520bv$spin 07-19-99 16:17:24 UNITED STATES REPORTS 520 OCT. TERM 1996 520bv$titl 07-19-99 16:30:45 UNITED STATES REPORTS VOLUME 520 CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT AT OCTOBER TERM, 1996 March 3 Through June 18, 1997 FRANK D. WAGNER reporter of decisions WASHINGTON : 1999 Printed on Uncoated Permanent Printing Paper For sale by the U. S. Government Printing Office Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328 520BV$ Unit: $UII [08-03-99 17:13:58] PGT: FRT Erratum 503 U. S. 66, final line, to 67, first line: "87 Eng. 808, 816" should be "91 Eng. 19, 20". ii 520BV$ Unit: UIII [07-19-99 16:56:37] PGT: FRTBX m J USTICES of the SU PREM E COU RT during the time of these reports WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, Chief Justice. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, Associate Justice. SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, Associate Justice. ANTONIN SCALIA, Associate Justice. ANTHONY M. KENNEDY, Associate Justice. DAVID H. SOUTER, Associate Justice. CLARENCE THOMAS, Associate Justice. RUTH BADER GINSBURG, Associate Justice. STEPHEN BREYER, Associate Justice. retired LEWIS F. POWELL, Jr., Associate Justice. WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, Jr., Associate Justice. BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice. HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Associate Justice. officers of the court JANET RENO, Attorney General. WALTER DELLINGER, Acting Solicitor General. WILLIAM K. SUTER, Clerk. FRANK D. WAGNER, Reporter of Decisions. DALE E. BOSLEY, Marshal. SHELLEY L. DOWLING, Librarian. iii 520BV$ Unit: $UIV [07-19-99 17:00:27] PGT: FRTBX m SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Allotment of Justices It is ordered that the following allotment be made of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of this Court among the circuits, pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 42, and that such allotment be entered of record, effective September 30, 1994, viz.: For the District of Columbia Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice. For the First Circuit, David H. Souter, Associate Justice. For the Second Circuit, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate Justice. For the Third Circuit, David H. Souter, Associate Justice. For the Fourth Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice. For the Fifth Circuit, Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice. For the Sixth Circuit, John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice. For the Seventh Circuit, John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice. For the Eighth Circuit, Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice. For the Ninth Circuit, Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice. For the Tenth Circuit, Stephen Breyer, Associate Justice. For the Eleventh Circuit, Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice. For the Federal Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice. September 30, 1994. (For next previous allotment, and modifications, see 502 U. S., p. vi, 509 U. S., p. v, and 512 U. S., p. v.) iv Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Note: All undesignated references herein to the United States Code are to the 1994 edition. Cases reported before page 1101 are those decided with opinions of the Court or decisions per curiam. Cases reported on page 1101 et seq. are those in which orders were entered. Page A.; Barry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 A. v. Giuliani . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 AAF-McQuay, Inc.; Burns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Abdul-Salaam v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Abele v. Swigert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Abellan v. Fairmont Hotel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Abernathy v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Abidekun v. New York City Dept. of Housing Preserv. and Dev. 1241 ABN­AMRO Bank, N. A.; Red Rock Commodities, Ltd. v. . . . . . 1166 Acker; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Acker; Jefferson County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261 Adams v. Duncan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Adams v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Adams v. Robertson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 Adams v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180,1253 Adams County Detention Facility; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Adkins v. Gilmore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Adkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Administracion Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (Antel) v. New Valley Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc.; Hess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am. v. Applied Materials . . . 1230 Aetna Health Plans of California, Inc. v. Ardary . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co.; Stanescu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Agcaoili v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159,1249 Agency for Health Care Admin.; Associated Industries of Fla. v. 1115 Agostini v. Felton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141,1154 Aguilar-Higuerra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Aguilos; McNeil v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Ahern v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 v Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR vi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Ainsworth v. State Bar of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172,1271 Aircraft Braking Systems Corp. v. Automobile Workers . . . . . . . 1143 Airmont v. LeBlanc-Sternberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Akamiokhor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Akins; Federal Election Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Akpaeti v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Akujorobi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Alabama; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Alabama; Felder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Alabama; Hays v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Alabama; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Alabama; Knotts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Alabama; Payne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Alabama; Thornton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Alabama; Windsor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Alabama Aviation and Technical College; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Alabama Dept. of Human Resources; Bonner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Alamance County; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Alaska Bar Assn.; Triem v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Albertson's, Inc.; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Albright; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195,1208 Albuquerque Bd. of Ed.; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Alessi v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Alexander, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209,1284 Alexander v. Prewitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Alexander; Prince George's County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Alexander v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128,1160 Alford v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Algernon Blair, Inc. v. Walters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Al-Hakim v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Ali v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Allah v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Allbright v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Allen, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Allen v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Allen v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Allen v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Allen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202,1281 Allen v. Westwinds Apartments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Alliance Against IFQs v. Secretary of Commerce . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Allstate Ins. Co.; Sharp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Hibma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1282 Almendarez-Torres v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED vii Page Alpha Therapeutic Corp.; Madanat v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Alston v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Altschul v. Logue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Altschul v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177,1244,1245 Alvarado Orozco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Alvarez Ramirez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Ambrosini; Upjohn Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 American Breeders Service; Pickett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 American Broadcasting Cos. v. Lundell Mfg. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 American Civil Liberties Union; Reno v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102,1113 American Civil Liberties Union of N. J.; Schundler v. . . . . . . . . . 1265 American Express Travel Related Services Co.; Hashemi v. . . . . 1230 American National Red Cross; HealthSouth Rehab. Hosp. v. . . . . 1264 American Public Gas Assn. v. FERC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 American Red Cross Blood Servs.; HealthSouth Rehab. Hosp. v. 1264 American Savings Bank; Kabakow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 American States Ins. Co.; Labour v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 American Telephone & Telegraph Co.; Arthur A. Collins, Inc. v. . . 1193 Ames Department Stores, Inc.; Finks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Amoco Production Co. v. Public Service Co. of Colo. . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Amoco Production Co.; Williams Natural Gas Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Amtex, Inc.; Bonnell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Amtrak National Railroad Passenger Corp.; Carter v. . . . . . . . . 1213 Anaheim v. California Credit Union League . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261 Anchorage; Area G Home & Landowners Organization, Inc. v. . . 1211 Anderson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Anderson v. Clow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Anderson v. Holifield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Anderson v. Las Vegas Tribe of Paiute Indians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Anderson; Monroe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Anderson; Noe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256,1267 Anderson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109,1194 Anderson; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Andrews; Edwards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Andrews Federal Credit Union; McCrea v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Anesthesia Partners, Inc.; Healow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Angelone; Buchanan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163,1196,1227 Angelone; Fett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Angelone; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Animashaum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Antonelli v. Fugett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Antonio Perez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 A­1 Contractors; Strate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 438 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR viii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page A. O. Smith Corp.; Klehr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142,1154 Applied Materials; Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am. v. . . . 1230 Aramony v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Aranda-Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Arbeiter v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Ardary; Aetna Health Plans of Cal., Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Ardary; Inland Healthcare Group v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Area G Home & Landowners Organization, Inc. v. Anchorage . . . 1211 Argent Chemical Laboratories, Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Arias v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Arigoni v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Arizona; Arizonans for Official English v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43,1141 Arizona; Doody v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Arizona; Dunlap v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Arizona; Jewitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Arizona; Martinez-Villareal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Arizona v. Mendoza Duarte . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Arizona; Molina Lopez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Arizona; Mott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Arizona; Oberuch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Arizona; Porter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Arizona v. Richcreek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Arizona; Soto-Fong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Arizona; Stapley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Arizona; Thornton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Arizona; Tripati v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43,1141 Arkansas; Echols v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Arkansas v. Farm Credit Services of Central Ark. . . . . . . . . . . 821,1154 Arkansas; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Arkansas; Mullinax v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Arkansas; Ugwu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Arkansas Ed. Television Comm'n v. Forbes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Arkansas Regional Blood Service; Pledger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Armstrong; Calder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Armstrong v. Executive Office of President . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Armstrong; Mazurek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Arneson Products, Inc.; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Arnold v. Board of Comm'rs of Effingham County . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Aroostock Medical Center; Benjamin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Arroyo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Arteaga v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Arteaga v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Sixth Appellate Dist. . . . . . . 1233 Arteaga v. Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED ix Page Arteaga v. Superior Court of Cal., Santa Clara County . . . . . . . . 1233 Arteaga v. U. S. Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Arthur A. Collins, Inc. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. . . . 1193 Artis v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Artuz; Barrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Artuz; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190,1283 Artuz; Dingle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Asam v. Devereaux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Asam v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Asam v. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Ashing v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Ashmore; Morewitz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120,1225 Ashton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Asonye v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Associated Industries of Fla. v. Agency for Health Care Admin. 1115 Associated Press, Inc.; Newman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953,1141,1163 Associate Tribal Judge v. A­1 Contractors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 438 Association. For labor union, see name of trade. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co.; Inter-Modal Rail Employees Assn. v. 510,1102 Atkins, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Atkins v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Atkinson-Kiewit, J/V; Morehead v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Atlantic Coast Life Ins. Co. v. Shaw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Atlas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Atlas Turner, Inc. v. Straub . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 AT&T Communications, Inc.; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Attorney General v. American Civil Liberties Union . . . . . . . 1102,1113 Attorney General v. Bossier Parish School Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471,1164 Attorney General; Gaither v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Attorney General; Spice Entertainment Cos. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Attorney General; Terry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Attorney General of Cal.; Crawford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Attorney General of Cal.; Stevenson-Bey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Attorney General of N. C.; Harrington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Attorney General of Tex.; Pugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Attorney General of Va.; Adkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Ault; Sisco v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Ault; Thongvanh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Auriemma, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112,1261 Auten Electric, Inc. v. Berry Construction, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Automobile Workers; Aircraft Braking Systems Corp. v. . . . . . . . 1143 Avery; Evans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR x TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Avnet, Inc.; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 A & W Investors Group, Inc.; Markson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Ayala; Speckard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Aybar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270 Azubuko v. Board of Directors, British Airways . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Azubuko v. Board of Trustees, Framingham State College . . . . . 1193 Azubuko v. First National Bank of Boston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127,1205 Azubuko v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Azubuko v. Montgomery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106,1225 Azubuko v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157,1225 Baba v. 1133 Building Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Baba v. Evans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Babbitt; Murray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187,1259 Babcock & Wilcox Co.; Clements v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Babigian v. Rehnquist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Badley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Badru v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Baheth v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117,1224 Baheth v. Regions Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117,1224 Bailey; Nagle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Bailey v. Turner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Bailey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Bain v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Bajakajian; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Baker v. General Motors Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Baker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179,1220,1222 Baker, Inc.; Maxwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Bakery Workers; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143,1225 Baldree v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Baldwin v. George . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Baldwin; McKinney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Balisok; Edwards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 641 Ball v. Booker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Ball v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Ballard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Ballistrea v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Ballod v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Bank of Boston Corp.; Kamilewicz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Bank of N. Y.; Elison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Banks v. Randolph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Banks v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Banks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1282 Barakat v. Life Ins. Co. of Va. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143,1225 Baramdyka v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xi Page Barbara v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Barbour; Harrison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Barbour; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Barcella v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Bardin v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Baris; Caltex Petroleum Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Baris; Steamship Mut. Underwriting Assn. (Bermuda) Ltd. v. . . . . 1168 Barkley Seed, Inc. v. Botelho Shipping Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Barlow v. Herron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Barlow v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Barnabei v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Barnes v. Pierpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Barnes; Shelton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Barnes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Barnett; Devin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Barnett; Hickmon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Barnett v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Barnett Bank of Central Fla., N. A.; Mulligan v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1106,1194 Barrett v. Artuz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Barrett v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Barrick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Barrios; Cohea v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Barry; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Barry v. LaShawn A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Bartlett; Glenn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Bartlett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Bascue v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Basey v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 BASF Corp.; Parsons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Basic Energy Corp. v. Chiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Baskin v. Bath Township Bd. of Zoning Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Bast v. Glasberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Bast v. U. S. Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Bates v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114,1253 Bath Township Bd. of Zoning Appeals; Baskin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Baticados v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Batson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Battle; Saffle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Bautista de la Cruz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pens. Tr. v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal. 1209 Baybank, FSB; Gangi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Baylor; Duncan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Bean; Calderon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Beard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR xii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Beards v. Bible Way Church of Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Beasley v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Beasley; Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Committee v. . . . 1166 Beasley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Beaty v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Beck; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Beeman v. Cohen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Begier v. Begier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Behringer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1272 Behringer v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1260 Beiswenger Enterprises Corp. v. Carletta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Belcher v. Lesley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Beldotti v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Bell v. DiMario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Bell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220,1281 Bell v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Bell Atlantic-New Jersey, Inc.; Vrettos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Beller v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Belton v. Department of Veterans Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Belton v. Dow Chemical Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Beltran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Bemis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Bendet, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184,1272 Benjamin v. Aroostock Medical Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Bennallack v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Bennett v. Spear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 Bentley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Bentsen v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Berard v. Gorczyk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Berger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Bergne v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Bermudez-Reyes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Bernard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Bernys v. Wing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244,1268 Berry Construction, Inc.; Floyd Auten Electric, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . 1265 Bery; New York City v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Betancourt-Arestuche v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Bethley v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1259 Bexar County Tax Office; Crawford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Beyong Chul Choi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Bianchi v. Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Bible Way Church of Jesus Christ of Washington; Beards v. . . . . 1155 Bickel; Korean Air Lines Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xiii Page Billy-Eko v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Bingman v. Ward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Bishop v. Bishop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Bishop v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Bisson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 Bizberg-Gogol v. Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Black v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113,1149,1151 Blackburn; Craig v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Blackburn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Blair v. Calderon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Blair, Inc. v. Walters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Blandino v. Lippold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Blessing v. Freestone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329 Block v. Wilkinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Blouin v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Board of Comm'rs of Effingham County; Arnold v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown . . . . . . . 397,1283 Board of Directors, British Airways; Azubuko v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Board of Ed. of Chattanooga; Rowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Board of Ed. of Downers Grove School Dist. 58; Steven L. v. . . . 1113,1198 Board of Governors of Univ. of N. C.; Viswanathan v. . . . . . . . 1115,1271 Board of Trustees, Framingham State College; Azubuko v. . . . . . 1193 Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill.; Smart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Board to Determine Fitness of Bar App., Sup. Ct. of Ga.; Newton v. 1283 Boehme, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153,1262 Bogan v. Scott-Harris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Boggs v. Boggs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,1101 Boles; Stanley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Boliek v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Bonaccorso; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Bonds v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Bonnell v. Amtex, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Bonner, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102,1194 Bonner v. Alabama Dept. of Human Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Bonsey; DiCicco v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187,1283 Bonsignore; Overfield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Bonta v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Booker; Ball v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Booker v. Worsham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Boone; Lowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Boone; Lynch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Boone; Wiford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Borg; St. Joseph v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Borg & Warner Auto Elec. & Mech. Systems Corp.; Williams v. . . . 1153 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR xiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Borkowski v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 Borough. See name of borough. Bossier Parish School Bd.; Price v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471,1164 Bossier Parish School Bd.; Reno v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471,1164 Botelho Shipping Corp.; Barkley Seed, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Botelho Shipping Corp.; Pacific Southwest Seed & Grain, Inc. v. . . . 1211 Bouie v. Peterson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Boulineau v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Bowen; St. Petersburg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Bowen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Bowers v. Saturn General Motors Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170,1283 Bowersox; Abernathy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Bowersox; Boliek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Bowersox; Feltrop v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Bowersox; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Bowersox; McCauley-Bey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Bowersox; Parker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Bowersox; Reese v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Bowersox; Six v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Bowler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Bowman v. Gammon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Boyd v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Boyer; Fitzpatrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Boykins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Boyle, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184,1272 Boyle v. Colorado Bd. of Medical Examiners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Bracey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Bracy v. Gramley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Bradley v. First Gibraltar Bank, FSB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Bradshaw v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Brancato v. Fischer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Branch v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Branch v. Tower Air, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Branch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Branch Banking & Trust Co.; McLemore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Brandenburg v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Brandt v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Brandt v. First Union Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Brasten v. Zindell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Brayall v. Dart Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123,1225 Breedlove v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Brekke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Brewer v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Brewster v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xv Page Bridges; Yourdon, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Bridget and Lucy R.; Dry Creek Rancheria v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Bridgewater v. Hardison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Brigano; Rhodes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Britt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 Britton; Crawford-El v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Britz v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Broadbelt, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Brock v. Caterpillar, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Brock v. Unknown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Brogan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Brooklyn Developmental Center; Tadros v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Brooks v. Sheppard Air Force Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Brother Records, Inc.; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Broussard v. Burkett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Broussard v. Evans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Broward County; Burick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Broward County; Kuchinskas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Brown; Agcaoili v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159,1249 Brown v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Brown; Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. . . . . . . . 397,1283 Brown v. Bonaccorso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Brown v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194,1195 Brown; McRae v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Brown; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Brown v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Brown; Richards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Brown; Schwarz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Brown v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Brown v. Turpin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Brown v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179,1236 Brown Univ. v. Cohen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Bruce v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Bruff; Nowicki v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Brumfield v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Bryan v. East Stroudsburg Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Bryan; Russell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Bryan Independent School Dist.; J. W. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Buchanan v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163,1196,1227 Buchler; Vines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Buell v. Gelman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Bueno-Sierra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Buford v. James T. Strickland Youth Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Buggs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR xvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Bulson; Burnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Bumpass v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Bunnell v. Shell Oil Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Burchill v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Burdex v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Bureau of Prisons; Merritt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Bureau Veritas v. Carbotrade S. p. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Burgess v. Easley Municipal Election Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Burick v. Broward County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Burkett; Broussard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Burks; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Burks v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Co. v. FERC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Burnett v. Bulson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Burnett v. Chippewa County Bar Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Burnett v. Chippewa County Sheriff's Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Burnett v. Eastern Upper Peninsula Mental Health Center . . 1172,1283 Burnett v. Riggle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Burnett v. Willette . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126,1225 Burns v. AAF-McQuay, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Burns; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Burns; Simmons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Burrill; Grace v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Burton v. Burton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Bush v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Buss v. Painesville Township . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Bustamante v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129,1225 Buster v. Thomas, Head & Greisen Employees Trust . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Butler; Home Depot U. S. A., Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Butler v. Merchants Bank & Trust Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176,1283 Butler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Byrd; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Byrd; Raines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Byrd; Stone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Cablevision Systems; Glendora v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Caesar's Tahoe, Inc.; Lurie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Caffrey v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109,1194 Cain; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194,1195 Cain; Goins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Cain; Howard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Cain; James v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Cain; Muse v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Cain; Pizzo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190,1260 Cain; Trest v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xvii Page Cain; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Cain; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Cajina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Calamia v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Calder v. Armstrong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Calderon, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Calderon v. Bean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Calderon; Blair v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Calderon; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1259 Caldwell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 California; Allah v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 California; Arias v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 California; Arteaga v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 California; Edelbacher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 California; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 California; Hart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 California; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 California; Madrid v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 California; Marshall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 California; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 California v. Opuku-Boateng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 California; Pallan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 California; Peck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 California; Powell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 California; Seward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 California; Stephen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 California; Sweeney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 California; Warren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 California; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 California Committee of Bar Examiners; Harrington v. . . . . . . . . 1106 California Credit Union League; Anaheim v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261 California Dept. of Water Resources Control Bd.; Etemad v. . . . . 1255 California Franchise Tax Bd. v. MacFarlane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 California Labor Comm'r; Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. . . . 1248 Califorrniaa v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Callins, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Callum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 Caltex Petroleum Corp. v. Baris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Calvert, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262 Campbell v. Towse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Campbell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179,1242 Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Harrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 564 Canady; Wronke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR xviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Cannon v. Simms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Cannon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Canseco; Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal. v. 1118 Canutillo Independent School Dist.; Leija v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Carbotrade S. p. A.; Bureau Veritas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Cardenas Cuellar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Cardwell v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Carey v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Cargill, Inc. v. Parsley Dairy Farm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Cargill, Inc.; Parsley Dairy Farm v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Cargle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Carlen v. Department of Health Services of Suffolk County . . . . . 1166 Carletta; Beiswenger Enterprises Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Carlson v. Kristi Micander, P. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Carman v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Carner v. Townsend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Carpenter; San Francisco v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Carpenter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130,1266 Carpenters Northern Cal. Jt. Apprenticeship Comm. v. Eldredge . 1187 Carr v. Raney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Carrasco Ramos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Carraway v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Carrington v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Carroll v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Carson v. Coast Village Property Owners Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Carson v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Carter v. Amtrak National Railroad Passenger Corp. . . . . . . . . . 1213 Carter v. Artuz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190,1283 Carter v. Hopkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Carter v. Neustrup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Carter v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Carter v. Siegler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Carter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193,1228 Caspari; Howard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Caspari; Mack v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Casteel v. Pieschek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Castillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Castro, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261 Castro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 CAT Contracting, Inc. v. Insituform Technologies, Inc. . . . . . . . . 1198 Caterpillar, Inc.; Brock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Catz v. Chalker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Catz v. McDonald . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Caudle v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xix Page Causey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 CEDC Federal Credit Union v. National Credit Union Admin. 1165 C. E. Fleming Corp.; Nagi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 CEMEX, S. A. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Cessna Aircraft Co.; Farley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Chalet v. Morton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Chalker; Catz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Chambers v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Chambers County Comm'n; Swint v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Chamorro-Torres v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . 1103 Champion; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Chancellor, Bd. of Ed. of New York City v. Felton . . . . . . . . . 1142,1154 Chandler v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Chandler v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305 Chandler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Chapleau; Huff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Chapman; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Charles Schwab & Co.; Guice v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Charlotte; Moffitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Charlotte v. Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Charlotte; Price v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Charm v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Chater; Forsman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Chater; Holt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Chater; Leal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130,1225 Chater; Lohse v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Chater; Seeger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Chater; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Chater; Swaney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Chater; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Chater; Wall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Chatriand v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Chavez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Chen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Cherry v. Rocking Horse Ridge Estates Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Chesney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1282 Chicago v. International College of Surgeons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Chicago; Leahy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Chicago; Van Harken v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Chicago Tribune Co.; Daily Herald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Chicago Tribune Co.; Paddock Publications, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Chief Judge, Court of Appeals of Mo., Western Dist.; Tyler v. . . . 1188 Chief Judge, Court of Appeals of N. Y.; McReynolds v. . . . . . . . . 1254 Chief Justice of U. S.; Babigian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR xx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Childress v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270 Chiles; Basic Energy Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Chin v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Chippewa County Bar Assn.; Burnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Chippewa County Sheriff's Dept.; Burnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Chiquito v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Choi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Chong v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Cho Ng v. Quiet Forest II Homeowners Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106,1193 Chorney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Chris L.; Morgan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1271 Christensen v. Griffes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Chubb Life Ins. Co. of America; Colford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Chul Choi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Chun; Wong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Churn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Cianchetti; Zaragoza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 CIGNA HealthCare of Conn., Inc. v. Napoletano . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Cincinnati Enquirer v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Cisneros v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 Citibank, F. S. B.; Veale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114,1198 City. See name of city. Civil Service Comm'n of Los Angeles County; Dobos v. . . . . . . . . 1159 Clark v. Burns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Clark v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1259 Clark v. Hermosa Beach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Clark v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Clark v. LeCureux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Clark v. Sikes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Clark; Texas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Clark v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133,1178,1271 Clarke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Clay v. Council of District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Clayton v. Clayton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Clayton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Clement v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Clements v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Clemons v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Clemy P. v. Montgomery County Dept. of Social Services . . . . . . 1267 Cleveland Heights; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Cliff v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Clinton; Califorrniaa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Clinton v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 681 Clinton; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1283 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxi Page Clinton; Schwarz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Clinton; Tavakoli-Nouri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Clinton; Vey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Clorox Co. v. Haile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Clovis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Clow; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Coast Village Property Owners Corp.; Carson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Cobb v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270 Cocivera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Cockrell v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Coffman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Coggins/Continental Granite Co.; Tucker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Cohea v. Barrios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Cohea v. Mueller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Cohea v. State Bar of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Cohea v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199,1243 Cohen; Beeman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Cohen; Brown Univ. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Cohen v. Sarpy County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Cohen; Selland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Cohen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Coker v. Douglas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Cole v. Dickman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Cole v. Huntsville Memorial Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Cole v. Irvin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Cole; Marchman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Coleman v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Coleman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220,1234 Colford v. Chubb Life Ins. Co. of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Collagen Corp. v. Green . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 College Station Independent School Dist.; Shinn v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Colley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270 Colligan v. Trans World Airlines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Collins v. Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Collins v. Welborn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1272 Collins, Inc. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Collyer v. Darling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Colonel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Colony of Stone Mountain; Hargrove v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190,1283 Colorado; Lorenz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Colorado v. Sanchez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Colorado; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261 Colorado; Sullivan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Colorado Bd. of Medical Examiners; Boyle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:03] PGT: TCR xxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Columbia Correctional Institution; Frederick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Commissioner; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Commissioner; Cuong Duy Nguyen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Commissioner v. D'Ambrosio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Commissioner v. Hubert's Estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Commissioner; Karim-Panahi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Commissioner; Standifird v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Commissioner v. Texaco Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Commissioner of Internal Revenue. See Commissioner. Commission on Civil Rights; Schwarz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Commonwealth. See name of Commonwealth. Comsource Independent Food Service Cos.; Union Pacific R. Co. v. 1229 Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Indian Reserv. v. Washington . . 1168 Conley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Connecticut; Kiser v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Connecticut; Phidd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Connecticut; Sundwall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Connecticut Statewide Grievance Committee; Kucej v. . . . . . . . . 1276 Connell v. Douglass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Consolidated Rail Corp.; Eckles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Constant, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Construction Ind. Training Coun. of Wash. v. Seattle Bldg. Coun. 1210 Construction Laborers Pens. Tr. for Southern Cal. v. Canseco . . . 1118 Conte v. Joe Conte Toyota, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Conte Toyota, Inc.; Conte v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Continental Ins. Co.; Lords Landing Village Condo. Council v. . . 893 Continental Trend Resources, Inc. v. OXY USA Inc. . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Contra Costa County; Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Contreras v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 C. O. N. T. R. O. L. v. Neilsen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Cook v. Crogan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Cook v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Cooke v. Dinapoli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Cooley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Cooper v. Gammon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202,1284 Cooper v. Malone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Cooper v. Missouri Parole Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Cooper; Scanlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Cornett v. Longois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Cornforth v. Howard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Cornish v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Corrections Commissioner. See name of commissioner. Correia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Cosby; Isles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxiii Page Cosentino v. Kelly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Cottman Transmission Systems, Inc.; Rosati v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Cottrell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Cottrill v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Coulter v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Council of District of Columbia; Clay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Countryman; Song v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 County. See name of county. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co.; Schroering v. . . . . . . . . . 1118 Courtney v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Court of Appeal of Cal., Sixth Appellate Dist.; Arteaga v. . . . . . . 1233 Court of Appeals. See U. S. Court of Appeals. Court of Common Pleas for Sumter County, S. C.; James v. . . . . . 1245 Covelli v. Crystal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Cox v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Coyne; Jae v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Craig v. Blackburn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Craig v. Lee Rosenbaum & Associates, P. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Craig v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Crane v. Olsten Staffing Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Craven v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Crawford v. Bexar County Tax Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Crawford v. Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126,1249 Crawford v. Lungren . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Crawford v. Martin-Marietta Technologies, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Crawford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Crawford-El v. Britton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Creager; MacKenzie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Creecy; Wambach v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Cribb; Paul v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Crite v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Crogan; Cook v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Crosby v. Hospital Authority of Valdosta and Lowndes County . . 1116 Crosby v. Mazurkiewicz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Crosby v. South Ga. Medical Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Cross v. Cross . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Crotts v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Crowe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Crown Clothing Corp.; Speen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Crutcher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Cryo-Trans, Inc. v. General American Transportation Corp. . . . . 1155 Crystal; Covelli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 CSC Credit Services, Inc.; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Sirbaugh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Cuartas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Cuellar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Culp v. Hood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Cummings-El v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Cunningham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179,1192 Cuong Duy Nguyen v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Curry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Curtis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Cuyahoga County; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Cvijanovic v. Loral Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Cypress; Martineau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Cypress Semiconductor Corp.; Texas Instruments Inc. v. . . . . . . . 1228 Cyrk Inc.; Freestyle U. S. A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Cyrk Inc.; Sunburst Products, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Czerkies v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Daily Herald v. Chicago Tribune Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust; Gill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Dallas Area Rapid Transit; Tolbert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Dallas Bd. of Adjustments; Mattox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 D'Ambrosio; Commissioner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 D'Ambrosio v. Shoppers Food Warehouse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 D'Amelia v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Dancer v. Merit Systems Protection Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Dangerfield v. Star Editorial, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Daniel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1272 Daniell v. Old Line Life Ins. Co. of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Daniels v. Kansas City Southern R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Daniels v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Danville v. Kentucky River Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Darden; Vann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Darden, III; Tatum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Darling; Collyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Dart Industries; Brayall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123,1225 Darwall v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 David v. Mosley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 David v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Davis v. AT&T Communications, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Davis v. Burks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Davis v. Hanover Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104,1182 Davis v. Hudgins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Davis v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Davis v. Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Davis; Pringle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Davis v. Service Employees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119,1225 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxv Page Davis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129,1161,1258 Davis v. Wonderland Greyhound Park, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Davis v. Zavaras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Davison, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Davis Publishing Co.; Von Grabe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Daws v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Dawson; Huck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Dawson v. Richmond Heights Local School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Day v. Painter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107,1194 Day v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 DeBose; Bear Valley Church of Christ v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 DeBose; Wolfe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Debowale v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 De Buono v. NYSA­ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund . . . 806 Deep Sea Research, Inc.; California v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Deere Co.; Midcon Equipment Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Deere Co.; Taylor Equipment, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 DeGerolamo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Dehaene; De Wiest v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 DeHart & Son, Inc.; Totoro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Delano; Goodroad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Delaware; Artis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Delaware; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 DelCourt v. Silverman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213,1283 Delespine, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Del Junco; Goehring v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Delk v. Ford Motor Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 DeLone v. Morris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 DeMorales; Rosenbalm v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Dempsey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Denker, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113,1207 Denman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Denmark; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Denouden v. University of Wash. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Denver v. Sonnenfeld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Department of Ed.; Tucker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Department of Health Services of Suffolk County; Carlen v. . . . . 1166 Department of Interior; Grijalva v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Department of Interior; Owens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Department of Interior; Tobie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124,1237 Department of Justice; Schwarz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216,1283 Department of Justice; Tin Yat Chin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Department of Justice; Weaver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Department of Revenue of Wash.; Digital Equipment Corp. v. . . . 1273 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Department of State; Lidman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124,1283 Department of Veterans Affairs; Belton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Despain v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 DeTella; Henderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 DeTella; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 DeTella; Willis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202,1284 Detroit Pension Fund v. Prudential Securities, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Dever v. Turner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Devereaux; Asam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Devin v. Barnett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Devine v. Stone, Leyton & Gershman, P. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 De Wiest v. Dehaene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 DeWitte v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Dexter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Diallo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Diaz v. Mitchell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Diaz; Sheppard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 DiCicco v. Bonsey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187,1283 Dickerson v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Dickerson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Dickey v. Hartsville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Dickman; Cole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Dickson Supply Co.; El-Badrawi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Dies v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Diggs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1282 DiGiovanni v. Traylor Brothers, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Digital Equipment Corp. v. Department of Revenue of Wash. . . . 1273 Dillon; Lagana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Dillon; Ragusa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 DiMario; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Dimensions Medical Center v. Illinois Health Planning Bd. . . . . . 1169 Dime Savings Bank of N. Y.; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122,1225 Dinapoli; Cooke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Dingle v. Artuz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Director, Central Intelligence Agency; Stahl v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Director, OWCP; Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Director, OWCP; Stevedoring Services of America v. . . . . . . 1155,1250 Director of penal or correctional institution. See name or title of director. DiSanto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Disney Co.; Howard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189,1237 District Court. See U. S. District Court. District Judge. See U. S. District Judge. District of Columbia; Bonds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxvii Page District of Columbia; Milton S. Kronheim & Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 District of Columbia; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 District of Columbia; Women Prisoners, D. C. Dept. of Corr. v. . . 1196 District of Columbia Dept. of Human Services; McKinley v. . . . . . 1108 District of Columbia Rental Housing Comm'n; Slaby v. . . . . . . . . 1190 Dittrich v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Divers; Louisiana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Dobos v. Civil Service Comm'n of Los Angeles County . . . . . . . . 1159 Dobyns v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Dockett v. Hofbauer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Dodd v. Oliver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125,1249 Dodson v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Doe; D'Amelia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Doe; Sikora v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Doggins v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Doherty v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Dolan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Dolsky; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Dominguez v. Henry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Dominguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Donnellon, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Doody v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Dorf & Stanton Communications, Inc. v. Molson Breweries . . . . . 1275 Dorsey; Marquez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Dorsey; Ontiveros v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Dortch v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Dostert v. Supreme Court of Appeals of W. Va. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Douglas; Coker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Douglas v. Sylvester . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Douglas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Douglass; Connell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Dow Chemical Co.; Belton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Downey v. Krempin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201,1284 Drake; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Drinkard v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Drobny v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Drug Enforcement Agency; Gant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178,1260 Drummond v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Dry Creek Rancheria v. Bridget and Lucy R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 DSM Copolymer, Inc.; Spears v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Duarte; Arizona v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Dudley v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Duffey v. Hartman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Dunbar v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Duncan; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Duncan v. Baylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Duncan; Samuel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157,1283 Duncan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Dunlap v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Dunn; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Du Pont de Nemours & Co.; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1259 Dupree; Mundy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Durant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Durbin; Mothershed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Durham; Glover v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Durham v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Durham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213,1270 Durkin; Shea & Gould v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Durko; Glass Workers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Durko; OI­NEG TV Products, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Durst-Lee v. Merit Systems Protection Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Du Vall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104,1193 Duy Nguyen v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Dye v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Dye; Ponder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Dyer v. Stevens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Easley Municipal Election Comm'n; Burgess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Easter v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Easterday v. Gilbert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Eastern Upper Peninsula Mental Health Center; Burnett v. . 1172,1283 Easterwood v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 East Lyme; Meehan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 East Stroudsburg Univ.; Bryan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Eaton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Ebenhart v. Howard Community Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Echols, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153,1262 Echols v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Eckerson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Eddmonds v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Edelbacher v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Edmond v. Martin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Edmond v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 651 Edmonds v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Edmundson v. Keesler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Edwards v. Andrews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Edwards v. Balisok . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 641 Edwards; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxix Page Edwards v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170,1247 Eidson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1259 Einaugler v. Supreme Court of N. Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Elam v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 El-Badrawi v. Dickson Supply Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Eldredge; Carpenters Northern Cal. Jt. Apprenticeship Comm. v. 1187 Eldridge v. Quick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Eldridge Auto Sales, Inc. v. Purtle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 1133 Building Corp.; Baba v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Elison v. Bank of N. Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Elkins; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1282 Elliott v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Ellis, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Ellis v. Pinkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Ellison v. Forrest City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 El Muhammad v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Embrey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Emerick v. United Technologies Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Emerson v. Gilmore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Emerson; Gilmore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Emerson Electric Co.; Kahn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Emerson Electric Co. v. Karcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Emerson Electric Co.; Karcher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Emery v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Emhart Glass Machinery, Inc.; Schwartz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 England v. Stepanik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Englander v. Mills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 English v. Louisiana Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Entergy Operations, Inc.; Oubre v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Environmental Technology Council; South Carolina v. . . . . . . . . . 1113 En Vogue; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n; Reed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Ernst & Young v. Simpson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Ernst & Young LLP v. McGann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Escobar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Escobar-Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Escobar Velasquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 Espinoza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176,1180 Essex County; Graham-Weber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164,1242 Estate. See name of estate. Etemad v. California Dept. of Water Resources Control Bd. . . . . 1255 Evans v. Avery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Evans; Baba v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Evans; Broussard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Evans v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Everhart v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Executive Office of President; Armstrong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Exxon Corp.; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Ezeoke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Fadem; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Fairmont Hotel; Abellan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Falcon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Falconer v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Fanelli v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1271 Fankell; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Farcas, Stewart, Brownie, Handson & Bliss; Rivers v. . . . . . . . . . 1242 Farley v. Cessna Aircraft Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Farm Credit Services of Central Ark.; Arkansas v. . . . . . . . . . 821,1154 Farmer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Farmer v. McDaniel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Farmer v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Farmer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Farrell v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Farrow v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Farrugia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Fashina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Fatta v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Faunce; Risley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Faust v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Federal Bureau of Investigation; Bizberg-Gogol v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Federal Bureau of Investigation; Morales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Federal Bureau of Investigation; Zion v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 FCC; Ochoa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 FCC; Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Brandt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; First Security Bank v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Federal Election Comm'n v. Akins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Federal Election Comm'n; Hagelin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 FERC; American Public Gas Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 FERC; Associated Gas Distributors v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 FERC; Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 FERC; Imparato v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 FERC; Indicated Expansion Shippers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 FERC; New York Public Service Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Federal Express Corp.; Trustees of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund of Philadelphia and Vicinity v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Federal Ins. Co.; Vemco, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxi Page Federal Republic of Germany; Wolf v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Feichtinger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 Felder v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Feldman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Feltner v. MCA Television, Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Felton; Agostini v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141,1154 Felton; Chancellor, Bd. of Ed. of New York City v. . . . . . . . . 1142,1154 Feltrop v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Fennessey; Southwest Airlines Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Ferbar Corp. of Cal.; Bay Area Laundry Pension Trust v. . . . . . . 1209 Fernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Fernengel; Michigan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Ferrell v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123,1173 Ferret-Castellanos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Festo Corp.; Shoketsu Kinzoku Kabushiki Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Festo Corp.; SMC Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Fett v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Fett v. Morris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Fidel v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. v. Fink . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Fidis v. Lakeside Medical Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Fielder; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Fields; Lowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Fields v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Fierro Ruiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Figueroa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Finalco, Inc. v. Roosevelt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Finberg v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. of Pa. . . . . . . . . 1123 Fink; Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Finks v. Ames Department Stores, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Finnerty; Paladin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Fiore, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 First Bancorp of La., Inc.; Silmon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 First Federal Savings Bank; Hualde-Redin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 First Gibraltar Bank, FSB; Bradley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 First National Bank of Boston; Azubuko v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127,1205 First National Bank of Centre Hall; Huff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 First Security Bank v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 First Union Corp.; Brandt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 First Union National Bank of Fla.; Staup v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Fischer; Brancato v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Fischer v. Philadelphia Electric Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Fisher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Fitzgerald v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145,1214 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Fitzgerald v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Fitzpatrick v. Boyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Fjetland v. Lone Star Northwest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Fleet National Bank; H & D Entertainment, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Fleming v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151,1169 Fleming Corp.; Nagi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Fletcher v. Harrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Fletcher v. Schindler Elevator Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174,1260 Fletcher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Fletcher Pacific Construction Co.; Milnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Flint v. Middleton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Flores v. FMC Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120,1225 Florida; Al-Hakim v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Florida; Branch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Florida; Cummings-El v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Florida; Ferrell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123,1173 Florida; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Florida; Lark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Florida; McDonald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Florida; Medina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Florida; Mundy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Florida; Olsen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Florida; O'Neill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Florida; Sims v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Florida; Vidal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Florida; Wilkinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Florida; Williamson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Florida Bar; Glant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Florida Bar; Nunes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Florida Power & Light Co.; Hover v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Florio v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Flowers v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Floyd Auten Electric, Inc. v. Berry Construction, Inc. . . . . . . . . . 1265 FMC Corp.; Flores v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120,1225 Fogie; THORN Americas, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Foltice v. Guardsman Products, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Forbes; Arkansas Ed. Television Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Ford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Ford v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Fordice; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273 Ford Motor Co.; Delk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Forest, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 Forest Industries Ins. Exchange; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Formica v. Huntington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxiii Page Forrest City; Ellison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Forsman v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Fort v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Fort Stewart Assn. of Educators v. Weston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Foster v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Foster v. Giant Food, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Foster v. Love . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Foster v. Old Town Trolley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Foster v. Southfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Foster v. U. S. Marshals Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Foster v. Wolf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Fountain v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 Fowler; South Carolina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Fox v. Love . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Fox v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Frank; Yount v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Franklin v. Hiser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Franklin v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Franklin Homes, Inc.; Hines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Franks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179,1249 Frederick v. Columbia Correctional Institution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Freeman; West American Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Freeman v. Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Freestone; Blessing v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329 Freestyle U. S. A. v. Cyrk Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Freisinger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270 French v. Pepe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Fresh Fields Market, Inc.; Levy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Friedman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141,1207 Frieze, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Frost v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Frye, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184,1272 Fuch; Oliver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Fu Chen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Fuentes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Fugett; Antonelli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Fulbright v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Fulfree v. Manchester . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Fullwood v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Furukawa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Fuszek; Royal King Fisheries v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Futo; Missouri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Futterman v. Nasset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Gaither v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Gale; Trowery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Gales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Gallagher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Gallardo, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Gallares v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Gallego; Madril v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Gallego v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Galvan v. Hurley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Gammon; Bowman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Gammon; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202,1284 Gangel-Jacob; McReynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173,1260 Gangi v. Baybank, FSB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Gant v. Drug Enforcement Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178,1260 Garcia v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Garcia v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Garin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Garner v. Pennington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Garner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Garner v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Garner Food Services, Inc.; Wood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Garrett v. Moore McCormack Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Gary v. Turpin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Garza v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Garza-Nevarez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Gates; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243,1278 Gates v. San Luis Obispo County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Gates v. Shinn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Gates v. Trevino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Gates; Trevino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Gauthier v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Gay; Wafer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Gelb, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Gelis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Gelman; Buell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 General Accounting Office; Singh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 General American Transportation Corp.; Cryo-Trans, Inc. v. . . . . 1155 General Electric Co. v. Joiner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 General Motors Corp.; Baker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 General Motors Corp.; Kearns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Genins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 George; Baldwin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 George v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Georgetown Univ.; Ward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxv Page Georgia; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Georgia; Posey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Gerald v. Morton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Germany; Wolf v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Geske & Sons, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Gethers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Giacomel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Giant Food, Inc.; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Gibbons; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Gibbs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Gibson; Lowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Giebel v. Montana System of Higher Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Gilbert; Easterday v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Gilbert v. Homar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924,1102,1113 Gill v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Gillespie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Gilliam v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Gillis; Spruill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Gilmore; Adkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Gilmore v. Emerson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Gilmore; Emerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Giorgio v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Girard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Giseburt v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Giuliani; Marisol A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Givner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Glant v. Florida Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Glasberg; Bast v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Glass Workers v. Durko . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Glaze; Grooms v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Glendora v. Cablevision Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Glendora v. Hostetter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Glenn v. Bartlett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Glickman; Worthington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Global Marine Drilling Co.; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Glock v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Glover v. Durham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Glover v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Godwin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Goehring v. Del Junco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Goff; Ohio Assn. of Independent Schools v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Goff v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Goggins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Goins v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Goins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Golden v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Golden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Goldy v. Morton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Gomes v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Gomez; Ali v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Gomez; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Gomez; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Gomez; Nettles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Gomez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Gomez; Wells v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Gonzales v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Gonzales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Gonzales; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Gonzalez v. Kuhlmann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Gonzalez-Quezada v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 Goodroad v. Delano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.; Tumlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Goonewardena v. University of Minn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Goord; Le Grand v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Goord; Levine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Goosbly; Hopper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Gorczyk; Berard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Gorham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Gotcher; Wood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Gould; Jensen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Goulding v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Governing Bd. of Marin Community College Dist.; Jordan v. . . . . 1143 Government of Virgin Islands; Hollar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Governor of Cal.; Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Governor of Cal. v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Governor of Colo.; Pastorius v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Governor of Fla.; Basic Energy Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Governor of Ga.; Chandler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305 Governor of La. v. Love . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Governor of N. J.; Presbytery of N. J. Orthodox Church v. . . . . . . 1155 Governor of N. Y.; Nicholas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Governor of N. Y.; Volberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Governor of S. C.; Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Comm. v. 1166 Governor of Utah v. Jane L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Grace v. Burrill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Grade v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Graham; Pandey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1282 Graham-Weber v. Essex County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164,1242 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxvii Page Gramley; Bracy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Gramley; McCain v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Grant v. McCoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Grant v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Grant v. Rivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Grant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Grant Medical Center; Leak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Grassia v. Luongo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Gravely v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Graves v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 Gray v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Gray v. Nielson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Gray v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129,1145,1203,1246 Gray v. Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Green v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Green; Collagen Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Green v. Dolsky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Green v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Green v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Green v. Umana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Green v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180,1203,1253 Gregory, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Gregory v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Greschner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Gresham v. Transportation Communications Union . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Griffes; Christensen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Griffin; McVicar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Griffin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180,1222 Grijalva v. Department of Interior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Grooms v. Glaze . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Groose; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179,1283 Groose; Ross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202,1216 Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion County Building Authority . . . 1230 Growney, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152,1262 Grubbs, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 GS Roofing Products Co.; Spinden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Guam; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Guaranty Bank & Trust Co.; Baheth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117,1224 Guardsman Products, Inc.; Foltice v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Gucci Design Studio, Ltd. v. Sinatra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Guerriero v. Lufthansa German Airlines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114,1198 Guice v. Charles Schwab & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Guilbeau v. W. W. Henry Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Guinn v. Kopf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Gulch; Ruthers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Gulf Beach Hotel, Inc. v. Hilton Inns, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Guzman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 Hacklander-Ready v. Wisconsin ex rel. Sprague . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 H. A. DeHart & Son, Inc.; Totoro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Hadley v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 H & D Entertainment, Inc. v. Fleet National Bank . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Hagelin v. Federal Election Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Haile; Clorox Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Hai Vominh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Hale v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Hall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Halpin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Hamilton, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153,1164,1195 Hamilton v. Koons Sterling Ford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Hamilton v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Hamm v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Hammond v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Hampton v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Hampton v. Killinger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Hampton v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Hanks; Hogan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Han Kuk Chun; Wong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Hannigan; Nickel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Hanover Ins. Co.; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104,1182 Hansen, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Hansen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131,1222,1235 Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 548 Harden v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Hardison; Bridgewater v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Hardison; Joseph v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Hardy v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Hargrove v. Colony of Stone Mountain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190,1283 Harmon v. Sikes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Harper; Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Harper v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Supreme Court of Ohio 1274 Harper; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 Harrington v. Attorney General of N. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Harrington v. California Committee of Bar Examiners . . . . . . . . 1106 Harris v. Chapman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Harris v. Cuyahoga County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Harris v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Harris v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127,1260 Harris v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218,1257 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxix Page Harris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Harrison v. Barbour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Harrison; Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 564 Harrison; Fletcher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Hart v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Hart v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231,1270 Hart/Cross v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Hartman; Duffey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Hartman v. Health Services Management, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Hartman v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Hartman v. Northern Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Hartnett v. Stein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Hartnett v. Western Construction Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Hartsville; Dickey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Harvard; Kent v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Harvey v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Harvey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179,1242 Hashemi v. American Express Travel Related Services Co. . . . . . 1230 Hatch; Mustang Fuel Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Hawaii; Crawford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126,1249 Hawaii; Kealoha v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Hawaii; Radcliffe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Hawkins v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Hawkins v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Hawkins v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Hawkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Hawkins v. Uzzell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Haycock v. Hughes Aircraft Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Hayes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Haynes v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Hays v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Hays v. Urbana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Hayward v. Murray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Healow v. Anesthesia Partners, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Health Services Management, Inc.; Hartman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 HealthSouth Rehab. Hosp. v. American National Red Cross . . . . 1264 HealthSouth Rehab. Hosp. v. American Red Cross Blood Servs. 1264 Hearn v. Robertson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Hearn v. Veasy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Heatwole v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Hedgepeth; Jasper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Heimermann v. Vander Ark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Helton v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Henderson v. DeTella . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xl TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Henderson v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Hendrickson v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Hendrickson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Hennessy Industries, Inc.; Peitzmeier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Henry, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Henry; Dominguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Henry v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Henry v. Williamson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Henry Co.; Guilbeau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Henson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270 Henton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Herman v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Herman v. Ratelle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Herman v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Hermosa Beach; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Hernandez v. Santa Ana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Hernandez; Santa Ana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170,1234,1251 Hernando County; Wallis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Herron; Barlow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Heurtebise; Reliable Business Computers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Hewlett-Packard Co.; Orback v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Hibma; Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1282 Hickmon v. Barnett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Hicks v. Prince Graves Homes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Hicks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193,1258 Higgason v. Swihart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Higgins, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 Hill, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Hill v. Acker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Hill v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Hill; Arteaga v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Hill v. Beck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Hill v. CSC Credit Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Hill v. Gates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243,1278 Hill v. Hopper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Hill v. Kemp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Hill v. McClure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Hill v. McKee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Hill v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Hill v. Raup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Hill v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132,1203 Hilton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xli Page Hilton Davis Chemical Co.; Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. . . . . . . . . . 17,1153 Hilton Inns, Inc.; Gulf Beach Hotel, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Hiltunen v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Hinchliffe v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Hinckley; Judy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Hines v. Franklin Homes, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Hiser; Franklin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Hobauer; Dockett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Hoeflich; Martech USA, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Hoekstra v. Independent School Dist. No. 283 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Hoelzer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 Hofbauer; Lyons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Hogan v. Hanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Holcomb v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Holifield; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Holihan; Lucky Stores, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Hollar v. Government of Virgin Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Holliday v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Holman v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Holman v. Page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Holman v. U. S. Parole Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Holt v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Holt v. JTM Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Holt v. KMI-Continental, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Holtzman v. Mullon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Homar; Gilbert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924,1102,1113 Home Depot U. S. A., Inc. v. Butler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Home Depot U. S. A., Inc. v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Honeywell, Inc. v. Litton Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Honeywell, Inc.; PSI Repair Services, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Hood; Culp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Hooper v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Hopkins; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Hopper v. Goosbly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Hopper; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Horgan; Velasco v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Horn v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Horton v. Union Recovery Ltd. Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Horton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Hospital Authority of Valdosta and Lowndes County; Crosby v. . . . 1116 Hostetter; Glendora v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Hough v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 House v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Houser v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xlii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page House the Homeless, Inc. v. Widnall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Houston v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Hover v. Florida Power & Light Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Howard v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Howard v. Caspari . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Howard; Cornforth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Howard v. Howard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Howard; Hutton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Howard; Shay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Howard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234,1235 Howard v. Walt Disney Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189,1237 Howard Community Services; Ebenhart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Howell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 How Investment Ltd. v. Nowak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Hualde-Redin v. First Federal Savings Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Hubbard v. Kentucky Ed. Professional Standards Bd. . . . . . . . . . 1240 Hubert's Estate; Commissioner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Huck v. Dawson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Hudgins; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Hudson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Huerta v. Los Angeles County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Huff v. Chapleau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Huff v. First National Bank of Centre Hall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Huff v. Northwest Savings Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Hughes Aircraft Co.; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Hughes Aircraft Co.; United States ex rel. Haycock v. . . . . . . . . . 1211 Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer . . . . . . . . . 939 Hughes Aircraft Co.; Yee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Huie v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Humphrey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Humphries v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Humphries v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Hunter; Iolab Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185,1260 Hunter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Huntington; Formica v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Huntsville Memorial Hospital; Cole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Hurford; Lovell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156,1249 Hurley; Galvan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Hussein v. Pierre Hotel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188,1283 Hutchinson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Hutchinson; Vartinelli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Hutton v. Howard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Hutton v. Three Rivers Area Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Hyde; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 670 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xliii Page Hyperion 1999 Term Trust, Inc.; Olkey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Ibida v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Idaho; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Idaho State Bar; Topp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Ijemba, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114,1249 Iko v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Ilic v. Liquid Air Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Illinois; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Illinois; Ashing v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Illinois; Britz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Illinois; Clemons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Illinois; Falconer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Illinois; Gilliam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Illinois; Hadley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Illinois; Hampton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Illinois; Hardy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Illinois; Haynes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Illinois; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Illinois; Kidd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Illinois; Marshall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Illinois; Maxwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Illinois; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Illinois; Nevius v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Illinois v. Nitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Illinois; Shatner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Illinois; Trotter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Illinois; Watson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Illinois; Weekly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Illinois; Wiggins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Illinois; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Illinois; Woods v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Illinois Dept. of Professional Regulation; Pfluger v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Illinois Health Planning Bd.; Dimensions Medical Center v. . . . . . 1169 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Chamorro-Torres v. . . . 1103 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Salazar-Haro v. . . . . . . . 1239 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Suan See Chong v. . . . . 1119 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Uwagbale v. . . . . . . . . . 1157 Imparato v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 In re. See name of party. Independent School Dist. No. 283; Hoekstra v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Indiana; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Indiana; Helton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Indiana; Lambert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Indiana; McCoy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xliv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Indiana; Platt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Indiana; Propes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Indiana; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Indianapolis-Marion County Building Authority; Grossbaum v. . . 1230 Indicated Expansion Shippers v. FERC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Director, OWCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Ingram v. Powell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Ingram v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Inland Healthcare Group v. Ardary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Insituform Technologies, Inc.; CAT Contracting, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . 1198 Institute of Specialized Medicine; Leff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Inter-Modal Rail Employees Assn. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 510,1102 Internal Revenue Service; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Internal Revenue Service; Schroeder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 International. For labor union, see name of trade. International Business Machines Corp.; Muse v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 International College of Surgeons; Chicago v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Iolab Corp. v. Hunter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185,1260 Iowa; Dunbar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Iowa; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Iowa; Rieflin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Iowa; Trobaugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Iowa; Wessels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Iowa District Court for Des Moines County; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . 1197 Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Pro. Ethics and Conduct; Ronwin v. 1241 Irons v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Irvin; Cole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Irvin; Kroemer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Irvin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Isles v. Cosby . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Isom v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Ivani Contracting Corp.; New York City v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Ivory v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Ivy v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Ivy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131,1249 Iyamu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Jackson v. Barry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Jackson v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Jackson v. Byrd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Jackson v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Jackson v. Champion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Jackson v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Jackson v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Jackson v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xlv Page Jackson v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Jackson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131,1178,1222,1236 Jacksonville; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175,1260 Jacobson v. Stevens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177,1260 Jacquot v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Jae v. Coyne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Jae v. Kessler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Jahannes v. Reid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142,1214 Jain v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 James v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 James v. Court of Common Pleas for Sumter County, S. C. . . . . . 1245 James v. McClain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 James T. Strickland Youth Center; Buford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Jane L.; Leavitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Jane Phillips Episcopal Memorial Medical Center v. Rishell . . . . . 1152 Jaques, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Jarrett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Jasper v. Hedgepeth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 J. Baker, Inc.; Maxwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Jefferson v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Jefferson v. Tarrant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Jefferson County v. Acker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261 Jefferson Lighthouse School; Muller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Jenkins v. Oakley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200,1256 Jenkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Jenkins v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217,1252 Jensen v. Gould . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Jenson v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Jewitt v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Jimenez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 J. M. Martinac & Co. v. Saratoga Fishing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 J. M. Martinac & Co.; Saratoga Fishing Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Joe Conte Toyota, Inc.; Conte v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 John Deere Co.; Midcon Equipment Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 John Deere Co.; Taylor Equipment, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Johnson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195,1209 Johnson; Alford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Johnson v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Johnson; Asonye v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Johnson; Baldree v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Johnson; Bardin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Johnson; Basey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Johnson; Behringer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1260 Johnson; Bumpass v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xlvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Johnson; Carraway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Johnson; Carson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Johnson; Doggins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Johnson; Drinkard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Johnson; Dudley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Johnson; Elam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Johnson v. En Vogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Johnson v. Fankell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911 Johnson; Flowers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Johnson; Garza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Johnson v. Gibbons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Johnson v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Johnson; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127,1260 Johnson; Hawkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Johnson; Herman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Johnson; Houser v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Johnson; Huie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Johnson v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Johnson v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Johnson v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Johnson; Klyng v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Johnson v. Lamont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Johnson; Losada v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Johnson v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Johnson; Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Johnson; Mixon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Johnson; Neese v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Johnson; Ornelas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Johnson; Reagans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Johnson; Reyna v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Johnson; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Johnson; Rose v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Johnson; Ruthruff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Johnson; Stoker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Johnson; Taplin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Johnson; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Johnson; Union Pacific R. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Johnson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461, 1109, 1110, 1132, 1133, 1144, 1148, 1192, 1222, 1223, 1234, 1236, 1251,1253,1271,1281 Johnson; Vela v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Johnson; Wafer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Johnson; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Johnson; West v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xlvii Page Johnson; Westley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Johnson; Wharton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Johnson; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Johnson; Wilkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Johnson; Woods v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Johnson; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Johnson-Bey v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261 Joiner; General Electric Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Joiner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Jones; Clinton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 681 Jones v. Forest Industries Ins. Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Jones v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179,1283 Jones v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Jones v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Jones v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Jones v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Jones v. Senkowski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Jones v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Jones v. Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Jones v. Toombs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127,1194 Jones v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132,1149,1202,1203,1236,1282 Jones; Vickery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Jordan v. Governing Bd. of Marin Community College Dist. . . . . 1143 Jordan v. Kenton County Bd. of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Jordan; McColm v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176,1283 Jordan v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Joseph v. Hardison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Joseph v. Quaglino Tobacco & Candy Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Joyce v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1282 Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 JTM Industries, Inc.; Holt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Judd v. University of N. M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Judge, Court of Appeals of Ohio, Cuyahoga County v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Supreme Court of Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Judge, District Court of Ky., Kenton County; Thompson v. . . . . . 1125 Judge, District Court of Okla., Okla. County; Thomas v. . . . . . . . 1215 Judge, District Court of Tulsa County; Morrow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Judge, District of Columbia Superior Court; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . 1159 Judge, Municipal Court of N. J., In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Judge, Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County; Zaragoza v. 1126 Judge, Superior Court of Ga., Fulton County; Thomas v. . . . . . . . 1147 Judge, Territorial Court of V. I. v. Government of V. I. . . . . . . . . . 1277 Judy v. Hinckley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xlviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Juneu; Mount Juneau Enterprises, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Justice, App. Div., N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1st Jud. Dept.; McReynolds v. 1173,1260 Justice, Family Court of N. Y.; McReynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Juvenile Male v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162,1219,1221,1223 J. W. v. Bryan Independent School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Kabakow v. American Savings Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Kahn v. Emerson Electric Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Kahn; State Oil Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Kahn; United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.; Blouin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Kaisserman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Kanahele v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Kansas; Peden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Kansas City Southern R. Co.; Daniels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Karafa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1282 Karcher v. Emerson Electric Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Karcher; Emerson Electric Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Karim-Panahi v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Kaufman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Kaufman; Tidik v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Kaye; McReynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Kealoha v. Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Keane; Laureano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Keane; Yarborough v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Kearns v. General Motors Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Keathley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Keaton v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Keesler; Edmundson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Kehm v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Keirsey v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Keisling; Oregon Taxpayers United PAC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Kelly; Cosentino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Kelly v. Merit Systems Protection Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Kelly v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Kemna; Spencer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165,1227 Kemp; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Kenilworth; New Jersey Carpenters Apprentice Train. & Ed. Fd. v. 1241 Kennedy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Kent v. Harvard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Kenton County Bd. of Ed.; Jordan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Kentucky; Chandler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Kentucky; Vergara v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Kentucky Bar Assn.; Roe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xlix Page Kentucky Dept. of Corrections; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Kentucky Ed. Professional Standards Bd.; Hubbard v. . . . . . . . . . 1240 Kentucky River Authority; Danville v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Kern v. Rochester . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Kernats; Smiths Industries Medical Systems, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Keshishian v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270 Kessler; Jae v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Keys v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Keys; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Khanna v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Kidd v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Kierstead v. Suter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Killinger; Hampton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Kimball v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Kimble v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247,1282 Kincaid v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Kinder v. Potts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 King v. Fielder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 King v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Kingston Constructors v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. 1274 Kin-Hong v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. . . . . . . 1113 Kirby, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Kirk, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262 Kirkland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Kiser v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Klehr v. A. O. Smith Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142,1154 Klingensmith v. Roy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Klyng v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 KMI-Continental, Inc.; Holt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Knapp v. Northwestern Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Knight v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Knotts v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Kobayashi America, Inc.; Sprague v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Koch v. Stewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Koche; Maghe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Koger, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Koons Sterling Ford; Hamilton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Kopf; Guinn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Korean Air Lines Co. v. Bickel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Kovacs v. Mental Health Services of Orange County . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Kraft v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Kraytsberg v. Kraytsberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Krempin; Downey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201,1284 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR l TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Krier v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Kristi Micander, P. C.; Carlson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Kroemer v. Irvin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Kronheim & Co. v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Kruger v. Sonic Restaurants, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Krygoski Construction Co., Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Kucej v. Connecticut Statewide Grievance Committee . . . . . . . . . 1276 Kuchinskas v. Broward County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Kuhlmann; Gonzalez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Kuhn v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Transportation, Driver Licensing 1118 Kuk Chun; Wong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Kumpan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Kutnyak v. Walters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Kuykendall; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124,1194 L. v. Board of Ed. of Downers Grove Grade School Dist. No. 58 . 1113,1198 L.; Leavitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 L.; Morgan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1271 Labastida v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 LaBonte; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 751,1238 Labor and Industry Review Comm'n; Pioterek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Labor Union. See name of trade. Labour v. American States Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Lackey, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Lackey v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Contra Costa County . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Lafever v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana v. Transaero, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Lagana v. Dillon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Lakeside Medical Center; Fidis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Lamb v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Lambert v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Lambert v. Wicklund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292 Lambrix v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 518 Lamont; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Landan, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262 Lane v. Ministry of Defense, State of Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Lane v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Lang; Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Lang v. Reynolds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Langdon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Lanier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1271 Lanier; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259 L'anza Research International; Quality King Distributors v. . . . . 1250 LaPlant v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED li Page LaPlante v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Lark v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Larson v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Lash, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262 LaShawn A.; Barry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Las Vegas Tribe of Paiute Indians; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Laureano v. Keane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Lawal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Lawanson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Law Offices of Herbert Hafif v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Law Offices of Linnie L. Darden, III; Tatum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Laws v. United Mo. Bank of Kansas City, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Lawuary v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Lazenby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 651 Leahy v. Chicago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Leak v. Grant Medical Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Leal v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130,1225 Leaver v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 651 Leavitt v. Jane L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Lebbos v. Massachusetts State Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 LeBlanc-Sternberg; Airmont v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Leckie Smokeless Coal Co.; U. M. W. A. 1992 Benefit Plan v. . . . . 1118 LeCureux; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 LeCureux; Turnpaugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Ledet v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Leding v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Leeper v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Lee Rosenbaum & Associates, P. C.; Craig v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Leff v. Institute of Specialized Medicine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Le Grand v. Goord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Leidner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Leija v. Canutillo Independent School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Leiphardt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Lemons; Wootton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Leonard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 651 Leppert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Lesley; Belcher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Letsinger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Levesque v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Levine v. Goord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Levinson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Levy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112,1207 Levy v. Fresh Fields Market, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Lewis v. Alamance County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Lewis v. Iowa District Court for Des Moines County . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Lewis; Sacramento County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 Lewis; Sidles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Lewis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177,1209,1226 Lewis Lang v. Reynolds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach . . . . . . . 1227 Liberty Mut. Ins. Group; Azubuko v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Licciardi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Lichtman v. Lichtman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Lidman v. Department of State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124,1283 Life College, Inc. v. Mangum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Life Ins. Co. of Va.; Barakat v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143,1225 Lightman v. Zenith Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Ligons v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Lindsey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Linnie L. Darden, III; Tatum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Linscomb v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103,1193 Linville v. Linville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Linza v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Lippitt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 Lippold; Blandino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Liquid Air Corp.; Ilic v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Littlefield v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Litton Systems, Inc.; Honeywell, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Livingstone; North Belle Vernon Borough v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Livingston Union School Dist.; Takahashi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Loaisiga v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1271 Local. For labor union, see name of trade. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.; Pate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Logue; Altschul v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Lohse v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Lombard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Lone Star Northwest; Fjetland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Longois; Cornett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Lopez v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Lopez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231,1282 Loral Corp.; Cvijanovic v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Lords Landing Village Condo. Council v. Cont'l Ins. Co. . . . . . . . 893 Lorenz v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Lorenz v. Martin Marietta Corp., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Losada, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1260 Losada v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Losada v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261 Los Angeles Cty.; Huerta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED liii Page Los Angeles Cty. Dept. of Children & Fam. Servs.; Raymond T. v. 1176 Los Angeles Cty. Dept. of Children's Services; Reynolds v. . . . . . 1234 Louisiana; Bethley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1259 Louisiana v. Divers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Louisiana; Hamilton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Louisiana; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Louisiana; Pizzo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Louisiana; Roy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Louisiana; Seals v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Louisiana Dept. of Corrections; English v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Louisiana Land & Exploration Co.; Verdin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Love; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Love; Fox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Love v. Rouse Co. of Mo. Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Love; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Lovell v. Hurford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156,1249 Lovett v. Minnesota Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Loving v. Pirelli Cable Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Lowe v. Boone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Lowe v. Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Lowe v. Gibson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Lowe v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Lowe v. Pogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Lowe v. Zimmerman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Lowell v. Prunty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Lucas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Luchkowec v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Luck v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Lucky Stores, Inc. v. Holihan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Lufkin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Lufthansa German Airlines, Inc.; Guerriero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114,1198 Lui Kin-Hong v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 Lundell Mfg. Co.; American Broadcasting Cos. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Lundquist v. Premier Financial Services-Texas, L. P. . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Lungren; Crawford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Lungren; Stevenson-Bey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Luongo; Grassia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Luongo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Lurie v. Caesar's Tahoe, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Lutalo v. Walker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Lux v. Spotsylvania County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Lynch v. Boone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Lynch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170,1180 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR liv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Lynn, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Lyons v. Hofbauer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Lyons; Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Macalino v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Maccaferri Gabions, Inc. v. Wilkinson & Jenkins Construction Co. 1167 MacFarlane; California Franchise Tax Bd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Machinists; Nielsen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Mack v. Caspari . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 MacKenzie v. Creager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Mackey v. Stalder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Madanat v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Madden, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Madden v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Madrid v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Madril v. Gallego . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Maghe v. Koch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Main v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Maine; Collins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Maine Dept. of Env. Protection; SC Testing Technology v. . . . . . . 1264 Makowski; Welky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Malik v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Malkiewicz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Mallard v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Mallia v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Mallott & Peterson v. Stadtmiller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Malone; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Manchester; Fulfree v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Mangone v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Mangrum v. Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Mangum; Life College, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Mans v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.; Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. . . . . . . 1113 Manussier v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Maravilla v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Marchman v. Cole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Mardula; Merchants Bank of Cal., N. A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Maricopa County; Zankich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Marisol A. v. Giuliani . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Mark; McReynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Marks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Markson v. A & W Investors Group, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Marmolejo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Maroney, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101,1207 Marozsan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lv Page Marquez v. Dorsey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Marshall v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Marshall v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Marshall v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174,1279 Martech USA, Inc. v. Hoeflich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Martin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Martin; Edmond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Martin v. Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Martin v. Rivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Martin; Schmidt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Martin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Martinac & Co. v. Saratoga Fishing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Martinac & Co.; Saratoga Fishing Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Martin County; Section 28 Partnership, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Martineau v. Cypress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Martinez-Cano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Martinez-Villareal v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Martinez-Villareal; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Martin Marietta Corp., Inc.; Lorenz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Martin-Marietta Technologies, Inc.; Crawford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Maryland; Cox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Maryland; Drummond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Maryland; Gray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Maryland; Holman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Maryland; Keirsey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Maryland; McNamara v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Maryland; Moschetti v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Maryland; Perry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Maryland v. Stanberry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Maryland Dept. of Health and Mental Hygiene; Raynor v. . . . . . . 1166 Mason v. Norwest Bank S. D., N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Mason v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Mason v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132,1202 Massachusetts; Arigoni v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Massachusetts; Beldotti v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Massachusetts; Gregory v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Massachusetts; Vieux v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Massachusetts Dept. of Correction; Wilder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Massachusetts State Bar; Lebbos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Massasoit Greyhound, Inc.; Pielech v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Mastaw v. Norfolk & Western R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Mathewson v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Mathis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Matthews v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Mattox v. Dallas Bd. of Adjustments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Maudal v. Texas Instruments Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Maxberry v. Paramount Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Maxwell v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Maxwell v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 May v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 May v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Mayor of Alton; Campbell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Mayor of Baltimore; Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Mayor of Baltimore; Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. . . . . . 1204 Mayor of Baltimore; Sweeney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Mayor of D. C.; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Mayor of D. C. v. LaShawn A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Mayor of Jersey City v. American Civil Liberties Union of N. J. . 1265 Mayor of New York City; Marisol A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Mays v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Mazurek v. Armstrong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968 Mazurkiewicz; Crosby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Mazzei, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 McAffee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 MCA Television, Ltd.; Feltner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 McBride v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 McCain v. Gramley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 McCall, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 McCauley-Bey v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 McClain; James v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 McClain v. Rho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 McClain v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 McClure; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 McColm v. Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176,1283 McColm v. Nelson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 McCormack Resources; Garrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 McCotter; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 McCotter; Werner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 McCoy; Grant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 McCoy v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 McCoy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 McCrea v. Andrews Federal Credit Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 McCroy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 McCullah v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 McDaniel; Farmer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 McDonald, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 McDonald; Catz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lvii Page McDonald v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 McDonald v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 McDonnell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 McDougall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 McGann; Ernst & Young LLP v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 McGehee; United Companies Lending Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 McGillivray v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 McGuire v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 McHan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 McKee; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 McKenzie v. Renberg's, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 McKinley v. District of Columbia Dept. of Human Services . . . . . 1108 McKinney v. Baldwin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 McKinney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110,1226 McKnight; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 McKoy v. Morris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 McLemore v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 McLeod v. News-Register Publishing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 McLeod v. Oregon Lithoprint, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 McMillian v. Monroe County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 781,1102 McMullen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 McMullin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 McNamara v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 McNeil v. Aguilos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 McNely; Ocala Star-Banner Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 McQueen v. Parker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 McQueen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 McQuilken v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 McRae v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 McReynolds v. Gangel-Jacob . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173,1260 McReynolds v. Kaye . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 McReynolds v. Mark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 McReynolds v. Murphy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 McReynolds v. Venkataraghaven . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 McTeer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 McVicar v. Griffin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Medina, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Medina v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Medina v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Medina v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Medley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Medrano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Meehan v. East Lyme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Melius v. Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Mendoza Duarte; Arizona v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Mental Health Services of Orange County; Kovacs v. . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Merchants Bank of Cal., N. A. v. Mardula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Merchants Bank & Trust Co.; Butler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176,1283 Merit Contracting, Inc. v. Roberts & Schaefer Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Merit Systems Protection Bd.; Dancer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Merit Systems Protection Bd.; Durst-Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Merit Systems Protection Bd.; Kelly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Merritt v. Bureau of Prisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Metro-North Commuter R. Co. v. Padilla . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Metro-North Commuter R. Co.; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.; Coulter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Meyer; Nesbitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Meyers v. Norfolk and Western R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Miami; Skinner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Micander, P. C.; Carlson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Michigan; Darwall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Michigan; Dye v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Michigan v. Fernengel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Michigan; Linza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Michigan Dept. of Corrections; Hawkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Michigan Document Services, Inc. v. Princeton Univ. Press . . . . . 1156 Mickens v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Micron Separations, Inc. v. Pall Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Midcon Equipment Co. v. John Deere Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Middleton; Flint v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Midwest Investments v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n . . . . . 1165 Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach; Lexecon Inc. v. . . . . . . 1227 Miles v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Miles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1271 Miller v. Albright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195,1208 Miller v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Miller; Chandler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305 Miller v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Miller; Ivy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Miller; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Miller v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Miller v. Schoemehl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Miller v. State Industrial Ins. System of Nev. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Miller v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Mills; Englander v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Millus v. Newsday, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Milnes v. Fletcher Pacific Construction Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lix Page Miltland Raleigh-Durham; Mudie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Milton v. World Savings and Loan Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Milton S. Kronheim & Co. v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Minard; Startup v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Mincey, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Mines v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Ministry of Defense, State of Israel; Lane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Minnesota; Hendrickson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Minnesota Bd. of Medical Practice; Tatreau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Minnesota Dept. of Corrections; Lovett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Minnesota Pollution Control Agency; Mmubango v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Minniecheske, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Mississippi; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Mississippi; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Mississippi; Grant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Mississippi; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Mississippi; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Mississippi; Russell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Mississippi; Saulsberry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Mississippi; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145,1225 Mississippi Bar; Robb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Missouri v. Futo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Missouri; Jordan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Missouri; Rushing v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Missouri; Smulls v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Harper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Missouri Parole Bd.; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Mitchell v. Albuquerque Bd. of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Mitchell; Diaz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Mitchell v. Parker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Mitchell v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Mitchell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109,1180,1280 Mixon v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Mmubango v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Mobley; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Moffitt v. Charlotte . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Molina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Molina Lopez v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Mollenhour v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Molson Breweries; Dorf & Stanton Communications, Inc. v. . . . . . 1275 Monaco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Monroe v. Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Monroe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Monroe County; McMillian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 781,1102 Monroe Township; Zafiratos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Montana System of Higher Ed.; Giebel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Montez v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Montgomery; Azubuko v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106,1225 Montgomery County Dept. of Social Services; Clemy P. v. . . . . . . 1267 Montoya, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1284 Moore; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Moore; Ligons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Moore v. Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Moore v. Perrin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Moore; Plyler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Moore v. Roberts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Moore; Sheets v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Moore v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Moore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131,1282 Moore McCormack Resources; Garrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Morales v. Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Morales; Pugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Morales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Morales-Lopez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Morath, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262 Mordan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Morehead v. Atkinson-Kiewit, J/V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Moreno Ramos v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Moretz v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Morewitz v. Ashmore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120,1225 Morgan v. Chris L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1271 Morgan; Rhoden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Morgan v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Morgan v. Texas Utilities Electric Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Moriel v. Prunty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Mormon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Morris; DeLone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Morris; Fett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Morris; McKoy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Morris v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Morris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Morris v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Morrison v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131,1194 Morrow v. Winslow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Morton; Chalet v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Morton; Gerald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Morton; Goldy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxi Page Mosby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Moschetti v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Mosley; David v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Mothershed v. Durbin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Mott v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Mount Juneau Enterprises, Inc. v. Juneau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Muchnick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 Mudie v. Miltland Raleigh-Durham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Mueller; Cohea v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Muhammad, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Muhaymin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Mullanix v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Mulligan v. Barnett Bank of Central Fla., N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . 1106,1194 Mullinax v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Mullon; Holtzman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Multani v. Ross Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Multani v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Mundy v. Dupree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Mundy v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Mundy v. Wright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Murff; Professional Medical Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238,1273 Murphy; McReynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Murphy v. Perrill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Murphy v. Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Murray v. Babbitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187,1259 Murray; Hayward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Murry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1271 Muse v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Muse v. International Business Machines Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Mussari v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Hatch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Myers v. Shumacher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Myers; Tolliver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Myers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218,1223,1270 Myles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Nachman; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Nadal v. Yonkers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Nagi v. C. E. Fleming Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Nagle v. Bailey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Napoletano; CIGNA HealthCare of Conn., Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Nassau County v. State Employees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Nasset; Futterman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 National Credit Union Admin.; CEDC Federal Credit Union v. . . 1165 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page National Credit Union Admin.; Sadowski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 NLRB; Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 NLRB; Geske & Sons, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Van Holt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh; Fidel v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Neal; Tuller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Nebraska; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Neese v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Negrete-Diaz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1282 Neiderlitz; Prestonwood Golf Club Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Neilsen; C. O. N. T. R. O. L. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Nelson v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Nelson v. DeTella . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Nelson v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Nelson; McColm v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Nelson v. Strawn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Nelson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109,1122,1203 Nesbitt v. Meyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Nesson v. Nesson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Netherland; O'Dell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Nettles v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Neustrup; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Nevada; Atkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Nevada; Barrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Nevada; Bentsen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Nevada; Bonta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Nevada; Cardwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Nevada; Daws v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Nevada; Despain v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Nevada; Dortch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Nevada; Evans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Nevada; Everhart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Nevada; Fitzgerald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145,1214 Nevada; Florio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Nevada; Franklin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Nevada; Garcia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Nevada; Gauthier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Nevada; Giseburt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Nevada; Gomes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Nevada; Henderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Nevada; Hiltunen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Nevada; Iko v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Nevada; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Nevada; Jenson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxiii Page Nevada; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Nevada; Labastida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Nevada; Lafever v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Nevada; Lane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Nevada; Macalino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Nevada; Mathewson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Nevada; May v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Nevada; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Nevada; Reeves v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Nevada; Singleton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Nevada; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Nevada; Sparks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Nevada; Spike v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Nevada; Tapia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Nevada; Trillo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Nevada; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Nevada; Wesley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Nevada; Wheeler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Nevada; Whiterock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Nevada; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Nevada; Witter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Nevada; Wood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Nevada; Zamora v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Nevius v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Newberry; Todd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 New Hampshire; Veale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 New Jersey; Farmer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 New Jersey; Medina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 New Jersey v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 New Jersey Carpenters Apprentice Train. & Ed. Fd. v. Kenilworth 1241 New Jersey ReIns. Co.; Tarapacki v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Newman v. Associated Press, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 New Mexico; Ogden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 New Mexico; Texas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Newsday, Inc.; Millus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 News-Register Publishing Co.; McLeod v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Newton v. Board of Fitness for Bar Applicants, Sup. Ct. of Ga. . . 1283 New Valley Corp.; Administracion Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (Antel) v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 New York; Arbeiter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 New York; Cliff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 New York; Harvey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 New York; Mallia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 New York; New Jersey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page New York v. Owens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 New York; Siddiqui v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 New York; Walsh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 New York; Woodard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 New York City v. Bery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 New York City v. Ivani Contracting Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 New York City Dept. of Housing Preserv. and Dev.; Abidekun v. 1241 New York Mercantile Exchange; Tavora v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 New York Public Service Comm'n v. FERC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 New York State Dept. of Social Services; Nicolau v. . . . . . . . . . . 1127 New York State Unified Court System; Schulz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 New York Tax Appeals Tribunal; Lunding v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Ng v. Quiet Forest II Homeowners Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106,1193 Nguyen v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Nicholas v. Pataki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Nichols v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 651 Nickel v. Hannigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Nicolau v. New York State Dept. of Social Services . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Nicolaus v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Nicoletti v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Niederlitz; Prestonwood Country Club v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Nielsen v. Machinists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Nielson; Gray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Nikolits v. Parrish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Nitz; Illinois v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Noe v. Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256,1267 Norbury v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Nordberg; Tanca v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Nordquest, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 Norfolk and Western R. Co.; Meyers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Lang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Norfolk Southern R. Co.; Prickett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Norfolk Southern R. Co.; Trimiew v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Norfolk & Western R. Co.; Mastaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Norris; Asam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Norris; Easter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Norris; Parker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Norris; Tosh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 North Belle Vernon Borough v. Livingstone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 North Carolina; Ball v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 North Carolina; Elliott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 North Carolina; Fullwood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 North Carolina; Harden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 North Carolina; Hartman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxv Page North Carolina; Heatwole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 North Carolina; Norwood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 North Carolina; Penland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 North Carolina; Womble v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 North Carolina; Wooten v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 North Central Bronx Hospital; Philippeaux v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Northern Services, Inc.; Hartman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Northrop Grumman Corp.; United States ex rel. Sylvester v. . . . 1119 Northwest Airlines, Inc.; Alessi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Northwestern Univ.; Knapp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Northwest Iowa Mental Health Center; Somers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Northwest Savings Bank; Huff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Norwest Bank S. D., N. A.; Mason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Norwood v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Novey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Novi; Paragon Properties Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Nowaczyk v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Nowak; Tak How Investment Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Nowicki v. Bruff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Noyes; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Nunes v. Florida Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 NYSA­ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund; De Buono v. . . . 806 Oak Forest Police Pension Bd; Zielinski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Oakley; Jenkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200,1256 Oberuch v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Oboh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Ocala Star-Banner Corp. v. McNely . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 O'Callaghan; Republican Party of Alaska v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Ochoa v. Federal Communications Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Ochoa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 O'Connell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 O'Connor; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 O'Dell v. Netherland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Supreme Court of Ohio; Harper v. 1274 Office of Government Ethics; Schwarz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Office of Personnel Management; Jefferson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Ogbuehi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Ogden v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Ogletree v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Ohio; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Ohio; Farrell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Ohio; Hawkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Ohio; Keaton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Ohio; Swiger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Ohio; Tolbert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Lyons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Ohio Assn. of Independent Schools v. Goff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 OI­NEG TV Products, Inc. v. Durko . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Oklahoma; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Oklahoma; Carey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Oklahoma; Charm v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Oklahoma; Easterwood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Oklahoma; Fields v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Oklahoma; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Oklahoma; Leding v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Oklahoma; Lowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Oklahoma; Mallard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Oklahoma; Mason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Oklahoma; Norbury v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Oklahoma; Reid v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Oklahoma; Rhine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Oklahoma; Ridgeway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Oklahoma; Willoughby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Oklahoma; Wolfe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Okoli v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270 Old Line Life Ins. Co. of America; Daniell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Old Town Trolley; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Oliver; Dodd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125,1249 Oliver v. Fuch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Oliver v. Oshkosh Truck Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Oliver v. Rossen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Olkey v. Hyperion 1999 Term Trust, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Olk Long; Shepherd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Olsen v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Olson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Olsten Staffing Services; Crane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Omori v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 O'Neal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 O'Neill v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 1­95­CV­553­D1; 1­95­CV­553­P1 v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 1­95­CV­553­P1 v. 1­95­CV­553­D1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 Ontiveros v. Dorsey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Opuku-Boateng; California v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Orback v. Hewlett-Packard Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Oregon; Montez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Oregon Lithoprint, Inc.; McLeod v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Oregon Secretary of State; Oregon Taxpayers United PAC v. . . . 1252 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxvii Page Oregon Taxpayers United PAC v. Keisling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Ornelas v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Orozco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Ortega Venegas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Ortiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Orton v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Oshkosh Truck Corp.; Oliver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Osias v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Osume v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Otis Elevator Co.; Tuerk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Outlaws Club v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Overfield v. Bonsignore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Overseas Bulktank Corp. v. Rose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Owens v. Department of Interior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Owens; New York v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Owens; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Owens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 OXY USA Inc.; Continental Trend Resources, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . 1241 P. v. Montgomery County Dept. of Social Services . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Pacheco-Chong v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Pacheco-Maldonado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Pacific Southwest Seed & Grain, Inc. v. Botelho Shipping Corp. . . . 1211 Paddock Publications, Inc. v. Chicago Tribune Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Padilla; Metro-North Commuter R. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Pagan v. Warner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Page; Holman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Page v. Saunders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Painesville Township; Buss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Painter; Day v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107,1194 Paladin v. Finnerty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Pallan v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Pall Corp.; Micron Separations, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Palmer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Palomo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Panchal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 Pandey v. Graham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1282 Paolo Gucci Design Studio, Ltd. v. Sinatra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Papai; Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 548 Pappas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Paradies v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Paragon Properties Co. v. Novi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Paramount Communications; Maxberry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Parker v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Parker; McQueen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Parker; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Parker v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Parker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Park Place Apartments; Struve v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Parrish; Nikolits v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Parrish; Willis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Parsley Dairy Farm v. Cargill, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Parsley Dairy Farm; Cargill, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Parsons v. BASF Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Parton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Passman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Pastorius v. Romer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Pataki; Nicholas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Pataki; Volberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Pate v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Patel v. Penman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Patrick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120,1170 Patterson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1271 Patterson v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Patton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Paul v. Cribb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Paulus v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270 Payne, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Payne v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Pease v. Yellowstone County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Peck v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Peden v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Peeler v. Spartan Radiocasting, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Pena-Castrejon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Penland v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Penman; Patel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. Schmoke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Pennington; Garner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Pennsylvania; Abdul-Salaam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Pennsylvania; Ballod v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Pennsylvania; Beasley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Pennsylvania; Burchill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Pennsylvania; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Pennsylvania; Hinchliffe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Pennsylvania; Miles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Pennsylvania; Mines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Pennsylvania; Reyes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxix Page Pennsylvania; Rios v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Pennsylvania; Rucci v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Pennsylvania; Showers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Pennsylvania; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Pennsylvania; Wooley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Pennsylvania Dept. of Transportation, Driver Licensing; Kuhn v. 1118 Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n v. Philadelphia . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Penny v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Pepe; French v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Perales-Gonzalez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Perdue v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Perez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121,1175 Perrill; Murphy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Perrin; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Perry v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Perryman v. Prado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Persyn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Peters v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Peters; Vance v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Petersen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Peterson; Bouie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Peterson v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Peterson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Petrick v. Reynolds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Pettco Enterprises, Inc. v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Pfluger v. Illinois Dept. of Professional Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Phidd v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Philadelphia; Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Philadelphia Electric Co.; Fischer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Philippeaux v. North Central Bronx Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Philips v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Phillip; Rahman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Phillips v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Phillips v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Phillips Episcopal Memorial Medical Center v. Rishell . . . . . . . . . 1152 Pickens v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Pickett v. American Breeders Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Pick 'n Save; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Pidal; Williamson of Homestead v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Pidal; W. W. W. Enterprises, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Pierpoint; Barnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Pierre v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Pierre Hotel; Hussein v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188,1283 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Pierson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Pierson v. Wilshire Terrace Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Pieschek; Casteel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Pigram v. Thymes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Pillette v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Pinkins; Ellis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Pino-Lara v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Pioterek v. Labor and Industry Review Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Pirelli Cable Corp.; Loving v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Pitt, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Pizzo v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190,1260 Pizzo v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc.; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Platt v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Pledger v. Arkansas Regional Blood Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Plust, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Plyler v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Pogue; Lowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Pollard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Ponce-Bran v. Trustees of Cal. State Univ. and Colleges . . . . . . . 1191 Ponder v. Dye . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Porter v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Porter v. Senkowski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Porter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Porter v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129,1283 Portillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Posey v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Postmaster General; Dodson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Postmaster General; Gallares v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Postmaster General; Garcia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Postmaster General; Hale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Postmaster General; Hough v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Postmaster General; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Postmaster General; Rowls v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Postmaster General; Skinner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Potomac Electric Power Co.; Willoughby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Potts; Kinder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Powell v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Powell; Ingram v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Powell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Powell; Vaden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Prado; Perryman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxi Page Premier Financial Services-Texas, L. P.; Lundquist v. . . . . . . . . . 1229 Presbytery of N. J. of Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Whitman 1155 Prescott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 President of U. S.; Califorrniaa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 President of U. S.; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1283 President of U. S.; Tavakoli-Nouri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 President of U. S.; Vey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Presiding Justice, Sup. Ct. of N. Y., App. Div., 1st Jud. Dept.; McReynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Pressley v. Pressley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Prestonwood Country Club v. Niederlitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Prestonwood Golf Club Corp. v. Niederlitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Pretty v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Prewitt; Alexander v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Price v. Bossier Parish School Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471,1164 Price v. Charlotte . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Price; Charlotte v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Price; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Prickett v. Norfolk Southern R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Prince George's County v. Alexander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Prince Graves Homes; Hicks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Princeton Univ. Press; Michigan Document Services, Inc. v. . . . . 1156 Pringle v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Pritchard; Southern Co. Services, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Pritchard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 Professional Medical Ins. Co. v. Murff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238,1273 Propes v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Prou v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Prudential Securities, Inc.; Detroit Pension Fund v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Prunty; Lowell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Prunty; Moriel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Prunty; Stephen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 PSI Repair Services, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Public Service Co. of Colo.; Amoco Production Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Pugh v. Morales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Pullock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Purtle; Eldridge Auto Sales, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Quaglino Tobacco & Candy Co.; Joseph v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Quality King Distributors v. L'anza Research International . . . . . 1250 Quick; Eldridge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Quiet Forest II Homeowners Assn.; Sing Cho Ng v. . . . . . . . . 1106,1193 R.; Dry Creek Rancheria v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 Radcliffe v. Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Rafael Medrano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Ragusa v. Dillon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Rahman v. Phillip . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Railroad Retirement Bd.; Watts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Raines v. Byrd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Rambo; Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Ramirez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130,1220 Ramos v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Ramos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128,1131 Randall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Randolph; Banks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Raney; Carr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Rash; Associates Commercial Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953,1141,1163 Ratelle; Herman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Raup; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Ray; Sharp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Raymond T. v. L. A. Cty. Dept. of Children & Family Services . . 1176 Raynor v. Maryland Dept. of Health and Mental Hygiene . . . . . . 1166 Reagans v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Recession Hearing Official; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Red Rock Commodities, Ltd. v. ABN­AMRO Bank, N. A. . . . . . . 1166 Reed, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184,1272 Reed v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Reed v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Reese v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Reeves v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Regents of Univ. of Cal.; Genentech, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Regions Bank; Baheth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117,1224 Registrar of Motor Vehicles; Azubuko v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157,1225 Rehnquist; Babigian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Reid; Jahannes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142,1214 Reid v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Reliable Business Computers v. Heurtebise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Remeta v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147,1225 Renberg's, Inc.; McKenzie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Renfroe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102,1113 Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471,1164 Reno; Gaither v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Reno; Spice Entertainment Cos. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Reno; Terry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Reprise Records; Spiegelman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Republican Party of Alaska v. O'Callaghan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Revenue Division, Dept. of Treasury of Mich.; Thiokol Corp. v. . . 1271 Reyes v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxiii Page Reyna v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Reynolds; Lewis Lang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Reynolds v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children's Services . . . 1234 Reynolds; Petrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Rheinstrom v. Robinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Rhine v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Rho; McClain v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Rhoades v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Rhoden v. Morgan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Rhodes v. Brigano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Riales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Ricardo Ruiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Richards, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1262 Richards v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Richards v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385,1102,1154 Richardson v. Albertson's, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Richardson v. Bakery Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143,1225 Richardson v. McKnight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Richardson; Standifird v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Richcreek; Arizona v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Richmond Heights Local School Dist.; Dawson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Ricotta v. Ricotta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Riddick v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Ridgeway v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Rieflin v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Riggle; Burnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Rios v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Rishell; Jane Phillips Episcopal Memorial Medical Center v. . . . . 1152 Rishell; Wellshear v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Risley v. Faunce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Ritsema; Tidik v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Rivas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Rivera Contreras v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Rivers v. Farcas, Stewart, Brownie, Handson & Bliss . . . . . . . . . 1242 Rivers; Grant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Rivers; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Roane v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 Robb v. Mississippi Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Roberts; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Robertson; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 Robertson; Hearn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Robertson v. Thornell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Robertson County; Russell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Roberts & Schaefer Co.; Merit Contracting, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Robinson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Robinson v. Barbour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Robinson v. Cleveland Heights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Robinson v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1283 Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Robinson; Rheinstrom v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Robinson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Robokoff v. Women's Choice of Bergen County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Rochester; Kern v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Rocking Horse Ridge Estates Assn.; Cherry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Rodea v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Rodgers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Rodriguez, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Rodriguez v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Rodriguez; Rosenstiel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Rodriguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Rodriguez-Meraz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Rodriguez Salinas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Roe v. Kentucky Bar Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Roe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 Rogers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161,1178,1237,1239,1247 Rokosik; Seamon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Roman; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Romer; Pastorius v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Ronwin v. Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Pro. Ethics and Conduct 1241 Roosevelt; Finaloc, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Rosati v. Cottman Transmission Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Rose v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Rose; Overseas Bulktank Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Rose v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Rose v. Woods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Rosenbalm v. DeMorales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Rosenbaum & Associates, P. C.; Craig v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Ross v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202,1216 Rossen; Oliver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Ross Univ.; Multani v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Rothschild v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Rouse Co. of Mo. Inc.; Love v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Rowbal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Rowe v. Board of Ed. of Chattanooga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Rowls v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Roy; Klingensmith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxv Page Roy v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Royal King Fisheries v. Fuszek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Rucci v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Rudd, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Ruelas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1282 Ruiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176,1191 Runnels v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Runyon; Dodson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Runyon; Gallares v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Runyon; Garcia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Runyon; Hale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Runyon; Hough v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Runyon; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Runyon; Rowls v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Runyon; Skinner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Rushing v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Russell v. Bryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Russell v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Russell v. Robertson County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Ruthers v. Gulch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Ruthruff v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Ryan; Asam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Ryion v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Saba; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Sacerio v. School Bd. of Dade County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Sacramento County v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 Saculla v. Wisconsin Medical Examining Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Sadowski v. National Credit Union Administration . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Saffle v. Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Safford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 St. Joseph v. Borg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 St. Paul-Ramsey Medical Center, Inc. v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 St. Petersburg v. Bowen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Saiyed v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Salazar-Haro v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . 1239 Salinas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Saltaris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Samuel v. Duncan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157,1283 Sanchez; Colorado v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Sanchez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Sanders v. Arneson Products, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Sanders v. Edwards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Sandoval v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Sands, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153,1262 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page San Francisco v. Carpenter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Sanguandikul v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 San Luis Obispo County; Gates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Santa Ana v. Hernandez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Santa Ana; Hernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Santiago v. Ware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Santos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J. M. Martinac & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 Saratoga Fishing Co.; J. M. Martinac & Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Sarpy County; Cohen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Saturn General Motors Corp.; Bowers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170,1283 Saulsberry v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Saulsgiver v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Saunders; Page v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Saunders v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212,1253 Sawyer; Word of Faith World Outreach Center Church v. . . . . . . 1117 Sawyers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Scanlin v. Cooper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Scheetz v. Seville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Scheffer; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Schindler Elevator Corp.; Fletcher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174,1260 Schlottman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Schmidt v. Martin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Schmoke; Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Schmoke; Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Schmoke; Sweeney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Schoemehl; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 School Bd. of Dade County; Sacerio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Schriro; Tyler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Schroeder v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Schroeder v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Schroering v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co. . . . . . . . . . 1118 Schulz v. New York State Unified Court System . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Schumer; Hughes Aircraft Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 Schundler v. American Civil Liberties Union of N. J. . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Schwab & Co.; Guice v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Schwartz, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184,1208,1272 Schwartz v. Emhart Glass Machinery, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Schwarz v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Schwarz v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Schwarz v. Commission on Civil Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Schwarz v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216,1283 Schwarz v. Office of Government Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Schwarz v. Woodruff, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxvii Page Schweihs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Scott v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Scott v. Dime Savings Bank of N. Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122,1225 Scott v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Scott v. Nachman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Scott v. Recession Hearing Official . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Scott v. Sutor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Scott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Scott-Harris; Bogan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Scroger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Scruggs v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 SC Testing Technology, Inc. v. Maine Dept. of Env. Protection . . 1264 Seagram & Sons, Inc.; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Seals v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Seamon v. Rokosik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Sears, Roebuck & Co.; Caudle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Seattle Bldg. & Constr. Coun.; Constr. Ind. Train. Coun. of Wash. v. 1210 Secretary of Agriculture; Worthington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Secretary of Air Force; House the Homeless, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Secretary of Army; Boulineau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Secretary of Army; Porter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129,1283 Secretary of Army; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148,1225 Secretary of Commerce; Alliance Against IFQs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Secretary of Defense; Selland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Secretary of HHS; Courtney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Secretary of HHS; St. Paul-Ramsey Medical Center, Inc. v. . . . . 1250 Secretary of Interior; Murray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187,1259 Secretary of Labor; Joy Technologies, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Secretary of State; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195,1208 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Agcaoili v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159,1249 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; McRae v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Section 28 Partnership, Ltd. v. Martin County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Securities and Exchange Comm'n; Midwest Investments v. . . . . . 1165 Securities and Exchange Comm'n; Orton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 See Chong v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . 1119 Seeger v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Seiler v. Thalacker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Selland v. Cohen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Senkowski; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Senkowski; Porter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Serra, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Service Employees; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119,1225 Severa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Seville; Scheetz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Seward v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Shaffer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Shaffett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Shalala; Courtney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Shalala; St. Paul-Ramsey Medical Center, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 Shaller v. Walker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Shanks; Sinks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Shaper v. Tracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Sharp v. Allstate Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Sharp v. Ray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Shatner v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Shaw; Atlantic Coast Life Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Shay v. Howard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Shea & Gould v. Durkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Sheets v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Shell Oil Co.; Slagel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Shell Oil Co.; Van Scoy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168,1169 Shell Oil Station; Bunnell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Shelton v. Barnes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Shepherd v. Olk Long . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Sheppard v. Diaz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Sheppard Air Force Base; Brooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Shinn v. College Station Independent School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Shinn; Gates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Shoketsu Kinzoku Kabushiki Co. v. Festo Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Shoobs v. Zaveletta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Shoppers Food Warehouse; D'Ambrosio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Short, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Short v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Showers v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Shumacher; Myers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Siddiqui v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Sidles v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Sidles v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Siegler; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Sikes; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Sikes; Harmon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Sikora v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Silmon v. First Bancorp of La., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Silver v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Silverman; DelCourt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213,1283 Simmons v. Burns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Simms; Cannon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Simpson; Ernst & Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxix Page Simpson v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Sims v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Sims v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Sinatra; Paolo Gucci Design Studio, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Sindram v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Sing Cho Ng v. Quiet Forest II Homeowners Assn. . . . . . . . . 1106,1193 Singh v. General Accounting Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Singletary; Calamia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Singletary; Durham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Singletary; Glock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Singletary; Holliday v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Singletary; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Singletary; Lambrix v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 518 Singletary; Marshall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174,1279 Singletary; Medina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Singletary; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Singletary; Morgan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Singletary; Peterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Singletary; Phillips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Singletary; Pickens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Singletary; Remeta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147,1225 Singletary; Watts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Singletary; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158,1283 Singleton v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Sinks v. Shanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Sirbaugh; CSX Transportation, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Sisco v. Ault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Sisk v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Sistrunk v. Strongsville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Six v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Skinner v. Miami . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Skinner v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Slaby v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Comm'n . . . . . . . . . 1190 Slagel v. Shell Oil Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Sloan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Sloboda, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Smallwood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Smart v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Smart v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 SMC Corp. v. Festo Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Smith v. Alabama Aviation and Technical College . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Smith v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Smith v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261 Smith v. Elkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1282 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lxxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Smith v. Metro-North Commuter R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Smith v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Smith v. Noyes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Smith v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Smith v. Pick 'n Save . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Smith v. Roman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya . . . . . . . . 1204,1259 Smith; Tremblay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Smith v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . 1144,1160,1193,1203,1219,1225,1248 Smith v. U. S. Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261 Smith v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Smith Corp.; Klehr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142,1154 Smiths Industries Medical Systems, Inc. v. Kernats . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Smulls v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Snipe, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 So v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; Smith v. . . . . . . . 1204,1259 Solan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Solano County; White Wing Associates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Solano County; White Wing Development, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Somers v. Northwest Iowa Mental Health Center . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Somers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Song v. Countryman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Sonic Restaurants, Inc.; Kruger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Sonnenfeld; Denver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Soria v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 Sotelo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Soto-Fong v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Southall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 South Carolina v. Environmental Technology Council . . . . . . . . . 1113 South Carolina v. Fowler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 South Carolina; George v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 South Carolina; Henry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 South Carolina; Humphries v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 South Carolina; Simpson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 South Carolina; Tucker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Southern v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Southern Co. Services, Inc. v. Pritchard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Southfield; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 South Ga. Medical Center; Crosby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Southwest Airlines Co. v. Fennessy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Sparks v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Spartan Radiocasting, Inc.; Peeler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxi Page Spear; Bennett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 Spear v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Spearman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 Spears v. DSM Copolymer, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Spears v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178 Special Judge, District Court of Okla., Okla. County; Cornforth v. 1241 Speckard v. Ayala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Speen v. Crown Clothing Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Spence v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Spencer v. Kemna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165,1227 Spice Entertainment Cos. v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Spicer v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Spiegelman v. Reprise Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Spike v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Spinden v. GS Roofing Products Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Spotsylvania County; Lux v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Spradling; Tulsa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Sprague; Hacklander-Ready v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Sprague v. Kobayashi America, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Spruill v. Gillis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Spychala, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Stadtmiller; Mallott & Peterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Stage House Inn; Vrettos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Stahl v. Director, Central Intelligence Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Stalder; Mackey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Stanberry; Maryland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Standifird v. Richardson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Stanescu v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Stanley v. Boles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Stapley v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Star Editorial, Inc.; Dangerfield v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Startup v. Minard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 State. See also name of State. State Bar of Cal.; Ainsworth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172,1271 State Bar of Cal.; Cohea v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 State Bar of Cal.; Wolfgram v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1283 State Employees; Nassau County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 State Industrial Ins. System of Nev.; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 State Oil Co. v. Khan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 State Roads Comm'n of Md. Highway Admin.; WJM Realty v. . . 1212 Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Committee v. Beasley . . . . 1166 Staup v. First Union National Bank of Fla. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Steamship Mut. Underwriting Assn. (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Baris . . . 1168 Stearman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lxxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Steele v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Stein; Hartnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Stelmokas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Stelmokevicius v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Stepanik; England v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Stephen v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Stephen v. Prunty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Stevedoring Services of America v. Director, OWCP . . . . . . . 1155,1250 Steven L. v. Board of Ed. of Downers Grove School Dist. 58 . . . 1113,1198 Stevens; Dyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Stevens; Jacobson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177,1260 Stevenson-Bey v. Lungren . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Stewart; Koch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Stewart v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220,1236,1246 Stewart; Woratzeck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173,1260 Stine; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Stoker v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Stone, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Stone v. Byrd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Stone, Leyton & Gershman, P. C.; Devine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Stowe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Strate v. A­1 Contractors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 438 Straub; Atlas Turner, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Strawn; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Strickland Youth Center; Buford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Strongsville; Sistrunk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Struve v. Park Place Apartments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Sturgis, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Suan See Chong v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . 1119 Suffolk Parents of Handicapped Adults v. Wingate . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 725 Sullivan v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Sullivan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Sunburst Products, Inc. v. Cyrk Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.; Oncale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Sundwall v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Superintendent of penal or correctional institution. See name or title of superintendent. Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . 1193 Superior Court of Cal., Santa Clara County; Arteaga v. . . . . . . . . 1233 Supreme Court of Appeals of W. Va.; Dostert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Supreme Court of N. Y.; Einaugler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Suter; Kierstead v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxiii Page Sutor; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Sutton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Swaney v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Sweeney v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Sweeney v. Schmoke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Swiger v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Swigert; Abele v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Swihart; Higgason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Sylvester; Douglas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Sylvester v. Northrop Grumman Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Szmalec v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 T. v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children and Family Services 1176 Tadros v. Brooklyn Developmental Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Tahoe Regional Planning Agency; Suitum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 725 Takacs, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Takahashi v. Livingston Union School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Tak How Investment Ltd. v. Nowak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Talamasey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Tanca v. Nordberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Tapia v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Taplin v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255 Tarapacki v. New Jersey ReIns. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Tarrant; Jefferson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Tarrant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270 Tatreau v. Minnesota Bd. of Medical Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Tatum v. Law Offices of Linnie L. Darden, III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Tauil-Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Tavakoli-Nouri v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Tavares v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Tavora v. New York Mercantile Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Tax Comm'r of Ohio; Shaper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Taylor v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Taylor v. Love . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Taylor; Mangrum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Taylor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103,1148,1161,1181,1223 Taylor Equipment, Inc. v. John Deere Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Tebbetts v. Whitson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Tee v. UAL Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Tei Fu Chen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Tennessee; Giorgio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Tennessee; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218,1257 Tennessee; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lxxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Territory. See name of Territory. Terry v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Texaco Inc.; Commissioner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Texas; Altschul v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177,1244,1245 Texas; Barnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Texas; Brewer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Texas; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Texas; Burks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Texas; Carman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Texas v. Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Texas; Cockrell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Texas; Dickerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Texas; Goff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Texas; Golden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Texas; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Texas; Herman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Texas; Johnson-Bey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261 Texas; Kelly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Texas; Lackey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Texas; Losada v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261 Texas; Madden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Texas; Maxwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Texas; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Texas; Moreno Ramos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Texas; Morris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Texas v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Texas; Runnels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Texas; Sisk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Texas; Soria v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 Texas; Southern v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Texas; Spence v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Texas; Szmalec v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Texas; Trevino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Texas; Villareal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Texas; Westley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Texas Instruments Corp.; Maudal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp. . . . . . . . 1228 Texas Utilities Electric Co.; Morgan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Thalacker; Seiler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Thanh Hai Vominh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Thiokol Corp. v. Revenue Division, Dept. of Treasury of Mich. . . 1271 Thomas; Banks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Thomas; Gonzales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Thomas v. McCotter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxv Page Thomas v. Owens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Thomas v. Tusan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Thomas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110,1221 Thomas v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148,1225 Thomas, Head & Greisen Employees Trust; Buster v. . . . . . . . . . 1116 Thompson v. Calderon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1259 Thompson; Holcomb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Thompson; McBride v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Thompson v. True . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Thompson v. Trusty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Thompson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Thongvanh v. Ault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 THORN Americas, Inc. v. Fogie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Thornell; Robertson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Thornton v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Thornton v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Thornton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Three Rivers Area Hospital; Hutton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Thymes; Pigram v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. California Labor Comm'r . . . . 1248 Tidik v. Kaufman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Tidik v. Ritsema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Tidik v. Tidik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Tierney v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Tilley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1271 Tillman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Timber v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Timmons v. Turner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351 Tin Yat Chin v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Tipton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 Tobie v. Department of Interior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124,1237 Todd v. Newberry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Todd v. U. S. Parole Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Tokars v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Tolbert v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Tolbert v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Tolliver v. Myers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Toombs; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127,1194 Topp v. Idaho State Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Torres v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Tosh v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Totoro v. H. A. DeHart & Son, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Tower Air, Inc.; Branch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lxxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Town. See name of town. Townsend; Carner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Towse; Campbell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Tracy; Shaper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Transaero, Inc.; La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Transportation Communications Union; Gresham v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Trans World Airlines; Colligan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Traylor Brothers, Inc.; DiGiovanni v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Tremblay v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Trest v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Trevino v. Gates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Trevino; Gates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Trevino v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Trevino-Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Triem v. Alaska Bar Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Trillo v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Trimiew v. Norfolk Southern R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Tripati v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Triplett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236,1270 Tristan Montoya, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1284 Trobaugh v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Trotter v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Trowbridge v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Trowery v. Gale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 True; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Trustees of Cal. State Univ. and Colleges; Ponce-Bran v. . . . . . . . 1191 Trustees of Teamsters Pension Trust of Phila. v. Federal Express 1151 Trusty; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Tucker v. Coggins/Continental Granite Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Tucker v. Department of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Tucker v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Tucker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1178,1192,1222 Tucker Bey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Tuerk v. Otis Elevator Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Tuller v. Neal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Tulsa v. Spradling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Tumlin v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Turner; Bailey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Turner v. Denmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Turner; Dever v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Turner v. Guam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Turner v. Kuykendall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124,1194 Turner; Timmons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxvii Page Turnpaugh v. LeCureux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Turpin; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Turpin; Gary v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Tusan; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Twin Cities Area New Party; Timmons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351 Tyler, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1273 Tyler v. Schriro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Tyler v. Ulrich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Tyus; Urban Search Management v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 UAL Corp.; Tee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1264 Ugwu v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Ukandu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Ulloa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Ulrich; Tyler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Umana; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1275 Union. For labor union, see name of trade. Union Pacific R. Co. v. Comsource Independent Food Service Cos. 1229 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Union Recovery Ltd. Partnership; Horton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 United. For labor union, see name of trade. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Kahn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 United Companies Lending Corp. v. McGehee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 United Machine Specialties Corp.; Vrettos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 United Mine Workers 1992 Benefit Plan v. Leckie Smokeless Coal 1118 United Mo. Bank of Kansas City, N. A.; Laws v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 United States. See name of other party. U. S. Court of Appeals; Arteaga v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 U. S. Court of Appeals; Bast v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 U. S. Court of Appeals; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1261 U. S. District Court; Bergne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 U. S. District Court; Cincinnati Enquirer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 U. S. District Court; Home Depot U. S. A., Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 U. S. District Court; House v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 U. S. District Court; Ledet v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 U. S. District Court; Nicolaus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 U. S. District Court; Patterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 U. S. District Court; Sidles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 U. S. District Court; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 U. S. District Court; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 U. S. District Judge; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 U. S. District Judge; Perryman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 U. S. Information Agency; Weaver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 U. S. Marshals Service; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 U. S. Parole Comm'n; Holman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR lxxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page U. S. Parole Comm'n; Todd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 U. S. Postal Service; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 U. S. Postal Service; Czerkies v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 U. S. Postal Service; Daniels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 U. S. Postal Service; Edmonds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 U. S. Postal Service; Jenkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217,1252 United Technologies Corp.; Emerick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Universal Computer Systems, Inc., In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 University of Minn.; Goonewardena v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 University of N. M.; Judd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 University of Wash.; Denouden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Unknown; Brock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Upjohn Co. v. Ambrosini . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Urbana; Hays v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Urban Search Management v. Tyus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Uwagbale v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . 1157 Uzzell; Hawkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Vaccaro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Vaden v. Powell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Valdez-Mejia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Vance v. Peters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Vander Ark; Heimermann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 Van Harken v. Chicago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Van Holt; National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Vann v. Darden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Van Scoy v. Shell Oil Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168,1169 Van Zant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1271 Vartinelli v. Hutchinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Vasquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Veale v. Citibank, F. S. B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114,1198 Veale v. New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Veasy; Hearn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Veatch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149,1280 Vega v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Vela v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Velasco v. Horgan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Velasquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 Velazquez-Medina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270 Velazquez-Overa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Vemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Venable v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 651 Venegas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Venkataraghaven; McReynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Verdin v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxix Page Vergara v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Vey, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303 Vey v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937 Via v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Vickery v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Vidal v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Vieux v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Village. See name of village. Villareal v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254 Vinci v. Waste Management, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Vines v. Buchler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Vines v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Virginia; Barnabei v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Virginia; Mickens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Virginia; Moretz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Virginia; Morris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Virginia; Riddick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Virginia; Spicer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Virginia; Watkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Virgin Islands; Hollar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1277 Visintine, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Visintine v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150,1205 Viswanathan v. Board of Governors of Univ. of N. C. . . . . . . . 1115,1271 Volberg v. Pataki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Volkswagen of America, Inc.; Zimmerman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Volpe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Vominh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Von Grabe v. Ziff Davis Publishing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Von Hoff v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 Vrettos v. Bell Atlantic-New Jersey, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Vrettos v. Stage House Inn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Vrettos v. United Machine Specialties Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 W. v. Bryan Independent School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Wafer v. Gay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Wafer v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Walker v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Walker v. Kentucky Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1269 Walker; Lutalo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Walker; Shaller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Walker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191,1219 Walker v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Wall v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Wallis v. Hernando County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Walsh v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xc TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Walt Disney Co.; Howard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189,1237 Walters; Algernon Blair, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Walters; Kutnyak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Wambach v. Creecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Ward; Bingman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Ward v. Georgetown Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Warden. See name of warden. Ware; Santiago v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Ware v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1179 Warner; Pagan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Warner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. . . . . . . . . . . 17,1153 Warren v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Warren v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Washington, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Washington; Caffrey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109,1194 Washington; Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Indian Reservation v. 1168 Washington; Eddmonds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Washington; Garner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Washington v. Jacksonville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175,1260 Washington v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Washington; Krier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Washington; Manussier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Washington v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Washington; Saiyed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Washington; Tierney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Washington v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth.; Kingston Constructors v. 1274 Waste Management, Inc.; Vinci v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Watkins, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1272 Watkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Watkins v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Watson v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257 Watts v. Railroad Retirement Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Watts v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Weaver v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Weaver v. U. S. Information Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Weaver v. Weaver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Webber v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Weekly v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 Weisman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Welborn; Collins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1272 Welky v. Makowski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Wells v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xci Page Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Wellshear v. Rishell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Werner v. McCotter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Wesley v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Wessels v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 West; Boulineau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 West v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 West; Porter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129,1283 West; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148,1225 West v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 West American Ins. Co. v. Freeman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Western Construction Co.; Hartnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Westley v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Westley v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Weston; Fort Stewart Assn. of Educators v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Westwinds Apartments; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Wharton v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Wheeler v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 White, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 White v. Adams County Detention Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 White; Baticados v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 White; Cohea v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199,1243 White; Horn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 White v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1177 White v. O'Connor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 White; Pettco Enterprises, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 White; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 White v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181 White v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 White; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Whitecliff v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Whitehead v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Whiterock v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 White Wing Associates v. Solano County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 White Wing Development, Inc. v. Solano County . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Whitman; Presbytery of N. J. of Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. 1155 Whitson; Tebbetts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Wicklund; Lambert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292 Widnall; House the Homeless, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Wiford v. Boone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Wiggins v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Wilder v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Wilkins v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Wilkinson; Block v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xcii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Wilkinson v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Wilkinson & Jenkins Construction Co.; Maccaferri Gabions, Inc. v. 1167 Willette; Burnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126,1225 Williams, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102,1114,1208 Williams v. Avnet, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Williams v. Borg & Warner Auto Elec. & Mech. Systems Corp. . . 1153 Williams v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Williams v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Williams v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Williams v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145,1225 Williams v. Mobley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Williams v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256 Williams v. Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Williams v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158,1283 Williams v. United States . 1129,1150,1183,1188,1192,1220,1222,1234,1235 Williams Natural Gas Co. v. Amoco Production Co. . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Williamson v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Williamson; Henry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Williamson of Homestead v. Pidal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Willis v. DeTella . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202,1284 Willis v. Parrish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Willoughby v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1278 Willoughby v. Potomac Electric Power Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Wilshire Terrace Corp.; Pierson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Wilson v. Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Wilson v. Brother Records, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Wilson; Chambers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1280 Wilson v. Drake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Wilson; Ford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Wilson; Gallego v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Wilson v. Saba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Wilson; Scruggs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1265 Wilson; Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Wilson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Wilson v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Wimbush v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Windom v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Windsor v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Wing; Bernys v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244,1268 Wingate; Suffolk Parents of Handicapped Adults v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Winslow; Morrow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Wisconsin; Hampton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Wisconsin; LaPlant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Wisconsin; Larson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xciii Page Wisconsin; Richards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385,1102,1154 Wisconsin ex rel. Sprague; Hacklander-Ready v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Wisconsin Medical Examining Bd.; Saculla v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Witchell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Withers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Witter v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 WJM Realty v. State Roads Comm'n of Md. Highway Admin. . . . 1212 Wolf v. Federal Republic of Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Wolf; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Wolfe v. DeBose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Wolfe v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Wolfgram v. State Bar of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1283 Womble v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Women Prisoners, D. C. Dept. of Corrections v. District of Columbia 1196 Women's Choice of Bergen County; Robokoff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Wonderland Greyhound Park, Inc.; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Wong v. Han Kuk Chun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Wood; Bianchi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Wood v. Garner Food Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Wood v. Gotcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Wood; Gray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Wood; Melius v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Wood v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Woodall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Woodard v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266 Wood-Ede v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Woodruff, Inc.; Schwarz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1175 Woods v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Woods v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Woods; Rose v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Woolley v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1279 Woolley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Wooten v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Wooten v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Wootton v. Lemons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Woratzeck v. Stewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173,1260 Word of Faith World Outreach Center Church v. Sawyer . . . . . . . 1117 Workman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1281 Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. of Pa.; Finberg v. . . . . . . . 1123 World Savings and Loan Assn.; Milton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Worsham; Booker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Worthington v. Glickman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Wright, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Wright v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Job: 520REP Unit: U123 [07-19-99 22:31:04] PGT: TCR xciv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Wright; Mundy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Wright v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Wright v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169,1187,1220,1226,1236 Wronke v. Canady . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 W. W. Henry Co.; Guilbeau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 W. W. W. Enterprises, Inc. v. Pidal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Wyatt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Yankton Sioux Tribe; South Dakota v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1263 Yarborough v. Keane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Yat Chin v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Yee v. Hughes Aircraft Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Yellowstone County; Pease v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Yonkers; Nadal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Young v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Young v. Fordice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273 Young; Freeman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Young v. Harper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 Young v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Young; Murphy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Young v. Stine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Young v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131,1162,1181 Yount v. Frank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1176 Yourdon, Inc. v. Bridges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Zackary v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270 Zafiratos v. Monroe Township . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Zamora v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Zankich v. Maricopa County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Zaragoza v. Cianchetti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Zarnes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102,1239 Zavaras; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Zaveletta; Shoobs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Zenith Ins. Co.; Lightman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1274 Zielinski v. Oak Forest Police Pension Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Ziff Davis Publishing Co.; Von Grabe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Zimmerman; Lowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1267 Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Zindell; Brasten v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1276 Zion v. Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AT OCTOBER TERM, 1996 UNITED STATES v. GONZALES et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the tenth circuit No. 95­1605. Argued December 11, 1996-Decided March 3, 1997 All three respondents were convicted in New Mexico courts and sentenced to prison terms on state charges arising from the use of guns by two of them to hold up undercover officers during a drug sting operation. After they began to serve their state sentences, respondents were con- victed on various drug and related federal charges connected to the sting operation, and of using firearms during those crimes in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 924(c). In ordering their imprisonment, the District Court directed that the portion of their federal sentences attributable to the drug convictions run concurrently with their state sentences, with the remaining 60-month sentences required by § 924(c) to run consecutively to both. Among other rulings, the Tenth Circuit vacated the firearms sentences on the ground that they should have run concurrently with the state prison terms. The court found § 924(c)'s language to be am- biguous, resorted to the legislative history, and held that a § 924(c) sen- tence may run concurrently with a previously imposed, already opera- tional state sentence, but not with another federal sentence. Held: Section § 924(c)'s plain language-i. e., "the sentence . . . under this subsection [shall not] run concurrently with any other term of imprison- ment" (emphasis added)-forbids a federal district court to direct that the section's mandatory 5-year firearms sentence run concurrently with any other prison term, whether state or federal. Read naturally, the section's word "any" has an expansive meaning that is not limited to federal sentences, and so must be interpreted as referring to all "term[s] 1 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN 2 UNITED STATES v. GONZALES Opinion of the Court of imprisonment," including those imposed by state courts. Cf., e. g., United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U. S. 350, 358. Unlike the Tenth Circuit, this Court sees nothing remarkable (much less ambiguous) about Congress' decision, in drafting § 924(c), to prohibit concurrent sentences instead of simply mandating consecutive ones. Moreover, given the straightforward statutory command, there is no reason to resort to legislative history. Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 254. Indeed, the legislative history excerpt relied upon by the Tenth Circuit only muddies the waters. Contrary to that court's interpretation, § 924(c)'s prohibition applies only to the section's manda- tory firearms sentence, and does not limit a district court's normal authority under § 3584(a) to order that other federal sentences run con- currently with or consecutively to other state or federal prison terms. Pp. 4­11. 65 F. 3d 814, vacated and remanded. O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer, J., joined, post, p. 12. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 14. Miguel A. Estrada argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Del- linger, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, and Dep- uty Solicitor General Dreeben. Edward Bustamante, by appointment of the Court, 519 U. S. 804, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Angela Arellanes, by appointment of the Court, 519 U. S. 804, Roberto Albertorio, by appointment of the Court, 519 U. S. 962, and Carter G. Phillips.* Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. We are asked to decide whether a federal court may direct that a prison sentence under 18 U. S. C. § 924(c) run concur- rently with a state-imposed sentence, even though § 924(c) *Leah J. Prewitt, Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Placido G. Gomez, and Barbara Bergman filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging affirmance. 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 1 (1997) 3 Opinion of the Court provides that a sentence imposed under that statute "shall [not] . . . run concurrently with any other term of imprison- ment." We hold that it may not. I Respondents were arrested in a drug sting operation during which two of them pulled guns on undercover police officers. All three were convicted in New Mexico courts on charges arising from the holdup. The state courts sen- tenced them to prison terms ranging from 13 to 17 years. After they began to serve their state sentences, respondents were convicted in federal court of committing various drug offenses connected to the sting operation, and conspiring to do so, in violation of 21 U. S. C. §§ 841 and 846. They were also convicted of using firearms during and in relation to those drug trafficking crimes, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 924(c). Respondents received sentences ranging from 120 to 147 months in prison, of which 60 months reflected the mandatory sentence required for their firearms convictions. Pursuant to § 924(c), the District Court ordered that the por- tion of respondents' federal sentences attributable to the drug convictions run concurrently with their state sentences, with the remaining 60 months due to the firearms offenses to run consecutively to both. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit vacated re- spondents' sentences for the firearms violations, on the ground that the § 924(c) sentences should have run concur- rently with the state prison terms. 65 F. 3d 814 (1995). (The court also vacated respondents' substantive drug con- victions and dealt with various other sentencing issues not before us.) Although the Court of Appeals recognized that other Circuits had uniformly "held that § 924(c)'s plain lan- guage prohibits sentences imposed under that statute from running concurrently with state sentences," it nevertheless thought that "a literal reading of the statutory language would produce an absurd result." Id., at 819. Feeling 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN 4 UNITED STATES v. GONZALES Opinion of the Court obliged to "venture into the thicket of legislative history," id., at 820 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), the court found a line in a Senate Committee Report indi- cating that " `the mandatory sentence under the revised sub- section 924(c) [should] be served prior to the start of the sentence for the underlying or any other offense,' " ibid. (quoting S. Rep. No. 98­225, pp. 313­314 (1983) (hereinafter S. Rep.)) (emphasis deleted). If this statement were applied literally, respondents would have to serve first their state sentences, then their 5-year federal firearms sentences, and finally the sentences for their narcotics convictions-even though the narcotics sentences normally would have run con- currently with the state sentences, since they all arose out of the same criminal activity. 65 F. 3d, at 821. To avoid this irrational result, the court held that "§ 924(c)'s manda- tory five-year sentence may run concurrently with a pre- viously imposed state sentence that a defendant has already begun to serve." Id., at 819. We granted certiorari, 518 U. S. 1003, and now vacate and remand. II Our analysis begins, as always, with the statutory text. Section 924(c)(1) provides: "Whoever, during and in relation to any . . . drug traf- ficking crime . . . for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime . . . , be sentenced to imprisonment for five years . . . . Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not place on probation or suspend the sen- tence of any person convicted of a violation of this sub- section, nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment including that imposed for the . . . drug trafficking crime in which the firearm was used or carried." 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1) (emphasis added). 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 1 (1997) 5 Opinion of the Court The question we face is whether the phrase "any other term of imprisonment" "means what it says, or whether it should be limited to some subset" of prison sentences, Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1, 4 (1980)-namely, only federal sen- tences. Read naturally, the word "any" has an expansive meaning, that is, "one or some indiscriminately of what- ever kind." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 97 (1976). Congress did not add any language limiting the breadth of that word, and so we must read § 924(c) as referring to all "term[s] of imprisonment," including those imposed by state courts. Cf. United States v. Alvarez- Sanchez, 511 U. S. 350, 358 (1994) (noting that statute refer- ring to "any law enforcement officer" includes "federal, state, or local" officers); Collector v. Hubbard, 12 Wall. 1, 15 (1871) (stating "it is quite clear" that a statute prohibiting the filing of suit "in any court" "includes the State courts as well as the Federal courts," because "there is not a word in the [statute] tending to show that the words `in any court' are not used in their ordinary sense"). There is no basis in the text for limiting § 924(c) to federal sentences. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens suggests that the word "any" as used in the first sentence of § 924(c) "un- questionably has the meaning `any federal.' " Post, at 14. In that first sentence, however, Congress explicitly limited the scope of the phrase "any crime of violence or drug traf- ficking crime" to those "for which [a defendant] may be pros- ecuted in a court of the United States." Given that Con- gress expressly limited the phrase "any crime" to only federal crimes, we find it significant that no similar restric- tion modifies the phrase "any other term of imprisonment," which appears only two sentences later and is at issue in this case. See Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (" `Where Congress includes particular language in one sec- tion of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intention- ally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion' "). 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN 6 UNITED STATES v. GONZALES Opinion of the Court The Court of Appeals also found ambiguity in Congress' decision, in drafting § 924(c), to prohibit concurrent sen- tences instead of simply mandating consecutive sentences. 65 F. 3d, at 820. Unlike the lower court, however, we see nothing remarkable (much less ambiguous) about Congress' choice of words. Because consecutive and concurrent sen- tences are exact opposites, Congress implicitly required one when it prohibited the other. This "ambiguity" is, in any event, beside the point because this phraseology has no bear- ing on whether Congress meant § 924(c) sentences to run con- secutively only to other federal terms of imprisonment. Given the straightforward statutory command, there is no reason to resort to legislative history. Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 254 (1992). Indeed, far from clarifying the statute, the legislative history only mud- dies the waters. The excerpt from the Senate Report ac- companying the 1984 amendment to § 924(c), relied upon by the Court of Appeals, reads: "[T]he Committee intends that the mandatory sentence under the revised subsection 924(c) be served prior to the start of the sentence for the underlying or any other offense." S. Rep., at 313­314. This snippet of legislative history injects into § 924(c) an entirely new idea-that a defendant must serve the 5-year prison term for his firearms conviction before any other sen- tences. This added requirement, however, is "in no way an- chored in the text of the statute." Shannon v. United States, 512 U. S. 573, 583 (1994). The Court of Appeals was troubled that this rule might lead to irrational results. Normally, a district court has au- thority to decide whether federal prison terms should run concurrently with or consecutively to other prison sentences. 18 U. S. C. § 3584(a) (vesting power in district court to run most prison terms either concurrently or consecutively); United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 1 (1997) 7 Opinion of the Court § 5G1.3 (Nov. 1995) (USSG) (guiding court's discretion under § 3584(a)). If the prison terms for respondents' other fed- eral sentences could not begin until after their § 924(c) terms were completed, however, the District Court would effec- tively be stripped of its statutory power to decide whether the sentences for the underlying narcotics offenses should run concurrently with respondents' state terms of imprison- ment. 65 F. 3d, at 822. The court observed that such a rule could lead to dramatically higher sentences, particularly for the respondents in this case. Perez, for example, is already serving a 17-year state prison term for his role in the holdup. Normally, his 7.25-year federal sentence for narcotics posses- sion would run concurrently with that state term under USSG § 5G1.3(b); his 5-year firearm sentence under § 924(c) would follow both, for a total of 22 years in prison. If he must serve his federal narcotics sentence after his 5-year firearms sentence, however, he would face a total of 29.25 years in prison. 65 F. 3d, at 821. Seeking to avoid this conflict between § 924(c) (as reinter- preted in light of its legislative history) and § 3584(a), the Court of Appeals held that § 924(c) only prohibited running federal terms of imprisonment concurrently. Ibid. It also reasoned that such a narrow reading was necessary because "there is no way in which a later-sentencing federal court can cause the mandatory 5-year § 924(c) sentence to be served before a state sentence that is already being served." Ibid. We see three flaws in this reasoning. First, the statutory texts of §§ 924(c) and 3584(a), unvarnished by legislative history, are entirely consistent. Section 924(c) specifies only that a court must not run a firearms sentence concur- rently with other prison terms. It leaves plenty of room for a court to run other sentences-whether for state or fed- eral offenses-concurrently with one another pursuant to § 3584(a) and USSG § 5G1.3. The statutes clash only if we engraft onto § 924(c) a requirement found only in a single 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN 8 UNITED STATES v. GONZALES Opinion of the Court sentence buried in the legislative history: that the firearms sentence must run first. We therefore follow the text, rather than the legislative history, of § 924(c). By disregard- ing the suggestion that a district court must specify that a sentence for a firearms conviction be served before other sentences, we give full meaning to the texts of both §§ 924(c) and 3584(a). See United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95­96 (1820) (Marshall, C. J.) ("Where there is no ambigu- ity in the words, there is no room for construction. The case must be a strong one indeed, which would justify a court in departing from the plain meaning of words . . . in search of an intention which the words themselves did not suggest"). Second, even if we ignored the plain language of § 924(c) and required courts to list the order in which a defendant must serve the sentences for different convictions, we would thereby create a rule that is superfluous in light of § 3584(c). That statute instructs the Bureau of Prisons to treat multi- ple terms of imprisonment, whether imposed concurrently or consecutively, "for administrative purposes as a single, ag- gregate term of imprisonment." Ibid. As a practical mat- ter, then, it makes no difference whether a court specifies the sequence in which each portion of an aggregate sentence must be served. We will not impose on sentencing courts new duties that, in view of other statutory commands, will be effectively meaningless. Third, the Court of Appeals' solution-to allow § 924(c) prison terms to run concurrently with state sentences-does not eliminate any anomaly that arises when a firearms sen- tence must run "first." Although it is clear that a prison term under § 924(c) cannot possibly run before an earlier im- posed state prison term, the same holds true when a prisoner is already serving a federal sentence. See § 3585(a) (provid- ing that a federal prison term commences when the defend- ant is received into custody or voluntarily arrives to begin serving the sentence). Because it is impossible to start a 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 1 (1997) 9 Opinion of the Court § 924(c) sentence before any prison term that the prisoner is already serving, whether imposed by a state or federal court, limiting the phrase "any other term of imprisonment" to state sentences does not get rid of the problem. Thus, we think that the Court of Appeals both invented the problem and devised the wrong solution. Justice Breyer questions, in dissent, whether Congress wanted to impose a § 924(c) sentence on a defendant who is already serving a prison term pursuant to a virtually identi- cal state sentencing enhancement statute. Post, at 15. A federal court could not (for double jeopardy reasons) sen- tence a person to two consecutive federal prison terms for a single violation of a federal criminal statute, such as § 924(c). If Congress cannot impose two consecutive federal § 924(c) sentences, the dissent argues, it is unlikely that Congress would have wanted to stack a § 924(c) sentence onto a prison term under a virtually identical state firearms enhancement. Ibid. As we have already observed, however, the straight- forward language of § 924(c) leaves no room to speculate about congressional intent. See supra, at 4­5. The statute speaks of "any term of imprisonment" without limitation, and there is no intimation that Congress meant § 924(c) sentences to run consecutively only to certain types of prison terms. District courts have some discretion under the Sentencing Guidelines, of course, in cases where related offenses are prosecuted in multiple proceedings, to establish sentences "with an eye toward having such punishments ap- proximate the total penalty that would have been imposed had the sentences for the different offenses been imposed at the same time . . . ." Witte v. United States, 515 U. S. 389, 404 (1995) (discussing USSG § 5G1.3). See post, at 14­15 (Breyer, J., dissenting). When Congress enacted § 924(c)'s consecutive-sentencing provision, however, it cabined the sentencing discretion of district courts in a single circum- stance: When a defendant violates § 924(c), his sentencing en- 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN 10 UNITED STATES v. GONZALES Opinion of the Court hancement under that statute must run consecutively to all other prison terms. Given this clear legislative directive, it is not for the courts to carve out statutory exceptions based on judicial perceptions of good sentencing policy. Other language in § 924(c) reinforces our conclusion. In 1984, Congress amended § 924(c) so that its sentencing en- hancement would apply regardless of whether the underly- ing felony statute "provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device." Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98­473, § 1005(a), 98 Stat. 2138­2139. Congress thus repudi- ated the result we reached in Busic v. United States, 446 U. S. 398 (1980), in which we held that "prosecution and en- hanced sentencing under § 924(c) is simply not permissible where the predicate felony statute contains its own enhance- ment provision," irrespective of whether the Government had actually sought an enhancement under that predicate statute. Id., at 404; see also Simpson v. United States, 435 U. S. 6, 15 (1978) (holding that a federal court may not im- pose sentences under both § 924(c) and the weapon enhance- ment under the armed bank robbery statute, 18 U. S. C. § 2113, based on a single criminal transaction). Our holdings in these cases were based on our conclusion that the un- amended text of § 924(c) left us with little "more than a guess" as to how Congress meant to mesh that statute with the sentencing enhancement provisions scattered throughout the federal criminal code. Simpson, supra, at 15; Busic, supra, at 405. The 1984 amendment, however, eliminated these ambiguities. At that point, Congress made clear its desire to run § 924(c) enhancements consecutively to all other prison terms, regardless of whether they were imposed under firearms enhancement statutes similar to § 924(c). We therefore cannot agree with Justice Breyer's contention that our interpretation of § 924(c) distinguishes between "those subject to undischarged state, and those subject to 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 1 (1997) 11 Opinion of the Court undischarged federal, sentences." Post, at 16. Both sorts of defendants face sentences for their other convictions that run concurrently with or consecutively to each other accord- ing to normal sentencing principles, plus an enhancement under § 924(c). In short, in light of the 1984 amendment, we think that Congress has foreclosed the dissent's argument that § 924(c) covers only federal sentences. Finally, we pause to comment on Justice Stevens' con- cern over how today's decision might affect other cases where "the state trial follows the federal trial and the state judge imposes a concurrent sentence" that might be viewed as inconsistent with § 924(c). Post, at 12. That, of course, was not the sequence in which the respondents were sen- tenced in this case, and so we have no occasion to decide whether a later sentencing state court is bound to order its sentence to run consecutively to the § 924(c) term of impris- onment. See ibid. All that is before us today is the author- ity of a later sentencing federal court to impose a consecutive sentence under § 924(c). We are hesitant to reach beyond the facts of this case to decide a question that is not squarely presented for our review. III In sum, we hold that the plain language of 18 U. S. C. § 924(c) forbids a federal district court to direct that a term of imprisonment under that statute run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment, whether state or federal. The statute does not, however, limit the court's authority to order that other federal sentences run concurrently with or consecutively to other prison terms-state or federal- under § 3584. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN 12 UNITED STATES v. GONZALES Stevens, J., dissenting Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Breyer joins, dissenting. This case arose out of a criminal enterprise that violated both New Mexico law and federal law and gave rise to both state and federal prosecutions. It raises a narrow but important question concerning the scope of the prohibition against concurrent sentences contained in 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1). As the Government reads that provision, it pro- hibits the § 924(c) sentence from running concurrently with a state sentence that has already been imposed, but permits concurrent state and federal sentences when the federal prosecution precedes the state prosecution.1 Thus, the length of the total term of imprisonment-including both the state sentence and the federal sentence-is determined, in part, by the happenstance of which case is tried first. Read literally, however, the text of § 924(c)(1) would avoid this anomalous result. Because the text broadly prohibits the § 924(c) sentence from running "concurrently with any other term of imprisonment" regardless of whether that other term is imposed before or after the federal sentence, if the statute is read literally, it would require state judges to make any state term of imprisonment run consecutively to the § 924(c) sentence. Alternatively, if the state trial fol- lows the federal trial and the state judge imposes a concur- rent sentence (because she does not read § 924(c) as having any applicability to state sentences), the literal text would require the federal authorities to suspend the § 924(c) sen- tence until the state sentence has been served. By relying so heavily on pure textual analysis, the Court's opinion would appear to dictate this result. Like the Gov- ernment, however, I do not think the statute can reasonably be interpreted as containing any command to state sentenc- ing judges or as requiring the suspension of any federal sen- tences when concurrent state sentences are later imposed. 1 Reply Brief for United States 10­11; Tr. of Oral Arg. 6­10. 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 1 (1997) 13 Stevens, J., dissenting Thus, common sense requires us to reject a purely literal reading of the text. The question that then arises is which is the better of two plausible nonliteral readings. Should the term "any other term of imprisonment" be narrowed by reading it to cover only "any other term of imprisonment that has already been imposed," as the Government argues, or "any other federal term of imprisonment," as respond- ents contend? For three reasons, I think it more likely that Congress intended the latter interpretation. First, it borders on the irrational to assume that Congress would actually intend the severity of the defendant's punishment in a case of this kind to turn on the happenstance of whether the state or the fed- eral prosecution was concluded first. Respondents' reading of the statute avoids that anomaly. Second, when § 924(c) was amended in 1970 to prohibit concurrent sentences, see Title II, Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1889, this prohibition applied only to the federal sentence imposed for the underlying offense. When Congress amended the statute in 1984 to broaden the prohibition beyond the under- lying offense, it said nothing about state sentences; if Con- gress had intended the amendment to apply to state as well as federal sentences, I think there would have been some mention of this important change in the legislative history.2 Furthermore, the 1984 amendment was part of a general revision of sentencing laws that sought to achieve more uniformity and predictability in federal sentencing. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1987, 18 U. S. C. § 3551 et seq. The anomaly that the Government's read- ing of § 924(c) authorizes is inconsistent with the basic uni- formity theme of the 1984 legislation. Finally, the context 2 "In a case where the construction of legislative language such as this makes so sweeping and so relatively unorthodox a change as that made here, I think judges as well as detectives may take into consideration the fact that a watchdog did not bark in the night." Harrison v. PPG Indus- tries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578, 602 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN 14 UNITED STATES v. GONZALES Breyer, J., dissenting in which the relevant language appears is concerned entirely with federal sentencing. Indeed, the word "any" as used earlier in the section unquestionably has the meaning "any federal." 3 Given the Government's recognition of the fact that a com- pletely literal reading of § 924(c)(1) is untenable, and the further fact that the Court offers nothing more than the dic- tionary definition of the word "any" to support its result, I think the wiser course is to interpret that word in the prohi- bition against concurrent sentences as having the same meaning as when the same word is first used in the statute. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens joins, dissenting. I believe that Justice Stevens is right. Section 924(c) concerns federal, not state, sentences. Hence Congress in- tended the words "other term of imprisonment" to refer to other federal, not other state, "terms." With respect to un- discharged state sentences, therefore, 18 U. S. C. § 924(c) is permissive, not mandatory. That is, it permits the federal sentencing judge to make a § 924(c) sentence and an undis- charged state sentence concurrent. Quite often, it will make little difference that, in this state/ federal circumstance, the consecutive/concurrent decision is permissive, not mandatory. That is because federal sentenc- ing judges, understanding that § 924 requires consecutive sentencing where undischarged federal sentences are at issue, would normally treat undischarged state sentences the same way. They would make the § 924(c) sentence consecu- 3 In the first sentence of § 924(c)(1) the word "any" is expressly confined to federal prosecutions. When the word is used a second time to describe "any other provision of law," it is again quite obvious that it embraces only other provisions of federal law even though that limitation is implicit rather than explicit. Nowhere in § 924(c) is there any explicit reference to state law or state sentences. 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 1 (1997) 15 Breyer, J., dissenting tive to undischarged state sentences (even though § 924(c) would not force that result) in order to avoid treating simi- larly situated offenders differently. United States Sen- tencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 5G1.3 (Nov. 1995). Ordinarily, the fact that the State, rather than the Federal Government, imposed an undischarged sentence is irrelevant in terms of any sentencing objective. In at least one circumstance, however, federal sentencing judges would probably not treat an undischarged state sen- tence as if it were federal. That is where the undischarged state sentence is a sentence under a state statute that itself simply mimics § 924(c). Such a situation cannot arise where the initial undischarged sentence is federal. Indeed, the Constitution would forbid any effort to apply § 924(c) twice to a single instance of gun possession. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U. S. 161, 165 (1977). But a State might have its own version of § 924(c), and a federal § 924(c) offender could be subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment imposed under such a statute. To run a § 924(c) sentence consecu- tively in such an instance (even if constitutionally permissi- ble, cf. Abbate v. United States, 359 U. S. 187 (1959); Heath v. Alabama, 474 U. S. 82 (1985)) would treat the state offender differently, and far more harshly, than any possible federal counterpart. I am not inventing a purely hypothetical possibility. The State, in the very case before us, has punished respondents, in part, pursuant to a mandatory state sentence enhance- ment statute that has no counterpart in federal law but for § 924(c) itself, which the state statute, N. M. Stat. Ann. § 31­18­16(A) (Supp. 1994), very much resembles. But cf. Witte v. United States, 515 U. S. 389, 398­404 (1995). I un- derstand that Congress wanted to guarantee that § 924(c)'s sentence would amount to an additional sentence. But I do not see why Congress would have wanted to pile Pelion on Ossa in this way, adding the § 924(c) sentence to another sen- tence that does the identical thing. Nor do I believe that 520US1 Unit: $U31 [09-10-99 14:11:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN 16 UNITED STATES v. GONZALES Breyer, J., dissenting Congress would have intended potentially to create this kind of harsh distinction between those subject to undischarged state, and those subject to undischarged federal, sentences- a likely practical result of the majority's holding. See id., at 404­406. This reason, along with those that Justice Stevens has discussed, makes me think that Congress did intend § 924(c) to refer to federal sentences alone, and lead me to dissent in this close case. 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 17 Syllabus WARNER-JENKINSON CO., INC. v. HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the federal circuit No. 95­728. Argued October 15, 1996-Decided March 3, 1997 Petitioner and respondent both manufacture dyes from which impurities must be removed. Respondent's " '746 patent," which issued in 1985, discloses an improved purification process involving the "ultrafiltration" of dye through a porous membrane at pH levels between 6.0 and 9.0. The inventors so limited their claim's pH element during patent prosecu- tion after the patent examiner objected because of a perceived overlap with the earlier "Booth" patent, which disclosed an ultrafiltration proc- ess operating at a pH above 9.0. In 1986, petitioner developed its own ultrafiltration process, which operated at a pH level of 5.0. Respondent sued for infringement of the '746 patent, relying solely on the "doctrine of equivalents," under which a product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is "equivalence" between the elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U. S. 605, 609. Over petitioner's objections that this is an equitable doctrine and is to be applied by the court, the equivalence issue was included among those sent to the jury, which found, inter alia, that petitioner infringed upon the '746 patent. The District Court, among its rulings, entered a permanent injunction against petitioner. The en banc Fed- eral Circuit affirmed, holding that the doctrine of equivalents continues to exist, that the question of equivalence is for the jury to decide, and that the jury had substantial evidence from which to conclude that peti- tioner's process was not substantially different from the process dis- closed in the '746 patent. Held:1. The Court adheres to the doctrine of equivalents. Pp. 24­30. (a) In Graver Tank, supra, at 609, the Court, inter alia, described some of the considerations that go into applying the doctrine, such as the patent's context, the prior art, and the particular circumstances of the case, including the purpose for which an ingredient is used in the patent, the qualities it has when combined with the other ingredients, the function it is intended to perform, and whether persons reasonably 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 18 WARNER-JENKINSON CO. v. HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO. Syllabus skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one that was. Pp. 24­25. (b) This Court rejects petitioner's primary argument, that the doc- trine of equivalents, as set out in Graver Tank in 1950, is inconsistent with, and thus did not survive, particular aspects of Congress' 1952 revi- sion of the Patent Act, 35 U. S. C. § 100 et seq. Petitioner's first three arguments in this regard-that the doctrine (1) is inconsistent with § 112's requirement that a patentee specifically "claim" the covered in- vention, (2) circumvents the patent reissue process under §§ 251­252, and (3) is inconsistent with the primacy of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) in setting a patent's scope-were made in Graver Tank, supra, at 613­615, and n. 3, in the context of the 1870 Patent Act, and failed to command a majority. The 1952 Act is not materially different from the 1870 Act with regard to these matters. Also unpersuasive is petitioner's fourth argument, that the doctrine of equivalents was im- plicitly rejected as a general matter by Congress' specific and limited inclusion of it in § 112, ¶ 6. This new provision was enacted as a tar- geted cure in response to Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U. S. 1, 8, and thereby to allow so-called "means" claims describing an element of an invention by the result accomplished or the function served. Moreover, the statutory reference to "equivalents" appears to be no more than a prophylactic against potential side effects of that cure, i. e., an attempt to limit the application of the broad literal language of "means" claims to those means that are "equivalent" to the actual means shown in the patent specification. Pp. 25­28. (c) The determination of equivalence should be applied as an objec- tive inquiry on an element-by-element basis. The Court is concerned that the doctrine, as it has come to be broadly applied since Graver Tank, conflicts with the Court's numerous holdings that a patent may not be enlarged beyond the scope of its claims. The way to reconcile the two lines of authority is to apply the doctrine to each of the individ- ual elements of a claim, rather than to the accused product or process as a whole. Doing so will preserve some meaning for each of a claim's elements, all of which are deemed material to defining the invention's scope. So long as the doctrine does not encroach beyond these limits, or beyond related limits discussed in the Court's opinion, infra, at 30­34, 39, n. 8, and 39­40, it will not vitiate the central functions of patent claims to define the invention and to notify the public of the patent's scope. Pp. 28­30. (d) Petitioner is correct that Graver Tank did not supersede the well-established limitation on the doctrine of equivalents known as "prosecution history estoppel," whereby a surrender of subject matter during patent prosecution may preclude recapturing any part of that 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 17 (1997) 19 Syllabus subject matter, even if it is equivalent to the matter expressly claimed. But petitioner reaches too far in arguing that any such surrender estab- lishes a bright line beyond which no equivalents may be claimed, and that the reason for an amendment during patent prosecution is therefore irrelevant to any subsequent estoppel. There are a variety of reasons why the PTO may request a change in claim language, and if the patent holder demonstrates that an amendment had a purpose unrelated to patentability, a court must consider that purpose in order to decide whether an estoppel is precluded. Where the patent holder is unable to establish such a purpose, the court should presume that the purpose behind the required amendment is such that prosecution history estop- pel would apply. Here, it is undisputed that the upper limit of 9.0 pH was added to the '746 patent in order to distinguish the Booth patent, but the record before this Court does not reveal the reason for adding the lower 6.0 pH limit. It is therefore impossible to tell whether the latter reason could properly avoid an estoppel. Pp. 30­34. (e) The Court rejects petitioner's argument that Graver Tank re- quires judicial exploration of the intent of the alleged infringer or a case's other equities before allowing application of the doctrine of equiv- alents. Although Graver Tank certainly leaves room for the inclusion of intent-based elements in the doctrine, the Court does not read the case as requiring proof of intent. The better view, and the one consist- ent with Graver Tank's predecessors, see, e. g., Winans v. Denmead, 15 How. 330, 343, and the objective approach to infringement, is that intent plays no role in the doctrine's application. Pp. 34­36. (f) The Court also rejects petitioner's proposal that in order to min- imize conflict with the notice function of patent claims, the doctrine of equivalents should be limited to equivalents that are disclosed within the patent itself. Insofar as the question under the doctrine is whether an accused element is equivalent to a claimed element, the proper time for evaluating equivalency-and knowledge of interchangeability be- tween elements-is at the time of infringement, not at the time the patent was issued. P. 37. (g) The Court declines to consider whether application of the doc- trine of equivalents is a task for the judge or for the jury, since reso- lution of that question is not necessary to answer the question here presented. Pp. 37­39. (h) In the Court's view, the particular linguistic framework used to determine "equivalence," whether the so-called "triple identity" test or the "insubstantial differences" test, is less important than whether the test is probative of the essential inquiry: Does the accused product or process contain elements identical or equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention? Different linguistic frameworks 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 20 WARNER-JENKINSON CO. v. HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO. Syllabus may be more suitable to different cases, depending on their particular facts. The Court leaves it to the Federal Circuit's sound judgment in this area of its special expertise to refine the formulation of the test for equivalence in the orderly course of case-by-case determinations. Pp. 39­40. 2. Because the Federal Circuit did not consider all of the require- ments of the doctrine of equivalents as described by the Court in this case, particularly as related to prosecution history estoppel and the preservation of some meaning for each element in a claim, further pro- ceedings are necessary. Pp. 40­41. 62 F. 3d 1512, reversed and remanded. Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Ginsburg, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Kennedy, J., joined, post, p. 41. Richard G. Taranto argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were H. Bartow Farr III and J. Robert Chambers. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Bingaman, Cornelia T. L. Pillard, Nancy J. Linck, and Albin F. Drost. David E. Schmit argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Gateway Technol- ogies, Inc., by Richard Grant Lyon; for GHZ Equipment Co. by Ronald D. Maines and Richard G. Wilkins; for the Information Technology Industry Council et al. by Joel M. Freed, Jerrold J. Ganzfried, John F. Cooney, and William D. Coston; for the Intellectual Property Owners by Carter G. Phillips, Mark E. Haddad, and Joseph R. Guerra; for MCI Telecommuni- cations Corp. by Paul M. Smith and Nory Miller; for Micron Separations, Inc., by Steven M. Bauer and John J. Cotter; and for Seagate Technology, Inc., et al. by Carrie L. Walthour, Karl A. Limbach, Deborah Bailey- Wells, and Edward P. Heller III. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Biotech- nology Industry Organization by Charles E. Ludlam; for Chiron Corp. by Donald S. Chisum; for the Dallas-Fort Worth Intellectual Property Law Association by Lawrence J. Bassuk; for Litton Systems, Inc., by Laurence 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 17 (1997) 21 Opinion of the Court Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. Nearly 50 years ago, this Court in Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U. S. 605 (1950), set out the modern contours of what is known in patent law as the "doctrine of equivalents." Under this doctrine, a product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is "equivalence" between the elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention. Id., at 609. Petitioner, which was found to have infringed upon respondent's patent under the doctrine of equivalents, invites us to speak the death of that doctrine. We decline that invitation. The significant disagreement within the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concern- ing the application of Graver Tank suggests, however, that the doctrine is not free from confusion. We therefore will endeavor to clarify the proper scope of the doctrine. I The essential facts of this case are few. Petitioner Warner-Jenkinson Co. and respondent Hilton Davis Chemi- cal Co. manufacture dyes. Impurities in those dyes must be removed. Hilton Davis holds United States Patent No. 4,560,746 ('746 patent), which discloses an improved purifica- tion process involving "ultrafiltration." The '746 process filters impure dye through a porous membrane at certain H. Tribe and Jonathan S. Massey; and for the Ohio State Bar Association by Eugene P. Whetzel and Albert L. Bell. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Automobile Manufac- turers Association by D. Dennis Allegretti, Phillip D. Brady, and Andrew D. Koblenz; for the American Intellectual Property Law Association by Robert J. Baechtold, Stevan J. Bosses, Nicholas M. Cannella, Charles L. Gholz, and Roger W. Parkhurst; for the Chemical Manufacturers Associa- tion by Robert A. Armitage and Michael P. Walls; and for the Licensing Executive Society (U. S. A. and Canada), Inc., by Gayle Parker and James W. Gould. 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 22 WARNER-JENKINSON CO. v. HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO. Opinion of the Court pressures and pH levels,1 resulting in a high purity dye product. The '746 patent issued in 1985. As relevant to this case, the patent claims as its invention an improvement in the ul- trafiltration process as follows: "In a process for the purification of a dye . . . the im- provement which comprises: subjecting an aqueous solu- tion . . . to ultrafiltration through a membrane having a nominal pore diameter of 5­15 Angstroms under a hy- drostatic pressure of approximately 200 to 400 p.s.i.g., at a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0, to thereby cause separation of said impurities from said dye . . . ." App. 36­37 (emphasis added). The inventors added the phrase "at a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0" during patent prosecution. At a minimum, this phrase was added to distinguish a previous patent (the "Booth" patent) that disclosed an ultrafiltration process oper- ating at a pH above 9.0. The parties disagree as to why the low-end pH limit of 6.0 was included as part of the claim.2 1 The pH, or power (exponent) of Hydrogen, of a solution is a measure of its acidity or alkalinity. A pH of 7.0 is neutral; a pH below 7.0 is acidic; and a pH above 7.0 is alkaline. Although measurement of pH is on a logarithmic scale, with each whole number difference representing a ten- fold difference in acidity, the practical significance of any such difference will often depend on the context. Pure water, for example, has a neutral pH of 7.0, whereas carbonated water has an acidic pH of 3.0, and concen- trated hydrochloric acid has a pH approaching 0.0. On the other end of the scale, milk of magnesia has a pH of 10.0, whereas household ammonia has a pH of 11.9. 21 Encyclopedia Americana 844 (Int'l ed. 1990). 2 Petitioner contends that the lower limit was added because below a pH of 6.0 the patented process created "foaming" problems in the plant and because the process was not shown to work below that pH level. Brief for Petitioner 4, n. 5, 37, n. 28. Respondent counters that the process was successfully tested to pH levels as low as 2.2 with no effect on the process because of foaming, but offers no particular explanation as to why the lower level of 6.0 pH was selected. Brief for Respondent 34, n. 34. 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 17 (1997) 23 Opinion of the Court In 1986, Warner-Jenkinson developed an ultrafiltration process that operated with membrane pore diameters as- sumed to be 5­15 Angstroms, at pressures of 200 to nearly 500 p. s. i. g., and at a pH of 5.0. Warner-Jenkinson did not learn of the '746 patent until after it had begun commercial use of its ultrafiltration process. Hilton Davis eventually learned of Warner-Jenkinson's use of ultrafiltration and, in 1991, sued Warner-Jenkinson for patent infringement. As trial approached, Hilton Davis conceded that there was no literal infringement, and relied solely on the doctrine of equivalents. Over Warner-Jenkinson's objection that the doctrine of equivalents was an equitable doctrine to be ap- plied by the court, the issue of equivalence was included among those sent to the jury. The jury found that the '746 patent was not invalid and that Warner-Jenkinson infringed upon the patent under the doctrine of equivalents. The jury also found, however, that Warner-Jenkinson had not inten- tionally infringed, and therefore awarded only 20% of the damages sought by Hilton Davis. The District Court denied Warner-Jenkinson's post-trial motions, and entered a perma- nent injunction prohibiting Warner-Jenkinson from practic- ing ultrafiltration below 500 p. s. i. g. and below 9.01 pH. A fractured en banc Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. 62 F. 3d 1512 (1995). The majority below held that the doctrine of equivalents continues to exist and that its touchstone is whether substan- tial differences exist between the accused process and the patented process. Id., at 1521­1522. The court also held that the question of equivalence is for the jury to decide and that the jury in this case had substantial evidence from which it could conclude that the Warner-Jenkinson process was not substantially different from the ultrafiltration proc- ess disclosed in the '746 patent. Id., at 1525. There were three separate dissents, commanding a total of 5 of 12 judges. Four of the five dissenting judges viewed the doctrine of equivalents as allowing an improper expan- 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 24 WARNER-JENKINSON CO. v. HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO. Opinion of the Court sion of claim scope, contrary to this Court's numerous hold- ings that it is the claim that defines the invention and gives notice to the public of the limits of the patent monopoly. Id., at 1537­1538 (opinion of Plager, J.). The fifth dissenter, the late Judge Nies, was able to reconcile the prohibition against enlarging the scope of claims and the doctrine of equivalents by applying the doctrine to each element of a claim, rather than to the accused product or process "overall." Id., at 1574. As she explained it: "The `scope' is not enlarged if courts do not go beyond the substitution of equivalent ele- ments." Ibid. All of the dissenters, however, would have found that a much narrowed doctrine of equivalents may be applied in whole or in part by the court. Id., at 1540­1542 (opinion of Plager, J.); id., at 1579 (opinion of Nies, J.). We granted certiorari, 516 U. S. 1145 (1996), and now reverse and remand. II In Graver Tank we considered the application of the doc- trine of equivalents to an accused chemical composition for use in welding that differed from the patented welding mate- rial by the substitution of one chemical element. 339 U. S., at 610. The substituted element did not fall within the lit- eral terms of the patent claim, but the Court nonetheless found that the "question which thus emerges is whether the substitution [of one element for the other] . . . is a change of such substance as to make the doctrine of equivalents inap- plicable; or conversely, whether under the circumstances the change was so insubstantial that the trial court's invocation of the doctrine of equivalents was justified." Ibid. The Court also described some of the considerations that go into applying the doctrine of equivalents: "What constitutes equivalency must be determined against the context of the patent, the prior art, and the particular circumstances of the case. Equivalence, in the patent law, is not the prisoner of a formula and is 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 17 (1997) 25 Opinion of the Court not an absolute to be considered in a vacuum. It does not require complete identity for every purpose and in every respect. In determining equivalents, things equal to the same thing may not be equal to each other and, by the same token, things for most purposes differ- ent may sometimes be equivalents. Consideration must be given to the purpose for which an ingredient is used in a patent, the qualities it has when combined with the other ingredients, and the function which it is intended to perform. An important factor is whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one that was." Id., at 609. Considering those factors, the Court viewed the difference between the chemical element claimed in the patent and the substitute element to be "colorable only," and concluded that the trial court's judgment of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents was proper. Id., at 612. A Petitioner's primary argument in this Court is that the doctrine of equivalents, as set out in Graver Tank in 1950, did not survive the 1952 revision of the Patent Act, 35 U. S. C. § 100 et seq., because it is inconsistent with several aspects of that Act. In particular, petitioner argues: (1) The doctrine of equivalents is inconsistent with the statutory re- quirement that a patentee specifically "claim" the invention covered by a patent, § 112; (2) the doctrine circumvents the patent reissue process-designed to correct mistakes in draft- ing or the like-and avoids the express limitations on that process, §§ 251­252; (3) the doctrine is inconsistent with the primacy of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) in setting the scope of a patent through the patent prosecution process; and (4) the doctrine was implicitly rejected as a general mat- ter by Congress' specific and limited inclusion of the doctrine 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 26 WARNER-JENKINSON CO. v. HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO. Opinion of the Court in one section regarding "means" claiming, § 112, ¶ 6. All but one of these arguments were made in Graver Tank in the context of the 1870 Patent Act, and failed to command a majority.3 The 1952 Patent Act is not materially different from the 1870 Act with regard to claiming, reissue, and the role of the PTO. Compare, e. g., 35 U. S. C. § 112 ("The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the ap- plicant regards as his invention") with the Consolidated Pat- ent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (the applicant "shall particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination which he claims as his inven- tion or discovery"). Such minor differences as exist be- tween those provisions in the 1870 and the 1952 Acts have no bearing on the result reached in Graver Tank, and thus provide no basis for our overruling it. In the context of in- fringement, we have already held that pre-1952 precedent survived the passage of the 1952 Act. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U. S. 336, 342 (1961) (new section defining infringement "left intact the entire 3 Graver Tank was decided over a vigorous dissent. In that dissent, Justice Black raised the first three of petitioner's four arguments against the doctrine of equivalents. See 339 U. S., at 613­614 (doctrine inconsist- ent with statutory requirement to "distinctly claim" the invention); id., at 614­615 (patent reissue process available to correct mistakes); id., at 615, n. 3 (duty lies with the Patent Office to examine claims and to conform them to the scope of the invention; inventors may appeal Patent Office determinations if they disagree with result). Indeed, petitioner's first argument was not new even in 1950. Nearly 100 years before Graver Tank, this Court approved of the doctrine of equivalents in Winans v. Denmead, 15 How. 330 (1854). The dissent in Winans unsuccessfully argued that the majority result was inconsistent with the requirement in the 1836 Patent Act that the applicant "particu- larly `specify and point' out what he claims as his invention," and that the patent protected nothing more. Id., at 347 (opinion of Campbell, J.). 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 17 (1997) 27 Opinion of the Court body of case law on direct infringement"). We see no reason to reach a different result here.4 Petitioner's fourth argument for an implied congressional negation of the doctrine of equivalents turns on the reference to "equivalents" in the "means" claiming provision of the 1952 Act. Section 112, ¶ 6, a provision not contained in the 1870 Act, states: "An element in a claim for a combination may be ex- pressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be con- strued to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof." (Emphasis added.) Thus, under this new provision, an applicant can describe an element of his invention by the result accomplished or the function served, rather than describing the item or element to be used (e. g., "a means of connecting Part A to Part B," rather than "a two-penny nail"). Congress enacted § 112, ¶ 6, in response to Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U. S. 1 (1946), which rejected claims that "do not describe the invention but use `conveniently functional language at the exact point of novelty.' " Id., at 8 (citation 4 Petitioner argues that the evolution in patent practice from "central" claiming (describing the core principles of the invention) to "peripheral" claiming (describing the outer boundaries of the invention) requires that we treat Graver Tank as an aberration and abandon the doctrine of equiv- alents. Brief for Petitioner 43­45. We disagree. The suggested change in claiming practice predates Graver Tank, is not of statutory origin, and seems merely to reflect narrower inventions in more crowded arts. Also, judicial recognition of so-called "pioneer" patents suggests that the aban- donment of "central" claiming may be overstated. That a claim describ- ing a limited improvement in a crowded field will have a limited range of permissible equivalents does not negate the availability of the doctrine vel non. 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 28 WARNER-JENKINSON CO. v. HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO. Opinion of the Court omitted). See In re Donaldson Co., 16 F. 3d 1189, 1194 (CA Fed. 1994) (Congress enacted predecessor of § 112, ¶ 6, in re- sponse to Halliburton); In re Fuetterer, 319 F. 2d 259, 264, n. 11 (CCPA 1963) (same); see also 2 D. Chisum, Patents § 8.04[2], pp. 63­64 (1996) (discussing 1954 commentary of then-Chief Patent Examiner P. J. Federico). Section 112, ¶ 6, now expressly allows so-called "means" claims, with the proviso that application of the broad literal language of such claims must be limited to only those means that are "equiva- len[t]" to the actual means shown in the patent specification. This is an application of the doctrine of equivalents in a re- strictive role, narrowing the application of broad literal claim elements. We recognized this type of role for the doctrine of equivalents in Graver Tank itself. 339 U. S., at 608­609. The added provision, however, is silent on the doctrine of equivalents as applied where there is no literal infringement. Because § 112, ¶ 6, was enacted as a targeted cure to a specific problem, and because the reference in that provision to "equivalents" appears to be no more than a prophylactic against potential side effects of that cure, such limited con- gressional action should not be overread for negative impli- cations. Congress in 1952 could easily have responded to Graver Tank as it did to the Halliburton decision. But it did not. Absent something more compelling than the dubi- ous negative inference offered by petitioner, the lengthy his- tory of the doctrine of equivalents strongly supports adher- ence to our refusal in Graver Tank to find that the Patent Act conflicts with that doctrine. Congress can legislate the doctrine of equivalents out of existence any time it chooses. The various policy arguments now made by both sides are thus best addressed to Congress, not this Court. B We do, however, share the concern of the dissenters below that the doctrine of equivalents, as it has come to be applied since Graver Tank, has taken on a life of its own, unbounded 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 17 (1997) 29 Opinion of the Court by the patent claims. There can be no denying that the doc- trine of equivalents, when applied broadly, conflicts with the definitional and public-notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement. Judge Nies identified one means of avoiding this conflict: "[A] distinction can be drawn that is not too esoteric between substitution of an equivalent for a component in an invention and enlarging the metes and bounds of the invention beyond what is claimed. . . . . . "Where a claim to an invention is expressed as a com- bination of elements, as here, `equivalents' in the sobri- quet `Doctrine of Equivalents' refers to the equivalency of an element or part of the invention with one that is substituted in the accused product or process. . . . . . "This view that the accused device or process must be more than `equivalent' overall reconciles the Supreme Court's position on infringement by equivalents with its concurrent statements that `the courts have no right to enlarge a patent beyond the scope of its claims as al- lowed by the Patent Office.' [Citations omitted.] The `scope' is not enlarged if courts do not go beyond the substitution of equivalent elements." 62 F. 3d, at 1573­ 1574 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis in original). We concur with this apt reconciliation of our two lines of precedent. Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the scope of the patented inven- tion, and thus the doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual elements of the claim, not to the invention as a whole. It is important to ensure that the application of the doctrine, even as to an individual element, is not allowed such broad play as to effectively eliminate that element in its entirety. So long as the doctrine of equivalents does not encroach beyond the limits just described, or beyond related 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 30 WARNER-JENKINSON CO. v. HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO. Opinion of the Court limits to be discussed infra this page and 31­34, 39, n. 8, and 39­40, we are confident that the doctrine will not vitiate the central functions of the patent claims themselves. III Understandably reluctant to assume this Court would overrule Graver Tank, petitioner has offered alternative ar- guments in favor of a more restricted doctrine of equivalents than it feels was applied in this case. We address each in turn. A Petitioner first argues that Graver Tank never purported to supersede a well-established limit on nonliteral infringe- ment, known variously as "prosecution history estoppel" and "file wrapper estoppel." See Bayer Aktiengesellschaft v. Duphar Int'l Research B. V., 738 F. 2d 1237, 1238 (CA Fed. 1984). According to petitioner, any surrender of subject matter during patent prosecution, regardless of the reason for such surrender, precludes recapturing any part of that subject matter, even if it is equivalent to the matter ex- pressly claimed. Because, during patent prosecution, re- spondent limited the pH element of its claim to pH levels between 6.0 and 9.0, petitioner would have those limits form bright lines beyond which no equivalents may be claimed. Any inquiry into the reasons for a surrender, petitioner claims, would undermine the public's right to clear notice of the scope of the patent as embodied in the patent file. We can readily agree with petitioner that Graver Tank did not dispose of prosecution history estoppel as a legal limita- tion on the doctrine of equivalents. But petitioner reaches too far in arguing that the reason for an amendment during patent prosecution is irrelevant to any subsequent estoppel. In each of our cases cited by petitioner and by the dissent below, prosecution history estoppel was tied to amendments made to avoid the prior art, or otherwise to address a specific concern-such as obviousness-that arguably would have 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 17 (1997) 31 Opinion of the Court rendered the claimed subject matter unpatentable. Thus, in Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U. S. 126 (1942), Chief Justice Stone distinguished inclusion of a limiting phrase in an original patent claim from the "very different" situation in which "the applicant, in order to meet objections in the Patent Office, based on references to the prior art, adopted the phrase as a substitute for the broader one" pre- viously used. Id., at 136 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Keystone Driller Co. v. Northwest Engineering Corp., 294 U. S. 42 (1935), estoppel was applied where the initial claims were "rejected on the prior art," id., at 48, n. 6, and where the allegedly infringing equivalent element was outside of the revised claims and within the prior art that formed the basis for the rejection of the earlier claims, id., at 48.5 It is telling that in each case this Court probed the rea- soning behind the Patent Office's insistence upon a change in the claims. In each instance, a change was demanded because the claim as otherwise written was viewed as not describing a patentable invention at all-typically because what it described was encompassed within the prior art. But, as the United States informs us, there are a variety of other reasons why the PTO may request a change in claim language. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22­23 5 See also Smith v. Magic City Kennel Club, Inc., 282 U. S. 784, 788 (1931) (estoppel applied to amended claim where the original "claim was rejected on the prior patent to" another); Computing Scale Co. of America v. Automatic Scale Co., 204 U. S. 609, 618­620 (1907) (initial claims re- jected based on lack of invention over prior patents); Hubbell v. United States, 179 U. S. 77, 83 (1900) (patentee estopped from excluding a claim element where element was added to overcome objections based on lack of novelty over prior patents); Sutter v. Robinson, 119 U. S. 530, 541 (1886) (estoppel applied where, during patent prosecution, the applicant "was ex- pressly required to state that [the device's] structural plan was old and not of his invention"); cf. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U. S. 1, 33 (1966) (noting, in a validity determination, that "claims that have been narrowed in order to obtain the issuance of a patent by distin- guishing the prior art cannot be sustained to cover that which was pre- viously by limitation eliminated from the patent"). 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 32 WARNER-JENKINSON CO. v. HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO. Opinion of the Court (counsel for the PTO also appearing on the brief). And if the PTO has been requesting changes in claim language without the intent to limit equivalents or, indeed, with the expectation that language it required would in many cases allow for a range of equivalents, we should be extremely re- luctant to upset the basic assumptions of the PTO without substantial reason for doing so. Our prior cases have con- sistently applied prosecution history estoppel only where claims have been amended for a limited set of reasons, and we see no substantial cause for requiring a more rigid rule invoking an estoppel regardless of the reasons for a change.6 In this case, the patent examiner objected to the patent claim due to a perceived overlap with the Booth patent, which revealed an ultrafiltration process operating at a pH above 9.0. In response to this objection, the phrase "at a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0" was added to the claim. While it is undisputed that the upper limit of 9.0 was added in order to distinguish the Booth patent, the reason for add- ing the lower limit of 6.0 is unclear. The lower limit cer- tainly did not serve to distinguish the Booth patent, which said nothing about pH levels below 6.0. Thus, while a lower limit of 6.0, by its mere inclusion, became a material element of the claim, that did not necessarily preclude the application of the doctrine of equivalents as to that element. See Hub- bell v. United States, 179 U. S. 77, 82 (1900) (" `[A]ll [specified elements] must be regarded as material,' " though it remains an open " `question whether an omitted part is supplied by an equivalent device or instrumentality' " (citation omitted)). 6 That petitioner's rule might provide a brighter line for determining whether a patentee is estopped under certain circumstances is not a suffi- cient reason for adopting such a rule. This is especially true where, as here, the PTO may have relied upon a flexible rule of estoppel when decid- ing whether to ask for a change in the first place. To change so substan- tially the rules of the game now could very well subvert the various bal- ances the PTO sought to strike when issuing the numerous patents which have not yet expired and which would be affected by our decision. 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 17 (1997) 33 Opinion of the Court Where the reason for the change was not related to avoiding the prior art, the change may introduce a new element, but it does not necessarily preclude infringement by equivalents of that element.7 We are left with the problem, however, of what to do in a case like the one at bar, where the record seems not to reveal the reason for including the lower pH limit of 6.0. In our view, holding that certain reasons for a claim amendment may avoid the application of prosecution history estoppel is not tantamount to holding that the absence of a reason for an amendment may similarly avoid such an estoppel. Mind- ful that claims do indeed serve both a definitional and a no- tice function, we think the better rule is to place the burden on the patent holder to establish the reason for an amend- ment required during patent prosecution. The court then would decide whether that reason is sufficient to overcome prosecution history estoppel as a bar to application of the doctrine of equivalents to the element added by that amend- ment. Where no explanation is established, however, the court should presume that the patent applicant had a sub- stantial reason related to patentability for including the limiting element added by amendment. In those circum- stances, prosecution history estoppel would bar the applica- tion of the doctrine of equivalents as to that element. The presumption we have described, one subject to rebuttal if an appropriate reason for a required amendment is established, gives proper deference to the role of claims in defining an invention and providing public notice, and to the primacy of 7 We do not suggest that, where a change is made to overcome an objec- tion based on the prior art, a court is free to review the correctness of that objection when deciding whether to apply prosecution history estop- pel. As petitioner rightly notes, such concerns are properly addressed on direct appeal from the denial of a patent, and will not be revisited in an infringement action. Smith v. Magic City Kennel Club, Inc., supra, at 789­790. What is permissible for a court to explore is the reason (right or wrong) for the objection and the manner in which the amendment ad- dressed and avoided the objection. 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 34 WARNER-JENKINSON CO. v. HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO. Opinion of the Court the PTO in ensuring that the claims allowed cover only sub- ject matter that is properly patentable in a proffered patent application. Applied in this fashion, prosecution history estoppel places reasonable limits on the doctrine of equiva- lents, and further insulates the doctrine from any feared con- flict with the Patent Act. Because respondent has not proffered in this Court a rea- son for the addition of a lower pH limit, it is impossible to tell whether the reason for that addition could properly avoid an estoppel. Whether a reason in fact exists, but simply was not adequately developed, we cannot say. On remand, the Federal Circuit can consider whether reasons for that portion of the amendment were offered or not and whether further opportunity to establish such reasons would be proper. B Petitioner next argues that even if Graver Tank remains good law, the case held only that the absence of substantial differences was a necessary element for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, not that it was sufficient for such a result. Brief for Petitioner 32. Relying on Graver Tank's references to the problem of an "unscrupulous copy- ist" and "piracy," 339 U. S., at 607, petitioner would require judicial exploration of the equities of a case before allowing application of the doctrine of equivalents. To be sure, Graver Tank refers to the prevention of copying and piracy when describing the benefits of the doctrine of equivalents. That the doctrine produces such benefits, however, does not mean that its application is limited only to cases where those particular benefits are obtained. Elsewhere in Graver Tank the doctrine is described in more neutral terms. And the history of the doctrine as re- lied upon by Graver Tank reflects a basis for the doctrine not so limited as petitioner would have it. In Winans v. Denmead, 15 How. 330, 343 (1854), we described the doctrine 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 17 (1997) 35 Opinion of the Court of equivalents as growing out of a legally implied term in each patent claim that "the claim extends to the thing pat- ented, however its form or proportions may be varied." Under that view, application of the doctrine of equivalents involves determining whether a particular accused product or process infringes upon the patent claim, where the claim takes the form-half express, half implied-of "X and its equivalents." Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U. S. 120, 125 (1878), on which Graver Tank also relied, offers a similarly intent-neutral view of the doctrine of equivalents: "[T]he substantial equivalent of a thing, in the sense of the patent law, is the same as the thing itself; so that if two devices do the same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the same result, they are the same, even though they differ in name, form, or shape." If the essential predicate of the doctrine of equivalents is the notion of identity between a patented invention and its equivalent, there is no basis for treating an infringing equiv- alent any differently from a device that infringes the express terms of the patent. Application of the doctrine of equiva- lents, therefore, is akin to determining literal infringement, and neither requires proof of intent. Petitioner also points to Graver Tank's seeming reliance on the absence of independent experimentation by the al- leged infringer as supporting an equitable defense to the doc- trine of equivalents. The Federal Circuit explained this fac- tor by suggesting that an alleged infringer's behavior, be it copying, designing around a patent, or independent experi- mentation, indirectly reflects the substantiality of the differ- ences between the patented invention and the accused device or process. According to the Federal Circuit, a person aim- ing to copy or aiming to avoid a patent is imagined to be at 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 36 WARNER-JENKINSON CO. v. HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO. Opinion of the Court least marginally skilled at copying or avoidance, and thus intentional copying raises an inference-rebuttable by proof of independent development-of having only insubstantial differences, and intentionally designing around a patent claim raises an inference of substantial differences. This ex- planation leaves much to be desired. At a minimum, one wonders how ever to distinguish between the intentional copyist making minor changes to lower the risk of legal ac- tion and the incremental innovator designing around the claims, yet seeking to capture as much as is permissible of the patented advance. But another explanation is available that does not require a divergence from generally objective principles of patent infringement. In both instances in Graver Tank where we referred to independent research or experiments, we were discussing the known interchangeability between the chemi- cal compound claimed in the patent and the compound sub- stituted by the alleged infringer. The need for independ- ent experimentation thus could reflect knowledge-or lack thereof-of interchangeability possessed by one presumably skilled in the art. The known interchangeability of substi- tutes for an element of a patent is one of the express objec- tive factors noted by Graver Tank as bearing upon whether the accused device is substantially the same as the patented invention. Independent experimentation by the alleged in- fringer would not always reflect upon the objective question whether a person skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability between two elements, but in many cases it would likely be probative of such knowledge. Although Graver Tank certainly leaves room for petition- er's suggested inclusion of intent-based elements in the doc- trine of equivalents, we do not read it as requiring them. The better view, and the one consistent with Graver Tank's predecessors and the objective approach to infringement, is that intent plays no role in the application of the doctrine of equivalents. 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 17 (1997) 37 Opinion of the Court C Finally, petitioner proposes that in order to minimize con- flict with the notice function of patent claims, the doctrine of equivalents should be limited to equivalents that are dis- closed within the patent itself. A milder version of this ar- gument, which found favor with the dissenters below, is that the doctrine should be limited to equivalents that were known at the time the patent was issued, and should not extend to after-arising equivalents. As we have noted, supra, at 36, with regard to the objec- tive nature of the doctrine, a skilled practitioner's knowledge of the interchangeability between claimed and accused ele- ments is not relevant for its own sake, but rather for what it tells the factfinder about the similarities or differences be- tween those elements. Much as the perspective of the hypo- thetical "reasonable person" gives content to concepts such as "negligent" behavior, the perspective of a skilled prac- titioner provides content to, and limits on, the concept of "equivalence." Insofar as the question under the doctrine of equivalents is whether an accused element is equivalent to a claimed element, the proper time for evaluating equiva- lency-and thus knowledge of interchangeability between el- ements-is at the time of infringement, not at the time the patent was issued. And rejecting the milder version of peti- tioner's argument necessarily rejects the more severe propo- sition that equivalents must not only be known, but must also be actually disclosed in the patent in order for such equivalents to infringe upon the patent. IV The various opinions below, respondents, and amici devote considerable attention to whether application of the doctrine of equivalents is a task for the judge or for the jury. How- ever, despite petitioner's argument below that the doctrine should be applied by the judge, in this Court petitioner makes only passing reference to this issue. See Brief for 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 38 WARNER-JENKINSON CO. v. HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO. Opinion of the Court Petitioner 22, n. 15 ("If this Court were to hold in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., No. 95­26 (argued Jan. 8, 1996), that judges rather than juries are to construe patent claims, so as to provide a uniform definition of the scope of the legally protected monopoly, it would seem at cross- purposes to say that juries may nonetheless expand the claims by resort to a broad notion of `equivalents' "); Reply Brief for Petitioner 20 (whether judge or jury should apply the doctrine of equivalents depends on how the Court views the nature of the inquiry under the doctrine of equivalents). Petitioner's comments go more to the alleged inconsist- ency between the doctrine of equivalents and the claiming requirement than to the role of the jury in applying the doctrine as properly understood. Because resolution of whether, or how much of, the application of the doctrine of equivalents can be resolved by the court is not necessary for us to answer the question presented, we decline to take it up. The Federal Circuit held that it was for the jury to decide whether the accused process was equivalent to the claimed process. There was ample support in our prior cases for that holding. See, e. g., Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U. S., at 125 ("[I]n determining the question of infringement, the court or jury, as the case may be, . . . are to look at the machines or their several devices or elements in the light of what they do, or what office or function they perform, and how they perform it, and to find that one thing is substan- tially the same as another, if it performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result"); Winans v. Denmead, 15 How., at 344 ("[It] is a question for the jury" whether the accused device was "the same in kind, and effected by the employment of [the patent- ee's] mode of operation in substance"). Nothing in our re- cent decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U. S. 370 (1996), necessitates a different result than that reached by the Federal Circuit. Indeed, Markman cites with considerable favor, when discussing the role of judge 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 17 (1997) 39 Opinion of the Court and jury, the seminal Winans decision. 517 U. S., at 384­ 385. Whether, if the issue were squarely presented to us, we would reach a different conclusion than did the Federal Circuit is not a question we need decide today.8 V All that remains is to address the debate regarding the linguistic framework under which "equivalence" is deter- mined. Both the parties and the Federal Circuit spend con- siderable time arguing whether the so-called "triple iden- tity" test-focusing on the function served by a particular claim element, the way that element serves that function, and the result thus obtained by that element-is a suitable method for determining equivalence, or whether an "insub- stantial differences" approach is better. There seems to be substantial agreement that, while the triple identity test may be suitable for analyzing mechanical devices, it often 8 With regard to the concern over unreviewability due to black-box jury verdicts, we offer only guidance, not a specific mandate. Where the evi- dence is such that no reasonable jury could determine two elements to be equivalent, district courts are obliged to grant partial or complete sum- mary judgment. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U. S. 317, 322­323 (1986). If there has been a reluctance to do so by some courts due to unfamiliarity with the subject matter, we are confident that the Federal Circuit can remedy the problem. Of course, the various legal limitations on the application of the doctrine of equivalents are to be determined by the court, either on a pretrial motion for partial summary judgment or on a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the evidence and after the jury verdict. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56; Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 50. Thus, under the particular facts of a case, if prosecu- tion history estoppel would apply or if a theory of equivalence would en- tirely vitiate a particular claim element, partial or complete judgment should be rendered by the court, as there would be no further material issue for the jury to resolve. Finally, in cases that reach the jury, a spe- cial verdict and/or interrogatories on each claim element could be very useful in facilitating review, uniformity, and possibly postverdict judg- ments as a matter of law. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 49 and 50. We leave it to the Federal Circuit how best to implement procedural improvements to promote certainty, consistency, and reviewability to this area of the law. 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 40 WARNER-JENKINSON CO. v. HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO. Opinion of the Court provides a poor framework for analyzing other products or processes. On the other hand, the insubstantial differences test offers little additional guidance as to what might render any given difference "insubstantial." In our view, the particular linguistic framework used is less important than whether the test is probative of the es- sential inquiry: Does the accused product or process contain elements identical or equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention? Different linguistic frameworks may be more suitable to different cases, depending on their particular facts. A focus on individual elements and a spe- cial vigilance against allowing the concept of equivalence to eliminate completely any such elements should reduce con- siderably the imprecision of whatever language is used. An analysis of the role played by each element in the context of the specific patent claim will thus inform the inquiry as to whether a substitute element matches the function, way, and result of the claimed element, or whether the substitute ele- ment plays a role substantially different from the claimed element. With these limiting principles as a backdrop, we see no purpose in going further and micromanaging the Fed- eral Circuit's particular word choice for analyzing equiva- lence. We expect that the Federal Circuit will refine the formulation of the test for equivalence in the orderly course of case-by-case determinations, and we leave such refine- ment to that court's sound judgment in this area of its spe- cial expertise. VI Today we adhere to the doctrine of equivalents. The de- termination of equivalence should be applied as an objec- tive inquiry on an element-by-element basis. Prosecution history estoppel continues to be available as a defense to infringement, but if the patent holder demonstrates that an amendment required during prosecution had a purpose unre- lated to patentability, a court must consider that purpose in 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 17 (1997) 41 Ginsburg, J., concurring order to decide whether an estoppel is precluded. Where the patent holder is unable to establish such a purpose, a court should presume that the purpose behind the required amendment is such that prosecution history estoppel would apply. Because the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit did not consider all of the requirements as described by us today, particularly as related to prosecution history estoppel and the preservation of some meaning for each element in a claim, we reverse its judgment and remand the case for fur- ther proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Kennedy joins, concurring. I join the opinion of the Court and write separately to add a cautionary note on the rebuttable presumption the Court announces regarding prosecution history estoppel. I ad- dress in particular the application of the presumption in this case and others in which patent prosecution has already been completed. The new presumption, if applied woodenly, might in some instances unfairly discount the expectations of a patentee who had no notice at the time of patent prose- cution that such a presumption would apply. Such a pat- entee would have had little incentive to insist that the rea- sons for all modifications be memorialized in the file wrapper as they were made. Years after the fact, the patentee may find it difficult to establish an evidentiary basis that would overcome the new presumption. The Court's opinion is sen- sitive to this problem, noting that "the PTO may have relied upon a flexible rule of estoppel when deciding whether to ask for a change" during patent prosecution. Ante, at 32, n. 6. Because respondent has not presented to this Court any explanation for the addition of the lower pH limit, I concur in the decision to remand the matter to the Federal Circuit. 520US1 Unit: $U32 [09-10-99 14:21:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN 42 WARNER-JENKINSON CO. v. HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO. Ginsburg, J., concurring On remand, that court can determine-bearing in mind the prior absence of clear rules of the game-whether suitable reasons for including the lower pH limit were earlier offered or, if not, whether they can now be established. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 43 Syllabus ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH et al. v. ARIZONA et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 95­974. Argued December 4, 1996-Decided March 3, 1997 Maria-Kelly F. Yniguez, an Arizona state employee at the time, sued the State and its Governor, Attorney General, and Director of the Depart- ment of Administration under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging that State Constitution Article XXVIII-key provisions of which declare English "the official language of the State," require the State to "act in English and in no other language," and authorize state residents and businesses "to bring [state-court] suit[s] to enforce th[e] Article"-violated, inter alia, the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Yniguez used both English and Spanish in her work and feared that Article XXVIII, if read broadly, would require her to face discharge or other discipline if she did not refrain from speaking Spanish while serving the State. She requested injunctive and declaratory relief, counsel fees, and "all other relief that the Court deems just and proper." During the early phases of the suit, the State Attorney General released an opinion ex- pressing his view that Article XXVIII is constitutional in that, although it requires the expression of "official acts" in English, it allows govern- ment employees to use other languages to facilitate the delivery of gov- ernmental services. The Federal District Court heard testimony and, among its rulings, determined that only the Governor, in her official capacity, was a proper defendant. The court, at the same time, dis- missed the State because of its Eleventh Amendment immunity, the State Attorney General because he had no authority to enforce Article XXVIII against state employees, and the Director because there was no showing that she had undertaken or threatened any action adverse to Yniguez; rejected the Attorney General's interpretation of the Article on the ground that it conflicted with the measure's plain language; de- clared the Article fatally overbroad after reading it to impose a sweep- ing ban on the use of any language other than English by all of Arizona officialdom; and declined to allow the Arizona courts the initial oppor- tunity to determine the scope of Article XXVIII. Following the Gov- ernor's announcement that she would not appeal, the District Court denied the State Attorney General's request to certify the pivotal state- law question-the Article's correct construction-to the Arizona Su- preme Court. The District Court also denied the State Attorney Gen- 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 44 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Syllabus eral's motion to intervene on behalf of the State, under 28 U. S. C. § 2403(b), to contest on appeal the court's holding that the Article is unconstitutional. In addition, the court denied the motion of newcom- ers Arizonans for Official English Committee (AOE) and its Chairman Park, sponsors of the ballot initiative that became Article XXVIII, to intervene to support the Article's constitutionality. The day after AOE, Park, and the State Attorney General filed their notices of appeal, Yniguez resigned from state employment to accept a job in the private sector. The Ninth Circuit then concluded that AOE and Park met standing requirements under Article III of the Federal Constitution and could proceed as party appellants, and that the Attorney General, hav- ing successfully obtained dismissal below, could not reenter as a party, but could present an argument, pursuant to § 2403(b), regarding the con- stitutionality of Article XXVIII. Thereafter, the State Attorney Gen- eral informed the Ninth Circuit of Yniguez's resignation and suggested that, for lack of a viable plaintiff, the case was moot. The court dis- agreed, holding that a plea for nominal damages could be read into the complaint's "all other relief" clause to save the case. The en banc Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the District Court's ruling that Article XXVIII was unconstitutional, and announced that Yniguez was entitled to nominal damages from the State. Finding the Article's "plain lan- guage" dispositive, and noting that the State Attorney General had never conceded that the Article would be unconstitutional if construed as Yniguez asserted it should be, the Court of Appeals also rejected the Attorney General's limiting construction of the Article and declined to certify the matter to the State Supreme Court. Finally, the Ninth Cir- cuit acknowledged a state-court challenge to Article XXVIII's constitu- tionality, Ruiz v. State, but found that litigation no cause to stay the federal proceedings. Held: Because the case was moot and should not have been retained for adjudication on the merits, the Court vacates the Ninth Circuit's judg- ment and remands the case with directions that the action be dismissed by the District Court. This Court expresses no view on the correct interpretation of Article XXVIII or on the measure's constitutionality. Pp. 64­80. (a) Grave doubts exist as to the standing of petitioners AOE and Park to pursue appellate review under Article III's case-or-controversy re- quirement. Standing to defend on appeal in the place of an original defendant demands that the litigant possess "a direct stake in the out- come." Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54, 62. Petitioners' primary argument-that, as initiative proponents, they have a quasi-legislative 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 45 Syllabus interest in defending the measure they successfully sponsored-is dubi- ous because they are not elected state legislators, authorized by state law to represent the State's interests, see Karcher v. May, 484 U. S. 72, 82. Furthermore, this Court has never identified initiative proponents as Article-III-qualified defenders. Cf. Don't Bankrupt Washington Committee v. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 460 U. S. 1077. Their assertion of representational or associational stand- ing is also problematic, absent the concrete injury that would confer standing upon AOE members in their own right, see, e. g., Food and Commercial Workers v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U. S. 544, 551­553, and absent anything in Article XXVIII's state-court citizen-suit provision that could support standing for Arizona residents in general, or AOE in particular, to defend the Article's constitutionality in federal court. Nevertheless, this Court need not definitively resolve the standing of AOE and Park to proceed as they did, but assumes such standing argu- endo in order to analyze the question of mootness occasioned by origi- nating plaintiff Yniguez's departure from state employment. See, e. g., Burke v. Barnes, 479 U. S. 361, 363, 364, n. Pp. 64­67. (b) Because Yniguez no longer satisfies the case-or-controversy re- quirement, this case is moot. To qualify as a case fit for federal-court adjudication, an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of re- view, not merely at the time the complaint is filed. E. g., Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401. Although Yniguez had a viable claim at the outset of this litigation, her resignation from public sector employ- ment to pursue work in the private sector, where her speech was not governed by Article XXVIII, mooted the case stated in her complaint. Cf. Boyle v. Landry, 401 U. S. 77, 78, 80­81. Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's ruling, her implied plea for nominal damages, which the Ninth Circuit approved as against the State of Arizona, could not revive the case, as § 1983 actions do not lie against a State, Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 71; Arizona was permitted to participate in the appeal only as an intervenor, through its Attorney General, not as a party subject to an obligation to pay damages; and the State's coopera- tion with Yniguez in waiving Eleventh Amendment immunity did not recreate a live case or controversy fit for federal-court adjudication, cf., e. g., United States v. Johnson, 319 U. S. 302, 304. Pp. 67­71. (c) When a civil case becomes moot pending appellate adjudication, the established practice in the federal system is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 39. This Court is not disarmed from that course by the State Attorney General's failure to petition for cer- tiorari. The Court has an obligation to inquire not only into its own 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 46 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Syllabus authority to decide the questions presented, but to consider also the authority of the lower courts to proceed, even though the parties are prepared to concede it. E. g., Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U. S. 534, 541. Because the Ninth Circuit refused to stop the adjudication when it learned of the mooting event-Yniguez's departure from public employment-its unwarranted en banc judgment must be set aside. Nor is the District Court's judgment saved by its entry be- fore the occurrence of the mooting event or by the Governor's refusal to appeal from it. AOE and Park had an arguable basis for seeking appellate review; moreover, the State Attorney General's renewed certi- fication plea and his motion to intervene in this litigation demonstrate that he was pursuing his § 2403(b) right to defend Article XXVIII's con- stitutionality when the mooting event occurred. His disclosure of that event to the Ninth Circuit warranted a mootness disposition, which would have stopped his § 2403(b) endeavor and justified vacation of the District Court's judgment. The extraordinary course of this litigation and the federalism concern next considered lead to the conclusion that vacatur down the line is the equitable solution. Pp. 71­75. (d) Taking into account the novelty of the question of Article XXVIII's meaning, its potential importance to the conduct of Arizona's business, the State Attorney General's views on the subject, and the at-least-partial agreement with those views by the Article's sponsors, more respectful consideration should have been given to the Attorney General's requests to seek, through certification, an authoritative con- struction of the Article from the State Supreme Court. When anticipa- tory relief is sought in federal court against a state statute, respect for the place of the States in our federal system calls for close consideration of the question whether conflict is avoidable. Federal courts are not well equipped to rule on a state statute's constitutionality without a controlling interpretation of the statute's meaning and effect by the state courts. See, e. g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Certification saves time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism. See, e. g., Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 416 U. S. 386, 391. Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's suggestion, this Court's decisions do not require as a condition precedent to certifi- cation a concession by the Attorney General that Article XXVIII would be unconstitutional if construed as Yniguez contended it should be. Moreover, that court improperly blended abstention with certification when it found that "unique circumstances," rather than simply a novel or unsettled state-law question, are necessary before federal courts may employ certification. The Arizona Supreme Court has before it, in Ruiz v. State, the question: What does Article XXVIII mean? Once that court has spoken, adjudication of any remaining federal constitu- 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 47 Syllabus tional question may be "greatly simplifie[d]." See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 151. Pp. 75­80. 69 F. 3d 920, vacated and remanded. Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Barnaby W. Zall argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners. Robert J. Pohlman argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent Yniguez was Brian A. Luscher. Stephen G. Montoya, Albert M. Flores, and George Robles Vice III filed a brief for respondents Arizo- nans Against Constitutional Tampering et al. Grant Woods, Attorney General, Rebecca White Berch, First Assistant At- torney General, C. Tim Delaney, Solicitor General, Paula S. Bickett, Assistant Attorney General, and Carter G. Phillips filed briefs for respondents State of Arizona et al.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the FLA­187 Committee et al. by Stanley W. Sokolowski; for the Pacific Legal Founda- tion by Sharon L. Browne; for U. S. English, Inc., by Leonard J. Henzke, Jr.; for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Richard K. Willard, Bennett Evan Cooper, Daniel J. Popeo, Richard A. Samp, and Don Sten- berg; and for Thurston Greene, pro se. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of New Mexico by Tom Udall, Attorney General, Manuel Tijerina, Deputy Attorney General, and Gerald T. E. Gonzalez, Tannis L. Fox, Laura Fash- ing, Elizabeth A. Glenn, and William S. Keller, Assistant Attorneys Gen- eral; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Edward M. Chen, Steven R. Shapiro, Marjorie Heins, and Robert L. Rusky; for the Hawaii Civil Rights Commission et al. by John H. Ishihara, Carl C. Christensen, and Eric K. Yamamoto; for Human Rights Watch by Allan Blumstein and Kenneth Roth; for the Linguistic Society of America et al. by Peter M. Tiersma; for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund by E. Richard Larson; for the National Council of La Raza et al. by Joseph N. Onek, William D. Wallace, and Javier M. Guzman; for the Navajo Nation by Thomas W. Christie; for the Puerto Rican Legal De- fense and Education Fund et al. by Kenneth Kimerling, Karen K. Nara- saki, and Richard Albores; and for Representative Nydia M. Velazquez et al. by Walter A. Smith, Jr., and Audrey J. Anderson. Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General Hun- ger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen- 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 48 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. Federal courts lack competence to rule definitively on the meaning of state legislation, see, e. g., Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U. S. 82, 86­87 (1970), nor may they adjudicate challenges to state measures absent a showing of actual impact on the challenger, see, e. g., Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103, 110 (1969). The Ninth Circuit, in the case at hand, lost sight of these limitations. The initiating plaintiff, Maria-Kelly F. Yniguez, sought federal-court resolution of a novel question: the compatibility with the Federal Constitution of a 1988 amendment to Arizona's Constitution declaring English "the official language of the State of Arizona"-"the language of . . . all government functions and actions." Ariz. Const., Art. XXVIII, §§ 1(1), 1(2). Participants in the federal litiga- tion, proceeding without benefit of the views of the Arizona Supreme Court, expressed diverse opinions on the meaning of the amendment. Yniguez commenced and maintained her suit as an individ- ual, not as a class representative. A state employee at the time she filed her complaint, Yniguez voluntarily left the State's employ in 1990 and did not allege she would seek to return to a public post. Her departure for a position in the private sector made her claim for prospective relief moot. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit held that a plea for nominal damages could be read into Yniguez's complaint to save the case, and therefore pressed on to an ultimate decision. A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals declared Article XXVIII unconstitutional in 1994, and a divided en banc court, in 1995, adhered to the panel's position. The Ninth Circuit had no warrant to proceed as it did. The case had lost the essential elements of a justiciable con- troversy and should not have been retained for adjudica- tion on the merits by the Court of Appeals. We therefore eral Preston, Irving L. Gornstein, and Anthony J. Steinmeyer filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 49 Opinion of the Court vacate the Ninth Circuit's judgment, and remand the case to that court with directions that the action be dismissed by the District Court. We express no view on the correct interpretation of Article XXVIII or on the measure's constitutionality. I A 1988 Arizona ballot initiative established English as the official language of the State. Passed on November 8, 1988, by a margin of one percentage point,1 the measure became effective on December 5 as Arizona State Constitution Arti- cle XXVIII. Among key provisions, the Article declares that, with specified exceptions, the State "shall act in Eng- lish and in no other language." Ariz. Const., Art. XXVIII, § 3(1)(a). The enumerated exceptions concern compliance with federal laws, participation in certain educational pro- grams, protection of the rights of criminal defendants and crime victims, and protection of public health or safety. Id., § 3(2). In a final provision, Article XXVIII grants standing to any person residing or doing business in the State "to bring suit to enforce th[e] Article" in state court, under such "reasonable limitations" as "[t]he Legislature may enact." Id., § 4.2 Federal-court litigation challenging the constitutionality of Article XXVIII commenced two days after the ballot initiative passed. On November 10, 1988, Maria-Kelly F. Yniguez, then an insurance claims manager in the Arizona Department of Administration's Risk Management Division, sued the State of Arizona in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. Yniguez invoked 42 U. S. C. 1 The measure, opposed by the Governor as "sadly misdirected," App. 38, drew the affirmative votes of 50.5% of Arizonans casting ballots in the election, see Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F. 3d 920, 924 (CA9 1995). 2 Article XXVIII, titled "English as the Official Language," is set out in full in an appendix to this opinion. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 50 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court § 1983 as the basis for her suit.3 Soon after the lawsuit com- menced, Yniguez added as defendants, in their individual and official capacities, Arizona Governor Rose Mofford, Arizona Attorney General Robert K. Corbin, and the Director of Arizona's Department of Administration, Catherine Eden. Yniguez brought suit as an individual and never sought des- ignation as a class representative. Fluent in English and Spanish, Yniguez was engaged pri- marily in handling medical malpractice claims against the State. In her daily service to the public, she spoke English to persons who spoke only that language, Spanish to persons who spoke only that language, and a combination of English and Spanish to persons able to communicate in both lan- guages. Record, Doc. No. 62, ¶¶ 8, 13 (Statement of Stipu- lated Facts, filed Feb. 9, 1989). Yniguez feared that Article XXVIII's instruction to "act in English," § 3(1)(a), if read broadly, would govern her job performance "every time she [did] something." See Record, Doc. No. 62, ¶ 10. She be- lieved she would lose her job or face other sanctions if she did not immediately refrain from speaking Spanish while serving the State. See App. 58, ¶ 19 (Second Amended Complaint). Yniguez asserted that Article XXVIII violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d. She requested injunctive and declaratory relief, counsel fees, and "all other relief that the 3 Derived from § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983 provides in relevant part: "Civil action for deprivation of rights. "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 51 Opinion of the Court Court deems just and proper under the circumstances." App. 60. All defendants named in Yniguez's complaint moved to dismiss all claims asserted against them.4 The State of Arizona asserted immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The individual defendants asserted the ab- sence of a case or controversy because "none of [them] ha[d] threatened [Yniguez] concerning her use of Spanish in the performance of her job duties [or had] ever told her not to use Spanish [at work]." Record, Doc. No. 30, p. 1. The de- fendants further urged that novel state-law questions con- cerning the meaning and application of Article XXVIII should be tendered first to the state courts. See id., at 2.5 Trial on the merits of Yniguez's complaint, the parties agreed, would be combined with the hearing on her motion for a preliminary injunction.6 Before the trial occurred, the State Attorney General, on January 24, 1989, released an opinion, No. I89­009, construing Article XXVIII and ex- plaining why he found the measure constitutional. App. 61­76. 4 Under Arizona law, the State Attorney General represents the State in federal court. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41­193(A)(3) (1992). Throughout these proceedings, the State and all state officials have been represented by the State Attorney General, or law department members under his supervision. See § 41­192(A). 5 Arizona law permits the State's highest court to "answer questions of law certified to it by the supreme court of the United States, a court of appeals of the United States, a United States district court or a tribal court . . . if there are involved in any proceedings before the certifying court questions of [Arizona law] which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the supreme court and the intermediate appellate courts of this state." Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12­1861 (1994). 6 The District Court, on December 8, 1988, had denied Yniguez's applica- tion for a temporary restraining order, finding no "imminent danger of the imposition of sanctions" against her. Record, Doc. No. 23, p. 1. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 52 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court In Opinion No. I89­009, the Attorney General said it was his obligation to read Article XXVIII "as a whole," in line "with the other portions of the Arizona Constitution" and "with the United States Constitution and federal laws." App. 61. While Article XXVIII requires the performance of "official acts of government" in English, it was the Attor- ney General's view that government employees remained free to use other languages "to facilitate the delivery of gov- ernmental services." Id., at 62. Construction of the word "act," as used in Article XXVIII, to mean more than an "of- ficial ac[t] of government," the Attorney General asserted, "would raise serious questions" of compatibility with federal and state equal protection guarantees and federal civil rights legislation. Id., at 65­66.7 On February 9, 1989, two weeks after release of the Attor- ney General's opinion, the parties filed a statement of stipu- lated facts, which reported Governor Mofford's opposition to the ballot initiative, her intention nevertheless "to comply with Article XXVIII," and her expectation that "State serv- ice employees [would] comply" with the measure. See Rec- ord, Doc. No. 62, ¶¶ 35, 36, 39. The stipulation confirmed the view of all parties that "[t]he efficient operation [and ad- ministration] of the State is enhanced by permitting State service employees to communicate with citizens of the State in languages other than English where the citizens are not proficient in English." Id., ¶¶ 16, 17. In particular, the parties recognized that "Yniguez'[s] use of a language other 7 Specifically addressing "[t]he handling of customer inquiries or com- plaints involving state or local government services," the Attorney Gen- eral elaborated: "All official documents that are governmental acts must be in English, but translation services and accommodating communications are permissi- ble, and may be required if reasonably necessary to the fair and effective delivery of services, or required by specific federal regulation. Communi- cations between elected and other governmental employees with the pub- lic at large may be in a language other than English on the same princi- ples." App. 74. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 53 Opinion of the Court than English in the course of her performing government business contributes to the efficient operation . . . and . . . administration of the State." Id., ¶ 15. The stipulation re- ferred to the Attorney General's January 24, 1989, opinion, id., ¶ 46, and further recounted that since the passage of Ar- ticle XXVIII, "none of [Yniguez's] supervisors ha[d] ever told her to change or cease her prior use of Spanish in the per- formance of her duties," id., ¶ 48.8 The District Court heard testimony on two days in Febru- ary and April 1989, and disposed of the case in an opinion and judgment filed February 6, 1990. Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309. Prior to that final decision, the court had dismissed the State of Arizona as a defendant, accepting the State's plea of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id., at 311. Yniguez's second amended complaint, filed February 23, 1989, accordingly named as defendants only the Gover- nor, the Attorney General, and the Director of the Depart- ment of Administration. See App. 55.9 The District Court determined first that, among the named defendants, only the Governor, in her official capacity, was a proper party. The Attorney General, the District Court found, had no authority under Arizona law to enforce provisions like Article XXVIII against state employees. 730 F. Supp., at 311­312. The Director and the Governor, 8 Supplementing their pleas to dismiss for want of a case or controversy, the defendants urged that Attorney General Opinion No. I89­009 "puts to rest any claim that [Yniguez] will be penalized by the State for using Spanish in her work." Record, Doc. No. 51, p. 4, n. 1. 9 The second amended complaint added another plaintiff, Arizona State Senator Jaime Gutierrez. Senator Gutierrez alleged that Article XXVIII interfered with his rights to communicate freely with persons, including residents of his Senate district, who spoke languages other than English. App. 58­59. The District Court dismissed Gutierrez's claim on the ground that the defendants, all executive branch officials, lacked authority to take enforcement action against elected legislative branch officials. Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309, 311 (Ariz. 1990). Gutierrez is no longer a participant in these proceedings. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 54 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court on the other hand, did have authority to enforce state laws and rules against state service employees. Id., at 311. But nothing in the record, the District Court said, showed that the Director had undertaken or threatened to undertake any action adverse to Yniguez. Id., at 313. That left Gover- nor Mofford. The Attorney General "ha[d] formally interpreted Article XXVIII as not imposing any restrictions on Yniguez's con- tinued use of Spanish during the course of her official du- ties," id., at 312, and indeed all three named defendants- Mofford as well as Corbin and Eden, see supra, at 50-"ha[d] stated on the record that Yniguez may continue to speak Spanish without fear of official retribution." 730 F. Supp., at 312. Governor Mofford therefore reiterated that Yniguez faced no actual or threatened injury attributable to any Ari- zona executive branch officer, and hence presented no genu- ine case or controversy. See ibid. But the District Court singled out the stipulations that "Governor Mofford intends to comply with Article XXVIII," and "expects State service employees to comply with Article XXVIII." Record, Doc. No. 62, ¶¶ 35, 36; see 730 F. Supp., at 312. If Yniguez proved right and the Governor wrong about the breadth of Article XXVIII, the District Court concluded, then Yniguez would be vulnerable to the Governor's pledge to enforce compliance with the Article. See ibid. Proceeding to the merits, the District Court found Article XXVIII fatally overbroad. The measure, as the District Court read it, was not merely a direction that all official acts be in English, as the Attorney General's opinion maintained; instead, according to the District Court, Article XXVIII imposed a sweeping ban on the use of any language other than English by all of Arizona officialdom, with only limited exceptions. Id., at 314. The District Court adverted to the Attorney General's confining construction, but found it unpersuasive. Opinion No. I89­009, the District Court observed, is "merely . . . advisory," not binding on any 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 55 Opinion of the Court court. 730 F. Supp., at 315. "More importantly," the Dis- trict Court concluded, "the Attorney General's interpre- tation . . . is simply at odds with Article XXVIII's plain language." Ibid. The view that Article XXVIII's text left no room for a moderate and restrained interpretation led the District Court to decline "to allow the Arizona courts the initial op- portunity to determine the scope of Article XXVIII." Id., at 316. The District Court ultimately dismissed all parties save Yniguez and Governor Mofford in her official capacity, then declared Article XXVIII unconstitutional as violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, but denied Yniguez's request for an injunction because "she ha[d] not established an enforcement threat sufficient to warrant [such] relief." Id., at 316­317. Postjudgment motions followed, sparked by Governor Mofford's announcement that she would not pursue an ap- peal. See App. 98. The Attorney General renewed his re- quest to certify the pivotal state-law question-the correct construction of Article XXVIII-to the Arizona Supreme Court. See Record, Doc. No. 82. He also moved to in- tervene on behalf of the State, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2403(b),10 in order to contest on appeal the District Court's declaration that a provision of Arizona's Constitution vio- lated the Federal Constitution. Record, Doc. Nos. 92, 93. 10 Title 28 U. S. C. § 2403(b) provides: "In any action, suit, or proceeding in a court of the United States to which a State or any agency, officer, or employee thereof is not a party, wherein the constitutionality of any statute of that State affecting the public interest is drawn in question, the court shall certify such fact to the attorney general of the State, and shall permit the State to intervene for presentation of evidence, if evidence is otherwise admissible in the case, and for argument on the question of constitutionality. The State shall, subject to the applicable provisions of law, have all the rights of a party and be subject to all liabilities of a party as to court costs to the extent necessary for a proper presentation of the facts and law relating to the question of constitutionality." 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 56 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court Two newcomers also appeared in the District Court after judgment: the Arizonans for Official English Committee (AOE) and Robert D. Park, Chairman of AOE. Invoking Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, AOE and Park moved to intervene as defendants in order to urge on appeal the constitutionality of Article XXVIII. App. 94­ 102. AOE, an unincorporated association, was principal sponsor of the ballot initiative that became Article XXVIII. AOE and Park alleged in support of their intervention mo- tion the interest of AOE members in enforcement of Article XXVIII and Governor Mofford's unwillingness to defend the measure on appeal. Responding to the AOE/Park motion, Governor Mofford confirmed that she did not wish to appeal, but would have no objection to the Attorney General's inter- vention to pursue an appeal as the State's representative, or to the pursuit of an appeal by any other party. See Record, Doc. No. 94. Yniguez expressed reservations about proceeding further. "She ha[d] won [her] suit against her employer" and had "ob- tained her relief," her counsel noted. Record, Doc. No. 114, p. 18 (Tr. of Proceeding on Motion to Intervene and Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, Mar. 26, 1990). If the litiga- tion "goes forward," Yniguez's counsel told the District Court, "I guess we do, too," but, counsel added, it might be in Yniguez's "best interest . . . if we stopped it right here." Ibid. The District Court agreed. In an opinion filed April 3, 1990, the District Court denied all three postjudgment motions. Yniguez v. Mofford, 130 F. R. D. 410. Certification was inappropriate, the District Court ruled, in light of the court's prior rejection of the At- torney General's narrow reading of Article XXVIII. See id., at 412. As to the Attorney General's intervention appli- cation, the District Court observed that § 2403(b) addresses only actions " `to which the State or any agency, officer, or employee thereof is not a party.' " See id., at 413 (quoting § 2403(b)). Yniguez's action did not fit the § 2403(b) de- 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 57 Opinion of the Court scription, the District Court said, because the State and its officers were the very defendants-the sole defendants- Yniguez's complaint named. Governor Mofford remained a party throughout the District Court proceedings. If the State lost the opportunity to defend the constitutionality of Article XXVIII on appeal, the District Court reasoned, it was "only because Governor Mofford determine[d] that the state's sovereign interests would be best served by foregoing an appeal." Ibid. Turning to the AOE/Park intervention motion, the Dis- trict Court observed first that the movants had failed to file a pleading "setting forth the[ir] claim or defense," as re- quired by Rule 24(c). Ibid. But that deficiency was not critical, the District Court said. Ibid. The insurmountable hurdle was Article III standing. The labor and resources AOE spent to promote the ballot initiative did not suffice to establish standing to sue or defend in a federal tribunal, the District Court held. Id., at 414­415. Nor did Park or any other AOE member qualify for party status, the District Court ruled, for the interests of voters who favored the ini- tiative were too general to meet traditional standing criteria. Id., at 415. In addition, the District Court was satisfied that AOE and Park could not tenably assert practical impairment of their interests stemming from the precedential force of the deci- sion. As nonparticipants in the federal litigation, they would face no issue preclusion. And a lower federal-court judgment is not binding on state courts, the District Court noted. Thus, AOE and Park would not be precluded by the federal declaration from pursuing "any future state court proceeding [based on] Article XXVIII." Id., at 415­416. II The Ninth Circuit viewed the matter of standing to appeal differently. In an opinion released July 19, 1991, Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F. 2d 727, the Court of Appeals reached these 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 58 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court conclusions: AOE and Park met Article III requirements and could proceed as appellants; Arizona's Attorney General, however, having successfully moved in the District Court for his dismissal as a defendant, could not reenter as a party, but would be permitted to present argument regarding the constitutionality of Article XXVIII. Id., at 738­740. The Ninth Circuit reported it would retain jurisdiction over the District Court's decision on the merits, id., at 740, but did not then address the question whether Article XXVIII's meaning should be certified for definitive resolution by the Arizona Supreme Court. Concerning AOE's standing, the Court of Appeals rea- soned that the Arizona Legislature would have standing to defend the constitutionality of a state statute; by analogy, the Ninth Circuit maintained, AOE, as principal sponsor of the ballot initiative, qualified to defend Article XXVIII on appeal. Id., at 732­733; see also id., at 734, n. 5 ("[W]e hold that AOE has standing in the same way that a legislature might."). AOE Chairman Park also had standing to appeal, according to the Ninth Circuit, because Yniguez "could have had a reasonable expectation that Park (and possibly AOE as well) would bring an enforcement action against her" under § 4 of Article XXVIII, which authorizes any person residing in Arizona to sue in state court to enforce the Arti- cle. Id., at 734, and n. 5.11 11 In a remarkable passage, the Ninth Circuit addressed Yniguez's argu- ment, opposing intervention by AOE and Park, that the District Court's judgment was no impediment to any state-court proceeding AOE and Park might wish to bring, because that judgment is not a binding prece- dent on Arizona's judiciary. See 939 F. 2d, at 735­736. The Court of Appeals questioned the wisdom of the view expressed "in the academic literature," "by some state courts," and by "several individual justices" that state courts are "coordinate and coequal with the lower federal courts on matters of federal law." Id., at 736 (footnote omitted). The Ninth Circuit acknowledged "there may be valid reasons not to bind the state courts to a decision of a single federal district judge-which is not even binding on the same judge in a subsequent action." Id., at 736­737. However, the appellate panel added, those reasons "are inapplicable to 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 59 Opinion of the Court Having allowed AOE and Park to serve as appellants, the Court of Appeals held Arizona's Attorney General "judi- cial[ly] estoppe[d]" from again appearing as a party. Id., at 738­739; see also id., at 740 ("[H]aving asked the district court to dismiss him as a party, [the Attorney General] can- not now become one again.").12 With Governor Mofford choosing not to seek Court of Appeals review, the appeal became one to which neither "[the] State [n]or any agency, officer, or employee thereof [was] a party," the Ninth Circuit observed, so the State's Attorney General could appear pur- suant to 28 U. S. C. § 2403(b). See 939 F. 2d, at 739.13 But, the Ninth Circuit added, § 2403(b) "confers only a limited right," a right pendent to the AOE/Park appeal, "to make an argument on the question of [Article XXVIII's] constitu- tionality." Id., at 739­740. Prior to the Ninth Circuit's July 1991 opinion, indeed the very day after AOE, Park, and the Arizona Attorney General filed their notices of appeal, a development of prime impor- tance occurred. On April 10, 1990, Yniguez resigned from state employment in order to accept another job. Her resig- decisions of the federal courts of appeals." Id., at 737. But cf. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U. S. 605, 617 (1989) ("state courts . . . possess the authority, absent a provision for exclusive federal jurisdiction, to render binding judicial decisions that rest on their own interpretations of federal law"); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U. S. 364, 375­376 (1993) (Thomas, J., con- curring) (Supremacy Clause does not require state courts to follow rulings by federal courts of appeals on questions of federal law). 12 Because the Court of Appeals found AOE and Park to be proper appel- lants, that court did not "address the question whether the Attorney Gen- eral would have standing to appeal under Article III if no other party were willing and able to appeal." 939 F. 2d, at 738. The Court of Ap- peals assumed, however, that "whenever the constitutionality of a provi- sion of state law is called into question, the state government will have a sufficient interest [to satisfy] Article III." Id., at 733, n. 4. Cf. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131, 137 (1986) (intervening State had standing to appeal from judgment holding state law unconstitutional); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54, 62 (1986) ("a State has standing to defend the constitutionality of its statute"). 13 The full text of 28 U. S. C. § 2403(b) is set out supra, at 55, n. 10. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 60 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court nation apparently became effective on April 25, 1990. Ari- zona's Attorney General so informed the Ninth Circuit in September 1991, "suggest[ing] that this case may lack a via- ble plaintiff and, hence, may be moot." Suggestion of Moot- ness in Nos. 90­15546 and 90­15581 (CA9), Affidavit and Exh. A. One year later, on September 16, 1992, the Ninth Circuit rejected the mootness suggestion. Yniguez v. Arizona, 975 F. 2d 646. The court's ruling adopted in large part Yni- guez's argument opposing a mootness disposition. See App. 194­204 (Appellee Yniguez's Response Regarding Mootness Considerations). "[T]he plaintiff may no longer be affected by the English only provision," the Court of Appeals ac- knowledged. 975 F. 2d, at 647. Nevertheless, the court continued, "[her] constitutional claims may entitle her to an award of nominal damages." Ibid. Her complaint did "not expressly request nominal damages," the Ninth Circuit noted, but "it did request `all other relief that the Court deems just and proper under the circumstances.' " Id., at 647, n. 1; see supra, at 50­51. Thus, the Court of Appeals reasoned, one could regard the District Court's judgment as including an "implicit denial" of nominal damages. 975 F. 2d, at 647, n. 2. To permit Yniguez and AOE to clarify their positions, the Ninth Circuit determined to return the case to the District Court. There, with the Ninth Circuit's permission, AOE's Chairman Park could file a notice of appeal from the District Court's judgment, following up the Circuit's decision 14 months earlier allowing AOE and Park to intervene. Id., at 647.14 And next, Yniguez could cross-appeal to place before 14 In their original notice of appeal, filed April 9, 1990, AOE and Park targeted the District Court's denial of their motion to intervene. See App. 150­151. Once granted intervention, their original notice indicated, they would be positioned to file an appeal from the judgment declaring Article XXVIII unconstitutional. See id., at 150. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 61 Opinion of the Court the Ninth Circuit, explicitly, the issue of nominal damages. Id., at 647, and n. 2.15 In line with the Ninth Circuit's instructions, the case file was returned to the District Court on November 5, 1992; AOE and Park filed their second notice of appeal on Decem- ber 3, App. 206­208, and Yniguez cross-appealed on Decem- ber 15, App. 209.16 The Ninth Circuit heard argument on the merits on May 3, 1994. After argument, on June 21, 1994, the Ninth Circuit allowed Arizonans Against Constitu- tional Tampering (AACT) and Thomas Espinosa, Chairman of AACT, to intervene as plaintiffs-appellees. App. 14; Yniguez v. Arizona, 42 F. 3d 1217, 1223­1224 (1994) (amended Jan. 17, 1995). AACT was the principal opponent of the ballot initiative that became Article XXVIII. Id., at 1224. In permitting this late intervention, the Court of Ap- peals noted that "it d[id] not rely on [AACT's] standing as a party." Ibid. The standing of the preargument partici- pants, in the Ninth Circuit's view, sufficed to support a deter- mination on the merits. See ibid. In December 1994, the Ninth Circuit panel that had super- intended the case since 1990 affirmed the judgment declaring Article XXVIII unconstitutional and remanded the case, di- recting the District Court to award Yniguez nominal dam- 15 The Ninth Circuit made two further suggestions in the event that Yniguez failed to seek nominal damages: A new plaintiff "whose claim against the operation of the English only provision is not moot" might intervene; or Yniguez herself might have standing to remain a suitor if she could show that others had refrained from challenging the English-only provision in reliance on her suit. See 975 F. 2d, at 647­648. No state employee later intervened to substitute for Yniguez, nor did Yniguez en- deavor to show that others had not sued because they had relied on her suit. 16 On March 16, 1993, the District Court awarded Yniguez nearly $100,000 in attorney's fees. Record, Doc. No. 127. Governor Mofford and the State filed a notice of appeal from that award on April 8, 1993. Rec- ord, Doc. No. 128. Because the Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the Dis- trict Court's judgment on the merits, the appeals court did not reach the state defendants' appeal from the award of fees. 69 F. 3d, at 924, n. 2, 927. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 62 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court ages. 42 F. 3d 1217 (amended Jan. 17, 1995). Despite the Court of Appeals' July 1991 denial of party status to Arizona, the Ninth Circuit apparently viewed the State as the defend- ant responsible for any damages, for it noted: "The State of Arizona expressly waived its right to assert the Eleventh Amendment as a defense to the award of nominal damages." Id., at 1243. The Ninth Circuit agreed to rehear the case en banc, 53 F. 3d 1084 (1995), and in October 1995, by a 6-to-5 vote, the en banc court reinstated the panel opinion with minor alterations. 69 F. 3d 920. Adopting the District Court's construction of Article XXVIII, the en banc court read the provision to prohibit " `the use of any language other than English by all officers and employees of all political subdivisions in Arizona while performing their official duties, save to the extent that they may be allowed to use a foreign language by the limited exceptions contained in § 3(2) of Article XXVIII.' " 69 F. 3d, at 928 (quoting 730 F. Supp., at 314). Because the court found the "plain language" dispositive, 69 F. 3d, at 929, it rejected the State Attorney General's limit- ing construction and declined to certify the matter to the Arizona Supreme Court, id., at 929­931. As an additional reason for its refusal to grant the Attorney General's request for certification, the en banc court stated: "The Attorney General . . . never conceded that [Article XXVIII] would be unconstitutional if construed as Yniguez asserts it properly should be." Id., at 931, and n. 14.17 The Ninth Circuit also pointed to a state-court challenge to the constitutionality of 17 The Court of Appeals contrasted Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., Inc., 484 U. S. 383 (1988), in which this Court certified to the Vir- ginia Supreme Court questions concerning the proper interpretation of a state statute. In American Booksellers, the Ninth Circuit noted, "the State Attorney General conceded [the statute] would be unconstitutional if construed as the plaintiffs contended it should be." 69 F. 3d, at 930. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 63 Opinion of the Court Article XXVIII, Ruiz v. State, No. CV92­19603 (Sup. Ct. Maricopa County, Jan. 24, 1994). In Ruiz, the Ninth Circuit observed, the state court of first instance "dispos[ed] of [the] First Amendment challenge in three paragraphs" and "d[id] nothing to narrow [the provision]." 69 F. 3d, at 931.18 After construing Article XXVIII as sweeping in scope, the en banc Court of Appeals condemned the provision as mani- festly overbroad, trenching untenably on speech rights of Arizona officials and public employees. See id., at 931­948. For prevailing in the § 1983 action, the court ultimately an- nounced, Yniguez was "entitled to nominal damages." Id., at 949. On remand, the District Court followed the en banc Court of Appeals' order and, on November 3, 1995, awarded Yniguez $1 in damages. App. 211. AOE and Park petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to the Ninth Circuit.19 They raised two questions: (1) Does Article XXVIII violate the Free Speech Clause of the First 18 The Ruiz case included among its several plaintiffs four elected offi- cials and five state employees. After defeat in the court of first instance, the Ruiz plaintiffs prevailed in the Arizona Court of Appeals. Ruiz v. Symington, No. 1 CA­CV 94­0235, 1996 WL 309512 (Ariz. App., June 11, 1996). That court noted, with evident concern, that "the Ninth Circuit refused to abstain and certify the question of Article [XXVIII]'s proper interpretation to the Arizona Supreme Court, although the issue was pending in our state court system." Id., at *4. "Comity," the Arizona intermediate appellate court observed, "typically applies when a federal court finds that deference to a state court, on an issue of state law, is proper." Ibid. Nevertheless, in the interest of uniformity and to dis- courage forum shopping, the Arizona appeals court decided to defer to the federal litigation, forgoing independent analysis. Ibid. The Arizona Supreme Court granted review in Ruiz in November 1996, and stayed proceedings pending our decision in this case. App. to Supplemental Brief for Petitioners 1. 19 The State did not oppose the petition and, in its Appearance Form, filed in this Court on January 10, 1996, noted that "if the Court grants the Petition and reverses the lower court's decision . . . Arizona will seek reversal of award of attorney's fees against the State." See supra, at 61, n. 16. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 64 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court Amendment by "declaring English the official language of the State and requiring English to be used to perform official acts"?; (2) Do public employees have "a Free Speech right to disregard the [State's] official language" and perform official actions in a language other than English? This Court granted the petition and requested the parties to brief as threshold matters (1) the standing of AOE and Park to pro- ceed in this action as defending parties, and (2) Yniguez's continuing satisfaction of the case-or-controversy require- ment. 517 U. S. 1102 (1996). III Article III, § 2, of the Constitution confines federal courts to the decision of "Cases" or "Controversies." Standing to sue or defend is an aspect of the case-or-controversy require- ment. Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Con- tractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U. S. 656, 663­664 (1993) (standing to sue); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54, 56 (1986) (standing to defend on appeal). To qualify as a party with standing to litigate, a person must show, first and foremost, "an invasion of a legally protected interest" that is "concrete and particularized" and " `actual or imminent.' " Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155 (1990)). An interest shared generally with the public at large in the proper application of the Constitution and laws will not do. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S., at 573­576. Standing to defend on appeal in the place of an original defendant, no less than standing to sue, demands that the litigant possess "a direct stake in the outcome." Diamond, 476 U. S., at 62 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 740 (1972) (in- ternal quotation marks omitted)). The standing Article III requires must be met by persons seeking appellate review, just as it must be met by persons appearing in courts of first instance. Diamond, 476 U. S., at 62. The decision to seek review "is not to be placed in the 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 65 Opinion of the Court hands of `concerned bystanders,' " persons who would seize it "as a `vehicle for the vindication of value interests.' " Ibid. (citation omitted). An intervenor cannot step into the shoes of the original party unless the intervenor independently "fulfills the requirements of Article III." Id., at 68. In granting the petition for a writ of certiorari in this case, we called for briefing on the question whether AOE and Park have standing, consonant with Article III of the Federal Constitution, to defend in federal court the constitutionality of Arizona Constitution Article XXVIII. Petitioners argue primarily that, as initiative proponents, they have a quasi- legislative interest in defending the constitutionality of the measure they successfully sponsored. AOE and Park stress the funds and effort they expended to achieve adoption of Article XXVIII. We have recognized that state legislators have standing to contest a decision holding a state statute unconstitutional if state law authorizes legislators to repre- sent the State's interests. See Karcher v. May, 484 U. S. 72, 82 (1987).20 AOE and its members, however, are not elected representatives, and we are aware of no Arizona law ap- pointing initiative sponsors as agents of the people of Ari- zona to defend, in lieu of public officials, the constitutionality of initiatives made law of the State. Nor has this Court ever identified initiative proponents as Article-III-qualified de- fenders of the measures they advocated. Cf. Don't Bank- rupt Washington Committee v. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 460 U. S. 1077 (1983) (summarily dis- missing, for lack of standing, appeal by an initiative propo- nent from a decision holding the initiative unconstitutional). AOE also asserts representational or associational stand- ing. An association has standing to sue or defend in such 20 Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 930, n. 5, 939­940 (1983) (Immigration and Naturalization Service appealed Court of Appeals ruling to this Court but declined to defend constitutionality of one-House veto provision; Court held Congress a proper party to defend measure's validity where both Houses, by resolution, had authorized intervention in the lawsuit). 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 66 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court capacity, however, only if its members would have standing in their own right. See Food and Commercial Workers v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U. S. 544, 551­553 (1996); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U. S. 333, 343 (1977). The requisite concrete injury to AOE members is not apparent. As nonparties in the District Court, AOE's members were not bound by the judgment for Yniguez. That judgment had slim precedential effect, see supra, at 58­59, n. 11,21 and it left AOE entirely free to invoke Article XXVIII, § 4, the citizen suit provision, in state court, where AOE could pursue whatever relief state law authorized. Nor do we discern anything flowing from Article XXVIII's citizen suit provision-which authorizes suits to enforce Ar- ticle XXVIII in state court-that could support standing for Arizona residents in general, or AOE in particular, to defend the Article's constitutionality in federal court. We thus have grave doubts whether AOE and Park have standing under Article III to pursue appellate review. Nevertheless, we need not definitively resolve the issue. Rather, we will follow a path we have taken before and in- quire, as a primary matter, whether originating plaintiff Yniguez still has a case to pursue. See Burke v. Barnes, 479 U. S. 361, 363, 364, n. (1987) (leaving unresolved question of congressional standing because Court determined case was moot). For purposes of that inquiry, we will assume, argu- endo, that AOE and Park had standing to place this case before an appellate tribunal. See id., at 366 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Court properly assumed standing, even though that matter raised a serious question, in order to analyze mootness issue). We may resolve the question whether 21 As the District Court observed, the stare decisis effect of that court's ruling was distinctly limited. The judgment was "not binding on the Ari- zona state courts [and did] not foreclose any rights of [AOE] or Park in any future state-court proceeding arising out of Article XXVIII." Yniguez v. Mofford, 130 F. R. D. 410, 416 (D. Ariz. 1990). 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 67 Opinion of the Court there remains a live case or controversy with respect to Yni- guez's claim without first determining whether AOE or Park has standing to appeal because the former question, like the latter, goes to the Article III jurisdiction of this Court and the courts below, not to the merits of the case. Cf. U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U. S. 18, 20­22 (1994). IV To qualify as a case fit for federal-court adjudication, "an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed." Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401 (1975) (quoting Steffel v. Thomp- son, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a state employee subject to Article XXVIII, Yniguez had a viable claim at the outset of the litigation in late 1988. We need not consider whether her case lost vital- ity in January 1989 when the Attorney General released Opinion No. I89­009. That opinion construed Article XXVIII to require the expression of "official acts" in Eng- lish, but to leave government employees free to use other languages "if reasonably necessary to the fair and effective delivery of services" to the public. See App. 71, 74; supra, at 52­53, 54; see also Marston's Inc. v. Roman Catholic Church of Phoenix, 132 Ariz. 90, 94, 644 P. 2d 244, 248 (1982) ("Attorney General opinions are advisory only and are not binding on the court. . . . This does not mean, however, that citizens may not rely in good faith on Attorney General opin- ions until the courts have spoken."). Yniguez left her state job in April 1990 to take up employment in the private sec- tor, where her speech was not governed by Article XXVIII. At that point, it became plain that she lacked a still vital claim for prospective relief. Cf. Boyle v. Landry, 401 U. S. 77, 78, 80­81 (1971) (prospective relief denied where plain- tiffs failed to show challenged measures adversely affected any plaintiff's primary conduct). 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 68 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court The Attorney General suggested mootness,22 but Yniguez resisted, and the Ninth Circuit adopted her proposed method of saving the case. See supra, at 60­61.23 It was not dis- positive, the court said, that Yniguez "may no longer be af- fected by the English only provision," 975 F. 2d, at 647, for Yniguez had raised in response to the mootness suggestion "[t]he possibility that [she] may seek nominal damages," ibid.; see App. 197­200 (Appellee Yniguez's Response Re- garding Mootness Considerations). At that stage of the liti- gation, however, Yniguez's plea for nominal damages was not the possibility the Ninth Circuit imagined. Yniguez's complaint rested on 42 U. S. C. § 1983. See supra, at 49­50, and n. 3. Although Governor Mofford in her official capacity was the sole defendant against whom the 22 Mootness has been described as " `the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the com- mencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its exist- ence (mootness).' " United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U. S. 388, 397 (1980) (quoting Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 Yale L. J. 1363, 1384 (1973)). 23 Yniguez's counsel did not inform the Court of Appeals of Yniguez's departure from government employment, a departure effective April 25, 1990, the day before the appeal was docketed. See App. 7. It was not until September 1991 that the State's Attorney General notified the Ninth Circuit of the plaintiff's changed circumstances. See id., at 187. Yni- guez's counsel offered a laconic explanation for this lapse: First, "legal research disclosed that this case was not moot"; second, counsel for the State of Arizona knew of the resignation and "agreed this appeal should proceed." App. 196, n. 2 (Appellee Yniguez's Response Regarding Moot- ness Considerations). The explanation was unsatisfactory. It is the duty of counsel to bring to the federal tribunal's attention, "without delay," facts that may raise a question of mootness. See Board of License Comm'rs of Tiverton v. Pastore, 469 U. S. 238, 240 (1985) (per curiam). Nor is a change in circumstances bearing on the vitality of a case a matter opposing counsel may withhold from a federal court based on counsels' agreement that the case should proceed to judgment and not be treated as moot. See United States v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253 U. S. 113, 116 (1920); R. Stern, E. Gressman, S. Shapiro, & K. Geller, Supreme Court Practice 721­722 (7th ed. 1993). 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 69 Opinion of the Court District Court's February 1990 declaratory judgment ran, see supra, at 55, the Ninth Circuit held the State answerable for the nominal damages Yniguez requested on appeal. See 69 F. 3d, at 948­949 (declaring Yniguez "entitled to nominal damages for prevailing in an action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983" and noting that "[t]he State of Arizona expressly waived its right to assert the Eleventh Amendment as a defense to the award of nominal damages"). We have held, however, that § 1983 actions do not lie against a State. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 71 (1989). Thus, the claim for relief the Ninth Circuit found sufficient to overcome mootness was nonexistent. The barrier was not, as the Ninth Circuit supposed, Eleventh Amendment immunity, which the State could waive. The stopper was that § 1983 creates no remedy against a State.24 Furthermore, under the Ninth Circuit's ruling on inter- vention, the State of Arizona was permitted to participate in the appeal, but not as a party. 939 F. 3d, at 738­740. The Court of Appeals never revised that ruling. To recapitulate, 24 State officers in their official capacities, like States themselves, are not amenable to suit for damages under § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S., at 71, and n. 10. State officers are subject to § 1983 liability for damages in their personal capacities, however, even when the conduct in question relates to their official duties. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U. S. 21, 25­31 (1991). At no point after the nominal damages solution to mootness surfaced in this case did the Ninth Circuit identify Governor Mofford as a party whose conduct could be the predicate for retrospective relief. That is hardly surprising, for Mofford never partici- pated in any effort to enforce Article XXVIII against Yniguez. More- over, she opposed the ballot initiative that became Article XXVIII, see supra, at 49, n. 1, associated herself with the Attorney General's restrained interpretation of the provision, see supra, at 52­53, and was unwilling to appeal from the District Court's judgment declaring the Article unconsti- tutional, see supra, at 56. In this Court, Yniguez raised the possibility of Governor Mofford's individual liability under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908). See Brief for Respondent Yniguez 21­22. That doctrine, however, permits only prospective relief, not retrospective monetary awards. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 664 (1974). 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 70 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court in July 1991, two months prior to the Attorney General's suggestion of mootness, the Court of Appeals rejected the Attorney General's plea for party status, as representative of the State. Ibid. The Ninth Circuit accorded the Attorney General the "right [under 28 U. S. C. § 2403(b)] to argue the constitutionality of Article XXVIII . . . contingent upon AOE and Park's bringing the appeal." Id., at 740; see supra, at 59. But see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131, 136­137 (1986) (State's § 2403(b) right to urge on appeal the constitutionality of its laws is not contingent on participation of other appel- lants). AOE and Park, however, were the sole participants recognized by the Ninth Circuit as defendants-appellants. The Attorney General "ha[d] asked the district court to dis- miss him as a party," the Court of Appeals noted, hence he "cannot now become one again." 939 F. 2d, at 740. While we do not rule on the propriety of the Ninth Circuit's exclu- sion of the State as a party, we note this lapse in that court's accounting for its decision: The Ninth Circuit did not explain how it arrived at the conclusion that an intervenor the court had designated a nonparty could be subject, nevertheless, to an obligation to pay damages. True, Yniguez and the Attorney General took the steps the Ninth Circuit prescribed: Yniguez filed a cross-appeal notice, see supra, at 61; the Attorney General waived the State's right to assert the Eleventh Amendment as a defense to an award of nominal damages, see 69 F. 3d, at 948­949. But the earlier, emphatic Court of Appeals ruling remained in place: The State's intervention, although proper under § 2403(b), the Ninth Circuit maintained, gave Arizona no sta- tus as a party in the lawsuit. See 939 F. 2d, at 738­740.25 25 Section 2403(b) by its terms subjects an intervenor "to all liabilities of a party as to court costs" required "for a proper presentation of the facts and law relating to the question of constitutionality." 28 U. S. C. § 2403(b) (emphasis added). It does not subject an intervenor to liability for damages available against a party defendant. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 71 Opinion of the Court In advancing cooperation between Yniguez and the Attor- ney General regarding the request for and agreement to pay nominal damages, the Ninth Circuit did not home in on the federal courts' lack of authority to act in friendly or feigned proceedings. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 319 U. S. 302, 304 (1943) (per curiam) (absent "a genuine adversary issue between . . . parties," federal court "may not safely proceed to judgment"). It should have been clear to the Court of Appeals that a claim for nominal damages, extracted late in the day from Yniguez's general prayer for relief and asserted solely to avoid otherwise certain mootness, bore close inspec- tion. Cf. Fox v. Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N. Y., 42 F. 3d 135, 141­142 (CA2 1994) (rejecting claim for nominal damages proffered to save case from mootness years after litigation began where defendants could have asserted quali- fied immunity had plaintiffs' complaint specifically requested monetary relief). On such inspection, the Ninth Circuit might have perceived that Yniguez's plea for nominal dam- ages could not genuinely revive the case.26 When a civil case becomes moot pending appellate adjudi- cation, "[t]he established practice . . . in the federal system . . . is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss." United States v. Munsing- wear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 39 (1950). Vacatur "clears the path for future relitigation" by eliminating a judgment the loser was stopped from opposing on direct review. Id., at 40. Vacatur is in order when mootness occurs through happen- stance-circumstances not attributable to the parties-or, 26 Endeavoring to meet the live case requirement, petitioners AOE and Park posited in this Court several "controversies remaining between the parties." Reply Brief for Petitioners 18­19. Tellingly, none of the as- serted controversies involved Yniguez, sole plaintiff and prevailing party in the District Court. See ibid. (describing AOE and Park as adverse to intervenor Arizonans Against Constitution Tampering (AACT), see supra, at 61, AACT as adverse to the State, AOE and Park as adverse to the State). 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 72 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court relevant here, the "unilateral action of the party who pre- vailed in the lower court." U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co., 513 U. S., at 23; cf. id., at 29 ("mootness by reason of settlement [ordinarily] does not justify vacatur of a judgment under review"). As just explained, Yniguez's changed circumstances-her resignation from public sector employment to pursue work in the private sector-mooted the case stated in her com- plaint.27 We turn next to the effect of that development on the judgments below. Yniguez urges that vacatur ought not occur here. She maintains that the State acquiesced in the Ninth Circuit's judgment and that, in any event, the District Court judgment should not be upset because it was entered before the mooting event occurred and was not properly ap- pealed. See Brief for Respondent Yniguez 23­25. Concerning the Ninth Circuit's judgment, Yniguez argues that the State's Attorney General effectively acquiesced in that court's dispositions when he did not petition for this Court's review. See id., at 24­25; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 10­11, and n. 4 (citing Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54 (1986)).28 We do not agree that this Court is disarmed in the manner suggested. 27 It bears repetition that Yniguez did not sue on behalf of a class. See supra, at 50; cf. Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 404 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring) (mootness determination unavoidable where plaintiff- respondent's case lost vitality and action was not filed on behalf of a class); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 397­403 (1975) (recognizing class action ex- ception to mootness doctrine). 28 Designated a respondent in this Court, the State was not required or specifically invited to file a brief answering the AOE/Park petition. In his appearance form, filed January 10, 1996, Arizona's Attorney General made this much plain: The State-aligned with petitioners AOE and Park in that Arizona defended Article XXVIII's constitutionality-did not op- pose certiorari; in the event Yniguez did not prevail here, Arizona would seek to recoup the attorney's fees the District Court had ordered the State to pay her. See supra, at 61, n. 16. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 73 Opinion of the Court We have taken up the case for consideration on the petition for certiorari filed by AOE and Park. Even if we were to rule definitively that AOE and Park lack standing, we would have an obligation essentially to search the pleadings on core matters of federal-court adjudicatory authority-to inquire not only into this Court's authority to decide the questions petitioners present, but to consider, also, the authority of the lower courts to proceed. As explained in Bender v. Wil- liamsport Area School Dist., 475 U. S. 534 (1986): "[E]very federal appellate court has a special obligation to `satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review,' even though the parties are prepared to concede it. Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U. S. 237, 244 (1934). See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S. 327, 331­332 (1977) (standing). `And if the record discloses that the lower court was without jurisdiction this court will notice the defect, although the parties make no contention concerning it. [When the lower federal court] lack[s] jurisdiction, we have ju- risdiction on appeal, not of the merits but merely for the purpose of correcting the error of the lower court in entertaining the suit.' United States v. Corrick, 298 U. S. 435, 440 (1936) (footnotes omitted)." Id., at 541 (brackets in original). See also Iron Arrow Honor Soc. v. Heckler, 464 U. S. 67, 72­73 (1983) (per curiam) (vacating judgment below where Court of Appeals had ruled on the merits although case had become moot). In short, we have authority to "make such disposition of the whole case as justice may require." U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co., 513 U. S., at 21 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because the Ninth Circuit re- fused to stop the adjudication when Yniguez's departure from public employment came to its attention, we set aside the unwarranted en banc Court of Appeals judgment. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 74 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court As to the District Court's judgment, Yniguez stresses that the date of the mooting event-her resignation from state employment effective April 25, 1990-was some 21 2 months after the February 6, 1990, decision she seeks to preserve. Governor Mofford was the sole defendant bound by the Dis- trict Court judgment, and Mofford declined to appeal. Therefore, Yniguez contends, the District Court's judgment should remain untouched. But AOE and Park had an arguable basis for seeking ap- pellate review, and the Attorney General promptly made known his independent interest in defending Article XXVIII against the total demolition declared by the District Court. First, the Attorney General repeated his plea for certifica- tion of Article XXVIII to the Arizona Supreme Court. See Record, Doc. No. 82. And if that plea failed, he asked, in his motion to intervene, "to be joined as a defendant so that he may participate in all post-judgment proceedings." Record, Doc. No. 93, p. 2. Although denied party status, the Attor- ney General had, at a minimum, a right secured by Congress, a right to present argument on appeal "on the question of constitutionality." See 28 U. S. C. § 2403(b). He was in the process of pursuing that right when the mooting event occurred. We have already recounted the course of proceedings thereafter. First, Yniguez did not tell the Court of Appeals that she had left the State's employ. See supra, at 68, n. 23. When that fact was disclosed to the court by the Attorney General, a dismissal for mootness was suggested, and re- jected. A mootness disposition at that point was in order, we have just explained. Such a dismissal would have stopped in midstream the Attorney General's endeavor, premised on § 2403(b), to defend the State's law against a declaration of unconstitutionality, and so would have war- ranted a path-clearing vacatur decree. The State urges that its current plea for vacatur is compel- ling in view of the extraordinary course of this litigation. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 75 Opinion of the Court See Brief for Respondents State of Arizona et al. 34 ("It would certainly be a strange doctrine that would permit a plaintiff to obtain a favorable judgment, take voluntary action [that] moot[s] the dispute, and then retain the [benefit of the] judgment."). We agree. The "exceptional circum- stances" that abound in this case, see U. S. Bancorp Mort- gage Co., 513 U. S., at 29, and the federalism concern we next consider, lead us to conclude that vacatur down the line is the equitable solution. V In litigation generally, and in constitutional litigation most prominently, courts in the United States characteristically pause to ask: Is this conflict really necessary? 29 When an- ticipatory relief is sought in federal court against a state statute, respect for the place of the States in our federal system calls for close consideration of that core question. See, e. g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 526 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[N]ormally this Court ought not to consider the Constitutionality of a state statute in the absence of a controlling interpretation of its meaning and effect by the state courts."); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U. S. 549, 573­574 (1947); Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 543, 580­585 (1985). Arizona's Attorney General, in addition to releasing his own opinion on the meaning of Article XXVIII, see supra, at 52, asked both the District Court and the Court of Appeals to pause before proceeding to judgment; specifically, he asked both federal courts to seek, through the State's certi- fication process, an authoritative construction of the new measure from the Arizona Supreme Court. See supra, at 51, and n. 5, 55, 62­63, and nn. 17, 18. Certification today covers territory once dominated by a deferral device called "Pullman abstention," after the gen- 29 The phrasing is borrowed from Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Neces- sary?, 37 Texas L. Rev. 657 (1959). 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 76 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court erative case, Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941). Designed to avoid federal-court error in deciding state-law questions antecedent to federal constitu- tional issues, the Pullman mechanism remitted parties to the state courts for adjudication of the unsettled state-law issues. If settlement of the state-law question did not prove dispositive of the case, the parties could return to the federal court for decision of the federal issues. Attractive in theory because it placed state-law questions in courts equipped to rule authoritatively on them, Pullman abstention proved protracted and expensive in practice, for it entailed a full round of litigation in the state court system before any re- sumption of proceedings in federal court. See generally 17A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 4242, 4243 (2d ed. 1988 and Supp. 1996). Certification procedure, in contrast, allows a federal court faced with a novel state-law question to put the question directly to the State's highest court, reducing the delay, cut- ting the cost, and increasing the assurance of gaining an au- thoritative response. See Note, Federal Courts-Certifica- tion Before Facial Invalidation: A Return to Federalism, 12 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 217 (1990). Most States have adopted certification procedures. See generally 17A Wright, Miller, & Cooper, supra, § 4248. Arizona's statute, set out supra, at 51, n. 5, permits the State's highest court to con- sider questions certified to it by federal district courts, as well as courts of appeals and this Court. Both lower federal courts in this case refused to invite the aid of the Arizona Supreme Court because they found the language of Article XXVIII "plain," and the Attorney Gen- eral's limiting construction unpersuasive. See 730 F. Supp., at 315­316; 69 F. 3d, at 928­931.30 Furthermore, the Ninth 30 But cf. Huggins v. Isenbarger, 798 F. 2d 203, 207­210 (CA7 1986) (East- erbrook, J., concurring) (reasoned opinion of State Attorney General should be accorded respectful consideration; federal courts should hesitate 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 77 Opinion of the Court Circuit suggested as a proper price for certification a conces- sion by the Attorney General that Article XXVIII "would be unconstitutional if construed as [plaintiff Yniguez] con- tended it should be." Id., at 930; see id., at 931, and n. 14. Finally, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the pendency of a case similar to Yniguez's in the Arizona court system, but found that litigation no cause for a stay of the federal-court proceedings. See id., at 931; supra, at 62­63, and n. 18 (de- scribing the Ruiz litigation). A more cautious approach was in order. Through certifi- cation of novel or unsettled questions of state law for author- itative answers by a State's highest court, a federal court may save "time, energy, and resources and hel[p] build a co- operative judicial federalism." Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 416 U. S. 386, 391 (1974); see also Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 148 (1976) (to warrant district court certification, "[i]t is sufficient that the statute is susceptible of . . . an interpreta- tion [that] would avoid or substantially modify the federal constitutional challenge to the statute"). It is true, as the Ninth Circuit observed, 69 F. 3d, at 930, that in our decision certifying questions in Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., Inc., 484 U. S. 383 (1988), we noted the State's con- cession that the statute there challenged would be uncon- stitutional if construed as plaintiffs contended it should be, id., at 393­396. But neither in that case nor in any other did we declare such a concession a condition precedent to certification. The District Court and the Court of Appeals ruled out certification primarily because they believed Article XXVIII was not fairly subject to a limiting construction. See 730 F. Supp., at 316 (citing Houston v. Hill, 482 U. S. 451, 467 (1987)); 69 F. 3d, at 930. The assurance with which the lower courts reached that judgment is all the more puzzling to conclude that "[a State's] Executive Branch does not understand state law"). 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 78 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court in view of the position the initiative sponsors advanced be- fore this Court on the meaning of Article XXVIII. At oral argument on December 4, 1996, counsel for peti- tioners AOE and Park informed the Court that, in petition- ers' view, the Attorney General's reading of the Article was "the correct interpretation." Tr. of Oral Arg. 6; see id., at 5 (in response to the Court's inquiry, counsel for petitioners stated: "[W]e agree with the Attorney General's opinion as to [the] construction of Article XXVIII on [constitutional] grounds."). The Ninth Circuit found AOE's "explanations as to the initiative's scope . . . confused and self- contradictory," 69 F. 3d, at 928, n. 12, and we agree that AOE wavered in its statements of position, see, e. g., Brief for Peti- tioners 15 (AOE may "protect its political and statutory rights against the State and government employees"), 32­39 (Article XXVIII regulates Yniguez's "language on the job"), 44 ("AOE might . . . sue the State for limiting Art. XXVIII"). Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals understood that the bal- lot initiative proponents themselves at least "partially en- dorsed the Attorney General's reading." 69 F. 3d, at 928, n. 12. Given the novelty of the question and its potential importance to the conduct of Arizona's business, plus the views of the Attorney General and those of Article XXVIII's sponsors, the certification requests merited more respectful consideration than they received in the proceedings below. Federal courts, when confronting a challenge to the consti- tutionality of a federal statute, follow a "cardinal principle": They "will first ascertain whether a construction . . . is fairly possible" that will contain the statute within constitutional bounds. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U. S. 435, 444 (1984); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 692­693 (1979); Rescue Army, 331 U. S., at 568­569. State courts, when interpreting state statutes, are similarly equipped to apply that cardinal principle. See Knoell v. Cerkvenik- 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 79 Opinion of the Court Anderson Travel, Inc., 185 Ariz. 546, 548, 917 P. 2d 689, 691 (1996) (citing Ashwander). Warnings against premature adjudication of constitutional questions bear heightened attention when a federal court is asked to invalidate a State's law, for the federal tribunal risks friction-generating error when it endeavors to construe a novel state Act not yet reviewed by the State's highest court. See Rescue Army, 331 U. S., at 573­574. "Specula- tion by a federal court about the meaning of a state statute in the absence of prior state court adjudication is particularly gratuitous when . . . the state courts stand willing to address questions of state law on certification from a federal court." Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U. S. 491, 510 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Blending abstention with certification, the Ninth Circuit found "no unique circumstances in this case militating in favor of certification." 69 F. 3d, at 931. Novel, unsettled questions of state law, however, not "unique circumstances," are necessary before federal courts may avail themselves of state certification procedures.31 Those procedures do not entail the delays, expense, and procedural complexity that generally attend abstention decisions. See supra, at 76. Taking advantage of certification made available by a State may "greatly simplif[y]" an ultimate adjudication in federal court. See Bellotti, 428 U. S., at 151. The course of Yniguez's case was complex. The complex- ity might have been avoided had the District Court, more than eight years ago, accepted the certification suggestion made by Arizona's Attorney General. The Arizona Su- preme Court was not asked by the District Court or the Court of Appeals to say what Article XXVIII means. But the State's highest court has that very question before it in 31 Arizona itself requires no "unique circumstances." It permits certi- fication to the State's highest court of matters "which may be determina- tive of the cause," and as to which "no controlling precedent" is apparent to the certifying court. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12­1861 (1994). 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 80 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Appendix to opinion of the Court Ruiz v. Symington, see supra, at 62­63, and n. 18, the case the Ninth Circuit considered no cause for federal-court hesi- tation. In Ruiz, which has been stayed pending our decision in this case, see supra, at 63, n. 18, the Arizona Supreme Court may now rule definitively on the proper construction of Article XXVIII. Once that court has spoken, adjudica- tion of any remaining federal constitutional question may indeed become greatly simplified. * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Ap- peals is vacated, and the case is remanded to that court with directions that the action be dismissed by the District Court. It is so ordered. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT ARTICLE XXVIII. ENGLISH AS THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE § 1. English as the official language; applicability Section 1. (1) The English language is the official lan- guage of the State of Arizona. (2) As the official language of this State, the English lan- guage is the language of the ballot, the public schools and all government functions and actions. (3)(a) This Article applies to: (i) the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government[,] (ii) all political subdivisions, departments, agencies, orga- nizations, and instrumentalities of this State, including local governments and municipalities, (iii) all statutes, ordinances, rules, orders, programs and policies[,] (iv) all government officials and employees during the performance of government business. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 43 (1997) 81 Appendix to opinion of the Court (b) As used in this Article, the phrase "This State and all political subdivisions of this State" shall include every entity, person, action or item described in this Section, as appro- priate to the circumstances. § 2. Requiring this state to preserve, protect and enhance English Section 2. This State and all political subdivisions of this State shall take all reasonable steps to preserve, protect and enhance the role of the English language as the official lan- guage of the State of Arizona. § 3. Prohibiting this state from using or requiring the use of languages other than English; exceptions Section 3. (1) Except as provided in Subsection (2): (a) This State and all political subdivisions of this State shall act in English and in no other language. (b) No entity to which this Article applies shall make or enforce a law, order, decree or policy which requires the use of a language other than English. (c) No governmental document shall be valid, effective or enforceable unless it is in the English language. (2) This State and all political subdivisions of this State may act in a language other than English under any of the following circumstances: (a) to assist students who are not proficient in the English language, to the extent necessary to comply with federal law, by giving educational instruction in a language other than English to provide as rapid as possible a transition to English. (b) to comply with other federal laws. (c) to teach a student a foreign language as a part of a required or voluntary educational curriculum. (d) to protect public health or safety. (e) to protect the rights of criminal defendants or victims of crime. 520US1 Unit: $U33 [09-10-99 14:35:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN 82 ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH v. ARIZONA Appendix to opinion of the Court § 4. Enforcement; standing Section 4. A person who resides in or does business in this State shall have standing to bring suit to enforce this Article in a court of record of the State. The Legislature may enact reasonable limitations on the time and manner of bringing suit under this subsection. 520US1 Unit: $U34 [09-10-99 15:14:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 83 Syllabus ADAMS et al. v. ROBERTSON et al. certiorari to the supreme court of alabama No. 95­1873. Argued January 14, 1997-Decided March 3, 1997 Respondent Robertson filed a class action in Alabama, alleging that re- spondent Liberty National Life Insurance Company had fraudulently encouraged its customers to exchange existing health insurance policies for new ones with less coverage. The trial court made him class repre- sentative and certified the class under the Alabama Rules of Civil Proce- dure, which do not give class members the right to opt out of a class. It then approved a settlement that precluded class members from indi- vidually suing Liberty National for fraud based on its exchange pro- gram. Petitioners, who had objected to the settlement in the trial court, appealed, and the State Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion addressing only state-law issues. Certiorari was granted on the ques- tion whether the certification and settlement violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause because class members could not opt out of the class or settlement. Held: Since petitioners have failed to establish that they properly pre- sented the due process issue to the Alabama Supreme Court, this Court will not reach the question presented, and the writ is dismissed as im- providently granted. With rare exceptions, Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 533, this Court will not consider a petitioner's federal claim that was not addressed by, or properly presented to, the state court ren- dering the decision. The Alabama Supreme Court did not expressly address the claim raised here, and petitioners have not shown that it was properly presented to that court. When the highest state court is silent on the federal question before this Court, it is assumed that the issue was not properly presented; the aggrieved party bears the burden of defeating this assumption, Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Ro- tary Club of Duarte, 481 U. S. 537, 550, by demonstrating that the state court had a fair opportunity to address the issue, Webb v. Webb, 451 U. S. 493, 501. Petitioners have not met this burden. They have not demonstrated that they complied with the applicable state rules for rais- ing their federal claim before the State Supreme Court, see, e. g., Bank- ers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U. S. 71, 77­78, explained why the failure to comply with those rules would not be an adequate and independent ground for the state court to disregard that claim, see, e. g., Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U. S. 255, 262­265, or shown that their claim was presented with fair precision and in due time, see, e. g., New York 520US1 Unit: $U34 [09-10-99 15:14:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 84 ADAMS v. ROBERTSON Syllabus ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, 67. Even assuming that the rule that a claim be addressed or properly presented in state court is purely prudential, the circumstances here justify no exception. An interest in penalizing respondents for failing to raise a timely objection to petitioners' failure to comply with the rule does not outweigh the interest of comity the rule serves or the value to this Court of a fully developed record upon which to base its decisions. Certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted. Reported below: 676 So. 2d 1265. Norman E. Waldrop, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Stephen C. Olen, George M. Walker, M. Kathleen Miller, J. Gusty Yearout, M. Clay Ragsdale IV, John D. Richardson, David F. Daniell, and Roderick P. Stout. John G. Roberts, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Liberty National Life Insurance Company. With him on the brief were David G. Leitch, Gregory G. Garre, Michael R. Pennington, James W. Gewin, and Edgar M. Elliott III. Paul M. Smith, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Jere L. Beasley, Frank M. Wilson, James A. Main, and Walter R. Byars filed a brief for respondent Charlie Frank Robertson.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Jeffrey Robert White and Howard F. Twiggs; and for Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, P. C., by Leslie A. Brueckner and Arthur H. Bryant. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Alabama by Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, and William H. Pryor, Jr., Deputy Attorney General; for the American Council of Life Insurance by Evan M. Tager and Phillip E. Stano; for Continental Casualty Com- pany et al. by Herbert M. Wachtell, Meir Feder, Paul J. Bschorr, Stephen M. Snyder, Kelly C. Wooster, Elihu Inselbuch, Peter Van N. Lockwood, Joseph F. Rice, Joseph B. Cox, Jr., Rodney L. Eshelman, Donald T. Ram- sey, Stuart Philip Ross, Sean M. Hanifan, Merril Hirsh, Steven Kazan, and Harry F. Wartnick; for Exxon Corporation by Charles W. Bender and John F. Daum; and for the National Association of Manufacturers et al. by Alfred W. Cortese, Jr., Kathleen L. Blaner, James C. Wilson, Jan S. Amundson, Quentin Riegel, and D. Dudley Oldham. A brief of amici curiae was filed for the State of New York et al. by Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General of New York, Barbara Gott Billet, 520US1 Unit: $U34 [09-10-99 15:14:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 83 (1997) 85 Per Curiam Per Curiam. We granted a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama to decide whether the Alabama courts' approval of the class action and the settlement agreement in this case, without affording all class members the right to exclude themselves from the class or the agreement, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Ala- bama Supreme Court did not address this federal issue, and it is now apparent that petitioners have failed to establish that they properly presented the issue to that court. We therefore dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. I In 1992, respondent Charlie Frank Robertson filed a class- action suit in an Alabama trial court, alleging that Liberty National Life Insurance Company had fraudulently encour- aged its customers to exchange existing health insurance pol- icies for new policies that, according to Robertson, provided less coverage for cancer treatment. The trial court ap- pointed Robertson as class representative and certified the Solicitor General, and Shirley F. Sarna, Nancy A. Spiegel, and Joy Feigen- baum, Assistant Attorneys General, Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney Gen- eral of Vermont, and Elliot Burg, Assistant Attorney General, Winston Bryant, Attorney General of Arkansas, Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Con- necticut, Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, Alan G. Lance, Attorney General of Idaho, James E. Ryan, Attorney General of Illinois, Tom Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, Carla J. Stovall, Attorney General of Kansas, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General of Missouri, Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General of Nevada, Jeffrey R. Howard, Attorney General of New Hamp- shire, Michael F. Easley, Attorney General of North Carolina, Heidi Heit- kamp, Attorney General of North Dakota, W. A. Drew Edmondson, Attor- ney General of Oklahoma, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Charles W. Burson, Attorney General of Tennessee, and Charles F. C. Ruff, Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia. 520US1 Unit: $U34 [09-10-99 15:14:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 86 ADAMS v. ROBERTSON Per Curiam class pursuant to provisions of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure that do not give class members the right to ex- clude themselves from a class. See 676 So. 2d 1265, 1268, 1270 (Ala. 1995); App. 90. The trial court then approved a settlement agreement that precluded class members from individually suing Liberty National for fraud based on its insurance policy exchange program. See 676 So. 2d, at 1270­1271; App. 158­159. Petitioners, who had objected to the settlement in the trial court, appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion addressing only state-law issues, see 676 So. 2d, at 1270­1274, and petitioners sought a writ of certiorari. We granted certiorari, 518 U. S. 1056 (1996), on the question whether the certification and settlement of this class-action suit (which petitioners characterize as primarily involving claims for monetary relief) violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the class members were not afforded the right to opt out of the class or the settlement. II With "very rare exceptions," Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 533 (1992), we have adhered to the rule in reviewing state-court judgments under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 that we will not consider a petitioner's federal claim unless it was either addressed by or properly presented to the state court that rendered the decision we have been asked to review. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U. S. 82, 87 (1985); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 217­219 (1983); McGoldrick v. Compagnie Gen- erale Transatlantique, 309 U. S. 430, 434 (1940). As peti- tioners concede here, the Alabama Supreme Court did not expressly address the question on which we granted certio- rari. See Reply Brief for Petitioners 2­3, n. 1. Nor have petitioners met their burden of showing that the issue was properly presented to that court. When the high- est state court is silent on a federal question before us, we assume that the issue was not properly presented, Board of 520US1 Unit: $U34 [09-10-99 15:14:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 83 (1997) 87 Per Curiam Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U. S. 537, 550 (1987), and the aggrieved party bears the burden of defeating this assumption, ibid., by demonstrating that the state court had "a fair opportunity to address the federal question that is sought to be presented here," Webb v. Webb, 451 U. S. 493, 501 (1981). We have described in different ways how a petitioner may satisfy this requirement. See Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 583­585 (1969). In some cases, we have focused on the need for petitioners either to establish that the claim was raised " `at the time and in the manner required by the state law,' " Bankers Life & Cas- ualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U. S. 71, 77­78 (1988) (quoting Webb, supra, at 501), see, e. g., Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U. S. 176, 181, n. 3 (1983); Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541, 549­554 (1962), or to persuade us that the state procedural requirements could not serve as an independent and ade- quate state-law ground for the state court's judgment, see, e. g., Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U. S. 255, 262­265 (1982). In other cases, we have described a petitioner's burden as in- volving the need to demonstrate that it presented the partic- ular claim at issue here with "fair precision and in due time," New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, 67 (1928); PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 85, n. 9 (1980). See generally 16B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4022, pp. 322­ 339 (1996). But however we phrase our requirements, petitioners here have failed to satisfy them. Petitioners have done nothing to demonstrate that they complied with the applicable state rules for raising their federal due process claim before the Alabama Supreme Court,1 or to explain why the failure to 1 Respondents have argued that because petitioners failed to list their federal claim in the "statement of issues" section of their appellate brief in accordance with Alabama Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(3), the Ala- bama Supreme Court would have properly disregarded the claim even if petitioners had presented it below. See Brief for Respondent Liberty 520US1 Unit: $U34 [09-10-99 15:14:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 88 ADAMS v. ROBERTSON Per Curiam comply with those rules would not be an adequate and inde- pendent ground for the state court to disregard that claim. Neither have petitioners satisfied us that they presented their federal claim with "fair precision and in due time." They argue that they raised their federal due process claim in their initial brief before the Alabama Supreme Court, and point to two pages of that brief discussing Brown v. Ticor, 982 F. 2d 386 (CA9 1992), cert. dism'd as improvidently granted, 511 U. S. 117 (1994). Although Ticor is relevant to the federal claim they present here, see 982 F. 2d, at 392, they mentioned the case below in the context of an entirely different argument that the right to a jury trial under § 11 of the Alabama Constitution gives a plaintiff the right to opt out of a class-action settlement agreement. The discussion of "a federal case, in the midst of an unrelated argument, is insufficient to inform a state court that it has been presented with a claim." Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l, supra, at 550, n. 9. Equally unavailing is petitioners' reliance on three other pages of their Alabama Supreme Court brief. Although that portion begins with a heading asserting that "[m]ini- mum due process requires that Class Members be given the right to opt out or exclude themselves from the class," see Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1931603 et al. (Sup. Ct. Ala.), p. 23, the discussion under that heading addresses only whether members of the class who were not Alabama resi- dents had been afforded due process under Phillips Petro- leum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U. S. 797 (1985). We therefore think that a court may fairly have read this section as arguing, as had the petitioner in Shutts, id., at 802, that the state court lacked personal jurisdiction over out-of-state class members, not the different and broader question of whether, if a state National Life Insurance Company 4, n. 2 (citing Ala. Rule App. Proc. 28(a)(3)), and Eady v. Stewart Dredging & Construction Co., Inc., 463 So. 2d 156, 157 (Ala. 1985); Brief for Respondent Robertson 16, n. 12 (citing Eady). Petitioners have not even responded to that argument. 520US1 Unit: $U34 [09-10-99 15:14:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 83 (1997) 89 Per Curiam court has jurisdiction over the plaintiffs, due process re- quires that all class members have the right to opt out of the class and settlement agreement. Nor are petitioners helped by the fact that respondents addressed the federal due process issue raised here in their briefs as appellees in the Alabama Supreme Court.2 Peti- tioners failed to address respondents' federal due process arguments in their reply brief in the State Supreme Court and, instead, described "[t]he pivotal issue in this case" as the right to a jury trial under the Alabama Constitution. Reply Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1931603 et al. (Sup. Ct. Ala.), pp. 1­5. In these circumstances, it would have been per- fectly reasonable for a state court to conclude that the broader federal claim was not before it.3 2 Respondent Robertson listed among issues presented for review: "Whether an opt-out provision is required by the due process [clause] and/ or trial by jury guarantees of the U. S. and Alabama Constitutions." Brief for Appellee Robertson in Nos. 1931603 et al. (Sup. Ct. Ala.), p. 11. 3 Petitioners also direct our attention to 80 pages of the Joint Appendix containing papers filed in the trial court, see Reply Brief for Petitioners 2­3, n. 1 (referring to App. 93­126, 190­245). This general citation fails to comply with our requirement that petitioners provide us with "specific reference to the places in the record where the matter appears," see this Court's Rule 14.1(g)(i) (emphasis added). Moreover, the passing invoca- tions of "due process" we found therein, see App. 196, 209, 226­227, fail to cite the Federal Constitution or any cases relying on the Fourteenth Amendment, but could have just as easily referred to the due process guarantee of the Alabama Constitution, see Ala. Const., § 13 (1901), and thus they did not meet our minimal requirement that it must be clear that a federal claim was presented, Webb v. Webb, 451 U. S. 493, 496­497, 501 (1981); see Bowe v. Scott, 233 U. S. 658, 664­665 (1914). Petitioners also note that they raised their federal due process claim in their petition for rehearing before the Alabama Supreme Court. While the claim presented there closely resembles the one they ask us to review, see Appellants' Application for Rehearing and Brief in Support of Applica- tion for Rehearing in Nos. 1931603 et al. (Sup. Ct. Ala.), pp. 7­12, we have generally refused to consider issues raised clearly for the first time in a petition for rehearing when the state court is silent on the question, see Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U. S. 520US1 Unit: $U34 [09-10-99 15:14:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 90 ADAMS v. ROBERTSON Per Curiam III Petitioners having thus failed to carry their burden of showing that the claim they raise here was properly pre- sented to the Alabama Supreme Court, we will not reach the question presented. We need not decide in this case whether our requirement that a federal claim be addressed or properly presented in state court is jurisdictional or pru- dential, see Yee, 503 U. S., at 533; Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 486 U. S., at 79; Gates, 462 U. S., at 217­219, because even treating the rule as purely prudential, the circumstances here justify no exception. The rule serves an important interest of comity. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., supra, at 79. As we have explained, "it would be unseemly in our dual system of government" to disturb the finality of state judgments on a federal ground that the state court did not have occasion to consider. Webb, 451 U. S., at 500 (citations and internal quotation marks omit- ted). Thus, the rule affords state courts "an opportunity to consider the constitutionality of the actions of state officials, and, equally important, proposed changes" that could obvi- ate any challenges to state action in federal court. Gates, supra, at 221­222. Here, the Alabama Supreme Court has an undeniable interest in having the opportunity to deter- mine in the first instance whether its existing rules govern- ing class-action settlements satisfy the requirements of due process, and whether to exercise its power to amend those rules to avoid potential constitutional challenges, see Ala. Const., § 6.11; 1971 Ala. Acts No. 1311. Our traditional standard also reflects "practical considera- tions" relating to this Court's capacity to decide issues. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., supra, at 79. Requiring par- ties to raise issues below not only avoids unnecessary adjudi- cation in this Court by allowing state courts to resolve issues 537, 549­550 (1987); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235, 244, n. 4 (1958); Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 128 (1945). 520US1 Unit: $U34 [09-10-99 15:14:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 83 (1997) 91 Per Curiam on state-law grounds, but also assists us in our deliberations by promoting the creation of an adequate factual and legal record. See Webb, supra, at 500. Here, even if the state court's construction of its class-action rules would not obvi- ate the due process challenge, it would undoubtedly aid our understanding of those rules as a predicate to our assess- ment of their constitutional adequacy. And not incidentally, the parties would enjoy the opportunity to test and refine their positions before reaching this Court. The only unusual consideration weighing in favor of reach- ing the question presented is that respondents failed to raise a timely objection to our granting the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the question presented in that petition had not been properly raised or addressed.4 This Court's Rule 15.2 "admonishe[s counsel] that they have an obligation to the Court to point out in the brief in opposition, and not later, any perceived misstatement" "of fact or law in the peti- tion that bears on what issues properly would be before the Court if certiorari were granted." Without minimizing this obligation,5 however, we find no interest here in penalizing 4 Respondent Robertson failed to raise the objection in his brief in oppo- sition to the certiorari petition; respondent Liberty National waived its right to submit a brief in opposition. 5 Respondents' obligation to object under Rule 15.2 was not diminished by the fact that their objection may have been based on this Court's juris- diction, see supra, at 90, and thus nonwaivable. Even if, contrary to the assumption underlying our discussion in the main text, the requirement that claims be raised in or addressed by the state court is jurisdictional and cannot be waived, counsel are obliged to this Court (not to mention their clients) to raise such threshold issues in their briefs in opposition. Nor is respondents' failure to object in accordance with Rule 15.2 ex- cused by petitioners' failure to comply with this Court's Rule 14.1(g)(i), which requires a petitioner seeking review of a state-court judgment to specify, among other things, "when the federal questions sought to be re- viewed were raised" in the state court system and "the method or manner of raising them and the way in which they were passed on by those courts, . . . so as to show that the federal question was timely and properly raised and that this Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment on a writ of 520US1 Unit: $U34 [09-10-99 15:14:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN 92 ADAMS v. ROBERTSON Per Curiam the failure of counsel to comply with Rule 15.2 that overrides the interest of comity or the value to this Court of a fully developed factual and legal record upon which to base decisions.6 Accordingly, we dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvi- dently granted. It is so ordered. certiorari." The obligations under Rules 14.1 and 15.2 are complemen- tary, but independent of each other. 6 We note, of course, that we dismissed a writ of certiorari regarding a similar question three Terms ago in Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U. S. 117 (1994) (per curiam). Our continuing interest in an issue, how- ever, does not affect the application of our Rules, because we recognize that by "adher[ing] scrupulously to the customary limitations on our dis- cretion" regardless of the significance of the underlying issue, "we `pro- mote respect . . . for the Court's adjudicatory process.' " Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 224 (1983) (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 677 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 93 Syllabus COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. ESTATE OF HUBERT, DECEASED, C & S SOVRAN TRUST CO. (GEORGIA) N. A., CO-EXECUTOR certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit No. 95­1402. Argued November 12, 1996-Decided March 18, 1997 The executors of decedent Hubert's substantial estate filed a federal estate tax return about a year after his death. Subsequently, petitioner Com- missioner of Internal Revenue issued a notice of deficiency, claiming underreporting of federal estate tax liability caused by the estate's as- serted entitlement to marital and charitable deductions. While the es- tate's redetermination petition was pending in the Tax Court, interested parties settled much of the litigation surrounding the estate that had begun after Hubert's death. The agreement divided the estate's resi- due principal, assumed to be worth $26 million on the date of death, about equally between marital trusts and a charitable trust. It also provided that the estate would pay its administration expenses either from the principal or the income of the assets that would comprise the residue and the corpus of the trusts, preserving the executors' discre- tion to apportion such expenses. The estate paid about $500,000 of its nearly $2 million of administration expenses from principal and the rest from income. It then recalculated its tax liability, reducing the marital and charitable deductions by the amount of principal, but not the amount of income, used to pay the expenses. The Commissioner con- cluded that using income for expenses required a dollar-for-dollar reduc- tion of the deductions. The Tax Court disagreed, finding that no reduc- tion was required by reason of the executors' power, or the exercise of their power, to pay administration expenses from income. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: The judgment is affirmed. 63 F. 3d 1083, affirmed. Justice Kennedy, joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Stevens, and Justice Ginsburg, concluded that a taxpayer does not have to reduce the estate tax deduction for marital or charitable bequests by the amount of the administration expenses that were paid from income generated during administration by assets allocated to those bequests. Pp. 99­111. 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 94 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Syllabus (a) Hubert's executors used the standard date-of-death valuation to determine the value of property included in the gross estate for estate tax purposes. The parties agree that, for purposes of the question pre- sented, the charitable, 26 U. S. C. § 2055, and marital, § 2056, deduction statutes should be read to require the same answer, notwithstanding differences in their language. Since the marital deduction statute and regulation speak in more specific terms on this question than the chari- table deduction statute, this plurality concentrates on the marital provi- sions, but the holding here applies to both deductions. Pp. 99­100. (b) The marital deduction statute allows deduction for qualifying property only to the extent of the property's "value." So when the executors use date-of-death valuation for gross estate purposes, the deduction's value will be limited by that value. Marital deduction "value" is "net value," determined by the same principles as if the be- quest were a gift to the spouse, 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(a), i. e., present value as of the controlling valuation date, § 25.2523(a)­1(e); see also §§ 20.2056(b)­4(d), 20.2055­2(f)(1). Although the question presented is not controlled by these provisions' exact terms, it is natural to apply the present-value principle here. Thus, assuming it were necessary for valuation purposes to take into account that income, this would be done by subtracting from the value of the bequest, computed as if the income were not subject to administration expense charges, the present value (as of the controlling valuation date) of the income expected to be used to pay administration expenses. Cf. Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 151. There is no dispute the entire interests transferred in trust here qualify for the marital and charitable deductions; the ques- tion before the Court is one of valuation. Pp. 100­104. (c) Only material limitations on the right to receive income are taken into account when valuing the property interest passing to the surviving spouse. 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(a). A provision requiring or allowing administration expenses to be paid from income "may" be deemed a "material limitation" on the spouse's right to income. For example, where the amount of the corpus, and the expected income from it, are small, the amount of the estate's anticipated administration expenses chargeable to income may be material as compared with the anticipated income used to determine the assets' date-of-death value. Whether a limitation is material will also depend in part on the nature of the spouse's interest in the assets generating income. An obligation to pay administration expenses from income is more likely to be material where the value of the trust to the spouse is derived solely from income, but is less likely to be material where, as here, the marital property is valued as being equivalent to a transfer of the fee. Pp. 104­107. 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 95 Syllabus (d) The Tax Court found that, on the facts presented, the trustee's discretion to pay administration expenses out of income was not a mate- rial limitation on the right to receive income. There is no reason to reverse for the Tax Court's failure to specify the facts it considered relevant to the materiality inquiry. The anticipated expenses could have been thought immaterial in light of the income the trust corpus could have been expected to generate. P. 107. (e) This approach to the valuation question is consistent with the lan- guage of 26 U. S. C. § 2056(b), as interpreted in United States v. Stapf, 375 U. S. 118, 126, in which the Court held that the marital deduction should not exceed the "net economic interest received by the surviving spouse." There is no basis here for the Commissioner's argument that the reduction she seeks is necessary to avoid a "double deduction" for administration expenses in violation of 26 U. S. C. § 642(g). Moreover, assuming that the marital deduction statute's legislative history would have relevance here, it does not support the Commissioner's position. Pp. 109­111. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Souter and Justice Thomas, concluded that the relevant sources point to a test of quantitative mate- riality to determine whether allocation of administrative expenses to postmortem income reduces marital and charitable deductions, and that test is not met by the unusual factual record in this case. Pp. 111­122. (a) Neither the Tax Code itself nor its legislative history supplies guidance on the question whether allocation of administrative expenses to postmortem income reduces the marital deduction always, some- times, or not at all. However, the Commissioner's regulations and revenue rulings can be relied on to decide this issue. Title 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(a) directs the reader to ask whether the executor's right to allocate administrative expenses to the marital bequest's postmortem income is a "material limitation" upon the spouse's "right to income from the property," such that "account must be taken of its effect." Because the executor's power is undeniably a "limitation" on the spouse's right to income, the case hinges on whether that limitation is "material." In Revenue Ruling 93­48, the Commissioner ruled that § 20.2056(b)­4(a)'s marital deduction is not "ordinarily" reduced when an executor allocates interest payments on deferred federal estate taxes to the spousal be- quest's postmortem income. Such interest and the administrative ex- penses at issue here are so similar that they should be treated the same under § 20.2056(b)­4(a). The Commissioner's treatment of interest in the Revenue Ruling also indicates that some, but not all, financial obli- gations will reduce the marital deduction. Thus, by virtue of the Rul- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 96 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Syllabus ing, the Commissioner has created a quantitative materiality rule for § 20.2056(b)­4(a). This rule is consistent with the example set forth in § 20.2056(b)­4(a), and the Commissioner's expressed preference for such a construction is entitled to deference. Pp. 112­120. (b) The proper measure of materiality has yet to be decided by the Commissioner. In the absence of guidance from the Commissioner, the Tax Court's approach is as consistent with the Code as any other test, and provides no basis for reversal. Here, the Commissioner's litigation strategy effectively pre-empted the Tax Court from finding the $1.5 million diminution in postmortem income material under a quantitative materiality test, for she argued that any diversion of postmortem in- come was material and never presented any evidence or argued that this diminution was quantitatively material. Her failure to offer proof of materiality left the Tax Court with little choice but to reach its care- fully crafted conclusion that the amount was not quantitatively material on the facts before it. Pp. 120­122. Kennedy, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. O'Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Souter and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 111. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer, J., joined, post, p. 122. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 138. Kent L. Jones argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General Argrett, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Jonathan S. Cohen, and Joan I. Oppenheimer. David D. Aughtry argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Shelley Cashion.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel by Edward F. Koren and Alvin J. Golden; for the American Council on Education et al. by Matthew J. Zinn and Carol A. Rhees; for the Baptist Foundation of Texas et al. by Terry L. Simmons, pro se; and for the Tax Section of The Florida Bar by Jerald David August and James J. Freeland. 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 97 Opinion of Kennedy, J. Justice Kennedy announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice, Justice Stevens, and Justice Ginsburg join. In consequence of life's two certainties a decedent's estate faced federal estate tax deficiencies, giving rise to this case. The issue is whether the amount of the estate tax deduction for marital or charitable bequests must be reduced to the extent administration expenses were paid from income gen- erated during administration by assets allocated to those bequests. I The estate of Otis C. Hubert was substantial, valued at more than $30 million when he died. Considerable probate and civil litigation ensued soon after his death. The parties to the various proceedings included his wife and children; his nephew; one of the estate's coexecutors, Citizens and South- ern Trust Company (Georgia), N. A., the predecessor of re- spondent C & S Sovran Trust Company (Georgia), N. A.; the district attorney for Cobb County, Georgia, on behalf of cer- tain charitable beneficiaries; and the Georgia State Revenue Commission. Hubert had made various wills and codicils, and the legal disputes for the most part concerned the distri- bution of estate assets; but they were not confined to this. In addition to will contests alleging fraud and undue influ- ence, there were satellite civil suits including claims of slan- der and abuse of process. The principal proceedings were in the Probate and the Superior Courts of Cobb County, Georgia. The estate attracted the attention of petitioner, the Com- missioner of Internal Revenue. The executors filed the fed- eral estate tax return in 1987, about a year after Hubert died. In 1990, the Commissioner issued a notice of defi- ciency, claiming underreporting of federal estate tax liability by some $14 million. The Commissioner's major challenge then was to the estate's claimed entitlement to two deduc- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 98 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Opinion of Kennedy, J. tions. One was the marital deduction, under 68A Stat. 392, as amended, 26 U. S. C. § 2056, for qualifying property pass- ing from a decedent to the surviving spouse. The other was the charitable deduction, under § 2055, for qualifying prop- erty passing from a decedent to a charity. The Commission- er's notice of deficiency asserted, for reasons not relevant here, that the property passing to Hubert's surviving wife and to charity did not qualify for the marital and charitable deductions. The estate petitioned the United States Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency. Within days of the estate's petition in the Tax Court, much of the other litigation surrounding the estate settled. The settlement agreement divided the estate's residue principal between a marital and a charitable share, which we can as- sume for purposes of our discussion were worth a total of $26 million on the day Hubert died. The settlement agreement divided the $26 million principal about half to trusts for the surviving spouse and half to a trust for the charities. The Commissioner stipulated that the nature of the trusts did not prevent them from qualifying for the marital and charitable deductions. The stipulation streamlined the Tax Court liti- gation but did not resolve it. The settlement agreement provided that the estate would pay its administration expenses either from the principal or from the income of the assets that would comprise the resi- due and the corpus of the trusts, preserving the discretion Hubert's most recent will had given his executors to appor- tion administration expenses. The apportionment provi- sions of the agreement and the will were consistent for all relevant purposes with the law of Georgia, the State where the decedent resided. The estate's administration expenses, including attorney's fees, were on the order of $2 million. The estate paid about $500,000 in expenses from principal and the rest from income. The estate recalculated its estate tax liability based on the settlement agreement and the payments from principal. 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 99 Opinion of Kennedy, J. The estate did not include in its marital and charitable de- ductions the amount of residue principal used to pay admin- istration expenses. The parties here have agreed through- out that the marital or charitable deductions could not include those amounts. The estate, however, did not reduce its marital or charitable deductions by the amount of the income used to pay the balance of the administration ex- penses. The Commissioner disagreed and contended that use of income for this purpose required a dollar-for-dollar reduction of the amounts of the marital and charitable deductions. In a reviewed opinion, the Tax Court, with two judges concurring in part and dissenting in part, rejected the Com- missioner's position. 101 T. C. 314 (1993). The court noted it had resolved the same issue against the Commissioner in Estate of Street v. Commissioner, 56 TCM 774, 57 TCM 2851 (1988), ¶ 88,553 P­H Memo TC. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had reversed this aspect of Estate of Street, see 974 F. 2d 723, 727­729 (1992), but in the instant case the Tax Court adhered to its view and said, given all the cir- cumstances here, no reduction was required by reason of the executors' power, or the exercise of their power, to pay ad- ministration expenses from income. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court, adopt- ing the latter's opinion and noting the resulting conflict with the Sixth Circuit's decision in Street and with the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's decision in Burke v. United States, 994 F. 2d 1576, cert. denied, 510 U. S. 990 (1993). See 63 F. 3d 1083, 1084­1085 (CA11 1995). We granted certiorari, 517 U. S. 1166 (1996), and, in agreement with the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals for the Elev- enth Circuit, we now affirm the judgment. II A necessary first step in calculating the taxable estate for federal estate tax purposes is to determine the property in- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 100 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Opinion of Kennedy, J. cluded in the gross estate, and its value. Though an alterna- tive valuation date is authorized, the executors of the Hubert estate used the standard date-of-death valuation. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 2031(a), 2051. A later step is to compute any claimed charitable or marital deductions. See §§ 2055 (char- itable), 2056 (marital). Our inquiry here involves the rela- tionship between valuation principles and those computa- tions. The language of the charitable and marital deduction sections differs. For instance, § 2056 requires consideration, in valuing a marital bequest, of obligations or encumbrances the decedent imposes on the bequest, "in the same manner as if the amount of a gift to such spouse of such interest were being determined." § 2056(b)(4). Section 2055 has no similar language. Treasury Reg. § 20.2056(b)­4(a), 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(a) (1996), moreover, has amplified aspects of the marital deduction statute, as we discuss. There is no similar regulation for the charitable deduction statute. These differences notwithstanding, the Commissioner and respondent agree that, for purposes of the question pre- sented, the two deduction statutes should be read to require the same answer. We adopt this approach. For the issue we decide, the marital deduction statute and regulation speak in more specific terms than the charitable deduction statute, so we concentrate on the marital provisions. Our holding in the case applies to both deductions. We begin with the language of the marital deduction stat- ute. It allows an estate to deduct for federal estate tax purposes "an amount equal to the value of any interest in property which passes or has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse, but only to the extent that such interest is included in determining the value of the gross estate." 26 U. S. C. § 2056(a). The statute allows deduction for qualifying property only to the extent of the property's "value." So when the execu- tors value the property for gross estate purposes as of the date of death, the value of the marital deduction will be lim- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 101 Opinion of Kennedy, J. ited by its date-of-death value. This is directed by the stat- utory language capping the deduction at "the value of any interest . . . included in determining the value of the gross estate." It is made explicit by Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)­4(a), which says "value, for the purpose of the marital deduction . . . is to be determined as of the date of the decedent's death [unless the estate uses the alternative valuation date]." Section 20.2056(b)­4(a) provides that "value" for marital deduction purposes is "net value," determined by applying "the same principles . . . as if the amount of a gift to the spouse were being determined." Section 25.2523(a)­1, enti- tled "Gift to spouse; in general," includes a subsection (e), entitled "Valuation," which parallels § 20.2056(b)­4(d); see also § 20.2055­2(f)(1). Section 25.2523(a)­1(e) provides: "If the income from property is made payable to the donor or another individual for life or for a term of years, with remainder to the donor's spouse . . . the marital deduction is computed . . . with respect to the present value of the remainder, determined under [26 U. S. C. § ]7520. The present value of the remainder (that is, its value as of the date of gift) is to be deter- mined in accordance with the rules stated in § 25.2512­5 or, for certain prior periods, § 25.2512­5A." Section 7520, in turn, refers to present-value tables located in regulation § 20.2031­7. The question presented here, in- volving date-of-death valuation of property or a principal amount, some of the income from which may be used to pay administration expenses, is not controlled by the exact terms of these provisions. For that reason, we do not attempt to force it into their detailed mold. It is natural, however, to apply the present-value principle to the question at hand, as we are directed to do by § 20.2056(b)­4(a). In other words, assuming it were necessary for valuation purposes to take into account that income, see infra, at 106­107 (discussing materiality), this would be done by subtracting from the 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 102 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Opinion of Kennedy, J. value of the bequest, computed as if the income were not subject to administration expense charges, the present value (as of the controlling valuation date) of the income expected to be used to pay administration expenses. Our application of the present-value principle to the issue here is further supported by Justice Holmes' explanation of valuation theory in his opinion for the Court in Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 151 (1929). The decedent there bequeathed the residue of his estate in trust to charity, subject to a particular life interest in his wife. After hold- ing that the charitable bequest qualified for the charitable deduction under the law as it stood in 1929, the Court consid- ered how to value the bequest. The Government argued the value should be reduced to reflect the wife's probable life expectancy as of the date the decedent died. The estate ar- gued for a smaller reduction than the Government, because by the time of the litigation it was known that the wife had, in fact, lived for only six months after the decedent died. Justice Holmes wrote: "The first impression is that it is absurd to resort to statistical probabilities when you know the fact. But this is due to inaccurate thinking. . . . [Value] depends largely on more or less certain prophecies of the future; and the value is no less real at that time if later the prophecy turns out false than when it comes out true. . . . Tempting as it is to correct uncertain probabilities by the now certain fact, we are of opinion that it cannot be done. . . . Our opinion is not changed by the necessary exceptions to the general rule specifically made by the Act." Id., at 155. So the charitable deduction had to be valued based on the wife's probable life expectancy as of the date of death rather than the known fact that she died only six months after her husband. 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 103 Opinion of Kennedy, J. It is suggested that § 20.2056(b)­4(a)'s direction to value the marital deduction as a spousal gift refers to a gift tax qualification regulation, § 25.2523(e)­1(f), and a Revenue Rul- ing interpreting it, Rev. Rul. 69­56, 1969­1 Cum. Bull. 224. Post, at 116 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). The suggestion misunderstands the regulations and the Reve- nue Ruling. Section 20.2056(b)­4(a) concerns how to deter- mine the "value, for the purpose of the marital deduction, of any deductible interest." Before determining an interest's value under § 20.2056(b)­4(a), one must decide the extent to which the interest qualifies as deductible. There is a structural problem with interpreting § 20.2056(b)­4(a) as directing reference to § 25.2523(e)­1(f) for valuation purposes. Qualification and valuation are dif- ferent steps. Section 25.2523(e)­1(f) prescribes conditions under which an interest transferred in trust qualifies for a marital deduction under the gift tax. It tracks the language of § 20.2056(b)­5(f), which prescribes the same conditions for determining whether an interest transferred in trust quali- fies for a marital deduction under the estate tax. Any inter- est to which § 25.2523(e)­1(f) would apply, were its principles understood to be incorporated into § 20.2056(b)­4(a), would, of necessity, already have been analyzed under the same principles at the earlier, qualification stage of the estate-tax marital-deduction inquiry under § 20.2056(b)­5(f). So under the suggested interpretation, whether or not an interest passed the qualification test, there would never be a need to value it. If it failed, there would be nothing to value; if it passed, its value would never be reduced at the val- uation stage. The qualification step of the estate-tax marital-deduction inquiry would render the valuation step superfluous. We do not think the Commissioner adopted this view of the regulations in Revenue Ruling 69­56. The Revenue Ruling held that a trustee's power to: 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 104 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Opinion of Kennedy, J. "charge to income or principal, executor's or trustee's commissions, legal and accounting fees, custodian fees, and similar administration expenses . . . [does] not result . . . . . "[does] in the disallowance or diminution of the marital deduction for estate and gift tax purposes unless the execution of such directions would or the exercise of such powers could, cause the spouse to have less than substantially full beneficial enjoyment of the particular interest transferred." Rev. Rul. 69­56, 1969­1 Cum. Bull. 224. The Revenue Ruling cites for this proposition §§ 20.2056(b)­ 5(f)(1) and 25.2523(e)­1(f)(1), parts of the estate and gift tax qualification regulations discussed above. The qualifica- tion regulations provide that an interest may qualify as de- ductible only in part. Where that happens, the deduction need not be disallowed but it must be diminished. See, e. g., § 20.2056(b)­5(b); § 25.2523(e)­1(b); see also 26 U. S. C. §§ 2056(b)(5), 2523(e). It is in this qualification context that the Revenue Ruling speaks of "diminution" of the marital deduction. There is no dispute the entire interests trans- ferred in trust here qualify for the estate tax marital and charitable deductions, respectively. The question before us is one of valuation. Sections 25.2523(e)­1(f) and 20.2056(b)­ 5(f) and Revenue Ruling 69­56 do not bear on our inquiry. The parties here agree that the marital and charitable de- ductions had to be reduced by the amount of marital and charitable residue principal used to pay administration ex- penses. The Commissioner contends that the estate must reduce its marital and charitable deductions by the amount of administration expenses paid not only from principal but also, and in all events, from income and by a dollar-for-dollar amount. The Commissioner cites the controlling regulation in support of her position. The regulation says: 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 105 Opinion of Kennedy, J. "The value, for the purpose of the marital deduction, of any deductible interest which passed from the dece- dent to his surviving spouse is to be determined as of the date of the decedent's death [unless the estate uses the alternative valuation date]. The marital deduction may be taken only with respect to the net value of any deductible interest which passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse, the same principles being applica- ble as if the amount of a gift to the spouse were being determined. In determining the value of the interest in property passing to the spouse account must be taken of the effect of any material limitations upon her right to income from the property. An example of a case in which this rule may be applied is a bequest of property in trust for the benefit of the decedent's spouse but the income from the property from the date of the dece- dent's death until distribution of the property to the trustee is to be used to pay expenses incurred in the administration of the estate." 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­ 4(a) (1996). The regulation does not help the Commissioner. It says a limitation providing that income "is to be used" throughout the administration period to pay administration expenses "may" be material in a given case and, if it is, account must be taken of it for valuation purposes as if it were a gift to the spouse, as we have discussed, see supra, at 101­102. The Tax Court was quite accurate in its description of the regulation when it said: "That section is merely a valuation provision which re- quires material limitations on the right to receive in- come to be taken into account when valuing the prop- erty interest passing to the surviving spouse. The fact that income from property is to be used to pay expenses during the administration of the estate is not necessarily 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 106 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Opinion of Kennedy, J. a material limitation on the right to receive income that would have a significant effect on the date-of-death value of the property of the estate." 101 T. C., at 324­325. There is no indication in the case before us that the execu- tor's power to charge administration expenses to income is equivalent to an express postponement of the spouse's right to income beyond a reasonable period of administration. Cf. 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­5(f)(9) (1996) (requiring valuation of ex- press postponements of the spouse's right to income beyond a reasonable period of administration). By contrast, we have no difficulty conceiving of situations where a provision requiring or allowing administration expenses to be paid from income could be deemed a "material limitation" on the spouse's right to income. Suppose the decedent's other be- quests account for most of the estate's property or that most of its assets are nonincome producing, so that the corpus of the surviving spouse's bequest, and the income she could expect to receive from it, would be quite small. In these circumstances, the amount of the estate's anticipated admin- istration expenses chargeable to income may be material as compared with the anticipated income used to determine the assets' date-of-death value. If so, a provision requiring or allowing administration expenses to be charged to income would be a material limitation on the spouse's right to in- come, reducing the marital bequest's date-of-death value and the allowable marital deduction. Whether a limitation is "material" will also depend in part on the nature of the spouse's interest in the assets generat- ing income. This analysis finds strong support in the text of § 20.2056(b)­4(a). The regulation gives an example of where a limitation on the right to income "may" be mate- rial-bequests "in trust" for the benefit of a decedent's spouse. The example suggests a significant difference be- tween a bequest of income and an outright gift of the fee interest in the income-producing property. A fee in the 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 107 Opinion of Kennedy, J. same interest will almost always be worth much more. Where the value of the trust to the beneficiaries is derived solely from income, an obligation to pay administration ex- penses from that income is more likely to be "material." In the case of a specific bequest of income, for example, valued only for its future income stream, a diversion of that income would be more significant. The marital property in this case, however, comprising trusts involving either a general power of appointment (the GPA trust) or an irrevocable elec- tion (the QTIP trust), was valued as being equivalent to a transfer of the fee. See Brief for Petitioner 8­9, n. 1 ("[T]he corpus of both trusts is includable in the estate of the sur- viving spouse"). As a result, the limitation on the right to income here is less likely to be material. The inquiry into the value of the estate's anticipated administration expenses should be just as administrable, if not more so, than valu- ing property interests like going-concern businesses, see, e. g., § 20.2031­3, involving much greater complexity and uncertainty. The Tax Court concluded here: "On the facts before us, we find that the trustee's discretion to pay administration expenses out of income is not a material limitation on the right to receive income." 101 T. C., at 325. The Tax Court did not specify the facts it considered relevant to the materi- ality inquiry. As we have explained, however, the Commis- sioner does not contend the estate failed to give adequate consideration to expected future administration expenses as of the date of death in determining the amount of the marital deduction. We have no basis to reverse for the Tax Court's failure to elaborate. Here, given the size and complexity of the estate, one might have expected it to incur substantial litigation costs. But the anticipated expenses could none- theless have been thought immaterial in light of the income the trust corpus could have been expected to generate. The major disagreement in principle between the Tax Court majority and dissenters involved the distinction be- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 108 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Opinion of Kennedy, J. tween expected and actual income and expenses. Judge Halpern's opinion, joined by Judge Beghe, explained: "I believe the majority is undone by its view that income earned on estate property is not included in the gross estate. Once it is accepted that income earned on es- tate property (as anticipated at the appropriate valua- tion date) is included in the gross estate, the next ques- tion is whether, but for the use of such income to pay administration expenses, it would be received by the surviving spouse or charitable beneficiary. If the an- swer is yes, then it follows easily that, when such income is used for administration expenses, rather than re- ceived by the surviving spouse or charitable beneficiary, the value of the interest passing from the decedent to the surviving spouse or charitable beneficiary is de- creased." Id., at 342­343 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Tax Court dissenters recognized that only anticipated, not actual, income is included in the gross estate, as the gross estate is based on date-of-death value. See also id., at 342, n. 5 (opinion of Halpern, J.) ("It is true, of course, that income actually earned on . . . property [included in valuing the gross estate] during the period of estate administration is not included in the gross estate. The gross estate, however, does include the discounted value of post mortem income ex- pected to be earned during estate administration" (emphasis deleted)). The dissenters failed to recognize that following their own logic, as a general rule, assuming compliance with § 20.2056(b)­4(a)'s limitation to relevant facts on the control- ling valuation date, only anticipated administration expenses payable from income, not the actual ones, affect the date-of- death value of the marital or charitable bequests. The dis- senters were, in a sense, a step closer to § 25.2523(a)­1(e)'s present-value approach than the Commissioner, for they would have required the estate to reduce the marital or char- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 109 Opinion of Kennedy, J. itable deduction by only the discounted value of the actual administration expenses, whereas the Commissioner insists on a dollar-for-dollar reduction. The dissenters' wait-and- see approach to the valuation inquiry, however, is still at odds with the valuation inquiry required by the regulations: What is the net value of the marital or charitable bequest on the controlling valuation date, determined as if it were a gift to the spouse? The Commissioner directs us to the language of § 2056(b)(4), which says: "In determining . . . the value of any interest in prop- erty passing to the surviving spouse for which a deduc- tion is allowed by this section- . . . . . "(B) where such interest or property is encumbered in any manner, or where the surviving spouse incurs any obligation imposed by the decedent with respect to the passing of such interest, such encumbrance or obligation shall be taken into account in the same manner as if the amount of a gift to such spouse of such interest were being determined." We interpreted this language in United States v. Stapf, 375 U. S. 118 (1963). The husband's will there gave property to his wife, conditioned on her relinquishing other property she owned to the couple's children. We held that the husband's estate was entitled to a marital deduction only to the extent the value of the property the husband gave his wife ex- ceeded the value of the property she relinquished to receive it. The marital deduction, we explained, should not exceed the "net economic interest received by the surviving spouse." Id., at 126. The statutory language, as we inter- preted it in Stapf, is consistent with our analysis here. Where the will requires or allows the estate to pay adminis- tration expenses from income that would otherwise go to the surviving spouse, our analysis requires that the marital 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 110 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Opinion of Kennedy, J. deduction reflect the date-of-death value of the expected fu- ture administration expenses chargeable to income if they are material as compared with the date-of-death value of the expected future income. Using this approach to valuation, the estate will arrive at the "net economic interest received by the surviving spouse." Ibid. For the first time at oral argument, the Commissioner sug- gested that the reduction she seeks is necessary to avoid a "double deduction" in violation of 26 U. S. C. § 642(g). Under § 642(g), an estate may take an estate tax deduction for administration expenses under § 2053(a)(2), or it may take them, if deductible, off its taxable income, but it may not do both. The so-called double deduction argument is rhetori- cal, not statutory. As our colleagues in dissent recognize, "nothing in § 642(g) compels the conclusion that the marital (or charitable) deduction must be reduced whenever an es- tate elects to deduct expenses from income." Post, at 137 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). The Commis- sioner nevertheless suggests that, unless we reduce the estate's marital deduction by the amount of administration expenses paid from income and deducted on its income tax, the estate will receive a deduction for them on its income tax as well as a deduction for them on its estate tax in the form of inflated marital and charitable deductions. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 12, 15. The marital and charitable estate tax deductions do not include income, however. When income is used, consistent with state law and the will, to pay admin- istration expenses, this does not require that the estate tax deductions be diminished. The deductions include asset val- ues determined with reference to expected income, but under our analysis the values must also be reduced to reflect material expected administration expense charges to which that income may be subjected. As noted above, the Com- missioner has not contended the estate's marital and charita- ble deductions fail to reflect such expected payments. So 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 111 O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment there is no basis for the double deduction argument. Our analysis is consistent with the design of the statute. The Commissioner also invites our attention to the legisla- tive history of the marital deduction statute. Assuming for the sake of argument it would have relevance here, it does not support her position. The Senate Report accompanying the statute says: "The interest passing to the surviving spouse from the decedent is only such interest as the decedent can give. If the decedent by his will leaves the residue of his estate to the surviving spouse and she pays, or if the estate income is used to pay, claims against the estate so as to increase the residue, such increase in the residue is acquired by purchase and not by bequest. Accord- ingly, the value of any additional part of the residue passing to the surviving spouse cannot be included in the amount of the marital deduction." S. Rep. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, p. 6 (1948). The Report supports our analysis. It underscores that valu- ation for marital deduction purposes occurs on the date of death. The Commissioner's position is inconsistent with the con- trolling regulations. The Tax Court and the Court of Ap- peals were correct in finding for the taxpayer on these facts, and we affirm the judgment. It is so ordered. Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Souter and Justice Thomas join, concurring in the judgment. "Logic and taxation are not always the best of friends." Sonneborn Brothers v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 506, 522 (1923) (McReynolds, J., concurring). In cases like the one before us today, they can be complete strangers. That our tax laws can at times be in such disarray is a discomforting thought. I can understand why the plurality attempts to extrapolate 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 112 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment a generalized estate tax valuation theory from one regula- tion and then to apply that theory to resolve this case, per- haps with the hope of making sense out of the applicable law. But where the applicability-not to mention the validity-of that theory is far from clear, the temptation to make order out of chaos at any cost should be resisted, especially when the question presented can be resolved-albeit imperfectly- by reference to more directly applicable sources. While Justice Scalia, Justice Breyer, and I agree on this point, we disagree on the result ultimately dictated by these sources. I therefore write separately to explain why in my view the plurality's result, though not its reasoning, is correct. I When a citizen or resident of the United States dies, the Federal Government imposes a tax on "all [of his] property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated." 26 U. S. C. §§ 2001(a), 2031(a). Specifically excluded from taxation, however, is certain property devised to the dece- dent's spouse or to charity. Such testamentary gifts may qualify for the marital deduction, § 2056(a), or the charitable deduction, § 2055(a). If they do, they are removed from the decedent's "gross estate" and exempted from the estate tax. § 2051. Calculating the estate tax, however, takes time, as does marshaling the decedent's property and distributing it to the ultimate beneficiaries. During this process, the assets in the estate often earn income and the estate itself incurs administrative expenses. To deal with this eventual- ity, the Tax Code permits an estate administrator to choose between allocating these expenses to the assets in the estate at the time of death (the estate principal), or to the postmor- tem income earned by those assets. § 642(g). Everyone agrees that when these expenses are charged against a por- tion of the estate's principal devised to the spouse or charity, that portion of the principal is diverted from the spouse or charity and the marital and charitable deductions are accord- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 113 O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment ingly "reduced" by the actual amount of expenses incurred. See ante, at 104 (plurality opinion); post, at 123 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Brief for Petitioner 19; Brief for Respondent 6. The question presented here is what becomes of these deduc- tions when the estate chooses the second option under § 642(g) and allocates administrative expenses to the post- mortem income generated by the property in the spousal or charitable devise. The Tax Code itself supplies no guidance. Accord, post, at 127 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The statute most relevant to this case, 26 U. S. C. § 2056(b)(4)(B), provides: "[W]here [any interest in property otherwise qualifying for the marital deduction] is encumbered in any manner, or where the surviving spouse incurs any obligation im- posed by the decedent with respect to the passing of such interest, such encumbrance or obligation shall be taken into account in the same manner as if the amount of a gift to such spouse of such interest were being determined." Although an executor's power to burden the postmortem in- come of the marital bequest with the estate's administrative expenses is arguably an "encumbrance" or an "obligation im- posed by the decedent with respect to the passing of such interest," the statute itself says only that the "encumbrance or obligation shall be taken into account." It does not ex- plain how this should be done, however. In my view, it is not possible to tell from § 2056(b)(4)(B) whether allocation of administrative expenses to postmortem income reduces the marital deduction always, sometimes, or not at all. Nor does the Code's legislative history give shape to its otherwise ambiguous language. The discussion in the Sen- ate Report of § 2056(b)(4)(B)'s predecessor statute reads: "The interest passing to the surviving spouse from the decedent is only such interest as the decedent can give. If the decedent by his will leaves the residue of his es- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 114 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment tate to the surviving spouse and she pays, or if the estate income is used to pay, claims against the estate so as to increase the residue, such increase in the residue is acquired by purchase and not by bequest. Accordingly, the value of any such additional part of the residue passing to the surviving spouse cannot be included in the amount of the marital deduction." S. Rep. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, p. 6 (1948) (emphasis added). This italicized passage might be helpful if it explicitly referred to "administrative expenses" instead of "claims against the estate." But it is not at all clear from the Senate Report whether the latter term includes the former: The Report nowhere defines the term "claims against the es- tate," and the immediately preceding paragraph discusses § 2056(b)(4)(B)'s language with reference to mortgages. Ibid. Because mortgages differ from administrative ex- penses in many ways (e. g., mortgages pre-exist the dece- dent's death and are fixed in amount at that time), there is a reasonable argument that administrative expenses are not "claims against the estate." In sum, the Code's legisla- tive history is not illuminating. II All that remains in this statutory vacuum are the Commis- sioner's regulations and Revenue Rulings, and it is on these sources that I would decide this issue. The key regulation is 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(a) (1996): "The value, for the purpose of the marital deduction, of any deductible interest which passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse is to be determined as of the date of the decedent's death . . . . The marital deduction may be taken only with respect to the net value of any deductible interest which passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse, the same principles being applica- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 115 O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment ble as if the amount of a gift to the spouse were being determined. In determining the value of the interest in property passing to the spouse account must be taken of the effect of any material limitations upon her right to income from the property." The text of the regulation leaves no doubt that only the "net value" of the spousal gift may be deducted. Moreover, there is little doubt that, in assessing this "net value," one should examine how the spousal devise would have been treated if it were instead an inter vivos gift. See 26 U. S. C. § 2056(b)(4)(A) (also referring to treatment of gifts). The plurality latches onto 26 CFR § 25.2523(a)­1(e) (1996), and to the statutes and regulations to which it refers. Ante, at 101­102 (referring to 26 U. S. C. § 7520; 26 CFR § 20.2031­7 (1996)). In the plurality's view, these regulations define how to "tak[e] [account] of the effect of any material limitations upon [a spouse's] right to income from the property." 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(a) (1996). The plurality frankly admits that these regulations do not speak directly to the anteced- ent inquiry-when an executor's right to allocate administra- tive expenses to income constitutes a "material limitation." Ante, at 106. The plurality nevertheless believes that these regulations bear indirectly on this inquiry by imply- ing an underlying estate tax valuation theory that, in the plurality's view, dovetails nicely with our decision in Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 151 (1929). Ante, at 102. It is on the basis of this valuation theory that the plu- rality is able to conclude that the Tax Court's analysis was wrong because that analysis did not, consistent with the plu- rality's theory, focus solely on anticipated administrative ex- penses and anticipated income. Ante, at 107­109. But, as Justice Scalia points out, the plurality's valuation theory is not universally applicable and, in fact, conflicts with the Commissioner's treatment of some other expenses. See 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(c) (1996); post, at 133­136. Because § 25.2523(a)­1(e) and its accompanying provisions do no more 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 116 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment than suggest an estate tax valuation theory that itself has questionable value in this context, these provisions do not in my view provide any meaningful guidance in this case. The Tax Court, on the other hand, zeroed in on 26 CFR §§ 25.2523(e)­1(f)(3) and (4) (1996), the gift tax regulations which, read together, provide that a trustee's power to allo- cate the "trustees' commissions . . . and other charges" to the trust's income will not disqualify the trust from the gift tax spousal deduction as long as the donee spouse receives "substantial beneficial enjoyment" of the trust property. 101 T. C. 314, 325 (1993); see also 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­5(f) (1996) (tracking language of § 25.2523(e)­1(f)). The Commis- sioner interpreted this language in Revenue Ruling 69­56, and held that a trustee's power to "charge to income or principal, executor's or trustee's commissions, legal and accounting fees, custodian fees, and similar administration expenses . . . . . . . . "[does] not result in the disallowance or diminution of the marital deduction for estate and gift tax purposes unless the execution of such directions would or the ex- ercise of such powers could, cause the spouse to have less than substantially full beneficial enjoyment of the particular interest transferred." Rev. Rul. 69­56, 1969­1 Cum. Bull. 224 (emphasis added). Both the plurality and Justice Scalia argue that these gift regulations and rulings are inapposite because they address how the power to allocate expenses affects a trust's qualifi- cation for the marital deduction, and not how it affects the trust's value. Ante, at 103­104; post, at 125­126, 131­132. They further contend that the "material limitation" language in 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(a) (1996) would be rendered super- fluous if a "material limitation" on the spouse's right to receive income existed only when that spouse lacked "sub- stantial beneficial enjoyment" of the income. 101 T. C., 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 117 O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment at 325­326 (adopting this argument). Under this reading, there could be no such thing as a trust that qualified for the marital deduction but imposed a material limitation on the right to income because any trust failing the "substantial beneficial enjoyment" test would not qualify for the deduc- tion at all. Ante, at 103; post, at 132. These are potent criticisms. But no matter how poorly drafted or ill con- ceived the Revenue Ruling might be, the fact remains that the Commissioner issued it and its plain language is hard to ignore. In the end, the conclusion one draws regarding how the marital and charitable trusts would be treated if they were inter vivos gifts depends on whether one takes the Commissioner at her word: If one does, the gift tax pro- visions, Revenue Ruling 69­56 in particular, favor respond- ent's position; if one does not, one is left with no guidance at all. Neither result is wholly satisfying. Fortunately, § 20.2056(b)­4(a) further directs the reader to consider a second method of determining the amount of the marital deduction: "In determining the value of the interest in property passing to the spouse account must be taken of the effect of any material limitations upon her right to income from the property." From this we ask whether the executor's right to allocate administrative expenses to the postmortem income of the marital bequest is a material limitation upon the spouse's "right to income from the property," such that "account must be taken of the effect." Because the executor's power is undeniably a "limitation" on the spouse's right to income, the case hinges on whether that limitation is "material." Accord, post, at 128 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The beginning of analysis . . . is to determine what, in the context of § 20.2056(b)­4(a), the word `material' means"). We can quibble over which definition of "material"-"sub- stantial" or "relevant"-precedes the other in the dictionary, 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 118 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment see ibid.; American Heritage Dictionary 772 (2d ed. 1985) ("substantial" precedes "relevant"), but this debate is beside the point. The Commissioner has already interpreted the language in § 20.2056(b)­4(a). In Revenue Ruling 93­48, the Commissioner ruled that the marital deduction is not "ordi- narily" reduced when an executor allocates interest pay- ments on deferred federal estate taxes to the postmortem income of the spousal bequest. Rev. Rul. 93­48, 1993­2 Cum. Bull. 271 ("[T]he value of a residuary charitable [or marital] bequest is [not] reduced by the amount of [interest] expenses payable from the income of the residuary prop- erty"). Justice Scalia contends that Revenue Ruling 93­48 should be disregarded because it was promulgated by the Commissioner only after her attempts to prevail on the contrary position in federal court repeatedly failed. Post, at 129­130. To be sure, the Commissioner may not have whole-heartedly embraced Revenue Ruling 93­48, but the Ruling nevertheless issued and we may not totally ig- nore the plain language of a regulation or ruling because the entity promulgating it did not really want to have to adopt it. See Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253­254 (1992) ("We have stated time and time again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there"); West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U. S. 83, 98 (1991) (rejecting argument that "the congressional purpose in enacting [a statute] must prevail over the ordinary mean- ing of statutory terms"). It is, as an initial matter, difficult to reconcile the Commis- sioner's treatment of interest under Revenue Ruling 93­48 with her position in this case. For all intents and purposes, interest accruing on estate taxes is functionally indistin- guishable from the administrative expenses at issue here. By definition, neither of these expenses can exist prior to the decedent's death; before that time, there is no estate to administer and no estate tax liability to defer. Yet both 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 119 O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment types of expenses are inevitable once the estate is open be- cause it is virtually impossible to close an estate in a day so as to avoid the deferral of estate tax payments or the incur- sion of some administration expenses. Although both can theoretically be avoided if an executor donates his time or pays up front what he estimates the estate tax to be, this will not often occur. Both types of expenses are, moreover, of uncertain amount on the date of death. Because these two types of expenses are so similar in relevant ways, in my view they should be treated the same under § 20.2056(b)­4(a) and Ruling 93­48, despite the Commissioner's limitation on the applicability of Revenue Ruling 93­48 to interest on deferred estate taxes. But more important, the Commissioner's treatment of interest on deferred estate taxes in Revenue Ruling 93­48 indicates her rejection of the notion that every financial bur- den on a marital bequest's postmortem income is a material limitation warranting a reduction in the marital deduction. That the Ruling purports to apply not only to income but also to principal, and may therefore deviate from the ac- cepted rule regarding payment of expenses from principal, see supra, at 112­113, does not undercut the relevance of the Ruling's implications as to income. Post, at 130 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Thus, some financial burdens on the spouse's right to postmortem income will reduce the marital deduc- tion; others will not. The line between the two does not, as Justice Scalia contends, depend upon the relevance of the limitation on the spouse's right to income to the value of the marital bequest, post, at 128­129, since interest on deferred estate taxes surely reduces, and is therefore relevant to, "the value of what passes," post, at 128 (emphasis deleted). By virtue of Revenue Ruling 93­48, the Commissioner has instead created a quantitative rule for § 20.2056(b)­4(a). That a limitation affects the marital deduction only upon reaching a certain quantum of substantiality is not a concept alien to the law of taxation; such rules are quite common. 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 120 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment See, e. g., Rev. Rul. 75­298, 1975­2 Cum. Bull. 290 (exempting from income tax the income of qualifying banks owned by foreign governments, as long as their participation in domes- tic commercial activity is de minimis); Rev. Rul. 90­60, 1990­2 Cum. Bull. 3 (establishing de minimis rule so that taxpayers who give up less than 33.3% of their partnership interest need not post a bond to enable them to defer pay- ment of credit recapture taxes for low-income housing). The Commissioner's quantitative materiality rule is con- sistent with the example set forth in 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­ 4(a) (1996): "An example of a case in which [the material limitation] rule may be applied is a bequest of property in trust for the benefit of the decedent's spouse but the income from the property from the date of the decedent's death until distribution of the property to the trustee is to be used to pay expenses incurred in the administration of the estate." Even assuming that Justice Scalia is correct that the word "may" connotes "possibility rather than permissibility," post, at 131, the example still does not specify whether it applies when all the income, some of the income, or any of the income "from the property . . . is to be used to pay expenses incurred in the administration of the estate." Any of these construc- tions of the example's language is plausible, and the Commis- sioner's expressed preference for the second one is worthy of deference. National Muffler Dealers Assn., Inc. v. United States, 440 U. S. 472, 476 (1979). That said, the proper measure of materiality has yet to be decided by the Commissioner. The Tax Court below com- pared the actual amount spent on administration expenses to its estimate of the income to be generated by the marital bequest during the spouse's lifetime. 101 T. C., at 325. One amicus suggests a comparison of the discounted present value of the projected income stream from the marital be- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 121 O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment quest when the actual administrative expenses are allocated to income with the projected income stream when the ex- penses are allocated to principal. App. to Brief for Ameri- can College of Trust and Estate Counsel as Amicus Curiae 1­2. The plurality, drawing upon its valuation theory, supra, at 115, looks to whether the "date-of-death value of the expected future administration expenses chargeable to income . . . [is] material as compared with the date-of-death value of the expected future income." Ante, at 110. None of these tests specifies with any particularity when the threshold of materiality is crossed. Cf. 26 U. S. C. § 2503(b) (setting $10,000 annual minimum before gift tax liability at- taches). The proliferation of possible tests only underscores the need for the Commissioner's guidance. In its absence, the Tax Court's approach is as consistent with the Code as any of the others, and provides no basis for reversal. I share Justice Scalia's reluctance to find a $1.5 million diminution in postmortem income immaterial under any standard. Post, at 128­129. Were this Court considering the question of quantitative materiality in the first instance, I would be hard pressed not to find this amount "material" given the size of Mr. Hubert's estate. But the Tax Court in this case was effectively pre-empted from making such a finding by the Commissioner's litigation strategy. It ap- pears from the record that the Commissioner elected to marshal all her resources behind the proposition that any diversion of postmortem income was material, and never presented any evidence or argued that $1.5 million was quan- titatively material. See App. 58 (Stipulation of Agreed Issues) (setting forth Commissioner's argument); Brief for Respondent 47. Because she bore the burden of proving materiality (since her challenge to administrative expenses was omitted from the original notice of deficiency), Tax Court Rule 142(a), her failure of proof left the Tax Court with little choice but to reach its carefully crafted conclusion that $1.5 million was not quantitatively material on "the 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 122 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Scalia, J., dissenting facts before [it]." 101 T. C., at 325. I would resist the temptation to correct the seemingly counterintuitive result in this case by protecting the Commissioner from her own litigation strategy, especially when she continues to adhere to that strategy and does not, even now, ask us to reconsider the Tax Court's finding on this issue. This complex case has spawned four separate opinions from this Court. The question presented is simple and its answer should have been equally straightforward. Yet we are confronted with a maze of regulations and rulings that lead at times in opposite directions. There is no reason why this labyrinth should exist, especially when the Commis- sioner is empowered to promulgate new regulations and make the answer clear. Indeed, nothing prevents the Com- missioner from announcing by regulation the very position she advances in this litigation. Until that time, however, the relevant sources point to a test of quantitative material- ity, one that is not met by the unusual factual record in this case. I would, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Tax Court. Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Breyer joins, dissenting. The statute and regulation most applicable to the question presented in this case are discussed in today's opinion almost as an afterthought. Instead of relying on the text of 26 U. S. C. § 2056(b)(4)(B) and its interpretive Treasury Regula- tion, 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(a) (1996), the plurality hinges its analysis on general principles of valuation which it mistak- enly believes to inhere in the estate tax. It thereby creates a tax boondoggle never contemplated by Congress, and an- nounces a test of deductibility virtually impossible for tax- payers and the Internal Revenue Service to apply. In my view, § 2056(b)(4)(B) and § 20.2056(b)­4(a) provide a straight- forward disposition, namely, that the marital (and charitable) deductions must be reduced whenever income from property 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 123 Scalia, J., dissenting comprising the residuary bequest to the spouse (or charity) is used to satisfy administration expenses. I therefore re- spectfully dissent. I Section 2056 of the Internal Revenue Code provides for a deduction from gross estate for marital be- quests.1 The Code places two limitations on the marital de- duction which are relevant to this case. First, as would be expected, the marital deduction is limited to "an amount equal to the value of any interest in property which passes or has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse, but only to the extent that such interest is included in determin- ing the value of the gross estate." 26 U. S. C. § 2056(a). Thus, as the plurality correctly recognizes, and as both par- ties agree, if any portion of marital bequest principal is used to pay estate administration expenses, then the marital de- duction must be reduced commensurately. Second, and more to the point, "where such interest or property [be- queathed to the spouse] is encumbered in any manner, or where the surviving spouse incurs any obligation imposed by the decedent with respect to the passing of such interest, such encumbrance or obligation shall be taken into account in the same manner as if the amount of a gift to such spouse of such interest were being determined." § 2056(b)(4)(B). Section 2056(b)(4)(B) controls this case and leads to the conclusion that the marital deduction must be reduced when estate income which would otherwise pass to the spouse is used to pay administration expenses of the estate. A As the plurality implicitly recognizes, Mrs. Hubert's inter- est in the estate was burdened with the obligation of paying 1 This case involves both the marital and the charitable deductions. I agree with the plurality's determination that the provisions governing the two should be read in pari materia, ante, at 100, and, like the plurality, I focus my attention on the marital deduction. 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 124 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Scalia, J., dissenting administration expenses. The settlement agreement resolv- ing the will contest, like Mr. Hubert's most recent will, pro- vided that the estate's administration expenses would be paid from the residuary trusts, with the discretion given to the executor to apportion expenses between the income and principal of the residue. The marital bequest, which makes up some 52% of the residue, was thus plainly burdened with the obligation of paying 52% of the administration expenses of the estate. (The charitable bequest accounted for the remaining 48% of the residue.) Our task under § 2056(b)(4)(B) is to determine how this obligation would affect the value of the marital bequest were the bequest an inter vivos gift. This seemingly rudimen- tary question proves difficult to answer. Both parties point to various provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and the Treasury Regulations, but these concern the quite differ- ent question whether a gift qualifies for the gift tax mari- tal deduction; none discusses how the actual payment of administration expenses from income will affect the value of the gift tax marital deduction. See, e. g., Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2523(e)­1(f)(3) and (4), 26 CFR §§ 25.2523(e)­1(f)(3) and (4) (1996) (inclusion of the power to a trustee to allocate ex- penses of a trust between income and corpus will not dis- qualify the gift from the marital deduction so long as the spouse maintains substantial beneficial enjoyment of the in- come). The plurality seeks to derive some support from § 25.2523(a)­1(e), see ante, at 101­102, though it must ac- knowledge that "[t]he question presented here . . . is not con- trolled by the exact terms of [that regulation or the provi- sions to which it refers]," ante, at 101. Even going beyond its "exact terms," however, the regulation has no relevance. Like its counterparts in the estate tax provisions, see §§ 20.2031­1(b), 20.2031­7, it simply provides instruction on how to value the assets comprising the gift. It says nothing about how to take account of administration expenses. In- deed, the gross estate does not include anticipated adminis- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 125 Scalia, J., dissenting tration expenses. As I discuss below, infra, at 134­135, the estate tax provisions provide for a deduction from the gross estate for administration expenses actually incurred. See 26 U. S. C. § 2053(a)(2) and 26 CFR § 20.2053­3(a) (1996). Were expected administration expenses taken into account in valuing the assets of the gross estate, as the plurality in- correctly suggests, then the estate tax deduction for actual administration expenses would in effect be a second deduc- tion for the same charge. Respondent's strongest argument is based on Rev. Rul. 69­56, 1969­1 Cum. Bull. 224, which held that inclusion in a marital trust of the power to charge administration expenses to either income or principal does not run afoul of that provi- sion of the regulations which requires, in order for a life- estate trust to qualify for the gift and estate tax marital deductions, that the settlor intend the spouse to enjoy "sub- stantially that degree of beneficial enjoyment of the trust property during her life which the principles of the law of trust accord to a person who is unqualifiedly designated as the life beneficiary of a trust." 26 CFR §§ 2523(e)­1(f)(1), 2056(b)­5(f)(1) (1996). Although the Revenue Ruling was an interpretation of qualification regulations, it also pur- ported to "h[o]ld" that inclusion of the "power" to allocate expenses between income and principal "does not result in the disallowance or diminution of the marital deduction," Rev. Rul. 69­56, 1969­1 Cum. Bull. 224, 225 (emphasis added). I agree with the Commissioner that this Revenue Ruling is inapposite because it deals with the effect of the mere existence of the power to allocate expenses against in- come; it speaks not at all to the question of how the actual exercise of that power will affect the valuation of the estate tax marital deduction. If the Ruling is construed to mean that exercise of the power does not reduce the marital deduc- tion, then actually using principal to pay the expenses should not reduce the marital deduction, a result which everyone agrees is incorrect, see, e. g., ante, at 104 (plurality opinion); 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 126 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Scalia, J., dissenting ante, at 112­113 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); supra, at 123, and which plainly conflicts with § 2056(a). It seems to me obvious that the Commissioner was simply not addressing the issue before us today when she issued Reve- nue Ruling 69­56, a conclusion confirmed by the fact that the Commissioner's longstanding view-which antedates Reve- nue Ruling 69­56-is that use of marital bequest income to pay administration expenses requires that the marital deduc- tion be reduced, see, e. g., Brief for Government Appellee in Ballantine v. Tomlinson, No. 18,736 (CA5 1961), p. 18; Brief for Government Appellee in Alston v. United States, No. 21,402 (CA5 1965), p. 15. B The Commissioner contends that Treas. Reg. § 20.2056 (b)­4(a), 26 CFR § 2056(b)­4(a) (1996), which interprets § 2056(b)­(4)(B), mandates the conclusion that payment of ad- ministration expenses from marital bequest income reduces the marital deduction. Section 20.2056(b)­4(a) provides: "The value, for the purpose of the marital deduction, of any deductible interest which passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse is to be determined as of the date of the decedent's death, [unless the executor elects the alternate valuation date]. The marital deduction may be taken only with respect to the net value of any deductible interest which passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse, the same principles being applica- ble as if the amount of a gift to the spouse were being determined. In determining the value of the interest in property passing to the spouse account must be taken of the effect of any material limitations upon her right to income from the property. An example of a case in which this rule may be applied is a bequest of property in trust for the benefit of the decedent's spouse but the income from the property from the date of decedent's death until distribution of the property to the trustee is 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 127 Scalia, J., dissenting to be used to pay expenses incurred in the administra- tion of the estate." (Emphasis added.) This text was issued pursuant to explicit authority given the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate the rules and regu- lations necessary to enforce the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 U. S. C. § 7805(a). As this Court has repeatedly ac- knowledged, judicial deference to the Secretary's handiwork "helps guarantee that the rules will be written by `masters of the subject.' " National Muffler Dealers Assn., Inc. v. United States, 440 U. S. 472, 477 (1979), quoting United States v. Moore, 95 U. S. 760, 763 (1878). Thus, when a pro- vision of the Internal Revenue Code is ambiguous, as § 2056(b)(4)(B) plainly is, this Court has consistently deferred to the Treasury Department's interpretive regulations so long as they " ` "implement the congressional mandate in some reasonable manner." ' " National Muffler Dealers Assn., Inc., supra, at 476, quoting United States v. Cart- wright, 411 U. S. 546, 550 (1973), in turn quoting United States v. Correll, 389 U. S. 299, 307 (1967). See also Cottage Savings Assn. v. Commissioner, 499 U. S. 554, 560­561 (1991). As the courts below recognized, the crucial term of the regulation for present purposes is "material limitations." Curiously enough, however, neither the Commissioner nor respondent comes forward with a definition of this term, the former simply contending that "it is the burden of paying administration expenses itself that constitutes the `material' limitation," Brief for Petitioner 31, and the latter simply con- tending that that burden is for various reasons not substan- tial enough to qualify. Today's plurality opinion also takes the latter approach, never defining the term but displaying by its examples that "material" must mean "relatively sub- stantial." If, it says, a spouse's bequest represents a small portion of the overall estate and could be expected to gen- erate little income, the estate's anticipated administration expenses " `may' be material" when compared to the antici- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 128 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Scalia, J., dissenting pated income. Ante, at 106. But, it says, the mere fact that an estate incurs (or as I discuss below, under the plurality's approach, expects to incur) "substantial litigation costs" is insufficient to make a limitation material. Ante, at 107. The beginning of analysis, it seems to me, is to determine what, in the context of § 20.2056(b)­4(a), the word "material" means. In common parlance, the word sometimes bears the meaning evidently assumed by respondent: "substantial," or "serious," or "important." See 1 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 1714 (1993) (def. 3); Webster's New Inter- national Dictionary 1514 (2d ed. 1950) (def. 2a). It would surely bear that meaning in a regulation that referred to a "material diminution of the value of the spouse's estate." Relatively small diminutions would not count. But where, as here, the regulation refers to "material limitations upon [the spouse's] right to receive income," it seems to me that the more expansive meaning of "material" is naturally sug- gested-the meaning that lawyers use when they move that testimony be excluded as "immaterial": Not "insubstantial" or "unimportant," but "irrelevant" or "inconsequential." See American Heritage Dictionary 1109 (3d ed. 1992) (def. 4: defining "material" as "[b]eing both relevant and consequen- tial," and listing "relevant" as a synonym). In the context of § 20.2056(b)­4(a), which deals, as its first sentence recites, with "[t]he value, for the purpose of the marital deduction, of any deductible interest which passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse" (emphasis added), a "material limita- tion" is a limitation that is relevant or consequential to the value of what passes. Many limitations are not-for exam- ple, a requirement that the spouse not spend the income for five years, or that the spouse be present at the reading of the will, or that the spouse reconcile with an alienated relative. That this is the more natural reading of the provision is amply demonstrated by the consequences of the alternative reading, which would leave it to the taxpayer, the Commis- sioner, and ultimately the courts, to guess whether a particu- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 129 Scalia, J., dissenting lar decrease in value is "material" enough to qualify-with- out any hint as to what might be a "ballpark" figure, or indeed any hint as to whether there is such a thing as "abso- lute materiality" (the $2 million at issue here, for instance), or whether it is all relative to the size of the estate. One should not needlessly impute such a confusing meaning to a regulation which readily bears another interpretation that is more precise. Moreover, the Commissioner's interpretation of her own regulation, so long as it is consistent with the text, is entitled to considerable deference, see National Muf- fler Dealers Assn., Inc., supra, at 488­489; Cottage Savings Assn., supra, at 560­561. The concurrence contends that the other (more unnatural) reading of "material" must be adopted-and that no defer- ence is to be accorded the Commissioner's longstanding ap- proach of reducing the marital deduction for any payment of administrative expenses out of marital-bequest income- because of a recent Revenue Ruling in which the Commis- sioner acquiesced in lower court holdings that the marital deduction is not reduced by the payment from the marital bequest of interest on deferred estate taxes. Ante, at 118­ 120 (discussing Rev. Rul. 93­48). The concurrence asserts that interest accruing on estate taxes "is functionally indis- tinguishable" from administrative expenses, so that Revenue Ruling 93­48 "created a quantitative rule" shielding some financial burdens from affecting the calculation of the marital deduction. Ante, at 118, 119. I think not. The Commis- sioner issued Revenue Ruling 93­48 only after her conten- tion, that § 20.2056(b)­4(a) required the marital deduction to be reduced by payment of estate tax interest from the mari- tal bequest, was repeatedly rejected by the Tax Court and the Courts of Appeals. See, e. g., Estate of Street v. Com- missioner, 974 F. 2d 723 (CA6 1992); Estate of Whittle v. Commissioner, 994 F. 2d 379 (CA7 1993); Estate of Richard- son v. Commissioner, 89 T. C. 1193 (1987). Rather than con- tinuing to expend resources in litigation that seemed likely 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 130 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Scalia, J., dissenting to bring little or no income to the Treasury, the Commis- sioner chose, in Revenue Ruling 93­48, to "adopt the result" of then-recent court decisions regarding interest on taxes. It is impossible to think that this suggested her view on the proper treatment of administrative expenses had changed. Indeed, the Ruling itself expressly indicates continued ad- herence to the Commissioner's longstanding position by reaf- firming Revenue Ruling 73­98, which held that the charita- ble deduction must be reduced by the amount of charitable bequest income and principal consumed to pay administra- tive expenses, modifying it only insofar as it applies to pay- ment of interest on taxes. Moreover, the Courts of Appeals whose results the Commissioner adopted themselves distin- guished administrative expenses. In Estate of Street, for example, the court reasoned that while administrative ex- penses accrue at death interest on taxes accrues after death, and noted that the example in Treas. Reg. § 2056(b)­4(a) spe- cifically required a reduction of the marital deduction for payment of administrative expenses, but was silent as to in- terest on taxes. 974 F. 2d, at 727, 729. While the concur- rence may be correct that the distinctions advanced by the Courts of Appeals are not wholly persuasive (the Commis- sioner herself argued that to no avail), I hardly think they are so irrational that it was arbitrary or capricious for the Commissioner to maintain her longstanding prior position on administrative expenses once Revenue Ruling 93­48 was issued; and it is utterly impossible to think that Revenue Ruling 93­48 was, or was understood to be, an indication that the Commissioner had changed her prior position on administrative expenses. That eliminates the only two grounds on which Revenue Ruling 93­48 could be relevant. The concurrence's reading of Revenue Ruling 93­48 suf- fers from an additional flaw. Revenue Ruling 93­48 is not limited to payment from marital bequest income, but rather extends to payment from marital bequest principal as well. Thus, under the concurrence's view of that Ruling, even sub- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 131 Scalia, J., dissenting stantial administrative expenses paid out of marital bequest principal may not require a reduction of the marital deduc- tion. This result is, of course, inconsistent with the statute, see 26 U. S. C. § 2056(a), and with what appears to be (as I noted earlier, supra, at 125­126) the concurrence's view, ante, at 112­113. Respondent asserts that some inquiry into "substantiality" is necessarily implied by the fact that the last sentence of the regulation describes an income-to-pay-administration- expenses limitation as "[a]n example of a case in which this rule [of taking account of material limitations] may be applied," 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(a) (1996) (emphasis added). The word "may" implies, the argument goes, that in some circumstances under those same facts the rule would not be applied-namely (the argument posits), when the adminis- tration expenses are not "substantial." But the latter is not the only explanation for the "may." Assuming it connotes possibility rather than permissibility (as in, "My boss said that I may go to New York"), the contingency referred to could simply be the contingency that there be some income which is used to pay administration expenses. The Tax Court (in analysis adopted verbatim by the Elev- enth Circuit and seemingly adopted by the concurrence, ante, at 120­121) took yet a third approach to "material limita- tion," which I must pause to consider. The Tax Court relied on 26 CFR § 25.2523(e)­1(f)(3) (1996), which, it stated, pro- vides that so long as the spouse has substantial beneficial enjoyment of the income of a trust, the bequest will not be disqualified from the marital gift deduction by virtue of a provision allowing the trustee to allocate expenses to in- come, and the spouse will be deemed to have received all the income from the trust. The Tax Court concluded: "If Mrs. Hubert is treated as having received all of the income from the trust, there can be no material limitation on her right to receive income." 101 T. C. 314, 325­326 (1993). This rea- soning fails for a number of reasons. First, § 25.2523(e)­ 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 132 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Scalia, J., dissenting 1(f)(3) is a qualification provision; it does not purport to instruct on how to value the bequest. Second, and more fundamentally, the Tax Court's approach renders the "ma- terial limitation" phrase in § 20.2056(b)­4(a) superfluous. Under that view, a limitation is material only if it deprives the spouse of substantial beneficial enjoyment of the income. However, if the spouse does not have substantial beneficial enjoyment of the income, the trust does not qualify for the marital deduction and whether the limitation is material is irrelevant. That "material limitation" is not synonymous with "substantial beneficial enjoyment" is further suggested by the regulations governing the qualification of trusts for the marital estate tax deduction, which are virtually identi- cal to the gift tax provisions relied upon by the Tax Court. See 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­5(f) (1996). Section 20.2056(b)­ 5(f)(9) provides that a spouse will not be deemed to lack sub- stantial beneficial enjoyment of the income merely because the spouse is not entitled to the income from the estate assets for the period reasonably required for administration of the estate. However, that section expressly provides: "As to the valuation of the property interest passing to the spouse in trust where the right to income is expressly post- poned, see § 20.2056(b)­4." Ibid. (emphasis added). C My understanding of § 20.2056(b)­4(a) is the only approach consistent with the statutory requirement that the marital deduction be limited to the value of property which passes to the spouse. See 26 U. S. C. § 2056(a). As the plurality and the concurrence acknowledge, one component of an asset's value is its discounted future income. See, e. g., Maass v. Higgins, 312 U. S. 443, 448 (1941); 26 CFR § 20.2031­1(b) (1996). (This explains why postmortem in- come earned by the estate is not added to the date-of-death value in computing the gross estate: projected income was already included in the date-of-death value.) The plurality 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 133 Scalia, J., dissenting and the concurrence also properly acknowledge that if resid- uary principal is used to pay administration expenses, then the marital deduction must be reduced commensurately be- cause the property does not pass to the spouse. See ante, at 104 (plurality opinion); ante, at 112­113 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); 26 U. S. C. § 2056(a). The plurality and the concurrence decline, however, to follow this reason- ing to its logical conclusion. Since the future stream of income is one part of the value of the assets at the date of death, use of the income to pay administration expenses (which were not included in calculating the assets' values) in effect reduces the value of the interest that passes to the spouse. As succinctly explained by a respected tax commentator: "Beneficiaries are compensated for the delay in receiv- ing possession by giving them the right to the income that is earned during administration. . . . [I]t is only the combination of the two rights-that to the income and that to possess the property in the future-that gives the beneficiary rights at death that are equal to value of the property at death. If the beneficiary does not get the income, what the beneficiary gets is less than the deathtime value of the property." Davenport, A Street Through Hubert's Fog, 73 Tax Notes 1107, 1110 (1996). If the beneficiary does not receive the income generated by the marital bequest principal, she in effect receives at the date of death less than the value of the property in the es- tate, in much the same way as she receives less than the value of the property in the estate when principal is used to pay expenses. II Besides giving the word "material" the erroneous meaning of something in excess of "substantial," the plurality's opin- ion adopts a unique methodology for determining material- ity. Consistent with its apparent view that the estate tax provisions prohibit examination of any events following the 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 134 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Scalia, J., dissenting date of death, the plurality concludes that whether a limita- tion is material, and the extent of any reduction in the mari- tal deduction, are determined solely on the basis of the infor- mation available at the date of death-a position espoused by neither litigant, none of the amici, and none of the courts to have considered this issue since it arose some 35 years ago. The plurality appears to have been misled by its view that the estate tax demands symmetry: Since only antici- pated income is included in the gross estate, only anticipated administration expenses can reduce the marital deduction. See ante, at 102, 106­109. The provisions of the estate tax clearly reject such a notion of symmetry and do not sharply discriminate between date-of-death and postmortem events insofar as the allowance of deductions for claims against and obligations of the estate are concerned. In this very case, for example, in calculating the taxable estate the executors deducted $506,989 of actual administration expenses pur- suant to 26 U. S. C. § 2053(a)(2). App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a. The regulations governing such deductions provide that "[t]he amounts deductible . . . as `administration expenses' . . . are limited to such expenses as are actually and nec- essarily, incurred in the administration of the decedent's es- tate," 26 CFR § 20.2053­3(a) (1996) (emphasis added), and expressly prohibit taking a deduction "upon the basis of a vague or uncertain estimate," § 20.2053­1(b)(3). Since such common administration expenses as litigation costs will be impossible to ascertain with any exactitude as of the date of death, the plurality's approach flatly contradicts the provi- sions of these regulations.2 The marital deduction itself is calculated on the basis of actual, rather than anticipated, expenditures from the mari- tal bequest. The regulations governing 26 U. S. C. § 2056(b) 2 The plurality's reference to Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 151 (1929), is unhelpful. That case holds that date-of-death valuation is applicable to bequeathed assets, not that it is applicable to claims and obligations that are to be satisfied out of those assets. 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 135 Scalia, J., dissenting (4)(A), the provision requiring the marital deduction to be reduced to take account of the effect of estate and inheri- tance taxes, make it clear that the actual amounts of those taxes control. See 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(c) (1996). (With respect to the charitable deduction, the requirement that ac- tual amounts be used is apparent on the face of the statute itself, see 26 U. S. C. § 2055(c).) Moreover, the language of § 2056(b)(4)(A) is quite similar to the language of the regulation at issue here, § 20.2056(b)­4(a), suggesting that the latter, like the former, should be interpreted to require consideration of actual, rather than merely expected, ad- ministration expenses. Compare 26 U. S. C. § 2056(b)(4)(A) ("[T]here shall be taken into account the effect which the tax imposed by section 2001, or any estate [tax], has on the net value to the surviving spouse of such interest" (emphasis added)) with 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(a) (1996) ("The marital deduction may be taken only with respect to the net value of any deductible interest which passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse . . . . In determining the value of the interest in property passing to the spouse account must be taken of the effect of any material limitations upon [the spouse's] right to income" (emphasis added)). In short, the plurality's general theory concerning valu- ation is contradicted by provisions of both the Code and regulations. It is also plagued by a number of practical problems. Most prominently, the plurality's rule is simply unadministrable. It requires the Internal Revenue Service and courts to engage in a peculiar, nunc pro tunc, three- stage investigation into what would have been believed on the date of death of the decedent. This highly speculative inquiry begins, I presume, with an examination of the vari- ous possible administration expenditures multiplied by the likelihood that they would actually come into being (for example, estimating the chances that a will contest would develop). Next, one must calculate the expected future income from the bequest. Finally, one must determine if, 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 136 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Scalia, J., dissenting in light of the expected income, the anticipated expenses are such that a willing buyer would deem them to be a "ma- terial [i. e., substantial] limitation" on the right to receive income. Just how a court, presiding over a tax controversy many years after the decedent's death, is supposed to blind itself to later developed facts, and gauge the expected administration expenses and anticipated income just as they would have been gauged on the date of death, is a mystery to me. In most cases, it is nearly impossible to estimate administration expenses as of the date of death; much less is it feasible to reconstruct such an estimation five or six years later. The plurality's test creates tremendous uncertainty and will un- doubtedly produce extensive litigation. We should be very reluctant to attribute to the Code or the Secretary's regula- tions the intention to require this sort of inherently difficult inquiry, especially when the key regulation is best read to require that account be taken of actual expenses. The plurality's test also leads to rather peculiar results. One example should suffice: Assume a decedent leaves his entire $30 million estate in trust to his wife and that as of the date of death a hypothetical buyer estimates that the estate will generate administration expenses on the order of $5 million because the decedent's estranged son has publicly stated that he is going to wage a fight over the will. Fur- ther, assume that the will provides that either income or principal may be used to satisfy the estate's expenses. Fi- nally, assume that a week after the decedent's death, mother and son put aside their differences and that the money passes to the spouse almost immediately with virtually no adminis- tration expenses. Under the plurality's test, since "only an- ticipated administration expenses payable from income, not the actual ones, affect the date-of-death value of the marital or charitable bequests," ante, at 108, the marital deduction will be limited to approximately $25 million, and, despite generating almost no income and having very few adminis- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 137 Scalia, J., dissenting tration expenses, the estate will be required to pay an estate tax on some $5 million even though the entire estate passed to the spouse. The plurality's test creates taxable estates where none exist. The proper result under § 2056(b)(4)(B) and § 20.2056(b)­4(a) is that the marital deduction is $30 million and the estate pays no estate tax. I have one final concern with the plurality's approach: It effectively permits an estate to obtain a double deduction from tax for administration expenses, a tax windfall which Congress could never have intended. Title 26 U. S. C. § 642(g) provides that administration expenses, which are al- lowed as a deduction in computing the taxable estate of a decedent, see § 2053, may be deducted from income (provided they fall within an income tax deduction) if the estate files a statement with the Commissioner stating that such amounts have not been taken as deductions from the gross estate. Here, respondent elected to deduct some $1.5 million of its administration expenses on its fiduciary income tax returns and was prohibited from taking these expenses as a deduc- tion from the gross estate. Notwithstanding § 642(g), how- ever, the plurality's holding effectively permits respondent to deduct the $1.5 million of administration expenses on the estate tax return under the guise of a marital or charitable deduction. Of course, the estate could have avoided the es- tate tax by electing to deduct its administration expenses on its estate tax return, but then it would have had no income tax deduction; Congress gave estates a choice, not a road map to a double deduction. I recognize that nothing in § 642(g) compels the conclusion that the marital (or charita- ble) deduction must be reduced whenever an estate elects to deduct expenses from income. However, by enacting § 642 to prohibit a double deduction, Congress seemingly antici- pated that if an estate elected to deduct administration ex- penses against income, its potential estate tax liability would increase commensurately. The plurality's holding today defeats this expectation. 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 138 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Breyer, J., dissenting III The plurality today virtually ignores the controlling au- thority and instead decides this case based on a novel vision of the estate tax system. Because 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(a) (1996), which is a reasonable interpretation of 26 U. S. C. § 2056(b)(4)(B), squarely controls this case and requires that the marital (and charitable) deductions be reduced whenever marital (or charitable) bequest income is used to pay admin- istration expenses, I would reverse the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit. There is some dispute as to how exactly to calculate the reduction in the marital and charitable de- ductions. The dissenting judges in the Tax Court, on the one hand, contended that the marital and charitable deduc- tions should be reduced by the date-of-death value of an an- nuity charged against the residuary interest that would be sufficient to pay the actual administration expenses charged to income. See 101 T. C., at 348­349 (Beghe, J., dissenting). The Commissioner, on the other hand, contends that the mar- ital and charitable deductions must be reduced on a dollar- for-dollar basis, reasoning that this is the same way that all claims and obligations of the estate are treated. Since this dispute was not adequately briefed by the parties, nor passed upon by the Eleventh Circuit or the majority of judges in the Tax Court, I would remand the case to allow the lower courts to consider this issue in the first instance. Justice Breyer, dissenting. I join Justice Scalia's dissent. This case turns on whether a payment of administration expenses out of income generated by estate assets constitutes a "material limitation" on the right to receive income from those assets. 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(a) (1996). The Commissioner has long, and consistently, argued that such a payment does reduce the value of the marital deduction. See, e. g., Ballantine v. Tomlinson, 293 F. 2d 311 (CA5 1961); Alston v. United States, 349 F. 2d 87 (CA5 1965); Estate of Street v. Commis- 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 139 Breyer, J., dissenting sioner, 974 F. 2d 723 (CA6 1992); Estate of Roney, 33 T. C. 801 (1960), aff'd per curiam, 294 F. 2d 774 (CA5 1961); Reply Brief for Petitioner 15. Justice Scalia explains why the Commissioner's interpretation is consistent with the regula- tion's language and the statute it interprets. I add a brief explanation as to why I believe that it is consistent with basic statutory and regulatory tax law objectives as well. The regulation, which speaks of the "net value" of what passes to the spouse, requires a realistic valuation of the in- terest left to the spouse as of the date of the decedent's death. Assume, for example, that a decedent leaves his en- tire estate to his wife in trust, with the proviso that the administrator pay 25% of the income earned by the estate assets during the period of administration to the decedent's son. Assume that the period of administration lasts several years and that the estate generates several million dollars in income during that time. On these assumptions, the son will have received an important asset (included in the es- tate's date-of-death value) that the surviving spouse did not receive, namely, the right to a portion of the estate's income over a period of several years. Were estate tax law to fail to take account of this fact (that the son, not the wife, re- ceived that asset), it would permit a valuable asset (the right to that income) to pass to the son without estate tax. But estate tax law does seem realistically to appraise the "net value" of what passes to the wife in such circumstances. See 26 CFR §§ 20.2056(b)­5(f)(9), 20.2056(b)­4(a) (1996); 4 A. Casner, Estate Planning § 13.11, pp. 138­139, and § 13.14.6, n. 18 (5th ed. 1988); cf. Estate of Friedberg, 63 TCM 3080 (1992), ¶ 92,310 P­H Memo TC (delay in payment of a specific bequest to a surviving spouse reduces its marital deduction value). And that being so, why would it not take account of the similar limitation on the right to income at issue here? The fact that the administrator uses estate income to pay administration expenses, rather than to make a bequest to the son, makes no difference from a marital deduction 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 140 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Breyer, J., dissenting perspective, for, as the regulations state, the marital deduc- tion focuses upon the "net value" of the "interest which passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse." 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)­4(a) (1996); see United States v. Stapf, 375 U. S. 118, 125 (1963). The Commissioner's position also treats economic equals as equal. The time when the administrator writes the rele- vant checks, and not the account to which he debits them, determines economic impact. Thus $100,000 in administra- tion expenses incurred by a $1 million estate open for one year, paid by check on the year's last day will (assuming 10% simple interest and assuming away here-irrelevant complexi- ties) leave $1 million for the spouse at year's end, whether the administrator pays the expenses out of estate principal or from income. On these same assumptions, a commitment to pay, say, $100,000 in administration expenses out of income will reduce the value of principal by an amount identical to the reduction in value that would flow from a commitment to pay a similar amount out of principal. This economic similarity argues for similar estate tax treatment. I recognize that the statute permits estates to deduct ad- ministration and certain other expenses either from the es- tate tax or from the estate's income tax. 26 U. S. C. § 642(g); cf. ante, at 112­113 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). But I do not read that statute as allowing a spouse to escape payment both of the estate tax (through a greater marital deduction) and also of income tax (through the deduction of the administration expenses from income). One can easily read the provision's language as simply granting the estate the advantage of whichever of the two tax rates is the more favorable, while continuing to require the estate to pay at least one of the two potential taxes. To read the "election" provision in this way makes of it a less dramatic departure from a Tax Code that otherwise sees what passes to heirs not as the full value of what the testator left, but, rather, as 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 93 (1997) 141 Breyer, J., dissenting that value minus a set of permitted deductions. 26 U. S. C. § 2053(a) (specifying deductions). Although respondent argues that the Commissioner's in- terpretation will sometimes produce an unjustified "shrink- ing" of the marital deduction, I do not see how that is so. I concede that unfairness could occur were the Commissioner to readjust the marital deduction every time the adminis- trator deducted from the estate's income tax every expense necessary to produce that income. But regulations guard against her doing so. Those regulations distinguish be- tween (a) "expenditures . . . essential to the proper settle- ment of the estate," and (b) expenses "incurred for the indi- vidual benefit of the heirs, legatees, or devisees." 26 CFR § 20.2053­3(a) (1996). The former are "administration ex- penses"; the latter are not. Deducting expenses in the lat- ter category from the estate's income tax should not affect the marital deduction; and, as long as that is so, the Commis- sioner's interpretation will simply permit estates to use their administration expense deductions to the best tax advantage. It will not lead to a marital deduction that to the spouse's overall disadvantage somehow shrinks, or disappears. The Commissioner's insistence upon reducing the date-of- death value of the trust dollar for dollar poses a more serious problem. Payment of $100,000 in administration expenses from future income should reduce the date-of-death value of assets left to a wife in trust not by $100,000, but by $100,000 discounted to reflect the fact that the $100,000 will be paid in the future, earning interest in the meantime. (Assuming a 10% interest rate and payment one year after death, the reduction in value would be about $91,000, not $100,000.) Nonetheless, the Commissioner's practice of reducing the marital deduction dollar for dollar might reflect the simplify- ing assumption that discount calculations do not make a suf- ficiently large difference sufficiently often to warrant the ad- ministrative burden of authorizing them. Or it might reflect 520US1 Unit: $U35 [09-13-99 10:42:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN 142 COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF HUBERT Breyer, J., dissenting the fact that when administration expenses are taken as a deduction against the estate tax, their value is not dis- counted. Were the Commissioner to defend the dollar-for- dollar position in some such way, her approach might prove reasonable. And this Court will defer to longstanding inter- pretations of the Code and Treasury Regulations, see supra, at 138­139, that reasonably "implement the congressional mandate." United States v. Correll, 389 U. S. 299, 307 (1967); see National Muffler Dealers Assn., Inc. v. United States, 440 U. S. 472, 488 (1979). Regardless, I would not decide this matter now, for it has not been argued to us. Finally, although I agree with much that Justice O'Con- nor has written, I cannot agree that the amount at issue- almost $1.5 million of administration expenses deducted from income-is insignificant hence immaterial; and I can find no concession to that effect in the courts below. For these reasons and those set forth by Justice Scalia, I would reverse the Court of Appeals. 520US1 Unit: $U36 [09-10-99 15:36:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1996 143 Syllabus YOUNG et al. v. HARPER certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the tenth circuit No. 95­1598. Argued December 9, 1996-Decided March 18, 1997 Oklahoma's Preparole Conditional Supervision Program (preparole or Pro- gram) took effect whenever the state prisons became overcrowded and authorized the conditional release of prisoners before their sentences expired. The Pardon and Parole Board (Board) determined who could participate in it, and an inmate could be placed on preparole after serv- ing 15% of his sentence. An inmate was eligible for parole only after one-third of his sentence had elapsed, and the Governor, based on the Board's recommendation, decided to grant parole. Program partici- pants and parolees were released subject to similar constraints. Upon reviewing respondent's criminal record and prison conduct, the Board simultaneously recommended him for parole and released him under the Program. At that time, he had served 15 years of a life sentence. After he spent five apparently uneventful months outside the peniten- tiary, the Governor denied him parole, whereupon he was ordered to, and did, report back to prison. Despite his claim that his summary reincarceration deprived him of liberty without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, he was denied habeas relief by, succes- sively, the state trial court, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, and the Federal District Court. The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that preparole was sufficiently like parole that a Program participant was entitled to the procedural protections set forth in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471. Held: The Program, as it existed when respondent was released, was equivalent to parole as understood in Morrissey. Morrissey's descrip- tion of the "nature of the interest of the parolee in his continued liberty" could just as easily have applied to respondent while he was on prepa- role. In compliance with state procedures, he was released from prison before the expiration of his sentence. See 408 U. S., at 477. He kept his own residence; he sought, obtained, and maintained a job; and he lived a life generally free of the incidents of imprisonment. See id., at 481­482. Although he was not permitted to use alcohol, to incur other than educational debt, or to travel outside the county without permis- sion, and he was required to report regularly to a parole officer, similar limits on a parolee's liberty did not in Morrissey render such liberty beyond procedural protection. Id., at 478. Some of the factors as- 520US1 Unit: $U36 [09-10-99 15:36:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN 144 YOUNG v. HARPER Opinion of the Court serted by petitioners to differentiate the Program from parole under Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215, 228-that preparole had the purpose of reducing prison overcrowding, and that a preparolee continued to serve his sentence and receive earned credits, remained within the cus- tody of the Department of Corrections, and was aware that he could have been transferred to a higher security level if the Governor denied parole-do not, in fact, appear to distinguish the two programs at all. Other differences identified by petitioners-that participation in the Program was ordered by the Board, while the Governor conferred pa- role; that escaped preparolees could be prosecuted as though they had escaped from prison, while escaped parolees were subject only to parole revocation, and that a preparolee could not leave Oklahoma under any circumstances, while a parolee could leave the State with his parole officer's permission-serve only to set preparole apart from the specific terms of parole as it existed in Oklahoma, but not from the more general class of parole identified in Morrissey. The Program appears to have differed from parole in name alone. Pp. 147­153. 64 F. 3d 563, affirmed. Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Sandra D. Howard, Assistant Attorney General of Okla- homa, argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were W. A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General, and Jennifer B. Miller, Assistant Attorney General. Margaret Winter, by appointment of the Court, 518 U. S. 1015, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Marjorie Rifkin, Elizabeth Alexander, Micheal Salem, and Steven R. Shapiro.* Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the narrow question whether a program employed by the State of Oklahoma to reduce the overcrowd- *A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for the State of Ne- vada et al. by Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General of Nevada, and Anne Cathcart, Senior Deputy Attorney General, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Daniel E. Lungren of Cali- fornia, Gale A. Norton of Colorado, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, and Dennis C. Vacco of New York. 520US1 Unit: $U36 [09-10-99 15:36:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 143 (1997) 145 Opinion of the Court ing of its prisons was sufficiently like parole that a person in the program was entitled to the procedural protections set forth in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), before he could be removed from it. We hold that the program, as it appears to have been structured at the time respondent was placed on it, differed from parole in name alone, and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. I As pertinent to this case, Oklahoma operated two pro- grams under which inmates were conditionally released from prison before the expiration of their sentences. One was pa- role, the other was the Preparole Conditional Supervision Program (preparole or Program). The Program was in ef- fect whenever the population of the prison system exceeded 95% of its capacity. Okla. Stat., Tit. 57, § 365(A) (Supp. 1990). An inmate could be placed on preparole after serving 15% of his sentence, § 365(A)(2), and he was eligible for pa- role when one-third of his sentence had elapsed, § 332.7(A). The Pardon and Parole Board (Board) had a role in the place- ment of both parolees and preparolees. The Board itself de- termined who could participate in the Program, while the Governor, based on the Board's recommendation, decided whether a prisoner would be paroled. As we describe fur- ther in Part II, infra, participants in the Program were released subject to constraints similar to those imposed on parolees. In October 1990, after reviewing respondent Ernest Eu- gene Harper's criminal record and conduct while incar- cerated, the Pardon and Parole Board simultaneously rec- ommended him for parole and released him under the Program. At that time, respondent had served 15 years of a life sentence for two murders. Before his release, re- spondent underwent orientation, during which he reviewed the "Rules and Conditions of Pre-Parole Conditional Super- vision," see App. 7, and after which he executed a document 520US1 Unit: $U36 [09-10-99 15:36:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN 146 YOUNG v. HARPER Opinion of the Court indicating that he "underst[ood] that being classified to com- munity level depend[ed] upon [his] compliance with each of these expectations," id., at 6. He spent five apparently un- eventful months outside the penitentiary. Nonetheless, the Governor of Oklahoma denied respondent parole. On March 14, 1991, respondent was telephoned by his parole officer, informed of the Governor's decision, and told to report back to prison, which he did later that day. Respondent filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in state court complaining that his summary return to prison had deprived him of liberty without due process. The state trial court denied relief and the Oklahoma Court of Crimi- nal Appeals affirmed. 852 P. 2d 164 (1993). The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that respondent's removal from the Program impinged only upon an interest in his "degree of confinement," an interest to which the procedural protec- tions set out in Morrissey did not attach. 852 P. 2d, at 165. The court found "[d]ispositive of the issue" the fact that re- spondent "was not granted parole by the Governor of Okla- homa." Ibid. The court noted that the Board had adopted a procedure under which preparolees subsequently denied parole remained on the Program, and had their cases re- viewed within 90 days of the denial for a determination whether they should continue on preparole. According to the court, "such a procedure gives an inmate sufficient notice when he is placed in the program that he may be removed from it when the governor exercises his discretion and de- clines to grant parole." Ibid. Respondent fared no better in District Court on his peti- tion for relief under 28 U. S. C. § 2254. But the Tenth Cir- cuit reversed. 64 F. 3d 563 (1995). It determined that pre- parole "more closely resembles parole or probation than even the more permissive forms of institutional confinement" and that "[d]ue process therefore mandates that program partici- pants receive at least the procedural protections described in Morrissey." Id., at 566­567. Petitioners sought certio- 520US1 Unit: $U36 [09-10-99 15:36:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 143 (1997) 147 Opinion of the Court rari on the limited question whether preparole "is more simi- lar to parole or minimum security imprisonment; and, thus, whether continued participation in such program is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Pet. for Cert. i. We granted certiorari, 517 U. S. 1219 (1996), and, because we find that preparole as it existed at the time of respondent's release was equivalent to parole as under- stood in Morrissey, we affirm.1 II "The essence of parole is release from prison, before the completion of sentence, on the condition that the prisoner abide by certain rules during the balance of the sentence." Morrissey, 408 U. S., at 477. In Morrissey, we described the "nature of the interest of the parolee in his continued liberty": "[H]e can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring at- tachments of normal life. Though the State properly subjects him to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens, his condition is very different from that of con- finement in a prison. . . . The parolee has relied on at 1 Respondent contends that the petition for certiorari was filed out of time, and that we are thus without jurisdiction. We disagree. A timely filed petition for rehearing will toll the running of the 90-day period for filing a petition for certiorari until disposition of the rehearing petition. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U. S. 33, 46 (1990). The petition for certiorari was filed within 90 days of the denial of rehearing. Although the petition for rehearing was filed two days late, the Tenth Circuit granted petitioners "leave to file a late petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc," as it had authority to do. See Fed. Rule App. Proc. 40(a). More- over, after granting petitioners leave to file the petition for rehearing, the Tenth Circuit treated it as timely and no mandate issued until after the petition was denied. See Fed. Rule App. Proc. 41(a). In these circum- stances, we are satisfied that both the petition for rehearing and the subse- quent petition for certiorari were timely filed. 520US1 Unit: $U36 [09-10-99 15:36:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN 148 YOUNG v. HARPER Opinion of the Court least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole conditions." Id., at 482. This passage could just as easily have applied to respondent while he was on preparole. In compliance with state proce- dures, he was released from prison before the expiration of his sentence. He kept his own residence; he sought, ob- tained, and maintained a job; and he lived a life generally free of the incidents of imprisonment. To be sure, respond- ent's liberty was not unlimited. He was not permitted to use alcohol, to incur other than educational debt, or to travel outside the county without permission. App. 7­8. And he was required to report regularly to a parole officer. Id., at 7. The liberty of a parolee is similarly limited, but that did not in Morrissey, 408 U. S., at 478, render such liberty be- yond procedural protection. Petitioners do not ask us to revisit Morrissey; they merely dispute that preparole falls within its compass. Our inquiry, they argue, should be controlled instead by Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215 (1976). There, we determined that the interest of a prisoner in avoiding an intrastate prison trans- fer was "too ephemeral and insubstantial to trigger proce- dural due process protections as long as prison officials have discretion to transfer him for whatever reason or for no rea- son at all." Id., at 228; see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U. S. 472, 487 (1995). Petitioners contend that reincarceration of a preparolee was nothing more than a "transfe[r] to a higher degree of confinement" or a "classification to a more super- vised prison environment," Brief for Petitioners 18, which, like transfers within the prison setting, involved no liberty interest. In support of their argument that preparole was merely a lower security classification and not parole, petitioners iden- tify several aspects of the Program said to render it different from parole. Some of these do not, in fact, appear to distin- guish the two programs. Others serve only to set preparole 520US1 Unit: $U36 [09-10-99 15:36:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 143 (1997) 149 Opinion of the Court apart from the specific terms of parole as it existed in Okla- homa, but not from the more general class of parole identified in Morrissey. None of the differences-real or imagined- supports a view of the Program as having been anything other than parole as described in Morrissey. We first take up the phantom differences. We are told at the outset that the purposes of preparole and parole were different. Preparole was intended "to reduce prison over- crowding," while parole was designed "to help reintegrate the inmate into society." Reply Brief for Petitioners 10. This alleged difference is less than it seems. Parole could also be employed to reduce prison overcrowding, see Okla. Stat., Tit. 57, § 332.7(B) (Supp. 1990). And the Program's requirement that its participants work or attend school be- lies the notion that preparole was concerned only with mov- ing bodies outside of teeming prison yards. In fact, in their brief below, petitioners described the Program as one in which the Department of Corrections "places eligible in- mates into a community for the purpose of reintegration into society." Brief for Appellees in No. 95­5026 (CA10), p. 7, n. 2. We are also told that "an inmate on the Program continues to serve his sentence and receives earned credits . . . , whereas a parolee is not serving his sentence and, if parole is revoked, the parolee is not entitled to deduct from his sen- tence time spent on parole." Reply Brief for Petitioners 11. Our review of the statute in effect when respondent was re- leased, however, reveals that a parolee was "entitled to a deduction from his sentence for all time during which he has been or may be on parole" and that, even when parole was revoked, the Board had the discretion to credit time spent on parole against the sentence. Okla. Stat., Tit. 57, § 350 (Supp. 1990). Petitioners next argue that preparolees, unlike parolees, remained within the custody of the Department of Correc- tions. This is said to be evidenced by respondent's having 520US1 Unit: $U36 [09-10-99 15:36:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN 150 YOUNG v. HARPER Opinion of the Court had to report to his parole officer weekly and to provide the officer with a weekly itinerary. Reply Brief for Petitioners 13. We are at a loss to explain why respondent's regular visits to his parole officer rendered him more "in custody" than a parolee, who was required to make similar visits. See App. to Brief for Respondent 28a. Likewise, the provi- sion that preparolees "be subject to disciplinary proceedings as established by the Department of Corrections" in the event that they "violate any rule or condition during the pe- riod of community supervision," Okla. Stat., Tit. 57, § 365(E) (Supp. 1990), did not distinguish their "custodial" status from that of parolees, who were also subject to the department's custody in the event of a parole violation. See Reply Brief for Petitioners 13. Petitioners, for their final nonexistent distinction, argue that, because a preparolee "is aware that he may be trans- ferred to a higher security level if the Governor, through his discretionary power, denies parole," he does not enjoy the same liberty interest as a parolee. Brief for Petitioners 20. Preparole, contend petitioners, was thus akin to a furlough program, in which liberty was not conditioned on the partici- pant's behavior but on extrinsic events. By this reasoning, respondent would have lacked the "implicit promise" that his liberty would continue so long as he complied with the condi- tions of his release, Morrissey, 408 U. S., at 482. Respond- ent concedes the reasoning of petitioners' argument as it relates to furloughs, but challenges the premise that his par- ticipation in the Program was conditioned on the Governor's decision regarding parole. In support of their assertion that a preparolee knew that a denial of parole could result in reincarceration, petitioners rely-as they have throughout this litigation-on a proce- dure promulgated in August 1991, nearly five months after respondent was returned to prison. See Pardon and Parole Board Procedure No. 004­011 (1991), App. to Pet. for Cert. 520US1 Unit: $U36 [09-10-99 15:36:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 143 (1997) 151 Opinion of the Court 56a.2 The Court of Criminal Appeals also relied on this pro- vision, but because it was not in effect when respondent was released, it has little relevance to this case. Nor have we been presented with any other evidence to substantiate this asserted limitation on respondent's release. The closest petitioners come is to direct us to the orientation form reviewed with respondent upon his release. Item 9 of that orientation form says: "Reviewed options available in the event of parole denial." App. 5. Mindful of Procedure No. 004­011, as amended after respondent was reincarcer- ated, it is possible to read this item as indicating that re- spondent was told his participation in the Program could be terminated if parole were denied. But the mere possibility of respondent's having been so informed is insufficient to overcome his showing of the facially complete, written "Rules and Conditions of Pre-Parole Conditional Super- vision," App. 7­9, which said nothing about the effect of a parole denial. Counsel for the State also claims that at the time respond- ent was participating in the Program, preparolees were al- ways reincarcerated if the Governor denied them parole. Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. In the absence of evidence to this ef- fect-and the State points to none-this assertion is insuffi- cient to rebut the seemingly complete rules and conditions of respondent's release. On the record before us, therefore, the premise of petitioners' argument-that respondent's con- tinued participation was conditioned on extrinsic events-is illusory, and the analogy to furlough inapposite.3 2 The version of Procedure No. 004­011 in effect when respondent was placed on the Program was silent as to a parole denial's effect. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 43a­52a. The procedure was amended again in 1994, and now provides that "[i]nmates denied parole by the Governor while on [preparole] will remain on the program, unless returned to higher security by due process." App. to Brief for Respondent 38a. 3 Equally illusory is the argument, which petitioners made for the first time in this Court, that the Board had authority to reimprison a prepa- rolee for any reason or for no reason. The written rules and conditions 520US1 Unit: $U36 [09-10-99 15:36:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN 152 YOUNG v. HARPER Opinion of the Court Petitioners do identify some actual differences between preparole and Oklahoma's version of parole, but these do no better at convincing us that preparole was different from parole as we understood it in Morrissey. As petitioners point out, participation in the Program was ordered by the Board, while the Governor conferred parole. In this regard, preparole was different from parole in Oklahoma; but it was no different from parole as we described it in Morrissey. See 408 U. S., at 477­478. In addition, preparolees who "es- cape[d]" from the Program could be prosecuted as though they had escaped from prison, see Okla. Stat., Tit. 57, § 365(F) (Supp. 1990), while it appears that parolees who "es- caped" from parole were subject not to further prosecution, but to revocation of parole, see Reply Brief for Petitioners 11. That the punishment for failure to abide by one of the conditions of his liberty was potentially greater for a prepa- rolee than for a parolee did not itself diminish that liberty. Petitioners also note that a preparolee could not leave Okla- homa under any circumstances, App. 7, while a parolee could leave Oklahoma with his parole officer's permission, App. to Brief for Respondent 27a. This minor difference in a re- leased prisoner's ability to travel did not, we think, alter the fundamentally parole-like nature of the Program.4 III We conclude that the Program, as it existed when respond- ent was released, was a kind of parole as we understood pa- of respondent's release identify no such absolute discretion, and petitioners point to nothing to support their contention. 4 A comparison of the conditions of preparole of which respondent was informed, App. 7­9, and those of which a roughly contemporary parolee would have been informed, App. to Brief for Respondent 27a­30a, reveals that-except for the travel and "escape" provisions-the two sets of condi- tions were essentially identical. 520US1 Unit: $U36 [09-10-99 15:36:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 143 (1997) 153 Opinion of the Court role in Morrissey.5 The judgment of the Tenth Circuit is therefore affirmed. It is so ordered. 5 The Program appears to be different now. We have no occasion to pass on whether the State's amendments to the Program, adopted since respondent was reincarcerated, render the liberty interest of a present- day preparolee different in kind from that of a parolee. 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 154 OCTOBER TERM, 1996 Syllabus BENNETT et al. v. SPEAR et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 95­813. Argued November 13, 1996-Decided March 19, 1997 The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) requires the Secretary of the Interior to specify animal species that are "threatened" or "endangered" and designate their "critical habitat," 16 U. S. C. § 1533, and requires federal agencies to ensure that any action they authorize, fund, or carry out is not likely to jeopardize a listed species or adversely modify its critical habitat, § 1536(a)(2). If an agency determines that a proposed action may adversely affect such a species, it must formally consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service, which must provide it with a written statement (the Biological Opinion) explaining how the proposed action will affect the species or its habitat. § 1536(b)(3)(A). If the Service concludes that such action will result in jeopardy or adverse habitat modification, § 1536(a)(2), the Biological Opinion must outline any "rea- sonable and prudent alternatives" that the Service believes will avoid that consequence, § 1536(b)(3)(A). If the Biological Opinion concludes that no jeopardy or adverse habitat modification will result, or if it offers reasonable and prudent alternatives, the Service must issue a written statement (known as the Incidental Take Statement) specifying the terms and conditions under which an agency may take the species. § 1536(b)(4). After the Bureau of Reclamation notified the Service that the operation of the Klamath Irrigation Project might affect two endan- gered species of fish, the Service issued a Biological Opinion, concluding that the proposed long-term operation of the project was likely to jeop- ardize the species and identifying as a reasonable and prudent alterna- tive the maintenance of minimum water levels on certain reservoirs. The Bureau notified the Service that it would operate the project in compliance with the Biological Opinion. Petitioners, irrigation districts receiving project water and operators of ranches in those districts, filed this action against respondents, the Service's director and regional di- rectors and the Secretary, claiming that the jeopardy determination and imposition of minimum water levels violated § 1536, and constituted an implicit critical habitat determination for the species in violation of § 1533(b)(2)'s requirement that the designation's economic impact be con- sidered. They also claimed that the actions violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which prohibits agency actions that are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 154 (1997) 155 Syllabus law. 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A). The District Court dismissed the com- plaint, concluding that petitioners lacked standing because they asserted "recreational, aesthetic, and commercial interests" that did not fall within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the ESA. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the "zone of interests" test- which requires that a plaintiff's grievance arguably fall within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the statutory provision or consti- tutional guarantee invoked in the suit-limits the class of persons who may obtain judicial review not only under the APA, but also under the ESA's citizen-suit provision, 16 U. S. C. § 1540(g); and that only plaintiffs alleging an interest in the preservation of endangered species fall within the zone of interests protected by the ESA. Held: Petitioners have standing to seek judicial review of the Biological Opinion. Pp. 161­179. (a) The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that petitioners lacked standing under the zone-of-interests test to bring their claims under the ESA's citizen-suit provision. The test is a prudential standing require- ment of general application, see, e. g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751, that applies unless expressly negated by Congress. By providing that "any person may commence a civil suit," § 1540(g)(1) negates the test. The quoted phrase is an authorization of remarkable breadth when compared with the language Congress ordinarily uses. The Court's readiness to take the term "any person" at face value is greatly aug- mented by the interrelated considerations that the legislation's overall subject matter is the environment and that § 1540(g)'s obvious purpose is to encourage enforcement by so-called "private attorneys general." See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U. S. 205, 210­211. The "any person" formulation applies to all § 1540(g) causes of action, including actions against the Secretary asserting overenforcement of § 1533; there is no textual basis for saying that the formulation's expansion of standing requirements applies to environmentalists alone. Pp. 161­166. (b) Three alternative grounds advanced by the Government-(1) that petitioners fail to meet Article III standing requirements; (2) that § 1540(g) does not authorize judicial review of the types of claims peti- tioners advanced; and (3) that judicial review is unavailable under the APA-do not support affirmance. Petitioners' complaint alleges an in- jury in fact that is fairly traceable to the Biological Opinion and redress- able by a favorable judicial ruling and, thus, meets Article III standing requirements at this stage of the litigation. Their § 1533 claim is clearly reviewable under § 1540(g)(1)(C), which authorizes suit against the Sec- retary for an alleged failure to perform any nondiscretionary act or duty 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 156 BENNETT v. SPEAR Syllabus under § 1533. Their § 1536 claims are obviously not reviewable under subsection (C), however. Nor are they reviewable under subsection (A), which authorizes injunctive actions against any person "who is al- leged to be in violation" of the ESA or its regulations. Viewed in the context of the entire statute, subsection (A)'s reference to any ESA "violation" cannot be interpreted to include the Secretary's maladminis- tration of the Act. The § 1536 claims are nonetheless reviewable under the APA. The ESA does not preclude such review, and the claim that petitioners will suffer economic harm because of an erroneous jeopardy determination is plainly within the zone of interests protected by § 1536, the statutory provision whose violation forms the basis for the com- plaint, see Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U. S. 871. In addition, the Biological Opinion constitutes final agency action for APA purposes. It marks the consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process, Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103, 113. It is also an action from which "legal consequences will flow," Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assn. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U. S. 62, 71, because the Biological Opinion and ac- companying Incidental Take Statement alter the legal regime to which the Bureau is subject, authorizing it to take the endangered species if (but only if) it complies with the prescribed conditions. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U. S. 788, and Dalton v. Specter, 511 U. S. 462, distin- guished. Pp. 166­179. 63 F. 3d 915, reversed and remanded. Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Gregory K. Wilkinson argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was William F. Schroeder. Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Malcolm L. Stewart, Anne S. Almy, Robert L. Klarquist, and Evelyn S. Ying.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Cali- fornia et al. by Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, Rod- erick E. Walston, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles W. Getz IV, Assistant Attorney General, and Linus Masouredis, Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Grant Woods of Arizona, Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Gale A. Norton of Colorado, Margery S. Bronster of 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 154 (1997) 157 Opinion of the Court Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a challenge to a biological opinion issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service in accordance with the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 87 Stat. 884, as amended, 16 U. S. C. § 1531 et seq., concerning the operation of the Kla- math Irrigation Project by the Bureau of Reclamation, and the project's impact on two varieties of endangered fish. The question for decision is whether the petitioners, who have competing economic and other interests in Klamath Project water, have standing to seek judicial review of the biological opinion under the citizen-suit provision of the ESA, § 1540(g)(1), and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 80 Stat. 392, as amended, 5 U. S. C. § 701 et seq. I The ESA requires the Secretary of the Interior to promul- gate regulations listing those species of animals that are "threatened" or "endangered" under specified criteria, and Hawaii, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Jeremiah W. Nixon of Missouri, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Ne- braska, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, Jan Graham of Utah, and Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia; for the State of Texas by Dan Morales, Attorney General, Jorge Vega, First Assistant Attorney General, and Ja- vier P. Guajardo and Sam Goodhope, Special Assistant Attorneys Gen- eral; for the American Farm Bureau Federation et al. by Timothy S. Bishop, Michael F. Rosenblum, John J. Rademacher, Richard L. Krause, and Nancy N. McDonough; for the American Forest & Paper Association et al. by Steven P. Quarles, Clifton S. Elgarten, Thomas R. Lundquist, and William R. Murray; for the American Homeowners Foundation et al. by Nancie G. Marzulla; for the Association of California Water Agencies et al. by Thomas W. Birmingham, Clifford W. Schulz, Janet K. Goldsmith, and William T. Chisum; for the National Association of Home Builders of the United States et al. by Glen Franklin Koontz, Thomas C. Jackson, and Nick Cammarota; for the Nationwide Public Projects Coalition et al. by Lawrence R. Liebesman and Kenneth S. Kamlet; for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. by Robin L. Rivett and M. Reed Hopper; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo, Paul D. Kamenar, and Craig S. Harrison. 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 158 BENNETT v. SPEAR Opinion of the Court to designate their "critical habitat." 16 U. S. C. § 1533. The ESA further requires each federal agency to "insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary . . . to be criti- cal." § 1536(a)(2). If an agency determines that action it proposes to take may adversely affect a listed species, it must engage in formal consultation with the Fish and Wild- life Service, as delegate of the Secretary, ibid.; 50 CFR § 402.14 (1995), after which the Service must provide the agency with a written statement (the Biological Opinion) ex- plaining how the proposed action will affect the species or its habitat, 16 U. S. C. § 1536(b)(3)(A). If the Service con- cludes that the proposed action will "jeopardize the contin- ued existence of any [listed] species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of [critical habitat]," § 1536(a)(2), the Biological Opinion must outline any "reasonable and prudent alternatives" that the Service believes will avoid that consequence, § 1536(b)(3)(A). Addi- tionally, if the Biological Opinion concludes that the agency action will not result in jeopardy or adverse habitat modifi- cation, or if it offers reasonable and prudent alternatives to avoid that consequence, the Service must provide the agency with a written statement (known as the Incidental Take Statement) specifying the "impact of such incidental taking on the species," any "reasonable and prudent measures that the [Service] considers necessary or appropriate to minimize such impact," and setting forth "the terms and conditions . . . that must be complied with by the Federal agency . . . to implement [those measures]." § 1536(b)(4). The Klamath Project, one of the oldest federal reclamation schemes, is a series of lakes, rivers, dams, and irrigation canals in northern California and southern Oregon. The project was undertaken by the Secretary of the Interior 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 154 (1997) 159 Opinion of the Court pursuant to the Reclamation Act of 1902, 32 Stat. 388, as amended, 43 U. S. C. § 371 et seq., and the Act of Feb. 9, 1905, 33 Stat. 714, and is administered by the Bureau of Reclama- tion, which is under the Secretary's jurisdiction. In 1992, the Bureau notified the Service that operation of the project might affect the Lost River Sucker (Deltistes luxatus) and Shortnose Sucker (Chasmistes brevirostris), species of fish that were listed as endangered in 1988, see 53 Fed. Reg. 27130­27133 (1988). After formal consultation with the Bu- reau in accordance with 50 CFR § 402.14 (1995), the Service issued a Biological Opinion which concluded that the " `long- term operation of the Klamath Project was likely to jeopar- dize the continued existence of the Lost River and shortnose suckers.' " App. to Pet. for Cert. 3. The Biological Opinion identified "reasonable and prudent alternatives" the Service believed would avoid jeopardy, which included the mainte- nance of minimum water levels on Clear Lake and Gerber reservoirs. The Bureau later notified the Service that it intended to operate the project in compliance with the Bio- logical Opinion. Petitioners, two Oregon irrigation districts that receive Klamath Project water and the operators of two ranches within those districts, filed the present action against the director and regional director of the Service and the Secre- tary of the Interior. Neither the Bureau nor any of its offi- cials is named as defendant. The complaint asserts that the Bureau "has been following essentially the same procedures for storing and releasing water from Clear Lake and Gerber reservoirs throughout the twentieth century," id., at 36; that "[t]here is no scientifically or commercially available evidence indicating that the populations of endangered suckers in Clear Lake and Gerber reservoirs have declined, are declin- ing, or will decline as a result" of the Bureau's operation of the Klamath Project, id., at 37; that "[t]here is no commer- cially or scientifically available evidence indicating that the restrictions on lake levels imposed in the Biological Opinion 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 160 BENNETT v. SPEAR Opinion of the Court will have any beneficial effect on the . . . populations of suck- ers in Clear Lake and Gerber reservoirs," id., at 39; and that the Bureau nonetheless "will abide by the restrictions im- posed by the Biological Opinion," id., at 32. Petitioners' complaint included three claims for relief that are relevant here. The first and second claims allege that the Service's jeopardy determination with respect to Clear Lake and Gerber reservoirs, and the ensuing imposition of minimum water levels, violated § 7 of the ESA, 16 U. S. C. § 1536. The third claim is that the imposition of minimum water elevations constituted an implicit determination of critical habitat for the suckers, which violated § 4 of the ESA, 16 U. S. C. § 1533(b)(2), because it failed to take into consideration the designation's economic impact.1 Each of the claims also states that the relevant action violated the APA's prohibition of agency action that is "arbitrary, capri- cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A). The complaint asserts that petitioners' use of the reser- voirs and related waterways for "recreational, aesthetic and commercial purposes, as well as for their primary sources of irrigation water," will be "irreparably damaged" by the ac- tions complained of, App. to Pet. for Cert. 34, and that the restrictions on water delivery "recommended" by the Biolog- ical Opinion "adversely affect plaintiffs by substantially re- ducing the quantity of available irrigation water," id., at 40. In essence, petitioners claim a competing interest in the water the Biological Opinion declares necessary for the pres- ervation of the suckers. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. It concluded that petitioners did not have 1 Petitioners also raised a fourth claim: that the de facto designation of critical habitat violated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 853, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 4332(2)(C), because it was not preceded by preparation of an environmental assessment. The Court of Appeals' dismissal of that claim has not been challenged. 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 154 (1997) 161 Opinion of the Court standing because their "recreational, aesthetic, and commer- cial interests . . . do not fall within the zone of interests sought to be protected by ESA." Id., at 28. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F. 3d 915 (1995). It held that the "zone of interests" test limits the class of persons who may obtain judicial review not only under the APA, but also under the citizen-suit provi- sion of the ESA, 16 U. S. C. § 1540(g), and that "only plaintiffs who allege an interest in the preservation of endangered species fall within the zone of interests protected by the ESA," 63 F. 3d, at 919 (emphasis in original). We granted certiorari. 517 U. S. 1102 (1996). In this Court, petitioners raise two questions: first, whether the prudential standing rule known as the "zone of interests" test applies to claims brought under the citizen- suit provision of the ESA; and second, if so, whether petition- ers have standing under that test notwithstanding that the interests they seek to vindicate are economic rather than environmental. In this Court, the Government has made no effort to defend the reasoning of the Court of Appeals. In- stead, it advances three alternative grounds for affirmance: (1) that petitioners fail to meet the standing requirements imposed by Article III of the Constitution; (2) that the ESA's citizen-suit provision does not authorize judicial review of the types of claims advanced by petitioners; and (3) that judi- cial review is unavailable under the APA because the Biolog- ical Opinion does not constitute final agency action. II We first turn to the question the Court of Appeals found dispositive: whether petitioners lack standing by virtue of the zone-of-interests test. Although petitioners contend that their claims lie both under the ESA and the APA, we look first at the ESA because it may permit petitioners to recover their litigation costs, see 16 U. S. C. § 1540(g)(4), and because the APA by its terms independently authorizes re- 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 162 BENNETT v. SPEAR Opinion of the Court view only when "there is no other adequate remedy in a court," 5 U. S. C. § 704. The question of standing "involves both constitutional lim- itations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limita- tions on its exercise." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975) (citing Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953)). To satisfy the "case" or "controversy" requirement of Article III, which is the "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing, a plaintiff must, generally speaking, demonstrate that he has suffered "injury in fact," that the injury is "fairly traceable" to the actions of the defendant, and that the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560­561 (1992); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separa- tion of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 471­472 (1982). In addition to the immutable requirements of Article III, "the federal judiciary has also adhered to a set of prudential principles that bear on the question of standing." Id., at 474­475. Like their constitutional counterparts, these "ju- dicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdic- tion," Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751 (1984), are "founded in concern about the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society," Warth, supra, at 498; but unlike their constitutional counterparts, they can be modified or abrogated by Congress, see 422 U. S., at 501. Numbered among these prudential requirements is the doctrine of par- ticular concern in this case: that a plaintiff's grievance must arguably fall within the zone of interests protected or regu- lated by the statutory provision or constitutional guarantee invoked in the suit. See Allen, supra, at 751; Valley Forge, supra, at 474­475. The "zone of interests" formulation was first employed in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150 (1970). There, certain data proces- sors sought to invalidate a ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency authorizing national banks to sell data processing 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 154 (1997) 163 Opinion of the Court services on the ground that it violated, inter alia, § 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 1132, which prohibited bank service corporations from engaging in "any activity other than the performance of bank services for banks." The Court of Appeals had held that the banks' data-processing competitors were without standing to chal- lenge the alleged violation of § 4. In reversing, we stated the applicable prudential standing requirement to be "whether the interest sought to be protected by the com- plainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be pro- tected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guar- antee in question." Data Processing, supra, at 153. Data Processing, and its companion case, Barlow v. Collins, 397 U. S. 159 (1970), applied the zone-of-interests test to suits under the APA, but later cases have applied it also in suits not involving review of federal administrative action, see Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U. S. 439, 449 (1991); Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U. S. 318, 320­321, n. 3 (1977); see also Note, A Defense of the "Zone of Interests" Standing Test, 1983 Duke L. J. 447, 455­456, and nn. 40­49 (1983) (cataloging lower court decisions), and have specifi- cally listed it among other prudential standing requirements of general application, see, e. g., Allen, supra, at 751; Valley Forge, supra, at 474­475. We have made clear, however, that the breadth of the zone of interests varies according to the provisions of law at issue, so that what comes within the zone of interests of a statute for purposes of obtaining judicial review of administrative action under the " `generous review provisions' " of the APA may not do so for other pur- poses, Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U. S. 388, 400, n. 16 (1987) (quoting Data Processing, supra, at 156). Congress legislates against the background of our pruden- tial standing doctrine, which applies unless it is expressly negated. See Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S. 340, 345­348 (1984). Cf. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U. S. 519, 532­533, and n. 28 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 164 BENNETT v. SPEAR Opinion of the Court (1983). The first question in the present case is whether the ESA's citizen-suit provision, set forth in pertinent part in the margin,2 negates the zone-of-interests test (or, perhaps more accurately, expands the zone of interests). We think it does. The first operative portion of the provision says that "any person may commence a civil suit"-an authorization of re- markable breadth when compared with the language Con- 2 "(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf- "(A) to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency (to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution), who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter or regulation issued under the authority thereof; or . . . . . "(C) against the Secretary where there is alleged a failure of the Secre- tary to perform any act or duty under section 1533 of this title which is not discretionary with the Secretary. "The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce any such provi- sion or regulation, or to order the Secretary to perform such act or duty, as the case may be. . . . "(2)(A) No action may be commenced under subparagraph (1)(A) of this section- "(i) prior to sixty days after written notice of the violation has been given to the Secretary, and to any alleged violator of any such provision or regulation; "(ii) if the Secretary has commenced action to impose a penalty pursu- ant to subsection (a) of this section; or "(iii) if the United States has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a criminal action . . . to redress a violation of any such provision or regulation. . . . . . "(3)(B) In any such suit under this subsection in which the United States is not a party, the Attorney General, at the request of the Secre- tary, may intervene on behalf of the United States as a matter of right. "(4) The court, in issuing any final order in any suit brought pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate." 16 U. S. C. § 1540(g). 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 154 (1997) 165 Opinion of the Court gress ordinarily uses. Even in some other environmental statutes, Congress has used more restrictive formulations, such as "[any person] having an interest which is or may be adversely affected," 33 U. S. C. § 1365(g) (Clean Water Act); see also 30 U. S. C. § 1270(a) (Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act) (same); "[a]ny person suffering legal wrong," 15 U. S. C. § 797(b)(5) (Energy Supply and Environ- mental Coordination Act); or "any person having a valid legal interest which is or may be adversely affected . . . whenever such action constitutes a case or controversy," 42 U. S. C. § 9124(a) (Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act). And in contexts other than the environment, Congress has often been even more restrictive. In statutes concerning unfair trade practices and other commercial matters, for example, it has authorized suit only by "[a]ny person injured in his business or property," 7 U. S. C. § 2305(c); see also 15 U. S. C. § 72 (same), or only by "competitors, customers, or subse- quent purchasers," § 298(b). Our readiness to take the term "any person" at face value is greatly augmented by two interrelated considerations: that the overall subject matter of this legislation is the envi- ronment (a matter in which it is common to think all persons have an interest) and that the obvious purpose of the par- ticular provision in question is to encourage enforcement by so-called "private attorneys general"-evidenced by its elim- ination of the usual amount-in-controversy and diversity-of- citizenship requirements, its provision for recovery of the costs of litigation (including even expert witness fees), and its reservation to the Government of a right of first refusal to pursue the action initially and a right to intervene later. Given these factors, we think the conclusion of expanded standing follows a fortiori from our decision in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U. S. 205 (1972), which held that standing was expanded to the full extent permitted under Article III by § 810(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 85, 42 U. S. C. § 3610(a) (1986 ed.), that authorized 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 166 BENNETT v. SPEAR Opinion of the Court "[a]ny person who claims to have been injured by a discrimi- natory housing practice" to sue for violations of the Act. There also we relied on textual evidence of a statutory scheme to rely on private litigation to ensure compliance with the Act. See 409 U. S., at 210­211. The statutory lan- guage here is even clearer, and the subject of the legislation makes the intent to permit enforcement by everyman even more plausible. It is true that the plaintiffs here are seeking to prevent application of environmental restrictions rather than to im- plement them. But the "any person" formulation applies to all the causes of action authorized by § 1540(g)-not only to actions against private violators of environmental restric- tions, and not only to actions against the Secretary asserting underenforcment under § 1533, but also to actions against the Secretary asserting overenforcement under § 1533. As we shall discuss below, the citizen-suit provision does favor envi- ronmentalists in that it covers all private violations of the ESA but not all failures of the Secretary to meet his admin- istrative responsibilities; but there is no textual basis for saying that its expansion of standing requirements applies to environmentalists alone. The Court of Appeals therefore erred in concluding that petitioners lacked standing under the zone-of-interests test to bring their claims under the ESA's citizen-suit provision. III The Government advances several alternative grounds upon which it contends we may affirm the dismissal of peti- tioners' suit. Because the District Court and the Court of Appeals found the zone-of-interests ground to be dispositive, these alternative grounds were not reached below. A re- spondent is entitled, however, to defend the judgment on any ground supported by the record, see Ponte v. Real, 471 U. S. 491, 500 (1985); Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 516 U. S. 367, 379, n. 5 (1996). The asserted grounds were 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 154 (1997) 167 Opinion of the Court raised below, and have been fully briefed and argued here; we deem it an appropriate exercise of our discretion to con- sider them now rather than leave them for disposition on remand. A The Government's first contention is that petitioners' com- plaint fails to satisfy the standing requirements imposed by the "case" or "controversy" provision of Article III. This "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing requires: (1) that the plaintiff have suffered an "injury in fact"-an invasion of a judicially cognizable interest which is (a) con- crete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not con- jectural or hypothetical; (2) that there be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of-the in- jury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court; and (3) that it be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Defenders of Wild- life, 504 U. S., at 560­561. Petitioners allege, among other things, that they currently receive irrigation water from Clear Lake, that the Bureau "will abide by the restrictions imposed by the Biological Opinion," App. to Pet. for Cert. 32, and that "[t]he restric- tions on lake levels imposed in the Biological Opinion ad- versely affect [petitioners] by substantially reducing the quantity of available irrigation water," id., at 40. The Gov- ernment contends, first, that these allegations fail to satisfy the "injury in fact" element of Article III standing because they demonstrate only a diminution in the aggregate amount of available water, and do not necessarily establish (absent information concerning the Bureau's water allocation prac- tices) that petitioners will receive less water. This conten- tion overlooks, however, the proposition that each element of Article III standing "must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 168 BENNETT v. SPEAR Opinion of the Court of proof, i. e., with the manner and degree of evidence re- quired at the successive stages of the litigation." Defenders of Wildlife, supra, at 561. Thus, while a plaintiff must "set forth" by affidavit or other evidence "specific facts" to sur- vive a motion for summary judgment, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e), and must ultimately support any contested facts with evidence adduced at trial, "[a]t the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we `presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.' " Defenders of Wild- life, supra, at 561 (quoting Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed- eration, 497 U. S. 871, 889 (1990)). Given petitioners' allega- tion that the amount of available water will be reduced and that they will be adversely affected thereby, it is easy to presume specific facts under which petitioners will be in- jured-for example, the Bureau's distribution of the reduc- tion pro rata among its customers. The complaint alleges the requisite injury in fact. The Government also contests compliance with the second and third Article III standing requirements, contending that any injury suffered by petitioners is neither "fairly trace- able" to the Service's Biological Opinion, nor "redressable" by a favorable judicial ruling, because the "action agency" (the Bureau) retains ultimate responsibility for determining whether and how a proposed action shall go forward. See 50 CFR § 402.15(a) (1995) ("Following the issuance of a bio- logical opinion, the Federal agency shall determine whether and in what manner to proceed with the action in light of its section 7 obligations and the Service's biological opinion"). "If petitioners have suffered injury," the Government con- tends, "the proximate cause of their harm is an (as yet un- identified) decision by the Bureau regarding the volume of water allocated to petitioners, not the biological opinion itself." Brief for Respondents 22. This wrongly equates injury "fairly traceable" to the defendant with injury as to 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 520 U. S. 154 (1997) 169 Opinion of the Court which the defendant's actions are the very last step in the chain of causation. While, as we have said, it does not suf- fice if the injury complained of is " `th[e] result [of] the inde- pendent action of some third party not before the court,' " Defenders of Wildlife, supra, at 560­561 (emphasis added) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 41­42 (1976)), that does not exclude injury produced by determinative or coercive effect upon the action of someone else. By the Government's own account, while the Service's Bio- logical Opinion theoretically serves an "advisory function," 51 Fed. Reg. 19928 (1986), in reality it has a powerful coer- cive effect on the action agency: "The statutory scheme . . . presupposes that the biologi- cal opinion will play a central role in the action agency's decisionmaking process, and that it will typically be based on an administrative record that is fully adequate for the action agency's decision insofar as ESA issues are concerned. . . . [A] federal agency that chooses to deviate from the recommendations contained in a biolog- ical opinion bears the burden of `articulat[ing] in its ad- ministrative record its reasons for disagreeing with the conclusions of a biological opinion.' 51 Fed. Reg. 19,956 (1986). In the government's experience, action agencies very rarely choose to engage in conduct that the Service has concluded is likely to jeopardize the continued exist- ence of a listed species." Brief for Respondents 20­21. What this concession omits to say, moreover, is that the ac- tion agency must not only articulate its reasons for disagree- ment (which ordinarily requires species and habitat investi- gations that are not within the action agency's expertise), but that it runs a substantial risk if its (inexpert) reasons turn out to be wrong. A Biological Opinion of the sort ren- dered here alters the legal regime to which the action agency is subject. When it "offers reasonable and prudent alterna- 520US1 Unit: $U37 [09-10-99 16:19:30] PAGES PGT: OPIN 170 BENNETT v. SPEAR Opinion of the Court tives" to the proposed action, a Biological Opinion must in- clude a so-called "Incidental Take Statement"-a written statement specifying, among other things, those "measures that the [Service] considers necessary or appropriate to mini- mize [the action's impact on the affected species]" and the "terms and conditions . . . that must be complied with by the Federal agency . . . to implement [such] measures." 16 U. S. C. § 1536(b)(4). Any taking that is in compliance with these terms and conditions "shall not be considered to be a prohibited taking of the species concerned." § 1536(o)(2). Thus, the Biological Opinion's Incidental Take Statement constitutes a permit authorizing the action agency to "take" the endangered or threatened species so long as it respects the Service's "terms and conditions." The action agency is technically free to disregard the Biological Opinion and pro- ceed with its proposed action, but it does so at its own peril (and that of its employees), for "any person" who knowingly "takes" an endangered or threatened species is subject to substantial civil and criminal penalties, including imprison- ment. See §§ 1540(a) and (b) (authorizing civil fines of up to $25,000 per violation and criminal penalties of up to $50,000 and imprisonment for one year); see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore., 515 U. S. 687, 708 (1995) (upholding interpretation of the term "take" to include significant habitat degradation). The Service itself is, to put it mildly, keenly aware of the virtually determinative effect of its biological opinions. The Incidental Take Statement at issue in the present case be- gins by instructing the reader that any taking of a listed species is prohibited unless "such taking is in compliance with this incidental take statement," and warning that "[t]he measures described below are nondiscretionary, and must be taken by [the Bureau]." App. 92­93. Given all of this, and given petitioners' allegation that the Bureau had, until issu- ance of the Biological Opinion, operated the Klamath Proje