests) that recidivism is never an element of the crime. It does much less violence to our jurisprudence, and to the tradi- tional practice of requiring a jury finding of recidivism be- yond a reasonable doubt, to explain Graham as a recidivism exception to the normal double jeopardy rule that conviction of a lesser included offense bars later trial for the greater crime. Our double jeopardy law, after all, is based upon tra- ditional American and English practice, see United States v. Dixon, 509 U. S. 688, 704 (1993); United States v. Wilson, 420 U. S. 332, 339­344 (1975), and that practice has allowed recidivism to be charged and tried separately, see Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554, 566­567 (1967); Graham, supra, at 623, 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN 260 ALMENDAREZ-TORRES v. UNITED STATES Scalia, J., dissenting 625­626, 631; McDonald, supra, at 312­313. It has not al- lowed recidivism to be determined by a judge as more likely than not. While I have given many arguments supporting the posi- tion that the Constitution requires the recidivism finding in this case to be made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, I do not endorse that position as necessarily correct. In- deed, that would defeat my whole purpose, which is to honor the practice of not deciding doubtful constitutional ques- tions unnecessarily. What I have tried to establish-and all that I need to establish-is that on the basis of our juris- prudence to date, the answer to the constitutional question is not clear. It is the Court's burden, on the other hand, to establish that its constitutional answer shines forth clearly from our cases. That burden simply cannot be sustained. I think it beyond question that there was, until today's un- necessary resolution of the point, "serious doubt" whether the Constitution permits a defendant's sentencing exposure to be increased tenfold on the basis of a fact that is not charged, tried to a jury, and found beyond a reasonable doubt. If the Court wishes to abandon the doctrine of constitutional doubt, it should do so forthrightly, rather than by declaring certainty on a point that is clouded in doubt. II The Court contends that the doctrine of constitutional doubt is also inapplicable because § 1326 is not fairly suscep- tible of the construction which avoids the constitutional problem-i. e., the construction whereby subsection (b)(2) sets forth a separate criminal offense. Ante, at 238. The Court begins its statutory analysis not by examining the text of § 1326, but by demonstrating that the "subject matter [of the statute]-prior commission of a serious crime-is as typ- ical a sentencing factor as one might imagine." Ante, at 230. That is eminently demonstrable, sounds powerfully good, but in fact proves nothing at all. It is certainly true that a 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 224 (1998) 261 Scalia, J., dissenting judge (whether or not bound by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines) is likely to sentence nearer the maximum permit- ted for the offense if the defendant is a repeat offender. But the same can be said of many, perhaps most, factors that are used to define aggravated offenses. For example, judges will "typically" sentence nearer the maximum that a statute allows if the crime of conviction is committed with a firearm, or in the course of another felony; but that in no way sug- gests that armed robbery and felony murder are sentencing enhancements rather than separate crimes. The relevant question for present purposes is not whether prior felony conviction is "typically" used as a sentencing factor, but rather whether, in statutes that provide higher maximum sentences for crimes committed by convicted fel- ons, prior conviction is "typically" treated as a mere sen- tence enhancement or rather as an element of a separate offense. The answer to that question is the latter. That was the rule at common law, and was the near-uniform prac- tice among the States at the time of the most recent study I am aware of. See Note, Recidivist Procedures, 40 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 332, 333­334 (1965); Note, The Pleading and Proof of Prior Convictions in Habitual Criminal Prosecutions, 33 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 210, 215­216 (1958). At common law, the fact of prior convictions had to be charged in the same indict- ment charging the underlying crime, and submitted to the jury for determination along with that crime. See, e. g., Spencer v. Texas, supra, at 566; Massey v. United States, 281 F. 293, 297 (CA8 1922); Singer v. United States, 278 F. 415, 420 (CA3 1922); People v. Sickles, 156 N. Y. 541, 545, 51 N. E. 288, 289 (1898). While several States later altered this pro- cedure by providing a separate proceeding for the determi- nation of prior convictions, at least as late as 1965 all but eight retained the defendant's right to a jury determination on this issue. See Note, 40 N. Y. U. L. Rev., at 333­334, 347. I am at a loss to explain the Court's assertion that it has "found no statute that clearly makes recidivism an offense 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN 262 ALMENDAREZ-TORRES v. UNITED STATES Scalia, J., dissenting element" added to another crime, ante, at 230. There are many such.3 It is interesting that the Court drags the red herring of recidivism through both parts of its opinion-the "constitu- tional doubt" part and the "statutory interpretation" part alike. As just discussed, logic demonstrates that the nature of that charge (the fact that it is a "typical" sentencing fac- tor) has nothing to do with what this statute means. And as discussed earlier, the text and reasoning of McMillan, and of the cases McMillan distinguishes, provide no basis for saying that recidivism is exempt from the Court's clear acknowledgment that taking away from the jury facts that increase the maximum sentence is constitutionally ques- tionable. One wonders what state courts, and lower federal courts, are supposed to do with today's mysterious utter- ances. Are they to pursue logic, and conclude that all am- biguous statutes adding punishment for factors accompany- ing the principal offense are mere enhancements, or are they illogically to give this special treatment only to recidivism? Are they to deem the reasoning of McMillan superseded for all cases, or does it remain an open and doubtful question, for all cases except those involving recidivism, whether stat- utory maximums can be increased without the benefit of jury trial? Whatever else one may say about today's opin- ion, there is no doubt that it has brought to this area of the law more confusion than clarification. Passing over the red herring, let me turn now to the stat- ute at issue-§ 1326 as it stood when petitioner was con- 3 For federal statutes of this sort, see, e. g., 15 U. S. C. § 1264(a), 18 U. S. C. § 924(c), and § 2114(a). In each of these provisions, recidivism is recited in a list of sentence-increasing aggravators that include, for exam- ple, intent to defraud or mislead (15 U. S. C. § 1264(a)), use of a firearm that is a machine gun, or a destructive device, or that is equipped with a silencer (18 U. S. C. § 924(c)), and wounding or threatening life with a dangerous weapon (§ 2114(a)). It would do violence to the text to treat recidivism as a mere enhancement while treating the parallel provisions as aggravated offenses, which they obviously are. 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 224 (1998) 263 Scalia, J., dissenting victed. The author of today's opinion for the Court once agreed that the "language and structure" of this enactment "are subject to two plausible readings," one of them being that recidivism constitutes a separate offense. United States v. Forbes, 16 F. 3d 1294, 1298 (CA1 1994) (opinion of Coffin, J., joined by Breyer, C. J.).4 This would surely be enough to satisfy the requirement expressed by Justice Holmes, see United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U. S. 394, 401 (1916), and approved by the Court, ante, at 237­238, that the constitutional-doubt-avoiding construction be "fairly pos- sible." Today, however, the Court relegates statutory lan- guage and structure to merely two of five "factors" that "help courts determine a statute's objectives and thereby illuminate its text," ante, at 228. The statutory text reads, in relevant part, as follows: "Reentry of deported alien; criminal penalties for re- entry of certain deported aliens "(a) Subject to subsection (b) of this section, any alien who [has been deported and thereafter reenters the United States] . . . shall be fined under title 18, or impris- oned not more than 2 years, or both. "(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, in the case of any alien described in such subsection- "(1) whose deportation was subsequent to a convic- tion for commission of three or more misdemeanors in- volving drugs, crimes against the person, or both, or a felony (other than an aggravated felony), such alien shall be fined under title 18, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both; or "(2) whose deportation was subsequent to a convic- tion for commission of an aggravated felony, such alien 4 The statutory text at issue in Forbes was in all relevant respects identi- cal to the statute before us here, except that the years of imprisonment for the offenses were less; they were increased by a 1994 amendment, see § 130001(b), 108 Stat. 2023. 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN 264 ALMENDAREZ-TORRES v. UNITED STATES Scalia, J., dissenting shall be fined under such title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both." 8 U. S. C. § 1326(b). One is struck at once by the parallel structure of subsections (a) and (b). Neither subsection says that the individual it describes "shall be guilty of a felony," and both subsections say that the individuals they describe "shall be fined under title 18, or imprisoned not more than [2, 10, or 20] years." If this suffices to define a substantive offense in subsection (a) (as all agree it does), it is hard to see why it would not define a substantive offense in each paragraph of subsection (b) as well. Cf., for example, 21 U. S. C. § 841, which has a subsection (a) entitled "Unlawful acts," and a subsection (b) entitled "Penalties." The opening phrase of subsection (b) certainly does not indicate that what follows merely supplements or enhances the penalty provision of subsection (a); what follows is to apply "notwithstanding" all of subsection (a), i. e., "in spite of" or "without prevention or obstruction from or by" sub- section (a). See, e. g., Webster's New International Dic- tionary 1669 (2d ed. 1949). The next phrase ("in the case of any alien described in . . . subsection [(a)]") imports by reference the substantive acts attributed to the hypotheti- cal alien (deportation and unauthorized reentry) in sub- section (a). Significantly, this phrase does not apply subsec- tion (b) to any alien "convicted under" subsection (a)-which is what one would expect if the provision was merely in- creasing the penalty for certain subsection (a) convictions. See, e. g., United States v. Davis, 801 F. 2d 754, 755­756 (CA5 1986) (noting that "predicat[ing] punishment upon convic- tion" of another offense is one of the "common indicia of sentence-enhancement provisions"). Instead, subsection (b) applies to an alien "described in" subsection (a)-one who has been deported and has reentered illegally. And finally, subsection (a)'s provision that it applies "[s]ubject to subsec- tion (b)" means that subsection (a) is inapplicable to an alien covered by subsection (b), just as subsection (b) applies "not- 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 224 (1998) 265 Scalia, J., dissenting withstanding" that the alien would otherwise be covered by subsection (a).5 The Court relies on an earlier version of § 1326 to support its interpretation of the statute in its current form. Ante, at 232. While I agree that such statutory history is a legit- imate tool of construction, the statutory history of § 1326 does not support, but rather undermines, the Court's inter- pretation. That earlier version contained a subsection (a) that, in addition to setting forth penalties (as did the sub- parts of subsection (b)), contained the phrase (which the subparts of subsection (b) did not) "shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof . . . ." With such a formulation, of course, it would be easier to conclude that subsection (a) defines the crime and sets forth the basic penalty, and sub- section (b) sets forth merely penalty enhancements. But if that was what the additional language in subsection (a) of the 1988 statute connoted, then what was the elimination of that additional language (in the 1990 version of the stat- ute at issue here) meant to achieve? See § 543(b)(3), 104 Stat. 5059. The more strongly the "shall be guilty of a felony" language suggests that subsection (b) of the 1988 statute contained only enhancements, the more strongly the otherwise inexplicable elimination of that language sug- 5 The Court contends that treating subsection (b) as establishing sub- stantive offenses renders the "notwithstanding" and "subject to" provi- sions redundant, because even without them our lesser included-offense jurisprudence would prevent a defendant from being convicted under both subsections (a) and (b). Ante, at 231. Redundancy, however, con- sists of the annoying practice of saying the same thing twice, not the sensible practice of saying once, with clarity and conciseness, what the law provides. The author of today's opinion once agreed that "[t]he fact that each subsection makes reference to the other is simply the logical way of indicating the relationship between the arguably two separate crimes." United States v. Forbes, 16 F. 3d 1294, 1298 (CA1 1994). But if this be redundancy, it is redundancy that the Court's alternative reading does not cure-unless one believes that, without the "notwithstanding" and "sub- ject to" language, our interpretive jurisprudence would permit the subsec- tion (a) penalty to be added to the subsection (b) penalties. 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN 266 ALMENDAREZ-TORRES v. UNITED STATES Scalia, J., dissenting gests that subsection (b) of the 1990 statute was meant to be parallel with subsection (a)-i. e., that both subsec- tions were meant to set forth not merely penalties but also offenses.6 After considering the subject matter and statutory lan- guage, the third factor the Court considers in arriving at its determination that this statute can only be read as a sentenc- ing enhancement is the title of the 1988 amendment that added subsection (b)(2): "Criminal Penalties for Reentry of Certain Deported Aliens." See § 7345, 102 Stat. 4471, cited ante, at 234. Of course, this title pertains to a subsection (b)(2) which, unlike the (b)(2) under which petitioner was convicted, was not parallel with the preceding subsection (a). But even disregarding that, the title of the amendment proves nothing at all. While "Criminal Penalties for Re- entry" might normally be more suggestive of an enhance- ment than of a separate offense, there is good reason to be- lieve it imports no such suggestion here. For the very next provision of the same enactment, which adjusts the sub- stantive requirements for the crime of aiding and abetting the unlawful entry of an alien, is entitled "Criminal Penalties for Aiding or Assisting Certain Aliens to Enter the United States." See § 7346, 102 Stat. 4471. Evidently, new sub- stantive offenses that were penalized were simply entitled "Criminal Penalties" for the relevant offense. Moreover, 6 Immediately after stressing the significance of the 1988 version of § 1326(a), the Court dismisses the 1990 amendment that eliminated the 1988 language upon which it relies, as a "housekeeping measure" by which "Congress [did not] inten[d] to change, or to clarify, the fundamental rela- tionship between" subsections (a) and (b). Ante, at 234. The Court of- fers no support for this confident characterization, unless it is the mistaken assumption that statutory changes or clarifications unconfirmed by legisla- tive history are inoperative. "Suffice it to say that legislative history need not confirm the details of changes in the law effected by statutory language before we will interpret that language according to its natural meaning." Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374, 385, n. 2 (1992). 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 224 (1998) 267 Scalia, J., dissenting the 1988 amendment kept the original title of § 1326 ("Re- entry of Deported Alien") intact, leaving it to apply to both subsection (a) and subsection (b). See § 7345, supra; § 276, 66 Stat. 229. The Court's fourth factor leading it to conclude that this statute cannot reasonably be construed as establishing sub- stantive offenses is legislative history. See ante, at 234. It is, again, the legislative history of the provision as it existed in 1988, before subsection (a) was stripped of the language "shall be guilty of a felony," thereby making subsections (a) and (b) parallel. Even so, it is of no help to the Court's case. The stray statements that the Court culls from the Congres- sional Record prove only that the new subsection (b) was thought to increase penalties for unlawful reentry. But there is no dispute that it does that! The critical question is whether it does it by adding penalties to the subsection (a) offense, or by creating additional, more severely punished, offenses. That technical point is not alluded to in any of the remarks the Court recites. The Court's fifth and last argument in support of its inter- pretation of the statute is the contention that "the contrary interpretation . . . risks unfairness," ibid., because it would require bringing the existence of the prior felony conviction to the attention of the jury. But it is also "unfair," of course, to deprive the defendant of a jury determination (and a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof) on the critical question of the prior conviction. This Court's own assess- ment of which of those disadvantages is the greater can be of relevance here only insofar as we can presume that that perception would have been shared by the enacting Con- gress. We usually presume, however, not that an earlier Congress agreed with our current policy judgments, but rather that it agreed with the disposition provided by tradi- tional practice or the common law. See United States v. Texas, 507 U. S. 529, 534 (1993); Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U. S. 104, 108 (1991); Norfolk Redevel- 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN 268 ALMENDAREZ-TORRES v. UNITED STATES Scalia, J., dissenting opment and Housing Authority v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Va., 464 U. S. 30, 35 (1983); Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 263 (1952). As noted earlier, the Court's hostility to jury determination of prior convic- tions is quite simply at odds with the manner in which recidi- vism laws have historically been treated in this country. Moreover, even if we were free to resolve this matter according to our current views of what is fair, the Court's judgment that avoiding jury "infection" is more important than affording a jury verdict (beyond a reasonable doubt) does not seem to me sound. The Court is not correct, to begin with, that the fact of prior conviction is "almost never contested," ante, at 235, particularly in unlawful-entry cases. That is clear from the very legislative history of the present statute. Senator Chiles explained that "identifying and prosecuting . . . illegal alien felons is a long and complex process" because "[i]t is not uncommon for an alien who has committed a certain felony to pay his bond and walk, only to be apprehended for a similar crime in the next county but with a new name and identification." 133 Cong. Rec. 8771 (1987). He went on to describe two specific aliens, one from whom police "seized 3 passports issued to him in 3 different names, 11 drivers licenses, immigration cards and numerous firearms and stolen property," and the other on whom immi- gration officials had "5 alien files . . . with 13 aliases, different birth dates and different social security cards." Id., at 8771, 8772. He said that "these aliens [were] not exceptions but rather common amongst the 100,000 illegal alien felons in the United States." Id., at 8772. Representative Smith stated that aliens arrested for felonies "often are able to pay expen- sive bonds and disappear under a new identity often to reap- pear in court with a different name and a new offense. In some cases, they may return to their native lands and reen- ter the United States with new names and papers but com- mitting the same crimes." Id., at 28840. And on the other side of the ledger, I doubt whether "infection" of the jury 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 224 (1998) 269 Scalia, J., dissenting with knowledge of the prior crime is a serious problem. See, e. g., Spencer, 385 U. S., at 561 ("The defendants' inter- ests [in keeping prejudicial prior convictions from the jury] are protected by limiting instructions and by the discretion residing with the trial judge to limit or forbid the admission of particularly prejudicial evidence even though admissible under an accepted rule of evidence" (citation omitted)); Old Chief v. United States, 519 U. S. 172, 191 (1997) (it is an abuse of discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to disallow defendant's stipulation to prior felony convictions where such convictions are an element of the offense); cf. Brief for Na- tional Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae 30 ("In 1996, 98.2% of all Section 1326 defendants pleaded guilty"). If it is a problem, however, there are leg- islative and even judicial means for dealing with it, short of what today's decision does: taking the matter away from the jury in all cases. See Note, 40 N. Y. U. L. Rev., at 333­334 (describing commonly used procedures under which defend- ant's right to a jury is invoked only "[i]f [he] denies the exist- ence of prior convictions or stands mute"); Spencer, supra, at 567 (describing the English rule, under which the indictment alleges both the substantive offense and prior conviction, but the jury is not charged on the prior conviction until after it convicts the defendant of the substantive offense). In sum, I find none of the four nontextual factors relied upon by the Court to support its interpretation ("typicality" of recidivism as a sentencing factor; titles; legislative his- tory; and risk of unfairness) persuasive. What does seem to me significant, however, is a related statutory provision, introduced by a 1996 amendment, which explicitly refers to subsection (b)(2) as setting forth "offenses." See § 334, 110 Stat. 3009­635 (instructing United States Sentencing Commission to amend sentencing guidelines "for offenses under . . . 1326(b)"). This later amendment can of course not cause subsection (b)(2) to have meant, at the time of peti- tioner's conviction, something different from what it then 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN 270 ALMENDAREZ-TORRES v. UNITED STATES Scalia, J., dissenting said. But Congress's expressed understanding that subsec- tion (b) creates separate offenses is surely evidence that it is "fairly possible" to read the provision that way.7 I emphasize (to conclude this part of the discussion) that "fairly possible" is all that needs to be established. The doc- trine of constitutional doubt does not require that the problem-avoiding construction be the preferable one-the one the Court would adopt in any event. Such a standard would deprive the doctrine of all function. "Adopt the inter- pretation that avoids the constitutional doubt if that is the right one" produces precisely the same result as "adopt the right interpretation." Rather, the doctrine of constitutional doubt comes into play when the statute is "susceptible of" the problem-avoiding interpretation, Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S., at 408-when that interpretation is reason- able, though not necessarily the best. I think it quite impos- sible to maintain that this standard is not met by the inter- pretation of subsection (b) which regards it as creating separate offenses. * * * For the foregoing reasons, I think we must interpret the statute before us here as establishing a separate offense rather than a sentence enhancement. It can be argued that, once the constitutional doubts that require this course have been resolved, statutes no less ambiguous than the one be- fore us here will be interpretable as sentence enhancements, 7 The Court is incorrect in its contention that the effective-date provi- sion of the 1996 amendments reflects the opposite congressional under- standing. See ante, at 237. That provision states that the amendments "apply under [subsection (b)] . . . only to violations of [subsection (a)]," occurring on or after the date of enactment. § 321(c), 110 Stat. 3009­628. There is no dispute, of course, that if subsection (b) creates separate of- fenses, one of the elements of the separate offenses is the lesser offense set forth in subsection (a). The quoted language is the clearest and sim- plest way of saying that that element of the subsection (b) offenses must have occurred after the date of enactment in order for the amendments to be applicable. 523US1 Unit: $U43 [05-09-00 11:33:29] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 224 (1998) 271 Scalia, J., dissenting so that not much will have been achieved. That begs the question, of course, as to how the constitutional doubt will be resolved. Moreover, where the doctrine of constitutional doubt does not apply, the same result may be dictated by the rule of lenity, which would preserve rather than destroy the criminal defendant's right to jury findings beyond a reason- able doubt. See, e. g., People ex rel. Cosgriff v. Craig, 195 N. Y., at 197, 88 N. E., at 40 ("It is unnecessary in this case to decide how great punishment the legislature may constitu- tionally authorize Courts of Special Sessions to impose on a conviction without a common-law jury. It is sufficient to say that in cases of doubtful construction or of conflicting statu- tory provisions, that interpretation should be given which best protects the rights of a person charged with an offense, to a trial according to the common law"). Whichever doc- trine is applied for the purpose, it seems to me a sound prin- ciple that whenever Congress wishes a fact to increase the maximum sentence without altering the substantive offense, it must make that intention unambiguously clear. Accord- ingly, I would find that § 1326(b)(2) establishes a separate offense, and would reverse the judgment below. 523US1 Unit: $U44 [04-29-00 20:43:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 272 OCTOBER TERM, 1997 Syllabus OHIO ADULT PAROLE AUTHORITY et al. v. WOODARD certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit No. 96­1769. Argued December 10, 1997-Decided March 25, 1998 After respondent Woodard's Ohio murder conviction and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal and this Court denied certiorari, peti- tioner Ohio Adult Parole Authority commenced its clemency investiga- tion in accordance with state law, informing respondent that he could have his voluntary interview with Authority members on a particular date, and that his clemency hearing would be held a week later. Re- spondent filed this suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging that Ohio's clemency process violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process right and his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. The District Court granted judgment on the pleadings to the State, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Noting that Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U. S. 458, 464­465, had decisively rejected the argument that federal law can create a liberty interest in clemency, the latter court held that respondent had failed to establish a life or liberty interest protected by due process. The court also held, how- ever, that respondent's "original" pretrial life and liberty interests were protected by a "second strand" of due process analysis under Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U. S. 387, 393, although the amount of process due could be minimal because clemency, while an "integral part" of the adjudicatory system, is far removed from trial. The court remanded for the District Court to decide what that process should be. Finally, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Ohio's voluntary interview procedure presented respond- ent with a "Hobson's choice" between asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and participating in Ohio's clemency review process, thereby raising the specter of an unconstitutional condition. Held: The judgment is reversed. 107 F. 3d 1178, reversed. The Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Part III, concluding that giving an inmate the option of voluntarily participating in an interview as part of the clemency process does not violate his Fifth Amendment rights. That Amendment protects against compelled self-incrimination. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 523US1 Unit: $U44 [04-29-00 20:43:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 272 (1998) 273 Syllabus U. S. 308, 316­318. Even on assumptions most favorable to respond- ent's claim-i. e., that nothing in the clemency procedure grants appli- cants immunity for what they might say or makes the interview in any way confidential, and that the Authority will draw adverse inferences from respondent's refusal to answer questions-his testimony at a vol- untary interview would not be "compelled." He merely faces a choice quite similar to those made by a criminal defendant in the course of criminal proceedings. For example, a defendant who chooses to testify in his own defense abandons the privilege against self-incrimination when the prosecution seeks to cross-examine him, and may be im- peached by proof of prior convictions. In these situations, the un- doubted pressures to testify that are generated by the strength of the government's case do not constitute "compulsion" for Fifth Amendment purposes. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78, 84­85. Similarly, re- spondent here has the choice of providing information to the Author- ity-at the risk of damaging his case for clemency or for postconviction relief-or of remaining silent, but the pressure to speak does not make the interview compelled. Pp. 285­288. The Chief Justice, joined by Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas, concluded in Part II that an inmate does not establish a violation of the Due Process Clause in clemency proceedings, under either Dumschat or Evitts, where, as here, the procedures in question do no more than confirm that such decisions are committed, as is the Nation's tradition, to the executive's authority. This Court reaf- firms its holding in Dumschat, supra, at 464, that pardon and commuta- tion decisions are rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects for judicial review. Respondent's argument that there is a continuing life interest in clem- ency that is broader in scope than the "original" life interest adjudicated at trial and sentencing is barred by Dumschat. The process respond- ent seeks would be inconsistent with the heart of executive clemency, which is to grant clemency as a matter of grace, thus allowing the ex- ecutive to consider a wide range of factors not comprehended by ear- lier judicial proceedings and sentencing determinations. Although re- spondent maintains a residual life interest, e. g., in not being summarily executed by prison guards, he cannot use that interest to challenge the clemency determination by requiring the procedural protections he seeks. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Com- plex, 442 U. S. 1, 7. Also rejected is respondent's claim that clemency is entitled to due process protection under Evitts. Expressly relying on the combination of two lines of cases to justify the conclusion that a criminal defendant has a right to effective assistance of counsel on a first appeal as of right, 469 U. S., at 394­396, the Evitts Court did not 523US1 Unit: $U44 [04-29-00 20:43:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 274 OHIO ADULT PAROLE AUTHORITY v. WOODARD Syllabus purport to create a new "strand" of due process analysis, and it did not rely on the notion of a continuum of due process rights, as respondent claims. There is no such continuum. See, e. g., Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U. S. 1, 9­10. An examination of the function and significance of the discretionary clemency decision at issue here readily shows that it is far different from a first appeal as of right, and thus is not " `an inte- gral part of the . . . system for finally adjudicating . . . guilt or inno- cence,' " as Evitts, supra, at 393, requires. Pp. 279­285. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer, concluded that, because a prisoner under a death sentence has a continuing interest in his life, the question raised is what process is constitutionally necessary to protect that interest. Although due process demands are reduced once society has validly convicted an individual of a crime and therefore established its right to punish, Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399, 429 (O'Connor, J., concurring in result in part and dissenting in part), the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that some minimal procedural safeguards apply to clemency proceed- ings. Judicial intervention might, for example, be warranted in the face of a scheme whereby a state official flipped a coin to determine whether to grant clemency, or in a case where the State arbitrarily denied a prisoner any access to its clemency process. However, a remand to permit the District Court to address respondent's specific allegations of due process violations is not required. The process he received com- ports with Ohio's regulations and observes whatever limitations the Due Process Clause may impose on clemency proceedings. Pp. 288­290. Rehnquist, C. J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Part III, the opinion of the Court with respect to Part I, in which O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part II, in which Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. O'Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 288. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissent- ing in part, post, p. 290. William A. Klatt, First Assistant Attorney General of Ohio, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Jeffrey S. Sutton, State Solicitor, Simon B. Karas, and Jon C. Wal- den, Assistant Attorney General. 523US1 Unit: $U44 [04-29-00 20:43:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 272 (1998) 275 Opinion of the Court S. Adele Shank argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were David H. Bodiker, by appointment of the Court, 522 U. S. 930, Michael J. Benza, by appointment of the Court, 522 U. S. 804, and Gregory W. Meyers.* Chief Justice Rehnquist announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and III, and an opinion with respect to Part II in which Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas join. This case requires us to resolve two inquiries as to consti- tutional limitations on state clemency proceedings. The *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Cali- fornia et al. by Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Se- nior Assistant Attorney General, William G. Prahl, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Ward A. Campbell, Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama, Grant Woods of Arizona, Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Gale A. Norton of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert A. Butter- worth of Florida, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Jeffrey A. Modisett of Indiana, Albert B. Chandler III of Kentucky, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Andrew Ketterer of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Mis- souri, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Peter Verniero of New Jersey, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania, Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, Mark W. Barnett of South Dakota, John Knox Walkup of Tennessee, Dan Morales of Texas, Jan Graham of Utah, Richard Cullen of Virginia, Christine O. Gregoire of Washington, and William U. Hill of Wyoming; and for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Daniel T. Kobil, Steven R. Shapiro, and Diann Y. Rust-Tierney; and for the National Association of Criminal De- fense Lawyers by Andrea D. Lyon and Barbara E. Bergman. Jerome J. Shestack filed a brief for the American Bar Association as amicus curiae. 523US1 Unit: $U44 [04-29-00 20:43:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 276 OHIO ADULT PAROLE AUTHORITY v. WOODARD Opinion of the Court first is whether an inmate has a protected life or liberty in- terest in clemency proceedings, under either Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U. S. 458 (1981), or Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U. S. 387 (1985). The second is whether giving inmates the option of voluntarily participating in an inter- view as part of the clemency process violates an inmate's Fifth Amendment rights. We reaffirm our holding in Dumschat, supra, that "pardon and commutation decisions have not traditionally been the business of courts; as such, they are rarely, if ever, appro- priate subjects for judicial review." Id., at 464 (footnote omitted). The Due Process Clause is not violated where, as here, the procedures in question do no more than confirm that the clemency and pardon powers are committed, as is our tradition, to the authority of the executive.1 We further hold that a voluntary inmate interview does not violate the Fifth Amendment. I The Ohio Constitution gives the Governor the power to grant clemency upon such conditions as he thinks proper. Ohio Const., Art. III, § 2. The Ohio General Assembly can- not curtail this discretionary decisionmaking power, but it may regulate the application and investigation process. State v. Sheward, 71 Ohio St. 3d 513, 524­525, 644 N. E. 2d 369, 378 (1994). The General Assembly has delegated in large part the conduct of clemency review to petitioner Ohio Adult Parole Authority (Authority). Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2967.07 (1993). In the case of an inmate under death sentence, the Author- ity must conduct a clemency hearing within 45 days of the scheduled date of execution. Prior to the hearing, the in- mate may request an interview with one or more parole 1 Justice Stevens in dissent says that a defendant would be entitled to raise an equal protection claim in connection with a clemency decision. Post, at 292. But respondent has raised no such claim here, and therefore we have no occasion to decide that question. 523US1 Unit: $U44 [04-29-00 20:43:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 272 (1998) 277 Opinion of the Court board members. Counsel is not allowed at that interview. The Authority must hold the hearing, complete its clemency review, and make a recommendation to the Governor, even if the inmate subsequently obtains a stay of execution. If additional information later becomes available, the Authority may in its discretion hold another hearing or alter its recommendation. Respondent Eugene Woodard was sentenced to death for aggravated murder committed in the course of a carjacking. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal, State v. Woodard, 68 Ohio St. 3d 70, 623 N. E. 2d 75 (1993), and this Court denied certiorari, 512 U. S. 1246 (1994). When respondent failed to obtain a stay of execution more than 45 days before his scheduled execution date, the Authority commenced its clemency investigation. It informed re- spondent that he could have a clemency interview on Sep- tember 9, 1994, if he wished, and that his clemency hearing would be on September 16, 1994. Respondent did not request an interview. Instead, he ob- jected to the short notice of the interview and requested as- surances that counsel could attend and participate in the in- terview and hearing. When the Authority failed to respond to these requests, respondent filed suit in United States Dis- trict Court on September 14, alleging under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, that Ohio's clemency process vio- lated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. The District Court granted the State's motion for judg- ment on the pleadings. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. 107 F. 3d 1178 (1997). That court determined that under a "first strand" of due process analysis, arising out of the clemency proceeding itself, respondent had failed to establish a protected life or liberty interest. It noted that our decision in Dumschat, supra, at 464­465, "decisively rejected the argument that 523US1 Unit: $U44 [04-29-00 20:43:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 278 OHIO ADULT PAROLE AUTHORITY v. WOODARD Opinion of the Court federal law can create a liberty interest in clemency." 107 F. 3d, at 1183. The Court of Appeals further concluded that there was no state-created life or liberty interest in clemency. Id., at 1184­1185. Since the Governor retains complete discretion to make the final decision, and the Authority's recommenda- tion is purely advisory, the State has not created a protected interest. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U. S. 238, 249 (1983). The court noted that it would reach the same conclusion under Sandin v. Conner, 515 U. S. 472 (1995), to the extent that decision modified the Olim analysis. The Court of Appeals went on to consider, however, a "sec- ond strand" of due process analysis centered on "the role of clemency in the entire punitive scheme." 107 F. 3d, at 1186. The court relied on our statement in Evitts that "if a State has created appellate courts as `an integral part of the . . . system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant,' . . . the procedures used in deciding appeals must comport with the demands of " due process. 469 U. S., at 393 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 18 (1956)). The court thought this reasoning logically applied to subsequent proceedings, including discretionary appeals, postconviction proceedings, and clemency. Due process thus protected respondent's "original" life and liberty interests that he possessed before trial at each pro- ceeding. But the amount of process due was in proportion to the degree to which the stage was an "integral part" of the trial process. Clemency, while not required by the Due Process Clause, was a significant, traditionally available rem- edy for preventing miscarriages of justice when judicial proc- ess was exhausted. It therefore came within the Evitts framework as an "integral part" of the adjudicatory system. However, since clemency was far removed from trial, the process due could be minimal. The Court did not itself decide what that process should be, but remanded to the District Court for that purpose. 523US1 Unit: $U44 [04-29-00 20:43:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 272 (1998) 279 Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J. Finally, the Court of Appeals also agreed with respondent that the voluntary interview procedure presented him with a "Hobson's choice" between asserting his Fifth Amendment rights and participating in the clemency review process, rais- ing the specter of an unconstitutional condition. 107 F. 3d, at 1189. There was no compelling state interest that would justify forcing such a choice on the inmate. On the other hand, the inmate had a measurable interest in avoiding in- crimination in ongoing postconviction proceedings, as well as with respect to possible charges for other crimes that could be revealed during the interview. While noting some uncer- tainties surrounding application of the unconstitutional con- ditions doctrine, the Court of Appeals concluded the doctrine could be applied in this case. The dissenting judge would have affirmed the District Court's judgment. Id., at 1194. He agreed with the major- ity's determination that there was no protected interest under Dumschat. But he thought that the majority's find- ing of a due process interest under Evitts, supra, was neces- sarily inconsistent with the holding and rationale of Dum- schat. Evitts did not purport to overrule Dumschat. He also concluded that respondent's Fifth Amendment claim was too speculative, given the voluntary nature of the clem- ency interview. We granted certiorari, 521 U. S. 1117 (1997), and we now reverse. II Respondent argues first, in disagreement with the Court of Appeals, that there is a life interest in clemency broader in scope than the "original" life interest adjudicated at trial and sentencing. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399 (1986). This continuing life interest, it is argued, requires due proc- ess protection until respondent is executed.2 Relying on 2 Respondent alternatively tries to characterize his claim as a challenge only to the application process conducted by the Authority, and not to the final discretionary decision by the Governor. Brief for Respondent 8. But, respondent still must have a protected life or liberty interest in the 523US1 Unit: $U44 [04-29-00 20:43:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 280 OHIO ADULT PAROLE AUTHORITY v. WOODARD Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J. Eighth Amendment decisions holding that additional proce- dural protections are required in capital cases, see, e. g., Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625, 637­638 (1980), respondent asserts that Dumschat does not control the outcome in this case be- cause it involved only a liberty interest. Justice Stevens' dissent agrees on both counts. Post, at 291­292. In Dumschat, an inmate claimed Connecticut's clemency procedure violated due process because the Connecticut Board of Pardons failed to provide an explanation for its de- nial of his commutation application. The Court held that "an inmate has `no constitutional or inherent right' to com- mutation of his sentence." 452 U. S., at 464. It noted that, unlike probation decisions, "pardon and commutation deci- sions have not traditionally been the business of courts; as such, they are rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects for judicial review." Ibid. The Court relied on its prior decision in Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Com- plex, 442 U. S. 1 (1979), where it rejected the claim "that a constitutional entitlement to release [on parole] exists in- dependently of a right explicitly conferred by the State." Dumschat, 452 U. S., at 463­464. The individual's interest in release or commutation " `is indistinguishable from the initial resistance to being confined,' " and that interest has already been extinguished by the conviction and sentence. Id., at 464 (quoting Greenholtz, supra, at 7). The Court therefore concluded that a petition for commutation, like an appeal for clemency, "is simply a unilateral hope." 452 U. S., at 465. Respondent's claim of a broader due process interest in Ohio's clemency proceedings is barred by Dumschat. The process respondent seeks would be inconsistent with the heart of executive clemency, which is to grant clemency as a application process. Otherwise, as the Court of Appeals correctly noted, he is asserting merely a protected interest in process itself, which is not a cognizable claim. 107 F. 3d 1178, 1184 (CA6 1997); see also Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U. S. 238, 249­250 (1983). 523US1 Unit: $U44 [04-29-00 20:43:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 272 (1998) 281 Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J. matter of grace, thus allowing the executive to consider a wide range of factors not comprehended by earlier judicial proceedings and sentencing determinations. The dissent agrees with respondent that because "a living person" has a constitutionally protected life interest, it is incorrect to as- sert that respondent's life interest has been "extinguished." Post, at 291. We agree that respondent maintains a residual life interest, e. g., in not being summarily executed by prison guards. However, as Greenholtz helps to make clear, re- spondent cannot use his interest in not being executed in accord with his sentence to challenge the clemency determi- nation by requiring the procedural protections he seeks. 442 U. S., at 7.3 The reasoning of Dumschat did not depend on the fact that it was not a capital case. The distinctions accorded a life interest to which respondent and the dissent point, post, at 291­292, 293­295, are primarily relevant to trial. And this Court has generally rejected attempts to expand any distinctions further. See, e. g., Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U. S. 1, 8­9 (1989) (opinion of Rehnquist, C. J.) (there is no constitutional right to counsel in collateral proceedings for death row inmates; cases recognizing special constraints on capital proceedings have dealt with the trial stage); Satter- white v. Texas, 486 U. S. 249, 256 (1988) (applying traditional standard of appellate review to a Sixth Amendment claim in a capital case); Smith v. Murray, 477 U. S. 527, 538 (1986) (applying same standard of review on federal habeas in capi- 3 For the same reason, respondent's reliance on Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399, 425 (1986), is misplaced. In Ford, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prevents the execution of a person who has become insane since the time of trial. Id., at 410. This substantive constitutional prohibition implicated due process protections. This protected interest, however, arose subsequent to trial, and was separate from the life interest already adjudicated in the inmate's conviction and sentence. See id., at 425 (Powell, J., concurring). This interest therefore had not been afforded due process protection. The Court's recognition of a protected interest thus did not rely on the notion of a continuing "original" life interest. 523US1 Unit: $U44 [04-29-00 20:43:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 282 OHIO ADULT PAROLE AUTHORITY v. WOODARD Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J. tal and noncapital cases); Ford, supra, at 425 (Powell, J., con- curring) (noting that the Court's decisions imposing height- ened requirements on capital trials and sentencing proceed- ings do not apply in the postconviction context).4 The Court's analysis in Dumschat, moreover, turned not on the fact that it was a noncapital case, but on the nature of the benefit sought: "In terms of the Due Process Clause, a Con- necticut felon's expectation that a lawfully imposed sentence will be commuted or that he will be pardoned is no more substantial than an inmate's expectation, for example, that he will not be transferred to another prison; it is simply a unilateral hope." 452 U. S., at 464 (footnote omitted). A death row inmate's petition for clemency is also a "unilateral hope." The defendant in effect accepts the finality of the death sentence for purposes of adjudication, and appeals for clemency as a matter of grace. Respondent also asserts that, as in Greenholtz, Ohio has created protected interests by establishing mandatory clem- ency application and review procedures. In Greenholtz, supra, at 11­12, the Court held that the expectancy of release on parole created by the mandatory language of the Nebraska statute was entitled to some measure of con- stitutional protection. Ohio's clemency procedures do not violate due process. Despite the Authority's mandatory procedures, the ultimate decisionmaker, the Governor, retains broad discretion. Under any analysis, the Governor's executive discretion need not be fettered by the types of procedural protections sought by respondent. See Greenholtz, supra, at 12­16 (recogniz- ing the Nebraska parole statute created a protected liberty 4 The dissent provides no basis for its assertion that the special consider- ations afforded a capital defendant's life interest at the trial stage "apply with special force to the final stage of the decisional process that precedes an official deprivation of life." Post, at 295. This not only ignores our case law to the contrary, supra, at 281 and this page, but also assumes that executive clemency hearings are part and parcel of the judicial proc- ess preceding an execution. 523US1 Unit: $U44 [04-29-00 20:43:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 272 (1998) 283 Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J. interest, yet rejecting a claim that due process necessitated a formal parole hearing and a statement of evidence relied upon by the parole board). There is thus no substantive ex- pectation of clemency. Moreover, under Conner, 515 U. S., at 484, the availability of clemency, or the manner in which the State conducts clemency proceedings, does not impose "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Ibid.; see 107 F. 3d, at 1185­1186. A denial of clemency merely means that the inmate must serve the sentence originally imposed. Respondent also relies on the "second strand" of due proc- ess analysis adopted by the Court of Appeals. He claims that under the rationale of Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U. S. 387 (1985), clemency is an integral part of Ohio's system of adju- dicating the guilt or innocence of the defendant and is there- fore entitled to due process protection. Clemency, he says, is an integral part of the judicial system because it has his- torically been available as a significant remedy, its availabil- ity impacts earlier stages of the criminal justice system, and it enhances the reliability of convictions and sentences. Re- spondent further suggests, as did the Sixth Circuit, that Evitts established a due process continuum across all phases of the judicial process. In Evitts, the Court held that there is a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel on a first appeal as of right. Id., at 396. This holding, however, was expressly based on the combination of two lines of prior decisions. One line of cases held that the Fourteenth Amendment guar- antees a criminal defendant pursuing a first appeal as of right certain minimum safeguards necessary to make that appeal adequate and effective, including the right to counsel. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S., at 20; Douglas v. Califor- nia, 372 U. S. 353 (1963). The second line of cases held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at trial comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 344 (1963); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 523US1 Unit: $U44 [04-29-00 20:43:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 284 OHIO ADULT PAROLE AUTHORITY v. WOODARD Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J. 446 U. S. 335, 344 (1980). These two lines of cases justified the Court's conclusion that a criminal defendant has a right to effective assistance of counsel on a first appeal as of right. Evitts, supra, at 394­396. The Court did not thereby purport to create a new "strand" of due process analysis. And it did not rely on the notion of a continuum of due process rights. Instead, the Court evaluated the function and significance of a first appeal as of right, in light of prior cases. Related decisions simi- larly make clear that there is no continuum requiring vary- ing levels of process at every conceivable phase of the crimi- nal system. See, e. g., Giarratano, 492 U. S., at 9­10 (no due process right to counsel for capital inmates in state postcon- viction proceedings); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U. S. 551, 555­557 (1987) (no right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600, 610­611 (1974) (no right to counsel for discretionary appeals on direct review). An examination of the function and significance of the dis- cretionary clemency decision at issue here readily shows it is far different from the first appeal of right at issue in Evitts. Clemency proceedings are not part of the trial-or even of the adjudicatory process. They do not determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and are not intended primarily to enhance the reliability of the trial process. They are con- ducted by the executive branch, independent of direct appeal and collateral relief proceedings. Greenholtz, 442 U. S., at 7­8. And they are usually discretionary, unlike the more structured and limited scope of judicial proceedings. While traditionally available to capital defendants as a final and alternative avenue of relief, clemency has not traditionally "been the business of courts." Dumschat, 452 U. S., at 464. Cf. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390, 411­415 (1993) (recog- nizing the traditional availability and significance of clem- ency as part of executive authority, without suggesting that clemency proceedings are subject to judicial review); Ex 523US1 Unit: $U44 [04-29-00 20:43:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 272 (1998) 285 Opinion of the Court parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87, 120­121 (1925) (executive clemency exists to provide relief from harshness or mistake in the judicial system, and is therefore vested in an authority other than the courts). Thus, clemency proceedings are not " `an integral part of the . . . system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant,' " Evitts, supra, at 393 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, supra, at 18). Procedures mandated under the Due Process Clause should be consistent with the nature of the governmental power being invoked. Here, the executive's clemency authority would cease to be a matter of grace com- mitted to the executive authority if it were constrained by the sort of procedural requirements that respondent urges. Respondent is already under a sentence of death, determined to have been lawfully imposed. If clemency is granted, he obtains a benefit; if it is denied, he is no worse off than he was before.5 III Respondent also presses on us the Court of Appeals' con- clusion that the provision of a voluntary inmate interview, without the benefit of counsel or a grant of immunity for any statements made by the inmate, implicates the inmate's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right not to incriminate himself. Because there is only one guaranteed clemency review, re- spondent asserts, his decision to participate is not truly vol- untary. And in the interview he may be forced to answer questions; or, if he remains silent, his silence may be used against him. Respondent further asserts there is a substan- tial risk of incrimination since postconviction proceedings are in progress and since he could potentially incriminate himself on other crimes. Respondent therefore concludes that the interview unconstitutionally conditions his assertion 5 The dissent mischaracterizes the question at issue as a determination to deprive a person of life. Post, at 290. That determination has already been made with all required due process protections. 523US1 Unit: $U44 [04-29-00 20:43:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 286 OHIO ADULT PAROLE AUTHORITY v. WOODARD Opinion of the Court of the right to pursue clemency on his waiver of the right to remain silent. While the Court of Appeals accepted re- spondent's rubric of "unconstitutional conditions," we find it unnecessary to address it in deciding this case. In our opin- ion, the procedures of the Authority do not under any view violate the Fifth Amendment privilege. The Fifth Amendment protects against compelled self- incrimination. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U. S. 308, 316­318 (1976). The record itself does not tell us what, if any, use is made by the board of the clemency interview, or of an inmate's refusal to answer questions posed to him at that interview. But the Authority in its brief dispels much of the uncertainty: "Nothing in the procedure grants clemency applicants immunity for what they might say or makes the inter- view in any way confidential. Ohio has permissibly cho- sen not to allow the inmate to say one thing in the in- terview and another in a habeas petition, and no amount of discovery will alter this feature of the procedure." Reply Brief for Petitioners 6. Assuming also that the Authority will draw adverse infer- ences from respondent's refusal to answer questions-which it may do in a civil proceeding without offending the Fifth Amendment, Palmigiano, supra, at 316­318-we do not think that respondent's testimony at a clemency interview would be "compelled" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. It is difficult to see how a voluntary interview could "compel" respondent to speak. He merely faces a choice quite similar to the sorts of choices that a criminal defendant must make in the course of criminal proceed- ings, none of which has ever been held to violate the Fifth Amendment. Long ago we held that a defendant who took the stand in his own defense could not claim the privilege against self- incrimination when the prosecution sought to cross-examine 523US1 Unit: $U44 [04-29-00 20:43:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 272 (1998) 287 Opinion of the Court him. Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 597­598 (1896); Brown v. United States, 356 U. S. 148, 154­155 (1958). A defendant who takes the stand in his own behalf may be impeached by proof of prior convictions without violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554, 561 (1967). A defendant whose motion for acquittal at the close of the government's case is denied must then elect whether to stand on his motion or to put on a defense, with the accompanying risk that in doing so he will augment the government's case against him. McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 215 (1971). In each of these situations, there are undoubted pressures-generated by the strength of the government's case against him-pushing the criminal defendant to testify. But it has never been suggested that such pressures constitute "compulsion" for Fifth Amend- ment purposes. In Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78 (1970), it was claimed that Florida's requirement of advance notice of alibi from a criminal defendant, in default of which he would be pre- cluded from asserting the alibi defense, violated the privi- lege. We said: "Nothing in such a rule requires the defendant to rely on an alibi or prevents him from abandoning the defense; these matters are left to his unfettered choice. That choice must be made, but the pressures that bear on his pretrial decision are of the same nature as those that would induce him to call alibi witnesses at the trial: the force of historical fact beyond both his and the State's control and the strength of the State's case built on these facts. Response to that kind of pressure by of- fering evidence or testimony is not compelled self- incrimination transgressing the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id., at 84­85 (footnote omitted). Here, respondent has the same choice of providing infor- mation to the Authority-at the risk of damaging his case for 523US1 Unit: $U44 [04-29-00 20:43:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 288 OHIO ADULT PAROLE AUTHORITY v. WOODARD Opinion of O'Connor, J. clemency or for postconviction relief-or of remaining silent. But this pressure to speak in the hope of improving his chance of being granted clemency does not make the inter- view compelled. We therefore hold that the Ohio clemency interview, even on assumptions most favorable to respond- ent's claim, does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. IV We hold that neither the Due Process Clause nor the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is violated by Ohio's clemency proceedings. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore Reversed. Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. A prisoner under a death sentence remains a living person and consequently has an interest in his life. The question this case raises is the issue of what process is constitutionally necessary to protect that interest in the context of Ohio's clemency procedures. It is clear that "once society has val- idly convicted an individual of a crime and therefore estab- lished its right to punish, the demands of due process are reduced accordingly." Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399, 429 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in result in part and dissenting in part). I do not, however, agree with the sug- gestion in the principal opinion that, because clemency is committed to the discretion of the executive, the Due Proc- ess Clause provides no constitutional safeguards. The Chief Justice's reasoning rests on our decisions in Connect- icut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U. S. 458 (1981), and Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Com- plex, 442 U. S. 1 (1979). In those cases, the Court found that an inmate seeking commutation of a life sentence or discre- 523US1 Unit: $U44 [04-29-00 20:43:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 272 (1998) 289 Opinion of O'Connor, J. tionary parole had no protected liberty interest in release from lawful confinement. When a person has been fairly convicted and sentenced, his liberty interest, in being free from such confinement, has been extinguished. But it is in- correct, as Justice Stevens' dissent notes, to say that a prisoner has been deprived of all interest in his life before his execution. See post, at 291­292. Thus, although it is true that "pardon and commutation decisions have not tradi- tionally been the business of courts," Dumschat, supra, at 464, and that the decision whether to grant clemency is en- trusted to the Governor under Ohio law, I believe that the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that some minimal pro- cedural safeguards apply to clemency proceedings. Judicial intervention might, for example, be warranted in the face of a scheme whereby a state official flipped a coin to determine whether to grant clemency, or in a case where the State arbi- trarily denied a prisoner any access to its clemency process. In my view, however, a remand to permit the District Court to address respondent's specific allegations of due process violations is not required. The Ohio Death Penalty Clemency Procedure provides that, if a stay has not yet is- sued, the parole board must schedule a clemency hearing 45 days before an execution for a date approximately 21 days in advance of the execution. The board must also advise the prisoner that he is entitled to a prehearing interview with one or more parole board members. Although the Ohio Adult Parole Authority complied with those instructions here, respondent raises several objections to the process af- forded him. He contends that 3 days' notice of his interview and 10 days' notice of the hearing were inadequate; that he did not have a meaningful opportunity to prepare his clem- ency application because postconviction proceedings were pending; that his counsel was improperly excluded from the interview and permitted to participate in the hearing only at the discretion of the parole board chair; and that he was precluded from testifying or submitting documentary evi- 523US1 Unit: $U44 [04-29-00 20:43:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN 290 OHIO ADULT PAROLE AUTHORITY v. WOODARD Opinion of Stevens, J. dence at the hearing. I do not believe that any of these allegations amounts to a due process violation. The process respondent received, including notice of the hearing and an opportunity to participate in an interview, comports with Ohio's regulations and observes whatever limitations the Due Process Clause may impose on clemency proceed- ings. Moreover, I agree that the voluntary inmate inter- view that forms part of Ohio's process did not violate respondent's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Accordingly, I join Parts I and III of the Court's opinion and concur in the judgment. Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part. When a parole board conducts a hearing to determine whether the State shall actually execute one of its death row inmates-in other words, whether the State shall deprive that person of life-does it have an obligation to comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? In my judgment, the text of the Clause provides the answer to that question. It expressly provides that no State has the power to "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Without deciding what "minimal, perhaps even barely per- ceptible," procedural safeguards are required in clemency proceedings, the Court of Appeals correctly answered the basic question presented and remanded the case to the Dis- trict Court to determine whether Ohio's procedures meet the "minimal" requirements of due process.1 In Part II of his opinion today, however, The Chief Justice takes a differ- ent view-essentially concluding that a clemency proceeding could never violate the Due Process Clause. Thus, under such reasoning, even procedures infected by bribery, per- 1 107 F. 3d 1178, 1187­1188 (CA6 1997). 523US1 Unit: $U44 [04-29-00 20:43:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 272 (1998) 291 Opinion of Stevens, J. sonal or political animosity, or the deliberate fabrication of false evidence would be constitutionally acceptable. Like Justice O'Connor, I respectfully disagree with that conclusion. I The text of the Due Process Clause properly directs our attention to state action that may "deprive" a person of life, liberty, or property. When we are evaluating claims that the State has unfairly deprived someone of liberty or prop- erty, it is appropriate first to ask whether the state action adversely affected any constitutionally protected interest. Thus, we may conclude, for example, that a prisoner has no "liberty interest" in the place where he is confined, Mea- chum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215 (1976), or that an at-will em- ployee has no "property interest" in his job, Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341 (1976). There is, however, no room for legiti- mate debate about whether a living person has a constitu- tionally protected interest in life. He obviously does. Nor does Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U. S. 458 (1981), counsel a different conclusion. In that case the Court held that a refusal to commute a prison inmate's life sentence was not a deprivation of his liberty because the liberty interest at stake had already been extinguished. Id., at 461, 464. The holding was supported by the "crucial dis- tinction between being deprived of a liberty one has, as in parole, and being denied a conditional liberty one desires." Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Com- plex, 442 U. S. 1, 9 (1979).2 That "crucial distinction" points 2 "Our language in Greenholtz leaves no room for doubt: `There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence. The natural desire of an individual to be released is indistinguishable from the initial resistance to being confined. But the conviction, with all its procedural safeguards, has extinguished that liberty right: "[G]iven a valid conviction, the crimi- nal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty." ' 442 U. S., at 7 (emphasis supplied; citation omitted). Greenholtz pointedly dis- 523US1 Unit: $U44 [04-29-00 20:43:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN 292 OHIO ADULT PAROLE AUTHORITY v. WOODARD Opinion of Stevens, J. in the opposite direction in this case because respondent is contesting the State's decision to deprive him of life that he still has, rather than any conditional liberty that he desires. Thus, it is abundantly clear that respondent possesses a life interest protected by the Due Process Clause. II There are valid reasons for concluding that even if due process is required in clemency proceedings, only the most basic elements of fair procedure are required. Presumably a State might eliminate this aspect of capital sentencing entirely, and it unquestionably may allow the executive vir- tually unfettered discretion in determining the merits of appeals for mercy. Nevertheless, there are equally valid reasons for concluding that these proceedings are not en- tirely exempt from judicial review. I think, for example, that no one would contend that a Governor could ignore the commands of the Equal Protection Clause and use race, reli- gion, or political affiliation as a standard for granting or de- nying clemency. Our cases also support the conclusion that if a State adopts a clemency procedure as an integral part of its system for finally determining whether to deprive a person of life, that procedure must comport with the Due Process Clause. Even if a State has no constitutional obligation to grant criminal defendants a right to appeal, when it does establish appellate courts, the procedures employed by those courts must satisfy the Due Process Clause. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U. S. 387, 396 (1985). Likewise, even if a State has no duty to authorize parole or probation, if it does exercise its discre- tinguished parole revocation and probation revocation cases, noting that there is a `critical' difference between denial of a prisoner's request for initial release on parole and revocation of a parolee's conditional liberty. Id., at 9­11, quoting, inter alia, Friendly, `Some Kind of Hearing,' 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1296 (1975)." Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dum- schat, 452 U. S. 458, 464 (1981) (footnote omitted). 523US1 Unit: $U44 [04-29-00 20:43:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 272 (1998) 293 Opinion of Stevens, J. tion to grant conditional liberty to convicted felons, any deci- sion to deprive a parolee or a probationer of such conditional liberty must accord that person due process. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 480­490 (1972); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778, 781­782 (1973). Similarly, if a State estab- lishes postconviction proceedings, these proceedings must comport with due process.3 The interest in life that is at stake in this case warrants even greater protection than the interests in liberty at stake in those cases.4 For "death is a different kind of punishment 3 While it is true that the constitutional protections in state postconvic- tion proceedings are less stringent than at trial or on direct review, e. g., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U. S. 551, 555­557 (1987), we have never held or suggested that the Due Process Clause does not apply to these proceed- ings. Indeed, Finley itself asked whether the State's postconviction pro- ceedings comported with the "fundamental fairness mandated by the Due Process Clause." Id., at 556­557; see also Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U. S. 1, 8 (1989) (opinion of Rehnquist, C. J.) (" `[T]he fundamental fair- ness mandated by the Due Process Clause does not require that the [S]tate supply a lawyer' " (quoting Finley, 481 U. S., at 557)). The Chief Jus- tice, then, is simply wrong when he states that these cases "make clear that there is no continuum requiring varying levels of process at every . . . phase of the criminal system," ante, at 284; instead, these cases simply turned on what process is due. If there could be any question whether state postconviction proceedings are subject to due process protections, our unanimous opinion in Yates v. Aiken, 484 U. S. 211, 217­218 (1988), makes it clear that they are. 4 The Court has recognized the integral role that clemency proceedings play in the decision whether to deprive a person of life. Herrera v. Col- lins, 506 U. S. 390, 411­417 (1993). Indeed, every one of the 38 States that has the death penalty also has clemency procedures. Ala. Const., Amdt. 38, Ala. Code § 15­18­100 (1995); Ariz. Const., Art. V, § 5, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 31­443, 31­445 (1996); Ark. Const., Art. VI, § 18, Ark. Code Ann. § 5­4­607 (1997), and § 16­93­204 (Supp. 1997); Cal. Const., Art. V, § 8, Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§ 4800­4807 (West 1982 and Supp. 1998); Colo. Const., Art. IV, § 7, Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 16­17­101, 16­17­102 (1997); Conn. Const., Art. IV, § 13, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 18­26 (1997); Del. Const., Art. VII, § 1, Del. Code Ann., Tit. 29, § 2103 (1997); Fla. Const., Art. IV, § 8, Fla. Stat. § 940.01 (1997); Ga. Const., Art. IV, § 2, ¶ 2, Ga. Code Ann. §§ 42­9­ 20, 42­9­42 (1997); Idaho Const., Art. IV, § 7, Idaho Code § 20­240 (1997); 523US1 Unit: $U44 [04-29-00 20:43:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN 294 OHIO ADULT PAROLE AUTHORITY v. WOODARD Opinion of Stevens, J. from any other which may be imposed in this country. From the point of view of the defendant, it is different in both its severity and its finality. From the point of view of society, the action of the sovereign in taking the life of one of its citizens also differs dramatically from any other legiti- mate state action. It is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion." Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S. 349, 357­ Ill. Const., Art. V, § 12, Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 730, § 5/3­3­13 (1997); Ind. Const., Art. V, § 17, Ind. Code §§ 11­9­2­1 to 11­9­2­4, 35­38­6­8 (1993); Kan. Const., Art. I, § 7, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22­3701 (1995); Ky. Const., § 77; La. Const., Art. IV, § 5(E), La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:572 (West 1992); Md. Const., Art. II, § 20, Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 77 (1996), and Art. 41, § 4­ 513 (1997); Miss. Const., Art. V, § 124, Miss. Code Ann. § 47­5­115 (1981); Mo. Const., Art. IV, § 7, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 217.220, 217.800, 552.070 (1994); Mont. Const., Art. VI, § 12, Mont. Code Ann. §§ 46­23­301 to 46­23­316 (1994); Neb. Const., Art. IV, § 13, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 83­1,127 to 83­1,132 (1994); Nev. Const., Art. V, § 13, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 213.080 (1995); N. H. Const., pt. 2, Art. 52, N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4:23 (1988); N. J. Const., Art. V, § 2, ¶1, N. J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:167­4 (West 1985); N. M. Const., Art. V, § 6, N. M. Stat. Ann. § 31­21­17 (Supp. 1997); N. Y. Const., Art. IV, § 4, N. Y. Exec. Law §§ 15­19 (McKinney 1993); N. C. Const., Art. III, § 5(6), N. C. Gen. Stat. §§ 147­23 to 147­25 (1993); Ohio Const., Art. III, § 11, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2967.01 to 2967.12 (1996); Okla. Const., Art. VI, § 10, Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.11a (Supp. 1998); Ore. Const., Art. V, § 14, Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 144.640 to 144.670 (1991); Pa. Const., Art. IV, § 9; S. C. Const., Art. IV, § 14, S. C. Code Ann. §§ 24­21­910 to 24­21­1000 (1977 and Supp. 1997); S. D. Const., Art. IV, § 3, S. D. Codified Laws §§ 23A­27A­20 to 23A­27A­21, 24­14­1 to 24­14­7 (1988); Tenn. Const., Art. III, § 6, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40­27­101 to 40­27­109 (1997); Tex. Const., Art. IV, § 11, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 48.01 (Vernon Supp. 1997); Utah Const., Art. VII, § 12, Utah Code Ann. § 77­27­5.5 (1995); Va. Const., Art. V, § 12, Va. Code Ann. §§ 53.1­229 to 53.1­231 (1994); Wash. Const., Art. III, § 9, Wash. Rev. Code § 10.01.120 (1994); Wyo. Const., Art. IV, § 5, Wyo. Stat. § 7­13­801 (1995). It is, of course, irrelevant that States need not estab- lish clemency proceedings; having established these proceedings, they must comport with due process. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U. S. 387, 393, 400­401 (1985). 523US1 Unit: $U44 [04-29-00 20:43:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 272 (1998) 295 Opinion of Stevens, J. 358 (1977) (citations omitted) (plurality opinion). Those con- siderations apply with special force to the final stage of the decisional process that precedes an official deprivation of life. Accordingly, while I join Part III of the Court's opinion, I cannot accept the reasoning or the conclusion in Part II. Because this case comes to us in an interlocutory posture, I agree with the Court of Appeals that the case should be remanded to the District Court, "in light of relevant evi- dentiary materials submitted by the parties," 5 for a deter- mination whether Ohio's procedures meet the minimum requirements of due process. 5 107 F. 3d, at 1194. 523us1$45Z 01-06-99 17:39:34 PAGES OPINPGT 296 OCTOBER TERM, 1997 Syllabus TEXAS v. UNITED STATES appeal from the united states district court for the district of columbia No. 97­29. Argued January 14, 1998-Decided March 31, 1998 In 1995, the Texas Legislature enacted a comprehensive scheme (Chapter 39) that holds local school boards accountable to the State for student achievement in the public schools. When a school district falls short of Chapter 39's accreditation criteria, the State Commissioner of Education may select from 10 possible sanctions, including appointment of a master to oversee the district's operations, Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 39.131(a)(7), or appointment of a management team to direct operations in areas of unacceptable performance or to require contracting out of services, § 39.131(a)(8). Texas, a covered jurisdiction under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, submitted Chapter 39 to the United States Attorney General for a determination whether any of the sanctions affected vot- ing and thus required preclearance. While the Assistant Attorney Gen- eral for Civil Rights did not object to §§ 39.131(a)(7) and (8), he cautioned that under certain circumstances their implementation might result in a § 5 violation. Texas subsequently filed a complaint in the District Court, seeking a declaration that § 5 does not apply to the §§ 39.131(a)(7) and (8) sanctions. The court did not reach the merits of the case be- cause it concluded that Texas's claim was not ripe. Held: Texas's claim is not ripe for adjudication. A claim resting upon " `contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all,' " is not fit for adjudication. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U. S. 568, 580­581. Whether the problem Texas presents will ever need solving is too speculative. Texas will appoint a master or management team only after a school district falls below state standards and the Commissioner has tried other, less intrusive sanctions. Texas has not pointed to any school district in which the application of § 39.131(a)(7) or (8) is currently fore- seen or even likely. Even if there were greater certainty regarding implementation, the claim would not be ripe because the legal issues Texas raises are not yet fit for judicial decision and because the hardship to Texas of withholding court consideration until the State chooses to implement one of the sanctions is insubstantial. See Abbott Labora- tories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 149. Pp. 300­302. Affirmed. 523us1$45Z 01-06-99 17:39:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 523 U. S. 296 (1998) 297 Opinion of the Court Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Javier Aguilar, Special Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Dan Morales, Attorney General, Jorge Vega, First Assistant Attorney General, and Deborah A. Verbil, Special Assistant Attorney General. Paul R. Q. Wolfson argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Pinzler, Dep- uty Solicitor General Wallace, Mark L. Gross, and Miriam R. Eisenstein.* Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellant, the State of Texas, appeals from the judgment of a three-judge District Court for the District of Columbia. The State had sought a declaratory judgment that the pre- clearance provisions of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, do not apply to implementation of certain sections of the Texas Education Code that permit the State to sanction local school districts for failure to meet state-mandated educational achievement levels. This appeal presents the question whether the con- troversy is ripe. I In Texas, both the state government and local school districts are responsible for the public schools. There are more than 1,000 school districts, each run by an elected school board. In 1995, the Texas Legislature enacted a *Daniel J. Popeo filed a brief for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Pamela S. Karlan, Laughlin McDonald, Neil Bradley, Cristina Cor- reia, Elaine R. Jones, Theodore M. Shaw, Norman J. Chachkin, Jacque- line Berrien, Victor A. Bolden, and Steven R. Shapiro filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. 523us1$45K 01-06-99 17:39:34 PAGES OPINPGT 298 TEXAS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court comprehensive scheme (Chapter 39) that holds local school boards accountable to the State for student achievement. Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §§ 39.021­39.131 (1996). Chapter 39 contains detailed prescriptions for assessment of student academic skills, development of academic performance in- dicators, determination of accreditation status for school districts, and imposition of accreditation sanctions. It seeks to measure the academic performance of Texas schoolchil- dren, to reward the schools and school districts that achieve the legislative goals, and to sanction those that fall short. When a district fails to satisfy the State's accreditation criteria, the State Commissioner of Education may select from 10 possible sanctions that are listed in ascending order of severity. §§ 39.131(a)(1)­(10). Those include, "to the ex- tent the [C]ommissioner determines necessary," § 39.131(a), appointing a master to oversee the district's operations, § 39.131(a)(7), or appointing a management team to direct the district's operations in areas of unacceptable performance or to require the district to contract for services from another person, § 39.131(a)(8). When the Commissioner appoints masters or management teams, he "shall clearly define the[ir] powers and duties" and shall review the need for them every 90 days. § 39.131(e). A master or management team may approve or disapprove any action taken by a school principal, the district superintendent, or the district's board of trust- ees, and may also direct them to act. §§ 39.131(e)(1), (2). State law prohibits masters or management teams from tak- ing any action concerning a district election, changing the number of members on or the method of selecting the board of trustees, setting a tax rate for the district, or adopting a budget which establishes a different level of spending for the district from that set by the board. §§ 39.131(e)(3)­(6). Texas is a covered jurisdiction under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, see 28 CFR pt. 51, App. (1997), and con- sequently, before it can implement changes affecting vot- 523us1$45K 01-06-99 17:39:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 523 U. S. 296 (1998) 299 Opinion of the Court ing it must obtain preclearance from the United States Dis- trict Court for the District of Columbia or from the Attorney General of the United States. 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. Texas submitted Chapter 39 to the Attorney General for adminis- trative preclearance. The Assistant Attorney General* re- quested further information, including the criteria used to select special masters and management teams, a detailed de- scription of their powers and duties, and the difference be- tween their duties and those of the elected boards. The State responded by pointing out the limits placed on masters and management teams in § 39.131(e), and by noting that the actual authority granted "is set by the Commissioner at the time of appointment depending on the needs of the district." App. to Juris. Statement 99a. After receiving this informa- tion, the Assistant Attorney General concluded that the first six sanctions do not affect voting and therefore do not re- quire preclearance. He did not object to §§ 39.131(a)(7) and (8), insofar as the provisions are "enabling in nature," but he cautioned that "under certain foreseeable circumstances their implementation may result in a violation of Section 5" which would require preclearance. Id., at 36a. On June 7, 1996, Texas filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking a declaration that § 5 does not apply to the sanctions author- ized by §§ 39.131(a)(7) and (8), because (1) they are not changes with respect to voting, and (2) they are consistent with conditions attached to grants of federal financial assist- ance that authorize and require the imposition of sanctions to ensure accountability of local education authorities. The District Court did not reach the merits of these arguments because it concluded that Texas's claim was not ripe. We noted probable jurisdiction. 521 U. S. 1150 (1997). *The authority for determinations under § 5 has been delegated to the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division. 28 CFR § 51.3 (1997). 523us1$45K 01-06-99 17:39:34 PAGES OPINPGT 300 TEXAS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court II A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon " `con- tingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.' " Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U. S. 568, 580­581 (1985) (quoting 13A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3532, p. 112 (1984)). Whether Texas will appoint a master or management team under §§ 39.131(a)(7) and (8) is contingent on a number of factors. First, a school district must fall below the state standards. Then, pursuant to state policy, the Commissioner must try first "the imposition of sanctions which do not include the appointment of a master or management team," App. 10 (Original Complaint ¶12). He may, for example, "order the preparation of a student achievement improvement plan . . . , the submission of the plan to the [C]ommissioner for ap- proval, and implementation of the plan," § 39.131(a)(3), or "appoint an agency monitor to participate in and report to the agency on the activities of the board of trustees or the superintendent," § 39.131(a)(6). It is only if these less intru- sive options fail that a Commissioner may appoint a master or management team, Tr. of Oral Arg. 16, and even then, only "to the extent the [C]ommissioner determines necessary," § 39.131(a). Texas has not pointed to any particular school district in which the application of § 39.131(a)(7) or (8) is cur- rently foreseen or even likely. Indeed, Texas hopes that there will be no need to appoint a master or management team for any district. Tr. of Oral Arg. 16­17. Under these circumstances, where "we have no idea whether or when such [a sanction] will be ordered," the issue is not fit for adjudication. Toilet Goods Assn., Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 158, 163 (1967); see also Renne v. Geary, 501 U. S. 312, 321­ 322 (1991). Even if there were greater certainty regarding ultimate implementation of paragraphs (a)(7) and (a)(8) of the statute, we do not think Texas's claim would be ripe. Ripeness "re- 523us1$45K 01-06-99 17:39:34 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 523 U. S. 296 (1998) 301 Opinion of the Court quir[es] us to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judi- cial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration." Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 149 (1967). As to fitness of the issues: Texas asks us to hold that under no circumstances can the imposition of these sanctions constitute a change affecting voting. We do not have sufficient confidence in our powers of imagination to affirm such a negative. The operation of the statute is better grasped when viewed in light of a particular applica- tion. Here, as is often true, "[d]etermination of the scope . . . of legislation in advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function." Longshoremen v. Boyd, 347 U. S. 222, 224 (1954). In the present case, the remoteness and abstraction are in- creased by the fact that Chapter 39 has yet to be interpreted by the Texas courts. Thus, "[p]ostponing consideration of the questions presented, until a more concrete controversy arises, also has the advantage of permitting the state courts further opportunity to construe" the provisions. Renne, supra, at 323. And as for hardship to the parties: This is not a case like Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, supra, at 152, where the regulation at issue had a "direct effect on the day-to-day business" of the plaintiffs, because they were compelled to affix required labeling to their products under threat of crim- inal sanction. Texas is not required to engage in, or to re- frain from, any conduct, unless and until it chooses to imple- ment one of the noncleared remedies. To be sure, if that contingency should arise compliance with the preclearance procedure could delay much needed action. (Prior to this litigation, Texas sought preclearance for the appointment of a master in a Dallas County school district, and despite a request for expedition the Attorney General took 90 days to give approval. See Brief for Appellant 37, n. 28.) But even that inconvenience is avoidable. If Texas is confident that 523us1$45K 01-06-99 17:39:34 PAGES OPINPGT 302 TEXAS v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court the imposition of a master or management team does not constitute a change affecting voting, it should simply go ahead with the appointment. Should the Attorney General or a private individual bring suit (and if the matter is as clear, even at this distance, as Texas thinks it is), we have no reason to doubt that a district court will deny a preliminary injunction. See Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U. S. 491, 506 (1992); City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U. S. 125, 129, n. 3 (1983). Texas claims that it suffers the immediate hardship of a "threat to federalism." But that is an abstraction-and an abstraction no graver than the "threat to personal freedom" that exists whenever an agency regulation is promulgated, which we hold inadequate to sup- port suit unless the person's primary conduct is affected. Cf. Toilet Goods Assn., supra, at 164. In sum, we find it too speculative whether the problem Texas presents will ever need solving; we find the legal is- sues Texas raises not yet fit for our consideration, and the hardship to Texas of biding its time insubstantial. Accord- ingly, we agree with the District Court that this matter is not ripe for adjudication. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. It is so ordered. 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1997 303 Syllabus UNITED STATES v. SCHEFFER certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the armed forces No. 96­1133. Argued November 3, 1997-Decided March 31, 1998 A polygraph examination of respondent airman indicated, in the opinion of the Air Force examiner administering the test, that there was "no deception" in respondent's denial that he had used drugs since enlisting. Urinalysis, however, revealed the presence of methamphetamine, and respondent was tried by general court-martial for using that drug and for other offenses. In denying his motion to introduce the polygraph evidence to support his testimony that he did not knowingly use drugs, the military judge relied on Military Rule of Evidence 707, which makes polygraph evidence inadmissible in court-martial proceedings. Re- spondent was convicted on all counts, and the Air Force Court of Crimi- nal Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces re- versed, holding that a per se exclusion of polygraph evidence offered by an accused to support his credibility violates his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. Held: The judgment is reversed. 44 M. J. 442, reversed. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II­A, and II­D, concluding that Military Rule of Evidence 707 does not unconstitutionally abridge the right of accused members of the military to present a defense. Pp. 308­312, 315­317. (a) A defendant's right to present relevant evidence is subject to rea- sonable restrictions to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. See, e. g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U. S. 44, 55. State and federal rulemakers therefore have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence. Such rules do not abridge an accused's right to present a defense so long as they are not "arbitrary" or "disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve." E. g., id., at 56. This Court has found the exclusion of evi- dence to be unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate only where it has infringed upon a weighty interest of the accused. See, e. g., id., at 58. Rule 707 serves the legitimate interest of ensuring that only reliable evidence is introduced. There is simply no consensus that poly- graph evidence is reliable: The scientific community and the state and federal courts are extremely polarized on the matter. Pp. 308­312. 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN 304 UNITED STATES v. SCHEFFER Syllabus (b) Rule 707 does not implicate a sufficiently weighty interest of the accused to raise a constitutional concern under this Court's precedents. The three cases principally relied upon by the Court of Appeals, Rock, supra, at 57, Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 23, and Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284, 302­303, do not support a right to introduce polygraph evidence, even in very narrow circumstances. The exclu- sions of evidence there declared unconstitutional significantly under- mined fundamental elements of the accused's defense. Such is not the case here, where the court members heard all the relevant details of the charged offense from respondent's perspective, and Rule 707 did not preclude him from introducing any factual evidence, but merely barred him from introducing expert opinion testimony to bolster his own credi- bility. Moreover, in contrast to the rule at issue in Rock, supra, at 52, Rule 707 did not prohibit respondent from testifying on his own behalf; he freely exercised his choice to convey his version of the facts at trial. Pp. 315­317. Thomas, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II­A, and II­D, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts II­B and II­C, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia and Souter, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 318. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 320. Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Acting So- licitor General Dellinger, Acting Solicitor General Wax- man, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, David C. Frederick, Joel M. Gershowitz, and Michael J. Breslin. Kim L. Sheffield argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Carol L. Hubbard, Michael L. McIn- tyre, Robin S. Wink, and W. Craig Mullen.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Con- necticut et al. by John M. Bailey, Chief State's Attorney of Connecticut, and Judith Rossi, Senior Assistant State's Attorney, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Bill Pryor of Ala- bama, Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Daniel E. Lungren of California, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Thurbert E. Baker 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 303 (1998) 305 Opinion of the Court Justice Thomas announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II­A, and II­D, and an opinion with respect to Parts II­B and II­C, in which The Chief Justice, Justice Scalia, and Justice Souter join. This case presents the question whether Military Rule of Evidence 707, which makes polygraph evidence inadmissible in court-martial proceedings, unconstitutionally abridges the right of accused members of the military to present a de- fense. We hold that it does not. I In March 1992, respondent Edward Scheffer, an airman stationed at March Air Force Base in California, volunteered to work as an informant on drug investigations for the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI). His OSI super- visors advised him that, from time to time during the course of his undercover work, they would ask him to submit to drug testing and polygraph examinations. In early April, of Georgia, Jeffrey A. Modisett of Indiana, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Andrew Ketterer of Maine, J. Joseph Cur- ran, Jr., of Maryland, Scott Harshbarger of Massachusetts, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Philip T. McLaughlin of New Hamp- shire, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania, Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, Charles Molony Condon of South Carolina, Richard Cullen of Virginia, Christine O. Gre- goire of Washington, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, and William U. Hill of Wyoming; and for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Polygraph Association by Gordon L. Vaughan; for the United States Army Defense Appellate Division by John T. Phelps II; for the Committee of Concerned Social Scientists by Charles F. Peterson; for the National Asso- ciation of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Charles W. Daniels and Barbara E. Bergman; and for the United States Navy-Marine Corps Appellate De- fense Division by Syed N. Ahmad. 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN 306 UNITED STATES v. SCHEFFER Opinion of the Court one of the OSI agents supervising respondent requested that he submit to a urine test. Shortly after providing the urine sample, but before the results of the test were known, re- spondent agreed to take a polygraph test administered by an OSI examiner. In the opinion of the examiner, the test "indicated no deception" when respondent denied using drugs since joining the Air Force.1 On April 30, respondent unaccountably failed to appear for work and could not be found on the base. He was absent without leave until May 13, when an Iowa state patrolman arrested him following a routine traffic stop and held him for return to the base. OSI agents later learned that respond- ent's urinalysis revealed the presence of methamphetamine. Respondent was tried by general court-martial on charges of using methamphetamine, failing to go to his appointed place of duty, wrongfully absenting himself from the base for 13 days, and, with respect to an unrelated matter, uttering 17 insufficient funds checks. He testified at trial on his own behalf, relying upon an "innocent ingestion" theory and de- nying that he had knowingly used drugs while working for OSI. On cross-examination, the prosecution attempted to impeach respondent with inconsistencies between his trial testimony and earlier statements he had made to OSI. Respondent sought to introduce the polygraph evidence in support of his testimony that he did not knowingly use drugs. The military judge denied the motion, relying on Military Rule of Evidence 707, which provides, in relevant part: "(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the re- sults of a polygraph examination, the opinion of a poly- graph examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, 1 The OSI examiner asked three relevant questions: (1) "Since you've been in the [Air Force], have you used any illegal drugs?"; (2) "Have you lied about any of the drug information you've given OSI?"; and (3) "Be- sides your parents, have you told anyone you're assisting OSI?" Re- spondent answered "no" to each question. App. 12. 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 303 (1998) 307 Opinion of the Court failure to take, or taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be admitted into evidence." The military judge determined that Rule 707 was constitu- tional because "the President may, through the Rules of Evi- dence, determine that credibility is not an area in which a fact finder needs help, and the polygraph is not a process that has sufficient scientific acceptability to be relevant." 2 App. 28. He further reasoned that the factfinder might give undue weight to the polygraph examiner's testimony, and that collateral arguments about such evidence could consume "an inordinate amount of time and expense." Ibid. Respondent was convicted on all counts and was sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 30 months, total forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to the low- est enlisted grade. The Air Force Court of Criminal Ap- peals affirmed in all material respects, explaining that Rule 707 "does not arbitrarily limit the accused's ability to present reliable evidence." 41 M. J. 683, 691 (1995) (en banc). By a 3-to-2 vote, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces reversed. 44 M. J. 442 (1996). Without pointing to any particular language in the Sixth Amendment, the Court of Appeals held that "[a] per se exclusion of poly- graph evidence offered by an accused to rebut an attack on his credibility . . . violates his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense." Id., at 445.3 Judge Crawford, dissent- 2 Article 36 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice authorizes the Presi- dent, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, see U. S. Const., Art. II, § 2, to promulgate rules of evidence for military courts: "Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of proof, . . . may be prescribed by the President by regulations which shall, so far as he considers practi- cable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recog- nized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts." 10 U. S. C. § 836(a). 3 In this Court, respondent cites the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause as the specific constitutional provision supporting his claim. He also briefly contends that the "combined effect" of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments confers upon him the right to a " `meaningful op- 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN 308 UNITED STATES v. SCHEFFER Opinion of the Court ing, stressed that a defendant's right to present relevant evi- dence is not absolute, that relevant evidence can be excluded for valid reasons, and that Rule 707 was supported by a num- ber of valid justifications. Id., at 449­451. We granted cer- tiorari, 520 U. S. 1227 (1997), and we now reverse. II A defendant's right to present relevant evidence is not unlimited, but rather is subject to reasonable restrictions.4 See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U. S. 400, 410 (1988); Rock v. Ar- kansas, 483 U. S. 44, 55 (1987); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284, 295 (1973). A defendant's interest in presenting such evidence may thus " `bow to accommodate other legiti- mate interests in the criminal trial process.' " Rock, supra, at 55 (quoting Chambers, supra, at 295); accord, Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U. S. 145, 149 (1991). As a result, state and fed- eral rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials. Such rules do not abridge an accused's right to present a defense so long as they are not "arbitrary" or "dispropor- tionate to the purposes they are designed to serve." Rock, supra, at 56; accord, Lucas, supra, at 151. Moreover, we have found the exclusion of evidence to be unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate only where it has infringed upon a weighty interest of the accused. See Rock, supra, at 58; Chambers, supra, at 302; Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 22­23 (1967). portunity to present a complete defense,' " Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 683, 690 (1986) (citations omitted), and that this right in turn encompasses a constitutional right to present polygraph evidence to bolster his credibility. 4 The words "defendant" and "jury" are used throughout in reference to general principles of law and in discussing nonmilitary precedents. In reference to this case or to the military specifically, the terms "court," "court members," or "court-martial" are used throughout, as is the mili- tary term "accused," rather than the civilian term "defendant." 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 303 (1998) 309 Opinion of the Court Rule 707 serves several legitimate interests in the crimi- nal trial process. These interests include ensuring that only reliable evidence is introduced at trial, preserving the court members' role in determining credibility, and avoiding litiga- tion that is collateral to the primary purpose of the trial.5 The Rule is neither arbitrary nor disproportionate in pro- moting these ends. Nor does it implicate a sufficiently weighty interest of the defendant to raise a constitutional concern under our precedents. A State and Federal Governments unquestionably have a le- gitimate interest in ensuring that reliable evidence is pre- sented to the trier of fact in a criminal trial. Indeed, the exclusion of unreliable evidence is a principal objective of many evidentiary rules. See, e. g., Fed. Rules Evid. 702, 802, 901; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579, 589 (1993). The contentions of respondent and the dissent notwith- standing, there is simply no consensus that polygraph evi- dence is reliable. To this day, the scientific community re- mains extremely polarized about the reliability of polygraph techniques. 1 D. Faigman, D. Kaye, M. Saks, & J. Sanders, Modern Scientific Evidence 565, n. , § 14­2.0 to § 14­7.0 (1997); see also 1 P. Giannelli & E. Imwinkelried, Scientific 5 These interests, among others, were recognized by the drafters of Rule 707, who justified the Rule on the following grounds: the risk that court members would be misled by polygraph evidence; the risk that the tradi- tional responsibility of court members to ascertain the facts and adjudge guilt or innocence would be usurped; the danger that confusion of the issues " `could result in the court-martial degenerating into a trial of the polygraph machine;' " the likely waste of time on collateral issues; and the fact that the " `reliability of polygraph evidence has not been sufficiently established.' " See 41 M. J. 683, 686 (USAF Ct. Crim. App. 1995) (citing Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Analysis of the Military Rules of Evidence, App. 22, p. A22­46 (1994 ed.)). 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN 310 UNITED STATES v. SCHEFFER Opinion of the Court Evidence § 8­2(C), pp. 225­227 (2d ed. 1993) (hereinafter Gi- annelli & Imwinkelried); 1 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 206, p. 909 (4th ed. 1992) (hereinafter McCormick). Some studies have concluded that polygraph tests overall are ac- curate and reliable. See, e. g., S. Abrams, The Complete Polygraph Handbook 190­191 (1989) (reporting the overall accuracy rate from laboratory studies involving the common "control question technique" polygraph to be "in the range of 87 percent"). Others have found that polygraph tests assess truthfulness significantly less accurately-that scientific field studies suggest the accuracy rate of the "control question technique" polygraph is "little better than could be obtained by the toss of a coin," that is, 50 percent. See Iacono & Lykken, The Scientific Status of Research on Polygraph Techniques: The Case Against Polygraph Tests, in 1 Mod- ern Scientific Evidence, supra, § 14­5.3, at 629 (hereinafter Iacono & Lykken).6 This lack of scientific consensus is reflected in the disagree- ment among state and federal courts concerning both the 6 The United States notes that in 1983 Congress' Office of Technology Assessment evaluated all available studies on the reliability of polygraphs and concluded that " `[o]verall, the cumulative research evidence suggests that when used in criminal investigations, the polygraph test detects de- ception better than chance, but with error rates that could be considered significant.' " Brief for United States 21 (quoting U. S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing: A Research Review and Evaluation-A Technical Memorandum 5 (OTA­ TM­H­15, Nov. 1983)). Respondent, however, contends current research shows polygraph testing is reliable more than 90 percent of the time. Brief for Respondent 22, and n. 19 (citing J. Matte, Forensic Psychophysiol- ogy Using the Polygraph 121­129 (1996)). Even if the basic debate about the reliability of polygraph technology itself were resolved, however, there would still be controversy over the efficacy of countermeasures, or deliber- ately adopted strategies that a polygraph examinee can employ to provoke physiological responses that will obscure accurate readings and thus "fool" the polygraph machine and the examiner. See, e. g., Iacono & Lykken § 14­3.0. 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 303 (1998) 311 Opinion of the Court admissibility and the reliability of polygraph evidence.7 Al- though some Federal Courts of Appeals have abandoned the per se rule excluding polygraph evidence, leaving its admis- sion or exclusion to the discretion of district courts under Daubert, see, e. g., United States v. Posado, 57 F. 3d 428, 434 (CA5 1995); United States v. Cordoba, 104 F. 3d 225, 228 (CA9 1997), at least one Federal Circuit has recently reaf- firmed its per se ban, see United States v. Sanchez, 118 F. 3d 192, 197 (CA4 1997), and another recently noted that it has "not decided whether polygraphy has reached a sufficient state of reliability to be admissible." United States v. Mes- sina, 131 F. 3d 36, 42 (CA2 1997). Most States maintain per se rules excluding polygraph evidence. See, e. g., State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57, 92­95, 698 A. 2d 739, 758­759 (1997); People v. Gard, 158 Ill. 2d 191, 202­204, 632 N. E. 2d 1026, 1032 (1994); In re Odell, 672 A. 2d 457, 459 (RI 1996) (per curiam); Perkins v. State, 902 S. W. 2d 88, 94­95 (Ct. App. Tex. 1995). New Mexico is unique in making polygraph evi- dence generally admissible without the prior stipulation of the parties and without significant restriction. See N. M. 7 Until quite recently, federal and state courts were uniform in categori- cally ruling polygraph evidence inadmissible under the test set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (CADC 1923), which held that scientific evidence must gain the general acceptance of the relevant expert commu- nity to be admissible. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579 (1993), we held that Frye had been superseded by the Fed- eral Rules of Evidence and that expert testimony could be admitted if the district court deemed it both relevant and reliable. Prior to Daubert, neither federal nor state courts found any Sixth Amendment obstacle to the categorical rule. See, e. g., Bashor v. Risley, 730 F. 2d 1228, 1238 (CA9), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 838 (1984); People v. Price, 1 Cal. 4th 324, 419­420, 821 P. 2d 610, 663 (1991), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 851 (1992). Nothing in Daubert foreclosed, as a constitutional mat- ter, per se exclusionary rules for certain types of expert or scientific evi- dence. It would be an odd inversion of our hierarchy of laws if altering or interpreting a rule of evidence worked a corresponding change in the meaning of the Constitution. 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN 312 UNITED STATES v. SCHEFFER Opinion of Thomas, J. Rule Evid. § 11­707.8 Whatever their approach, state and federal courts continue to express doubt about whether such evidence is reliable. See, e. g., United States v. Messina, supra, at 42; United States v. Posado, supra, at 434; State v. Porter, supra, at 126­127, 698 A. 2d, at 774; Perkins v. State, supra, at 94; People v. Gard, supra, at 202­204, 632 N. E. 2d, at 1032; In re Odell, supra, at 459. The approach taken by the President in adopting Rule 707-excluding polygraph evidence in all military trials-is a rational and proportional means of advancing the legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence. Although the de- gree of reliability of polygraph evidence may depend upon a variety of identifiable factors, there is simply no way to know in a particular case whether a polygraph examiner's conclu- sion is accurate, because certain doubts and uncertainties plague even the best polygraph exams. Individual jurisdic- tions therefore may reasonably reach differing conclusions as to whether polygraph evidence should be admitted. We cannot say, then, that presented with such widespread un- certainty, the President acted arbitrarily or disproportion- ately in promulgating a per se rule excluding all polygraph evidence. B It is equally clear that Rule 707 serves a second legitimate governmental interest: Preserving the court members' core 8 Respondent argues that because the Government­­and in particular the Department of Defense­­routinely uses polygraph testing, the Gov- ernment must consider polygraphs reliable. Governmental use of poly- graph tests, however, is primarily in the field of personnel screening, and to a lesser extent as a tool in criminal and intelligence investigations, but not as evidence at trials. See Brief for United States 34, n. 17; Barland, The Polygraph Test in the USA and Elsewhere, in The Polygraph Test 76 (A. Gale ed. 1988). Such limited, out of court uses of polygraph tech- niques obviously differ in character from, and carry less severe conse- quences than, the use of polygraphs as evidence in a criminal trial. They do not establish the reliability of polygraphs as trial evidence, and they do not invalidate reliability as a valid concern supporting Rule 707's categori- cal ban. 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 303 (1998) 313 Opinion of Thomas, J. function of making credibility determinations in criminal trials. A fundamental premise of our criminal trial system is that "the jury is the lie detector." United States v. Bar- nard, 490 F. 2d 907, 912 (CA9 1973) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 416 U. S. 959 (1974). Determining the weight and credibility of witness testimony, therefore, has long been held to be the "part of every case [that] belongs to the jury, who are presumed to be fitted for it by their natural in- telligence and their practical knowledge of men and the ways of men." Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U. S. 76, 88 (1891). By its very nature, polygraph evidence may diminish the jury's role in making credibility determinations. The com- mon form of polygraph test measures a variety of physiologi- cal responses to a set of questions asked by the examiner, who then interprets these physiological correlates of anxiety and offers an opinion to the jury about whether the wit- ness-often, as in this case, the accused­­was deceptive in answering questions about the very matters at issue in the trial. See 1 McCormick § 206.9 Unlike other expert wit- nesses who testify about factual matters outside the jurors' knowledge, such as the analysis of fingerprints, ballistics, or DNA found at a crime scene, a polygraph expert can supply the jury only with another opinion, in addition to its own, about whether the witness was telling the truth. Jurisdic- tions, in promulgating rules of evidence, may legitimately be concerned about the risk that juries will give excessive 9 The examiner interprets various physiological responses of the exami- nee, including blood pressure, perspiration, and respiration, while asking a series of questions, commonly in three categories: direct accusatory questions concerning the matter under investigation, irrelevant or neutral questions, and more general "control" questions concerning wrongdoing by the subject in general. The examiner forms an opinion of the subject's truthfulness by comparing the physiological reactions to each set of ques- tions. See generally Giannelli & Imwinkelried 219­222; Honts & Quick, The Polygraph in 1995: Progress in Science and the Law, 71 N. D. L. Rev. 987, 990­992 (1995). 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN 314 UNITED STATES v. SCHEFFER Opinion of Thomas, J. weight to the opinions of a polygrapher, clothed as they are in scientific expertise and at times offering, as in respond- ent's case, a conclusion about the ultimate issue in the trial. Such jurisdictions may legitimately determine that the aura of infallibility attending polygraph evidence can lead jurors to abandon their duty to assess credibility and guilt. Those jurisdictions may also take into account the fact that a judge cannot determine, when ruling on a motion to admit poly- graph evidence, whether a particular polygraph expert is likely to influence the jury unduly. For these reasons, the President is within his constitutional prerogative to promul- gate a per se rule that simply excludes all such evidence. C A third legitimate interest served by Rule 707 is avoiding litigation over issues other than the guilt or innocence of the accused. Such collateral litigation prolongs criminal trials and threatens to distract the jury from its central function of determining guilt or innocence. Allowing proffers of polygraph evidence would inevitably entail assessments of such issues as whether the test and control questions were appropriate, whether a particular polygraph examiner was qualified and had properly interpreted the physiological re- sponses, and whether other factors such as countermeasures employed by the examinee had distorted the exam results. Such assessments would be required in each and every case.10 It thus offends no constitutional principle for the President to conclude that a per se rule excluding all poly- graph evidence is appropriate. Because litigation over the admissibility of polygraph evidence is by its very nature col- 10 Although some of this litigation could take place outside the presence of the jury, at the very least a foundation must be laid for the jury to assess the qualifications and skill of the polygrapher and the validity of the exam, and significant cross-examination could occur on these issues. 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 303 (1998) 315 Opinion of the Court lateral, a per se rule prohibiting its admission is not an arbi- trary or disproportionate means of avoiding it.11 D The three of our precedents upon which the Court of Ap- peals principally relied, Rock v. Arkansas, Washington v. Texas, and Chambers v. Mississippi, do not support a right to introduce polygraph evidence, even in very narrow cir- cumstances. The exclusions of evidence that we declared unconstitutional in those cases significantly undermined fun- damental elements of the defendant's defense. Such is not the case here. In Rock, the defendant, accused of a killing to which she was the only eyewitness, was allegedly able to remember the facts of the killing only after having her memory hypnoti- cally refreshed. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U. S., at 46. Because Arkansas excluded all hypnotically refreshed testi- mony, the defendant was unable to testify about certain rele- vant facts, including whether the killing had been accidental. See id., at 47­49. In holding that the exclusion of this evi- dence violated the defendant's "right to present a defense," we noted that the rule deprived the jury of the testimony of the only witness who was at the scene and had firsthand knowledge of the facts. See id., at 57. Moreover, the rule infringed upon the defendant's interest in testifying in her own defense­­an interest that we deemed particularly sig- nificant, as it is the defendant who is the target of any crimi- 11 Although the Court of Appeals stated that it had "merely remove[d] the obstacle of the per se rule against admissibility" of polygraph evidence in cases where the accused wishes to proffer an exculpatory polygraph to rebut an attack on his credibility, 44 M. J. 442, 446 (1996), and respondent thus implicitly argues that the Constitution would require collateral litiga- tion only in such cases, we cannot see a principled justification whereby a right derived from the Constitution could be so narrowly contained. 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN 316 UNITED STATES v. SCHEFFER Opinion of the Court nal prosecution. See id., at 52. For this reason, we stated that a defendant ought to be allowed "to present his own version of events in his own words." Ibid. In Washington, the statutes involved prevented co- defendants or coparticipants in a crime from testifying for one another and thus precluded the defendant from introduc- ing his accomplice's testimony that the accomplice had in fact committed the crime. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S., at 16­17. In reversing Washington's conviction, we held that the Sixth Amendment was violated because "the State arbitrarily denied [the defendant] the right to put on the stand a witness who was physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had personally observed." Id., at 23.12 In Chambers, we found a due process violation in the combined application of Mississippi's common-law "voucher rule," which prevented a party from impeaching his own wit- ness, and its hearsay rule that excluded the testimony of three persons to whom that witness had confessed. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S., at 302. Chambers spe- cifically confined its holding to the "facts and circumstances" presented in that case; we thus stressed that the ruling did not "signal any diminution in the respect traditionally ac- corded to the States in the establishment and implementa- tion of their own criminal trial rules and procedures." Id., at 302­303. Chambers therefore does not stand for the proposition that the defendant is denied a fair opportunity to defend himself whenever a state or federal rule excludes favorable evidence. Rock, Washington, and Chambers do not require that Rule 707 be invalidated, because, unlike the evidentiary rules at issue in those cases, Rule 707 does not implicate any signifi- 12 In addition, we noted that the State of Texas could advance no legiti- mate interests in support of the evidentiary rules at issue, and those rules burdened only the defense and not the prosecution. See 388 U. S., at 22­ 23. Rule 707 suffers from neither of these defects. 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 303 (1998) 317 Opinion of the Court cant interest of the accused. Here, the court members heard all the relevant details of the charged offense from the perspective of the accused, and the Rule did not preclude him from introducing any factual evidence.13 Rather, re- spondent was barred merely from introducing expert opinion testimony to bolster his own credibility. Moreover, in con- trast to the rule at issue in Rock, Rule 707 did not prohibit respondent from testifying on his own behalf; he freely exer- cised his choice to convey his version of the facts to the court-martial members. We therefore cannot conclude that respondent's defense was significantly impaired by the exclu- sion of polygraph evidence. Rule 707 is thus constitutional under our precedents. * * * For the foregoing reasons, Military Rule of Evidence 707 does not unconstitutionally abridge the right to present a defense. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. 13 The dissent suggests, post, at 331, that polygraph results constitute "factual evidence." The raw results of a polygraph exam-the subject's pulse, respiration, and perspiration rates-may be factual data, but these are not introduced at trial, and even if they were, they would not be "facts" about the alleged crime at hand. Rather, the evidence introduced is the expert opinion testimony of the polygrapher about whether the sub- ject was truthful or deceptive in answering questions about the alleged crime. A per se rule excluding polygraph results therefore does not prevent an accused-just as it did not prevent respondent here-from introducing factual evidence or testimony about the crime itself, such as alibi witness testimony, see ibid. For the same reasons, an expert poly- grapher's interpretation of polygraph results is not evidence of " `the ac- cused's whole conduct,' " see post, at 336, to which Dean Wigmore referred. It is not evidence of the " `accused's . . . conduct' " at all, much less "con- duct" concerning the actual crime at issue. It is merely the opinion of a witness with no knowledge about any of the facts surrounding the alleged crime, concerning whether the defendant spoke truthfully or deceptively on another occasion. 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN 318 UNITED STATES v. SCHEFFER Opinion of Kennedy, J. Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice O'Connor, Jus- tice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I join Parts I, II­A, and II­D of the opinion of the Court. In my view it should have been sufficient to decide this case to observe, as the principal opinion does, that various courts and jurisdictions "may reasonably reach differing conclusions as to whether polygraph evidence should be admitted." Ante, at 312. The continuing, good-faith dis- agreement among experts and courts on the subject of poly- graph reliability counsels against our invalidating a per se exclusion of polygraph results or of the fact an accused has taken or refused to take a polygraph examination. If we were to accept respondent's position, of course, our holding would bind state courts, as well as military and federal courts. Given the ongoing debate about polygraphs, I agree the rule of exclusion is not so arbitrary or disproportionate that it is unconstitutional. I doubt, though, that the rule of per se exclusion is wise, and some later case might present a more compelling case for introduction of the testimony than this one does. Though the considerable discretion given to the trial court in admitting or excluding scientific evidence is not a constitu- tional mandate, see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti- cals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579, 587 (1993), there is some tension between that rule and our holding today. And, as Justice Stevens points out, there is much inconsistency between the Government's extensive use of polygraphs to make vital security determinations and the argument it makes here, stressing the inaccuracy of these tests. With all respect, moreover, it seems the principal opinion overreaches when it rests its holding on the additional ground that the jury's role in making credibility determina- tions is diminished when it hears polygraph evidence. I am in substantial agreement with Justice Stevens' observa- tion that the argument demeans and mistakes the role and 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 303 (1998) 319 Opinion of Kennedy, J. competence of jurors in deciding the factual question of guilt or innocence. Post, at 336­337. In the last analysis the principal opinion says it is unwise to allow the jury to hear "a conclusion about the ultimate issue in the trial." Ante, at 314. I had thought this tired argument had long since been given its deserved repose as a categorical rule of exclu- sion. Rule 704(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence states: "Except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objec- tionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." The Advisory Committee's Notes state: "The older cases often contained strictures against al- lowing witnesses to express opinions upon ultimate is- sues, as a particular aspect of the rule against opinions. The rule was unduly restrictive, difficult of application, and generally served only to deprive the trier of fact of useful information. 7 Wigmore §§ 1920, 1921; McCor- mick § 12. The basis usually assigned for the rule, to prevent the witness from `usurping the province of the jury,' is aptly characterized as `empty rhetoric.' 7 Wigmore § 1920, p. 17." Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 704, 28 U. S. C., p. 888. The principal opinion is made less convincing by its con- tradicting the rationale of Rule 704 and the well considered reasons the Advisory Committee recited in support of its adoption. The attempt to revive this outmoded theory is especially inapt in the context of the military justice system; for the one narrow exception to the abolition of the ultimate issue rule still surviving in the Federal Rules of Evidence has been omitted from the corresponding rule adopted for the military. The ultimate issue exception in the Federal Rules of Evi- dence is as follows: "No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN 320 UNITED STATES v. SCHEFFER Stevens, J., dissenting state an opinion or inference as to whether the defend- ant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a de- fense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone." Fed. Rule Evid. 704(b). The drafting committee for the Military Rules of Evidence renounced even this remnant. It said: "The statutory quali- fications for military court members reduce the risk that mil- itary court members will be unduly influenced by the pres- entation of ultimate opinion testimony from psychiatric experts." Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Analy- sis of the Military Rules of Evidence, App. 22, p. A22­48 (1995 ed.). Any supposed need to protect the role of the finder of fact is diminished even further by this specific ac- knowledgment that members of military courts are not likely to give excessive weight to opinions of experts or otherwise to be misled or confused by their testimony. Neither in the federal system nor in the military courts, then, is it convinc- ing to say that polygraph test results should be excluded because of some lingering concern about usurping the jury's responsibility to decide ultimate issues. Justice Stevens, dissenting. The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that the President violated the Constitution in June 1991, when he promulgated Rule 707 of the Military Rules of Evidence. Had I been a member of that court, I would not have decided that question without first requiring the parties to brief and argue the antecedent question whether Rule 707 violates Article 36(a) of the Uniform Code of Mili- tary Justice, 10 U. S. C. § 836(a). As presently advised, I am persuaded that the Rule does violate the statute and should be held invalid for that reason. I also agree with the Court of Appeals that the Rule is unconstitutional. This Court's contrary holding rests on a serious undervaluation of the im- portance of the citizen's constitutional right to present a de- 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 303 (1998) 321 Stevens, J., dissenting fense to a criminal charge and an unrealistic appraisal of the importance of the governmental interests that undergird the Rule. Before discussing the constitutional issue, I shall comment briefly on the statutory question. I Rule 707 is a blanket rule of exclusion.1 No matter how reliable and how probative the results of a polygraph test may be, Rule 707 categorically denies the defendant any op- portunity to persuade the court that the evidence should be received for any purpose. Indeed, even if the parties stipu- late in advance that the results of a lie detector test may be admitted, the Rule requires exclusion. The principal charge against the respondent in this case was that he had knowingly used methamphetamine. His principal defense was "innocent ingestion"; even if the uri- nalysis test conducted on April 7, 1992, correctly indicated that he did ingest the substance, he claims to have been un- aware of that fact. The results of the lie detector test con- ducted three days later, if accurate, constitute factual evi- dence that his physical condition at that time was consistent with the theory of his defense and inconsistent with the the- ory of the prosecution. The results were also relevant be- cause they tended to confirm the credibility of his testimony. Under Rule 707, even if the results of the polygraph test were more reliable than the results of the urinalysis, the weaker evidence is admissible and the stronger evidence is inadmissible. Under the now discredited reasoning in a case decided 75 years ago, Frye v. United States, 54 App. D. C. 46, 293 1 Rule 707 states, in relevant part: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the results of a polygraph examination, the opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be admitted into evidence." Mil. Rule Evid. 707(a). 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN 322 UNITED STATES v. SCHEFFER Stevens, J., dissenting F. 1013 (1923), that anomalous result would also have been reached in nonmilitary cases tried in the federal courts. In recent years, however, we have not only repudiated Frye's general approach to scientific evidence, but the federal courts have also been engaged in the process of rejecting the once- popular view that all lie detector evidence should be categor- ically inadmissible.2 Well reasoned opinions are concluding, consistently with this Court's decisions in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579 (1993), and General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U. S. 136 (1997), that the federal rules wisely allow district judges to exercise broad discretion when evaluating the admissibility of scientific evi- dence.3 Those opinions correctly observe that the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of civil and crimi- nal cases in the federal courts do not contain any blanket prohibition against the admissibility of polygraph evidence. 2 "There is no question that in recent years polygraph testing has gained increasingly widespread acceptance as a useful and reliable scientific tool. Because of the advances that have been achieved in the field which have led to the greater use of polygraph examination, coupled with a lack of evidence that juries are unduly swayed by polygraph evidence, we agree with those courts which have found that a per se rule disallowing poly- graph evidence is no longer warranted. . . . Thus, we believe the best approach in this area is one which balances the need to admit all relevant and reliable evidence against the danger that the admission of the evidence for a given purpose will be unfairly prejudicial." United States v. Picci- nonna, 885 F. 2d 1529, 1535 (CA11 1989). "[W]e do not now hold that polygraph examinations are scientifically valid or that they will always assist the trier of fact, in this or any other individual case. We merely remove the obstacle of the per se rule against admissibility, which was based on antiquated concepts about the technical ability of the polygraph and legal precepts that have been expressly overruled by the Supreme Court." United States v. Posado, 57 F. 3d 428, 434 (CA5 1995). 3 "The per se . . . rule excluding unstipulated polygraph evidence is in- consistent with the `flexible inquiry' assigned to the trial judge by Dau- bert. This is particularly evident because Frye, which was overruled by Daubert, involved the admissibility of polygraph evidence." United States v. Cordoba, 104 F. 3d 225, 227 (CA9 1997). 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 303 (1998) 323 Stevens, J., dissenting In accord with the modern trend of decisions on this ad- missibility issue, in 1987 the Court of Military Appeals held that an accused was "entitled to attempt to lay" the founda- tion for admission of favorable polygraph evidence. United States v. Gipson, 24 M. J. 246, 253 (1987). The President responded to Gipson by adopting Rule 707. The governing statute authorized him to promulgate evidentiary rules "which shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally rec- ognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts." 10 U. S. C. § 836(a).4 Thus, if there are military concerns that warrant a special rule for military tri- bunals, the statute gives him ample authority to promulgate special rules that take such concerns into account. Rule 707 has no counterpart in either the Federal Rules of Evidence or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, to the extent that the use of the lie detector plays a special role in the military establishment, military prac- tices are more favorable to a rule of admissibility than is the less structured use of lie detectors in the civilian sector of our society. That is so because the military carefully regu- lates the administration of polygraph tests to ensure reliable results. The military maintains "very stringent standards for polygraph examiners" 5 and has established its own Poly- 4 "Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of proof, for cases arising under this chapter triable in courts-martial, military commis- sions and other military tribunals, and procedures for courts of inquiry, may be prescribed by the President by regulations which shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts, but which may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter." 10 U. S. C. § 836(a). 5 According to the Department of Defense's 1996 Report to Congress: "The Department of Defense maintains very stringent standards for poly- graph examiners. The Department of Defense Polygraph Institute's basic polygraph program is the only program known to base its curriculum on forensic psychophysiology, and conceptual, abstract, and applied knowl- 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN 324 UNITED STATES v. SCHEFFER Stevens, J., dissenting graph Institute, which is "generally considered to be the best training facility for polygraph examiners in the United States." 6 The military has administered hundreds of thou- sands of such tests and routinely uses their results for a wide variety of official decisions.7 edge that meet the requirements of a master's degree-level of study. Candidates selected for the Department of Defense polygraph positions must meet the following minimum requirements: "1. Be a United States citizen. "2. Be at least 25 years of age. "3. Be a graduate of an accredited four-year college or have equivalent experience that demonstrates the ability to master graduate-level aca- demic courses. "4. Have two years of experience as an investigator with a Federal or other law enforcement agency. . . . "5. Be of high moral character and sound emotional temperament, as confirmed by a background investigation. "6. Complete a Department of Defense-approved course of polygraph instruction. "7. Be adjudged suitable for the position after being administered a polygraph examination designed to ensure that the candidate realizes, and is sensitive to, the personal impact of such examinations. "All federal polygraph examiners receive their basic polygraph training at the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute. After completing the basic polygraph training, DoD personnel must serve an internship consist- ing of a minimum of six months on-the-job-training and conduct at least 25 polygraph examinations under the supervision of a certified polygraph examiner before being certified as a Department of Defense polygraph examiner. In addition, DoD polygraph examiners are required to com- plete 80 hours of continuing education every two years." Department of Defense Polygraph Program, Annual Polygraph Report to Congress, Fis- cal Year 1996, pp. 14­15; see also Yankee, The Current Status of Research in Forensic Psychophysiology and Its Application in the Psychophysiologi- cal Detection of Deception, 40 J. Forensic Sciences 63 (1995). 6 Honts & Perry, Polygraph Admissibility: Changes and Challenges, 16 Law and Human Behavior 357, 359, n. 1 (1992) (hereinafter Honts & Perry). 7 Between 1981 and 1997, the Department of Defense conducted over 400,000 polygraph examinations to resolve issues arising in counterintelli- gence, security, and criminal investigations. Department of Defense Polygraph Program, Annual Polygraph Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 303 (1998) 325 Stevens, J., dissenting The stated reasons for the adoption of Rule 707 do not rely on any special military concern. They merely invoke three interests: (1) the interest in excluding unreliable evidence; (2) the interest in protecting the trier of fact from being mis- led by an unwarranted assumption that the polygraph evi- dence has "an aura of near infallibility"; and (3) the interest in avoiding collateral debates about the admissibility of par- ticular test results. It seems clear that those interests pose less serious con- cerns in the military than in the civilian context. Disputes about the qualifications of the examiners, the equipment, and the testing procedures should seldom arise with respect to the tests conducted by the military. Moreover, there surely is no reason to assume that military personnel who perform the factfinding function are less competent than ordinary ju- rors to assess the reliability of particular results, or their relevance to the issues.8 Thus, there is no identifiable mili- tary concern that justifies the President's promulgation of a special military rule that is more burdensome to the accused in military trials than the evidentiary rules applicable to the trial of civilians. It, therefore, seems fairly clear that Rule 707 does not comply with the statute. I do not rest on this ground, how- ever, because briefing might persuade me to change my views, and because the Court has decided only the constitu- tional question. II The Court's opinion barely acknowledges that a person accused of a crime has a constitutional right to present a 1997, p. 1; id., Fiscal Year 1996, p. 1; id., Fiscal Year 1995, p. 1; id., Fiscal Year 1994, p. 1; id., Fiscal Year 1993, App. A; id., Fiscal Year 1992, App. A; id., Fiscal Year 1991, App. A­1 (reporting information for 1981­1991). 8 When the members of the court-martial are officers, as was true in this case, they typically have at least a college degree as well as significant military service. See 10 U. S. C. § 825(d)(2); see also, e. g., United States v. Carter, 22 M. J. 771, 776 (A. C. M. R. 1986). 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN 326 UNITED STATES v. SCHEFFER Stevens, J., dissenting defense. It is not necessary to point to "any particular lan- guage in the Sixth Amendment," ante, at 307, to support the conclusion that the right is firmly established. It is, how- ever, appropriate to comment on the importance of that right before discussing the three interests that the Government relies upon to justify Rule 707. The Sixth Amendment provides that "the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." Because this right "is an essential attribute of the adversary system itself," we have repeatedly stated that few rights "are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense." 9 Ac- cording to Joseph Story, that provision was included in the Bill of Rights in reaction to a notorious common-law rule categorically excluding defense evidence in treason and fel- ony cases.10 Our holding in Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14 (1967), that this right is applicable to the States, rested on the premises that it "is in plain terms the right to present a defense" and that it "is a fundamental element of due proc- 9 "Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense, see, e. g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284, 302 (1973). Indeed, this right is an essential attribute of the adver- sary system itself. . . . The right to compel a witness' presence in the courtroom could not protect the integrity of the adversary process if it did not embrace the right to have the witness' testimony heard by the trier of fact. The right to offer testimony is thus grounded in the Sixth Amendment . . . ." Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U. S. 400, 408­409 (1988). 10 "Joseph Story, in his famous Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, observed that the right to compulsory process was included in the Bill of Rights in reaction to the notorious common-law rule that in cases of treason or felony the accused was not allowed to introduce wit- nesses in his defense at all. Although the absolute prohibition of wit- nesses for the defense had been abolished in England by statute before 1787, the Framers of the Constitution felt it necessary specifically to pro- vide that defendants in criminal cases should be provided the means of obtaining witnesses so that their own evidence, as well as the prosecu- tion's, might be evaluated by the jury." Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 19­20 (1967) (footnotes omitted). 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 303 (1998) 327 Stevens, J., dissenting ess of law." 11 Consistent with the history of the provision, the Court in that case held that a state rule of evidence that excluded "whole categories" of testimony on the basis of a presumption of unreliability was unconstitutional.12 The blanket rule of inadmissibility held invalid in Wash- ington v. Texas covered the testimony of alleged accomplices. Both before and after that decision, the Court has recognized the potential injustice produced by rules that exclude entire categories of relevant evidence that is potentially unreliable. At common law interested parties such as defendants,13 their spouses,14 and their co-conspirators 15 were not competent 11 "The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process of law." Id., at 19. 12 "It is difficult to see how the Constitution is any less violated by arbi- trary rules that prevent whole categories of defense witnesses from testi- fying on the basis of a priori categories that presume them unworthy of belief. "The rule disqualifying an alleged accomplice from testifying on behalf of the defendant cannot even be defended on the ground that it rationally sets apart a group of persons who are particularly likely to commit per- jury." Id., at 22. 13 "It is familiar knowledge that the old common law carefully excluded from the witness stand parties to the record, and those who were inter- ested in the result; and this rule extended to both civil and criminal cases. Fear of perjury was the reason for the rule." Benson v. United States, 146 U. S. 325, 335 (1892). 14 "The common-law rule, accepted at an early date as controlling in this country, was that husband and wife were incompetent as witnesses for or against each other. . . . "The Court recognized that the basic reason underlying th[e] exclusion [of one spouse's testimony on behalf of the other] had been the practice of disqualifying witnesses with a personal interest in the outcome of a case. Widespread disqualifications because of interest, however, had long since [Footnote 15 is on p. 328] 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN 328 UNITED STATES v. SCHEFFER Stevens, J., dissenting witnesses. "Nor were those named the only grounds of ex- clusion from the witness stand; conviction of crime, want of religious belief, and other matters were held sufficient. In- deed, the theory of the common law was to admit to the wit- ness stand only those presumably honest, appreciating the sanctity of an oath, unaffected as a party by the result, and free from any of the temptations of interest. The courts were afraid to trust the intelligence of jurors." Benson v. United States, 146 U. S. 325, 336 (1892). And, of course, under the regime established by Frye v. United States, scien- tific evidence was inadmissible unless it met a stringent "general acceptance" test. Over the years, with respect to category after category, strict rules of exclusion have been replaced by rules that broaden the discretion of trial judges to admit potentially unreliable evidence and to allow prop- erly instructed juries to evaluate its weight. While that trend has included both rulemaking and nonconstitutional ju- dicial decisions, the direction of the trend has been consistent and it has been manifested in constitutional holdings as well. Commenting on the trend that had followed the decision in Benson, the Court in 1918 observed that in the "years which have elapsed since the decision of the Ben- son Case, the disposition of courts and of legislative bod- ies to remove disabilities from witnesses has continued, as that decision shows it had been going forward before, under dominance of the conviction of our time that the been abolished both in this country and in England in accordance with the modern trend which permitted interested witnesses to testify and left it for the jury to assess their credibility. Certainly, since defendants were uniformly allowed to testify in their own behalf, there was no longer a good reason to prevent them from using their spouses as witnesses. With the original reason for barring favorable testimony of spouses gone the Court concluded that this aspect of the old rule should go too." Hawkins v. United States, 358 U. S. 74, 75­76 (1958). 15 See Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S., at 20­21. 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 303 (1998) 329 Stevens, J., dissenting truth is more likely to be arrived at by hearing the testi- mony of all persons of competent understanding who may seem to have knowledge of the facts involved in a case, leaving the credit and weight of such testimony to be determined by the jury or by the court, rather than by rejecting witnesses as incompetent, with the result that this principle has come to be widely, almost univer- sally, accepted in this country and in Great Britain." Rosen v. United States, 245 U. S. 467, 471. See also Funk v. United States, 290 U. S. 371, 377­378 (1933). It was in a case involving the disqualification of spousal testi- mony that Justice Stewart stated: "Any rule that impedes the discovery of truth in a court of law impedes as well the doing of justice." Hawkins v. United States, 358 U. S. 74, 81 (1958) (concurring opinion). State evidentiary rules may so seriously impede the dis- covery of truth, "as well as the doing of justice," that they preclude the "meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense" that is guaranteed by the Constitution, Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 683, 690 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).16 In Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284, 302 16 "Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Chambers v. Mississippi, [410 U. S. 284 (1973)], or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 23 (1967); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308 (1974), the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants `a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.' California v. Trombetta, 467 U. S. [479, 485 (1984)]; cf. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 684­685 (1984) (`The Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth Amendment'). We break no new ground in observing that an essential component of procedural fairness is an op- portunity to be heard. In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 273 (1948); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 394 (1914). That opportunity would be an empty one if the State were permitted to exclude competent, reliable evidence 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN 330 UNITED STATES v. SCHEFFER Stevens, J., dissenting (1973), we concluded that "where constitutional rights di- rectly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice." 17 As the Court notes today, restrictions on the "defendant's right to present relevant evidence," ante, at 308, must comply with the admonition in Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U. S. 44, 56 (1987), that they "may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve." Applying that admonition to Arkansas' blanket rule prohibiting the admission of hypnotically refreshed testi- mony, we concluded that a "State's legitimate interest in bar- ring unreliable evidence does not extend to per se exclusions that may be reliable in an individual case." Id., at 61. That statement of constitutional law is directly relevant to this case. bearing on the credibility of a confession when such evidence is central to the defendant's claim of innocence. In the absence of any valid state justification, exclusion of this kind of exculpatory evidence deprives a de- fendant of the basic right to have the prosecutor's case encounter and `survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.' United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S. 648, 656 (1984). See also Washington v. Texas, supra, at 22­23." Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U. S., at 690­691. 17 "Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense. E. g., Webb v. Texas, 409 U. S. 95 (1972); Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 19 (1967); In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948). In the exercise of this right, the accused, as is required of the State, must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence de- signed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence. Although perhaps no rule of evidence has been more re- spected or more frequently applied in jury trials than that applicable to the exclusion of hearsay, exceptions tailored to allow the introduction of evidence which in fact is likely to be trustworthy have long existed. The testimony rejected by the trial court here bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness and thus was well within the basic rationale of the excep- tion for declarations against interest. That testimony also was critical to Chambers' defense. In these circumstances, where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S., at 302. 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 303 (1998) 331 Stevens, J., dissenting III The constitutional requirement that a blanket exclusion of potentially unreliable evidence must be proportionate to the purposes served by the rule obviously makes it necessary to evaluate the interests on both sides of the balance. Today the Court all but ignores the strength of the defendant's interest in having polygraph evidence admitted in certain cases. As the facts of this case illustrate, the Court is quite wrong in assuming that the impact of Rule 707 on respond- ent's defense was not significant because it did not preclude the introduction of any "factual evidence" or prevent him from conveying "his version of the facts to the court-martial members." Ante, at 317. Under such reasoning, a rule that excluded the testimony of alibi witnesses would not be significant as long as the defendant is free to testify himself. But given the defendant's strong interest in the outcome- an interest that was sufficient to make his testimony pre- sumptively untrustworthy and therefore inadmissible at common law-his uncorroborated testimony is certain to be less persuasive than that of a third-party witness. A rule that bars him "from introducing expert opinion testimony to bolster his own credibility," ibid., unquestionably impairs any "meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense"; indeed, it is sure to be outcome determinative in many cases. Moreover, in this case the results of the polygraph test, taken just three days after the urinalysis, constitute inde- pendent factual evidence that is not otherwise available and that strongly supports his defense of "innocent ingestion." Just as flight or other evidence of "consciousness of guilt" may sometimes be relevant, on some occasions evidence of "consciousness of innocence" may also be relevant to the cen- tral issue at trial. Both the answers to the questions pro- pounded by the examiner, and the physical manifestations produced by those utterances, were probative of an innocent state of mind shortly after he ingested the drugs. In Dean Wigmore's view, both "conduct" and "utterances" may con- 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN 332 UNITED STATES v. SCHEFFER Stevens, J., dissenting stitute factual evidence of a "consciousness of innocence." 18 As the Second Circuit has held, when there is a serious fac- tual dispute over the "basic defense [that defendant] was un- aware of any criminal wrongdoing," evidence of his innocent state of mind is "critical to a fair adjudication of criminal charges." 19 The exclusion of the test results in this case cannot be fairly equated with a ruling that merely prevented the defendant from encumbering the record with cumulative evidence. Because the Rule may well have affected the outcome of the trial, it unquestionably "infringed upon a weighty interest of the accused." Ante, at 308. The question, then, is whether the three interests on which the Government relies are powerful enough to support a cat- egorical rule excluding the results of all polygraph tests no matter how unfair such a rule may be in particular cases. 18 "Moreover, there are other principles by which a defendant may occa- sionally avail himself of conduct as evidence in his favor-in particular, of conduct indicating consciousness of innocence, . . . of utterances asserting his innocence . . . , and, in sedition charges, of conduct indicating a loyal state of mind . . . ." 1A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 56.1, p. 1180 (Tillers rev. ed. 1983); see United States v. Reifsteck, 841 F. 2d 701, 705 (CA6 1988). 19 "Mariotta's basic defense was that he was unaware of any criminal wrongdoing at Wedtech, that he was an innocent victim of the machina- tions of the sophisticated businessmen whom he had brought into the com- pany to handle its financial affairs. That defense was seriously in issue as to most of the charges against him, drawing considerable support from the evidence. . . . "With the credibility of the accusations about Mariotta's knowledge of wrongdoing seriously challenged, evidence of his denial of such knowledge in response to an opportunity to obtain immunity by admitting it and im- plicating others became highly significant to a fair presentation of his defense. . . . "Where evidence of a defendant's innocent state of mind, critical to a fair adjudication of criminal charges, is excluded, we have not hesitated to order a new trial." United States v. Biaggi, 909 F. 2d 662, 691­692 (CA2 1990); see also United States v. Bucur, 194 F. 2d 297 (CA7 1952); Herman v. United States, 48 F. 2d 479 (CA5 1931). 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 303 (1998) 333 Stevens, J., dissenting Reliability There are a host of studies that place the reliability of polygraph tests at 85% to 90%.20 While critics of the poly- graph argue that accuracy is much lower, even the studies cited by the critics place polygraph accuracy at 70%.21 Moreover, to the extent that the polygraph errs, studies have repeatedly shown that the polygraph is more likely to find innocent people guilty than vice versa.22 Thus, exculpatory polygraphs-like the one in this case-are likely to be more reliable than inculpatory ones. Of course, within the broad category of lie detector evi- dence, there may be a wide variation in both the validity and the relevance 23 of particular test results. Questions about the examiner's integrity, independence, choice of questions, or training in the detection of deliberate attempts to provoke misleading physiological responses may justify exclusion of 20 Raskin, Honts, & Kircher, The Scientific Status of Research on Poly- graph Techniques: The Case for Polygraph Tests, in 1 Modern Scientific Evidence 572 (D. Faigman, D. Kaye, M. Saks, & J. Sanders eds. 1997) (here- inafter Faigman) (compiling eight laboratory studies that place mean accu- racy at approximately 90%); id., at 575 (compiling four field studies, scored by independent examiners, that place mean accuracy at 90.5%); Raskin, Honts, & Kircher, A Response to Professors Iacono and Lykken, in Faig- man 627 (compiling six field studies, scored by original examiners, that place mean accuracy at 97.5%); Abrams, The Complete Polygraph Hand- book 190­191 (1989) (compiling 13 laboratory studies that, excluding incon- clusive results, place mean accuracy at 87%). 21 Iacono & Lykken, The Scientific Status of Research on Polygraph Techniques: The Case Against Polygraph Tests, in Faigman 608 (compiling three studies that place mean accuracy at 70%). 22 E. g., Iacono & Lykken, The Case Against Polygraph Tests, in Faig- man 608­609; Raskin, Honts, & Kircher, A Response to Professors Iacono and Lykken, in Faigman 621; Honts & Perry 362; Abrams, The Complete Polygraph Handbook, at 187­188, 191. 23 See, e. g., Judge Gonzalez's careful attention to the relevance inquiry in the proceedings on remand from the Court of Appeals decision in Picci- nonna. 729 F. Supp. 1336 (SD Fla. 1990). 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN 334 UNITED STATES v. SCHEFFER Stevens, J., dissenting specific evidence. But such questions are properly ad- dressed in adversary proceedings; they fall far short of justi- fying a blanket exclusion of this type of expert testimony. There is no legal requirement that expert testimony must satisfy a particular degree of reliability to be admissible. Expert testimony about a defendant's "future dangerous- ness" to determine his eligibility for the death penalty, even if wrong "most of the time," is routinely admitted. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 898­901 (1983). Studies indicate that handwriting analysis, and even fingerprint identifica- tions, may be less trustworthy than polygraph evidence in certain cases.24 And, of course, even highly dubious eyewit- 24 One study compared the accuracy of fingerprinting, handwriting anal- ysis, polygraph tests, and eyewitness identification. The study consisted of 80 volunteers divided into 20 groups of 4. Fingerprints and handwrit- ing samples were taken from all of the participants. In each group of four, one person was randomly assigned the role of "perpetrator." The perpetrator was instructed to take an envelope to a building doorkeeper (who knew that he would later need to identify the perpetrator), sign a receipt, and pick up a package. After the "crime," all participants were given a polygraph examination. The fingerprinting expert (comparing the original fingerprints with those on the envelope), the handwriting expert (comparing the original samples with the signed receipt), and the polygrapher (analyzing the tests) sought to identify the perpetrator of each group. In addition, two days after the "crime," the doorkeeper was asked to pick the picture of the perpetrator out of a set of four pictures. The results of the study demonstrate that polygraph evidence compares favorably with other types of evidence. Excluding "inconclusive" results from each test, the fingerprinting expert resolved 100% of the cases cor- rectly, the polygrapher resolved 95% of the cases correctly, the handwrit- ing expert resolved 94% of the cases correctly, and the eyewitness re- solved only 64% of the cases correctly. Interestingly, when "inconclusive" results were included, the polygraph test was more accurate than any of the other methods: The polygrapher resolved 90% of the cases correctly, compared with 85% for the handwriting expert, 35% for the eyewitness, and 20% for the fingerprinting expert. Widacki & Horvath, An Experi- mental Investigation of the Relative Validity and Utility of the Polygraph Technique and Three Other Common Methods of Criminal Identification, 23 J. Forensic Sciences 596, 596­600 (1978); see also Honts & Perry 365. 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 303 (1998) 335 Stevens, J., dissenting ness testimony is, and should be, admitted and tested in the crucible of cross-examination. The Court's reliance on po- tential unreliability as a justification for a categorical rule of inadmissibility reveals that it is "overly pessimistic about the capabilities of the jury and of the adversary system gener- ally. Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence." Daubert, 509 U. S., at 596.25 25 The Government argues that there is a widespread danger that people will learn to "fool" the polygraph, and that this possibility undermines any claim of reliability. For example, the Government points to the availabil- ity of a book called Beat the Box: The Insider's Guide to Outwitting the Lie Detector. Tr. of Oral Arg. 53; Brief for United States 25, n. 10. Beat the Box, however, actually cuts against a per se ban on polygraph evi- dence. As the preface to the book states: "Dr. Kalashnikov [the author] is a polygraph professional. If you go up against him, or someone like him, he'll probably catch you at your game. That's because he knows his work and does it by the book. "What most people don't realize is that there are a lot of not so profes- sional polygraph examiners out there. It's very possible that you may be tested by someone who is more concerned about the number of tests he will run this week (and his Christmas bonus) than he is about the precision of each individual test. . . . . . "Remember, the adage is that you can't beat the polygraph system but you can beat the operator. This book is gleefully dedicated to the idea of a sporting chance." V. Kalashnikov, Beat the Box: The Insider's Guide to Outwitting the Lie Detector (1983) (preface); id., at 9 ("[W]hile the system is all but unbeatable, you can surely beat the examiner"). Thus, Beat the Box actually supports the notion that polygraphs are reli- able when conducted by a highly trained examiner-like the one in this case. Nonetheless, some research has indicated that people can be trained to use "countermeasures" to fool the polygraph. See, e. g., Honts, Raskin, & Kircher, Mental and Physical Countermeasures Reduce the Accuracy of Polygraph Tests, 79 J. Applied Psychology 252 (1994). This possibility, however, does not justify a per se ban. First, research indicates that indi- viduals must receive specific training before they can fool the polygraph (i. e., information alone is not enough). Honts, Hodes, & Raskin, Effects 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN 336 UNITED STATES v. SCHEFFER Stevens, J., dissenting The Role of the Jury It is the function of the jury to make credibility determi- nations. In my judgment evidence that tends to establish either a consciousness of guilt or a consciousness of inno- cence may be of assistance to the jury in making such deter- minations. That also was the opinion of Dean Wigmore: "Let the accused's whole conduct come in; and whether it tells for consciousness of guilt or for consciousness of innocence, let us take it for what it is worth, remember- ing that in either case it is open to varying explanations and is not to be emphasized. Let us not deprive an in- nocent person, falsely accused, of the inference which common sense draws from a consciousness of innocence and its natural manifestations." 2 J. Wigmore, Evi- dence § 293, p. 232 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979). There is, of course, some risk that some "juries will give excessive weight to the opinions of a polygrapher, clothed as they are in scientific expertise," ante, at 313­314. In my judgment, however, it is much more likely that juries will be guided by the instructions of the trial judge concerning the credibility of expert as well as lay witnesses. The strong presumption that juries will follow the court's instructions, see, e. g., Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U. S. 200, 211 (1987), ap- plies to exculpatory as well as inculpatory evidence. Com- of Physical Countermeasures on the Physiological Detection of Deception, 70 J. Applied Psychology 177, 185 (1985); see also Honts, Raskin, Kir- cher, & Hodes, Effects of Spontaneous Countermeasures on the Physiolog- ical Detection of Deception, 16 J. Police Science and Administration 91, 93 (1988) (spontaneous countermeasures ineffective). Second, as counter- measures are discovered, it is fair to assume that polygraphers will de- velop ways to detect these countermeasures. See, e. g., Abrams & David- son, Counter-Countermeasures in Polygraph Testing, 17 Polygraph 16, 17­19 (1988); Raskin, Honts, & Kircher, The Case for Polygraph Tests, in Faigman 577­578. Of course, in any trial, jurors would be instructed on the possibility of countermeasures and could give this possibility its appro- priate weight. 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 303 (1998) 337 Stevens, J., dissenting mon sense suggests that the testimony of disinterested third parties that is relevant to the jury's credibility determination will assist rather than impair the jury's deliberations. As with the reliance on the potential unreliability of this type of evidence, the reliance on a fear that the average jury is not able to assess the weight of this testimony reflects a dis- tressing lack of confidence in the intelligence of the average American.26 Collateral Litigation The potential burden of collateral proceedings to deter- mine the examiner's qualifications is a manifestly insufficient justification for a categorical exclusion of expert testimony. Such proceedings are a routine predicate for the admission of any expert testimony, and may always give rise to searching cross-examination. If testimony that is critical to a fair de- termination of guilt or innocence could be excluded for that reason, the right to a meaningful opportunity to present a defense would be an illusion. It is incongruous for the party that selected the examiner, the equipment, the testing procedures, and the questions asked of the defendant to complain about the examinee's bur- den of proving that the test was properly conducted. While there may well be a need for substantial collateral proceed- ings when the party objecting to admissibility has a basis for questioning some aspect of the examination, it seems quite obvious that the Government is in no position to challenge 26 Indeed, research indicates that jurors do not "blindly" accept poly- graph evidence, but that they instead weigh polygraph evidence along with other evidence. Cavoukian & Heslegrave, The Admissibility of Poly- graph Evidence in Court: Some Empirical Findings, 4 Law and Human Behavior 117, 123, 127­128, 130 (1980) (hereinafter Cavoukian & Hesle- grave); see also Honts & Perry 366­367. One study found that expert testimony about the limits of the polygraph "completely eliminated the effect of the polygraph evidence" on the jury. Cavoukian & Heslegrave 128­129 (emphasis added). 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN 338 UNITED STATES v. SCHEFFER Stevens, J., dissenting the competence of the procedures that it has developed and relied upon in hundreds of thousands of cases. In all events the concern about the burden of collateral debates about the integrity of a particular examination, or the competence of a particular examiner, provides no support for a categorical rule that requires exclusion even when the test is taken pursuant to a stipulation and even when there has been a stipulation resolving all potential collateral issues. Indeed, in this very case there would have been no need for any collateral proceedings because respondent did not ques- tion the qualifications of the expert who examined him, and surely the Government is in no position to argue that one who has successfully completed its carefully developed train- ing program 27 is unqualified. The interest in avoiding bur- densome collateral proceedings might support a rule pre- scribing minimum standards that must be met before any test is admissible,28 but it surely does not support the blun- derbuss at issue.29 IV The Government's concerns would unquestionably support the exclusion of polygraph evidence in particular cases, and may well be sufficient to support a narrower rule designed to respond to specific concerns. In my judgment, however, 27 See n. 5, supra. 28 See N. M. Rule Evid. § 11­707. 29 It has been suggested that if exculpatory polygraph evidence may be adduced by the defendant, the prosecutor should also be allowed to intro- duce inculpatory test results. That conclusion would not be dictated by a holding that vindicates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to summon witnesses. Moreover, as noted above, studies indicate that exculpatory polygraphs are more reliable than inculpatory ones. See n. 22, supra. In any event, a concern about possible future legal developments is surely not implicated by the narrow issue presented by the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces in this case. Even if it were, I can see nothing fundamentally unfair about permitting the results of a test taken pursuant to stipulation being admitted into evidence to prove conscious- ness of guilt as well as consciousness of innocence. 523US1 Unit: $U46 [05-09-00 11:31:22] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 303 (1998) 339 Stevens, J., dissenting those concerns are plainly insufficient to support a categori- cal rule that prohibits the admission of polygraph evidence in all cases, no matter how reliable or probative the evidence may be. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 523US1 Unit: $U47 [04-29-00 21:09:57] PAGES PGT: OPIN 340 OCTOBER TERM, 1997 Syllabus FELTNER v. COLUMBIA PICTURES TELEVISION, INC. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 96­1768. Argued January 21, 1998-Decided March 31, 1998 Respondent Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., terminated agreements li- censing several television series to three television stations owned by petitioner Feltner after the stations' royalty payments became delin- quent. When the stations continued to broadcast the programs, Colum- bia sued Feltner and others for, inter alia, copyright infringement. Co- lumbia won partial summary judgment as to liability on its copyright infringement claims and then exercised the option afforded by § 504(c) of the Copyright Act of 1976 (Act) to recover statutory damages in lieu of actual damages. The District Court denied Feltner's request for a jury trial, and awarded Columbia statutory damages following a bench trial. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that neither § 504(c) nor the Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial on statutory damages. Held:1. There is no statutory right to a jury trial when a copyright owner elects to recover statutory damages. Section 504(c) makes no mention of a right to a jury trial or to juries at all, providing instead that dam- ages should be assessed in an amount "the court deems just," and that in the event that "the court finds" an infringement that is willful or innocent, "the court in its discretion" may increase or decrease the stat- utory damages. The word "court" in this context appears to mean judge, not jury. Other remedies provisions in the Act use the term "court" in contexts generally thought to confer authority on a judge, and the Act does not use the term "court" when addressing awards of actual damages and profits, see § 504(b), which generally are thought to constitute legal relief, Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U. S. 469, 477. Feltner's reliance on Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 585, for a contrary interpretation is misplaced. There being no statutory right to a jury trial on statutory damages, the constitutional question must be ad- dressed. See Tull v. United States, 481 U. S. 412, 417. Pp. 345­347. 2. The Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial on all issues pertinent to an award of statutory damages under § 504(c), includ- ing the amount itself. Pp. 347­355. 523US1 Unit: $U47 [04-29-00 21:09:57] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 340 (1998) 341 Syllabus (a) The Seventh Amendment applies to both common-law causes of action and to statutory actions more analogous to cases tried in 18th- century courts of law than to suits customarily tried in courts of equity or admiralty. Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 U. S. 33, 42. To determine the proper analogue, this Court examines both the nature of the statutory action and the remedy sought. See ibid. Pp. 347­348. (b) There are close 18th-century analogues to § 504(c) statutory damages actions. Before the adoption of the Seventh Amendment, the common law and statutes in England and this country granted copyright owners causes of action for infringement. More importantly, copyright suits for monetary damages were tried in courts of law, and thus before juries. There is no evidence that the first federal copyright law, the Copyright Act of 1790, changed this practice; and damages actions under the Copyright Act of 1831 were consistently tried before juries. The Court is unpersuaded by Columbia's contention that, despite this un- disputed historical evidence, statutory damages are clearly equitable in nature. Pp. 348­353. (c) The right to a jury trial includes the right to have a jury deter- mine the amount of statutory damages, if any, awarded to the copyright owner. There is overwhelming evidence that the consistent common- law practice was for juries to award damages. More specifically, this was the consistent practice in copyright cases. Tull v. United States, supra-in which this Court determined that, although the Seventh Amendment grants a right to a jury trial on liability for civil penalties under the Clean Water Act, Congress could constitutionally authorize trial judges to assess the amount of the civil penalties-is inapposite to this case. In Tull, there was no evidence that juries historically had determined the amount of civil penalties to be paid to the Government, and the awarding of such penalties could be viewed as analogous to sentencing in a criminal proceeding. Here there is no similar analogy, and there is clear and direct historical evidence that juries, both as a general matter and in copyright cases, set the amount of damages awarded to a successful plaintiff. Pp. 353­355. 106 F. 3d 284, reversed and remanded. Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judg- ment, post, p. 355. John G. Roberts, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were David G. Leitch and Jonathan S. Franklin. 523US1 Unit: $U47 [04-29-00 21:09:57] PAGES PGT: OPIN 342 FELTNER v. COLUMBIA PICTURES TELEVISION, INC. Opinion of the Court Henry J. Tashman argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Gregory J. Kopta.* Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 504(c) of the Copyright Act of 1976 permits a copy- right owner "to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages . . . , in a sum of not less than $500 or more than $20,000 as the court considers just." 90 Stat. 2585, as amended, 17 U. S. C. § 504(c)(1). In this case, we consider whether § 504(c) or the Seventh Amendment grants a right to a jury trial when a copyright owner elects to recover statutory damages. We hold that although the statute is silent on the point, the Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial, which includes a right to a jury determination of the amount of statutory damages. We therefore reverse. I Petitioner C. Elvin Feltner owns Krypton International Corporation, which in 1990 acquired three television stations in the southeastern United States. Respondent Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., had licensed several television se- ries to these stations, including "Who's the Boss," "Silver Spoons," "Hart to Hart," and "T. J. Hooker." After the sta- tions became delinquent in making their royalty payments to Columbia, Krypton and Columbia entered into negotia- tions to restructure the stations' debt. These discussions were unavailing, and Columbia terminated the stations' li- *Howard B. Abrams, pro se, filed a brief as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers by I. Fred Koenigsberg and Philip H. Schaeffer; for the International Anticounterfeiting Coalition, Inc., by Peter W. James, Anthony M. Keats, and Larry W. McFarland; and for the National Football League et al. by Neil K. Roman and Robert A. Long, Jr. 523US1 Unit: $U47 [04-29-00 21:09:57] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 340 (1998) 343 Opinion of the Court cense agreements in October 1991. Despite Columbia's ter- mination, the stations continued broadcasting the programs. Columbia sued Feltner, Krypton, the stations, various Krypton subsidiaries, and certain Krypton officers in Federal District Court alleging, inter alia, copyright infringement arising from the stations' unauthorized broadcasting of the programs. Columbia sought various forms of relief under the Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright Act), 17 U. S. C. § 101 et seq., including a permanent injunction, § 502; impoundment of all copies of the programs, § 503; actual damages or, in the alternative, statutory damages, § 504; and costs and attor- ney's fees, § 505. On Columbia's motion, the District Court entered partial summary judgment as to liability for Colum- bia on its copyright infringement claims.1 Columbia exercised the option afforded by § 504(c) of the Copyright Act to recover "Statutory Damages" in lieu of actual damages. In relevant part, § 504(c) provides: "Statutory Damages- "(1) Except as provided by clause (2) of this subsec- tion, the copyright owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work, . . . in a sum of not less than $500 or more than $20,000 as the court considers just. . . . "(2) In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $100,000. In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to be- lieve that his or her acts constituted an infringement of 1 During the course of the litigation, Columbia dropped all claims against all parties except its copyright claims against Feltner. 523US1 Unit: $U47 [04-29-00 21:09:57] PAGES PGT: OPIN 344 FELTNER v. COLUMBIA PICTURES TELEVISION, INC. Opinion of the Court copyright, the court [in] its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200. . . ." 17 U. S. C. § 504(c). The District Court denied Feltner's request for a jury trial on statutory damages, ruling instead that such issues would be determined at a bench trial. After two days of trial, the trial judge held that each episode of each series constituted a separate work and that the airing of the same episode by different stations controlled by Feltner constituted separate violations; accordingly, the trial judge determined that there had been a total of 440 acts of infringement. The trial judge further found that Feltner's infringement was willful and fixed statutory damages at $20,000 per act of infringement. Applying that amount to the number of acts of infringement, the trial judge determined that Columbia was entitled to $8,800,000 in statutory damages, plus costs and attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in all relevant respects. Columbia Pictures Television v. Kryp- ton Broadcasting of Birmingham, Inc., 106 F. 3d 284 (1997).2 Most importantly for present purposes, the court rejected Feltner's argument that he was entitled to have a jury deter- mine statutory damages. Relying on Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F. 2d 1157 (CA9 1977)-which held that § 25(b) of the Copyright Act of 1909, the statutory predecessor of § 504(c), required the trial judge to assess statutory damages 3-the Court of 2 The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded (for further explanation) the District Court's award of costs and attorney's fees to Columbia. See 106 F. 3d, at 296. 3 Under the 1909 Act, a copyright plaintiff could recover, "in lieu of ac- tual damages and profits, such damages as to the court shall appear to be just, and in assessing such damages the court may, in its discretion, allow the amounts as hereinafter stated, but in the case of a newspaper repro- duction of a copyrighted photograph[,] such damages shall not exceed the sum of [$200] nor be less than the sum of [$50], and such damages shall in 523US1 Unit: $U47 [04-29-00 21:09:57] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 340 (1998) 345 Opinion of the Court Appeals held that § 504(c) does not grant a right to a jury determination of statutory damages. The court reasoned that "[i]f Congress intended to overrule Krofft by having the jury determine the proper award of statutory damages, it would have altered" the language "as the court considers just" in § 504(c). 106 F. 3d, at 293. The Court of Appeals further concluded that the "Seventh Amendment does not provide a right to a jury trial on the issue of statutory dam- ages because an award of such damages is equitable in na- ture." Ibid. We granted certiorari. 521 U. S. 1151 (1997). II Before inquiring into the applicability of the Seventh Amendment, we must " `first ascertain whether a construc- tion of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitu- tional] question may be avoided.' " Tull v. United States, 481 U. S. 412, 417, n. 3 (1987) (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U. S. 189, 192, n. 6 (1974)). Such a construction is not possi- ble here, for we cannot discern "any congressional intent to grant . . . the right to a jury trial," 481 U. S., at 417, n. 3, on an award of statutory damages.4 The language of § 504(c) does not grant a right to have a jury assess statutory damages. Statutory damages are to be assessed in an amount that "the court considers just." § 504(c)(1). Further, in the event that "the court finds" the infringement was willful or innocent, "the court in its discre- tion" may, within limits, increase or decrease the amount of no other case exceed the sum of [$5,000] nor be less than the sum of [$250] . . ." Act of Mar. 4, 1909, § 25(b), 35 Stat. 1081 (later amended and codified at 17 U. S. C. § 101(b)). 4 The Courts of Appeals have unanimously held that § 504(c) is not sus- ceptible of an interpretation that would avoid the Seventh Amendment question. See, e. g., Cass County Music Co. v. C. H. L. R., Inc., 88 F. 3d 635, 641 (CA8 1996); Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F. 2d 1010, 1014 (CA7 1991); Gnossos Music v. Mitken Inc., 653 F. 2d 117, 119 (CA4 1981); see also Oboler v. Goldin, 714 F. 2d 211, 213 (CA2 1983); 4 M. Nim- mer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 14.04[C] (1997). 523US1 Unit: $U47 [04-29-00 21:09:57] PAGES PGT: OPIN 346 FELTNER v. COLUMBIA PICTURES TELEVISION, INC. Opinion of the Court statutory damages. § 504(c)(2). These phrases, like the en- tire statutory provision, make no mention of a right to a jury trial or, for that matter, to juries at all. The word "court" in this context appears to mean judge, not jury. Cf. F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U. S. 228, 232 (1952) (referring to the "judicial dis- cretion" necessary for "the court's choice between a com- puted measure of damage and that imputed by" the Copy- right Act of 1909 (emphasis added)). In fact, the other remedies provisions of the Copyright Act use the term "court" in contexts generally thought to confer authority on a judge, rather than a jury. See, e. g., § 502 ("court . . . may . . . grant temporary and final injunctions"); § 503(a) ("[T]he court may order the impounding . . . of all copies or phonorec- ords"); § 503(b) ("As part of a final judgment or decree, the court may order the destruction or other reasonable disposi- tion of all copies or phonorecords"); § 505 ("[T]he court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs" of litigation, and "the court may also award a reasonable attorney's fee"). In contrast, the Copyright Act does not use the term "court" in the subsection addressing awards of actual damages and profits, see § 504(b), which generally are thought to consti- tute legal relief. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U. S. 469, 477 (1962) (action for damages for trademark infringe- ment "subject to cognizance by a court of law"); see also Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F. 2d 464, 468 (CA2 1946) (copy- right action for damages is "triable at `law' and by a jury as of right"); Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F. 2d 1010, 1014 (CA7 1991) ("little question that the right to a jury trial exists in a copyright infringement action when the copyright owner endeavors to prove and recover its actual damages"); 3 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copy- right § 12.10[B] (1997) ("beyond dispute that a plaintiff who seeks to recover actual damages is entitled to a jury trial" (footnotes omitted)). 523US1 Unit: $U47 [04-29-00 21:09:57] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 340 (1998) 347 Opinion of the Court Feltner relies on Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 585 (1978), in which we held that the Age Discrimination in Em- ployment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. 602, 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq., provides a statutory right to a jury trial in an action for unpaid wages even though the statute authorizes "the court . . . to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate," § 626(b). That holding, however, turned on two crucial factors: The ADEA's remedial provisions were expressly to be enforced in accordance with the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 101 et seq., which had been uniformly interpreted to provide a right to a jury trial, Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S., at 580­581; and the statute used the word "legal," which we found to be a "term of art" used in cases "in which legal relief is available and legal rights are determined" by juries, id., at 583. Section 504(c), in contrast, does not make explicit reference to an- other statute that has been uniformly interpreted to provide a right to jury trial and does not use the word "legal" or other language denoting legal relief or rights.5 We thus discern no statutory right to a jury trial when a copyright owner elects to recover statutory damages. Ac- cordingly, we must reach the constitutional question. III The Seventh Amendment provides that "[i]n Suits at com- mon law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved. . . ." U. S. Const., Amdt. 7. Since Justice Story's time, the Court 5 In addition, a copyright plaintiff may elect statutory damages "at any time before final judgment is rendered." § 504(c)(1). The parties agree, and we have found no indication to the contrary, that election may occur even after a jury has returned a verdict on liability and an award of actual damages. It is at least unlikely that Congress intended that a jury, hav- ing already made a determination of actual damages, should be reconvened to make a determination of statutory damages. 523US1 Unit: $U47 [04-29-00 21:09:57] PAGES PGT: OPIN 348 FELTNER v. COLUMBIA PICTURES TELEVISION, INC. Opinion of the Court has understood "Suits at common law" to refer "not merely [to] suits, which the common law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but [to] suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinc- tion to those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were administered." Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 447 (1830) (emphasis in original). The Seventh Amendment thus applies not only to common-law causes of action, but also to "actions brought to enforce stat- utory rights that are analogous to common-law causes of ac- tion ordinarily decided in English law courts in the late 18th century, as opposed to those customarily heard by courts of equity or admiralty." Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 U. S. 33, 42 (1989) (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U. S., at 193). To determine whether a statutory action is more analogous to cases tried in courts of law than to suits tried in courts of equity or admiralty, we examine both the nature of the statutory action and the remedy sought. See 492 U. S., at 42. Unlike many of our recent Seventh Amendment cases, which have involved modern statutory rights unknown to 18th-century England, see, e. g., Wooddell v. Electrical Workers, 502 U. S. 93 (1991) (alleged violations of union's duties under Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, and Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959); Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, supra (action to rescind fraud- ulent preference under Bankruptcy Act); Tull v. United States, 481 U. S. 412 (1987) (Government's claim for civil pen- alties under Clean Water Act); Curtis v. Loether, supra (claim under Title VIII of Civil Rights Act of 1968), in this case there are close analogues to actions seeking statutory damages under § 504(c). Before the adoption of the Seventh Amendment, the common law and statutes in England and this country granted copyright owners causes of action for infringement. More importantly, copyright suits for mone- 523US1 Unit: $U47 [04-29-00 21:09:57] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 340 (1998) 349 Opinion of the Court tary damages were tried in courts of law, and thus before juries. By the middle of the 17th century, the common law recog- nized an author's right to prevent the unauthorized publica- tion of his manuscript. See, e. g., Stationers Co. v. Patent- ees, Carter's Rep. 89, 124 Eng. Rep. 842 (C. P. 1666). This protection derived from the principle that the manuscript was the product of intellectual labor and was as much the author's property as the material on which it was written. See Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2398, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 252 (K. B. 1769) (opinion of Mansfield, C. J.) (common-law copyright derived from principle that "it is just, that an Au- thor should reap the pecuniary Profits of his own ingenu- ity and Labour"); 1 W. Patry, Copyright Law and Practice 3 (1994). Actions seeking damages for infringement of common-law copyright, like actions seeking damages for in- vasions of other property rights, were tried in courts of law in actions on the case. See Millar v. Taylor, supra, at 2396­ 2397, 98 Eng. Rep., at 251. Actions on the case, like other actions at law, were tried before juries. See McClenachan v. McCarty, 1 Dall. 375, 378 (C. P. Phila. Cty. 1788); 5 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ¶38.11[5] (2d ed. 1996); 1 J. Chitty, Treatise on Pleading and Parties to Actions 164 (1892). In 1710, the first English copyright statute, the Statute of Anne, was enacted to protect published books. 8 Anne ch. 19 (1710). Under the Statute of Anne, damages for infringe- ment were set at "one Penny for every Sheet which shall be found in [the infringer's] custody, either printed or printing, published, or exposed to Sale," half ("one Moiety") to go to the Crown and half to the copyright owner, and were "to be recovered . . . by Action of Debt, Bill, Plaint, or Information." § 1. Like the earlier practice with regard to common-law copyright claims for damages, actions seeking damages under the Statute of Anne were tried in courts of law. See 523US1 Unit: $U47 [04-29-00 21:09:57] PAGES PGT: OPIN 350 FELTNER v. COLUMBIA PICTURES TELEVISION, INC. Opinion of the Court Beckford v. Hood, 7 T. R. 621, 627, 101 Eng. Rep. 1164, 1167 (K. B. 1798) (opinion of Kenyon, C. J.) ("[T]he statute having vested that right in the author, the common law gives the remedy by action on the case for the violation of it"). The practice of trying copyright damages actions at law before juries was followed in this country, where statutory copyright protections were enacted even before adoption of the Constitution. In 1783, the Continental Congress passed a resolution recommending that the States secure copyright protections for authors. See U. S. Copyright Office, Copy- right Enactments: Laws Passed in the United States Since 1783 Relating to Copyright, Bulletin No. 3, p. 1 (rev. ed. 1963) (hereinafter Copyright Enactments). Twelve States (all ex- cept Delaware) responded by enacting copyright statutes, each of which provided a cause of action for damages, and none of which made any reference to equity jurisdiction. At least three of these state statutes expressly stated that dam- ages were to be recovered through actions at law, see id., at 2 (in Connecticut, damages for double the value of the in- fringed copy "to be recovered . . . in any court of law in this State"); id., at 17 (in Georgia, similar damages enforceable "in due course of law"); id., at 19 (in New York, similar dam- ages enforceable in "any court of law"), while four others provided that damages would be recovered in an "action of debt," a prototypical action brought in a court of law before a jury. See F. Maitland, Forms of Action at Common Law 357 (1929) (hereinafter Maitland); see Copyright Enactments 4­9 (in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, damages enforceable by "action of debt"); id., at 12 (in South Carolina, damages of one shilling per sheet enforceable by "debt, bill, plaint or information"). Although these statutes were short-lived, and hence few courts had occasion to inter- pret them, the available evidence suggests that the practice was for copyright actions seeking damages to be tried to a jury. See Hudson & Goodwin v. Patten, 1 Root 133, 134 523US1 Unit: $U47 [04-29-00 21:09:57] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 340 (1998) 351 Opinion of the Court (Conn. Super. Ct. 1789) (jury awarded copyright owner £100 under Connecticut copyright statute). Moreover, three of the state statutes specifically author- ized an award of damages from a statutory range, just as § 504(c) does today. See Copyright Enactments 4 (in Massa- chusetts, damages of not less than £5 and not more than £3,000); id., at 8 (in New Hampshire, damages of not less than £5 and not more than £1,000); id., at 9 (in Rhode Island, damages of not less than £5 and not more than £3,000). Al- though we have found no direct evidence of the practice under these statutes, there is no reason to suppose that such actions were intended to deviate from the traditional prac- tice: The damages were to be recovered by an "action of debt," see id., at 4­9, which was an action at law, see Mait- land 357. In 1790, Congress passed the first federal copyright stat- ute, the Copyright Act of 1790, which similarly authorized the awarding of damages for copyright infringements. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, §§ 2, 6, 1 Stat. 124, 125. The Copy- right Act of 1790 provided that damages for copyright in- fringement of published works would be "the sum of fifty cents for every sheet which shall be found in [the infringer's] possession, . . . to be recovered by action of debt in any court of record in the United States, wherein the same is cogniza- ble." § 2. Like the Statute of Anne, the Copyright Act of 1790 provided that half ("one moiety") of such damages were to go to the copyright owner and half to the United States. For infringement of an unpublished manuscript, the statute entitled a copyright owner to "all damages occasioned by such injury, to be recovered by a special action on the case founded upon this act, in any court having cognizance thereof." § 6. There is no evidence that the Copyright Act of 1790 changed the practice of trying copyright actions for damages in courts of law before juries. As we have noted, actions on the case and actions of debt were actions at law for which a 523US1 Unit: $U47 [04-29-00 21:09:57] PAGES PGT: OPIN 352 FELTNER v. COLUMBIA PICTURES TELEVISION, INC. Opinion of the Court jury was required. See supra, at 349, 350.6 Moreover, ac- tions to recover damages under the Copyright Act of 1831­­ which differed from the Copyright Act of 1790 only in the amount (increased to $1 from 50 cents) authorized to be re- covered for certain infringing sheets­­were consistently tried to juries. See, e. g., Backus v. Gould, 7 How. 798, 802 (1849) (jury awarded damages of $2,069.75); Reed v. Carusi, 20 F. Cas. 431, 432 (No. 11,642) (CC Md. 1845) (jury awarded damages of $200); Millett v. Snowden, 17 F. Cas. 374, 375 (No. 9,600) (SDNY 1844) (jury awarded damages of $625); Dwight v. Appleton, 8 F. Cas. 183, 185 (No. 4,215) (SDNY 1843) (jury awarded damages of $2,000). Columbia does not dispute this historical evidence. In fact, Columbia makes no attempt to draw an analogy be- tween an action for statutory damages under § 504(c) and any historical cause of action­­including those actions for mone- tary relief that we have characterized as equitable, such as actions for disgorgement of improper profits. See Team- sters v. Terry, 494 U. S. 558, 570­571 (1990); Tull v. United States, 481 U. S., at 424. Rather, Columbia merely contends that statutory damages are clearly equitable in nature. We are not persuaded. We have recognized the "general rule" that monetary relief is legal, Teamsters v. Terry, supra, at 570, and an award of statutory damages may serve pur- poses traditionally associated with legal relief, such as com- pensation and punishment. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U. S., at 196 (actual damages are "traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law"); Tull v. United States, 481 U. S., at 422 6 The Copyright Act of 1790 did not provide for equitable remedies at all, and in Stevens v. Gladding, 17 How. 447 (1855), we held that, even after Congress had provided for equity jurisdiction under the Copyright Act, see Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481, the statute's damages provision could not be enforced through a suit in equity. 17 How., at 455; see also Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U. S. 617, 663 (1888) (Stevens v. Gladding determined that "the penalties given by § 7 of the copyright act of 1831 cannot be enforced in a suit in equity"). 523US1 Unit: $U47 [04-29-00 21:09:57] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 340 (1998) 353 Opinion of the Court ("Remedies intended to punish culpable individuals . . . were issued by courts of law, not courts of equity"). Nor, as we have previously stated, is a monetary remedy rendered equi- table simply because it is "not fixed or readily calculable from a fixed formula." Id., at 422, n. 7. And there is histor- ical evidence that cases involving discretionary monetary re- lief were tried before juries. See, e. g., Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N. J. L. 77 (1791) (jury award of "exemplary damages" in an action on a promise of marriage). Accordingly, we must conclude that the Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial where the copyright owner elects to recover statu- tory damages. The right to a jury trial includes the right to have a jury determine the amount of statutory damages, if any, awarded to the copyright owner. It has long been recognized that "by the law the jury are judges of the damages." Lord Townshend v. Hughes, 2 Mod. 150, 151, 86 Eng. Rep. 994, 994­995 (C. P. 1677). Thus in Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474 (1935), the Court stated that "the common law rule as it existed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution" was that "in cases where the amount of damages was uncertain[,] their assessment was a matter so peculiarly within the prov- ince of the jury that the Court should not alter it." Id., at 480 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). And there is overwhelming evidence that the consistent practice at common law was for juries to award damages. See, e. g., Duke of York v. Pilkington, 2 Show. 246, 89 Eng. Rep. 918 (K. B. 1760) (jury award of £100,000 in a slander action); Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft 1, 19, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 499 (C. P. 1763) (jury award of £1,000 in an action of trespass); Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C. P. 1763) (upholding jury award of £300 in an action for trespass, assault and im- prisonment); Genay v. Norris, 1 S. C. L. 6, 7 (1784) (jury award of £400); Coryell v. Colbaugh, supra (sustaining cor- rectness of jury award of exemplary damages in an action on a promise of marriage); see also K. Redden, Punitive Dam- 523US1 Unit: $U47 [04-29-00 21:09:57] PAGES PGT: OPIN 354 FELTNER v. COLUMBIA PICTURES TELEVISION, INC. Opinion of the Court ages § 2.2, p. 27 (1980) (describing "primacy of the jury in the awarding of damages"). More specifically, this was the consistent practice in copy- right cases. In Hudson & Goodwin v. Patten, 1 Root, at 134, for example, a jury awarded a copyright owner £100 under the Connecticut copyright statute, which permitted damages in an amount double the value of the infringed copy. In addition, juries assessed the amount of damages under the Copyright Act of 1831, even though that statute, like the Copyright Act of 1790, fixed damages at a set amount per infringing sheet. See Backus v. Gould, supra, at 802 (jury awarded damages of $2,069.75); Reed v. Carusi, supra, at 432 (same, but $200); Dwight v. Appleton, supra, at 185 (same, but $2,000); Millett v. Snowden, supra, at 375 (same, but $625). Relying on Tull v. United States, supra, Columbia con- tends that the Seventh Amendment does not provide a right to a jury determination of the amount of the award. In Tull, we held that the Seventh Amendment grants a right to a jury trial on all issues relating to liability for civil penalties under the Clean Water Act, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1251, 1319(d),7 see 481 U. S., at 425, but then went on to decide that Congress could constitutionally authorize trial judges to assess the amount of the civil penalties, see id., at 426­427.8 According to Columbia, Tull demonstrates that a jury determination of the amount of statutory damages is not necessary "to pre- serve `the substance of the common-law right of trial by jury.' " Id., at 426 (quoting Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U. S. 149, 157 (1973)). 7 Section 1319(d) of the Clean Water Act provided that violators of cer- tain sections of the Act "shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 per day" during the period of the violation. 481 U. S., at 414. 8 This portion of our opinion was arguably dicta, for our holding that there was a right to a jury trial on issues relating to liability required us to reverse the lower court's liability determination. 523US1 Unit: $U47 [04-29-00 21:09:57] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 340 (1998) 355 Scalia, J., concurring in judgment In Tull, however, we were presented with no evidence that juries historically had determined the amount of civil penal- ties to be paid to the Government.9 Moreover, the awarding of civil penalties to the Government could be viewed as anal- ogous to sentencing in a criminal proceeding. See 481 U. S., at 428 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).10 Here, of course, there is no similar analogy, and there is clear and direct historical evidence that juries, both as a general matter and in copyright cases, set the amount of damages awarded to a successful plaintiff. Tull is thus inapposite. As a result, if a party so demands, a jury must determine the actual amount of statutory damages under § 504(c) in order "to preserve `the substance of the common- law right of trial by jury.' " Id., at 426. * * * For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial on all issues per- tinent to an award of statutory damages under § 504(c) of the Copyright Act, including the amount itself. The judgment below is reversed, and we remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment. It is often enough that we must hold an enactment of Con- gress to be unconstitutional. I see no reason to do so here- 9 It should be noted that Tull is at least in tension with Bank of Hamil- ton v. Lessee of Dudley, 2 Pet. 492 (1829), in which the Court held in light of the Seventh Amendment that a jury must determine the amount of compensation for improvements to real estate, and with Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474 (1935), in which the Court held that the Seventh Amendment bars the use of additur. 10 As we have noted, even under the Statute of Anne and the Copyright Act of 1790, the amount awarded to the Government ("one Moiety") was determined by a jury. 523US1 Unit: $U47 [04-29-00 21:09:57] PAGES PGT: OPIN 356 FELTNER v. COLUMBIA PICTURES TELEVISION, INC. Scalia, J., concurring in judgment not because I believe that jury trial is not constitutionally required (I do not reach that issue), but because the statute can and therefore should be read to provide jury trial. "[W]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter." United States ex rel. Attor- ney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 408 (1909). The Copyright Act of 1976 authorizes statutory damages for copyright infringement "in a sum of not less than $500 or more than $20,000 as the court considers just." 17 U. S. C. § 504(c). The Court concludes that it is not "fairly possible," ante, at 345 (internal quotation marks omitted), to read § 504(c) as authorizing jury determination of the amount of those damages. I disagree. In common legal parlance, the word "court" can mean "[t]he judge or judges, as distinguished from the counsel or jury." Webster's New International Dictionary 611 (2d ed. 1949) (def. 10d). But it also has a broader meaning, which includes both judge and jury. See, e. g., ibid. (def. 10b: "The persons duly assembled under authority of law for the ad- ministration of justice"); Black's Law Dictionary 318 (5th ed. 1979) (". . . A body organized to administer justice, and including both judge and jury"). We held in Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575 (1978), that a statute authorizing "the court . . . to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate," 29 U. S. C. § 626(b), could fairly be read to afford a right to jury trial on claims for backpay under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. As the Court correctly observes, ante, at 347, there was more evidence in Lorillard than there is in the present case that "court" was being used to include the jury. The reme- dial provision at issue explicitly referred to the " `powers, remedies, and procedures' " of the Fair Labor Standards Act, under which "it was well established that there was a right to a jury trial," Lorillard, 434 U. S., at 580. The provision's 523US1 Unit: $U47 [04-29-00 21:09:57] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 340 (1998) 357 Scalia, J., concurring in judgment reference to "legal . . . relief" also strongly suggested a stat- utory right to jury trial. Id., at 583. The text of § 504(c) lacks such clear indications that "court" is being used in its broader sense. But their absence hardly demonstrates that the broader reading is not "fairly possible," e. g., Tull v. United States, 481 U. S. 412, 417, n. 3 (1987). The only sig- nificant evidence cited by the Court for that proposition is that the "Copyright Act use[s] the term `court' in contexts generally thought to confer authority on a judge, rather than a jury," ante, at 346, but "does not use the term `court' in the subsection addressing awards of actual damages and profits, see § 504(b), which generally are thought to consti- tute legal relief," ibid. That is a fair observation, but it is not, in my view, probative enough to compel an interpreta- tion that is constitutionally doubtful. That is at least so in light of contradictory evidence from the statutory history, which the Court chooses to ignore. Section 504(c) is the direct descendant of a remedy created for unauthorized performance of dramatic compositions in an 1856 copyright statute. That statute provided for damages "not less than one hundred dollars for the first, and fifty dol- lars for every subsequent performance, as to the court hav- ing cognizance thereof shall appear to be just," enforced through an "action on the case or other equivalent remedy." Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138, 139. Because actions on the case were historically tried at law, it seems clear that this original statute permitted juries to assess such damages. See Lorillard, supra, at 583. Although subsequent revisions omitted the reference to "action[s] on the case," they carried forward the language specifying dam- ages "as to the court shall appear to be just." See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 101, 16 Stat. 214; Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 482. In 1909, Congress extended those provi- sions to permit all copyright owners to recover "in lieu of actual damages and profits such damages as to the court shall appear just . . . ." Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 25(b), 523US1 Unit: $U47 [04-29-00 21:09:57] PAGES PGT: OPIN 358 FELTNER v. COLUMBIA PICTURES TELEVISION, INC. Scalia, J., concurring in judgment 35 Stat. 1081. We have recognized that, although the prior statutory damages provisions "were broadened [in 1909] so as to include other copy- rights and the limitations were changed in amount, . . . the principle on which they proceeded-that of commit- ting the amount of damages to be recovered to the court's discretion and sense of justice, subject to pre- scribed limitations-was retained. The new provision, like one of the old, says the damages shall be such `as to the court shall appear to be just.' " L. A. Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., 249 U. S. 100, 107 (1919). If a right to jury trial was consistent with the meaning of the phrase "as to the court . . . shall appear to be just" in the 1856 statutory damages provision, I see no reason to insist that the phrase "as the court considers just" has a different meaning in that provision's latest reenactment. "[W]here, as here, Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorpo- rated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute." Lorillard, supra, at 581. I do not contend that reading "court" to include "jury" is necessarily the best interpretation of this statutory text. The Court is perhaps correct that the indications pointing to a change in meaning from the 1856 statute predominate. As I have written elsewhere, however: "The doctrine of constitutional doubt does not require that the problem-avoiding construction be the prefera- ble one-the one the Court would adopt in any event. Such a standard would deprive the doctrine of all func- tion. `Adopt the interpretation that avoids the constitu- tional doubt if that is the right one' produces precisely the same result as `adopt the right interpretation.' Rather, the doctrine of constitutional doubt comes into play when the statute is `susceptible of' the problem- 523US1 Unit: $U47 [04-29-00 21:09:57] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 340 (1998) 359 Scalia, J., concurring in judgment avoiding interpretation, Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S., at 408-when that interpretation is reasonable, though not necessarily the best." Almendarez-Torres v. United States, ante, at 270 (dissenting opinion). As the majority's discussion amply demonstrates, there would be considerable doubt about the constitutionality of § 504(c) if it did not permit jury determination of the amount of statutory damages. Because an interpretation of § 504(c) that avoids the Seventh Amendment question is at least "fairly possible," I would adopt that interpretation, prevent the invalidation of this statute, and reserve the constitu- tional issue for another day. 523US1 Unit: $U48 [04-29-00 21:12:06] PAGES PGT: OPIN 360 OCTOBER TERM, 1997 Syllabus UNITED STATES v. UNITED STATES SHOE CORP. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the federal circuit No. 97­372. Argued March 4, 1998-Decided March 31, 1998 The Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT) obligates exporters, importers, and domestic shippers, 26 U. S. C. § 4461(c)(1), to pay 0.125 percent of the value of the commercial cargo they ship through the Nation's ports, § 4461(a). The HMT is imposed at the time of loading for exports and unloading for other shipments. § 4461(c)(2). It is collected by the Cus- toms Service and deposited in the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund (Fund), from which Congress may appropriate amounts to pay for har- bor maintenance and development projects and related expenses. § 9505. Respondent United States Shoe Corporation (U. S. Shoe) paid the HMT for articles the company exported during the period April to June 1994 and then filed a protest with the Customs Service alleging that, to the extent the toll applies to exports, it violates the Export Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 5, which states: "No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State." The Customs Service responded to U. S. Shoe with a form letter stating that the HMT is a statutorily mandated user fee, not an unconstitutional tax on exports. U. S. Shoe then sued for a refund, asserting that the HMT violates the Export Clause as applied to exports. In granting U. S. Shoe summary judgment, the Court of International Trade (CIT) held that it had juris- diction under 28 U. S. C. § 1581(i) and that the HMT qualifies as a tax. Rejecting the Government's characterization of the HMT as a user fee, the CIT reasoned that the tax is assessed ad valorem directly upon the value of the cargo itself, not upon any services rendered for the cargo. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Held:1. The CIT properly entertained jurisdiction in this case. Section 1581(i)(4) gives that court residual jurisdiction over "any civil action . . . against the United States . . . that arises out of any [federal] law . . . providing for . . . administration and enforcement with respect to the matters referred to in [§ 1581(i)(1)]," which in turn applies to "revenue from imports." This dispute involves such a law. The HMT statute, although applied to exports here, applies equally to imports. That § 1581(i) does not use the word "exports" is hardly surprising in view of the Export Clause, which confines customs duties to imports. More- 523US1 Unit: $U48 [04-29-00 21:12:06] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 360 (1998) 361 Syllabus over, 26 U. S. C. § 4462(f)(2) directs that the HMT "be treated as . . . a customs duty" for jurisdictional purposes. Such duties, by their very nature, provide for revenue from imports and are encompassed within 28 U. S. C. § 1581(i)(1). Accordingly, CIT jurisdiction over controver- sies regarding HMT administration and enforcement accords with § 1581(i)(4). Pp. 365­366. 2. Although the Export Clause categorically bars Congress from im- posing any tax on exports, United States v. International Business Ma- chines Corp., 517 U. S. 843 (IBM), it does not rule out a "user fee" that lacks the attributes of a generally applicable tax or duty and is, instead, a charge designed as compensation for Government-supplied services, facilities, or benefits, see Pace v. Burgess, 92 U. S. 372, 375­376. The HMT, however, is a tax, and thus violates the Export Clause as applied to exports. Pp. 366­370. (a) The HMT bears the indicia of a tax: Congress expressly de- scribed it as such, 26 U. S. C. § 4461(a), codified it as part of the Internal Revenue Code, and provided that, for administrative, enforcement, and jurisdictional purposes, it should be treated "as if [it] were a customs duty," §§ 4462(f)(1), (2). Prior cases in which this Court upheld flat and ad valorem charges as valid user fees do not govern here because they involved constitutional provisions other than the Export Clause. IBM plainly stated that the Export Clause's simple, direct, unqualified prohi- bition on any taxes or duties distinguishes it from other constitutional limitations on governmental taxing authority. 517 U. S., at 851, 852, 857, 861. Pp. 366­369. (b) The guiding precedent for determining what constitutes a bona fide user fee in the Export Clause context remains this Court's time- tested Pace decision. The Pace Court upheld a fee for stamps placed on tobacco packaged for export. The stamp was required to prevent fraud, and the charge for it, the Court said, served as "compensation given for services [in fact] rendered." 92 U. S., at 375. In holding that the fee was not a duty, the Court emphasized that the charge bore no relationship to the quantity or value of the goods stamped for export. Ibid. Pace establishes that, under the Export Clause, the connection between a service the Government renders and the compensation it re- ceives for that service must be closer than is present here. Unlike the fee at issue in Pace, the HMT is determined entirely on an ad valorem basis. The value of export cargo, however, does not correlate reliably with the federal harbor services, facilities, and benefits used or usable by the exporter. The Court's holding does not mean that exporters are exempt from any and all user fees designed to defray the cost of harbor 523US1 Unit: $U48 [04-29-00 21:12:06] PAGES PGT: OPIN 362 UNITED STATES v. UNITED STATES SHOE CORP. Opinion of the Court development and maintenance. It does mean, however, that such a fee must fairly match the exporters' use of port services and facilities. Pp. 369­370. 114 F. 3d 1564, affirmed. Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Kent L. Jones, David M. Cohen, Todd M. Hughes, and Lara Levinson. James R. Atwood argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Brian S. Goldstein, Steven S. Weiser, Laurence M. Friedman, Paul A. Horowitz, and Robert A. Long, Jr.* Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. The Export Clause of the Constitution states: "No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State." *Hardy Myers, Attorney General of Oregon, Michael D. Reynolds, So- licitor General, David Schuman, Deputy Attorney General, and Robert M. Atkinson, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of Oregon as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Addison Wesley Longman et al. by Carlos Rodriguez and Todd C. Fineberg; for the Alumi- num Co. of America et al. by Melvin S. Schwechter, John C. Cleary, and Julie A. Coletti; for Baxter Healthcare Corp. et al. by Mark S. Zolno and Michael E. Roll; for Boise Cascade et al. by Steven P. Florsheim, Robert B. Silverman, and Erik D. Smithweiss; for Cobe Laboratories, Inc., et al. by Lynn S. Baker, Thomas E. Johnson, and Gregory W. Bowman; for General Chemical Corp. et al. by Patrick D. Gill, John S. Rode, and Elea- nore Kelly-Kobayashi; for the National Industrial Transportation League by Nicholas J. DiMichael; and for Texaco Refining and Marketing, Inc., et al. by Steven H. Becker and Charles H. Critchlow. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for Amoco Chemical Co. by Robert E. Burke and Christopher E. Pey; for Arctic Cat, Inc., et al. by Robert J. Hennessey; for New Holland North America, Inc., et al. by Munford Page Hall II and John B. Rehm; and for Totes-Isotoner Corp. et al. by John M. Peterson and George W. Thompson. 523US1 Unit: $U48 [04-29-00 21:12:06] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 360 (1998) 363 Opinion of the Court U. S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 5. We held in United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U. S. 843 (1996) (IBM), that the Export Clause categorically bars Congress from imposing any tax on exports. The Clause, however, does not rule out a "user fee," provided that the fee lacks the attributes of a generally applicable tax or duty and is, instead, a charge designed as compensation for Government- supplied services, facilities, or benefits. See Pace v. Bur- gess, 92 U. S. 372, 375­376 (1876). This case presents the question whether the Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT), 26 U. S. C. § 4461(a), as applied to goods loaded at United States ports for export, is an impermissible tax on exports or, in- stead, a legitimate user fee. We hold, in accord with the Federal Circuit, that the tax, which is imposed on an ad valo- rem basis, is not a fair approximation of services, facilities, or benefits furnished to the exporters, and therefore does not qualify as a permissible user fee. I The HMT, enacted as part of the Water Resources Devel- opment Act of 1986, 26 U. S. C. §§ 4461­4462, imposes a uni- form charge on shipments of commercial cargo through the Nation's ports. The charge is currently set at 0.125 percent of the cargo's value. Exporters, importers, and domestic shippers are liable for the HMT, § 4461(c)(1), which is im- posed at the time of loading for exports and unloading for other shipments, § 4461(c)(2). The HMT is collected by the Customs Service and deposited in the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund (Fund). Congress may appropriate amounts from the Fund to pay for harbor maintenance and develop- ment projects, including costs associated with the St. Law- rence Seaway, or related expenses. § 9505. Respondent United States Shoe Corporation (U. S. Shoe) paid the HMT for articles the company exported during the period April to June 1994 and then filed a protest with the Customs Service alleging the unconstitutionality of the toll 523US1 Unit: $U48 [04-29-00 21:12:06] PAGES PGT: OPIN 364 UNITED STATES v. UNITED STATES SHOE CORP. Opinion of the Court to the extent it applies to exports. The Customs Service responded with a form letter stating that the HMT is a statu- torily mandated fee assessment on port users, not an uncon- stitutional tax on exports. On November 3, 1994, U. S. Shoe brought this action against the Government in the Court of International Trade (CIT). The company sought a refund on the ground that the HMT is unconstitutional as applied to exports. Sitting as a three-judge court, the CIT held that its juris- diction was properly invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1581(i); on the merits, the CIT agreed with U. S. Shoe that the HMT qualifies as a tax. 907 F. Supp. 408 (1995). Rejecting the Government's characterization of the HMT as a user fee rather than a tax, the CIT reasoned: "The Tax is assessed ad valorem directly upon the value of the cargo itself, not upon any services rendered for the cargo . . . . Congress could not have imposed the Tax any closer to exportation, or more immediate to the articles exported." Id., at 418. Relying on the Export Clause, the CIT entered summary judgment for U. S. Shoe. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting as a five-judge panel, affirmed. 114 F. 3d 1564 (1997). On auxil- iary questions, the Federal Circuit upheld the CIT's exercise of jurisdiction under § 1581(i) and agreed with the lower court that the HMT applied to goods in export transit.1 Concluding that the HMT is not based on a fair approxima- tion of port use, the Federal Circuit also agreed that the HMT imposes a tax, not a user fee. In making this determi- nation, the Court of Appeals emphasized that the HMT does not depend on the amount or manner of port use, but is de- termined solely by the value of cargo. Judge Mayer dis- sented; in his view, Congress properly designed the HMT as a user fee, a toll on shippers that supplies funds not for the 1 The Government does not here challenge the determination that the HMT applies to goods in export transit. 523US1 Unit: $U48 [04-29-00 21:12:06] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 360 (1998) 365 Opinion of the Court general support of government, but exclusively for the facili- tation of commercial navigation. Numerous cases challenging the constitutionality of the HMT as applied to exports are currently pending in the CIT and the Court of Federal Claims.2 We granted certiorari, 522 U. S. 944 (1997), to review the Federal Circuit's determi- nation that the HMT violates the Export Clause. II As an initial matter, we conclude that the CIT properly entertained jurisdiction in this case. The complaint alleged exclusive original jurisdiction in that tribunal under 28 U. S. C. § 1581(a) or, alternatively, § 1581(i). App. 26. We agree with the CIT and the Federal Circuit that § 1581(i) is the applicable jurisdictional prescription. The key directive is stated in 26 U. S. C. § 4462(f)(2), which instructs that for jurisdictional purposes, the HMT "shall be treated as if such tax were a customs duty." Section 1581(a) surely concerns customs duties. It con- fers exclusive original jurisdiction on the CIT in "any civil action commenced to contest the [Customs Service's] denial of a protest." A protest, as indicated in 19 U. S. C. § 1514, is an essential prerequisite when one challenges an actual Customs decision. As to the HMT, however, the Federal Circuit correctly noted that protests are not pivotal, for Cus- toms "performs no active role," it undertakes "no analysis [or adjudication]," "issues no directives," "imposes no liabili- ties"; instead, Customs "merely passively collects" HMT pay- ments. 114 F. 3d, at 1569. Section 1581(i) describes the CIT's residual jurisdiction over 2 According to the Government, some 4,000 cases raising this claim are currently stayed in the CIT, with more than 100 additional cases stayed in the Court of Federal Claims. See Brief for United States 4. 523US1 Unit: $U48 [04-29-00 21:12:06] PAGES PGT: OPIN 366 UNITED STATES v. UNITED STATES SHOE CORP. Opinion of the Court "any civil action commenced against the United States . . . that arises out of any law of the United States pro- viding for - "(1) revenue from imports or tonnage; . . . . . "(4) administration and enforcement with respect to the matters referred to in paragraphs (1)­(3) of this subsection . . . ." This dispute, as the Federal Circuit stated, "involve[s] the `administration and enforcement' of a law providing for reve- nue from imports because the HMT statute, although applied to exports here, does apply equally to imports." 114 F. 3d, at 1571. True, § 1581(i) does not use the word "exports." But that is hardly surprising in view of the Export Clause, which confines customs duties to imports. Revenue from imports and revenue from customs duties are thus synony- mous in this setting. In short, as the CIT correctly con- cluded and the Federal Circuit correctly affirmed, "Congress [in § 4462(f)(2)] directed [that] the [HMT] be treated as a cus- toms duty for purposes of jurisdiction. Such duties, by their very nature, provide for revenue from imports, and are en- compassed within [§ ]1581(i)(1)." 907 F. Supp., at 421. Ac- cordingly, CIT jurisdiction over controversies regarding the administration and enforcement of the HMT accords with § 1581(i)(4).3 III Two Terms ago, in IBM, this Court considered the ques- tion whether a tax on insurance premiums paid to protect 3 Because we determine that the CIT has exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to the HMT under § 1581(i)(4), it follows that the Court of Fed- eral Claims lacks jurisdiction over the challenges to the HMT currently pending there. See 28 U. S. C. § 1491(b). The plaintiffs in these chal- lenges may invoke § 1631, which authorizes intercourt transfers, when "in the interest of justice," to cure want of jurisdiction. See also § 610 (as used in Title 28, the term "court" includes the Court of Federal Claims and the CIT). 523US1 Unit: $U48 [04-29-00 21:12:06] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 360 (1998) 367 Opinion of the Court exports against loss violated the Export Clause. Distin- guishing case law developed under the Commerce Clause, 517 U. S., at 850­852, and the Import-Export Clause, id., at 857­861, the Court held that the Export Clause allows no room for any federal tax, however generally applicable or nondiscriminatory, on goods in export transit. Before this Court's decision in IBM, the Government argued that the HMT, even if characterized as a "tax" rather than a "user fee," should survive constitutional review "because it applies without discrimination to exports, imports and domestic commerce alike." Reply Brief for United States 9, n. 2. Recognizing that IBM "rejected an indistinguishable con- tention," the Government now asserts only that HMT is " `a permissible user fee,' " Reply Brief for United States 9, n. 2, a toll within the tolerance of Export Clause precedent. Adhering to the Court's reasoning in IBM, we reject the Government's current position. The HMT bears the indicia of a tax. Congress expressly described it as "a tax on any port use," 26 U. S. C. § 4461(a) (emphasis added), and codified the HMT as part of the Inter- nal Revenue Code. In like vein, Congress provided that, for administrative, enforcement, and jurisdictional purposes, the HMT should be treated "as if [it] were a customs duty." §§ 4462(f)(1), (2). However, "we must regard things rather than names," Pace v. Burgess, 92 U. S., at 376, in determining whether an imposition on exports ranks as a tax. The cru- cial question is whether the HMT is a tax on exports in oper- ation as well as nomenclature or whether, despite the label Congress has put on it, the exaction is instead a bona fide user fee. In arguing that the HMT constitutes a user fee, the Gov- ernment relies on our decisions in United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U. S. 52 (1989), Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444 (1978), and Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U. S. 707 (1972). In those cases, this Court upheld flat and ad valorem charges 523US1 Unit: $U48 [04-29-00 21:12:06] PAGES PGT: OPIN 368 UNITED STATES v. UNITED STATES SHOE CORP. Opinion of the Court as valid user fees. See United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U. S., at 62 (11 2 percent ad valorem fee applied to awards certified by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal qualifies as a user fee and is not so excessive as to violate the Takings Clause); Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S., at 463­ 467 (flat federal registration fee imposed annually on all civil aircraft meets genuine user fee standards and, as applied to state-owned aircraft, does not dishonor State's immunity from federal taxation); Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Au- thority, 405 U. S., at 717­721 (flat charge for each passenger enplaning, levied for the maintenance of State's airport facili- ties, does not run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause). Those decisions involved constitutional provisions other than the Export Clause, however, and thus do not govern here. IBM plainly stated that the Export Clause's simple, direct, unqualified prohibition on any taxes or duties distinguishes it from other constitutional limitations on governmental taxing authority. The Court there emphasized that the "text of the Export Clause . . . expressly prohibits Congress from laying any tax or duty on exports." 517 U. S., at 852; see also id., at 861 ("[T]he Framers sought to alleviate . . . concerns [that Northern States would tax exports to the disadvantage of Southern States] by completely denying to Congress the power to tax exports at all."). Accordingly, the Court rea- soned in IBM, "[o]ur decades-long struggle over the meaning of the nontextual negative command of the dormant Com- merce Clause does not lead to the conclusion that our inter- pretation of the textual command of the Export Clause is equally fluid." Id., at 851; see also id., at 857 ("We have good reason to hesitate before adopting the analysis of our recent Import-Export Clause cases into our Export Clause jurisprudence. . . . [M]eaningful textual differences exist [be- tween the two Clauses] and should not be overlooked."). In Sperry, moreover, we noted that the Takings Clause imposes fewer constraints on user fees than does the dormant Com- merce Clause. See 493 U. S., at 61, n. 7 (analysis under Tak- 523US1 Unit: $U48 [04-29-00 21:12:06] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 360 (1998) 369 Opinion of the Court ings Clause is less "exacting" than under the dormant Com- merce Clause). A fortiori, therefore, the Takings Clause is less restrictive than the Export Clause. The guiding precedent for determining what constitutes a bona fide user fee in the Export Clause context remains our time-tested decision in Pace. Pace involved a federal excise tax on tobacco. Congress provided that the tax would not apply to tobacco intended for export. To prevent fraud, however, Congress required that tobacco the manufacturer planned to export carry a stamp indicating that intention. Each stamp cost 25 cents (later 10 cents) per package of to- bacco. Congress did not limit the quantity or value of the tobacco packaged for export or the size of the stamped pack- age; "[t]hese were unlimited, except by the discretion of the exporter or the convenience of handling." 92 U. S., at 375. The Court upheld the charge, concluding that it was "in no sense a duty on exportation," but rather "compensation given for services [in fact] rendered." Ibid. In so ruling, the Court emphasized two characteristics of the charge: It "bore no proportion whatever to the quantity or value of the package on which [the stamp] was affixed"; and the fee was not excessive, taking into account the cost of arrangements needed both "to give to the exporter the benefit of exemp- tion from taxation, and . . . to secure . . . against the perpetra- tion of fraud." Ibid. Pace establishes that, under the Export Clause, the con- nection between a service the Government renders and the compensation it receives for that service must be closer than is present here. Unlike the stamp charge in Pace, the HMT is determined entirely on an ad valorem basis. The value of export cargo, however, does not correlate reliably with the federal harbor services used or usable by the exporter. As the Federal Circuit noted, the extent and manner of port use depend on factors such as the size and tonnage of a vessel, the length of time it spends in port, and the services it re- quires, for instance, harbor dredging. See 114 F. 3d, at 1572. 523US1 Unit: $U48 [04-29-00 21:12:06] PAGES PGT: OPIN 370 UNITED STATES v. UNITED STATES SHOE CORP. Opinion of the Court In sum, if we are "to guard against . . . the imposition of a [tax] under the pretext of fixing a fee," Pace v. Burgess, 92 U. S., at 376, and resist erosion of the Court's decision in IBM, we must hold that the HMT violates the Export Clause as applied to exports. This does not mean that exporters are exempt from any and all user fees designed to defray the cost of harbor development and maintenance. It does mean, however, that such a fee must fairly match the exporters' use of port services and facilities. * * * For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is Affirmed. 523US2 Unit: $U49 [04-29-00 17:17:11] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1997 371 Syllabus BREARD v. GREENE, WARDEN on application for stay and on petition for writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit No. 97­8214 (A­732). Decided April 14, 1998* Petitioner Breard, a Paraguayan citizen, was convicted and sentenced to death in Virginia state court. He filed a motion for habeas relief in Federal District Court, arguing for the first time that his convictions and sentences should be overturned because Virginia authorities vio- lated the Vienna Convention by failing to inform him that, as a foreign national, he had a right to contact the Paraguayan Consulate. The court held, however, that he procedurally defaulted his claim when he failed to raise it in state court and that he could not demonstrate cause and prejudice for this default. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Re- public of Paraguay and its officials also brought suit in the District Court, alleging that their separate rights under the Convention had been violated by Virginia's failure to inform Breard of his Convention rights and to inform the Paraguayan Consulate of his arrest, conviction, and sentence. The Paraguayan Consul General also asserted a 42 U. S. C. § 1983 claim. The court concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Paraguay was not alleging a continuing violation of federal law and therefore could not bring its claims within the Eleventh Amendment immunity exception. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Para- guay also instituted proceedings against the United States in the Inter- national Court of Justice (ICJ), alleging that the United States violated the Convention at Breard's arrest. The ICJ issued an order requesting the United States to "take all measures at its disposal to ensure that . . . Breard is not executed pending the final decision in these proceedings." Breard then filed a petition for an original writ of habeas corpus and a *Together with No. 97­1390 (A­738), Republic of Paraguay et al. v. Gilmore, Governor of Virginia, et al., on application for stay or injunction and on petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, No. 97­8660 (A­767), In re Breard, on application for stay and on petition for writ of habeas corpus, No. 125, Orig. (A­771), Republic of Paraguay et al. v. Gilmore, Governor of Virginia, et al., on application for temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction and on motion for leave to file a bill of complaint. 523US2 Unit: $U49 [04-29-00 17:17:11] PAGES PGT: OPIN 372 BREARD v. GREENE Per Curiam stay application in this Court to "enforce" the ICJ's order, and Paraguay filed a motion for leave to file an original bill of complaint. Held: Breard is not entitled to relief on any theory offered. He proce- durally defaulted his Vienna Convention claim, if any, by failing to raise it in the state courts. The argument that the claim may be heard in federal court because the Convention is the "supreme law of the land" and thus trumps the procedural default doctrine is plainly incorrect for two reasons. First, a well-established rule of international law, em- bodied in the Convention itself, specifies that, absent a clear and express statement to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State gov- ern the implementation of the treaty in that State. In this country, assertions of error in criminal proceedings must first be raised in state court in order to form the basis for relief in habeas. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72. Second, Breard's ability to obtain relief based on Convention violations is subject to the subsequently enacted Anti- terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which denies a habeas peti- tioner alleging that he is held in violation of treaties an evidentiary hearing if he has failed to develop the claim's factual basis in state- court proceedings. See, e. g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1, 18. As for Paraguay's suits, neither the Convention's text nor its history clearly provides a foreign nation a private right of action in United States' courts to set aside a criminal conviction and sentence for violating con- sular notification provisions. The Eleventh Amendment's "fundamen- tal principle" that "the States, in the absence of consent, are immune from suits brought against them . . . by a foreign State," Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 329­330, provides a separate reason why Paraguay's suit may not proceed. The Consul General's § 1983 suit is not cognizable because Paraguay, for whose benefit the suit is brought, is not a "person within the jurisdiction" of the United States authorized to bring suit under that section. See, e. g., Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693, 699. It is the Virginia Governor's prerogative to stay Breard's execution pending the ICJ's decision; nothing in this Court's existing case law allows it to make that decision for him. Habeas corpus, motion for leave to file bill of complaint, certiorari, and stay applications denied. Reported below: No. 97­8214, 134 F. 3d 615, and No. 97­1390, 134 F. 3d 622. Per Curiam. Angel Francisco Breard is scheduled to be executed by the Commonwealth of Virginia this evening at 9 p.m. Breard, a citizen of Paraguay, came to the United States in 1986, at the 523US2 Unit: $U49 [04-29-00 17:17:11] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 371 (1998) 373 Per Curiam age of 20. In 1992, Breard was charged with the attempted rape and capital murder of Ruth Dickie. At his trial in 1993, the State presented overwhelming evidence of guilt, includ- ing semen found on Dickie's body matching Breard's DNA profile and hairs on Dickie's body identical in all microscopic characteristics to hair samples taken from Breard. Breard chose to take the witness stand in his defense. During his testimony, Breard confessed to killing Dickie, but explained that he had only done so because of a Satanic curse placed on him by his father-in-law. Following a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Arlington County, Virginia, Breard was con- victed of both charges and sentenced to death. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed Breard's convictions and sentences, Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 445 S. E. 2d 670 (1994), and we denied certiorari, 513 U. S. 971 (1994). State collateral relief was subsequently denied as well. Breard then filed a motion for habeas relief under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 in Federal District Court on August 20, 1996. In that motion, Breard argued for the first time that his con- victions and sentences should be overturned because of al- leged violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela- tions (Vienna Convention), April 24, 1963, [1970] 21 U. S. T. 77, T. I. A. S. No. 6820, at the time of his arrest. Specifically, Breard alleged that the Vienna Convention was violated when the arresting authorities failed to inform him that, as a foreign national, he had the right to contact the Paraguayan Consulate. The District Court rejected this claim, conclud- ing that Breard procedurally defaulted the claim when he failed to raise it in state court and that Breard could not demonstrate cause and prejudice for this default. Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255, 1266 (ED Va. 1996). The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Breard v. Pruett, 134 F. 3d 615, 620 (1998). Breard has petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. 523US2 Unit: $U49 [04-29-00 17:17:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN 374 BREARD v. GREENE Per Curiam In September 1996, the Republic of Paraguay, the Ambas- sador of Paraguay to the United States, and the Consul Gen- eral of Paraguay to the United States (collectively Paraguay) brought suit in Federal District Court against certain Vir- ginia officials, alleging that their separate rights under the Vienna Convention had been violated by the Common- wealth's failure to inform Breard of his rights under the treaty and to inform the Paraguayan Consulate of Breard's arrest, convictions, and sentences. In addition, the Consul General asserted a parallel claim under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging a denial of his rights under the Vienna Convention. The District Court concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over these suits because Paraguay was not alleging a "continuing violation of federal law" and therefore could not bring its claims within the exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity established in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908). Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1272­1273 (ED Va. 1996). The Fourth Circuit affirmed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F. 3d 622 (1998). Para- guay has also petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. On April 3, 1998, nearly five years after Breard's con- victions became final, the Republic of Paraguay instituted proceedings against the United States in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), alleging that the United States vio- lated the Vienna Convention at the time of Breard's arrest. On April 9, the ICJ noted jurisdiction and issued an order requesting that the United States "take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not exe- cuted pending the final decision in these proceedings . . . ." The ICJ set a briefing schedule for this matter, with oral argument likely to be held this November. Breard then filed a petition for an original writ of habeas corpus and a stay application in this Court in order to "enforce" the ICJ's order. Paraguay filed a motion for leave to file a bill of com- plaint in this Court, citing this Court's original jurisdiction 523US2 Unit: $U49 [04-29-00 17:17:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 371 (1998) 375 Per Curiam over cases "affecting Ambassadors . . . and Consuls." U. S. Const., Art. III, § 2. It is clear that Breard procedurally defaulted his claim, if any, under the Vienna Convention by failing to raise that claim in the state courts. Nevertheless, in their petitions for certiorari, both Breard and Paraguay contend that Breard's Vienna Convention claim may be heard in fed- eral court because the Convention is the "supreme law of the land" and thus trumps the procedural default doctrine. Pet. for Cert. in No. 97­8214, pp. 15­18; Pet. for Cert. in No. 97­1390, p. 14, n. 8. This argument is plainly incorrect for two reasons. First, while we should give respectful consideration to the interpretation of an international treaty rendered by an in- ternational court with jurisdiction to interpret such, it has been recognized in international law that, absent a clear and express statement to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the implementation of the treaty in that State. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U. S. 717, 723 (1988); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U. S. 694, 700 (1988); Socie´te´ Nationale Industrielle Ae´ro- spatiale v. United States Dist. Court for Southern Dist. of Iowa, 482 U. S. 522, 539 (1987). This proposition is embod- ied in the Vienna Convention itself, which provides that the rights expressed in the Convention "shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State," provided that "said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are intended." Article 36(2), [1970] 21 U. S. T., at 101. It is the rule in this country that assertions of error in criminal proceedings must first be raised in state court in order to form the basis for relief in habeas. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977). Claims not so raised are considered defaulted. Ibid. By not as- serting his Vienna Convention claim in state court, Breard failed to exercise his rights under the Vienna Convention 523US2 Unit: $U49 [04-29-00 17:17:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN 376 BREARD v. GREENE Per Curiam in conformity with the laws of the United States and the Commonwealth of Virginia. Having failed to do so, he can- not raise a claim of violation of those rights now on federal habeas review. Second, although treaties are recognized by our Constitu- tion as the supreme law of the land, that status is no less true of provisions of the Constitution itself, to which rules of procedural default apply. We have held "that an Act of Congress . . . is on a full parity with a treaty, and that when a statute which is subsequent in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict renders the treaty null." Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1, 18 (1957) (plurality opin- ion); see also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 190, 194 (1888) (holding that if a treaty and a federal statute conflict, "the one last in date will control the other"). The Vienna Con- vention-which arguably confers on an individual the right to consular assistance following arrest-has continuously been in effect since 1969. But in 1996, before Breard filed his habeas petition raising claims under the Vienna Conven- tion, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which provides that a habeas petitioner alleging that he is held in violation of "treaties of the United States" will, as a general rule, not be afforded an evidentiary hearing if he "has failed to develop the fac- tual basis of [the] claim in State court proceedings." 28 U. S. C. §§ 2254(a), (e)(2) (1994 ed., Supp. IV). Breard's abil- ity to obtain relief based on violations of the Vienna Conven- tion is subject to this subsequently enacted rule, just as any claim arising under the United States Constitution would be. This rule prevents Breard from establishing that the viola- tion of his Vienna Convention rights prejudiced him. With- out a hearing, Breard cannot establish how the Consul would have advised him, how the advice of his attorneys differed from the advice the Consul could have provided, and what factors he considered in electing to reject the plea bargain that the State offered him. That limitation, Breard also ar- 523US2 Unit: $U49 [04-29-00 17:17:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 371 (1998) 377 Per Curiam gues, is not justified because his Vienna Convention claims were so novel that he could not have discovered them any earlier. Assuming that were true, such novel claims would be barred on habeas review under Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989). Even were Breard's Vienna Convention claim properly raised and proved, it is extremely doubtful that the violation should result in the overturning of a final judgment of con- viction without some showing that the violation had an effect on the trial. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U. S. 279 (1991). In this action, no such showing could even arguably be made. Breard decided not to plead guilty and to testify at his own trial contrary to the advice of his attorneys, who were likely far better able to explain the United States legal system to him than any consular official would have been. Breard's asserted prejudice-that had the Vienna Conven- tion been followed, he would have accepted the State's offer to forgo the death penalty in return for a plea of guilty- is far more speculative than the claims of prejudice courts routinely reject in those cases where an inmate alleges that his plea of guilty was infected by attorney error. See, e. g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U. S. 52, 59 (1985). As for Paraguay's suits (both the original action and the case coming to us on petition for certiorari), neither the text nor the history of the Vienna Convention clearly provides a foreign nation a private right of action in United States courts to set aside a criminal conviction and sentence for violation of consular notification provisions. The Eleventh Amendment provides a separate reason why Paraguay's suit might not succeed. That Amendment's "fundamental princi- ple" that "the States, in the absence of consent, are immune from suits brought against them . . . by a foreign State" was enunciated in Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 329­330 (1934). Though Paraguay claims that its suit is within an exemption dealing with continuing conse- quences of past violations of federal rights, see Milliken v. 523US2 Unit: $U49 [04-29-00 17:17:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN 378 BREARD v. GREENE Per Curiam Bradley, 433 U. S. 267 (1977), we do not agree. The failure to notify the Paraguayan Consul occurred long ago and has no continuing effect. The causal link present in Milliken is absent in this suit. Insofar as the Consul General seeks to base his claims on § 1983, his suit is not cognizable. Section 1983 provides a cause of action to any "person within the jurisdiction" of the United States for the deprivation "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." As an initial matter, it is clear that Paraguay is not authorized to bring suit under § 1983. Paraguay is not a "person" as that term is used in § 1983. See Moor v. County of Ala- meda, 411 U. S. 693, 699 (1973); South Carolina v. Katzen- bach, 383 U. S. 301, 323­324 (1966); cf. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58 (1989). Nor is Paraguay "within the jurisdiction" of the United States. And since the Consul General is acting only in his official capacity, he has no greater ability to proceed under § 1983 than does the country he represents. Any rights that the Consul General might have by virtue of the Vienna Convention exist for the benefit of Paraguay, not for him as an individual. It is unfortunate that this matter comes before us while proceedings are pending before the ICJ that might have been brought to that court earlier. Nonetheless, this Court must decide questions presented to it on the basis of law. The Executive Branch, on the other hand, in exercising its authority over foreign relations may, and in this case did, utilize diplomatic discussion with Paraguay. Last night the Secretary of State sent a letter to the Governor of Virginia requesting that he stay Breard's execution. If the Governor wishes to wait for the decision of the ICJ, that is his preroga- tive. But nothing in our existing case law allows us to make that choice for him. For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for an original writ of habeas corpus, the motion for leave to file a 523US2 Unit: $U49 [04-29-00 17:17:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 371 (1998) 379 Stevens, J., dissenting bill of complaint, the petitions for certiorari, and the accom- panying stay applications filed by Breard and Paraguay. Statement of Justice Souter. I agree with the Court that the lack of any reasonably arguable causal connection between the alleged treaty viola- tions and Breard's convictions and sentences disentitle him to relief on any theory offered. Moreover, I have substan- tial doubts that either Paraguay or any official acting for it is a "person" within the meaning of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and that the Vienna Convention is enforceable in any judicial pro- ceeding now underway. For these reasons, I believe the stay requests should be denied, with the result that Para- guay's claims will be mooted. Accordingly, I have voted to deny Paraguay's and Breard's respective petitions for certio- rari (Nos. 97­1390 and 97­8214), Paraguay's motion for leave to file a bill of complaint (No. 125, Orig.), Breard's application for an original writ of habeas corpus (No. 97­8660), and the associated requests for a stay of execution. Justice Stevens, dissenting. The Court of Appeals' decision denying petitioner Breard's first application for a federal writ of habeas corpus became final on February 18, 1998. Under this Court's Rules, a timely petition for a writ of certiorari to review that decision could have been filed as late as May 19, 1998. See Rule 13.1 ("[A] petition for a writ of certiorari to review a judgment in any case, civil or criminal, entered by . . . a United States court of appeals . . . is timely when it is filed with the Clerk of this Court within 90 days after entry of the judgment"). Ordinary review of that petition pursuant to our Rules would have given us additional time thereafter to consider its mer- its in the light of the response filed by the Commonwealth of Virginia. We have, however, been deprived of the normal time for considered deliberation by the Commonwealth's decision to set the date of petitioner's execution for today. 523US2 Unit: $U49 [04-29-00 17:17:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN 380 BREARD v. GREENE Breyer, J., dissenting There is no compelling reason for refusing to follow the pro- cedures that we have adopted for the orderly disposition of noncapital cases. Indeed, the international aspects of this case provide an additional reason for adhering to our estab- lished Rules and procedures. I would therefore grant the applications for a stay, and I respectfully dissent from the decision to act hastily rather than with the deliberation that is appropriate in a case of this character. Justice Ginsburg, dissenting in No. 97­8214 (A­732). I would grant the application for a stay of execution in order to consider in the ordinary course the instant petition, Breard's first federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. Justice Breyer, dissenting. In my view, several of the issues raised here are of sufficient difficulty to warrant less speedy consideration. Breard argues, for example, that the novelty of his Vienna Convention claim is sufficient to create "cause" for his having failed to present that claim to the Virginia state courts. Pet. for Cert. in No. 97­8214, pp. 20­22. He might add that the nature of his claim, were we to accept it, is such as to create a "watershed rule of criminal procedure," which might overcome the bar to consideration otherwise posed by Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 311 (1989). He additionally says that what the Solicitor General describes as Virginia's violation of the Convention "prejudiced" him by isolating him at a critical moment from Consular Officials who might have advised him to try to avoid the death penalty by plead- ing guilty. Pet. for Cert. in No. 97­8214, p. 22; see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Nos. 97­1390 and 97­8214, p. 12 ("[T]he Executive Branch has conceded that the Vienna Convention was violated"). I cannot say, with- out examining the record more fully, that these arguments are obviously without merit. Nor am I willing to accept without fuller briefing and consideration the positions taken 523US2 Unit: $U49 [04-29-00 17:17:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 371 (1998) 381 Breyer, J., dissenting by the majority on all of the sometimes difficult issues that the majority addresses. At the same time, the international aspects of the cases have provided us with the advantage of additional briefing even in the short time available. More time would likely mean additional briefing and argument, perhaps, for exam- ple, on the potential relevance of proceedings in an interna- tional forum. Finally, as Justice Stevens points out, Virginia is now pursuing an execution schedule that leaves less time for ar- gument and for Court consideration than the Court's Rules provide for ordinary cases. Like Justice Stevens, I can find no special reason here to truncate the period of time that the Court's Rules would otherwise make available. For these reasons, taken together, I would grant the requested stay of execution and consider the petitions for certiorari in the ordinary course. 523US2 Unit: $U50 [04-29-00 17:19:47] PAGES PGT: OPIN 382 OCTOBER TERM, 1997 Syllabus ATLANTIC MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. v. COMMIS- SIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the third circuit No. 97­147. Argued March 2, 1998-Decided April 21, 1998 Before enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the Internal Revenue Code gave property and casualty (PC) insurers a full deduction for "loss reserves": estimated amounts of losses reported but not yet paid, losses incurred but not yet reported, and administrative costs of resolving claims. In each taxable year, not only losses paid, but the full amount of the loss reserves, reduced by the amount of the loss reserves claimed for the prior taxable year, were treated as a business expense. Section 1023 of the 1986 Act required PC insurers, beginning with the 1987 taxable year, to discount unpaid losses to present value when claiming them as a deduction. Requiring insurers to subtract undiscounted year-end 1986 reserves from discounted year-end 1987 reserves in com- puting 1987 losses would produce artificially low deductions, so the Act included a transitional rule requiring insurers to discount 1986 reserves as well. This rule changed the "method of accounting" for computing taxable income. To avoid requiring PC insurers to recognize as income the difference between undiscounted and discounted year-end 1986 loss reserves, the Act afforded them a "fresh start," to wit, an exclusion from taxable income of the difference between undiscounted and discounted year-end 1986 loss reserves. § 1023(e)(3)(A). It foreclosed the possibil- ity that they would inflate reserves to manipulate the "fresh start" by excepting "reserve strengthening" from the exclusion. § 1023(e)(3)(B). Treasury Regulation § 1.846­3(c)(3)(ii) defines "reserve strengthening" to include any net additions to reserves. Respondent Commissioner determined that petitioner, Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co., and its sub- sidiary, a PC insurer, made net additions to loss reserves in 1986, reduc- ing the "fresh start" entitlement and resulting in a tax deficiency. The Tax Court disagreed, holding that "reserve strengthening" refers to only those increases that result from changes in computation methods or assumptions. In reversing, the Third Circuit concluded that the Treasury Regulation's definition of "reserve strengthening" is based on a permissible statutory construction. Held: The Treasury Regulation represents a reasonable interpretation of the term "reserve strengthening." Neither prior legislation nor in- dustry use establishes the plain meaning Atlantic ascribes to that term: 523US2 Unit: $U50 [04-29-00 17:19:47] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 382 (1998) 383 Opinion of the Court reserve increases attributable to changes in methods or assumptions. Since the term is ambiguous, the question is not whether the Treas- ury Regulation represents the best interpretation of the statute, but whether it represents a reasonable one. See Cottage Savings Assn. v. Commissioner, 499 U. S. 554, 560­561. As a purely linguistic matter, the phrase is broad enough to embrace all increases in the reserve's amount, for whatever reason and from whatever source. The provision at issue is a limitation upon an extraordinary deduction accorded to PC insurers. There was no need for the deduction to be microscopically fair, and the interpretation adopted in the Treasury Regulation seems to be a reasonable accommodation of the competing interests of fair- ness, administrability, and avoidance of abuse. Given the hundreds (or more likely thousands) of claims involved, claims resolved for less than estimated reserves will tend to offset claims that settle for more than estimated reserves. Any discrepancy would not approach the un- realistic proportions claimed by Atlantic. Pp. 387­391. 111 F. 3d 1056, affirmed. Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. George R. Abramowitz argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Dennis L. Allen, M. Kristan Rizzolo, John S. Breckinridge, Jr., and James H. Kenworthy. Kent L. Jones argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant At- torney General Argrett, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, David I. Pincus, and Edward T. Perelmuter.* Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. Property and casualty insurance companies maintain ac- counting reserves for "unpaid losses." Under the Tax Re- form Act of 1986, increases in loss reserves that constitute "reserve strengthening" do not qualify for a certain one-time tax benefit. We must decide whether the term "reserve strengthening" reasonably encompasses any increase in re- *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Ambase Corp. by Peter H. Winslow and Gregory K. Oyler; and for the American In- surance Association et al. by Matthew J. Zinn, J. Walker Johnson, Craig A. Berrington, Allan J. Stein, and Steven C. Elliott. 523US2 Unit: $U50 [04-29-00 17:19:47] PAGES PGT: OPIN 384 ATLANTIC MUT. INS. CO. v. COMMISSIONER Opinion of the Court serves, or only increases that result from changes in the methods or assumptions used to compute them. I Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. is the common parent of an affiliated group of corporations, including Centennial Insur- ance Co., a property and casualty (PC) insurer. From 1985 to 1993, the two corporations (Atlantic) maintained what in- surers call "loss reserves." Loss reserves are estimates of amounts insurers will have to pay for losses that have been reported but not yet paid, for losses that have been incurred but not yet reported, and for administrative costs of resolv- ing claims. Before enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99­514, 100 Stat. 2085, the Internal Revenue Code gave PC insurers a full deduction for loss reserves as "losses in- curred." In each taxable year, not only losses paid, but the full amount of the loss reserves, reduced by the amount of the loss reserves claimed for the prior taxable year, would be treated as a business expense. 26 U. S. C. §§ 832(b)(5) and (c)(4) (1982 ed.). This designation enabled the PC in- surer to take, in effect, a current deduction for future loss payments without adjusting for the "time value of money"- the fact that " `[a] dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow,' " D. Herwitz & M. Barrett, Accounting for Law- yers 221 (2d ed. 1997). Section 1023 of the 1986 Act amended the Code to require PC insurers, for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1986, to discount unpaid losses to present value when claiming them as a deduction. 100 Stat. 2399, 2404, 26 U. S. C. §§ 832(b)(5)(A), 846 (1982 ed., Supp. V). Absent a transitional rule, PC insurers would have been left to subtract undiscounted year-end 1986 re- serves from discounted year-end 1987 reserves for purposes of computing losses incurred for taxable year 1987-produc- ing artificially low deductions. The 1986 Act softened this consequence by requiring PC insurers, for purposes of that 523US2 Unit: $U50 [04-29-00 17:19:47] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 382 (1998) 385 Opinion of the Court 1987 tax computation, to discount 1986 reserves as well. 100 Stat. 2404, note following 26 U. S. C. § 846. Because the requirement that PC insurers discount 1986 reserves changed the "method of accounting" for computing taxable income, PC insurers, absent another transitional rule, would have been required to recognize as income the difference between undiscounted and discounted year-end 1986 loss reserves. See 26 U. S. C. § 481(a) (1988 ed.). To avoid this consequence, § 1023(e)(3)(A) of the 1986 Act af- forded PC insurers a "fresh start," to wit, an exclusion from taxable income of the difference between undiscounted and discounted year-end 1986 loss reserves. 100 Stat. 2404, note following 26 U. S. C. § 846. Of course the greater the 1986 reserves, the greater the exclusion. Section 1023(e)(3)(B) of the 1986 Act foreclosed the possibility that insurers would inflate reserves to manipulate the "fresh start" by excepting "reserve strengthening" from the exclusion: "(B) Reserve strengthening in years after 1985.-Subparagraph (A) [the fresh-start provision] shall not apply to any reserve strengthening in a taxable year beginning in 1986, and such strengthening shall be treated as occurring in the taxpayer's 1st taxable year beginning after December 31, 1986." 100 Stat. 2404, note following 26 U. S. C. § 846. Regulations promulgated by the Treasury Department set forth rules for determining the amount of "reserve strengthening": "(1) In general. The amount of reserve strengthen- ing (weakening) is the amount that is determined under paragraph (c)(2) or (3) to have been added to (subtracted from) an unpaid loss reserve in a taxable year beginning in 1986. For purposes of section 1023(e)(3)(B) of the 1986 Act, the amount of reserve strengthening (weaken- ing) must be determined separately for each unpaid loss 523US2 Unit: $U50 [04-29-00 17:19:47] PAGES PGT: OPIN 386 ATLANTIC MUT. INS. CO. v. COMMISSIONER Opinion of the Court reserve by applying the rules of this paragraph (c). This determination is made without regard to the rea- sonableness of the amount of the unpaid loss reserve and without regard to the taxpayer's discretion, or lack thereof, in establishing the amount of the unpaid loss reserve. . . . . . . . . "(3) Accident years before 1986-(i) In general. For each taxable year beginning in 1986, the amount of reserve strengthening (weakening) for an unpaid loss reserve for an accident year before 1986 is the amount by which the reserve at the end of that taxable year exceeds (is less than)- "(A) The reserve at the end of the immediately pre- ceding taxable year; reduced by "(B) Claims paid and loss adjustment expenses paid ("loss payments") in the taxable year beginning in 1986 with respect to losses that are attributable to the reserve. . . ." Treas. Reg. § 1.846­3(c), 26 CFR § 1.846­ 3(c) (1997). In short, any net additions to reserves (with two excep- tions not here at issue, § 1.846­3(c)(3)(ii)) constitute "reserve strengthening" under the regulation. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that Atlantic made net additions to reserves-"reserve strength- ening"-during 1986, reducing the "fresh start" entitlement by an amount that resulted in a tax deficiency of $519,987. The Tax Court disagreed, holding that Atlantic had not strengthened its reserves. "Reserve strengthening," the Tax Court held, refers only to increases in reserves that re- sult from changes in the methods or assumptions used to compute them. (Atlantic's reserve increases, there is no dispute, did not result from any such change.) The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the Tax Court, concluding that the Treasury Regulation's defini- 523US2 Unit: $U50 [04-29-00 17:19:47] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 382 (1998) 387 Opinion of the Court tion of "reserve strengthening" to include any net additions to reserves is based on a permissible construction of the stat- ute. 111 F. 3d 1056 (1997). (It expressly disagreed with the Eighth Circuit's conclusion in Western National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Commissioner, 65 F. 3d 90 (1995), that the Treasury Regulation is invalid.) We granted certiorari. 522 U. S. 931 (1997). II The 1986 Act does not define "reserve strengthening." Atlantic contends that the term has a plain meaning under the statute: reserve increases attributable to changes in methods or assumptions. If that is what the term plainly means, Atlantic must prevail, "for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Re- sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842­843 (1984). Atlantic contends that the plain meaning of "reserve strengthening" can be discerned, first, from its use in the PC insurance industry. It presented at trial two expert reports which, by "constructing a working definition of the term" that requires "a material change in methodology and/or as- sumptions," App. 68, 74, purport to demonstrate that Atlan- tic "did not strengthen reserves," id., at 99. Our task, of course, is to determine not what the term ought to mean, but what it does mean. Atlantic's first expert, before "con- structing" a definition, expressly acknowledged that "re- serve strengthening" is "not a well-defined PC insurance or actuarial term of art to be found in PC actuarial, accounting, or insurance regulatory literature." Id., at 60. On this point she was in agreement with the Commissioner's ex- perts: "In the property-casualty industry the term `reserve strengthening' has various meanings, rather than a single universal meaning," id., at 124. If the expert reports estab- lish anything, it is that "reserve strengthening" does not have an established meaning in the PC insurance industry. 523US2 Unit: $U50 [04-29-00 17:19:47] PAGES PGT: OPIN 388 ATLANTIC MUT. INS. CO. v. COMMISSIONER Opinion of the Court Atlantic next contends that a plain meaning can be dis- cerned from prior use of the term in life insurance tax legis- lation. According to Atlantic, the term has its roots in the Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959, which pro- vided tax consequences for changes in the "basis" for deter- mining life insurance reserves. 73 Stat. 125, 26 U. S. C. § 810(d) (1958 ed., Supp. I). But that provision does not de- fine, or for that matter even use, the term "reserve strength- ening." Though the regulation that implemented the provi- sion uses the term "reserve strengthening" in a caption, Treas. Reg. § 1.810­3(a), 26 CFR § 1.810­3(a) (1997), its text does not mention the term, and one of its Examples speaks only of "reserve strengthening attributable to the change in basis which occurred in 1959," § 1.810­3(b), Ex. 2. If, as At- lantic argues, "basis" and "assumptions or methodologies" are interchangeable terms, Brief for Petitioner 17, n. 8, and a change in basis is necessary for "reserve strengthening," it is redundant to say "reserve strengthening attributable to the change in basis which occurred in 1959," much as it would be to say "a sunburn attributable to the sun in 1959." On Atlantic's assumptions, the more natural formulation would have been simply "reserve strengthening in 1959." Thus, the 1959 Act and implementing regulation suggest, if any- thing, that a change in basis is a sufficient, but not a neces- sary, condition for "reserve strengthening." Atlantic further contends that the term "reserve strength- ening" draws a plain meaning from a provision of the Tax Reform Act of 1984 that accorded a "fresh start" adjustment to life insurance reserves. Div. A, 98 Stat. 758, note follow- ing 26 U. S. C. § 801 (1984 Act). That provision, like the "fresh start" adjustment for PC insurers in the 1986 Act, said that the "fresh start" would not apply to reserve strengthening, specifically, "to any reserve strengthening re- ported for Federal income tax purposes after September 27, 1983, for a taxable year ending before January 1, 1984." 98 523US2 Unit: $U50 [04-29-00 17:19:47] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 382 (1998) 389 Opinion of the Court Stat. 759. Unlike the 1986 Act, however, the 1984 Act ex- pressly provided that "reserve strengthening" would not be excluded from the "fresh start" if the insurer "employs the reserve practice used for purposes of the most recent annual statement filed before September 27, 1983 . . . ." Ibid. If, as Atlantic contends, reserve strengthening encompasses only reserve increases that result from a change in reserve practices (viz., change in methods or assumptions), the sav- ing clause is superfluous. Thus, to the extent the definition of "reserve strengthening" in the life insurance context is relevant to its meaning here (which is questionable, see 111 F. 3d, at 1061­1062), the 1984 Act, like the regulations under the 1959 Act, tends to contradict, rather than support, pe- titioner's interpretation. We conclude that neither prior legislation nor industry use establishes the plain meaning Atlantic ascribes to "reserve strengthening." III Since the term "reserve strengthening" is ambiguous, the task that confronts us is to decide, not whether the Treasury Regulation represents the best interpretation of the stat- ute, but whether it represents a reasonable one. See Cot- tage Savings Assn. v. Commissioner, 499 U. S. 554, 560­561 (1991). We conclude that it does. As a purely linguistic matter, the phrase is certainly broad enough to embrace all increases in (all "strengthening of") the amount of the reserve, for whatever reason and from whatever source. Atlantic contends that this interpretation is unreasonable because, in theory, it produces absurd re- sults, as the following example supposedly illustrates: As- sume that in 1985 a PC insurer had four case reserves of $500 each (total reserves of $2,000). If two cases settled in 1986 for $750 each ($1,500 total), the remaining loss reserve would be $1,000. Under the regulation, according to Atlan- tic, the Commissioner would find "reserve strengthening" of 523US2 Unit: $U50 [04-29-00 17:19:47] PAGES PGT: OPIN 390 ATLANTIC MUT. INS. CO. v. COMMISSIONER Opinion of the Court $500 (1986 loss reserves ($1,000) less (first year reserves ($2,000) less second year payments ($1,500))), even though reserves did not increase. The Commissioner denies this consequence, contending that under the stipulation in this case the increase in the reserve would be "reduced to zero" by an offsetting adjustment when the payment is made, and that adjustments in the IBNR reserve (reserve for claims "incurred but not reported") may result from payments in excess of prior reserve amounts, offsetting changes in other reserves. Brief for Respondent 36­39. We need not resolve that dispute, because we agree with the Commissioner that Atlantic's horrific example is in any event unrealistic. The property and casualty insurer that had only four cases would not be in business very long, with or without the benefit of the tax adjustment-or if he would, his talents could be put to better use in Las Vegas. The whole point of the insurance business is to spread the insured risk over a large number of cases, where experience and the law of probabilities can be relied upon. And where hun- dreds (or more likely thousands) of claims are involved, claims resolved for less than estimated reserves will tend to offset claims that settle for more than estimated reserves. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Discounted Unpaid Losses, FI­139­86, 1991­2 Cum. Bull. 946, 947 ("For most unpaid loss reserves . . . any potential inaccuracies are likely to offset each other in the aggregate"). There may, to be sure, be some discrepancy in one direction or the other, but it would not approach the relative proportions claimed by Atlantic. It should be borne in mind that the provision at issue here is a limitation upon an extraordinary deduction accorded to PC insurers. There was certainly no need for that deduc- tion to be microscopically fair, and the interpretation adopted by the Treasury Regulation seems to us a reason- able accommodation-and one that the statute very likely 523US2 Unit: $U50 [04-29-00 17:19:47] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 382 (1998) 391 Opinion of the Court intended-of the competing interests of fairness, administra- bility, and avoidance of abuse. * * * Because the Treasury Regulation represents a reason- able interpretation of the term "reserve strengthening," we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It is so ordered. 523US2 Unit: $U51 [04-29-00 17:25:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN 392 OCTOBER TERM, 1997 Syllabus CAMPBELL v. LOUISIANA certiorari to the court of appeal of louisiana, third circuit No. 96­1584. Argued January 20, 1998-Decided April 21, 1998 A grand jury in Evangeline Parish, Louisiana, indicted petitioner Camp- bell for second-degree murder. In light of evidence that, for the prior 161 2 years, no black person had served as grand jury foreperson in the Parish even though more than 20 percent of the registered voters were black, Campbell filed a motion to quash the indictment on the ground that his grand jury was constituted in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process rights and the Sixth Amendment's fair-cross-section requirement. The trial judge denied the motion because Campbell, a white man accused of killing another white man, lacked standing to complain about the exclusion of black persons from serving as forepersons. He was convicted, but the Loui- siana Court of Appeal ordered an evidentiary hearing, holding that Campbell could object to the alleged discrimination under the holding in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U. S. 400, that a white defendant had standing to challenge racial discrimination against black persons in the use of peremptory challenges. In reversing, the State Supreme Court de- clined to extend Powers to a claim such as Campbell's. It also found that he was not afforded standing to raise a due process objection by Hobby v. United States, 468 U. S. 339, in which the Court held that no relief could be granted to a white defendant even if his due process rights had been violated by discrimination in the selection of a federal grand jury foreperson whose duties were purely "ministerial." Noting that the Louisiana foreperson's role was similarly ministerial, the court held that any discrimination had little, if any, effect on Campbell's due process right of fundamental fairness. Held:1. A white criminal defendant has the requisite standing to raise equal protection and due process objections to discrimination against black persons in the selection of grand jurors. Pp. 396­403. (a) This case must be treated as one alleging discriminatory selec- tion of grand jurors, not just of a grand jury foreperson. In the federal system and in most States using grand juries, the foreperson is selected from the ranks of the already seated jurors. In Louisiana, by con- trast, the judge selects the foreperson from the grand jury venire before the remaining members are chosen by lot. In addition to his other 523US2 Unit: $U51 [04-29-00 17:25:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 392 (1998) 393 Syllabus duties, the Louisiana foreperson has the same full voting powers as other grand jury members. As a result, when the Louisiana judge se- lected the foreperson, he also selected one member of the grand jury outside of the drawing system used to compose the balance of that body. Pp. 396­397. (b) Campbell, like any other white defendant, has standing under Powers, supra, to raise an equal protection challenge to the discrimina- tory selection of his grand jury. The excluded jurors' own right not to be discriminatorily denied grand jury service can be asserted by Camp- bell because he satisfies the three preconditions for third-party standing outlined in Powers, supra, at 411. First, regardless of skin color, an accused suffers a significant "injury in fact" when the grand jury's com- position is tainted by racial discrimination. The integrity of the body's decisions depends on the integrity of the process used to select the grand jurors. If that process is infected with racial discrimination, doubt is cast over the fairness of all subsequent decisions. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545, 555­556. The Court rejects the State's argu- ment that no harm is inflicted when a single grand juror is selected based on racial prejudice because the discrimination is invisible to the grand jurors on that panel, and only becomes apparent when a pattern emerges over the course of years. This argument underestimates the seriousness of the allegations here: If they are true, the impartiality and discretion of the judge himself would be called into question. Second, Campbell has a "close relationship" to the excluded jurors, who share with him a common interest in eradicating discrimination from the grand jury selection process, and a vital interest in asserting their rights because his conviction may be overturned as a result. See, e. g., Powers, 499 U. S., at 413­414. The State's argument that Campbell has but a tenuous connection to jurors excluded in the past confuses his underlying claim-that black persons were excluded from his grand jury-with the evidence needed to prove it-that similarly situated ve- nirepersons were excluded in previous cases on account of intentional discrimination. Third, given the economic burdens of litigation and the small financial reward available, a grand juror excluded because of race has little incentive to sue to vindicate his own rights. See id., at 415. Pp. 397­400. (c) A white defendant alleging discriminatory selection of grand jurors has standing to litigate whether his conviction was procured by means or procedures which contravene due process. Hobby, supra, at 350, proceeded on the implied assumption that such standing exists. The Louisiana Supreme Court's reading of Hobby as foreclosing Camp- bell's standing is inconsistent with that implicit assumption and with the Court's explicit reasoning in Hobby. Campbell's challenge is different 523US2 Unit: $U51 [04-29-00 17:25:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN 394 CAMPBELL v. LOUISIANA Opinion of the Court in kind and degree from the one there at issue because it implicates the impermissible appointment of a member of the grand jury. What concerns Campbell is not the foreperson's performance of his minis- terial duty to preside, but his performance as a grand juror, namely, voting to charge Campbell with second-degree murder. The signifi- cance of this distinction was acknowledged in Hobby, supra, at 348. By its own terms, then, Hobby does not address a claim like Campbell's. Pp. 400­403. 2. The Court declines to address whether Campbell also has standing to raise a fair-cross-section claim. Neither of the Louisiana appellate courts discussed this contention, and Campbell has made no effort to meet his burden of showing the issue was properly presented to those courts. See Adams v. Robertson, 520 U. S. 83, 86 (per curiam). P. 403. 673 So. 2d 1061, reversed and remanded. Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I, II, IV, and V, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Part III, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concur- ring in part and dissenting in part, in which Scalia, J., joined, post, p. 403. Dmitrc I. Burnes argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Richard V. Burnes. Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General of Louisiana, ar- gued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Kathleen E. Petersen and Mary Ellen Hunley, Assistant Attorneys General, and Paul R. Baier.* Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. We must decide whether a white criminal defendant has standing to object to discrimination against black persons in the selection of grand jurors. Finding he has the requisite standing to raise equal protection and due process claims, we reverse and remand. I A grand jury in Evangeline Parish, Louisiana, indicted petitioner Terry Campbell on one count of second-degree *Joshua L. Dratel, Lisa Kemler, and Richard A. Greenberg filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging reversal. 523US2 Unit: $U51 [04-29-00 17:25:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 392 (1998) 395 Opinion of the Court murder. Campbell, who is white, filed a timely pretrial mo- tion to quash the indictment on the grounds the grand jury was constituted in violation of his equal protection and due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and in vio- lation of the Sixth Amendment's fair-cross-section require- ment. Campbell alleged a longstanding practice of racial discrimination in the selection of grand jury forepersons in the parish. His sole piece of evidence is that, between Janu- ary 1976 and August 1993, no black person served as a grand jury foreperson in the parish, even though more than 20 per- cent of the registered voters were black persons. See Brief for Petitioner 16. The State does not dispute this evidence. The trial judge refused to quash the indictment because "Campbell, being a white man accused of killing another white man," lacked standing to complain "where all of the forepersons were white." App. to Pet. for Cert. G­33. After Campbell's first trial resulted in a mistrial, he was retried, convicted of second-degree murder, and sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole. Campbell re- newed his challenge to the grand jury foreperson selection procedures in a motion for new trial, which was denied. See id., at I­2. The Louisiana Court of Appeal reversed, be- cause, under our decision in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U. S. 400 (1991), Campbell had standing to object to the alleged dis- crimination even though he is white. 651 So. 2d 412 (1995). The Court of Appeal remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing because it found Campbell's evidence of discrimina- tion inadequate. Id., at 413. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed. It distinguished Powers as turning on the "considerable and substantial im- pact" that a prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges has on a defendant's trial as well as on the integ- rity of the judicial system. See 661 So. 2d 1321, 1324 (1995). The court declined to extend Powers to a claim of discrimina- tion in the selection of a grand jury foreperson. It also found Hobby v. United States, 468 U. S. 339 (1984), did not 523US2 Unit: $U51 [04-29-00 17:25:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN 396 CAMPBELL v. LOUISIANA Opinion of the Court afford Campbell standing to raise a due process objection. In Hobby, this Court held no relief could be granted to a white defendant even if his due process rights were violated by discrimination in the selection of a federal grand jury foreperson. Noting that Hobby turned on the ministerial nature of the federal grand jury foreperson's duties, the Lou- isiana Supreme Court held "[t]he role of the grand jury fore- man in Louisiana appears to be similarly ministerial" such that any discrimination "has little, if any, effect on the de- fendant's due process right of fundamental fairness." 661 So. 2d, at 1324. Because the Court of Appeal had not ad- dressed Campbell's other asserted points of error, the Louisi- ana Supreme Court remanded the case. After the Court of Appeal rejected Campbell's remaining claims, 673 So. 2d 1061 (1996), the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to recon- sider its ruling on the grand jury issue, 685 So. 2d 140 (1997). We granted certiorari to address the narrow question of Campbell's standing to raise equal protection, due process, and fair-cross-section claims. 521 U. S. 1151 (1997). II As an initial matter, we note Campbell complains about more than discrimination in the selection of his grand jury foreperson; he alleges that discrimination shaped the compo- sition of the grand jury itself. In the federal system and in most States which use grand juries, the foreperson is se- lected from the ranks of the already seated grand jurors. See 1 S. Beale, W. Bryson, J. Felman, & M. Elston, Grand Jury Law and Practice § 4:6, pp. 4­20 to 4­21 (2d ed. 1997) (either the judge selects the foreperson or fellow grand jurors elect him or her). Under those systems, the title "foreperson" is bestowed on one of the existing grand jurors without any change in the grand jury's composition. In Louisiana, by contrast, the judge selects the foreperson from the grand jury venire before the remaining members of the grand jury have been chosen by lot. La. Code Crim. Proc. 523US2 Unit: $U51 [04-29-00 17:25:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 392 (1998) 397 Opinion of the Court Ann., Art. 413(B) (West Supp. 1997); see also 1 Beale, supra, at 4­22, n. 11 (Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Virginia use procedures similar to Louisiana's). In addition to his other duties, the foreperson of the Louisiana grand jury has the same full voting powers as other grand jury members. As a result, when the Louisiana judge selected the foreperson, he also selected one member of the grand jury outside of the drawing system used to compose the balance of that body. These considerations require us to treat the case as one al- leging discriminatory selection of grand jurors. III Standing to litigate often turns on imprecise distinctions and requires difficult line-drawing. On occasion, however, we can ascertain standing with relative ease by applying rules established in prior cases. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751 (1984). Campbell's equal protection claim is such an instance. In Powers v. Ohio, supra, we found a white defendant had standing to challenge racial discrimination against black per- sons in the use of peremptory challenges. We determined the defendant himself could raise the equal protection rights of the excluded jurors. Recognizing our general reluctance to permit a litigant to assert the rights of a third party, we found three preconditions had been satisfied: (1) the defend- ant suffered an "injury in fact"; (2) he had a "close relation- ship" to the excluded jurors; and (3) there was some hin- drance to the excluded jurors asserting their own rights. Powers, supra, at 411 (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106 (1976)). We concluded a white defendant suffers a seri- ous injury in fact because discrimination at the voir dire stage " `casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process' . . . and places the fairness of a criminal proceeding in doubt." 499 U. S., at 411. This cloud of doubt deprives the defendant of the certainty that a verdict in his case "is given in accord- ance with the law by persons who are fair." Id., at 413. 523US2 Unit: $U51 [04-29-00 17:25:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN 398 CAMPBELL v. LOUISIANA Opinion of the Court Second, the excluded juror and criminal defendant have a close relationship: They share a common interest in elimi- nating discrimination, and the criminal defendant has an in- centive to serve as an effective advocate because a victory may result in overturning his conviction. Id., at 413­414. Third, given the economic burdens of litigation and the small financial reward available, "a juror dismissed because of race probably will leave the courtroom possessing little incentive to set in motion the arduous process needed to vindicate his own rights." Id., at 415. Upon consideration of these fac- tors, we concluded a white defendant had standing to bring an equal protection challenge to racial discrimination against black persons in the petit jury selection process. Although Campbell challenges discriminatory selection of grand jurors, rather than petit jurors, Powers' reasoning ap- plies to this case on the question of standing. Our prior cases have not decided whether a white defendant's own equal protection rights are violated when the composition of his grand jury is tainted by discrimination against black persons. We do not need to address this issue because Campbell seeks to assert the well-established equal protec- tion rights of black persons not to be excluded from grand jury service on the basis of their race. See Tr. 9 (Dec. 2, 1993); see also Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene Cty., 396 U. S. 320, 329­330 (1970) (racial exclusion of prospective grand and petit jurors violates their constitutional rights). Campbell satisfies the three preconditions for third-party standing outlined in Powers. Regardless of his or her skin color, the accused suffers a significant injury in fact when the composition of the grand jury is tainted by racial discrimination. "[D]iscrimination on the basis of race in the selection of members of a grand jury . . . strikes at the fundamental values of our judicial system" because the grand jury is a central component of the criminal justice process. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545, 556 (1979). The Fifth Amendment requires the Federal Gov- 523US2 Unit: $U51 [04-29-00 17:25:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 392 (1998) 399 Opinion of the Court ernment to use a grand jury to initiate a prosecution, and 22 States adopt a similar rule as a matter of state law. See 1 Beale, supra, § 1:2, at 1­3; see also Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884) (Fifth Amendment's grand jury require- ment is not binding on the States). The grand jury, like the petit jury, "acts as a vital check against the wrongful exer- cise of power by the State and its prosecutors." Powers, supra, at 411. It controls not only the initial decision to in- dict, but also significant decisions such as how many counts to charge and whether to charge a greater or lesser offense, including the important decision to charge a capital crime. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 263 (1986). The integ- rity of these decisions depends on the integrity of the process used to select the grand jurors. If that process is infected with racial discrimination, doubt is cast over the fairness of all subsequent decisions. See Rose, supra, at 555­556 ("Se- lection of members of a grand jury because they are of one race and not another destroys the appearance of justice and thereby casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process"). Powers emphasized the harm inflicted when a prosecutor discriminates by striking racial minorities in open court and in front of the entire jury pool. The Court expressed con- cern that this tactic might encourage the jury to be lawless in its own actions. See 499 U. S., at 412­413. The State suggests this sort of harm is not inflicted when a single grand juror is selected based on racial prejudice because the discrimination is invisible to the grand jurors on that panel; it only becomes apparent when a pattern emerges over the course of years. See Brief for Respondent 16. This argu- ment, however, underestimates the seriousness of the allega- tions. In Powers, even if the prosecutor had been motivated by racial prejudice, those responsible for the defendant's fate, the judge and the jury, had shown no actual bias. If, by contrast, the allegations here are true, the impartiality and discretion of the judge himself would be called into question. 523US2 Unit: $U51 [04-29-00 17:25:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN 400 CAMPBELL v. LOUISIANA Opinion of the Court The remaining two preconditions to establish third-party standing are satisfied with little trouble. We find no reason why a white defendant would be any less effective as an ad- vocate for excluded grand jurors than for excluded petit ju- rors. See Powers, supra, at 413­414. The defendant and the excluded grand juror share a common interest in eradi- cating discrimination from the grand jury selection process, and the defendant has a vital interest in asserting the ex- cluded juror's rights because his conviction may be over- turned as a result. See Vasquez, supra, at 264; Rose, supra, at 551; Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282 (1950). The State con- tends Campbell's connection to "the excluded class of . . . jurors . . . who were not called to serve . . . for the prior 161 2 years is tenuous, at best." Brief for Respondent 22. This argument confuses Campbell's underlying claim with the evidence needed to prove it. To assert the rights of those venirepersons who were excluded from serving on the grand jury in his case, Campbell must prove their exclusion was on account of intentional discrimination. He seeks to do so based on past treatment of similarly situated venire- persons in other cases, see Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 482, 494 (1977), but this does not mean he seeks to assert those venirepersons' rights. As a final matter, excluded grand jurors have the same economic disincentives to assert their own rights as do excluded petit jurors. See Powers, supra, at 415. We find Campbell, like any other white de- fendant, has standing to raise an equal protection challenge to discrimination against black persons in the selection of his grand jury. IV It is axiomatic that one has standing to litigate his or her own due process rights. We need not explore the nature and extent of a defendant's due process rights when he al- leges discriminatory selection of grand jurors, and confine our holding to his standing to raise the issue. Our decision in Peters v. Kiff addressed the due process question, al- 523US2 Unit: $U51 [04-29-00 17:25:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 392 (1998) 401 Opinion of the Court though a majority of Justices could not agree on a compre- hensive statement of the rule or an appropriate remedy for any violation. See 407 U. S. 493, 504 (1972) (opinion of Mar- shall, J.) ("[W]hatever his race, a criminal defendant has standing to challenge the system used to select his grand . . . jury, on the ground that it arbitrarily excludes . . . members of any race, and thereby denies him due process of law"); id., at 507 (White, J., joined by Brennan and Powell, JJ., concur- ring in judgment) ("[T]he strong statutory policy of [18 U. S. C.] § 243, which reflects the central concern of the Four- teenth Amendment" permits a white defendant to challenge discrimination in grand jury selection). Our more recent decision in Hobby v. United States proceeded on the implied assumption that a white defendant had standing to raise a due process objection to discriminatory appointment of a fed- eral grand jury foreperson and skipped ahead to the question whether a remedy was available. 468 U. S., at 350. It is unnecessary here to discuss the nature and full extent of due process protection in the context of grand jury selection. That issue, to the extent it is still open based upon our earlier precedents, should be determined on the merits, assuming a court finds it necessary to reach the point in light of the concomitant equal protection claim. The relevant assump- tion of Hobby, and our holding here, is that a defendant has standing to litigate whether his conviction was procured by means or procedures which contravene due process. The Louisiana Supreme Court erred in reading Hobby to foreclose Campbell's standing to bring a due process chal- lenge. 661 So. 2d, at 1324. In Hobby, we held discrimina- tion in the selection of a federal grand jury foreperson did not infringe principles of fundamental fairness because the foreperson's duties were "ministerial." See Hobby, supra, at 345­346. In this case, the Louisiana Supreme Court de- cided a Louisiana grand jury foreperson's duties were minis- terial too, but then couched its decision in terms of Camp- 523US2 Unit: $U51 [04-29-00 17:25:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN 402 CAMPBELL v. LOUISIANA Opinion of the Court bell's lack of standing to litigate a due process claim. 661 So. 2d, at 1324. The Louisiana Supreme Court was wrong on both counts. Its interpretation of Hobby is inconsistent with the implicit assumption of standing we have just noted and with our ex- plicit reasoning in that case. In Hobby, a federal grand jury foreperson was selected from the existing grand jurors, so the decision to pick one grand juror over another, at least arguably, affected the defendant only if the foreperson was given some significant duties that he would not have had as a regular grand juror. See supra, at 396. Against this background, the Court rejected the defendant's claim be- cause the ministerial role of a federal grand jury foreperson "is not such a vital one that discrimination in the appoint- ment of an individual to that post significantly invades" due process. Hobby, supra, at 346. Campbell's challenge is dif- ferent in kind and degree because it implicates the impermis- sible appointment of a member of the grand jury. See supra, at 396­397. What concerns Campbell is not the fore- person's performance of his duty to preside, but performance as a grand juror, namely, voting to charge Campbell with second-degree murder. The significance of this distinction was acknowledged by Hobby's discussion of a previous case, Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979). In Rose, we assumed relief could be granted for a constitutional challenge to discrimination in the appointment of a state grand jury foreperson. See id., at 556. Hobby distinguished Rose in part because it involved Tennessee's grand jury system. Under the Tennessee law then in effect, 12 members of the grand jury were selected at random, and then the judge appointed a 13th member who also served as foreperson. See Hobby, 468 U. S., at 347. As a result, Hobby pointed out discrimination in selection of the foreperson in Tennessee was much more serious than in the federal system because the former can affect the com- position of the grand jury whereas the latter cannot: "So 523US2 Unit: $U51 [04-29-00 17:25:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 392 (1998) 403 Opinion of Thomas, J. long as the grand jury itself is properly constituted, there is no risk that the appointment of any one of its members as foreman will distort the overall composition of the array or otherwise taint the operation of the judicial process." Id., at 348. By its own terms, then, Hobby does not address a claim like Campbell's. V One of the questions raised on certiorari is whether Camp- bell also has standing to raise a fair-cross-section claim. It appears neither the Louisiana Supreme Court nor the Louisi- ana Court of Appeal discussed this contention. "With `very rare exceptions,' . . . we will not consider a petitioner's fed- eral claim unless it was either addressed by or properly pre- sented to the state court that rendered the decision we have been asked to review." Adams v. Robertson, 520 U. S. 83, 86 (1997) (per curiam). Campbell has made no effort to meet his burden of showing this issue was properly pre- sented to the Louisiana appellate courts, even after the State pointed out this omission before this Court. See Brief for Respondent 29­30. In fact, Campbell devotes no more than one page of text in his brief to his fair-cross-section claim. See Brief for Petitioner 31­32. We decline to address the issue. The judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court is reversed. The case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsist- ent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I fail to understand how the rights of blacks excluded from jury service can be vindicated by letting a white murderer go free. Yet, in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U. S. 400 (1991), the Court held that a white criminal defendant had standing to challenge his criminal conviction based upon alleged viola- tions of the equal protection rights of black prospective ju- 523US2 Unit: $U51 [04-29-00 17:25:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN 404 CAMPBELL v. LOUISIANA Opinion of Thomas, J. rors. Today's decision, rather than merely reaffirming Pow- ers' misguided doctrine of third-party standing, applies that doctrine to a context in which even Powers' rationales are inapplicable. Because Powers is both incorrect as an initial matter and inapposite to the case at hand, I respectfully dis- sent from Part III of the Court's opinion. I join Parts I, II, IV, and V and concur in the judgment reversing and remand- ing to the Louisiana Supreme Court. Powers broke new ground by holding for the first time that a criminal defendant may raise an equal protection chal- lenge to the use of peremptory strikes to exclude jurors of a different race. See id., at 422 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (ex- plaining that Powers was inconsistent with "a vast body of clear statement" in our precedents). Recognizing that the defendant could not claim that his own equal protection rights had been denied, the Court held that the defendant had standing to assert the equal protection rights of venire- men excluded from the jury. Id., at 410­416. The Court concluded that the defendant had such "third party stand- ing" because three criteria had been met: he had suffered an "injury in fact"; he had a "close relation" to the excluded jurors; and there was "some hindrance" to the jurors' ability to protect their own interests. Id., at 410­411. Powers distorted standing principles and equal protection law and should be overruled.1 As Justice Scalia ex- plained at length in his dissent, the defendant in Powers 1 As I have explained elsewhere, the entire line of cases following Bat- son v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause applies to the use of peremptory strikes), including Powers, is a misguided effort to remedy a general societal wrong by using the Con- stitution to regulate the traditionally discretionary exercise of peremp- tory challenges. The Batson doctrine, rather than helping to ensure the fairness of criminal trials, serves only to undercut that fairness by em- phasizing the rights of excluded jurors at the expense of the traditional protections accorded criminal defendants of all races. See Georgia v. Mc- Collum, 505 U. S. 42, 60­62 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). 523US2 Unit: $U51 [04-29-00 17:25:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 392 (1998) 405 Opinion of Thomas, J. could not satisfy even the first element of standing­­injury in fact. Id., at 426­429. The defendant, though certainly displeased with his conviction, failed to demonstrate that the alleged discriminatory use of peremptory challenges against veniremen of another race had any effect on the outcome of his trial. The Court instead found that the defendant had suffered a "cognizable" injury because racial discrimination in jury selection " `casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process' " and "invites cynicism respecting the jury's neutral- ity and its obligation to adhere to the law." Id., at 411­412. But the severity of an alleged wrong and a perception of unfairness do not constitute injury in fact. Indeed, " `[i]n- jury in perception' would seem to be the very antithesis of `injury in fact.' " Id., at 427 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Fur- thermore, there is no reason why a violation of a third par- ty's right to serve on a jury should be grounds for reversal when other violations of third-party rights, such as obtaining evidence against the defendant in violation of another per- son's Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights, are not. Id., at 429 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Powers further rested on an alleged "close relation[ship]" that arises between a defendant and veniremen because voir dire permits them "to establish a relation, if not a bond of trust," that continues throughout the trial. Id., at 411, 413. According to the Court, excluded veniremen share the ac- cused's interest in eliminating racial discrimination because a peremptory strike inflicts upon a venireman a "profound personal humiliation heightened by its public character." Id., at 413­414. But there was simply no basis for the Court's finding of a "close relation[ship]" or "common inter- est," id., at 413, between black veniremen and white defend- ants. Regardless of whether black veniremen wish to serve on a particular jury, they do not share the white defendant's interest in obtaining a reversal of his conviction. Surely a black venireman would be dismayed to learn that a white 523US2 Unit: $U51 [04-29-00 17:25:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN 406 CAMPBELL v. LOUISIANA Opinion of Thomas, J. defendant used the venireman's constitutional rights as a means to overturn the defendant's conviction.2 Finally, Powers concluded that there are substantial ob- stacles to suit by excluded veniremen, including the costs of proceeding individually and the difficulty of establishing a likelihood of recurrence. Id., at 414­415. These obsta- cles, though perhaps often present in the context of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), are alone insufficient to justify third-party standing. Even if the Powers justifications were persuasive, they would still be wholly inapplicable to this case, which involves neither peremptory strikes nor discrimination in the selec- tion of the petit jury. The "injury in fact" allegedly present in Powers is wholly absent from the context at hand. Pow- ers reasoned that repeated peremptory strikes of members of one race constituted an "overt wrong, often apparent to the entire jury panel," that threatened to "cas[t] doubt over the obligation of the parties, the jury, and indeed the court to adhere to the law throughout the trial of the cause." Powers, 499 U. S., at 412. Here, in contrast, the judge selected one member of the grand jury venire to serve as foreman, and the remaining members of the grand jury were selected at random. Even if discriminatory, the judge's selection (rather than exclusion) of a single member of the grand jury could hardly constitute an "overt" wrong that would affect the remainder of the grand jury proceedings, much less the subsequent trial. The Court therefore resorts to emphasizing the seriousness of the allegation of racial dis- crimination (as though repetition conveys some talismanic power), but that, of course, cannot substitute for injury in fact. In this case, unlike Powers, petitioner's allegation of injury in fact is not merely unsupported; it is directly foreclosed. There is no allegation in this case that the composition of 2 Of course, the same sense of dismay would arise if the defendant and the excluded venireman were of the same race. 523US2 Unit: $U51 [04-29-00 17:25:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 392 (1998) 407 Opinion of Thomas, J. petitioner's trial jury was affected by discrimination. In- stead, the allegation is merely that there was discrimination in the selection of the grand jury (and of only one member). The properly constituted petit jury's verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was in no way affected by the compo- sition of the grand jury. Indeed, to the extent that race played any part in the composition of petitioner's petit jury, it was by petitioner's own actions, as petitioner used 5 of his 12 peremptory strikes to eliminate blacks from the petit jury venire. Petitioner's attempt to assert that he was injured by the alleged exclusion of blacks at the grand jury stage is belied by his own use of peremptory strikes against blacks at the petit jury stage. It would be to no avail to suggest that the alleged discrimi- nation in grand jury selection could have caused an indict- ment improperly to be rendered, because the petit jury's ver- dict conclusively establishes that no reasonable grand jury could have failed to indict petitioner.3 Nor can the Court find support in our precedents allowing a defendant to chal- lenge his conviction based upon discrimination in grand jury selection, because all of those cases involved defendants' assertions of their own rights. See, e. g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282 (1950). Although we often do not require a criminal defendant to establish a cause-and-effect relationship between the proce- dural illegality and the subsequent conviction when the de- fendant asserts a denial of his own rights, see 499 U. S., at 427­428 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the government generally bears the burden of establishing harmlessness of such errors), even the Powers majority acknowledged that 3 For this reason, it is unlikely that petitioner ultimately will prevail on the merits of his due process claim. However, I agree with the Court's conclusion that petitioner has standing to raise that claim because peti- tioner asserts his own due process right. I join Part IV of the Court's opinion because it addresses only standing and does not address "the nature and extent" of petitioner's due process right. Ante, at 400. 523US2 Unit: $U51 [04-29-00 17:25:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN 408 CAMPBELL v. LOUISIANA Opinion of Thomas, J. such a showing is the foremost requirement of third-party standing, as evidenced by the lengths to which it went in an attempt to justify its finding of injury in fact. The Court's finding of a close relationship (an ambient fra- ternity of sorts) between petitioner and the black veniremen whose rights he seeks to vindicate is likewise unsupported. The Court, of course, never identifies precisely whose rights petitioner seeks to vindicate. Is it all veniremen who were not chosen as foreman? Is it all nonwhite veniremen? All black veniremen? Or just the black veniremen who were not ultimately chosen for the grand jury? Leaving aside the fact that the Court fails to identify the rights-holders, I fail to see how a "close relationship" could have developed between petitioner and the veniremen. Even if a "bond," Powers v. Ohio, supra, at 413, could develop between venire- men and defendants during voir dire, such a bond could not develop in the context of a judge's selection of a grand jury foreman-a context in which the defendant plays no role. Nor can any "common interest" between a defendant and excluded veniremen arise based upon a public humiliation suffered by the latter, because unlike the exercise of peremp- tory strikes, Evangeline Parish's process of selecting fore- men does not constitute "overt" action against particular ve- niremen. Rather, those veniremen not chosen (all but one) are simply left to take their chances at being randomly se- lected for the remaining seats on the grand jury. Finally, there are ample opportunities for prospective ju- rors whose equal protection rights have been violated to vin- dicate those rights, rather than relying upon a defendant of another race to do so for them. In contrast to the Batson line of cases, where an allegation may concern discrimination in the defendant's case alone, in this case petitioner alleges systematic discrimination in the selection of grand jury fore- men in Evangeline Parish. Such systematic discrimination provides a large class of potential plaintiffs and the opportu- 523US2 Unit: $U51 [04-29-00 17:25:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 392 (1998) 409 Opinion of Thomas, J. nity for declaratory or injunctive relief to prevent repeated violations. For these reasons, I would hold that petitioner-who does not claim that he was discriminated against or that the al- leged discrimination against others had any effect on the out- come of his trial­­lacks standing to raise the equal protec- tion rights of excluded black veniremen. Accordingly, I join Parts I, II, IV, and V of the Court's opinion and concur in the judgment. 523US2 Unit: $U52 [04-29-00 17:27:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN 410 OCTOBER TERM, 1997 Syllabus BEACH et ux. v. OCWEN FEDERAL BANK certiorari to the supreme court of florida No. 97­5310. Argued March 2, 1998-Decided April 21, 1998 Petitioners David and Linda Beach refinanced their Florida house in 1986 with a loan from Great Western Bank. In 1991, they stopped making mortgage payments, and in 1992 Great Western began this foreclosure proceeding. Respondent bank was thereafter substituted as the plain- tiff. The Beaches acknowledged their default but raised affirmative de- fenses, alleging, inter alia, that the bank's failure to make disclosures required by the Truth in Lending Act gave them the right under 15 U. S. C. § 1635 to rescind the mortgage agreement. The Florida trial court rejected that defense, holding, among other things, that any right to rescind had expired in 1989 under § 1635(f), which provides that the right of rescission "shall expire" three years after the loan closes. The State's intermediate appellate court affirmed, as did the Florida Su- preme Court. That court remarked that § 1635(f)'s plain language evi- dences an unconditional congressional intent to limit the right of rescis- sion to three years and distinguished its prior cases permitting a recoupment defense by ostensibly barred claims as involving statutes of limitation, not statutes extinguishing rights defensively asserted. Held: A borrower may not assert the § 1635 right to rescind as an affirm- ative defense in a collection action brought by the lender after § 1635(f)'s 3-year period has run. Absent "the clearest congressional language" to the contrary, Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U. S. 258, 264, a defendant may raise a claim in recoupment, a " `defense arising out of some feature of the transaction upon which the plaintiff's action is grounded,' " Rothen- sies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U. S. 296, 299 (quoting Bull v. United States, 295 U. S. 247, 262), even if the applicable statute of limita- tion would otherwise bar the claim as an independent cause of action. The 3-year period of § 1635(f), however, is not a statute of limitation that governs only the institution of suit; instead, it operates, with the lapse of time, to extinguish the right of rescission. The section's un- compromising statement that the borrower's right "shall expire" with the running of time manifests a congressional intent to extinguish com- pletely the right of rescission at the end of the 3-year period. The absence of a provision authorizing rescission as a defense stands in stark contrast to § 1640(e), which expressly provides that the Act's 1-year limi- tation on actions for recovery of damages "does not bar . . . assert[ion of] a violation . . . in an action . . . brought more than one year from the 523US2 Unit: $U52 [04-29-00 17:27:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 410 (1998) 411 Opinion of the Court date of the . . . violation as a matter of defense by recoupment." This quite different treatment of recoupment of damages and rescission in the nature of recoupment must be understood to reflect a deliberate in- tent on the part of Congress, see Bates v. United States, 522 U. S. 23, 29­ 30, and makes perfectly good sense. Since a statutory rescission right could cloud a bank's title on foreclosure, Congress may well have chosen to circumscribe that risk, while permitting recoupment of damages re- gardless of the date a collection action may be brought. Pp. 415­419. 692 So. 2d 146, affirmed. Souter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Bruce S. Rogow argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Beverly A. Pohl and Michael Tankersley. Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were James A. Huizinga, Michael F. Was- serman, Steven Ellison, and Patricia Lebow.* Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the Truth in Lending Act, 82 Stat. 146, 15 U. S. C. § 1601 et seq., when a loan made in a consumer credit trans- action is secured by the borrower's principal dwelling, the borrower may rescind the loan agreement if the lender fails to deliver certain forms or to disclose important terms accu- rately. See 15 U. S. C. § 1635. Under § 1635(f) of the stat- ute, this right of rescission "shall expire" in the usual case three years after the loan closes or upon the sale of the se- cured property, whichever date is earlier. The question here is whether a borrower may assert this right to rescind as an affirmative defense in a collection action brought by the lender more than three years after the consummation *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Association of Retired Persons by Jean Constantine-Davis and Nina F. Simon; and for Dorothy Botelho et al. by Richard J. Rubin and Gary Klein. Thomas M. Hefferon, John C. Englander, and Jeremiah S. Buckley filed a brief for the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. 523US2 Unit: $U52 [04-29-00 17:27:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN 412 BEACH v. OCWEN FED. BANK Opinion of the Court of the transaction. We answer no and hold that § 1635(f) completely extinguishes the right of rescission at the end of the 3-year period. I The declared purpose of the Act is "to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices." 15 U. S. C. § 1601(a); see Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U. S. 356, 363­368 (1973). Accordingly, the Act requires creditors to provide borrowers with clear and accurate disclosures of terms deal- ing with things like finance charges, annual percentage rates of interest, and the borrower's rights. See §§ 1631, 1632, 1635, 1638. Failure to satisfy the Act subjects a lender to criminal penalties for noncompliance, see § 1611, as well as to statutory and actual damages traceable to a lender's fail- ure to make the requisite disclosures, see § 1640. Section 1640(e) provides that an action for such damages "may be brought" within one year after a violation of the Act, but that a borrower may assert the right to damages "as a mat- ter of defense by recoupment or set-off" in a collection action brought by the lender even after the one year is up. Going beyond these rights to damages, the Act also au- thorizes a borrower whose loan is secured with his "principal dwelling," and who has been denied the requisite disclosures, to rescind the loan transaction entirely "until midnight of the third business day following the consummation of the transaction or the delivery of the information and rescis- sion forms required under this section together with a state- ment containing the material disclosures required under this subchapter, whichever is later." § 1635(a). A borrower who exercises this right to rescind "is not liable for any fi- nance or other charge, and any security interest given by [him], including any such interest arising by operation of law, becomes void" upon rescission. § 1635(b). Within 20 days 523US2 Unit: $U52 [04-29-00 17:27:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 410 (1998) 413 Opinion of the Court after receiving notice of rescission, the lender must "return to the [borrower] any money or property given as earnest money, downpayment, or otherwise, and shall take any ac- tion necessary or appropriate to reflect the termination of any security interest created under the transaction." Ibid. The Act provides, however, that the borrower's right of re- scission "shall expire three years after the date of consum- mation of the transaction or upon the sale of the property, whichever occurs first," even if the required disclosures have never been made. § 1635(f).1 The Act gives a borrower no express permission to assert the right of rescission as an affirmative defense after the expiration of the 3-year period. The borrowers in this case, petitioners David and Linda Beach, built a house in Jupiter, Florida, in 1986 with a se- cured $85,000 construction loan from Fidelity Federal Sav- ings Bank of Florida. In the same year, the Beaches refi- nanced the house with a loan from Great Western Bank.2 In 1991, the Beaches stopped making mortgage payments, and in 1992 the bank began this foreclosure proceeding. The Beaches acknowledged their default but raised affirmative defenses, alleging that the bank's failure to make disclosures required by the Act 3 gave them rights under §§ 1635 and 1 The Act provides a limited extension of this 3-year time period when "(1) any agency empowered to enforce the provisions of this subchapter institutes a proceeding to enforce the provisions of this section within three years after the date of consummation of the transaction, (2) such agency finds a violation of this section, and (3) the obligor's right to rescind is based in whole or in part on any matter involved in such proceeding." 15 U. S. C. § 1635(f). Under such circumstances, "the obligor's right of rescission shall expire three years after the date of consummation of the transaction or upon the earlier sale of the property, or upon the expiration of one year following the conclusion of the proceeding, or any judicial re- view or period for judicial review thereof, whichever is later." Ibid. 2 Ocwen Federal Bank was substituted as the plaintiff while this case was pending in the trial court. 3 Specifically, the Beaches claimed that the bank had failed to disclose properly and accurately (1) the amount financed, in violation of § 1638(a)(3); (2) the finance charge, in violation of § 1638(a)(3); (3) the annual percentage rate, in violation of § 1638(a)(4); (4) the number, amounts, and timing of 523US2 Unit: $U52 [04-29-00 17:27:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN 414 BEACH v. OCWEN FED. BANK Opinion of the Court 1640 to rescind the mortgage agreement and to reduce the bank's claim by the amount of their actual and statutory damages. The Circuit Court of the 15th Judicial Circuit of Florida agreed that under § 1640 the Beaches were entitled to "off- set the amount owed to Great Western" by $396 in actual damages and $1,000 in statutory damages because the bank had overstated the monthly mortgage payment by $0.58 and the finance charge by $201.84. But the court rejected the Beaches' effort to rescind the mortgage under § 1635, holding that the loan at issue was immune to rescission as part of a "residential mortgage transaction" (defined in § 1602(w)) and, in the alternative, that any right to rescind had expired after three years, in 1989. The court found it telling that Con- gress had included no saving clause to revive an expired right of rescission as a defense in the nature of recoupment or setoff. The State's intermediate appellate court affirmed, Beach v. Great Western Bank, 670 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996), and so did the Supreme Court of Florida, which addressed only the issue of rescission as a defense, Beach v. Great Western Bank, 692 So. 2d 146 (1997).4 That court remarked on the plain language of § 1635(f) as evidence of unconditional congressional intent to limit the right of rescis- sion to three years and explained that its prior cases permit- ting a defense of recoupment by an ostensibly barred claim were distinguishable because, among other things, they in- volved statutes of limitation, not statutes extinguishing rights defensively asserted. Because the reading of § 1635(f) given by the Supreme Court of Florida conflicts with the decisions of several other payments scheduled to repay the obligation, in violation of § 1638(a)(6); and (5) the total of payments, in violation of § 1638(a)(5). 4 Although the per curiam opinion posed the question as one "[u]nder Florida law," 692 So. 2d, at 147, it distinguished cases based on state law as inapposite and held that a defense of rescission was unavailable under the Act after three years. 523US2 Unit: $U52 [04-29-00 17:27:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 410 (1998) 415 Opinion of the Court courts,5 we granted certiorari, 522 U. S. 912 (1997), to deter- mine whether under federal law the statutory right of rescis- sion provided by § 1635 may be revived as an affirmative defense after its expiration under § 1635(f). We affirm. II The Beaches concede that any right they may have had to institute an independent proceeding for rescission under § 1635 lapsed in 1989, three years after they closed the loan with the bank, but they argue that the restriction to three years in § 1635(f) is a statute of limitation governing only the institution of suit and accordingly has no effect when a borrower claims a § 1635 right of rescission as a "defense in recoupment" to a collection action. They are, of course, cor- rect that as a general matter a defendant's right to plead "recoupment," a " `defense arising out of some feature of the transaction upon which the plaintiff's action is grounded,' " Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U. S. 296, 299 (1946) (quoting Bull v. United States, 295 U. S. 247, 262 (1935)), survives the expiration of the period provided by a statute of limitation that would otherwise bar the recoup- ment claim as an independent cause of action. So long as the plaintiff's action is timely, see ibid., a defendant may raise a claim in recoupment even if he could no longer bring it independently, absent " `the clearest congressional lan- guage' " to the contrary. Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U. S. 258, 264 (1993) (quoting United States v. Western Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 59, 71 (1956)). As we have said before, the object of a statute of limitation in keeping "stale litigation out of the courts," id., at 72, would be distorted if the statute were 5 See, e. g., In re Barsky, 210 B. R. 683 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Pa. 1997); In re Botelho, 195 B. R. 558 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Mass. 1996); In re Shaw, 178 B. R. 380 (Bkrtcy. Ct. NJ 1994); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ablin, 177 Ill. App. 3d 390, 532 N. E. 2d 379 (1988); Community Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of N. Y. v. McClammy, 525 N. Y. S. 2d 629, 138 App. Div. 2d 339 (1988); Dawe v. Merchants Mortgage and Trust Corp., 683 P. 2d 796 (Colo. 1984) (en banc). 523US2 Unit: $U52 [04-29-00 17:27:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN 416 BEACH v. OCWEN FED. BANK Opinion of the Court applied to bar an otherwise legitimate defense to a timely lawsuit, for limitation statutes "are aimed at lawsuits, not at the consideration of particular issues in lawsuits," ibid. The Beaches come up short, however, on the question whether this is a case for the general rule at all. The issue here is not whether limitation statutes affect recoupment rights, but whether § 1635(f) is a statute of limitation, that is, "whether [it] operates, with the lapse of time, to extin- guish the right which is the foundation for the claim" or "merely to bar the remedy for its enforcement." Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 320 U. S. 356, 358­ 359, and n. 4 (1943). The "ultimate question" is whether Congress intended that "the right shall be enforceable in any event after the prescribed time," id., at 360; accord, Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380 U. S. 424 (1965), and in this instance, the answer is apparent from the plain language of § 1635(f). See Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, 508 U. S. 402, 409 (1993). The terms of a typical statute of limitation provide that a cause of action may or must be brought within a certain pe- riod of time. So, in Reiter v. Cooper, supra, at 263­264, we concluded that 49 U. S. C. § 11706(c)(2), providing that a ship- per " `must begin a civil action to recover damages under [§ 11705(b)(3)] within two years after the claim accrues,' " was a statute of limitation raising no bar to a claim made in recoupment. See Note, Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177, 1179 (1950) (most stat- utes of limitation provide either that "all actions . . . shall be brought within" or "no action . . . shall be brought more than" so many years after "the cause thereof accrued" (inter- nal quotation marks omitted)); H. Wood, 1 Limitation of Actions § 1, pp. 2­3 (4th ed. 1916) ("[S]tatutes which pro- vide that no action shall be brought, or right enforced, unless brought or enforced within a certain time, are . . . statutes of limitation"). 523US2 Unit: $U52 [04-29-00 17:27:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 410 (1998) 417 Opinion of the Court To be sure, a limitation provision may be held to be noth- ing more than a bar to bringing suit, even though its terms are ostensibly more ambitious than the language of the clas- sic formulations cited above. Thus, for example, in Distri- bution Servs., Ltd. v. Eddie Parker Interests, Inc., 897 F. 2d 811 (1990), the Fifth Circuit concluded that § 3(6) of the Car- riage of Goods by Sea Act is a statute of limitation permit- ting counterclaim brought by way of recoupment, despite its fierce-sounding provision that "the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year after delivery of the goods," 46 U. S. C. App. § 1303(6). Section 1635(f), however, takes us beyond any question whether it limits more than the time for bringing a suit, by governing the life of the underlying right as well. The sub- section says nothing in terms of bringing an action but in- stead provides that the "right of rescission [under the Act] shall expire" at the end of the time period. It talks not of a suit's commencement but of a right's duration, which it ad- dresses in terms so straightforward as to render any limita- tion on the time for seeking a remedy superfluous. There is no reason, then, even to resort to the canons of construction that we use to resolve doubtful cases, such as the rule that the creation of a right in the same statute that provides a limitation is some evidence that the right was meant to be limited, not just the remedy. See Midstate Horticultural Co., supra, at 360; Burnett, supra, at 427, n. 2; Davis v. Mills, 194 U. S. 451, 454 (1904). The Act, however, has left even less to chance (if that is possible) than its "expire" provision would allow, standing alone. It is useful to look ahead to § 1640 with its provi- sions for recovery of damages. Subsection (e) reads that the 1-year limit on actions for damages "does not bar a person from asserting a violation of this subchapter in an action to collect the debt which was brought more than one year from 523US2 Unit: $U52 [04-29-00 17:27:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN 418 BEACH v. OCWEN FED. BANK Opinion of the Court the date of the occurrence of the violation as a matter of defense by recoupment or set-off in such action, except as otherwise provided by State law." 15 U. S. C. § 1640(e). Thus the effect of the 1-year limitation provision on damages actions is expressly deflected from recoupment claims. The quite different treatment of rescission stands in stark con- trast to this, however, there being no provision for rescission as a defense that would mitigate the uncompromising provi- sion of § 1635(f) that the borrower's right "shall expire" with the running of the time. Indeed, when Congress amended the Act in 1995 to soften certain restrictions on rescission as a defense in § 8, 109 Stat. 275­276, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1635(i)(1) and (2) (1994 ed., Supp. I), it took care to provide that any such liberality was "subject to the [three year] time pe- riod provided in subsection (f)," ibid., and it left a borrower's only hope for further recoupment in the slim promise of § 1635(i)(3), that "[n]othing in this subsection affects a con- sumer's right of rescission in recoupment under State law." § 8, 109 Stat. 276.6 Thus, recoupment of damages and rescis- sion in the nature of recoupment receive unmistakably differ- ent treatments, which under the normal rule of construction are understood to reflect a deliberate intent on the part of Congress. See Bates v. United States, 522 U. S. 23, 29­30 (1997) (" ` "[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or ex- clusion" ' ") (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983), in turn quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F. 2d 720, 722 (CA5 1972)). And the distinction thus indicated makes perfectly good sense. Since a statutory right of rescission could cloud a bank's title on foreclosure, 6 Since there is no claim before us that Florida law purports to provide any right to rescind defensively on the grounds relevant under the Act, we have no occasion to explore how state recoupment law might work when raised in a foreclosure proceeding outside the 3-year period. 523US2 Unit: $U52 [04-29-00 17:27:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 410 (1998) 419 Opinion of the Court Congress may well have chosen to circumscribe that risk, while permitting recoupment damages regardless of the date a collection action may be brought. See Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, Annual Report to Congress on Truth in Lending for the Year 1971, p. 19 (Jan. 3, 1972); Na- tional Commission on Consumer Finance, Consumer Credit in the United States 189­190 (Dec. 1972). We respect Congress's manifest intent by concluding that the Act permits no federal right to rescind, defensively or otherwise, after the 3-year period of § 1635(f) has run. Ac- cordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida. It is so ordered. 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:03] PAGES PGT: OPIN 420 OCTOBER TERM, 1997 Syllabus MILLER v. ALBRIGHT, SECRETARY OF STATE certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit No. 96­1060. Argued November 4, 1997-Decided April 22, 1998 Petitioner was born out of wedlock in 1970 in the Philippines. Her mother is a Filipino national. Her father, Charlie Miller, is an Ameri- can citizen residing in Texas who served in the United States military in the Philippines at the time of petitioner's conception. He never mar- ried petitioner's mother, and there is no evidence that he was in the Philippines at the time of her birth or that he ever returned there after completing his tour of duty. In 1992, the State Department denied peti- tioner's application for registration as a United States citizen. After a Texas court granted Mr. Miller's petition for a paternity decree finding him to be her father, petitioner reapplied for citizenship status, which was again denied on the ground that the Texas decree did not satisfy 8 U. S. C. § 1409(a)(4)'s requirement that a child born out of wedlock and outside the United States to an alien mother and an American father be legitimated before age 18 in order to acquire citizenship. Petitioner and Mr. Miller then sued the Secretary of State in Federal District Court in Texas, seeking a judgment declaring her to be a United States citizen. They emphasized that the citizenship of an out-of-wedlock, foreign-born child of an alien father and an American mother is estab- lished at birth under § 1409(c), and alleged that § 1409's different treat- ment of citizen fathers and citizen mothers violated Mr. Miller's Fifth Amendment equal protection right by utilizing the suspect classification of gender without justification. Concluding that Mr. Miller did not have standing, the court dismissed him as a party and transferred venue to the District Court for the District of Columbia. That court dismissed the suit on the ground that federal courts do not have power to grant citizenship. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that petitioner had standing to sue, but concluding that the § 1409 requirements imposed on a child like her, but not on the foreign-born, out-of-wedlock child of an American mother, were justified by governmental interests in fostering the child's ties with this country and with her citizen parent. Held: The judgment is affirmed. 96 F. 3d 1467, affirmed. Justice Stevens, joined by The Chief Justice, concluded that § 1409(a)(4)'s requirement that children born abroad and out of wedlock to citizen fathers, but not to citizen mothers, obtain formal 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:03] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 421 Syllabus proof of paternity by age 18 does not violate the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 428­445. (a) The foregoing is the only issue presented by this case's facts. Certain other issues need not be resolved: Whether Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787, dictates the outcome here; the validity of the distinction drawn by §§ 1401(g) and 1409(c) between residency requirements for unmarried citizen fathers and unmarried citizen mothers wishing to transmit citizenship at birth to their foreign-born, out-of-wedlock chil- dren; and the validity of §§ 1409(a)(1) and (a)(3), which impose additional requirements on citizen fathers wishing to transmit such citizenship. Because petitioner is contesting the Government's refusal to register and treat her as a citizen, a judgment in her favor would confirm her pre-existing citizenship rather than grant her rights that she does not now possess. The Court of Appeals was therefore correct that she has standing to invoke the federal courts' jurisdiction. Moreover, because her claim relies heavily on the proposition that her citizen father should have the same right to transmit citizenship as would a citizen mother, the Court should evaluate the alleged discrimination against him, as well as its impact on her. See, e. g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 193­ 197. Pp. 428­433. (b) The § 1409(a)(4) rule applicable to each class of out-of-wedlock chil- dren born abroad is eminently reasonable and justified by important Government interests: ensuring reliable proof that a person born out of wedlock who claims citizenship by birth actually shares a blood relation- ship with an American citizen; encouraging the development of a healthy relationship between the citizen parent and the child while the child is a minor; and fostering ties between the child and the United States. Male and female parents of foreign-born, out-of-wedlock chil- dren are differently situated in several pertinent respects. The child's blood relationship to its birth mother is immediately obvious and is typically established by hospital records and birth certificates, but the relationship to the unmarried father may often be undisclosed and unre- corded in any contemporary public record. Similarly, the child's birth mother certainly knows of the child's existence and typically will have immediate custody, whereas, due to the normal interval of nine months between conception and birth, an unmarried father may not even know that his child exists, and the child may not know the father's identity. Section 1409(a)(4)'s requirement-that children born out of wedlock to citizen fathers obtain formal proof of paternity by age 18, either through legitimation, written acknowledgment by the father under oath, or adjudication by a competent court-is well tailored to address these concerns. The conclusion that Congress may require an affirmative act by unmarried fathers and their children, but not mothers and their 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:03] PAGES PGT: OPIN 422 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Syllabus children, is directly supported by Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U. S. 248. Pp. 433­441. (c) The argument that § 1409(a)(4) is unconstitutional because it is a stereotypical "gender-based classification" must be rejected. None of the governmental interests underlying § 1409(a)(4) can be fairly charac- terized as an accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about the members of either sex. The biological differences between single men and single women provide a relevant basis for differing rules gov- erning their ability to confer citizenship on children born out of wedlock in foreign lands, and an impartial analysis of those differences rebuts the strong presumption that gender-based legal distinctions are suspect. Pp. 442­445. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, concluded that peti- tioner should not be accorded standing to raise her father's gender dis- crimination claim. This Court applies a presumption against third- party standing as a prudential limitation on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, see, e. g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 113, and that presumption may only be rebutted in particular circumstances: where a litigant has suffered injury in fact and has a close relation to a third party, and where some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests exists, see Powers v. Ohio, 499 U. S. 400, 411. Petitioner has not demonstrated a genuine obstacle to her father's abil- ity to assert his own rights that rises to the level of a hindrance. Ac- cordingly, she is precluded from raising his equal protection claims in this case. Although petitioner may still assert her own rights, she can- not invoke a gender discrimination claim that would trigger heightened scrutiny. Section 1409 draws a distinction based on the gender of the parent, not the child, and any claim of discrimination based on differen- tial treatment of illegitimate versus legitimate children is not presented in the question on which certiorari was granted. Thus, petitioner's own constitutional challenge is subject only to rational basis scrutiny. Even though § 1409 could not withstand heightened scrutiny, it is sustainable under the lower standard. Pp. 445­452. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, agreed with the out- come of this case on the ground that the complaint must be dismissed because the Court has no power to provide the relief requested: confer- ral of citizenship on a basis other than that prescribed by Congress. Petitioner, having been born outside United States territory, can only become a citizen by naturalization under congressional authority. See, e. g., United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 702­703. If there is no congressional enactment granting her citizenship, she remains an alien. By its plain language, 8 U. S. C. § 1409 sets forth a precondition to the acquisition of citizenship that petitioner admittedly has not met. 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:03] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 423 Opinion of Stevens, J. Thus, even if the Court were to agree that the difference in treatment between the illegitimate children of citizen fathers and citizen mothers is unconstitutional, it could not, consistent with the extremely limited judicial power in this area, see, e. g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787, 792, remedy that constitutional infirmity by declaring petitioner to be a citi- zen or ordering the State Department to approve her application for citizenship, see INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U. S. 875, 884. This is not a case in which the Court may remedy an alleged equal protection violation by either expanding or limiting the benefits conferred so as to deny or grant them equally to all. Pp. 452­459. Stevens, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., joined. O'Connor, J., filed an opin- ion concurring in the judgment, in which Kennedy, J., joined, post, p. 445. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 452. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opin- ion, in which Souter and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 460. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, post, p. 471. Donald Ross Patterson argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Edward C. DuMont, Michael Jay Singer, and John S. Koppel.* Justice Stevens announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice joins. There are "two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth and naturalization." United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 702 (1898). Within the former category, the Four- teenth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees that every person "born in the United States, and subject to the *Walter A. Smith, Jr., Steven R. Shapiro, Lucas Guttentag, Sara L. Mandelbaum, and Martha Davis filed a brief for the American Civil Lib- erties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:03] PAGES PGT: OPIN 424 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Opinion of Stevens, J. jurisdiction thereof, becomes at once a citizen of the United States, and needs no naturalization." 169 U. S., at 702. Persons not born in the United States acquire citizenship by birth only as provided by Acts of Congress. Id., at 703. The petitioner in this case challenges the constitutionality of the statutory provisions governing the acquisition of citi- zenship at birth by children born out of wedlock and outside of the United States. The specific challenge is to the distinc- tion drawn by § 309 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 238, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1409, between the child of an alien father and a citizen mother, on the one hand, and the child of an alien mother and a citizen father, on the other. Subject to residence requirements for the citizen parent, the citizenship of the former is established at birth; the citizenship of the latter is not established unless and until either the father or his child takes certain affirmative steps to create or confirm their relationship. Petitioner contends that the statutory requirement that those steps be taken while the child is a minor violates the Fifth Amendment be- cause the statute contains no limitation on the time within which the child of a citizen mother may prove that she be- came a citizen at birth. We find no merit in the challenge because the statute does not impose any limitation on the time within which the mem- bers of either class of children may prove that they qualify for citizenship. It does establish different qualifications for citizenship for the two classes of children, but we are per- suaded that the qualifications for the members of each of those classes, so far as they are implicated by the facts of this case, are well supported by valid governmental inter- ests. We therefore conclude that the statutory distinction is neither arbitrary nor invidious. I Petitioner was born on June 20, 1970, in Angeles City, Re- public of the Philippines. The records of the Local Civil 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:03] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 425 Opinion of Stevens, J. Registrar disclose that her birth was registered 10 days later, that she was named Lorena Pen ero, that her mother was Luz Pen ero, a Filipino national, and that her birth was "illegitimate." Spaces on the form referring to the name and the nationality of the father are blank. Petitioner grew up and received her high school and col- lege education in the Philippines. At least until after her 21st birthday, she never lived in the United States. App. 19. There is no evidence that either she or her mother ever resided outside of the Philippines.1 Petitioner's father, Charlie Miller, is an American citizen residing in Texas.2 He apparently served in the United States Air Force and was stationed in the Philippines at the time of petitioner's conception. Id., at 21. He never mar- ried petitioner's mother, and there is no evidence that he was in the Philippines at the time of petitioner's birth or that he ever returned there after completing his tour of duty. In 1992, Miller filed a petition in a Texas court to establish his relationship with petitioner. The petition was unopposed and the court entered a "Voluntary Paternity Decree" find- ing him "to be the biological and legal father of Lorelyn Pe- nero Miller." The decree provided that "[t]he parent-child relationship is created between the father and the child as if the child were born to the father and mother during mar- riage." App. to Pet. for Cert. 38. 1 Her mother was born in Leyte. Several years after petitioner's birth, her mother married a man named Frank Raspotnik and raised a family in Angeles City. App. 22. 2 Although there is no formal finding that his paternity has been estab- lished by clear and convincing evidence, it is undisputed. In a letter to petitioner's attorney, the State Department acknowledged that it was "sat- isfied that Mr. Charlie R. Miller, the putative father, is a U. S. citizen, that he possesses sufficient physical presence in the United States to transmit citizenship, and that there is sufficient evidence that he had access to the applicant's mother at the probable time of conception." App. to Pet. for Cert. 32­33. 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:03] PAGES PGT: OPIN 426 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Opinion of Stevens, J. In November 1991, petitioner filed an application for regis- tration as a United States citizen with the State Department. The application was denied in March 1992, and petitioner reapplied after her father obtained the paternity decree in Texas in July 1992. The reapplication was also denied on the ground that the Texas decree did not satisfy "the re- quirements of Section 309(a)(4) INA, which requires that a child born out of wedlock be legitimated before age eighteen in order to acquire U. S. citizenship under Section 301(g) INA (formerly Section 301(a)(7) INA)." Id., at 33. In fur- ther explanation of its reliance on § 309(a)(4), the denial letter added: "Without such legitimation before age eighteen, there is no legally recognized relationship under the INA and the child acquires no rights of citizenship through an American citizen parent." 3 Ibid. II In 1993, petitioner and her father filed an amended com- plaint against the Secretary of State in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, seeking a judgment declaring that petitioner is a citizen of the United States and that she therefore has the right to possess an American passport. They alleged that the INA's different treatment of citizen mothers and citizen fathers violated Mr. Miller's "right to equal protection under the laws by utilizing the suspect classification of gender without justification." App. 11. In response to a motion to dismiss filed by the 3 The comment, of course, related only to cases in which the child born out of wedlock claims citizenship through her father. Moreover, the refer- ence to age 18 was inaccurate; petitioner was born prior to 1986, when § 309(a) was amended to change the relevant age from 21 to 18, see Pub. L. 99­653, § 13, 100 Stat. 3657, and she falls within a narrow age bracket whose members may elect to have the preamendment law apply, see note following 8 U. S. C. § 1409 (Effective Date of 1986 Amendment) (quoting § 23(e), as added, Pub. L. 100­525, § 8(r), 102 Stat. 2619). This oversight does not affect her case, however, because she was over 21 when the Texas decree was entered. 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:03] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 427 Opinion of Stevens, J. Government, the District Court concluded that Mr. Miller did not have standing and dismissed him as a party. Be- cause venue in Texas was therefore improper, see 28 U. S. C. § 1391(e), the court transferred the case to the District Court for the District of Columbia, the site of the Secretary's resi- dence. The Government renewed its motion in that forum, and that court concluded that even though petitioner had suf- fered an injury caused by the Secretary's refusal to register her as a citizen, the injury was not "redressable" because federal courts do not have the power to "grant citizenship." 870 F. Supp. 1, 3 (1994) (citing INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U. S. 875, 884 (1988)). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, but on different grounds. It first held that peti- tioner does have standing to challenge the constitutionality of 8 U. S. C. § 1409(a). If her challenge should succeed, the court could enter a judgment declaring that she was already a citizen pursuant to other provisions of the INA. 96 F. 3d 1467, 1470 (1996). On the merits, however, the court con- cluded that the requirements imposed on the "illegitimate" child of an American citizen father, but not on the child of a citizen mother, were justified by the interest in fostering the child's ties with this country. It explained: "[W]e conclude, as did the Ninth Circuit, that `a desire to promote early ties to this country and to those rel- atives who are citizens of this country is not a[n ir]ra- tional basis for the requirements made by' sections 1409(a)(3) and (4). Ablang [v. Reno], 52 F. 3d at 806. Furthermore, we find it entirely reasonable for Con- gress to require special evidence of such ties between an illegitimate child and its father. A mother is far less likely to ignore the child she has carried in her womb than is the natural father, who may not even be aware of its existence. As the Court has recognized, `mothers and fathers of illegitimate children are not similarly sit- uated.' Parham v. Hughes, 441 U. S. 347, 355 (1979). 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:03] PAGES PGT: OPIN 428 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Opinion of Stevens, J. `The putative father often goes his way unconscious of the birth of the child. Even if conscious, he is very often totally unconcerned because of the absence of any ties to the mother.' Id. at 355 n. 7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This sex-based distinction seems especially warranted where, as here, the applicant for citizenship was fathered by a U. S. serviceman while serving a tour of duty overseas." Id., at 1472. Judge Wald concurred in the judgment despite her opinion that there is "no rational basis for a law that requires a U. S. citizen father, but not a U. S. citizen mother, to formally le- gitimate a child before she reaches majority as well as agree in writing to provide financial support until that date or for- ever forfeit the right to transmit citizenship." Id., at 1473. While she agreed that "requiring some sort of minimal `fam- ily ties' between parent and child, as well as fostering an early connection between child and country, is rational gov- ernment policy," she did not agree that those goals justify "a set of procedural hurdles for men-and only men-who wish to confer citizenship on their children." Id., at 1474. She nevertheless regretfully concurred in the judgment because she believed that our decision in Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787 (1977), required the court to uphold the constitutionality of § 1409. 96 F. 3d, at 1473. We granted certiorari to address the following question: "Is the distinction in 8 U. S. C. § 1409 between `illegit- imate' children of United States citizen mothers and `illegitimate' children of United States citizen fathers a violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution?" 520 U. S. 1208 (1997). III Before explaining our answer to the single question that we agreed to address, it is useful to put to one side certain 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:03] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 429 Opinion of Stevens, J. issues that need not be resolved. First, we need not decide whether Fiallo v. Bell dictates the outcome of this case, be- cause that case involved the claims of several aliens to a spe- cial immigration preference, whereas here petitioner claims that she is, and for years has been, an American citizen.4 Additionally, Fiallo involved challenges to the statutory dis- tinctions between "illegitimate" and "legitimate" children, which are not encompassed in the question presented in this case and which we therefore do not consider. The statutory provision at issue in this case, 8 U. S. C. § 1409, draws two types of distinctions between citizen fa- thers and citizen mothers of children born out of wedlock. The first relates to the class of unmarried persons who may transmit citizenship at birth to their offspring, and the sec- ond defines the affirmative steps that are required to trans- mit such citizenship. With respect to the eligible class of parents, an unmarried father may not transmit his citizenship to a child born abroad to an alien mother unless he satisfies the residency require- 4 The sections of the INA challenged in Fiallo defined the terms "child" and "parent," which determine eligibility for the special preference immi- gration status accorded to the "children" and "parents" of United States citizens and lawful permanent residents. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787, 788­789 (1977). " `Child' " was defined to include " `an illegitimate child, by, through whom, or on whose behalf a status, privilege, or benefit is sought by virtue of the relationship of the child to its natural mother.' " Id., at 788­789, n. 1 (quoting 8 U. S. C. § 1101(b)(1)(D) (1976 ed.)). Thus, the statute did not permit an illegitimate child to seek preference by virtue of relationship with its citizen or resident father, nor could an alien father seek preference based on his illegitimate child's citizenship or residence. 430 U. S., at 789. Following this Court's decision in Fiallo upholding those provisions, in 1986 Congress amended the INA to recog- nize "child" and "parent" status where the preference is sought based on the relationship of a child born out of wedlock to its natural father "if the father has or had a bona fide parent-child relationship with the per- son." Pub. L. 99­603, § 315(a), 100 Stat. 3439, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1101(b)(1)(D) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 430 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Opinion of Stevens, J. ment in § 1401(g) that applies to a citizen parent who is mar- ried to an alien.5 Under that provision, the citizen parent must have resided in the United States for a total of at least five years, at least two of which were after attaining the age of 14 years.6 If the citizen parent is an unmarried mother, however, § 1409(c) rather than § 1401(g) applies; under that subsection she need only have had one year of continuous residence in the United States in order to confer citizenship on her offspring.7 Since petitioner's father satisfied the resi- dency requirement in § 1401(g), the validity of the distinction between that requirement and the unusually generous provi- sion in § 1409(c) is not at issue.8 5 See 8 U. S. C. § 1409(a) (directing that §§ 1401(c), (d), (e), (g) and 1408(2) "shall apply" if the specified conditions of § 1409(a) are met). 6 Title 8 U. S. C. § 1401 provides: "The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth:. . . . . "(g) a person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than five years, at least two of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years . . . ." Prior to its amendment in 1986, the section had required residence of 10 total years, at least 5 of which were after attaining the age of 14. See § 301(a)(7), 66 Stat. 236. 7 Section 309(c) of the INA, codified in 8 U. S. C. § 1409(c), provides: "(c) Notwithstanding the provision of subsection (a) of this section, a per- son born, after December 23, 1952, outside the United States and out of wedlock shall be held to have acquired at birth the nationality status of his mother, if the mother had the nationality of the United States at the time of such person's birth, and if the mother had previously been physi- cally present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of one year." 8 The Government has offered two explanations for the special rule ap- plicable to unmarried citizen mothers who give birth abroad: first, an as- sumption that the citizen mother would probably have custody, and second, 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 431 Opinion of Stevens, J. As for affirmative steps, § 1409(a), as amended in 1986, im- poses four requirements concerning unmarried citizen fa- thers that must be satisfied to confer citizenship "as of the date of birth" on a person born out of wedlock to an alien mother in another country. Citizenship for such persons is established if: "(1) a blood relationship between the person and the father is established by clear and convincing evidence, "(2) the father had the nationality of the United States at the time of the person's birth, "(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide financial support for the person until the per- son reaches the age of 18 years, and "(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years- "(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person's residence or domicile, "(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under oath, or "(C) the paternity of the person is established by ad- judication of a competent court." 8 U. S. C. § 1409(a). Only the second of these four requirements is expressly included in § 1409(c), the provision applicable to unwed citi- zen mothers. See n. 7, supra. Petitioner, relying heavily on Judge Wald's separate opinion below, argues that there is no rational basis for imposing the other three requirements on children of citizen fathers but not citizen mothers. The first requirement is not at issue here, however, because the Government does not question Mr. Miller's blood relationship with petitioner. that in most foreign countries the nationality of an illegitimate child is that of the mother unless paternity has been established. The Govern- ment submits that the special rule would minimize the risk that such a child might otherwise be stateless. See Brief for Respondent 32­34. 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 432 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Opinion of Stevens, J. Moreover, even though the parties have disputed the va- lidity of the third condition 9-and even though that condition is repeatedly targeted in Justice Breyer's dissent-we need not resolve that debate because it is unclear whether the requirement even applies in petitioner's case; it was added in 1986, after her birth, and she falls within a special interim provision that allows her to elect application of the preamendment § 1409(a), which required only legitimation before age 21. See n. 3, supra. And even if the condition did apply to her claim of citizenship, the State Department's refusal to register petitioner as a citizen was expressly based on § 1409(a)(4). Indeed, since that subsection is written in the disjunctive, it is only necessary to uphold the least oner- ous of the three alternative methods of compliance to sustain the Government's position. Thus, the only issue presented by the facts of this case is whether the requirement in § 1409(a)(4)-that children born out of wedlock to citizen fathers, but not citizen mothers, obtain formal proof of pater- nity by age 18, either through legitimation, written acknowl- edgment by the father under oath, or adjudication by a com- petent court-violates the Fifth Amendment. It is of significance that the petitioner in this case, unlike the petitioners in Fiallo, see 430 U. S., at 790, and n. 3, is not challenging the denial of an application for special status. She is contesting the Government's refusal to register and treat her as a citizen. If she were to prevail, the judgment in her favor would confirm her pre-existing citizenship rather than grant her rights that she does not now possess. 9 The Government asserts that the purpose of § 1409(a)(3) is " `to facili- tate the enforcement of a child support order and, thus, lessen the chance that the child could become a financial burden to the states.' " Brief for Respondent 25­26, n. 13 (quoting Hearings on H. R. 4823 et al. before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 150 (1986) (state- ment of Joan M. Clark, Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs) (hereinafter Hearings)). 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 433 Opinion of Stevens, J. We therefore agree with the Court of Appeals that she has standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts. See 96 F. 3d, at 1469­1470 (distinguishing INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U. S. 875 (1988)). Moreover, because her claim relies heavily on the proposition that her citizen father should have the same right to transmit citizenship as would a citizen mother, we shall evaluate the alleged discrimination against him as well as its impact on her. See, e. g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 193­197 (1976).10 IV Under the terms of the INA, the joint conduct of a citizen and an alien that results in conception is not sufficient to produce an American citizen, regardless of whether the citi- zen parent is the male or the female partner. If the two parties engage in a second joint act-if they agree to marry one another-citizenship will follow. The provision at issue in this case, however, deals only with cases in which no rele- vant joint conduct occurs after conception; it determines the ability of each of those parties, acting separately, to confer citizenship on a child born outside of the United States. If the citizen is the unmarried female, she must first choose to carry the pregnancy to term and reject the alternative of abortion-an alternative that is available by law to many, and in reality to most, women around the world. She must then actually give birth to the child. Section 1409(c) re- 10 As a threshold matter, the Government now argues-though it never asserted this position below or in opposition to certiorari-that an alien outside the territory of the United States "has no substantive rights cogni- zable under the Fifth Amendment." Brief for Respondent 11­12. Even if that is so, the question to be decided is whether petitioner is such an alien or whether, as she claims, she is a citizen. Thus, we must address the merits to determine whether the predicate for this argument is accu- rate. In the cases on which the Government relies, Johnson v. Eisen- trager, 339 U. S. 763 (1950), and United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U. S. 259 (1990), it was perfectly clear that the complaining aliens were not citizens or nationals of the United States. 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 434 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Opinion of Stevens, J. wards that choice and that labor by conferring citizenship on her child. If the citizen is the unmarried male, he need not partici- pate in the decision to give birth rather than to choose an abortion; he need not be present at the birth; and for at least 17 years thereafter he need not provide any parental sup- port, either moral or financial, to either the mother or the child, in order to preserve his right to confer citizenship on the child pursuant to § 1409(a). In order retroactively to transmit his citizenship to the child as of the date of the child's birth, all that § 1409(a)(4) requires is that he be willing and able to acknowledge his paternity in writing under oath while the child is still a minor. 8 U. S. C. § 1409(a)(4)(B). In fact, § 1409(a)(4) requires even less of the unmarried father- that provision is alternatively satisfied if, before the child turns 18, its paternity "is established by adjudication of a competent court." § 1409(a)(4)(C). It would appear that the child could obtain such an adjudication absent any affirmative act by the father, and perhaps even over his express objection. There is thus a vast difference between the burdens im- posed on the respective parents of potential citizens born out of wedlock in a foreign land. It seems obvious that the burdens imposed on the female citizen are more severe than those imposed on the male citizen by § 1409(a)(4), the only provision at issue in this case. It is nevertheless argued that the male citizen and his offspring are the victims of irrational discrimination because § 1409(a)(4) is the product of " `overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and women.' " Brief for Petitioner 8. We find the argu- ment singularly unpersuasive.11 11 Though petitioner claims to be a citizen from birth, rather than claim- ing an immigration preference, citizenship does not pass by descent. Rog- ers v. Bellei, 401 U. S. 815, 830 (1971). Thus she must still meet the statutory requirements set by Congress for citizenship. Id., at 828­830; United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U. S. 472, 474 (1917). Deference to the 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 435 Opinion of Stevens, J. Insofar as the argument rests on the fact that the male citizen parent will "forever forfeit the right to transmit citi- zenship" if he does not come forward while the child is a minor, whereas there is no limit on the time within which the citizen mother may prove her blood relationship, the ar- gument overlooks the difference between a substantive con- dition and a procedural limitation. The substantive conduct of the unmarried citizen mother that qualifies her child for citizenship is completed at the moment of birth; the relevant conduct of the unmarried citizen father or his child may occur at any time within 18 years thereafter. There is, how- ever, no procedural hurdle that limits the time or the method by which either parent (or the child) may provide the State Department with evidence that the necessary steps were taken to transmit citizenship to the child. The substantive requirement embodied in § 1409(a)(4) serves, at least in part, to ensure that a person born out of wedlock who claims citizenship by birth actually shares a blood relationship with an American citizen. As originally enacted in 1952, § 1409(a) required simply that "the paternity of such child [born out of wedlock] is established while such child is under the age of twenty-one years by legitimation." 66 Stat. 238. The section offered no other means of proving a biological relationship. In 1986, at the same time that it modified the INA provisions at issue in Fiallo in favor of unmarried fathers and their out-of-wedlock children, see n. 4, supra, Congress expanded § 1409(a) to allow the two other alternatives now found in subsections (4)(B) and (4)(C). political branches dictates "a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigration and natural- ization." Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 82 (1976). Even if, as petitioner and her amici argue, the heightened scrutiny that normally governs gender discrimination claims applied in this context, see United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, 532­534 (1996), we are persuaded that the re- quirement imposed by § 1409(a)(4) on children of unmarried male, but not female, citizens is substantially related to important governmental objectives. 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 436 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Opinion of Stevens, J. Pub. L. 99­653, § 13, 100 Stat. 3657. The purpose of the amendment was to "simplify and facilitate determinations of acquisition of citizenship by children born out of wedlock to an American citizen father, by eliminating the necessity of determining the father's residence or domicile and establish- ing satisfaction of the legitimation provisions of the jurisdic- tion." Hearings, at 150. The 1986 amendment also added § 1409(a)(1), which requires paternity to be established by clear and convincing evidence, in order to deter fraudulent claims; but that standard of proof was viewed as an ancillary measure, not a replacement for proof of paternity by legiti- mation or a formal alternative. See id., at 150, 155. There is no doubt that ensuring reliable proof of a biologi- cal relationship between the potential citizen and its citizen parent is an important governmental objective. See Trim- ble v. Gordon, 430 U. S. 762, 770­771 (1977); Fiallo, 430 U. S., at 799, n. 8. Nor can it be denied that the male and female parents are differently situated in this respect. The blood relationship to the birth mother is immediately obvious and is typically established by hospital records and birth certifi- cates; the relationship to the unmarried father may often be undisclosed and unrecorded in any contemporary public rec- ord. Thus, the requirement that the father make a timely written acknowledgment under oath, or that the child obtain a court adjudication of paternity, produces the rough equiva- lent of the documentation that is already available to evi- dence the blood relationship between the mother and the child. If the statute had required the citizen parent, whether male or female, to obtain appropriate formal docu- mentation within 30 days after birth, it would have been "gender-neutral" on its face, even though in practical opera- tion it would disfavor unmarried males because in virtually every case such a requirement would be superfluous for the mother. Surely the fact that the statute allows 18 years in which to provide evidence that is comparable to what the 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 437 Opinion of Stevens, J. mother provides immediately after birth cannot be viewed as discriminating against the father or his child. Nevertheless, petitioner reiterates the suggestion that it is irrational to require a formal act such as a written ac- knowledgment or a court adjudication because the advent of reliable genetic testing fully addresses the problem of prov- ing paternity, and subsection (a)(1) already requires proof of paternity by clear and convincing evidence. See 96 F. 3d, at 1474. We respectfully disagree. Nothing in subsection (a)(1) requires the citizen father or his child to obtain a ge- netic paternity test. It is difficult, moreover, to understand why signing a paternity acknowledgment under oath prior to the child's 18th birthday is more burdensome than obtain- ing a genetic test, which is relatively expensive,12 normally requires physical intrusion for both the putative father and child,13 and often is not available in foreign countries.14 Congress could fairly conclude that despite recent scientific advances, it still remains preferable to require some formal legal act to establish paternity, coupled with a clear-and- convincing evidence standard to deter fraud. The time limi- 12 See 7 U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Affairs Manual § 1131.5­4(c) (1996) (hereinafter Foreign Affairs Manual). Commercially available testing in the United States presently appears to cost between about $450 to $600 per test. See Hotaling, Is He or Isn't He?, Los Angeles Times Magazine, Sept. 7, 1997, pp. 36, 54 (hereinafter Hotaling); Mirabella, Lab's Tests Give Answers to Genetic Questions, Baltimore Sun, Nov. 25, 1997, pp. 1C, 8C, cols. 2, 4 (hereinafter Mirabella). 13 Laboratories that conduct genetic paternity testing typically use either blood samples or cells scraped from the inside of the cheek of the putative father, the child, and often the mother as well. See, e. g., 1 D. Faigman, D. Kaye, M. Saks, & J. Sanders, Modern Scientific Evidence §§ 19­2.2, 19­2.7.1, pp. 761, 763, 775 (1997); Hotaling 36, 54; Mirabella, at 8C, cols. 2, 4. 14 The State Department has observed that "the competence, integrity, and availability of blood testing physicians and facilities vary around the world." 7 Foreign Affairs Manual § 1131.5­4(c). There are presently about 75 DNA testing laboratories in the United States, 51 of which are accredited by the American Association of Blood Banks. Hotaling 36. 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 438 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Opinion of Stevens, J. tation, in turn, provides assurance that the formal act is based upon reliable evidence, and also deters fraud.15 Con- gress is of course free to revise its collective judgment and permit genetic proof of paternity rather than requiring some formal legal act by the father or a court,16 but the Constitu- tion does not now require any such change. Section 1409 also serves two other important purposes that are unrelated to the determination of paternity: the in- terest in encouraging the development of a healthy relation- ship between the citizen parent and the child while the child is a minor; and the related interest in fostering ties between the foreign-born child and the United States. When a child is born out of wedlock outside of the United States, the citi- zen mother, unlike the citizen father, certainly knows of her child's existence and typically will have custody of the child immediately after the birth. Such a child thus has the op- portunity to develop ties with its citizen mother at an early age, and may even grow up in the United States if the mother returns. By contrast, due to the normal interval of nine months between conception and birth, the unmarried father may not even know that his child exists, and the child may not know the father's identity. Section 1409(a)(4) re- quires a relatively easy, formal step by either the citizen fa- ther or his child that shows beyond doubt that at least one of the two knows of their blood relationship, thus assuring at least the opportunity for them to develop a personal relationship. The facts of this very case provide a ready example of the concern. Mr. Miller and petitioner both failed to take any steps to establish a legal relationship with each other before 15 Once a child reaches the legal age of majority, a male citizen could make a fraudulent claim of paternity on the person's behalf without any risk of liability for child support. 16 In a different context Congress has already recognized the value of genetic paternity testing. See 96 F. 3d 1467, 1474­1475 (CADC 1996) (dis- cussing Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984). 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 439 Opinion of Stevens, J. petitioner's 21st birthday, and there is no indication in the record that they had any contact whatsoever before she ap- plied for a United States passport. Given the size of the American military establishment that has been stationed in various parts of the world for the past half century, it is reasonable to assume that this case is not unusual. In 1970, when petitioner was born, about 683,000 service personnel were stationed in the Far East, 24,000 of whom were in the Philippines. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 381 (99th ed. 1978). Of all Americans in the military at that time, only one percent were female.17 These figures, coupled with the interval between conception and birth and the fact that military personnel regularly re- turn to the United States when a tour of duty ends, suggest that Congress had legitimate concerns about a class of chil- dren born abroad out of wedlock to alien mothers and to American servicemen who would not necessarily know about, or be known by, their children. It was surely reason- able when the INA was enacted in 1952, and remains equally reasonable today, for Congress to condition the award of citi- zenship to such children on an act that demonstrates, at a minimum, the possibility that those who become citizens will develop ties with this country-a requirement that performs a meaningful purpose for citizen fathers but normally would be superfluous for citizen mothers. It is of course possible that any child born in a foreign country may ultimately fail to establish ties with its citizen parent and with this country, even though the child's citizen parent has engaged in the conduct that qualifies the child for citizenship. A citizen mother may abandon her child before 17 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Background Study, Use of Women in the Military 5 (2d ed. 1978). The proportion of military per- sonnel who were female in 1970 had dropped from a high of 2.2 percent in 1945. Id., at 3. Since 1970, the proportion has steadily increased to its present level of about 13 percent. See Dept. of Defense, Selected Man- power Statistics 23 (1996). 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 440 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Opinion of Stevens, J. returning to the States, and a citizen father, even after ac- knowledging paternity, may die or abscond before his child has an opportunity to bond with him or visit this country. The fact that the interest in fostering ties with this country may not be fully achieved for either class of children does not qualify the legitimacy or the importance of that interest. If, as Congress reasonably may have assumed, the formal requirements in § 1409(a)(4) tend to make it just as likely that fathers will have the opportunity to develop a meaningful relationship with their children as does the fact that the mother knows of her baby's existence and often has custody at birth, the statute's effect will reduce, rather than aggra- vate, the disparity between the two classes of children. We are convinced not only that strong governmental inter- ests justify the additional requirement imposed on children of citizen fathers, but also that the particular means used in § 1409(a)(4) are well tailored to serve those interests. It is perfectly appropriate to require some formal act, not just any evidence that the father or his child know of the other's existence. Such a formal act, whether legitimation, written acknowledgment by the father, or a court adjudication, less- ens the risk of fraudulent claims made years after the rele- vant conduct was required. As for the requirement that the formal act take place while the child is a minor, Congress obviously has a powerful interest in fostering ties with the child's citizen parent and the United States during his or her formative years. If there is no reliable, contemporaneous proof that the child and the citizen father had the opportu- nity to form familial bonds before the child turned 18, Con- gress reasonably may demand that the child show sufficient ties to this country on its own rather than through its citizen parent in order to be a citizen.18 18 The same policy presently applies to foreign-born persons not eligible for citizenship at birth: A child may obtain special immigration preference and the immediate issuance of a visa based on a parent's citizenship or lawful residence, but only until age 21. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1101(b)(1), 1153(d). 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 441 Opinion of Stevens, J. Our conclusion that Congress may require an affirmative act by unmarried fathers and their children, but not mothers and their children, is directly supported by our decision in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U. S. 248 (1983). That case involved a New York law that automatically provided mothers of "ille- gitimate" children with prior notice of an adoption proceed- ing and the right to veto an adoption, but only extended those rights to unmarried fathers whose claim of paternity was supported by some formal public act, such as a court adjudication, the filing of a notice of intent to claim paternity, or written acknowledgment by the mother. Id., at 251­252, n. 5, 266. The petitioner in Lehr, an unmarried putative fa- ther, need only have mailed a postcard to the State's "puta- tive father registry" to enjoy the same rights as the child's undisputed mother, id., at 264, yet he argued that this gender-based requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause. We rejected that argument, and we find the compa- rable claim in this case, if anything, even less persuasive. Whereas the putative father in Lehr was deprived of certain rights because he failed to take some affirmative step within about two years of the child's birth (when the adoption pro- ceeding took place), here the unfavorable gender-based treatment was attributable to Mr. Miller's failure to take ap- propriate action within 21 years of petitioner's birth and petitioner's own failure to obtain a paternity adjudication by a "competent court" before she turned 18.19 Even though the rule applicable to each class of children born abroad is eminently reasonable and justified by impor- tant Government policies, petitioner and her amici argue that § 1409 is unconstitutional because it is a "gender-based classification." We shall comment briefly on that argument. 19 Justice Breyer questions the relevance of Lehr because it was de- cided before advances in genetic testing, see post, at 487; there was, how- ever, no question about the paternity of the father in that case. As in this case, the father there failed to act promptly to establish a relationship with his child. 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 442 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Opinion of Stevens, J. V The words "stereotype," "stereotyping," and "stereotypi- cal" are used repeatedly in petitioner's and her amici's briefs. They note that we have condemned statutory classi- fications that rest on the assumption that gender may serve as a proxy for relevant qualifications to serve as the adminis- trator of an estate, Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971), to en- gage in professional nursing, Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718 (1982), or to train for military service, United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515 (1996), to name a few examples. Moreover, we have expressly repudiated cases that rested on the assumption that only the members of one sex could suitably practice law or tend bar. See Hogan, 458 U. S., at 725, n. 10 (commenting on Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130 (1873), and Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U. S. 464 (1948)). Discrimination that "is merely the accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about females" is unacceptable. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 223 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). The gender equality principle that was implicated in those cases is only indirectly involved in this case for two reasons.20 First, the conclusion that petitioner is not a citizen rests on several coinciding factors, not just the gender of her citizen parent. On the facts of this case, even if petitioner's mother had been a citizen 21 and her father had been the alien, peti- tioner would not qualify for citizenship because her mother has never been to the United States. Alternatively, if her citizen parent had been a female member of the Air Force and, like Mr. Miller, had returned to the States at the end of her tour of duty, § 1409 quite probably would have been irrelevant and petitioner would have become a citizen at 20 Of course, the sex of the person claiming citizenship is irrelevant; if she were a male, petitioner's case would be no stronger. 21 Theoretically she might have been the child of an American soldier stationed in the Philippines during World War II. See Ablang v. Reno, 52 F. 3d 801, 802 (CA9 1995), cert. denied, 516 U. S. 1043 (1996). 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 443 Opinion of Stevens, J. birth by force of the Constitution itself.22 Second, it is not merely the sex of the citizen parent that determines whether the child is a citizen under the terms of the statute; rather, it is an event creating a legal relationship between parent and child-the birth itself for citizen mothers, but postbirth conduct for citizen fathers and their offspring. Neverthe- less, we may assume that if the classification in § 1409 were merely the product of an outmoded stereotype, it would be invalid. The "gender stereotypes" on which § 1409 is supposedly premised are (1) "that the American father is never anything more than the proverbial breadwinner who remains aloof from day-to-day child rearing duties," 23 and (2) "that a mother will be closer to her child born out of wedlock than a father will be to his." 24 Even disregarding the statute's separate, nonstereotypical purpose of ensuring reliable proof of a blood relationship, neither of those propositions fairly reflects the justifications for the classification actually at issue. Section 1409(a)(4) is not concerned with either the average father or even the average father of a child born out of wed- lock. It is concerned with a father (a) whose child was born in a foreign country, and (b) who is unwilling or unable to acknowledge his paternity, and whose child is unable or un- willing to obtain a court paternity adjudication. A congres- sional assumption that such a father and his child are espe- cially unlikely to develop a relationship, and thus to foster the child's ties with this country, has a solid basis even if we assume that all fathers who have made some effort to become acquainted with their children are as good, if not better, parents than members of the opposite sex. 22 "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, § 1. 23 Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae 8. 24 96 F. 3d, at 1473 (Wald, J., concurring in judgment). 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 444 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Opinion of Stevens, J. Nor does the statute assume that all mothers of illegiti- mate children will necessarily have a closer relationship with their children than will fathers. It does assume that all of them will be present at the event that transmits their citi- zenship to the child, that hospital records and birth certifi- cates will normally make a further acknowledgment and for- mal proof of parentage unnecessary, and that their initial custody will at least give them the opportunity to develop a caring relationship with the child. Section 1409(a)(4)-the only provision that we need consider-is therefore supported by the undisputed assumption that fathers are less likely than mothers to have the opportunity to develop relation- ships, not simply, as Justice Breyer contends, post, at 482­ 483, that they are less likely to take advantage of that op- portunity when it exists.25 These assumptions are firmly grounded and adequately explain why Congress found it un- necessary to impose requirements on the mother that were entirely appropriate for the father. None of the premises on which the statutory classification is grounded can be fairly characterized as an accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about the mem- 25 Justice Breyer does not dispute the fact that the unmarried father of a child born abroad is less likely than the unmarried mother to have the opportunity to develop a relationship with the child. He nevertheless would replace the gender-based distinction with either a "knowledge of birth" requirement or a distinction between "Caretaker and Noncaretaker Parents." Post, at 487. Neither substitute seems a likely candidate for serious congressional consideration. The former in practice would be just as gender based as the present requirement, for surely every mother has knowledge of the birth when it occurs; nor would that option eliminate the need for formal steps and time limits to ensure that the parent truly had knowledge during the child's youth. The latter would be confusing at best, for Justice Breyer does not tell us how he would decide whether a father like Mr. Miller would qualify as a "caretaker" or a "non- caretaker"; and it would also be far less protective of families than the present statute, for it would deny citizenship to out-of-wedlock children who have relationships with their citizen parents but are not in the pri- mary care or custody of those parents. 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 445 O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment bers of either sex. The biological differences between sin- gle men and single women provide a relevant basis for dif- fering rules governing their ability to confer citizenship on children born in foreign lands. Indeed, it is the suggestion that simply because Congress has authorized citizenship at birth for children born abroad to unmarried mothers, it can- not impose any postbirth conditions upon the granting of citi- zenship to the foreign-born children of citizen fathers, that might be characterized as merely a byproduct of the strong presumption that gender-based legal distinctions are sus- pect. An impartial analysis of the relevant differences be- tween citizen mothers and citizen fathers plainly rebuts that presumption.26 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Kennedy joins, concurring in the judgment. This Court has long applied a presumption against third- party standing as a prudential limitation on the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Federal courts, we have held, "must hesitate before resolving a controversy, even one within their constitutional power to resolve, on the basis of the rights of third persons not parties to the litigation." Single- ton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 113 (1976); see also Warth v. Sel- din, 422 U. S. 490, 499 (1975). Contrary to this prudential rule, the principal opinion recognizes that petitioner has standing to raise an equal protection challenge to 8 U. S. C. § 1409. The statute, however, accords differential treatment to fathers and mothers, not to sons and daughters. Thus, 26 See Michael M. v. Superior Court, Sonoma Cty., 450 U. S. 464, 497­ 498, n. 4 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argues that petitioner's suit must be dismissed because the courts have "no power to provide the relief requested." Post, at 453. Because we conclude that there is no constitutional violation to remedy, we express no opinion on this question. 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 446 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment although petitioner is clearly injured by the fact that she has been denied citizenship, the discriminatory impact of the provision falls on petitioner's father, Charlie Miller, who is no longer a party to this suit. Consequently, I do not be- lieve that we should consider petitioner's gender discrimina- tion claim. The principal opinion recognizes that petitioner's claim turns on "the proposition that her citizen father should have the same right to transmit citizenship as would a citizen mother" and resolves to "evaluate the alleged discrimination against [petitioner's father] as well as its impact on [peti- tioner]." Ante, at 433. But even when "the very same al- legedly illegal act that affects the litigant also affects a third party," a plaintiff "cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights and interests of [the] third part[y]." Department of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U. S. 715, 720 (1990) (internal quota- tion marks omitted). A party raising a constitutional chal- lenge to a statute must demonstrate not only "that the al- leged unconstitutional feature [of the statute] injures him" but also that "he is within the class of persons with respect to whom the act is unconstitutional." Heald v. District of Columbia, 259 U. S. 114, 123 (1922). This requirement arises from the understanding that the third-party right- holder may not, in fact, wish to assert the claim in question, as well as from the belief that "third parties themselves usu- ally will be the best proponents of their rights." Singleton, supra, at 113­114; see also Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 397 (1898). In support of the decision to consider Charlie Miller's claim, both Justice Stevens, in the principal opinion, and Justice Breyer, in dissent, cite Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190 (1976). In that case, we allowed a vendor to challenge a state law that permitted sales of 3.2% beer to females who had reached the age of 18 but prohibited such sales to males until they turned 21. Because the law proscribed the sale rather than the consumption of beer, the Court determined 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 447 O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment that a vendor was the "least awkward challenger" to the gender-based distinction. Id., at 197. We reasoned that prudential objectives would not be served by rejecting third-party standing because "the lower court already ha[d] entertained the relevant constitutional challenge." Id., at 193. Here, however, the court below expressly did not take account of Charlie Miller's equal protection rights, instead reviewing petitioner's challenge as a first-party claim of gen- der discrimination against the children of citizen fathers as opposed to the children of citizen mothers. See 96 F. 3d 1467, 1470 (CADC 1996). More importantly, since this Court decided Craig, we have articulated the contours of the third-party standing inquiry in greater detail. In Powers v. Ohio, 499 U. S. 400 (1991), we stated that a litigant seeking to assert the rights of an- other party must satisfy three interrelated criteria: "The liti- gant must have suffered an injury in fact, thus giving him or her a sufficiently concrete interest in the outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests." Id., at 411 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Campbell v. Louisiana, ante, at 397­398. While it seems clear that petitioner has a significant stake in challenging the statute and a close relationship with her father, she has not demonstrated a substantial hindrance to her father's ability to assert his own rights. Powers and our earlier precedents suggest that the absence of such an obstacle precludes third- party standing. See 499 U. S., at 411 (explaining that "[all] three important criteria [must be] satisfied," i. e., that there "must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests" before the presumption is rebutted); see also Singleton, supra, at 116 ("Even where the relationship is close, the reasons for requiring persons to assert their own rights will generally still apply"). 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 448 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment Petitioner has not demonstrated that Charlie Miller con- fronted a "genuine obstacle" to the assertion of his own rights that rises to the level of a hindrance. 428 U. S., at 116; see also Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249, 257 (1953) (third-party standing accorded because it "would be difficult if not impossible for the persons whose rights are asserted to present their grievance before any court"). In fact, Charlie Miller originally filed suit and asserted his own rights but then opted not to pursue his claim throughout this litigation. It is true that he was wrongly dismissed from the action by the Eastern District of Texas, and that the Government made the misguided argument before that court that "[t]he rights, if any, which have been injured are those of Lorelyn Penero Miller, the true plaintiff in this action." See Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint or, in the Alternative, to Transfer Venue 4. But because he failed to appeal the erroneous dismissal of his claim, any hindrance to the vindication of Charlie Miller's constitutional rights is ultimately self imposed. I am reluctant to accept that the Government's litigation strategy, or an unfavorable ruling in the lower courts, could be a sufficiently severe obstacle to the assertion of a litigant's own rights to warrant an exception to our prudential stand- ing requirements. Those requirements were adopted to serve the institutional interests of the federal courts, not the convenience of the litigants. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U. S. 215, 231 (1990); Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U. S. 534, 541 (1986). Justice Breyer as- serts that appeals take time and money, and that a change of venue left Charlie Miller uncertain where to appeal. See post, at 474. But the only obstacle was the inconvenience caused by the normal course of litigation, which often in- volves a transfer of venue. Charlie Miller never indicated any intent to challenge his dismissal from the suit, and there is no suggestion that he faced any unusual practical or legal barriers to filing a notice of appeal. Instituting a suit is it- 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 449 O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment self burdensome-arguably as burdensome as filing an ap- peal from the denial of a claim-and to conclude that the course of events that transpired in this case constituted a hindrance to Charlie Miller's ability to assert his rights would be a step toward eliminating the hindrance prong altogether. Thus far, we have permitted third-party standing only where more "daunting" barriers deterred the rightholder. Powers, supra, at 414. To take an extreme example, in Hodel v. Irving, 481 U. S. 704 (1987), we concluded that plain- tiffs had third-party standing to assert the rights of their deceased parents. Id., at 711­712. And in Powers, we noted that potential jurors are not parties to the proceeding, cannot easily obtain declaratory or injunctive relief from a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges, would find it difficult to demonstrate a likelihood that discrimination against them would recur, and have economic disincentives to filing suit. 499 U. S., at 414­415. Privacy concerns may also provide a compelling explanation for a third party's ab- sence from the litigation. In Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U. S. 678 (1977), we determined that a vendor could challenge the law prohibiting the distribution of contracep- tives to minors because the desire to avoid publicity would deter potential purchasers from defending their own rights. Id., at 684, n. 4; see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 446 (1972). Likewise, in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patter- son, 357 U. S. 449 (1958), the Court held that an organization could raise the privacy rights of its members because litiga- tion initiated by those members would disclose their identity and destroy the very privacy they sought to protect. Id., at 459. Where insurmountable procedural obstacles preclude a rightholder's own suit, the Court has also accorded third- party standing. In Singleton, we concluded that physicians could assert the rights of indigent women denied funding for abortion because imminent mootness prevented the women from bringing their claims. See 428 U. S., at 108. Simi- 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 450 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment larly, Barrows involved the constitutional rights of the pro- spective victims of a racially restrictive real estate covenant, who were unidentified and thus not before the Court. See 346 U. S., at 254. And in Craig, the case from which the Court garners its sole support for according third-party standing here, the named plaintiff turned 21 during the course of the litigation, which mooted his challenge to the beer-sale restriction. See 429 U. S., at 192. Where legitimate obstacles such as these exist, which lie beyond the control of the rightholder, that party's absence from a suit more likely stems from disability than from disin- terest. A hindrance signals that the rightholder did not simply decline to bring the claim on his own behalf, but could not in fact do so. See Singleton, supra, at 116 ("If there is some genuine obstacle . . . the third party's absence from court loses its tendency to suggest that his right is not truly at stake, or truly important to him, and the party who is in court becomes by default the right's best available propo- nent"). Furthermore, where a hindrance impedes the asser- tion of a claim, the right likely will not be asserted-and thus the relevant law will not be enforced-unless the Court recognizes third-party standing. In Barrows, for example, the Court permitted third-party standing because "the rea- sons which underlie [the] rule denying standing to raise another's rights" were "outweighed by the need to protect the fundamental rights" which would otherwise have been denied. 346 U. S., at 257. Moreover, in contrast to this case, the white property owner contesting the racially restrictive covenant in Bar- rows was its "only effective adversary" because she was "the one in whose charge and keeping repose[d] the power to con- tinue to use her property to discriminate or to discontinue such use." Id., at 259. Here, although we have an injured party before us, the party actually discriminated against is both best suited to challenging the statute and available to undertake that task. See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 451 O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 100 (1979) (prudential barriers seek "to limit access to the federal courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim"). In light of petitioner's uncertain constitutional status and the potential problems with fashioning a remedy for her injury, see post, at 452­458 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment), allowing her to assert Charlie Miller's claim will likely dilute rather than protect his constitutional rights. Although petitioner cannot raise her father's rights, she may raise her own. While it is unclear whether an alien may assert constitutional objections when he or she is out- side the territory of the United States, see Johnson v. Eisen- trager, 339 U. S. 763 (1950), and United States v. Verdugo- Urquidez, 494 U. S. 259 (1990), I will assume that petitioner may challenge the constitutionality of § 1409. Her chal- lenge, however, triggers only rational basis scrutiny. As pointed out above, see supra, at 445, § 1409 does not draw a distinction based on the gender of the child, so petitioner cannot claim that she has been injured by gender discrimina- tion. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 755 (1984) (an in- jury arising from discrimination "accords a basis for standing only to those persons who are personally denied equal treat- ment by the challenged discriminatory conduct") (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the grant of certiorari was limited to the question whether § 1409 discriminates "between `illegitimate' children of United States citizen mothers and `illegitimate' children of United States citizen fathers," so any claim of discrimination based on differential treatment of illegitimate versus legitimate children is not presented. See 520 U. S. 1208 (1997). Given that petitioner cannot raise a claim of discrimination triggering heightened scrutiny, she can argue only that § 1409 irrationally discriminates between illegitimate chil- dren of citizen fathers and citizen mothers. Although I do not share Justice Stevens' assessment that the provision withstands heightened scrutiny, ante, at 433­444, I believe 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 452 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Scalia, J., concurring in judgment it passes rational scrutiny for the reasons he gives for sus- taining it under the higher standard. It is unlikely, in my opinion, that any gender classifications based on stereotypes can survive heightened scrutiny, but under rational scrutiny, a statute may be defended based on generalized classifica- tions unsupported by empirical evidence. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U. S. 312, 320 (1993) ("[A] classification must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. A State, moreover, has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification" (internal quotation marks and citations omit- ted)). This is particularly true when the classification is adopted with reference to immigration, an area where Con- gress frequently must base its decisions on generalizations about groups of people. * * * We adopted the presumption against third-party standing to preserve the court's "properly limited" role, Warth, 422 U. S., at 498, and we have identified a particular set of circumstances that will rebut that presumption. I believe that we should treat those considerations, in particular the hindrance prong, as meaningful criteria. Consequently, I would not accord petitioner standing to raise her father's claim of gender discrimination. Petitioner's own constitu- tional challenge triggers only rational basis scrutiny, and § 1409 is sustainable under that standard. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment affirming the Court of Appeals' decision. Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in the judgment. I agree with the outcome in this case, but for a reason more fundamental than the one relied upon by Justice Ste- vens. In my view it makes no difference whether or not 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 453 Scalia, J., concurring in judgment § 1409(a) passes "heightened scrutiny" or any other test Members of the Court might choose to apply. The complaint must be dismissed because the Court has no power to pro- vide the relief requested: conferral of citizenship on a basis other than that prescribed by Congress. The Constitution "contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth and naturalization." United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 702 (1898). Under the Four- teenth Amendment, "[e]very person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, becomes at once a citizen of the United States, and needs no naturaliza- tion." Ibid. Petitioner, having been born outside the terri- tory of the United States, is an alien as far as the Constitu- tion is concerned, and "can only become a citizen by being naturalized, either by treaty, as in the case of the annexation of foreign territory; or by authority of Congress." Id., at 702­703; see also Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U. S. 815, 827 (1971). Here it is the "authority of Congress" that is appealed to- its power under Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization." If there is no congressional enact- ment granting petitioner citizenship, she remains an alien. The enactment on which petitioner relies is § 309 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 238, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1409, which establishes the require- ments for the acquisition of citizenship by a child born out of wedlock when the child's father is a United States citizen. Section 1409(a) provides, in relevant part, that § 1401(g), which confers citizenship on foreign-born children when one parent is an alien and the other a citizen of the United States, shall apply: "(a) . . . as of the date of birth to a person born out of wedlock if- "(1) a blood relationship between the person and the father is established by clear and convincing evidence, "(2) the father had the nationality of the United States at the time of the person's birth, 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 454 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Scalia, J., concurring in judgment "(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide financial support for the person until the per- son reaches the age of 18 years, and "(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years- "(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person's residence or domicile, "(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under oath, or "(C) the paternity of the person is established by ad- judication of a competent court." By its plain language, § 1409(a) sets forth a precondition to the acquisition of citizenship under § 1401(g) by the illegiti- mate child of a citizen-father. Petitioner does not come into federal court claiming that she met that precondition, and that the State Department's conclusion to the contrary was factually in error. Rather, she acknowledges that she did not meet the last two requirements of that precondition, §§ 1409(a)(3) and (4). She nonetheless asks for a "declara- tory judgment that [she] is a citizen of the United States" and an order to the Secretary of State requiring the State Department to grant her application for citizenship, App. 11­ 12, because the requirements she did not meet are not also imposed upon illegitimate children of citizen-mothers, and therefore violate the Equal Protection Clause.1 Even if we 1 Petitioner makes the equal protection claim on behalf of her father, not on her own behalf. Justice Breyer finds that she has third-party stand- ing to make the claim because "[s]he has a `close' and relevant relationship" with her father, and "there was `some hindrance' to her father's asserting his own rights." Post, at 473 (quoting from Powers v. Ohio, 499 U. S. 400, 411 (1991)). As an original matter, I would agree with Justice O'Con- nor that this ground is inadequate, but I do not read our cases as demand- ing so significant an impairment of the rightholder's ability to sue as she does. For example, in Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 197 (1976), although the rightholder who was one of the named plaintiffs had indeed lost his ability to sue because he had turned 21, there was "no barrier whatever" to assertion of the constitutional claim by other Oklahoma males between 18 and 20. Id., at 216 (Burger, C. J., dissenting). Certainly here, as in 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 455 Scalia, J., concurring in judgment were to agree that the difference in treatment between ille- gitimate children of citizen-fathers and citizen-mothers is unconstitutional, we could not, consistent with the limited judicial power in this area, remedy that constitutional infir- mity by declaring petitioner to be a citizen or ordering the State Department to approve her application for citizen- ship. "Once it has been determined that a person does not qualify for citizenship, . . . the district court has no discre- tion to ignore the defect and grant citizenship." INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U. S. 875, 884 (1988) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Judicial power over immigration and naturalization is extremely limited. "Our cases `have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political depart- ments largely immune from judicial control.' " Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206, 210 (1953)). See also Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U. S. 21, 32 (1982) ("[T]he power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign preroga- tive"); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 79­80 (1976) ("In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigra- tion, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unac- ceptable if applied to citizens"); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 769­770 (1972) ("[P]lenary congressional power to make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has long been firmly established"); Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522, 531 (1954) ("That the formulation of [policies pertaining to the Craig, petitioner is the "least awkward challenger," id., at 197, since it is her right to citizenship that is at stake. Our law on this subject is in need of what may charitably be called clarification, but I would leave it for another day. Since I accept petitioner's third-party standing, there is no need for me to reach the Government's claim (which it asserts for the first time in its brief on the merits in this Court) that petitioner cannot invoke the Equal Protection Clause on her own behalf because she is not within the jurisdiction of the United States. Brief for Respondent 11­12. 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 456 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Scalia, J., concurring in judgment entry of aliens and their right to remain here] is entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly imbed- ded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government"). Because only Congress has the power to set the requirements for acquisition of citi- zenship by persons not born within the territory of the United States, federal courts cannot exercise that power under the guise of their remedial authority. "Neither by ap- plication of the doctrine of estoppel, nor by invocation of eq- uitable powers, nor by any other means does a court have the power to confer citizenship in violation of [statutory] lim- itations." Pangilinan, supra, at 885. "An alien who seeks political rights as a member of this Nation can rightfully ob- tain them only upon terms and conditions specified by Con- gress. Courts are without authority to sanction changes or modifications." United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U. S. 472, 474 (1917) (emphasis added). Petitioner argues, and Justice Breyer's dissent seems to agree, see post, at 488­489, that because she meets the requirements of § 1401(g), the Court may declare her a citi- zen "at birth" under that provision and ignore § 1409(a) entirely, which allegedly unconstitutionally takes away that citizenship. Brief for Petitioner 14­15. This argument adopts a fanciful view of the statute, whereby § 1409(a) takes away what § 1401(g) has unconditionally conferred-as though § 1409(a) were some sort of a condition subsequent to the conveyance of real estate in a will. If anything, of course, it would be a condition precedent, since it says that § 1401(g) "shall apply as of the date of birth to a person born out of wedlock if " the person meets the requirements there set forth. 8 U. S. C. § 1409(a) (emphasis added). But a uni- tary statute is not to be picked apart in this fashion. To be sure, § 1401(g), read in isolation, might refer to both married and unmarried parents. We do not, however, read statutory provisions in isolation, as if other provisions in the same Act do not exist, see King v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 502 U. S. 215, 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 457 Scalia, J., concurring in judgment 221 (1991). Section 1401(g) does not confer citizenship upon children born out of wedlock unless the requirements in § 1409 are satisfied. It can be argued that in exempting an applicant from an unconstitutional requirement (either part or all of § 1409(a)) a court is not rewriting the law, but simply ignoring that portion of the law which is a nullity. See post, at 488­489 (Breyer, J., dissenting). That assumes, however, a judicial power to sever the unconstitutional portion from the remain- der, and to apply the remainder unencumbered. Such a power exists in other cases-and is exercised on the basis of the Court's assessment as to whether Congress would have enacted the remainder of the law without the invalidated provision. See New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144, 186 (1992). I know of no instance, however, in which this Court has severed an unconstitutional restriction upon the grant of immigration or citizenship. It is in my view incompatible with the plenary power of Congress over those fields for judges to speculate as to what Congress would have enacted if it had not enacted what it did-whether it would, for example, have preferred to extend the requirements of §§ 1409(a)(3) and (4) to mothers instead of eliminating them for fathers, or even to deny citizenship to illegitimate chil- dren entirely. ("[T]he Court has specifically recognized the power of Congress not to grant a United States citizen the right to transmit citizenship by descent." Rogers, 401 U. S., at 830.) Moreover, if the mere character of the naturaliza- tion power were not enough to render the severing of a limi- tation upon citizenship improper, the INA itself contains a clear statement of congressional intent: "A person may only be naturalized as a citizen of the United States in the manner and under the conditions prescribed in this subchapter and not otherwise." 8 U. S. C. § 1421(d) (emphasis added). Jus- tice Breyer's reliance upon the INA's general severability clause, 66 Stat. 281, § 406, is misplaced because the specific governs the general, see Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 458 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Scalia, J., concurring in judgment Inc., 504 U. S. 374, 384­385 (1992). The question of sever- ance ultimately turns on "whether the provisions are insepa- rable by virtue of inherent character," Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 322 (1936), which must be gleaned from the structure and nature of the Act. Another obstacle to judicial deletion of the challenged re- quirements is the fact that when a statutory violation of equal protection has occurred, it is not foreordained which particular statutory provision is invalid. The constitutional vice consists of unequal treatment, which may as logically be attributed to the disparately generous provision (here, supposedly, the provision governing citizenship of illegiti- mate children of citizen-mothers) as to the disparately parsi- monious one (the provision governing citizenship of illegiti- mate children of citizen-fathers). "[W]e have noted that a court sustaining [an equal protection] claim faces `two reme- dial alternatives: [It] may either declare [the statute] a nul- lity and order that its benefits not extend to the class that the legislature intended to benefit, or it may extend the cov- erage of the statute to include those who are aggrieved by the exclusion.' " Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U. S. 728, 738 (1984), quoting Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S. 333, 361 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result). Given the nature of the law at issue here, and given the clear command of 8 U. S. C. § 1421(d) ("under the conditions prescribed in this subchapter and not otherwise"), there is no doubt which of those alternatives the Court must employ. It cannot confer citizenship where Congress has not done so. In any event, this is not like the ordinary equal protection case, in which one class is subjected to a restriction from which the other class is exempt. See, e. g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 191­192 (1976) (men can be served alcoholic beverages only if over 21 years of age, whereas women need be only 18). Here each class is subjected to restrictions from which the other is exempt. While illegitimate children of citizen-fathers must meet the requirements of § 1409(a) 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 459 Scalia, J., concurring in judgment from which illegitimate children of citizen-mothers are ex- empt, illegitimate children of citizen-mothers must meet the quite different requirements of § 1409(c), from which illegiti- mate children of citizen-fathers are exempt.2 In this situa- tion, eliminating the restrictions on fathers does not produce a law that complies with the Equal Protection Clause (as- suming it is initially in violation), but rather produces a law that treats fathers more favorably than mothers. There is no way a court can "fix" the law by merely disregarding one provision or the other as unconstitutional. It would have to disregard them both, either leaving no restrictions whatever upon citizenship of illegitimate children or (what I think the more proper course) denying naturalization of illegitimate children entirely (since § 1401(g) was not meant to apply by its unqualified terms to illegitimate children). Even outside the particularly sensitive area of immigration and naturaliza- tion, I am aware of no case that has engaged in such radical statutory surgery, and it certainly cannot be engaged in here. In sum, this is not a case in which we have the power to remedy the alleged equal protection violation by either expanding or limiting the benefits conferred so as to deny or grant them equally to all. "We are dealing here with an exercise of the Nation's sovereign power to admit or exclude foreigners in accordance with perceived national interests." Fiallo, 430 U. S., at 795, n. 6. Federal judges may not decide what those national interests are, and what require- ments for citizenship best serve them. Because petitioner is not a citizen under any Act of Con- gress, we cannot give her the declaratory judgment or af- firmative relief she requests. I therefore concur in the judgment. 2 Title 8 U. S. C. § 1409(c) provides that an illegitimate child born to a citizen-mother shall be a citizen "if the mother had previously been physi- cally present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of one year." 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 460 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Ginsburg, J., dissenting Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Souter and Justice Breyer join, dissenting. As Justice Breyer convincingly demonstrates, 8 U. S. C. § 1409 classifies unconstitutionally on the basis of gender in determining the capacity of a parent to qualify a child for citizenship. The section rests on familiar generalizations: mothers, as a rule, are responsible for a child born out of wedlock; fathers unmarried to the child's mother, ordinarily, are not. The law at issue might have made custody or sup- port the relevant criterion. Instead, it treats mothers one way, fathers another, shaping Government policy to fit and reinforce the stereotype or historic pattern. Characteristic of sex-based classifications, the stereotypes underlying this legislation may hold true for many, even most, individuals. But in prior decisions the Court has re- jected official actions that classify unnecessarily and over- broadly by gender when more accurate and impartial func- tional lines can be drawn. While the Court is divided on Lorelyn Miller's standing to sue, a solid majority adheres to that vital understanding. As Justice O'Connor's opinion makes plain, distinctions based on gender trigger heightened scrutiny and "[i]t is unlikely . . . that any gender classifica- tions based on stereotypes can survive heightened scrutiny." Ante, at 452 (opinion concurring in judgment); post, at 482­ 488 (Breyer, J., dissenting). On the surface, § 1409 treats females favorably. Indeed, it might be seen as a benign preference, an affirmative action of sorts. Compare Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 731, and n. 17 (1982), with id., at 740­744 (Pow- ell, J., dissenting). Two Justices today apparently take this view. Justice Stevens' opinion, in which The Chief Jus- tice joins, portrays § 1409 as helpfully recognizing the dif- ferent situations of unmarried mothers and fathers during the prenatal period and at birth, and fairly equalizing the "burdens" that each parent bears. See ante, at 433­434, 438. But pages of history place the provision in real-world 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 461 Ginsburg, J., dissenting perspective. Section 1409 is one of the few provisions re- maining in the United States Code that uses sex as a crite- rion in delineating citizens' rights. It is an innovation in this respect: During most of our Nation's past, laws on the transmission of citizenship from parent to child discrimi- nated adversely against citizen mothers, not against citizen fathers. I The first statute on the citizenship of children born abroad, enacted in 1790, stated: "[T]he children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural born citizens: Provided, That the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never been resi- dent in the United States." Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 104. Statutes passed in 1795 and 1802 similarly condi- tioned the citizenship of the child born abroad on the father's at least one-time residence in the United States. Act of Jan. 29, 1795, § 3, 1 Stat. 415; Act of Apr. 14, 1802, § 4, 2 Stat. 155. This father's residence requirement suggests that Congress intended a child born abroad to gain citizenship only when the father was a citizen. That, indeed, was the law of Eng- land at the time. See 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law *50­*51 (hereinafter Kent's Commentaries); 4 Geo. 2, ch. 21 (1731). The statutory language Congress adopted, however, was ambiguous. One could read the words "chil- dren of citizens" to mean that the child of a United States citizen mother and a foreign father would qualify for citizen- ship if the father had at some point resided in the country. See Binney, The Alienigenae of the United States, 2 Am. L. Reg. 193, 203­205 (1854). Or, as Chancellor Kent observed, the words might mean that both parents had to be United States citizens for citizenship to pass. 2 Kent's Commentar- ies *53. Under the 1802 legislation, children born abroad could not become citizens unless their parents were citizens in 1802, 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 462 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Ginsburg, J., dissenting which meant that as the years passed few foreign-born per- sons could qualify. Daniel Webster, among others, proposed remedial legislation. His bill would have granted citizen- ship to children born abroad to United States-born citizen mothers as well as fathers. His effort was unsuccessful. See Cong. Globe, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., 827 (1848); F. Franklin, The Legislative History of Naturalization in the United States 271­276 (reprint ed. 1971). Instead, in 1855, Congress clarified that citizenship would pass to children born abroad only when the father was a United States citi- zen. Act of Feb. 10, 1855, § 2, 10 Stat. 604. Codified as § 1993 of the Revised Statutes, the provision originating in 1855 read: "All children heretofore born or hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers were or may be at the time of their birth citizens thereof, are declared to be citizens of the United States; but the rights of citizenship shall not descend to children whose fathers never resided in the United States." Rev. Stat. § 1993. In these early statutes, Congress did not differentiate be- tween children born abroad to married parents and those born out of wedlock. Section 1993, as applied, allowed transmission of citizenship to children born out of wedlock if the father legitimated the child. See, e. g., 32 Op. Atty. Gen. 162, 164­165 (1920); see also Guyer v. Smith, 22 Md. 239 (1864) (foreign-born children who remain illegitimate do not qualify for citizenship). In several reported instances, chil- dren legitimated by their fathers gained citizenship even though the legitimation occurred, as it did in Lorelyn Miller's case, after the child reached majority. See In re P, 4 I. & N. Dec. 354 (C. O. 1951); 7 C. Gordon, S. Mailman, & S. Yale-Loehr, Immigration Law and Procedure § 93.04[2][d], pp. 93­43 to 93­44 (1992) (hereinafter Gordon). But see 3 G. Hackworth, Digest of International Law 29 (1942) (noting a case in which legitimation postmajority was deemed suffi- cient, but maintaining that "[n]ormally the legitimation must take place during the minority of the child"). 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 463 Ginsburg, J., dissenting In the early part of this century, the State Department permitted the transmission of citizenship from unwed mother to child reasoning that, for the child born out of wedlock, the mother "stands in the place of the father." House Commit- tee on Immigration and Naturalization, A Report Proposing A Revision and Codification of the Nationality Laws of the United States, Part One: Proposed Code with Explanatory Comments, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 18 (Comm. Print 1939) (hereinafter Proposed Code). Ultimately, however, the At- torney General rejected the Department's reasoning, finding it incompatible with § 1993's exclusive reference to fathers. See 39 Op. Atty. Gen. 397, 398 (1939). Women's inability to transmit their United States citizen- ship to children born abroad was one among many gender- based distinctions drawn in our immigration and nationality laws. The woman who married a foreign citizen risked los- ing her United States nationality. In early days, "marriage with an alien, whether a friend or an enemy, produce[d] no dissolution of the native allegiance of the wife." Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242, 246 (1830) (Story, J.). By the end of the 19th century, however, a few courts adopted the view that a woman's nationality followed her husband's, see, e. g., Pequignot v. Detroit, 16 F. 211, 216 (CC ED Mich. 1883), particularly when the woman resided abroad in her hus- band's country, see, e. g., Ruckgaber v. Moore, 104 F. 947, 948­949 (CC ED NY 1900). See generally C. Bredbenner, A Nationality of Her Own: Women, Marriage, and the Law of Citizenship 58­59 (1998) (hereinafter Bredbenner); Sapiro, Women, Citizenship, and Nationality: Immigration and Natu- ralization Policies in the United States, 13 Politics & Soc. 1, 4­10 (1984). State Department officials inclined towards this view as well. See L. Gettys, The Law of Citizenship in the United States 118 (1934). In 1907, Congress settled the matter: It provided by statute that a female United States citizen automatically lost her citizenship upon marriage to an alien. Act of Mar. 2, 1907, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228. This Court upheld the statute, noting that "[t]he identity of husband and 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 464 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Ginsburg, J., dissenting wife is an ancient principle of our jurisprudence." Macken- zie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299, 311 (1915). The statutory rule that women relinquished their United States citizenship upon marriage to an alien encountered in- creasing opposition, fueled in large part by the women's suf- frage movement and the enhanced importance of citizenship to women as they obtained the right to vote. See Bredben- ner 64, 68­81; Sapiro, supra, at 12­13. In response, Con- gress provided a measure of relief. Under the 1922 Cable Act, marriage to an alien no longer stripped a woman of her citizenship automatically. Act of Sept. 22, 1922 (Cable Act), ch. 411, § 3, 42 Stat. 1022. But equal respect for a woman's nationality remained only partially realized. A woman still lost her United States citizenship if she married an alien inel- igible for citizenship; she could not become a citizen by natu- ralization if her husband did not qualify for citizenship; she was presumed to have renounced her citizenship if she lived abroad in her husband's country for two years, or if she lived abroad elsewhere for five years. Id., §§ 3, 5; see also Sapiro, supra, at 11­12. A woman who became a naturalized citizen was unable to transmit her citizenship to her children if her noncitizen husband remained alive and they were not sepa- rated. See In re Citizenship Status of Minor Children, 25 F. 2d 210 (NJ 1928) ("the status of the wife was dependent upon that of her husband, and therefore the children ac- quired their citizenship from the same source as had been theretofore existent under the common law"); see also Get- tys, supra, at 56­57. No restrictions of like kind applied to male United States citizens. Instead, Congress treated wives and children of male United States citizens or immigrants benevolently. The 1855 legislation automatically granted citizenship to women who married United States citizens. Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 2, 10 Stat. 604; see also Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 498 (1869) (the 1855 Act "confers the privileges of citizenship upon women married to citizens of the United States" with- 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 465 Ginsburg, J., dissenting out further action); Bredbenner 15. Under an 1804 statute, if a male alien died after completing the United States resi- dence requirement but before actual naturalization, his widow and children would be "considered as citizens." Act of Mar. 26, 1804, § 2, 2 Stat. 292, 293. That 1804 measure granted no corresponding dispensation to the husband and children of an alien woman. In addition, Congress provided statutory exemptions to entry requirements for the wives and children of men but not for the husbands and children of women. See, e. g., Act of Mar. 3, 1903, § 37, 32 Stat. 1213, 1221 (wives and children entering the country to join perma- nent resident aliens and found to have contracted contagious diseases during transit shall not be deported if the diseases were easily curable or did not present a danger to others); S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 415­417 (1950) (wives exempt from literacy and quota requirements). In 1934, Congress moved in a new direction. It termi- nated the discrimination against United States citizen moth- ers in regard to children born abroad. Specifically, Con- gress amended § 1993 to read: "Any child hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdic- tion of the United States, whose father or mother or both at the time of the birth of such child is a citizen of the United States, is declared to be a citizen of the United States; but the rights of citizenship shall not descend to any such child unless the citizen father or citizen mother, as the case may be, has resided in the United States previous to the birth of such child." Act of May 24, 1934, § 1, 48 Stat. 797.1 1 A 1921 bill contained a similar provision allowing United States citizen women to transmit citizenship to their children born abroad. The bill provided: "A child born at any time without the United States, either parent being at the time of such birth a citizen of the United States, may, if not a citizen under section 1993 of the Revised Statutes, derive United States citizenship under this section." H. R. Rep. No. 15603, 66th Cong., 3d Sess., § 33(2), p. 26 (1921). This 1921 bill, a precursor to the Cable 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 466 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Ginsburg, J., dissenting Senate and House Reports on the Act stated that the change was made "to establish complete equality between American men and women in the matter of citizenship for themselves and for their children." S. Rep. No. 865, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1934); accord, H. R. Rep. No. 131, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1933); see generally Orfield, The Citizenship Act of 1934, 2 U. Chi. L. Rev. 99, 100­106 (1935). Congress again did not speak of children born out of wedlock, but the 1934 Act "was construed as authorizing transmission of American citizenship by descent by an American citizen mother to a child born abroad . . . out of wedlock under the same condi- tions as a child born in wedlock." 7 Gordon § 93.04[2][b], at 93­42; see also id., § 93.04[2][d][iii], at 93­46. The 1934 Act's equal respect for the citizenship stature of mothers and fathers of children born abroad did not remain unmodified. Six years later, Congress passed the National- ity Act of 1940, which replaced the Revised Statutes' single provision on citizenship of children born abroad with an array of provisions that turned on whether the child was born in an outlying possession of the United States, whether one or both of the child's parents were United States citizens, and whether the child was born in or out of wedlock. The 1940 Act preserved Congress' earlier recognition of parental equality in regard to children born in wedlock, but estab- lished a different regime for children born out of wedlock, one that disadvantaged United States citizen fathers and their children. Under the 1940 Act, if the mother of the child born abroad out of wedlock held United States citizenship and previously had resided in the country or in a United States possession, the child gained the mother's nationality from birth, pro- vided the child's paternity was not established by legitima- Act, passed the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization but proceeded no further. See H. R. Rep. No. 1185, 66th Cong., 3d Sess., 1 (1921). 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 467 Ginsburg, J., dissenting tion or a court order.2 But if the father and not the mother held United States citizenship, then the child would qualify for United States citizenship only upon legitimation or adju- dication of paternity during the child's minority. Further- more, the child generally had to live in the United States for five years before the age of 21. The same residency require- ment applied to children born abroad to married couples with only one United States citizen parent, whether that parent was the mother or the father. Nationality Act of 1940, §§ 201, 205, 54 Stat. 1138­1140.3 Subsequent legislation retained the gender lines drawn in the 1940 Act. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 made only one significant change regarding the citizenship of children born abroad out of wedlock. It removed the provi- sion that a mother could pass on her nationality to her child only if the paternity of the child had not been established.4 2 Nationality and citizenship are not entirely synonymous; one can be a national of the United States and yet not a citizen. 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(22). The distinction has little practical impact today, however, for the only re- maining noncitizen nationals are residents of American Samoa and Swains Island. See T. Aleinikoff, D. Martin, & H. Motomura, Immigration: Proc- ess and Policy 974­975, n. 2 (3d ed. 1995). The provision that a child born abroad out of wedlock to a United States citizen mother gains her national- ity has been interpreted to mean that the child gains her citizenship as well; thus if the mother is not just a United States national but also a United States citizen, the child is a United States citizen. See 7 Gordon § 93.04[2][b], at 93­42; id., § 93.04[2][d][viii], at 93­49. 3 The provision granting citizenship to children born abroad out of wed- lock applied retroactively; the provision granting citizenship to children born in wedlock did not. The 1934 Act, too, was nonretroactive. The net result was that a child born abroad out of wedlock to a United States citizen mother in 1933 or earlier had United States citizenship after the 1940 Act, but a child born in wedlock did not until 1994 when Congress enacted legislation making the 1934 Act retroactive. Pub. L. 103­416, Tit. I, § 101(a)(2), 108 Stat. 4306, codified at 8 U. S. C. § 1401(h). 4 The 1952 Act also provided that periods of service in the Armed Forces abroad could count toward satisfying the parental residency requirement in regard to a child born after January 13, 1941. Immigration and Nation- 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 468 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Ginsburg, J., dissenting Immigration and Nationality Act, § 309, 66 Stat. 238­239. In 1986, however, Congress added further gender-based dif- ferentials. The Legislature that year permitted substitu- tion of a written acknowledgment under oath or adjudication of paternity prior to age 18 in place of formal legitimation. To that extent, Congress eased access to citizenship by a child born abroad out of wedlock to a United States citizen father. At the same time, however, Congress imposed on such a child two further requirements: production of clear and convincing evidence of paternity, also a written state- ment from the father promising support until the child turned 18. The requirements for a child of a United States citizen mother remained the same; such a child obtained the mother's nationality if the mother had resided in the United States or its territorial possessions for at least a year before the child's birth. Act of Nov. 14, 1986, § 13, 100 Stat. 3657, codified as amended at 8 U. S. C. § 1409. No substantive change has been made since 1986 in the law governing citi- zenship of children born abroad out of wedlock. II The history of the treatment of children born abroad to United States citizen parents counsels skeptical examination of the Government's prime explanation for the gender line drawn by § 1409-the close connection of mother to child, in contrast to the distant or fleeting father-child link. Or, as Justice Stevens puts it, a mother's presence at birth, iden- tification on the birth certificate, and likely "initial custody" of the child give her an "opportunity to develop a caring relationship with the child," ante, at 444, which Congress legitimately could assume a father lacks. For most of our Nation's past, Congress demonstrated no high regard or re- spect for the mother-child affiliation. It bears emphasis, too, that in 1934, when Congress allowed United States citi- ality Act of 1952, §§ 301(a)(7), 309(b), 66 Stat. 236, 238, codified as amended at 8 U. S. C. §§ 1401(g), 1409(b). 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 469 Ginsburg, J., dissenting zen mothers to transmit their citizenship to their foreign- born children, Congress simultaneously and for the first time required that such children (unless both parents were citi- zens) fulfill a residence requirement: "[T]he right of citizen- ship shall not descend unless the child comes to the United States and resides therein for at least five years continuously immediately previous to his eighteenth birthday." Act of May 24, 1934, § 1, 48 Stat. 797. Commentary underscores what the text conveys. Congress largely relied on a resi- dence requirement, not the sex of the child's citizen parent, to assure an abiding affiliation with the United States. See Proposed Code 10­11, 14. Even if one accepts at face value the Government's current rationale, it is surely based on generalizations (stereotypes) about the way women (or men) are. These generalizations pervade the opinion of Justice Stevens, which constantly relates and relies on what "typically," or "normally," or "probably" happens "often." E. g., ante, at 436, 437, 442. We have repeatedly cautioned, however, that when the Government controls "gates to opportunity," it "may not ex- clude qualified individuals based on `fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females.' " United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, 541 (1996) (quoting Missis- sippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S., at 725); see also Orr v. Orr, 440 U. S. 268, 283 (1979) ("Where, as here, the State's . . . purposes are as well served by a gender-neutral classification as one that gender classifies and therefore car- ries with it the baggage of sexual stereotypes, the State can- not be permitted to classify on the basis of sex."). Only an " `exceedingly persuasive justification,' " Kirchberg v. Feen- stra, 450 U. S. 455, 461 (1981) (quoting Personnel Adminis- trator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 273 (1979)), one that does "not rely on overbroad generalizations about the differ- ent talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females," United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S., at 533, will support dif- 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 470 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Ginsburg, J., dissenting ferential treatment of men and women. See J. E. B. v. Ala- bama ex rel. T. B., 511 U. S. 127, 152 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that prevailing case law "re- veal[s] a strong presumption that gender classifications are invalid"). One can demur to the Government's observation that more United States citizen mothers of children born abroad out of wedlock actually raise their children than do United States citizen fathers of such children. As Justice Breyer has elucidated, this observation does not justify distinctions be- tween male and female United States citizens who take re- sponsibility, or avoid responsibility, for raising their children. Nor does it justify reliance on gender distinctions when the alleged purpose-assuring close ties to the United States- can be achieved without reference to gender. As Judge Wald commented in discussing an analogous claim when this case was before the Court of Appeals, "Congress is free to promote close family ties by ensur- ing that citizenship is conferred only on children who have at least minimal contact with citizen parents dur- ing their early and formative years. . . . But this putative interest provides absolutely no basis for requiring fa- thers, and only fathers, to formally declare parentage and agree to provide financial support before a child reaches age 18." Miller v. Christopher, 96 F. 3d 1467, 1476 (CADC 1996) (opinion concurring in judgment). * * * In 1934, it was no doubt true that many female United States citizens who gave birth abroad had married foreigners and moved to their husbands' country, and that the children of such marriages were brought up as natives of a foreign land. And if a female United States citizen were married to a United States citizen, her children born abroad could ob- tain United States citizenship through their father. Thus, the historic restriction of citizenship to children born abroad 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 471 Breyer, J., dissenting of United States citizen fathers may not have affected many women. But, in the words of one woman who testified in favor of the 1934 Act (and later became the first woman to sit as a federal district court judge), "[w]hether there are a lot of people who suffer or whether there are a few who suffer, it seems to us that the principle of equal application of the law to men and women ought to receive recognition." Hearings on H. R. 3673 and H. R. 77 before the House Com- mittee on Immigration and Naturalization, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 36 (1933) (testimony of Burnita Shelton Matthews). Congress recognized this equality principle in 1934, and is positioned to restore that impartiality before the century is out. Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Souter and Jus- tice Ginsburg join, dissenting. Since the founding of our Nation, American statutory law, reflecting a long-established legal tradition, has provided for the transmission of American citizenship from parent to child-even when the child is born abroad. Today's case focuses upon statutes that make those children, when born out of wedlock, "citizens of the United States at birth." 8 U. S. C. §§ 1401 and 1409. The statutes, as applied where only one parent is American, require the American parent- whether father or mother-to prove the child is his or hers and to meet a residency requirement. The statutes go on to require (1) that the American parent promise to provide financial support for the child until the child is 18, and (2) that the American parent (or a court) legitimate or formally acknowledge the child before the child turns 18-if and only if the American parent is the father, but not if the parent is the mother. What sense does it make to apply these latter two condi- tions only to fathers and not to mothers in today's world- where paternity can readily be proved and where women and men both are likely to earn a living in the workplace? As 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 472 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Breyer, J., dissenting Justice O'Connor has observed, and as a majority of the Court agrees, "[i]t is unlikely . . . that any gender classifica- tions based on stereotypes can survive heightened scrutiny." Ante, at 452. These two gender-based distinctions lack the " `exceedingly persuasive' " support that the Constitution re- quires. United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, 530 (1996). Consequently, the statute that imposes them violates the Fifth Amendment's "equal protection" guarantee. See Bol- ling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 500 (1954). I The family whose rights are at issue here consists of Char- lie Miller, an American citizen, Luz Pen ero, a citizen of the Philippines, and their daughter, Lorelyn. Lorelyn was born out of wedlock in 1970 in the Philippines. The relevant citi- zenship statutes state that a child born out of wedlock shall be a "citize[n] of the United States at birth," § 1401, if the child is born to a father who "had the nationality of the United States at the time of the person's birth," if the "blood relationship between the person and the father is established by clear and convincing evidence," if the father had been physically present in the United States for five years, and: "(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide financial support for the person until the per- son reaches the age of 18 years, and "(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years- "(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person's residence or domicile, "(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under oath, or "(C) the paternity of the person is established by ad- judication of a competent court." 8 U. S. C. §§ 1409(a) and 1401(g). Charlie Miller did not meet the requirements set forth in subsections (3) and (4) above on time. And the question be- 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 473 Breyer, J., dissenting fore us is whether the Constitution forbids the application of those requirements for the reason that the statute imposed them only where the child's American parent is the child's father, not the mother. In my view the Constitution does forbid their application. II I agree with Justice Stevens' resolution of the Govern- ment's three threshold claims. First, the Government takes issue with Lorelyn's argument that provisions (3) and (4) un- constitutionally infringe the rights of her father, Charlie, an American citizen. Brief for Respondent 11. It adds that Charlie, not Lorelyn, should assert those rights himself and that Lorelyn lacks legal "standing" to do so. Id., at 11, and n. 2. This Court has made clear, however, that a party can "assert" the constitutional rights of another person, where (1) that party has "suffered an `injury in fact' "; (2) the party and the other person have a "close relationship"; and (3) "there was some hindrance" to the other person's "assert- ing" his "own rights." Campbell v. Louisiana, ante, at 397; see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U. S. 400, 411 (1991). And these three requirements are met here. Lorelyn has suffered an "injury in fact." She has a "close" and relevant relationship with the other person, namely, her father. And there was "some hindrance" to her father's asserting his own rights. Charlie began this law- suit (originally filed in Texas) as a party, raising his own equal protection claim. The Government originally moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that Charlie "should be dismissed from this suit because he lack[ed] standing." Mo- tion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, or, in the Alternative, to Transfer Venue 6. The District Court agreed with the Government that Charlie lacked "standing," and he was dismissed from the suit. App. 11a. Lorelyn re- mained as the sole plaintiff, and for reasons of venue, see 28 U. S. C. § 1391(e)(1), the court then transferred the case to the District of Columbia pursuant to § 1406(a). App. 11a. 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 474 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Breyer, J., dissenting The conclusion that the Government "hindered" Charlie's assertion of his own rights in this case is irresistible. The Government points out that Charlie might have ap- pealed the adverse Texas District Court ruling. Brief for Respondent 11, n. 2. But appeals take time and money; the transfer of venue left the plaintiffs uncertain about where to appeal; the case was being heard with Lorelyn as plaintiff in any event; and the resulting comparison of costs and bene- fits (viewed prospectively) likely would have discouraged Charlie's pursuit of the alternative appeal route. The Gov- ernment's successful dismissal motion thus had practical con- sequences that "hindered" Charlie at least as much as those we have elsewhere said create "hindrances" sufficient to sat- isfy this portion of the "third-party standing" test. See, e. g., Campbell, supra, at 398 (criminal defendant can assert rights of racially excluded petit jurors because of "arduous" process surrounding, and small benefits accruing to, juror ef- fort to vindicate own rights); cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 193­194 (1976) ("decision . . . to forgo consideration of the constitutional merits . . . to await" another party's identi- cal claim would "foster repetitive and time-consuming litiga- tion under the guise of caution and prudence"). Second, the Government, citing United States v. Verdugo- Urquidez, 494 U. S. 259 (1990), and Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U. S. 763 (1950), argues that the Fifth Amendment does not protect an alien, such as Lorelyn, living outside the United States. Brief for Respondent 11­12. The rights to be vindicated here, however, are Charlie's, not Lorelyn's. And, in any event, those cases, as Justice Stevens points out, are irrelevant, for the matter at issue here is whether or not Lorelyn is a citizen. See Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U. S. 815 (1971) (considering on the merits a putative citizen's claim that he was a citizen due to the operation of the Fifth Amendment, even though he apparently was living outside the United States at the time he filed suit). 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 475 Breyer, J., dissenting Third, the Government argues that Lorelyn cannot suc- ceed because a federal court lacks the power to grant her the relief she seeks, namely, a grant of citizenship. Brief for Respondent 43­50. As I shall later explain in more detail, however, this argument is beside the point, for, once the two unconstitutional clauses are excised from the statute, that statute operates automatically to confer citizenship upon Lorelyn "at birth." 8 U. S. C. § 1401; see Part V, infra. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, says that Lorelyn cannot assert her father's rights because "she has not demonstrated a substantial hindrance to her father's ability to assert his own rights." Ante, at 447. But the obstacles that the Government placed in her father's path substantially hindered his efforts to do so in practice. See supra, at 473­474. Several of the cases mentioned in Jus- tice O'Connor's opinion involved the denial of standing, but none of those cases involved any "hindrance," and Justice O'Connor does not claim that they do. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U. S. 215, 234 (1990) (husband lacks standing to assert wife's moot claim); Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U. S. 534, 544­545 (1986) (school board member lacks standing to defend on board's behalf a claim that all other board members voted not to defend); Glad- stone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 112, n. 25 (1979) (nonresidents lack standing to challenge local real estate practices as discriminatory); Heald v. District of Columbia, 259 U. S. 114, 123 (1922) (District resident lacks standing to claim local tax unconstitutional as applied to bonds held by nonresidents outside District). I have pre- viously pointed to cases in which the Court has found third- party standing where the "hindrance" was of the same kind and approximate degree as that present here. Supra, at 474. There are, of course, other cases finding standing that arguably involve even greater hindrance. See, e. g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U. S. 704, 711­712 (1987); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U. S. 678, 684, n. 4 (1977); Singleton v. 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 476 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Breyer, J., dissenting Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 108 (1976); Craig, supra, at 192; Eisen- stadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 446 (1972); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 459 (1958); Barrows v. Jack- son, 346 U. S. 249, 254 (1953). But they set no inner limit. Nor do I agree with Justice O'Connor's determination that "rational scrutiny" must apply to Lorelyn's assertion of her own rights. Lorelyn belongs to a class made up of chil- dren of citizen fathers, whom the law distinguishes from the class of children of citizen mothers, solely on grounds of the parent's gender. This Court, I assume, would use height- ened scrutiny were it to review discriminatory laws based upon ancestry, say, laws that denied voting rights or educa- tional opportunity based upon the religion, or the racial makeup, of a parent or grandparent. And, if that is so, I am not certain that it makes a significant difference whether one calls the rights at issue those of Lorelyn or of her father. Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737 (1984), does not hold to the contrary. Id., at 755 (black schoolchildren's parents who claimed a "stigmatizing injury" due to Internal Revenue Service decision to grant tax exempt status to racially dis- criminatory private schools had not been "personally denied equal treatment," and thus had not been injured). Regardless, like Justice O'Connor, I "do not share," and thus I believe a Court majority does not share, "Justice Stevens' assessment that the provision withstands height- ened scrutiny." Ante, at 451. I also agree with Justice O'Connor that "[i]t is unlikely" that "gender classifications based on stereotypes can survive heightened scrutiny," ante, at 452, a view shared by at least five Members of this Court. Indeed, for reasons to which I shall now turn, we must sub- ject the provisions here at issue to "heightened scrutiny." And those provisions cannot survive. III This case is about American citizenship and its transmis- sion from an American parent to his child. The right of citi- 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 477 Breyer, J., dissenting zenship, as this Court has said, is "a most precious right." Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 159 (1963); see also Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U. S. 490, 507 (1981) (citizenship is a "priceless treasure" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Luria v. United States, 231 U. S. 9, 22 (1913) ("Citizenship is membership in a political society"); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U. S. 253, 268 (1967) ("[This Nation's] citizenry is the country and the country is its citizenry"). Further, the tie of parent to child is a special one, which in other circumstances by itself has warranted special consti- tutional protection. See, e. g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); see also Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535 (1942). Moreover, American statutory law has consistently recog- nized the rights of American parents to transmit their citi- zenship to their children. See Act of Mar. 26, 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 103; Act of Jan. 29, 1795, § 3, 1 Stat. 415; Act of Apr. 14, 1802, § 4, 2 Stat. 155; Act of Feb. 10, 1855, § 1, 10 Stat. 604; Rev. Stat. § 1993; Act of Mar. 2, 1907, § 6, 34 Stat. 1229; Act of May 24, 1934, § 1, 48 Stat. 797; Nationality Act of 1940, § 201(g), 54 Stat. 1139; Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, §§ 301(a)(7), (b), 66 Stat. 235, 236, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1401; cf., e. g., 1 Oppenheim's International Law § 384 (R. Jennings & A. Watts 9th ed. 1992) (noting that in many States, children born abroad of nationals become nationals); 43 A. Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law 389 (1953) (Roman citizenship was acquired principally by par- entage); Sandifer, A Comparative Study of Laws Relating to Nationality at Birth and to Loss of Nationality, 29 Am. J. Int'l L. 248, 248­261, 278 (1935) (discussing citizenship laws throughout the world and noting the "widespread extent of the rule of jus sanguinis"); E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations 101­102 (J. Chitty transl. 1883) (1758). Finally, the classification at issue is gender based, and we have held that, under the equal protection principle, such 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 478 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Breyer, J., dissenting classifications may not rest on generalizations about the different capacities of males and females when neutral cat- egories would serve the legislature's end. United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S., at 540­546. These circumstances mean that courts should not diminish the quality of review-that they should not apply specially lenient standards-when they review these statutes. The statutes focus upon two of the most serious of human rela- tionships, that of parent to child and that of individual to the State. They tie each to the other, transforming both while strengthening the bonds of loyalty that connect family with Nation. Yet because they confer the status of citizenship "at birth," they do not involve the transfer of loyalties that underlies the naturalization of aliens, where precedent sets a more lenient standard of review. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787 (1977). To the contrary, the same standard of review must apply when a married American couple travel abroad or temporar- ily work abroad and have a child as when a single American parent has a child born abroad out of wedlock. If the stand- ard that the law applies is specially lenient, then statutes conferring citizenship upon these children could discriminate virtually free of independent judicial review. And as a re- sult, many such children, lacking citizenship, would be placed outside the domain of basic constitutional protections. Nothing in the Constitution requires so anomalous a result. I recognize that, ever since the Civil War, the transmission of American citizenship from parent to child, jus sanguinis, has played a role secondary to that of the transmission of citizenship by birthplace, jus soli. See Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U. S., at 828; see also Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U. S. 657, 669­671 (1927) (citing United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 674 (1898), and id., at 714 (Fuller, C. J., dissenting)). That lesser role reflects the fact that the Fourteenth Amend- ment's Citizenship Clause does not mention statutes that might confer citizenship "at birth" to children of Americans 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 479 Breyer, J., dissenting born abroad. U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, § 1 (stating that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States . . . are citizens"). But that omission, though it may give Congress the power to decide whether or not to extend citizenship to children born outside the United States, see Rogers v. Bellei, supra, at 835, does not justify more lenient "equal protec- tion" review of statutes that embody a congressional decision to do so. Nothing in the language of the Citizenship Clause argues for less close scrutiny of those laws conferring citizenship at birth that Congress decides to enact. Nor have I found any support for a lesser standard in either the history of the Clause or its purpose. To the contrary, those who wrote the Citizenship Clause hoped thereby to assure that courts would not exclude newly freed slaves-born within the United States-from the protections the Fourteenth Amend- ment provided, including "equal protection of the laws." See, e. g., Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U. S., at 262; id., at 283­284 (Harlan, J., dissenting); H. Flack, Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 83­97 (1908). They took special care, lest dep- rivation of citizenship undermine the Amendment's guaran- tee of "equal protection of the laws." Care is no less nec- essary when statutes, transferring citizenship between American parent and child, make the child a citizen "at birth." How then could the Fourteenth Amendment itself provide support for a diminished standard of review? Nor have I found any such support in the history of the jus sanguinis statutes. That history shows a virtually un- broken tradition of transmitting American citizenship from parent to child "at birth," under statutes that imposed cer- tain residence requirements. Supra, at 477; see also Bellei, supra, at 835. A single gap occurred when, for a brief pe- riod of time, the relevant statutes (perhaps inadvertently) failed to confer citizenship upon what must have been a small group of children born abroad between 1802 and 1855 whose citizen fathers were also born between 1802 and 1855. See 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 480 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Breyer, J., dissenting Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U. S. 308, 311­312 (1961); Weedin, supra, at 663­664; Wong Kim Ark, supra, at 673­674. But even then, some courts, recognizing the importance of the right, found common-law authority for the transmission to those children of their parent's American citizenship. See Ludlam v. Ludlam, 26 N. Y. 356, 362­372 (1863); see also Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sandf. Ch. 583, 659­663 (N. Y. 1844). The history of these statutes does reveal considerable discrimination against women, particularly from 1855 to 1934. See ante, at 463­465 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). But that discrimination then cannot justify this discrimination now, when much discrimination that the law once tolerated, including "de jure segregation and the total exclusion of women from juries," is "now unconstitutional even though [it] once coexisted with the Equal Protection Clause." J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U. S. 127, 143, n. 15 (1994). Neither have I found case law that could justify use here of a more lenient standard of review. Justice Stevens points out that this Court has said it will apply a more le- nient standard in matters of " `immigration and naturaliza- tion.' " Ante, at 435, n. 11 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 82 (1976)). But that language arises in a case in- volving aliens. The Court did not say it intended that phrase to include statutes that confer citizenship "at birth." And Congress does not believe that this kind of citizenship involves "naturalization." 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(23) ("The term `naturalization' means the conferring of nationality of a state upon a person after birth, by any means whatsoever" (emphasis added)). The Court to my knowledge has never said, or held, or reasoned that statutes automatically confer- ring citizenship "at birth" upon the American child of Ameri- can parents receive a more lenient standard of review. The Court has applied a deferential standard of review in cases involving aliens, not in cases in which only citizens' rights were at issue. See Mathews, supra (rights of alien 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 481 Breyer, J., dissenting residents); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753 (1972) (citi- zens' rights related to treatment of alien); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787 (1977) (citizens' rights to obtain immigration prefer- ences for relatives who are aliens). When the Court has considered the latter kind of case, it has not lowered the standard of review. See Bellei, 401 U. S., at 828­836 (evalu- ating due process challenge to citizenship statute under gen- erally applicable standard). In sum, the statutes that automatically transfer American citizenship from parent to child "at birth" differ significantly from those that confer citizenship on those who originally owed loyalty to a different nation. To fail to recognize this difference, and consequently to apply an unusually lenient constitutional standard of review here, could deprive the children of millions of Americans, married and unmarried, working abroad, traveling, say, even temporarily to Canada or Mexico, of the most basic kind of constitutional protection. See U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 53 (1997) (Table 54) (reporting that, as of 1990, 1.86 million United States citizens were born abroad or at sea to American parents); see also Hearing be- fore the Subcommittee on International Operations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 114 (1991) (testimony of Andrew P. Sundberg) ("According to the most recent survey carried out by the State Department, 40,000 children are born abroad each year to a U. S. citizen parent"). Thus, generally prevailing, not specially lenient, standards of review must apply. IV If we apply undiluted equal protection standards, we must hold the two statutory provisions at issue unconstitutional. The statutes discriminate on the basis of gender, making it significantly more difficult for American fathers than for American mothers to transmit American citizenship to their children born out of wedlock. If the citizen parent is a man, 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 482 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Breyer, J., dissenting the statute requires (1) a promise by the father to support the child until the child is 18, and (2) before the child turns 18, legitimation, written acknowledgment by the father under oath, or an adjudication of paternity. 8 U. S. C. § 1409(a). If the citizen parent is a woman, she need not do either. § 1409(c). Distinctions of this kind-based upon gender-are subject to a " `strong presumption' " of constitutional invalidity. Virginia, 518 U. S., at 532 (quoting J. E. B., supra, at 152 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)). The Equal Protec- tion Clause permits them only if the Government meets the "demanding" burden of showing an " `exceedingly persua- sive' " justification for the distinction. Virginia, supra, at 533; see also J. E. B., supra, at 136; Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 724 (1982); Personnel Ad- ministrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 273 (1979); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U. S. 455, 461 (1981). That dis- tinction must further important governmental objectives, and the discriminatory means employed must be "substan- tially related" to the achievement of those objectives. Vir- ginia, supra, at 533 (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women, supra, at 724). This justification "must be genuine, not hy- pothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation." Virginia, 518 U. S., at 533. Further, "it must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capac- ities, or preferences of males and females." Ibid.; see also J. E. B., supra, at 139­140, and n. 11; Craig, 429 U. S., at 201; Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 223­224 (1977) (Ste- vens, J., concurring in judgment); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636, 643 (1975). The fact that the statutes "dis- criminat[e] against males rather than against females" is beside the point. Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U. S., at 723. The statutory distinctions here violate these standards. They depend for their validity upon the generalization that mothers are significantly more likely than fathers to care for 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 483 Breyer, J., dissenting their children, or to develop caring relationships with their children. But consider how the statutes work once one abandons that generalization as the illegitimate basis for leg- islative line-drawing we have held it to be. Id., at 726, 730. First, assume that the American citizen is also the Caretaker Parent. The statute would then require a Male Caretaker Parent to acknowledge his child prior to the child's 18th birthday (or for the parent or child to obtain a court equiva- lent) and to provide financial support. It would not require a Female Caretaker Parent to do either. The gender-based distinction that would impose added burdens only upon the Male Caretaker Parent would serve no purpose at all. Second, assume that the American citizen is the Non- Caretaker Parent. In that circumstance, the statute would forgive a Female Non-Caretaker Parent from complying with the requirements (for formal acknowledgment and writ- ten promises to provide financial support) that it would impose upon a Male Non-Caretaker Parent. Again, the gender-based distinction that would impose lesser burdens only upon the Female Non-Caretaker Parent would serve no purpose. To illustrate the point, compare the family before us- Charlie, Lorelyn, and Luz-with an imagined family-Car- los, a Philippine citizen, Lucy, his daughter, and Lenora, Lucy's mother and an American citizen. Suppose that Le- nora, Lucy's unmarried mother, returned to the United States soon after Lucy's birth, leaving Carlos to raise his daughter. Why, under those circumstances, should Lenora not be required to fulfill the same statutory requirements that here apply to Charlie? Alternatively, imagine that Charlie had taken his daughter Lorelyn back to the United States to raise. The statute would not make Lorelyn an American from birth unless Charlie satisfied its two condi- tions. But had our imaginary family mother, Lenora, taken her child Lucy back to the United States, the statute would have automatically made her an American from birth with- 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 484 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Breyer, J., dissenting out anyone having satisfied the two conditions. The ex- ample suggests how arbitrary the statute's gender-based distinction is once one abandons the generalization that mothers, not fathers, will act as caretaker parents. Let me now deal more specifically with the justifications that Justice Stevens finds adequate. Justice Stevens asserts that subsection (a)(4) serves two interests: first, "en- suring reliable proof of a biological relationship between the potential citizen and its citizen parent," ante, at 436, and sec- ond, "encouraging" certain relationships or ties, namely, "the development of a healthy relationship between the citizen parent and the child while the child is a minor," ante, at 438, as well as "the related interest in fostering ties between the foreign-born child and the United States," ibid. I have no doubt that these interests are important. But the relation- ship between the statutory requirements and those particu- lar objectives is one of total misfit. Subsection (a)(4) requires, for example, the American citi- zen father to "acknowledg[e]" paternity before the child reaches 18 years of age, or for the child or parent to obtain a court equivalent (legitimation or adjudication of paternity). Justice Stevens suggests that this requirement "produces the rough equivalent of the documentation," such as a birth certificate memorialized in hospital records, "already avail- able to evidence the blood relationship between the mother and the child." Ante, at 436. But, even if I assume the "equivalency" (only for argument's sake, since birth certifi- cates do not invariably carry a mother's true name or omit the father's), I still do not understand the need for the prior- to-18 legitimation-or-acknowledgment requirement. When the statute was written, one might have seen the require- ment as offering some protection against false paternity claims. But that added protection is unnecessary in light of inexpensive DNA testing that will prove paternity with certainty. See Shapiro, Reifler, and Psome, The DNA Pa- ternity Test: Legislating the Future Paternity Action, 7 J. 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 485 Breyer, J., dissenting Law & Health 1, 29 (1992­1993) (current testing methods can determine probability of paternity to 99.999999% accuracy); see also H. R. Rep. No. 98­527, p. 38 (1983). Moreover, a different provision of the statute, subsection (a)(1), already requires proof of paternity by "clear and con- vincing evidence." No one contests the validity of that pro- vision, and I believe that biological differences between men and women would justify its imposition where paternity is at issue. In light of that provision, subsection (a)(4)'s protection against false claims is not needed. Indeed, the Government concedes that, in light of the "clear and con- vincing evidence" requirement, the "time limit for meeting the legitimation-or-acknowledgement requirement of Section 309(a)(4) must . . . reflect, at least in part, some other con- gressional concern." Brief for Respondent 27 (emphasis added). Justice Stevens says that this "other concern" is a con- cern for the establishment of relationships and ties, to the father and to the United States, all before the child is 18. Ante, at 438. According to Justice Stevens, the way in which the requirement serves this purpose is by making cer- tain the father knows of the child's existence-in the same way, it says, that a mother, by giving birth, automatically knows that the child exists. Ibid. The distance between this knowledge and the claimed ob- jectives, however, is far too great to satisfy any legal require- ment of tailoring or proportionality. And the assump- tion that this knowledge of birth could make a significant gender-related difference rests upon a host of unproved gender-related hypotheses. Simple knowledge of a child's existence may, or may not, be followed by the kinds of rela- tionships for which Justice Stevens hopes. A mother or a father, knowing of a child's birth, may nonetheless fail to care for the child or even to acknowledge the child. A fa- ther with strong ties to the child may, simply by lack of knowledge, fail to comply with the statute's formal require- 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 486 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Breyer, J., dissenting ments. A father with weak ties might readily comply. Moreover, the statute does little to assure any tie for, as Justice Stevens acknowledges, a child might obtain an adjudication of paternity "absent any affirmative act by the father, and perhaps even over his express objection." Ante, at 434. To make plausible the connection between the statute's requirement and the asserted "relationship" goals, Justice Stevens must find a factual scenario where a father's knowledge-equivalent to the mother's knowledge that she has given birth-could lead to the establishment of a more meaningful parenting relationship or tie to America. He therefore points to what one might term the "war baby" problem-the problem created by American servicemen fa- thering children overseas and returning to America unaware of the related pregnancy or birth. The statutory remedy before us, however, is disproportionately broad even when considered in relation to that problem. Justice Stevens refers to 683,000 service personnel stationed in the Far East in 1970 when Lorelyn was born. Ante, at 439. The statute applies, however, to all Americans who live or travel abroad, including the 3.2 million private citizens, and the 925,000 Federal Government employees, who live, or who are sta- tioned, abroad-of whom today only 240,000 are active duty military employees, many of whom are women. U. S. Dept. of State, Private American Citizens Residing Abroad (Nov. 21, 1997); U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Americans Overseas in U. S. Censuses, Technical Paper 62, p. 62 (Nov. 1993) (1990 census figures); U. S. Dept. of Defense, Selected Manpower Statistics 23, 44 (DIOR/MO1­96 1996). Nor does the statute seem to have been aimed at the "war baby" problem, for the precursor to the provisions at issue was first proposed in a 1938 report and was first adopted in the Nationality Act of 1940, which was enacted before the United States entered World War II. Nationality Laws of the United States: Message from the President of the United 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 487 Breyer, J., dissenting States, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 17­18 (Comm. Print submitted to House Comm. on Immigration and Naturaliza- tion, 1939); Nationality Act of 1940, § 205, 54 Stat. 1139. Nor is there need for the gender-based discrimination at issue here, for, were Congress truly interested in achieving the goals Justice Stevens posits in the way Justice Ste- vens suggests, it could simply substitute a requirement of knowledge of birth for the present subsection (a)(4); or it could distinguish between Caretaker and Noncaretaker Par- ents, rather than between men and women. A statute that does not do so, but instead relies upon gender-based distinc- tions, appears rational only, as I have said, supra, at 482­484, if one accepts the legitimacy of gender-based generalizations that, for example, would equate gender and caretaking- generalizations of a kind that this Court has previously found constitutionally impermissible. See, e. g., Virginia, 518 U. S., at 542, 546 (striking down men-only admissions policy at Virginia Military Institute even assuming that "most women would not choose VMI's adversative method"); J. E. B., 511 U. S., at 139, n. 11 (invalidating gender-based peremptory challenges "[e]ven if a measure of truth can be found in some of the gender stereotypes used to justify" them); Craig, 429 U. S., at 201 (invalidating Oklahoma law that established different drinking ages for men and women, although the evidence supporting the age differential was "not trivial in a statistical sense"); Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S., at 645 (holding unconstitutional statutory classification giving to widowed mothers benefits not available to widowed fa- thers even though "the notion that men are more likely than women to be the primary supporters of their spouses and children is not entirely without empirical support"). Al- though Justice Stevens cites Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U. S. 248 (1983), for support, ante, at 441, that case was decided before the DNA advances described earlier. For similar reasons, subsection (3) denies Charlie Miller "equal protection" of the laws. That subsection requires an 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 488 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Breyer, J., dissenting American father to "agre[e] . . . to provide financial support" for the child until the child "reaches the age of 18," but does not require the same of an American mother. I agree with the Government that this provision has as one objective helping to assure ties between father and child. Brief for Respondent 26. But I do not see why the same need does not exist with respect to a mother. And, where the Ameri- can parent is the Non-Caretaker Parent, the need for such assurances would seem the same in respect to either sex. Where the American parent is the Caretaker Parent, there would seem no need for the assurance regardless of gender. Since either men or women may be caretakers, and since either men or women may be "breadwinners," one could jus- tify the gender distinction only on the ground that more women are caretakers than men, and more men are "bread- winners" than women. This, again, is the kind of general- ization that we have rejected as justifying a gender-based distinction in other cases. Virginia, supra, at 540­546; J. E. B., supra, at 139, n. 11; Craig, supra, at 201; Wiesenfeld, supra, at 645. For these reasons, I can find no "exceedingly persuasive" justification for the gender-based distinctions that the stat- ute draws. V Justice Scalia argues that, if the provisions at issue vio- late the Constitution, we nonetheless are powerless to find a remedy. But that is not so. The remedy is simply that of striking from the statute the two subsections that offend the Constitution's equal protection requirement, namely, subsec- tions (a)(3) and (a)(4). With those subsections omitted, the statute says that the daughter, Lorelyn, of one who, like Charlie, has proved paternity by "clear and convincing evi- dence," is an American citizen, and has lived in the United States for five years, is a "citize[n] of the United States at birth." 8 U. S. C. §§ 1409(a) and 1401. Whatever limita- tions there may be upon the Court's powers to grant citizen- 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 420 (1998) 489 Breyer, J., dissenting ship, those limitations are not applicable here, for the Court need not grant citizenship. The statute itself grants citizen- ship automatically, and "at birth." And this Court need only declare that that is so. INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U. S. 875 (1988), which Justice Scalia cites in support, is beside the point, for the plaintiffs in that case, conceding that the stat- ute at issue did not make them citizens, asked the courts to confer citizenship as a remedy in equity. Cf. Bellei, 401 U. S., at 828­836 (assessing claim that statute conferred citi- zenship in the absence of a provision argued to be unconsti- tutional, without identifying any special remedial problems). Of course, we can excise the two provisions only if Con- gress likely would prefer their excision, rather than imposing similar requirements upon mothers. Califano v. Westcott, 443 U. S. 76, 89­93 (1979); Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S. 333, 361 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result). But, since the provisions at issue seem designed in significant part to address difficulties in proving paternity (along with pro- viding encouragement for fathers to legitimate the child) and, since DNA advances have overcome the paternity-proof difficulties, I believe that Congress would have preferred severance. Justice Scalia is also wrong, I believe, when he says that "the INA itself contains a clear statement of congressional intent" not to sever, ante, at 457, for the Act in fact contains the following explicit severability provision: "If any particular provision of this Act, or the applica- tion thereof to any person or circumstance, is held in- valid, the remainder of the Act and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby." § 406, 66 Stat. 281; see note following 8 U. S. C. § 1101, p. 38, "Separability." The provision cited by Justice Scalia says: "A person may be naturalized as a citizen of the United States in the manner and under the conditions 523US2 Unit: $U53 [04-29-00 17:52:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN 490 MILLER v. ALBRIGHT Breyer, J., dissenting prescribed in this title and not otherwise." § 310(d), 66 Stat. 239, 8 U. S. C. § 1421(d). As "naturalization" under this statute does not include the conferral of citizenship at birth, the provision does not apply here. See 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(23) ("The term `naturalization' means the conferring of nationality of a state upon a person after birth" (emphasis added)). Justice Scalia also says that the law, as excised, would favor fathers over mothers. Ante, at 459. The law, how- ever, would require both fathers and mothers to prove their parentage; it would require that one or the other be an American, it would impose residency requirements that, if anything, would disfavor fathers. I cannot find the reverse favoritism that Justice Scalia fears. For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 523US2 Unit: $U54 [04-29-00 18:16:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1997 491 Syllabus CALIFORNIA et al. v. DEEP SEA RESEARCH, INC., et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 96­1400. Argued December 1, 1997-Decided April 22, 1998 The S. S. Brother Jonathan and its cargo sank off the coast of California in 1865. Shortly after the disaster, five insurance companies paid claims for the loss of certain cargo, but it is unclear whether the ship and the remaining cargo were insured. There is no evidence that either the State or the insurance companies have attempted to locate or re- cover the wreckage. In this action, respondent Deep Sea Research, Inc. (DSR), which has located the wreck, seeks rights to the vessel and cargo under the Federal District Court's in rem admiralty jurisdiction. California moved to dismiss, claiming that it possesses title to the wreck either under the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987 (ASA)-which pro- vides that the Federal Government asserts and transfers title to a State of any "abandoned shipwreck" embedded in the State's submerged lands or on a State's submerged lands and included, or eligible for inclusion, in the National Register-or under Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. § 6313- which vests title in the State to all abandoned shipwrecks on or in the State's tide and submerged lands-and therefore DSR's in rem action is an action against the State in violation of the Eleventh Amendment. DSR countered that the ASA could not divest the federal courts of the exclusive admiralty and maritime jurisdiction conferred by Article III, § 2, of the Constitution and requested a warrant for the arrest of the vessel and its cargo. The District Court concluded that the State failed to demonstrate a "colorable claim" to the wreck under the ASA; found that the ASA pre-empts § 6313; issued a warrant for the vessel's arrest; appointed DSR the vessel's custodian and made it the exclusive salvor; and decided that it would defer adjudication of title until after DSR completed the salvage operation. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the ASA pre-empts § 6313; that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the federal court's jurisdiction over the in rem proceeding as to the application of the ASA; that the State did not prove that the Brother Jonathan is abandoned under the ASA; and that the wreck's uninsured portion should not be treated as abandoned. 523US2 Unit: $U54 [04-29-00 18:16:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN 492 CALIFORNIA v. DEEP SEA RESEARCH, INC. Syllabus Held:1. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar a federal court's jurisdic- tion over an in rem admiralty action where the res is not within the State's possession. Pp. 501­508. (a) The federal courts have a unique role in admiralty cases as con- ferred by Article III, § 2, cl. 1, of the Constitution. That jurisdiction encompasses proceedings in rem. The jurisdiction of federal courts is also constrained, however, by the Eleventh Amendment. Early cases appear to have assumed the federal courts' jurisdiction over admiralty in rem actions despite the Eleventh Amendment. Subsequent deci- sions altered the role of federal courts by explaining that admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is not wholly exempt from the Eleventh Amend- ment. Ex parte New York, 256 U. S. 490 (New York I). Thus, this Court held that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction over an in rem action against a tugboat operated by New York State, Ex parte New York, 256 U. S. 503 (New York II), and that Florida could not invoke the Eleventh Amendment to block the arrest of maritime artifacts in the State's possession where that possession was unlawful, Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670 (plurality opinion). However, those opinions did not address situations comparable to this case, in which DSR asserts rights to a res not in the State's possession. The action in New York I, although styled as an in rem action, was actually, as the Court explained in that decision, an in personam action against a state official; and the action in New York II was an in rem suit against a vessel that was property of the State, in its possession and employed for governmental use. Assertions in the opinions in Treasure Salvors, which might be read to suggest that a federal court may not undertake in rem adjudication of the State's interest in property with- out the State's consent, regardless of the status of the res, should not be divorced from the context of that case and reflexively applied to the very different circumstances presented by this case. Also, because Treasure Salvors addressed only the District Court's authority to issue a warrant to arrest artifacts, any references to what the lower courts could have done if adjudicating the artifacts' title do not control the outcome here. Nor does the fact that Treasure Salvors has been cited for the general proposition that federal courts cannot adjudicate a State's claim of title to property prevent a more nuanced application of that decision in the context of the federal courts' in rem admiralty jurisdiction. Pp. 501­506. (b) In considering whether the Eleventh Amendment applies where the State asserts claim in an admiralty action to a res not in its posses- 523US2 Unit: $U54 [04-29-00 18:16:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 523 U. S. 491 (1998) 493 Syllabus sion, this Court's decisions involving the Federal Government's sover- eign immunity in in rem admiralty actions provide guidance, for the Court has recognized a correlation between sovereign immunity princi- ples applicable to States and the Federal Government. Based on the longstanding precedent that the federal courts' in rem admiralty juris- diction is barred only where the Federal Government actually possesses the disputed res, e. g., The Davis, 10 Wall. 15, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar federal jurisdiction over the Brother Jonathan, and the District Court may adjudicate DSR's and the State's claims to the ship- wreck. Pp. 506­508. 2. Because the lower courts' conclusion that the Brother Jonathan was not abandoned for ASA purposes was influenced by the assumption that the Eleventh Amendment was relevant to the courts' inquiry, the case is remanded for reconsideration of the abandonment issue, with the clarification that the meaning of "abandoned" under the ASA conforms with its meaning under admiralty law. The District Court's full consid- eration of the ASA's application on remand might negate the need to address the issue whether the ASA pre-empts § 6313, and, thus, this Court declines to undertake that analysis. Pp. 508­509. 102 F. 3d 379, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 509. Kennedy, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 510. Joseph C. Rusconi, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, Roderick E. Walston, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Richard M. Frank, Assistant Attorney General, Dennis M. Eagan, Dep- uty Attorney General, Jack Rump, and Peter Pelkofer. David C. Frederick argued the cause for the United States, respondent under this Court's Rule 12.6, in support of petitioners. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Deputy Assistant At- torney General Preston, and Richard A. Olderman. 523US2 Unit: $U54 [04-29-00 18:16:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN 494 CALIFORNIA v. DEEP SEA RESEARCH, INC. Opinion of the Court Fletcher C. Alford argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Stuart M. Gordon, David Col- lins, and David