517BV$spin 12-29-98 08:22:00 UNITED STATES REPORTS 517 OCT. TERM 1995 In Memoriam CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN E. BURGER 517bv$titl 01-05-99 12:09:35 UNITED STATES REPORTS VOLUME 517 CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT AT OCTOBER TERM, 1995 Opinions of March 20 Through (in part) June 13, 1996 Orders of March 20 Through June 13, 1996 Together With Opinion of Individual Justice in Chambers FRANK D. WAGNER reporter of decisions WASHINGTON : 1999 Printed on Uncoated Permanent Printing Paper For sale by the U. S. Government Printing Office Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328 517BV$$iii 01-05-99 12:12:51 PGT * frtbx n J USTICES of the SU PREM E COU RT during the time of these reports WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, Chief Justice. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, Associate Justice. SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, Associate Justice. ANTONIN SCALIA, Associate Justice. ANTHONY M. KENNEDY, Associate Justice. DAVID H. SOUTER, Associate Justice. CLARENCE THOMAS, Associate Justice. RUTH BADER GINSBURG, Associate Justice. STEPHEN BREYER, Associate Justice. retired LEWIS F. POWELL, Jr., Associate Justice. WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, Jr., Associate Justice. BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice. HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Associate Justice. officers of the court JANET RENO, Attorney General. DREW S. DAYS III, Solicitor General. WILLIAM K. SUTER, Clerk. FRANK D. WAGNER, Reporter of Decisions. DALE E. BOSLEY, Marshal. SHELLEY L. DOWLING, Librarian. iii 517BV$$$iv 01-05-99 12:12:59 PGT * frtbx n SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Allotment of Justices It is ordered that the following allotment be made of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of this Court among the circuits, pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 42, and that such allotment be entered of record, effective September 30, 1994, viz.: For the District of Columbia Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice. For the First Circuit, David H. Souter, Associate Justice. For the Second Circuit, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate Justice. For the Third Circuit, David H. Souter, Associate Justice. For the Fourth Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice. For the Fifth Circuit, Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice. For the Sixth Circuit, John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice. For the Seventh Circuit, John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice. For the Eighth Circuit, Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice. For the Ninth Circuit, Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice. For the Tenth Circuit, Stephen Breyer, Associate Justice. For the Eleventh Circuit, Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice. For the Federal Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice. September 30, 1994. (For next previous allotment, and modifications, see 502 U. S., p. vi, 509 U. S., p. v, and 512 U. S., p. v.) iv 517bv$$$$v 01-28-99 08:37:53 PGT * frtbx n PROCEEDINGS IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES IN MEMORY OF CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER* TUESDAY, APRIL 30, 1996 Present: Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter, Justice Thomas, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer. The Chief Justice said: The Court is in special session this afternoon to receive the Resolutions of the Bar of the Supreme Court in tribute to our late colleague and friend, Chief Justice Warren Earl Burger. The Court recognizes the Solicitor General. Mr. Solicitor General addressed the Court as follows: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: At a meeting of the members of the Bar of the Supreme Court this afternoon, resolutions memorializing our regard for the Honorable Warren E. Burger and expressing our pro- found sorrow at his death were unanimously adopted. With the Court's leave, and following recent precedent, I shall read selectively from the resolutions at this time and shall *Chief Justice Burger, who retired from the Court effective September 26, 1986 (478 U. S. vii), died in Washington, D. C., on June 25, 1995 (515 U. S. iii). v 517bv$$$$v 01-28-99 08:37:53 PGT * frtbx n vi CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER ask that they be set forth in their entirety in the records of the Court. RESOLUTION Warren Earl Burger served the Court and the country as Chief Justice of the United States from 1969 until his retire- ment in 1986. Lawyer, administrator, and jurist, Warren Burger embodied the finest traditions of American law in a career that spanned 65 years. Chief Justice Burger was very much a product of this Nation, a practical man with a passion for freedom and an understanding of the responsibilities that freedom entails. As a judge, he understood that the exercise of liberty must be guided by our traditions constrained by the rule of law. As an administrator, he sought tirelessly to improve the ways in which the legal system works for the people it is supposed to serve. Above all, as a lawyer, he knew the im- portance of tempering abstract legal doctrine with common sense. The resolution describes Burger's birth and early life in Minnesota, how he worked his way through college and law school and quickly established himself as one of the preemi- nent lawyers in the State's private bar, his marriage to El- vera Stromberg, who would be his lifelong companion, and commitment to his family, and his increasing involvement in the affairs of his community. An incident of that time helps illustrate Burger's personal commitment to the principles that animate the Constitution. After Pearl Harbor, there was widespread support for the policy of forcibly relocating California's Japanese Americans. The young St. Paul lawyer's voice was one of the few to argue that these citizens' constitutional rights ought not be sacrificed to popular passion. He organized a committee of the Council on Human Rela- tions to help resettle some of them in Minnesota, and opened his home to one family for nearly a year while the father looked for work. Although Burger refused all requests that he run for pub- lic office, he became deeply involved in Minnesota political 517bv$$$$v 01-28-99 08:37:53 PGT * frtbx n CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER vii life. At the 1952 Republican National Convention, he was instrumental in swinging his State delegation to support Dwight D. Eisenhower, thereby assuring General Eisen- hower the party's nomination. Following the election, President Eisenhower called him to Washington to serve as an Assistant Attorney General of the United States in charge of the Civil Division. The resolution discusses his outstanding contributions at the helm of the Civil Division until his appointment, 3 years later, to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. At that time, the Federal courts of the District of Colum- bia had the widest jurisdiction of any courts in the United States, functioning as the equivalent of State courts for the District itself, as well as having the regular jurisdiction of other Federal courts. Judge Burger quickly found himself embroiled in impor- tant controversies regarding the criminal law that were sweeping both the legal profession and the Nation at the time. Burger's opinions, whether for the court or in dissent, grew to the view that solicitude for the rights of the defend- ant should be tempered by recognition of the need to enforce the law, yet he was reluctant to press to overrule prior deci- sions, preferring instead to curtail their reach while preserv- ing their essence. The resolution then describes aspects of Burger's tenure at the D. C. Circuit, which established him as a leader on his court and throughout the Nation. When Chief Justice Earl Warren retired, President Nixon turned to Warren E. Burger. With the unanimous endorse- ment of the Judiciary Committee, Burger was quickly con- firmed by the Senate. He was sworn in as Chief Justice of the United States on June 23, 1969. There were many who expected that as Chief Justice he would try to overturn the landmark criminal law decisions of the Warren Court, but neither those who hoped for this outcome, nor those who feared it, seemed to have considered 517bv$$$$v 01-28-99 08:37:53 PGT * frtbx n viii CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER that one of the hallmarks of this judge was respect for precedent. Chief Justice Burger cared too deeply for the great institu- tion that is the Supreme Court of the United States to be- lieve that its decisions, the articulation of our Nation's high- est law, could be tossed aside whenever there was a change of personnel on the bench. His approach to major criminal law precedents such as Miranda v. Arizona and Mapp v. Ohio was to leave such rulings intact, while defining their outer limits. Under his leadership, for instance, the Court held that an otherwise inadmissible statement could be used to impeach a defendant's credibility at trial. He joined in one opinion establishing a public safety exception to Miranda and, in another, deciding that a confession obtained in violation of Miranda did not taint a second valid confession obtained later. Similarly, the Court he led trimmed the exclusionary rule enshrined in Mapp by carving out good faith exceptions. Burger's conservatism was of that American strain which insists that the law protect the individual from the excesses of State power. He was to state clearly and repeatedly that he would never vote to overrule Miranda because to do so would be an invitation to lawlessness by law enforcement authorities. He concurred in decisions extending to misdemeanor cases the right of indigent defendants to counsel, and recognizing a defendant's right to a psychiatrist if necessary for his defense. Chief Justice Burger placed a premium on protecting individual liberties. His strong commitment to the First Amendment values of freedom of speech and the press can be seen in many of his opinions. In Wooley v. Maynard, for example, he authored the opin- ion holding that a State may not compel an individual to carry on his license plate a slogan offensive to his deeply held views. 517bv$$$$v 01-28-99 08:37:53 PGT * frtbx n CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER ix Yet Burger also recognized that our freedoms are not absolute, that there are limits beyond which we may not go without trampling on the rights of others. In Miller v. California, Chief Justice Burger crafted the definition of obscenity that we use today. Further, in declaring that it was up to local juries applying contemporary community standards to decide whether a par- ticular work fit the Court's formulation, he put to rest the idea that there was some uniform national community stand- ard in such matters. The resolution describes The Chief Justice's commitment to the freedom of conscience exemplified by his opinions for the Court interpreting the religion clauses in cases such as Lemon v. Kurtzman and Wisconsin v. Yoder. Turning to Burger's contributions to the area of civil rights, the resolution observes that, as district courts became involved in complicated questions of quotas, racial balance, redrawing of school district lines, busing and more, many doubted the propriety of the Court's involvement at all, and some believed that Chief Justice Burger was hostile to such efforts. He put disbelief to rest in Swann v. Charlotte- Mecklenburg Board of Education. Writing for a unanimous Court, The Chief Justice emphatically affirmed the vital role of the Federal courts in eliminating all vestiges of racial seg- regation from public school systems. In other civil rights cases, he led the Court in upholding congressional set-asides of a percentage of public works funds for minority businesses, invalidating State aid to ra- cially segregated private schools, and sustaining the Internal Revenue Service's denial of tax exemptions to private schools that practice racial discrimination. During Chief Justice Burger's tenure, the Court also adopted a progressive approach to the rights of women and members of other disadvantaged groups under the Equal Protection Clause. His own more significant opinions in- cluded Reed v. Reed, striking down a State statute giving 517bv$$$$v 01-28-99 08:37:53 PGT * frtbx n x CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER preference to men over women in estate administrations, and Hishon v. King and Spalding, applying Title VII's prohibi- tion of sex discrimination to law firm partnership decisions. He voted to end gender classifications on social security dependent benefits and jury selection, and to declare invalid State laws restricting aliens' access to public employment and welfare benefits. After discussing Burger's role in Roe v. Wade and its progeny, the resolution turns to The Chief Justice's extraor- dinary contributions to this Court's separation of powers jurisprudence. Warren Burger was intensely interested in American Government. He understood fully the concerns that had led the Framers to separate Government power among compet- ing and mutually restraining legislative, executive, and judi- cial branches. In a case that produced one of his most im- portant opinions, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the Court invalidated the device known as the one-House veto. History will surely view Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court in another separation of powers case as the most significant of his career, indeed as one of the most important opinions of any justice at any time. United States v. Nixon was to lead directly to the resignation of a President. The special prosecutor's indictment of certain defendants in the Watergate affair was being hampered by President Nixon's refusal to turn over tapes and other records of con- versations between him and others, including Government officials. The President, like several of his predecessors, claimed ex- ecutive privilege. The district court had ruled that the spe- cial prosecutor had rebutted the presumption of privilege and ordered an in camera examination of the subpoenaed material. The Chief Justice's opinion for the Court upheld the valid- ity of the district court's order. The President's generalized assertion of privilege could not prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law and the fair administration of 517bv$$$$v 01-28-99 08:37:53 PGT * frtbx n CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER xi criminal justice. It would have to yield to the demonstrated specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial. Chief Justice Burger's interest in American Government also served him well as the administrative leader of the third branch. Indeed, he took his title, Chief Justice of the United States, seriously. In his eyes, its mandate encompassed stewardship of the entire judicial system, State and Federal. His role in reforming the American judicial system was profound. He was an active leader of the Federal judiciary as Chairman of the Judicial Conference of the United States. He turned the Federal Judicial Center, of which he was Chairman of the Board by statute, into a respected source of research and writing about the courts, and a rich educational resource. He promoted the idea of circuit executives, offi- cials who now contribute so much to the efficient working of our courts. In addition to his many contributions toward beneficial change, Chief Justice Burger revered this Court's history and saw its building not just as a courtroom and chambers, but as an opportunity to educate the public. A guiding spirit of the Supreme Court Historical Society and creator of the position of Curator of the Supreme Court, Burger helped to fill empty spaces with exhibits and to rekindle discussion and debate about our constitutional heritage. The resolution finally recounts the qualities that mark The Chief Justice as a man of great warmth and kindness. This was a man who, for example, conceived and personally super- vised the construction of a ramp to enable Justice Douglas to take his place at the bench after the latter's stroke. He was a man who, for more than 10 years, sent pins garnered in his world travels to the handicapped child of a former clerk. Many could not comprehend why Warren Burger would leave one of the most powerful positions in Government to serve as Chair of the Commission on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution. They did not know the man, with his love of that normal document, his understanding of our Nation's traditions, his 517bv$$$$v 01-28-99 08:37:53 PGT * frtbx n xii CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER appreciation of the lessons of history, and his faith in the power of education. There was no one in the United States more suited to the task, and no role more fitting as a cap- stone to his distinguished career. We cherish this image of Warren Burger as a teacher of fundamental democratic values to the Nation's children and to us all. Wherefore, it is accordingly RESOLVED that we, the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, express our profound sorrow that Chief Jus- tice Warren E. Burger is no longer with us, our admiration for his deep understanding of our history and traditions as a Nation, and his commitment to those wide restraints that make us free, and our gratitude for his ceaseless labors to improve the administration of the Nation's system of justice; and it is further RESOLVED that the Solicitor General be asked to pre- sent these resolutions to the Court, and that the Attorney General be asked to move that they be inscribed upon the Court's permanent records. The Chief Justice said: Thank you, Mr. Solicitor General. I recognize the Attor- ney General of the United States. Attorney General Reno addressed the Court as follows: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Bar of this Court met today to honor the memory of Warren Earl Burger, The Chief Justice of the United States from 1969 to 1986. Born in St. Paul in 1907 to a family of modest means, War- ren Burger was raised on a small truck farm in Stacy, Minne- sota. He attended local public schools and in high school 517bv$$$$v 01-28-99 08:37:53 PGT * frtbx n CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER xiii was president of the Student Council and editor of the school newspaper, and he lettered in football, hockey, swimming, and track. He then worked his way, selling insurance by day, through the University of Minnesota and the St. Paul College of Law, now William Mitchell, where he attended nights, receiving his law degree magna cum laude in 1931. Two years later, he married Elvera Stromberg. Harry Blackmun, his child- hood friend and future colleague on this Court, was best man. After graduating from law school, he soon joined an estab- lished firm in St. Paul, where he became a partner. From the beginning, Warren Burger demonstrated in both his pub- lic and his private life a deep commitment to just treatment of individuals of all races. In the 1940's, he served on St. Paul's first Council on Human Rights, which he helped organize to fight racial dis- crimination, and when Japanese Americans were forced to leave their West Coast homes following the bombing of Pearl Harbor, he led a committee to help resettle those who had been displaced. He became aligned politically with Harold Stassen, manag- ing Stassen's first gubernatorial campaign in 1938, and his campaign for the Republican presidential nomination in 1948. While serving as Stassen's floor manager at the Republi- can National Convention in 1952, Burger pledged the Minne- sota delegation's support to Dwight Eisenhower, ensuring Eisenhower's nomination on the first ballot. His energy, abilities, and political acumen did not go unno- ticed. In 1953, he left Minnesota for Washington, D. C., ac- cepting President Eisenhower's appointment to serve as an Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Division under Attorney General Brownell. His distinguished serv- ice in that capacity included several appearances before this Court. In 1956, President Eisenhower persuaded the Assistant Attorney General to forgo his return to private practice in St. Paul and instead to accept the President's nomination to 517bv$$$$v 01-28-99 08:37:53 PGT * frtbx n xiv CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER a seat on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. He would serve with distinction on that influ- ential court for 13 years, developing a national reputation. Judge Burger's express desire to restore greater balance to the criminal justice system caught the attention of the newly inaugurated Richard Nixon. Impressed as well with Judge Burger's reputation as an outstanding jurist, Presi- dent Nixon nominated him to replace the retiring Earl Warren. Less than 5 weeks later, on June 23rd, 1969, Warren Burger was sworn in as this Nation's fifteenth Chief Justice. He served in that role for 17 years, longer than any other Chief Justice in the 20th Century. Confounding the expectations of those who hoped, or feared, that he would immediately set about reversing the decisions of the Warren era, the new Chief Justice was not an advocate for radical change. His experiences as a prac- titioner, as Government official, as Federal judge, had in- stilled in him a skepticism towards rigid doctrinal views of any stripe. His jurisprudence was complex and nuanced, but consist- ently reflective of certain core values, a reverence for the constitutional framework envisioned by the Founders, a deep appreciation of the personal and structural importance of our fundamental liberties, including those of the people as an or- ganized community, an understanding that the law must take account of realities beyond the courtroom, and a steadfast dedication to improving the administration of justice. In addition to his contributions as a jurist, Warren Burg- er's tenure was remarkable for his intensive efforts to im- prove the quality of both the bench and the bar. He imple- mented the most significant administrative overhaul of this Court since the Taft era, directing substantial investments in systems and modernization and at the same time devoting significant resources to the preservation and commemoration of the Court's traditions and history, making the Court a more accessible and welcoming place for the thousands who visit its halls. 517bv$$$$v 01-28-99 08:37:53 PGT * frtbx n CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER xv As Chief Justice of the United States, Burger approached the task of judicial administration with an appreciation that how justice is dispensed at every level directly affects the lives of the people. In 1971, for example, he helped found the National Center for State Courts in Williamsburg, Virginia, which provides information, education, and management services for Court leaders. Following a prison riot at Attica, New York, he was instru- mental in establishing the National Institute of Corrections, an agency charged with providing specialized correction service to State and local corrections agencies, and as Chair- man of the Board of the Federal Judicial Center, The Chief Justice guided the newly established center's growth into a full fledged agency for research and training for the Fed- eral courts. The Chief Justice also visited and studied legal institutions in various parts of the globe, and participated actively in symposia with scholars and statesmen from around the world. Drawing largely on the British experience, he promoted the establishment and growth of the American Inns of Court program, which today has hundreds of local chapters throughout the 50 States and the District of Columbia, bring- ing novice attorneys together with more experienced attor- neys and local judges to help the former develop trial skills and to promote more generally a sense of ethics and fellow- ship within the profession. Burger's concern for the practical effect of legal rules played an important part in his jurisprudence. He was, for example, skeptical that the benefits of the exclusionary rule justified its cost to society. While the Court has retained the exclusionary rule, Chief Justice Burger played a key part in excepting from its reach classes of cases that do not per- suasively implicate the rule's deterrence rationale. Most noticeably, he delivered the opinion of the Court in Nix v. Williams, recognizing the inevitable discovery excep- tion. The basis for the exception was explicitly pragmatic. 517bv$$$$v 01-28-99 08:37:53 PGT * frtbx n xvi CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means, then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be received. The Chief Justice's reluctance to afford unlimited scope to abstract doctrine featured prominently in his landmark opin- ion for a unanimous Court in United States v. Nixon, uphold- ing the special prosecutor's subpoena of the President's tape-recorded conversations. Although The Chief Justice recognized that the President has a legitimate need for confidentiality in the performance of his executive duties, he rejected the contention that the President is entitled to an absolute privilege from disclosure. The Chief Justice observed that privileges against forced disclosure are rare exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence. They are not lightly created nor expansively con- strued, for they are in derogation of the search for truth. Though skeptical of judgemade rules, Chief Justice Burger observed strict fidelity to the dictates of the Constitution, particularly the structural limitations that inhere in the sep- aration of powers, which he believed critical to the stability of our system of governance. In 1983, he delivered the landmark opinion in INS v. Chadha, striking down on separation of powers grounds a one-House veto provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act, which permitted either House of Congress unilaterally to overrule immigration decisions delegated by law to the discretion of the Attorney General. Notwithstanding Congress' use of similar provisions in lit- erally hundreds of enactments, the Court held the one-House veto procedure to be violative of the constitutional require- ments for a valid legislative act, namely, bicameral approval and presentment to the President. The Chief Justice's opinion explained: The choices we dis- cern as having been made in the Constitutional Convention impose burdens on governmental processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable, but those hard choices 517bv$$$$v 01-28-99 08:37:53 PGT * frtbx n CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER xvii were consciously made by men who had lived under a form of government that permitted arbitrary governmental acts to go unchecked. "With all the obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not yet found a better way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution." Toward the end of his tenure, Chief Justice Burger again wrote for the Court in Bowsher v. Synar, striking down pro- visions of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act that required the President to make budget cuts specified by the Comptrol- ler General under certain emergency conditions. Concluding that the Comptroller General was answerable to Congress, The Chief Justice rejected the argument that he was unlikely, in fact, to act as an agent for the legislative branch. The separation of powers must be strictly enforced, he wrote, because as the Founders well understood, in the long term, structural protections against abuse of power are critical to preserving liberty. To Warren Burger, there was special significance in the first three words of the Constitution: `We, the People.' They were a concise, yet momentous declaration that for the first time in history, power was created in a Government from the bottom up, not from the top down. That Government was under the Constitution, therefore would not always be tidy, was all only natural. Democracy, as The Chief Justice understood it, is people, men and women with all their virtues and flaws, trying to work together to produce ordered liberty. The Chief Justice's abiding faith in the ordinary men and women of this Nation is reflected in his belief that along with the structural safeguards afforded by the separation of powers, the guarantees of the First Amendment are critical to the maintenance of ordered liberty. The link between structural integrity and free speech is manifest in his several opinions involving the right of the 517bv$$$$v 01-28-99 08:37:53 PGT * frtbx n xviii CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER people to hear, see, and communicate observations concern- ing criminal proceedings. The Chief Justice explained that people in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing. Warren Burger's appreciation of the value of individual liberties was reflected in many of his constitutional opinions. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, for example, where the Court upheld on free exercise grounds the right of Amish parents to ex- cept their offspring from uniform State schooling require- ments, he recognized as a constitutional imperative the prin- ciple that a way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is different. In Wooley v. Maynard, he again championed the right not to conform, authorizing the Court's opinion affirming the right of Jehovah's Witnesses to refuse to display the motto, "Live Free or Die," on their New Hampshire license plates. He explained that where the State's interest is to dissemi- nate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interests cannot outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to avoid being the courier for such message. He recognized at the same time, however, that the claims of individual liberty do not invariably outweigh the right of the people as a community to foster and protect common val- ues and needs. Under the now-familiar standard for the Court articulated by The Chief Justice in Miller v. Califor- nia, whether speech is obscene and therefore unprotected is judged from the viewpoint of the average person applying contemporary community standards. And in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, he upheld for the Court the State's authority to regulate the exhibition of obscene material in places of public accommodation, recog- nizing that the State's legitimate interest encompassed the interest of the public in the quality of life in the total com- munity environment, the tone of commerce in the great city centers, and possibly the public safety itself. 517bv$$$$v 01-28-99 08:37:53 PGT * frtbx n CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER xix In The Chief Justice's jurisprudence, the balance of individ- ual and community rights is sensitive, as exemplified by his opinions for the Court in cases involving claims of religious establishment. In upholding New York's tax exemption for property used for religious education or charitable purposes in Walz v. Tax Commission of New York, he acknowledged that the test is inescapably one of degree, and explained that it is an essential part of adjudication to draw distinc- tions, including fine ones, in the process of interpreting the Constitution. In the following year, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, The Chief Justice again wrote for the Court, this time striking down State programs providing aid to parochial schools that fos- tered an excessive degree of entanglement of church and State. Finally, Warren Burger remained true on the bench to his lifelong commitment to the equal treatment of individuals, irrespective of race or national origin. In one of his first major opinions as Chief Justice, he delivered the Court's unanimous opinion in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education. Affirming the propriety of compre- hensive relief, including busing of students to remedy racial segregation in education, he was equally vigilant in guarding against less direct, but still invidious forms of discrimination. He wrote opinions for the Court adopting a disparate im- pact standard for Federal statutory claims of racial discrimi- nation in employment, condemning on equal protection grounds the provision of State aid to racially segregated pri- vate schools and sustaining the denial of Federal tax exemp- tions to private schools that practice racial discrimination. Nor were racial minorities the only beneficiaries of The Chief Justice's abiding belief in equal work. In his opinion in Reed v. Reed, the Court for the first time struck down on equal protection grounds a State statute that arbitrarily discriminated against women, and in Hishon v. King and Spalding, his opinion for the Court held that the Federal statutory prohibition of sex discrimination in employment applies to partnership decisions made by a law firm. 517bv$$$$v 01-28-99 08:37:53 PGT * frtbx n xx CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER It was because of his dedication to, indeed, reverence for the principles embodied in our Constitution that Warren Burger retired from the Supreme Court in 1986 to head the Commission on the Bicentennial of the Constitution. He served in that capacity as a tireless emissary of the Constitu- tion to the ordinary men and women, and particularly the children of this Nation. In that role, as in all of the varied contexts in which he toiled and emerged as a leader in the law, as private lawyer, Assistant Attorney General, appellate judge, and Chief Jus- tice of the United States, his dedication to liberty and equal- ity, his faith in the citizens of this land, and his commitment to maintaining the integrity of our constitutional structure, guided his steps and consequently illuminated the path for us all. Mr. Chief Justice, on behalf of the lawyers of this Na- tion and, in particular, of the Bar of this Court, I respectfully request that the resolutions presented to you in honor and celebration of the memory of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger be accepted by the Court, and that they, together with the chronicle of these proceedings, be ordered kept for all time in the records of this Court. The Chief Justice said: Thank you, Attorney General Reno, and thank you, Gen- eral Days. The Court thanks both of you for your presentation today in memory of our late colleague and friend, Chief Justice Burger. We ask that you convey to Chairman John Sexton and the members of the Committee on Resolutions, Chairman Charles A. Hobbs and the members of the Arrangements Committee, and Michael Luttig, Chairman of today's meet- ing of the Bar, our appreciation for these appropriate resolutions. 517bv$$$$v 01-28-99 08:37:54 PGT * frtbx n CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER xxi Your motion that these resolutions be made a part of the permanent records of the Court is granted. For 17 years, a longer tenure than all but three of his pred- ecessors, Warren Burger presided over this Court. During that period of time, as might be expected, he authored numerous important opinions for the Court on a variety of subjects. The Nixon tapes case, INS v. Chadha, Miller v. California, Milliken v. Bradley, Nebraska Press Association were but a few. The resolutions mentioned many others. He was particularly interested in the constitutional doc- trine of separation of powers, and in the speech and religion clauses of the First Amendment. He was a person of strong convictions, who was nonetheless able to work harmoniously with his colleagues. The English scientist and philosopher, Alfred North Whitehead said in one of his books, all the world over and at all times, there have been practical men absorbed in irreduc- ible and stubborn facts. All the world over, and at all times, there have been men of philosophic temperament who have been absorbed in the weaving of general principles. No one, of course, is wholly in one of these camps or the other, but I think one would have to say that Warren Burger was predominantly in the camp of the practical man, as you have suggested, General Days. He was concerned as to how the Court's decisions would be translated into law at the trial level and at the community. To that end, he was instrumental in the founding of the National Center for State Courts, as you have mentioned, General Reno, an organization devoted to providing admin- istrative and technical assistance to State court systems. He was instrumental in the founding of the Institute for Court Management. He pioneered the idea of the Inns of Court in the United States, where law students, faculty, practicing lawyers, and judges could dine and meet together in the pursuit of their common interests. He was firmly of the view that the English system on which these Inns were patterned did a better job of disciplin- 517bv$$$$v 01-28-99 08:37:54 PGT * frtbx n xxii CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER ing practicing lawyers than did the more formal procedures employed in this country. Here at the Court, Warren Burger made changes that materially improved our operation. Take, for example, his reconfiguration of the bench on which my colleagues and I are now sitting. We take for granted the shape of the bench, and after 25 years it is understandable, but before the advent of Warren Burger it was an absolutely straight bench, making it diffi- cult for colleagues on either end to question counsel, difficult for colleagues in the middle to hear questions from either end, and difficult for counsel to address their remarks to those towards the end of the bench. By simply moving the two wings of the bench slightly for- ward, all of these difficulties were corrected or alleviated, although others may have been brought about. It can also be said, I think, that he made the Court more centrist by bringing the left and right wings closer together. Chief Justice Burger also brought the Court from the days of a hot lead printing press to automation in the printing of its opinions. The hot lead press which we had when I be- came a member of the Court some 20 years ago was little different from the printing press the Court had when I was a law clerk in the early fifties and, indeed, little different from the kind of hot lead press on which we set type for our high school newspaper at the beginning of World War II. And during the June crunch, as we came to know it, you would have to wait 2 or 3 days between the time you sent an opinion, draft opinion to the printer, and the time you could get it back. This all changed under Chief Justice Burger's regime, and major steps toward the kind of automation we have today were taken. Warren Burger was a man of tremendous energy. Often, when a lawyer takes the bench, he becomes less involved than previously with the various concerns of the legal profes- sion, but this was not true of Warren Burger. As an appel- late judge, he helped to found the Appellate Judges Confer- 517bv$$$$v 01-28-99 08:37:54 PGT * frtbx n CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER xxiii ence at New York University, and he also played an important part in the drafting of the standards of criminal justice for the American Bar Association. When he retired as Chief Justice in 1986, he said that one of the reasons he did so was that he could not do justice to both the office of Chief Justice and his position as Chairman of the Committee on the Bicentennial of the Constitution. When asked why he had chosen his chairmanship over the Chief Justiceship, he replied that he thought the President would have no trouble finding someone to be Chief Justice- but he might have trouble finding someone to be Chairman of the Committee on the Bicentennial, and after his retire- ment, he was able to concentrate on the Bicentennial Com- mission and bring that tremendous energy to bear to make Americans better acquainted with their Constitution. He was on occasion pressed by scholars to devote a large part of the resources of the Committee to academic forums and treatises on constitutional law, but he declined to do so. He saw his job as bringing home to millions of Americans the significance of their Constitution, and he succeeded mag- nificently in doing so. Warren Burger and I were good friends from the first time I met him, when he informally swore me in as an Associate Justice of this Court in December 1971. I continue to miss him. I remember stopping in to see him only a few weeks before his death, and he was very proud of a just-published book he had written about famous Supreme Court cases entitled, It Is So Ordered. Here was a man, 88 years old, who had just finished writing a book. Warren Burger, the fifteenth Chief Justice of the United States, left a large mark on this Court. He also left a large mark on the legal profession as a whole, a profession in which he retained an abiding interest throughout his life. 517rep123a 01-05-99 17:52:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Note: All undesignated references herein to the United States Code are to the 1994 edition. Cases reported before page 1101 are those decided with opinions of the Court or decisions per curiam. Cases reported on page 1101 et seq. are those in which orders were entered. The opinion reported on page 1301 is that written in chambers by an individual Justice. Page A.; New Mexico Dept. of Human Services v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 A. A. & M. Carting Service, Inc. v. Babylon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Aaron; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Aaron v. Public Utilities Comm'n of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Abbas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Abbey Medical, Inc.; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Abbott v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Abbott Ambulance; Bi-State Dev. Agcy., Mo.-Ill. Metro. Dist. v. . . 1156 ABC­TV; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Abdelmeged v. B­G Maintenance Management of Colo., Inc. . . . . 1145 Abdul Hakeem v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Abdullah v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Abeles v. Infotechnology, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Ables v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Abraham v. Adcock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Abrams v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207,1241 Abrams v. Urban Homeowners' Corp. of New Orleans . . . . . . . . . 1165 AC Rochester; Wynn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Adames v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 Adams v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Adams v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Adcock; Abraham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Adherence Group, Inc.; Gerasolo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Administrator, Hughes Non-Bargaining Retirement Plan; Hughes Salaried Retirees Action Committee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Agostini; Burkhart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Aguilar v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Aguilar v. Newton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145,1230 Aguirre v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 xxv 517rep123a 01-05-99 17:52:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Aikens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Aitken; Amphitheater Public Schools v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Akech v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125,1230 Akere v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Alabama; Dobyne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Alabama; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Alabama v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Alabama; Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Alabama v. Seeley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Alabama Comm'r of Revenue v. Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Assn., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Alabama State Bar; Lyon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Alaska v. Babbitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Alaska; Linton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Alaska; Totemoff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Alaska; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Alaska Federation of Natives v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Albuquerque; Westland Development Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Alcones v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Aleali v. Merkle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Alexander v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Alexander v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174,1188 Alferos v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139,1251 All American Asphalt v. Hyles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Allard v. Flamingo Hilton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Allen, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Allen; Calhoun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Allen v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Allen; Steeves v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Allen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130,1181,1200 Allen; Zankich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Alligator Farms, Inc. v. Groner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Allstate Ins. Co.; Parks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Allstate Ins. Co.; Quackenbush v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 706 Allstate Ins. Co.; Roussos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Alsberg v. Robertson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Alsberg Brothers Boatworks v. Robertson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Alton & Southern R. Co. v. Edwards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Altstatt v. Oregon State Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Alvarez v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Alvarez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Alvarez-Figueroa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Al-Wahhab v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 American Civil Liberties Union Foundation; Jones v. . . . . . . . 1118,1186 517rep123a 01-05-99 17:52:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxvii Page American Fork Investors; Echols v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 American General Finance, Inc.; Hanlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co.; Wodarski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 American National Can Co.; Tokhtameshev v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Americanos v. Carter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 American Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Williamson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 American Premier Underwriters, Inc. v. USX Corp. . . . . . . . . . . 1221 American S. S. Co. v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 American Telephone & Telegraph Co.; Saunders v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Ames; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Amey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Amos v. Esmor Mansfield, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Ampex Corp. v. Frymire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Amphitheater Public Schools v. Aitken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 AmSouth Bancorp., N. A.; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 AMTRAK; Lebron v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Anderson v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Anderson v. Newberry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Anderson v. Sharma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Anderson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151,1162 Andrews v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Andrews v. Georgia State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles . . . . . . . . . 1142 Andrews v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Angelone; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Angelone; Snurkowski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Angel Rivera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 Antonelli v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Antonelli v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Apa v. Sweeney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Apache Corp. v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Appraisal Foundation; National Assn. of Review Appraisers & Mortgage Underwriters, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Archexpo Commerce & Industry Centre v. International Ambas- sador Programs, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Arevalo-Gamboa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Argus Life Ins. Co.; Kee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Arias v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Arizona; Arizonans for Official English v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102,1242 Arizona; Barraza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Arizona v. Hook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Arizona; Salazar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Arizona; Walden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102,1242 517rep123a 01-05-99 17:52:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Arkansas; Bowen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Arkansas; Caldwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Arkansas; Nooner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Arkansas; Porter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Armstrong v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Armstrong; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 456 Aronson v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Arteaga v. U. S. Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Artis v. Garraghty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Arvin-Thornton v. Philip Morris Products, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Ashland Oil, Inc.; Ramey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109,1205 Ashley; Silverburg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Ashley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147,1250 Asrar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Atherton v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101,1133,1182 Atkinson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Beck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Attorney General; Blackston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Attorney General v. Bossier Parish School Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154,1232 Attorney General; Morrison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Attorney General; Nicholas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Attorney General; Pic-A-State PA, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Attorney General of Ala.; Bogan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Attorney General of Colo.; Kailey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Attorney General of Colo.; Ross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Attorney General of Colo.; Salazar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Attorney General of Ind.; Americanos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Attorney General of Mich. v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Attorney General of Minn.; Pourzandvakil v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Attorney General of Miss. v. Dupree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Attorney General of Ohio; Dayton Visually Impaired Persons v. . 1135 Attorney General of Pa.; Broadwater v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Attorney General of R. I.; D'Amario v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . 781 Augustin v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Ault; Stearns-Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Aultman Health Services Assn.; Schwartz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Aultman Hospital; Schwartz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Ayala-Allende v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Ayars v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113,1227 Ayers v. Fordice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 B. v. S. L. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118,1185 Babbitt; Alaska v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 517rep123a 01-05-99 17:52:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxix Page Babbitt; Fort Sumter Tours, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Babbitt; Pittston Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Babbitt v. Youpee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Babcock & Wilcox Co.; Clements v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136,1240 Babylon; A. A. & M. Carting Service, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Babylon; USA Recycling, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Bachstein, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Baijnath v. Chan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Bailey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234,1239 Baird v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Baker v. Hadley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Baker v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Baker v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Bakker v. Federal Deposit Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Bal v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Balandra Schiffahrts-Gesellschaft MBH & Co., KG v. Costa . . . . . 1245 Baldassaro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Balderas Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Baldwin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Balele v. Klauser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Balisok; Edwards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Ballard, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Baltimore; Neufeld v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Bandura v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Bankers Trust Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Bank of America; Strowski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106,1204 Bank of America National Trust and Savings Assn. v. FDIC . . . . 1103 Bankruptcy Judge, U. S. District Court; Youngs v. . . . . . . . . . 1184,1247 Banks v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142,1216 Banks v. San Diego County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Banks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Baptiste v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Barbee v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Barbee v. State Farm Automobile Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Barbour; Platzer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Barbour v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Barcher v. Shipman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Bard, Inc.; Talbott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Barkett v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Barnett; Darden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Barnett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Barnett Bank of Marion County, N. A. v. Nelson . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Barno v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Barraza v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 517rep123a 01-05-99 17:52:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Barron v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200,1250 Bartlett; Bragg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Bartley v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Bass v. National Super Markets, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Bass v. Nevada Bd. of Medical Examiners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Bass v. Sarasota County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Bastine, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 Batista v. Buffalo Police Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Baton Rouge Marine Contractors, Inc.; Robillard v. . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Battle v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Baxley; Roussos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Baxter v. Los Angeles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 B & D Mechanical Contractors, Inc.; St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. 1167 Beach, Cadigan & Martin; Karageorgos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Beard; Rauser v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Beck; Atlantic Richfield Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Becker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Beets v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157,1252 Bell v. Brookshire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Bell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Bell Communications Research; Sever v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Bellcore; Sever v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Bellrichard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Bell, Rosenberg & Hughes; Willis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. FCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129,1240 Belyeu v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Benavidez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 Bend; Springer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Bennett v. Plenert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Bennett v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109,1205 Bennett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145,1162,1191,1238 Bennis v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Benoit v. Louisiana Public Service Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Benson; Steeves v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Benton, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Berg, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Berger v. Morgan Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Berget v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Bergmann v. McCaughtry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126,1160,1205,1240 Bergmann v. McCollough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141,1230 Berkeley v. Home Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Berks County v. Murtagh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Bernard v. Office of Queens County District Attorney . . . . . . . . . 1143 517rep123a 01-05-99 17:52:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxi Page Bernardez v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Bertasavage, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Bertoli v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Bethea, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Bevill v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 B­G Maintenance Management of Colo., Inc.; Abdelmeged v. . . . . 1145 Biederman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Bieri v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Bies v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Biggs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Bilandic; Palmisano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Bilby-Knight; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Billberry v. Electrical Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Billups v. Schotten . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Bingham; Steinberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134,1240 Bingham; Zolt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134,1230 Bio-Recovery, Inc., In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Bishop v. Rickles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Bi-State Dev. Agcy., Mo.-Ill. Metro. Dist. v. Abbott Ambulance . . 1156 Black v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Blackfeet Tribe of Blackfeet Reservation; Jessup v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Blackman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Blackston v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Blair v. Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Blalack; Hennessey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Blanch Co.; Cherokee Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Blassingame v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Blessing v. Freestone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Bloomfield, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Blount v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Bludworth; Hoke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Blue Springs v. Kincade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Blytheville School Dist. No. 5 v. Harvell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 559 Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown . . . . . . . . . 1154 Board of Managers of Revere Condominium; Jaffer v. . . . . . . . . . 1171 Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences; Roselin v. . . . . . . . . 1116 Board of Regulatory Comm'rs of N. J.; Jersey Carting, Inc. v. . . . 1135 Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants, Supreme Court of Ga.; Newton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 "Bob" v. "Mary" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Bogan v. Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Boggs v. Bowron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Bold v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 517rep123a 01-05-99 17:52:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Bollman v. Emerson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Bolt v. Singleton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Bolt v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Bondad v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139,1252 Bonner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Booker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Borawick v. Shay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Borough. See name of borough. Bossier Parish School Bd.; Price v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Bossier Parish School Bd.; Reno v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154,1232 Botello v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Bounds v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Bourne v. Walt Disney Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Bourne Co. v. Walt Disney Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Bowen v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Bowen v. Gundy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Bower v. Bower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Bowersox; Battle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Bowersox; Harvey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Bowersox; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Bowersox; Nave v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Bowersox; Oxford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124,1252 Bowersox; Tyler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Bowersox v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345 Bowersox; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Bowles v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Bowron; Boggs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Boyce v. Greenway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Boyd v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Boyd; Hunter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Boyd v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Boyd v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Boyd; Sellers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Bracey v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Bradford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Bradley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Bragg v. Bartlett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Brake v. District Court of Appeal of Fla., Third Dist. . . . . . . . . . 1151 Bramhall, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Branch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Brasseur v. Empire Travel Service, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Bratton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Braun v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Bravo v. National Mediation Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 517rep123a 01-05-99 17:52:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxiii Page Brazil v. Dalton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Breath v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Brennan; Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Brett; Thornbrugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Brewer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Brewer v. Ward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Briggs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Brinkley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117,1231 British Airways; Shafii v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Brito v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Britt v. Wells . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Britton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Broach v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Broadwater v. Corbett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Brobston v. Insulation Corp. of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Brockamp; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Broida v. Horowitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Broida v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Brooks v. Wichita Falls State Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Brookshire; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Brotherhood. For labor union, see name of trade. Broumas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Brown, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Brown v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Brown; Aronson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Brown; Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. . . . . . . . . . 1154 Brown v. Campbell County Bd. of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Brown; Furrer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Brown; Guzman Zayas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124,1205 Brown; Jardine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Brown; LeFevre v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Brown v. Paskvan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Brown v. Plywood Panels, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Brown; Stearns-Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Brown; Sudranski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110,1205 Brown v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113,1114,1174 Brown v. U. S. Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Brown; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Brown Group, Inc.; Food & Commercial Workers v. . . . . . . . . . . . 544 Brown Shoe Co.; Food & Commercial Workers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 544 Bruckner, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Bruellisauer v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Brunner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Brunston v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 517rep123a 01-05-99 17:52:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Bryant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111,1113 Bryson v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Buc-Hanan v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Buchanan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Buffalo Police Dept.; Batista v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Buividas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Bullock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Bunnell; Ramos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Burke v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Burkhart v. Agostini . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Burks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Burley v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143,1216 Burnette v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Burr v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Burrell; Graves v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Burress v. Unitarian-Universalist Society of Sacramento, Inc. . . . 1169 Burt v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Bush v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Bush v. Vera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Butler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Butterfly v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Buyea v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Bynum v. State Farm Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Byrd v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Caballero Ybarra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Cabiles v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Cafe 207, Inc. v. St. Johns County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Cahill v. Department of Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Cain; Cupit v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Cain; Derryberry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Cain; Stephens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143,1205 Cain; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Cairnes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Calderon v. California First Amendment Coalition . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Calderon; Hendricks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Calderon; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Caldwell v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Calhoun v. Allen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Calhoun v. Huskisson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Caliendo v. Rodriguez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 California; Banks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142,1216 California; Barno v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 California; Buc-Hanan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 California; Chamberlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 517rep123a 01-05-99 17:52:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxv Page California; Cortez Escamilla v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 California; Dawson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 California; Di Jorio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 California; Fauber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 California v. Federal Communications Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 California; Free v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 California; Hawkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 California; Helms v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 California; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 California; Lang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 California; Lowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 California; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 California; Patin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 California; Patterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 California; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 California; Siqueros v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 California; Stanley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 California; Sultan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 California; Treadway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 California; Trippet v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 California; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 California Div. of Labor Stds. Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr. 1133 California First Amendment Coalition; Calderon v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 California State Univ. at Los Angeles; Verdugo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 California Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd.; Debbs v. . . . . . . 1123 Califorrniaa v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Calisaan v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Calles; Marian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Calvert, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Calvo v. U. S. Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Cambridge Tankers, Inc.; De Los Santos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Camilo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Camp v. Gregory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Camp; Gregory v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Camp v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Campbell; Gee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Campbell v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Campbell v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140,1209 Campbell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115,1147,1161,1228 Campbell County Bd. of Ed.; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Campisi v. Maffeo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Cannon; McQueen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Cannon; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Cannon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 517rep123a 01-05-99 17:52:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Cantrell v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Capers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Capistrano Unified School Dist.; Kletzelman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Cargill, Inc., In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Carlisle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416 Carlisle Area School Dist.; Scott P. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Carlson v. ICI Americas Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Carnahan; Fields v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Carpio v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Carr v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Carrazana v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Carson v. Fauver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Carson v. Waterfront Comm'n of N. Y. Harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Carter; Americanos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Carter v. Montana Dept. of Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Carter v. Mrozowski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Carter v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Carter v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Carter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Caruso v. Kelly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Carvajal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Casares v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Casarotto; Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 681 Casas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Casella v. Equifax Credit Information Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Casey; Fred Meyer, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Caspari; Craig v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Cassity v. Kentucky Transportation Cabinet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Castner v. Whalen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Castorena v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Castro; CSX Transportation, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Castro-Vega v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Catalfo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Catalina Enterprises, Inc. Pension Trust v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. 1105 Catanio v. Myers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Cathedral City; Hoesterey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Caton v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Cavanaugh v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Cawley; Sharp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Cayanan v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Cayton, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 CBS "60 Minutes"; Auvil v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 517rep123a 01-05-99 17:52:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxvii Page C & B Trucking v. Kentucky Transportation Cabinet . . . . . . . . . 1209 Celestial Church of Christ, Inc. v. Chicago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Center for Humanities, Inc.; Gasperini v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Center for Independence of Disabled; Dymits v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 CenTra, Inc. v. Chandler Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Central Cartage v. Central States, S. E. & S. W. Areas Pens. Fd. 1134 Central Ohio Joint Vocational School Dist.; J. A. Croson Co. v. . . . 1155 Central States, S. E. & S. W. Areas Health and Welfare Fund v. Pathology Laboratories of Ark. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Central States, S. E. & S. W. Areas Pens. Fd.; Central Cartage v. 1134 Central States, S. E. & S. W. Areas Pens. Fd.; Midwest Motor Express v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Central States, S. E. & S. W. Areas Pens. Fd. v. Sherwin-Williams 1190 Central Synagogue; Posner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Century Mortgage Co.; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Chamberlin v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Chambers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Champion; Dale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Chan; Baijnath v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Chandler Ins. Co.; CenTra, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Chapa v. Jim Wells County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Chaplin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Chara v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Chase Manhattan Bank, N. A.; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Chater; Gordon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Chater; Lawson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106,1204 Chater; Mangrum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Chater; Roberts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Chavez v. Housing Authority of El Paso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Chavez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Chavez v. University of Houston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Chavez; University of Houston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Chemetron Corp.; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Chemstar, Inc.; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Cheng v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Cherokee Ins. Co. v. E. W. Blanch Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Chevron U. S. A. Inc.; Hurinenko v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Chevron U. S. A. Inc.; United States ex rel. Fine v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Chicago; Celestial Church of Christ, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Chicago Bd. of Ed.; Pittman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Chicago Transit Authority; Radic v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Chick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Chief Judge, Circuit Court of Fla., Leon County; Pearson v. . . . . 1237 Chief Judge, U. S. District Court; Reliford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 517rep123a 01-05-99 17:52:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Ill.; Palmisano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Ohio; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Chief of National Guard Bureau; Tracy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Childers; Simpson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Chiles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Chilli v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Choucair; McGeshick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Christian Methodist Episcopal Church; Boyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Christopher v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Christy v. Cooper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Chrost; Gucikova v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Chrysler Corp.; Kearns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; Igbo v. . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Ciapponi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Cincinnati; Cook v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Cinergi Productions, Inc.; Fishburne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Circuit Court of Wis., Marathon County; Jacobs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Cisneros; Cost Control Marketing & Sales Management of Va. v. 1187 Citibank, N. A.; Lamb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Citibank (S. D.), N. A.; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Citibank (S. D.), N. A. v. Sherman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Citibank (S. D.), N. A.; Smiley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 735,1118,1154 City. See name of city. Claassen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Clapp, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Clark v. Clarkstown Central School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Clark v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Clark v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Clark Distributing Co.; Eades v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Clarke; Caton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Clarkstown Central School Dist.; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Class of Gutierrez v. Santa Ana Unified School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Claudio v. Snyder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Claypool v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Clayton County Comm'n; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Clement v. Florida Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Clements v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136,1240 Clements v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Cleveland Tankers, Inc.; American S. S. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Clifford v. Glickman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Clifton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Clinard, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Clinton; Califorrniaa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Clinton v. Middlesex Mut. Assurance Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 517rep123a 01-05-99 17:52:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxix Page Cluck v. Osherow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Cobb; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho; Idaho v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Coffin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Colbert v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Cole v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Coleman v. Hofbauer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Coleman v. Murray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Coleman v. New York Comm'n of Correction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Coleman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Coley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Collado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Collins; James v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Collins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Collins; Worthey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Colon v. Florida Comm'n on Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Colonial Beach; Melka Marine, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Colonial Beach; Mitrano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Colorado; Bruellisauer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Colorado; Hutton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Colorado; McWilliams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC . . . . 1117 Columbia County Redevelopment Authority; Noble v. . . . . . . . . . 1119 Columbia County Sheriff's Dept.; Hughey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Columbia Natural Resources, Inc.; Tatum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Colvard v. Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Combustion Engineering, Inc. v. Johansen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Commissioner; Cramer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Commissioner v. Hubert's Estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Commissioner; Hughes & Luce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Commissioner; Kurnik v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Commissioner; Lane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Commissioner; Levien v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Commissioner; Marcinek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Commissioner; McNeel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Commissioner; Nordvik v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Commissioner; Norwest Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Commissioner; Okolie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Commissioner; Philip Morris Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Commissioner; Pressley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Commissioner; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Commissioner; Webb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Commissioner of Internal Revenue. See Commissioner. 517rep123a 01-05-99 17:52:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xl TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks; Maresca v. . . . . . . . . . 1115 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n; Armstrong v. . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n; Dunn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Commonwealth. See name of Commonwealth. Comm-Tract Corp.; Tamburello v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Comptroller of Currency; First National Bank & Trust, Wibaux v. 1233 Concha; London v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Cong Pham v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Conley v. Eugene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Conley; Rashi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Connecticut; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130,1214 Connecticut; Hickam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Connick, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Connor v. Flynn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Connors; Petitte Brothers Mining Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.; O'Connor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308 Consolidated Rail Corp.; Idemudia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Consolidation Coal Co.; Newman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Construction Workers v. Murray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Conti v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 ContiCommodity Services, Inc.; Ragan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Continental Ins.; Tam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Continental Trend Resources, Inc.; OXY USA Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . 1216 Contreras v. Stainer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Cook v. Cincinnati . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Cook v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Cooper; Christy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Cooper v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130,1214 Cooper v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Cooper; Hazen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Cooper v. Malone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Cooper v. Massachusetts Comm'r of Revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Cooper; Neal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Cooper v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348 Cooper v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Copeland v. MBNA America Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Corbett; Broadwater v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Corces v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Corcoran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Cordova, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Coronel v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140,1252 Corpuz v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Correa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Correa Gonzalez; Hospital San Francisco, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 517rep123a 01-05-99 17:52:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xli Page Corrections Commissioner. See name of commissioner. Cortez Escamilla v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Corti v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 Cosmopolitan, Inc.; Sparky's Waterfront Saloon, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . 1189 Costa; Balandra Schiffahrts-Gesellschaft MBH & Co., KG v. . . . . 1245 Cost Control Marketing & Sales Management of Va. v. Cisneros 1187 Costello; Nunez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Cotner v. Nichols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Cotner v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Coto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Cotton v. Nagle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 County. See name of county. Coupar v. Turnbo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Court of Appeals. See U. S. Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals of Mich.; Kennedy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Court of Civil Appeals of Ala.; Knight v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Couse v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Covillion v. New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Cox v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Crabtree v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161,1240 Craig, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Craig v. Caspari . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Craig v. Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Cramer v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Crane Vessel Titan 5 v. Entron, Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Crawford; Prieto v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Crawford v. Roane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Crawley v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 C. R. Bard, Inc.; Talbott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Crehan v. DeBoer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Crispin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Cristino Rivera Mining Co.; Simpson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109,1163 Crocker; Union Security Life Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Crompton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Crooms v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Croson Co. v. Central Ohio Joint Vocational School Dist. . . . . . . . 1155 Crowder, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Crowe v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Crowe; Strickland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Csorba v. ITT Electro-Optical Products Division . . . . . . . . . . 1160,1252 CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Castro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Cudal v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Cullum v. Hawk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 517rep123a 01-05-99 17:52:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xlii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Cully v. St. Augustine Manor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Culver City; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Cumming; Haney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Cummings; Sledge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Cupit v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Curiale v. Sedwick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Curley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Current v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Curry v. E-Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Curtis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Custodio v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Cytron; Delbruegge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Daas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Dade County Auto Tag Office; Gowin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Daguinotnot v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . 1138,1251 Dale v. Champion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Dale v. Superior Court of Cal., San Luis Obispo County . . . . . . . 1224 Daley v. Rambo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 D'Almeida; Stork Brabant B. V. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Dalton; Brazil v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 D'Amario v. Pine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 D'Ambrosio v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Damer; Pepper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Dameron, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Danao v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Danger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Danos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Darden v. Barnett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Darden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Dart v. Dart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Datagate, Inc.; Hewlett-Packard Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Davenport v. Meloy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 David v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Davis; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Davis; McClaran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Davis v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Davis v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Davis v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Davis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111,1210,1227 Dawson v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Day, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Dayton Area Visually Impaired Persons, Inc. v. Montgomery . . . 1135 DeBarr v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Debbs v. California Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd. . . . . . . . 1123 517rep123a 01-05-99 17:52:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xliii Page DeBoer; Crehan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 De Buono v. NYSA­ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund . . . 1232 Dedes v. Page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Deeble v. Dyslin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 De Galan; Ram v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Degen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 De Guzman v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 De Jesus v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Dela Rea v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Delaware; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Delbridge v. New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services 1146 Delbruegge v. Cytron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 DeLeon v. San Antonio Independent School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 DeLeon-Rodriguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Delgado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Dellinger; Salzer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Deloatch v. Hughes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120,1204 Delos Reyes v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 De Los Santos v. Cambridge Tankers, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Denvers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Department of Air Force; Diaz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Department of Air Force; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control; Moose Lodge #259 v. 1221 Department of Commerce; Francis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Department of Commerce v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Department of Defense; Trivedi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Department of Health and Human Services; Ortiz v. . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Department of Justice; Kelley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Department of Labor; Cahill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Department of Veterans Affairs; Marsh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Depew v. Gummo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Depperman v. Health Care Employees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 DeRewal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Derryberry v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Desiderio; Rogers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 DeYoung v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 DeYoung v. Lorentz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 D. F.; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Dias, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Diaz v. Department of Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Diaz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Dieguez-Alvarez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Digby v. Followill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Di Jorio v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 517rep123a 01-05-99 17:52:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xliv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Dilbert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Dilley; Yeoman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Dillingham Constr., N. A.; Cal. Div. of Labor Stds. Enf. v. . . . . . . 1133 Dilworth v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Dime Savings Bank of N. Y.; Glavey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Dingle v. Victory Savings Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Dinh Tran v. Dinh Truong Tran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Dinh Tran; Dinh Truong Tran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Dinh Truong Tran v. Tho Dinh Tran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Dinh Truong Tran; Tho Dinh Tran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Director, OWCP; Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186,1243 Director of penal or correctional institution. See name or title of director. Distajo v. Doctor's Associates, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 District Court. See U. S. District Court. District Court of Appeal of Fla., First Dist.; Kleinschmidt v. . . . . 1226 District Court of Appeal of Fla., Third Dist.; Brake v. . . . . . . . . . 1151 District Judge. See U. S. District Judge. District of Columbia; Ifill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Dixon; Jeter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Dixon v. Maass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Dixon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Dobyne v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 681 Doctor's Associates, Inc.; Distajo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Dodson; Metropolitan Edison Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Doe; Sikora v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Dolcefino v. Ray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Dolenz v. Southwest Media Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134,1240 Dolloph v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Dorsey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Dostie v. Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Doucet; Louisiana Dept. of Transportation and Development v. . . 1120 Douglas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Downs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Downs v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Doyle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Dread v. Maryland State Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Dubuc v. Hopper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Duckett v. Godinez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Dudley; Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Duell v. Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Dukes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198,1226 Dumas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 517rep123a 01-05-99 17:52:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xlv Page Duncan; Usher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Dungca v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Dunn; Rivens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Dunn v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Dunn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Dunstable-Groton Corp. v. Groton Planning Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Dupont; Florida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Dupree; Lamar County Bd. of Ed. and Trustees v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Dupree; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Duquette v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Dushaw v. Roadway Express, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Dutton; Pickle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Dwyer v. Sparks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Dykes v. Southeastern Pa. Transportation Authority . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Dymits v. Center for Independence of Disabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Dymits v. Grim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Dyslin; Fraser Deeble v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Dyson v. Pawtucket . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Eades v. Clark Distributing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Eagerton v. Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Assn., Inc. . . . 1121 Eames v. Small Business Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Earl v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Easley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Ebershoff; Shieh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132,1218 Echols v. American Fork Investors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Echols v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Eckberg, Lammers, Briggs, Wolff & Vierling; Kittler v. . . . . . . . . 1221 Edmond v. Robinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Edwards; Alton & Southern R. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Edwards v. Balisok . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Edwards v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Eickleberry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Einhorn v. LaChance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Eisner; 640 Broadway Renaissance Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 El Dorado County; Townzen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Electrical Workers; Billberry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Electrical Workers; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Electrolux Corp.; Godby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120,1216 Elgendy v. Nehemiah Plan Homes Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Elias v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Elliott; Esparza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Elliott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 517rep123a 01-05-99 17:52:22 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xlvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Ellis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Elramly; Immigration and Naturalization Service v. . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Elrod v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Emerson; Bollman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Emery v. Plantier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Empire Travel Service, Inc.; Brasseur v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Engelking v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Entron, Ltd.; Crane Vessel Titan 5 v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Environmental Coalition of Ojai v. Secretary of Commerce . . . . . 1245 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n; Ghent v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Equifax Credit Information Services; Casella v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Ernesto Espinosa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Erwin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Escamilla v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Escamilla v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Escusa v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Esmor Mansfield, Inc.; Amos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Esparza v. Elliott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Espinosa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Estacio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Estate. See name of estate. Estes v. Namba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144,1230 E-Systems, Inc.; Curry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Ethicon, Inc.; United States Surgical Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Eugene; Conley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Evans v. Kansas City School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Evans; Romer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 620 Evans; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 E. W. Blanch Co.; Cherokee Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Ewing, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Executive Comm., U. S. Dist. Ct., N. Dist. of Ill.; Palmisano v. 1223 Exxon Co., U. S. A. v. Sofec, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Exxon Corp. v. Youell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Exxon Seamen's Union; SeaRiver Maritime, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 F.; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Fabian v. Shade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Fallini v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Fargo Women's Health Organization, Inc.; Vanyo v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Farmer v. Hawk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Farmer; Messler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Fauber v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Fauls v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Faunce v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Fauver; Carson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 517rep123a 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xlvii Page Fecht; Price Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Federal Bureau of Investigation; Mata v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 FCC; BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129,1240 FCC; California v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 FCC v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 FCC; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 FCC; Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 FDIC; Atherton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101,1133,1182 FDIC; Bakker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 FDIC; Bank of America National Trust and Savings Assn. v. . . . 1103 FDIC; Hanna v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 FDIC; Hennessy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 FDIC; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 FDIC; Russell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 FEC; Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. . . . . 1117 FEC; Whitmore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.; Hinchliffe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Felker v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Felker v. Turpin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182,1218 Felter; Roussos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Felton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Ferguson; Hamill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Ferrer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 FGS Constructors, Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Fields v. Carnahan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Fields v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Fields v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Fields; Webb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Filamor v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Fine v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Fink; Graven Auction Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 First Advantage Ins., Inc. v. Green . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 First Federal Savings Bank; Osborne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 First National Bank & Trust, Wibaux v. Comptroller of Currency 1233 Fishburne v. Cinergi Productions, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Fisoli; Funai v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Flamingo Hilton; Allard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Flathead Valley Community College; Talley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121,1216 Flemmings v. Morton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Flinn v. Florida Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Florentino v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139,1252 Florida; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Florida; Augustin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Florida; Barkett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 517rep123a 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xlviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Florida v. Dupont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Florida v. Frazier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Florida; Halstead v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Florida; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Florida v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136,1150 Florida v. Rayfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Florida; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123,1205 Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Fla. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Florida; Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Florida; Sobin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Florida; Wootton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Florida Bar; Clement v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Florida Bar; Flinn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Florida Comm'n on Ethics; Colon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Florida Power & Light Co.; Praxair, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Fluehr v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Flynn, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Flynn; Connor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Flynn v. Garden City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Flynn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Followill; Digby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Food & Commercial Workers v. Brown Group, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . 544 Food & Commercial Workers v. Brown Shoe Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 544 Ford v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Fordice; Ayers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Ford Motor Co. v. Fulkerson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Ford Motor Co. v. Sperau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Foronda v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141,1252 Fort Belknap Indian Community; Montana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Fort Peck Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes v. Tubridy . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Fort Sanders Regional Medical Center; Hartsell v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Fort Sumter Tours, Inc. v. Babbitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Forty-Estremera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 484 Foster v. Gilliam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Foster v. Hope Medical Group for Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Foster; Shores v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 $405,089.23 in U. S. Currency; United States v. . . . . . . . . 1102,1132,1154 Fox v. Hinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Fox v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115,1162 Fragoso; Hamilton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Fraidin v. Weitzman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Fraiser v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Francis v. Department of Commerce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 517rep123a 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xlix Page Francis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 Frank v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Franklin v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Franklyn v. Vista del Mar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169,1252 Fraser Deeble v. Dyslin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Frazier; Florida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Casey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Free v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Free v. U. S. Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Freestone; Blessing v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 French; Huang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Fried v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Friend v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Fromal v. Jackson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Frost v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Fry v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Frye v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Frymire; Ampex Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Fulkerson; Ford Motor Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Fuller v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority; Colvard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Funai v. Frisoli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Furrer v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Gadson; Maryland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Gallego-Sanchez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . 1151 Gallipeau v. Rhode Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Gambino v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Gamble v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 Garcia; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Garcia v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141,1252 Garcia v. Riverdale Plating & Heat Treating Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127,1239 Garden City; Flynn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Gardner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Garner v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147,1230 Garner; Vargas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Garraghty; Artis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Garrigan, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Gaston v. Viclo Realty Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Gaylor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Gee v. Campbell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Gee; Price-El v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Geery v. Shelley School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 517rep123a 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) l TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page General Dynamics Corp.; United States ex rel. Willis v. . . . . . . . . 1104 General Motors Corp.; Plott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 General Motors Corp. v. Tracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Genins, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Genish v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Georgia; Andrews v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Georgia; Crowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Georgia; Morrow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Georgia Dept. of Public Safety; Willis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Georgia State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles; Andrews v. . . . . . . . . 1142 Georgia State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles; Polley v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Gerasolo v. Adherence Group, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Gerdeman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Ghent v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Gibson v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Gibson; Sutton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Gibson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Gilbert v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. . . . . . . . . 1108 Giles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Gilkey v. Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Gill v. Guam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Gilliam; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Gillis; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Gillis; Pringle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Glasscock v. Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Glavey v. Dime Savings Bank of N. Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Glenn, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Glenolden Borough; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167,1251 Glickman; Clifford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Glickman; Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Globe Newspaper Co. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Glover, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Glucksberg; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Gobert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Godby v. Electrolux Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120,1216 Goddard v. Kansas Director of Taxation on Assessment of Mari- juana and Controlled Substances Tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Godinez; Duckett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Godwin; Yates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159,1230 Golb v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Gold v. Morrison-Knudsen Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Gomez; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Gomez Toledo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 517rep123a 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED li Page Gonzales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Gonzalez; Hospital San Francisco, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Gonzalez v. Moises Luna and Associates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Gonzalez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110,1215 Gonzalez-Lerma v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Good; Jae v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Gooden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Goodman v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Goodwin; Walp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Gordon v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Gore; BMW of North America, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 559 Gorman v. McAninch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106,1204 Gottfried, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Government of Virgin Islands; Petersen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Governor of Ala.; Tate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Governor of Colo. v. Evans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 620 Governor of Fla. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Governor of La. v. Hope Medical Group for Women . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Governor of Miss.; Ayers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Governor of N. Y.; McReynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Governor of N. C.; Pope v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Governor of N. C.; Shaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Governor of S. D.; Hinkle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Governor of S. D. v. Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic . . . . 1174 Governor of Tex. v. Vera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Governor of Wis.; Bartley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Gowin v. Dade County Auto Tag Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Graham v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Graham v. Turpin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Grant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Grant-Chase v. New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Graven Auction Co. v. Fink . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Graves v. Burrell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Graves v. Saunders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Graves v. U. S. Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Gray v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Graziani; James v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Great Falls Eye Surgery Center v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Green; First Advantage Ins., Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Green v. Housing Authority of New Orleans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Green v. Mellon Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Green v. Morton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Green v. Pennsylvania Municipal Service Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Green v. 25th Judicial Dist. Probation Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 517rep123a 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Green v. United Pentecostal Church International . . . . . . . . . 1134,1240 Greenberg; Wolfberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Greene, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Greenidge v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Greenway; Boyce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Greenwood Trust Co. v. Hunter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Greenwood Trust Co.; Stoorman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Gregory v. Camp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Gregory; Camp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Gregory v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Grennier v. Nagle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Grievance Committee for Southern Dist. of N. Y.; Polur v. . . . . . . 1196 Griggs v. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Grim; Dymits v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Groner; Alligator Farms, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Groose; Abdullah v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Groose; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Groose; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Groton Planning Bd.; Dunstable-Groton Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 GTE Northwest Inc.; Oregon Public Utility Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . 1155 Guam; Gill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Gucikova v. Chrost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Guerrero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Guest v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Gumm v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Gummo; Depew v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Gundy; Bowen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Gunn; Vargas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107,1230 Gurley v. Swaim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Gussin v. Nintendo of America, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Guth, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Guzman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Guzman Zayas v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124,1205 Gwinnett County School System; McGuffey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Hackensack; Moretti v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Hadley; Baker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Hadley v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Hai Cong Pham v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Hairston v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Hakeem v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Hale; Secakuku v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Hall v. Groose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Hall v. Indiana Dept. of Revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Halstead v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 517rep123b 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED liii Page Haman v. King . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Hamill v. Ferguson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Hamill; Harvey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Hamilton v. Fragoso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Hamlet v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Hammond v. Lindler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Hampton; J. A. L. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Han v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Hand v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Haney, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Haney v. Cumming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Hanks; Roberts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Hanks; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Hanlin v. American General Finance, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Hanlin v. Superior Court of Cal., Santa Clara County . . . . . . . . . 1121 Hanna v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Hansen v. Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Hansen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Hansen's Estate v. New Haven . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Hanus v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Harden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Hardy v. Orlando . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139,1252 Hardy v. Pinkerton Security Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Hargett; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Harmony; Thomson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Harper; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Harrington; Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Harris v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Harris v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Harris v. Montgomery County Dept. of Social Services . . . . . . . . 1132 Harris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Harris v. Virginia Beach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Harris Corp.; Mullholand v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Harrison v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Hart v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Hartford Fire Ins. Co.; Catalina Enterprises, Inc. Pension Trust v. 1105 Hartsell v. Fort Sanders Regional Medical Center . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Harvell; Blytheville School Dist. No. 5 v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Harvell v. Nagle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Harvey v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Harvey v. Hamill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Harvey v. Schriro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Harvey v. "United States Marshal Edmo" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Harvey v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 517rep123b 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) liv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Hasa v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Hassan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Hatch v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Hathaway; Shieh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132,1218 Hauser v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Hawaii; Kiliona v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Hawes v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Hawk; Cullum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Hawk; Farmer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Hawkins v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Hawkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Haws; Jennings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Hayes; McQueen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Hayes v. Spears . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Haynes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Hazen v. Cooper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Health Care Employees; Depperman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Heller v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Helms v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Helmsley-Spear, Inc.; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Helmstetter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Henderson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 654 Hendricks v. Calderon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Hendricks; Kansas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Hennessey v. Blalack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Hennessy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Hentz v. Roberts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Hernandez v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Hernandez v. Starbuck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Hernandez v. Van Oss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Hernandez; Vasquez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Hernandez-Vargas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Herrera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Herring; Marks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Herring; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Hess v. MacAskill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Hesse; Saathoff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Hewitt; Stephen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Datagate, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Hickam v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Hickok v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Hill v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Hill v. Department of Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Hill; Gilkey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 517rep123b 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lv Page Hill v. King . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Hill; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Hill v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Hill v. San Mateo County Youth and Family Services Division . . 1170 Hill v. Schroubroek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Hill v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Hills, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Hilton Davis Chemical Co.; Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Hinchliffe v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Hines v. Roach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Hinkle v. Janklow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Hinojosa v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Hinson; Fox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Hirsh, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Hodges; Reliford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Hodges v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Hoesterey v. Cathedral City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Hofbauer; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Hogan; Lake Barrington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Hoke v. Bludworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Holden Living Trust v. Joint City-County Bd. of Tax Assessors 1167 Holly Farms Corp. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . 392 Holmes v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Holmes v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Holmes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Holmes Bi-Rite Supermarket v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Holvey; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Home Ins. Co.; Berkeley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Hook; Arizona v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Hooks v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Hooper v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Hoover; Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Hope v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Hope v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Hope Medical Group for Women; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Hopkins; Lyman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Hopkins; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Hopper; Dubuc v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Horowitz; Broida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Horton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Hosier v. Wolff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Hospitality Investments of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Pennsylvania State Police, Bureau of Liquor Control Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 517rep123b 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Hospital San Francisco, Inc. v. Correa Gonzalez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 House v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Houser v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Housing Authority of El Paso; Chavez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Housing Authority of Kansas City; Morris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Housing Authority of New Orleans; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Howard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Howard County Sheriff's Dept.; Pruitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Howell v. Koch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Hoxsie v. Kerby . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Hoyett v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194,1198 Huang v. French . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Hubert's Estate; Commissioner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Hudson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Huffman; Terry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Huffman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Hufstetler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Hughes; Deloatch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120,1204 Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer . . . . . . . . . 1218 Hughes, Hubbard & Reed; Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc. v. . . 1245 Hughes & Luce v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Hughes Salaried Retirees Action Committee v. Administrator, Hughes Non-Bargaining Retirement Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Hughey v. Columbia County Sheriff's Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Humphrey; Pourzandvakil v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Hundley; Wyldes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Hunt; Pope v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Hunt; Shaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Hunter v. Boyd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Hunter; Greenwood Trust Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Hunter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Hurel Guerrero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Hurinenko v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Hurst v. Supreme Court of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Hurtado-Gonzalez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 Huskisson; Calhoun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Hutching v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127,1227,1246 Hutton v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Huu To v. Rubin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Hyatt Regency Phoenix Hotel Co.; Winston & Strawn v. . . . . . . . 1234 Hyde v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Hyles; All American Asphalt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Hyman v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Hyppolite v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 517rep123b 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lvii Page Iadarola v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Ibalio v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 ICI Americas Inc.; Carlson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 ICI Americas, Inc.; Kemmerer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Idaho; Blair v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Idaho; Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Idaho v. Lankford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Idaho v. Stuart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Idemudia v. Consolidated Rail Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Idowu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Ifill v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Igbo v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Illinois; Antonelli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Illinois; Burt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Illinois; Dilworth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Illinois; Franklin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Illinois; Guest v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Illinois; Hope v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Illinois; Kotsias v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Illinois v. Montanez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Illinois; Pudlo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Illinois; Sedano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Illinois; Sewell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Illinois; Sims v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Illinois; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Illinois; Trujillo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Illinois; Wheeler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Bandura v. . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Elramly . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Gallego-Sanchez v. . . . . 1151 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Soler-Somahano v. . . . . 1144 Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Harrington . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Indiana Dept. of Correction v. Sampley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Indiana Dept. of Revenue; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Industrial Comm'n of Ariz.; Morales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Infotechnology, Inc.; Abeles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Director, OWCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186,1243 In re. See name of party. Insulation Corp. of America; Brobston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Internal Revenue Service; Baker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Internal Revenue Service; Hauser v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 International. For labor union, see name of trade. International Amb. Programs; Archexpo Com. & Ind. Centre v. 1167 517rep123b 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page International Business Machines Corp.; Misek-Falkoff v. . . . . 1111,1230 International Business Machines Corp.; United States v. . . . . . . . 843 Iowa; Seehan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Iowa; Swartz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Iowa; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Iowa Bd. of Medical Examiners; Rosen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Iowa Dept. of Corrections; Tharp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Iowa-Missouri Conference of Seventh-day Adventists; Pierce v. . . 1220 Irons v. Karceski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Isaac v. Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Isla v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Israel Identity Tours, Inc.; Israel Travel Advisory Service, Inc. v. 1220 Israel Travel Advisory Service, Inc. v. Israel Identity Tours, Inc. 1220 ITT Electro-Optical Products Division; Csorba v. . . . . . . . . . . 1160,1252 Ivkovich; Walsh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Ivy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 J.; M. L. B. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118,1185 Jackson v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Jackson; Fromal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Jackson v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124,1205 Jackson v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Jackson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128,1139,1147,1157,1192,1229 Jacob v. Metrolaser, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Jacobs v. Circuit Court of Wis., Marathon County . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Jacobs v. Kern Community College Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Jacques v. Rhode Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 J. A. Croson Co. v. Central Ohio Joint Vocational School Dist. . . . 1155 Jae v. Good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Jaffer v. Board of Managers of Revere Condominium . . . . . . . . . . 1171 J. A. L. v. Hampton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 James, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 James v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 James v. Graziani . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 James v. State Bar of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 James; Tate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 James v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Janklow; Hinkle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Janneh v. The Regency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Jardine v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Jedrzejewski v. Menacker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Jefferson County; Richards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 793 Jeffress v. Suter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Jenkins v. New Mexico Securities Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 517rep123b 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lix Page Jenkins; Wesley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Jennings, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Jennings v. Haws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Jennings v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125,1228 Jensen v. Santa Clara County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Jensen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Jersey Carting, Inc. v. Board of Regulatory Comm'rs of N. J. . . . 1135 Jervis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Jespersen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Jessup v. Blackfeet Tribe of Blackfeet Reservation . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Jeter v. Dixon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Jim W. v. Margene L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Jim Wells County; Chapa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Jiricko v. Lakin & Herndon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Johansen; Combustion Engineering, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Johnson v. Aaron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Johnson; Ables v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Johnson; Abrams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207,1241 Johnson; Beets v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157,1252 Johnson; Belyeu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Johnson; Brunston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Johnson; Cavanaugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Johnson; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Johnson; Crooms v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Johnson v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Johnson v. Gillis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Johnson; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Johnson; Hinojosa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Johnson; Holmes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Johnson; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124,1205 Johnson v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122,1128,1171,1224 Johnson; Johnson-Bey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Johnson; Lemon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Johnson; Locke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Johnson; Luken v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Johnson; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Johnson; McClelland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Johnson; McDonald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Johnson; Montoya v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Johnson v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Johnson; Nunez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Johnson; Ramer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Johnson v. Reed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Johnson; Rogers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 517rep123b 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Johnson; Sherman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Johnson; Stitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Johnson; Tedder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Johnson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113,1115,1149,1158,1162 Johnson; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Johnson v. Welby . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Johnson; West v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Johnson-Bey v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Joint City-County Bd. of Tax Assessors; Holden Living Trust v. 1167 Jones, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165,1218 Jones v. ABC­TV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Jones v. American Civil Liberties Union Foundation . . . . . . . 1118,1186 Jones v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Jones; Bush v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Jones v. Chemetron Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Jones; Florida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136,1150 Jones v. Garcia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Jones; Gibson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Jones v. Gomez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Jones v. Holvey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Jones; Hoyett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194,1198 Jones v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Jones v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Jones v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Jordan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Joseph v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Joseph A.; New Mexico Dept. of Human Services v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Joyce v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Juarez v. Lee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Judge, District Court of Appeal of Fla., First Dist.; Rodriguez v. 1204 Judge, District Court of Appeal of Fla., Fourth Dist.; Messler v. 1247 Judge, District Court of Kan., 31st Dist.; DeYoung v. . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Judge, District Court of Tex., Potter County; Bollman v. . . . . . . . 1107 Judge, Jefferson County District Court; Swendra v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Judge, Justice Court of Sunflower County; Graves v. . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Judge, Superior Court of Cal., San Joaquin County; Hernandez v. 1213 Judge, Superior Court of Ga., Chattahoochee County; Digby v. . . 1144 Judge, Superior Court of Ga., Gwinnett County; McCauley v. . . . 1149 Judge, Tulsa County; Dubuc v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Justice v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Kaczynski v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Kailey v. Norton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Kakita; Shieh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343,1186 Kane v. Magna Mixer Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 517rep123b 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxi Page Kane; Magna Mixer Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Kansas; DeYoung v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Kansas v. Hendricks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Kansas City; McCarthy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108,1240 Kansas City School Dist.; Evans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Kansas Director of Taxation on Assessment of Marijuana and Con- trolled Substances Tax; Goddard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Karageorgos v. Beach, Cadigan & Martin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Karceski; Irons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Karimi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Kasenow; Riggins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Katz & Associates; Vrba v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Kaylo; McCormick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Keane; Warren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Kearns v. Chrysler Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Kee v. Argus Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Keeffe; Linehan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Kelleher, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Keller; Misek-Falkoff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Kelley v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Kelley v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Kellotat v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Kelly, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Kelly; Caruso v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Kelly; Metcalfe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Kelly v. Penson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Kemmerer v. ICI Americas, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Kendricks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Kennebec County; Struck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Kennedy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Kennedy v. Court of Appeals of Mich. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Kennedy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Kentucky; McCreary v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Kentucky; Sanborn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Kentucky Revenue Cabinet; St. Ledger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 Kentucky Transportation Cabinet; Cassity v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Kentucky Transportation Cabinet; C & B Trucking v. . . . . . . . . . 1209 Kerby; Hoxsie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Kern Community College Dist.; Jacobs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Key West; Mertz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Kiliona v. Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Kimbrough v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Kincade; Blue Springs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Kincheloe; LaPierre v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 517rep123b 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page King v. Clayton County Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 King; Haman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 King; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 King; Morris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 King Instrument Corp.; Perego v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Kinley v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Hoover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Kissane v. Trippett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Kittler v. Eckberg, Lammers, Briggs, Wolff & Vierling . . . . . . . . 1221 Klat v. San Diego County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Klauser; Balele v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Kleinschmidt v. District Court of Appeal of Fla., First Dist. . . . . 1226 Kletzelman v. Capistrano Unified School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Knapp Shoes Inc. v. Sylvania Shoe Mfg. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Knight v. Court of Civil Appeals of Ala. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Knight v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Knight v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . 1134 Knight Steel Fabricators v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. . . . . . 1134 Kobayashi v. Nakamura . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Koch; Howell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Koffiel v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Kornahrens v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Kornblum; St. Louis County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Kotsias v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Kowalski v. Oregon State Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108,1230 Krieger; Shieh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343,1186 Kroger Co.; Mosier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Kuhlmann; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Kuhn; Ollie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Kurnik v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Kussair v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Kwong v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 L. v. Hampton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 L.; Jim W. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Labor Union. See name of trade. LaChance; Einhorn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Lacombe; Nash v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Lake Barrington v. Hogan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Lakin & Herndon; Jiricko v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Lamar County Bd. of Ed. and Trustees v. Dupree . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Lamb v. Citibank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Lancour v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Lane v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Lane; Olsen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158,1252 517rep123b 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxiii Page Lane v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Lang v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Lankford; Idaho v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 LaPierre v. Kincheloe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Larrabee v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Law v. Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Lawhorn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Lawrence v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Lawson v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106,1204 Lawson v. Vera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Leary; Rodenbaugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 LeBon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. (AMTRAK) . . . . . . 1188 Lee; Juarez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Lee v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 LeFevre v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Lehtinen v. Quantum Chemical Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Lemon v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182 Levario v. State Bar of Tex. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Levien v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Levine v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Lewis; Caterpillar Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Lewis v. Century Mortgage Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Lewis v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Lewis; Spychala v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Lewter; Perry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chemstar, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Libman Co. v. Vining Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Libutti v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Liggins v. Ohio Dept. of Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Lincoln; Stevens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Lindenmeier v. Siemens Power Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Lindler; Hammond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Linehan v. Keeffe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Linton v. Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Linton; St. Peter Villa, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Little v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Litz v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135,1240 Liu v. New York City Police Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Lloyd v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 Local. For labor union, see name of trade. Locke v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Lockheed Corp. v. Spink . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882,1118 Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 517rep123b 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Lohr; Medtronic, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Lonchar v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314 London v. Concha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 London v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Longshoremen; Minetti v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Lopez v. Monterey County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Lopez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Lorentz; DeYoung v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Lorenz, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205,1232 Los Angeles; Baxter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Los Angeles; Ruvalcaba v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Los Angeles County Dept. of Children and Family Servs.; Rios v. 1234 Louisiana; Campbell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Louisiana; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Louisiana Dept. of Transportation and Development v. Doucet . . 1120 Louisiana Public Service Comm'n; Benoit v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Love v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Love; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Loving v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 748 Lowe v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Lowe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Lowenschuss v. Resorts International, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Lucas v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Lucien v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Ludmer; Nernberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Lugo; Reyes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Luken v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Luna and Associates; Gonzalez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Lussier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Lyman v. Hopkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Lynce v. Mathis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Lynch v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143,1252 Lyon v. Alabama State Bar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Maass; Dixon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 MacArmour v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 MacAskill; Hess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Mack v. Skupniewitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Madden v. Savage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Madison; Silva v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Maffeo; Campisi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Magante v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Maglalang v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Magna Mixer Co. v. Kane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Magna Mixer Co.; Kane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 517rep123b 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxv Page Mahern; Ohio Agricultural Commodity Depositors Fund v. . . . . . 1130 Maine; Dostie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Maine; Sevigny v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107,1158 Malloy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Malone; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Malone v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Management Co. Entertainment Group; Weinberg v. . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Mangrum v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Mangrum v. Simmons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Marathon Oil Co.; Motley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Marchese v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Marcinek v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Marcus, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Maresca v. Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks . . . . . . . . . 1115 Margene L.; Jim W. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Marian v. Calles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370 Markovitch, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Marks v. Herring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Marsh v. Department of Veterans Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Marshall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Martin v. Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Martin v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117 Martin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161,1251 Martinez, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Martinez v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114,1148 Martinez-Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Martorano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 "Mary"; "Bob" v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Maryboy v. Utah State Tax Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Maryland; Baker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Maryland v. Gadson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Maryland State Police; Dread v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Mason v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Massachusetts; McLaughlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Massachusetts; Wornum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Massachusetts Comm'r of Revenue; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Mata v. Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Mata; McQueen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Mates v. Occupational Safety and Health Administration . . . . 1105,1204 Mathis; Lynce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Matthews v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125,1235 Mattison v. Roach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 517rep123b 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Mattos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Mauricio v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Mauro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126,1252 Maxwell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Maybeck v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Maydak v. Wener . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Mayles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Mayo v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Mayor of Baltimore City; Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 Mays v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Mazurkiewicz; Zilich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 MBNA America Bank, N. A.; Copeland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 McAninch; Gorman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106,1204 McBride; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 McBride v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 McBride v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 McCarthy v. Kansas City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108,1240 McCarthy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 McCarver v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 McCastle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 McCaughtry; Bergmann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126,1160,1205,1240 McCauley v. Winegarden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 McClaran v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 McClelland v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 McClelland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 McCloskey, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 McCollough; Bergmann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141,1230 McCormack v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 McCormick v. Kaylo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 McCreary v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 McCutcheon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 McDade; Price v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 McDaniel v. McKenna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 McDonald v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co.; Burley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143,1216 McElrath v. Phillips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 McFarland v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 McGeshick v. Choucair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 McGuffey v. Gwinnett County School System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 McIntyre v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 McKenna; McDaniel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 McKenna v. Twin Cities Area New Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 McKenzie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 McLaughlin v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 517rep123b 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxvii Page McLaughlin v. North Carolina Bd. of Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 McLeod v. News-Register Publishing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 McLeod v. Oregon Lithoprint, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 McMahan & Co.; Wherehouse Entertainment, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1190 McMillan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 McNeel v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 McNelton v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 McQueen, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 McQueen v. Cannon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 McQueen v. Hayes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 McQueen v. Mata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 McQueen v. Turner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 McReynolds v. Pataki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 McWilliams v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Medina v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Medina-Acevedo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Medlock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Medtronic, Inc.; Lohr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Meeks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Melahn; Warmus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Melancon v. Rader . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Melka Marine, Inc., In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Melka Marine, Inc. v. Colonial Beach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Melkonian v. Truck Ins. Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Mellon Bank, N. A.; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Meloy; Davenport v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Meloy; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158,1230 Menacker; Jedrzejewski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Mendoza-Figueroa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Menken v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Menna's Estate v. St. Agnes Medical Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Mercer v. Monzack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Merkle; Aleali v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Mertz v. Key West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Messler v. Farmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Metcalfe v. Kelly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Metcalfe v. Metcalfe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Methodist Hospital of Ind.; Tinsley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Metrolaser, Inc.; Jacob v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Dodson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.; Cheng v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Meyer v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Meyer, Inc. v. Casey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 517rep123b 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Micci, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117,1231 Michigan; Bennis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Michigan Attorney Grievance Comm'n; Pitsch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Middlesex Mut. Assurance Co.; Clinton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Midwest Motor Express v. Central States, S. E. & S. W. Areas Pens. Fd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Mier v. Van Dyke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Miller v. AmSouth Bancorp., N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Miller v. Federal Communications Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Miller; Federal Communications Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Miller; National Assn. of Broadcasters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Miller v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Miller v. Oregon State Prison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Miller v. Purkett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Miller; Slaton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Miller v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Miller v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103,1147,1228 Mills v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Mills v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Milton S. Katz & Associates; Vrba v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Mims, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Mims v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Minetti v. Longshoremen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Minnesota; Bowles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Minnesota; Ford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Minnesota; Pettee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Minnesota; R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Minnesota; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Misch v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Misek-Falkoff v. International Business Machines Corp. . . . . . 1111,1230 Misek-Falkoff v. Keller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 Mississippi; Alexander v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Mississippi; Bevill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Mississippi; Boyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Mississippi; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Shepherd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Mitchell v. Bilby-Knight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Mitchell v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Mitrano, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Mitrano v. Colonial Beach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 M. L. B. v. S. L. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118,1185 Mock v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Environmental Resources . . . . . . . 1216 Moises Luna and Associates; Gonzalez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Molina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 517rep123b 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxix Page Moltan Co. v. Swaim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Monreal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Montana; Craig v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Montana v. Fort Belknap Indian Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Montana Dept. of Corrections and Human Services; Wolfe v. . . . . 1192 Montana Dept. of Transportation; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Montanez; Illinois v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Monterey County; Lopez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Montgomery; Dayton Area Visually Impaired Persons, Inc. v. . . . 1135 Montgomery County Dept. of Social Services; Harris v. . . . . . . . . 1132 Montgomery Ward Credit Corp.; Tucker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Montoya v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Monzack; Mercer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Moomchi v. University of N. M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Moon v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Moo & Oink, Inc.; Stancil v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Moore; Apache Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Moore; Cantrell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Moore v. Dupree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Moore v. Electrical Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Moore; Gamble v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 Moore; Kornahrens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Moore; Lancour v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Moore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Moore v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Moose Lodge #259 (Salt Lake City) v. Department of ABC . . . . . 1221 Morales v. Industrial Comm'n of Ariz. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Morata v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Moretti v. Hackensack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Morgan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148,1207 Morgan Hill; Berger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Morris v. Housing Authority of Kansas City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Morris v. King . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Morris v. School Bd. of Norfolk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Morrison v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Morrison-Knudsen Co.; Gold v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Morris Products, Inc.; Arvin-Thornton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Morrow v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Morrow v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Morse v. Republican Party of Va. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 Morton; Flemmings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Morton; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Morton; Square v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Mosier v. Kroger Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 517rep123b 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Motley v. Marathon Oil Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Moyer; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Mrozowski; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Mukherjee v. Sheraton-Palace Hotel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Mulazim v. Nuckles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Mullens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Mullholand v. Harris Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Munoz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Muraca, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Murdock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Murphy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Murray; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Murray; Construction Workers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Murray v. Roach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Murray v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Murtagh; Berks County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Musser v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Myers; Catanio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Myers; Ornelas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Myles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Nadal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Nagle; Cotton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Nagle; Grennier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Nagle; Harvell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Nakamoto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Nakamura; Kobayashi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Namba; Estes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144,1230 Nance v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Nansay Haw., Inc. v. Public Access Shoreline Haw. . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Nash v. Lacombe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Correction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Nassimos v. New Jersey Bd. of Examiners of Master Plumbers . . 1244 National Assn. of Broadcasters v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 National Assn. of Review Appraisers & Mortgage Underwriters, Inc. v. Appraisal Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 National Assn., Reversionary Prop. Owners v. Surface Transp. Bd. 1106 National Basketball Assn.; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 National Labor Relations Bd.; Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. . . . . . 781 National Labor Relations Bd.; Holly Farms Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . 392 National Labor Relations Bd.; President Container, Inc. v. . . . . . 1243 National Labor Relations Bd.; Teamsters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 National Mediation Bd.; Bravo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 National Railroad Passenger Corp. (AMTRAK); Lebron v. . . . . . 1188 National Solid Wastes Management Assn.; Meyer v. . . . . . . . . . . 1119 517rep123b 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxi Page National Super Markets, Inc.; Bass v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 NationsBanc Mortgage Corp.; Saleem v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Nava v. United States Soccer Federation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Navajo County Bd. of Supervisors; Stanislaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Navarro v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Nave v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Neal v. Cooper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Nebraska; Hansen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Neely v. Rutherford County Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Nehemiah Plan Homes Project; Elgendy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Nelson; Barnett Bank of Marion County, N. A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Nelson v. Cannon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Nelson v. Hopkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Nelson v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Nelson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113,1229 Nelthropp; Ross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Nernberg v. Ludmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Netherland v. Tuggle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1301 Netter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Neufeld v. Baltimore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Nevada; DeBarr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Nevada; Hasa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Nevada; McNelton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Nevada; Riker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Nevada Bd. of Medical Examiners; Bass v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Newberry; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 New Hampshire; Covillion v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 New Hampshire; Grant-Chase v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 New Hampshire; Rios v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 New Hampshire Bd. of Licensure for Land Surveyors; Smith v. . 1191 New Hampshire Motor Transport v. Plaistow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 New Haven; Hansen's Estate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 New Jersey; Ayars v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113,1227 New Jersey v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 New Jersey; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 New Jersey Bd. of Examiners of Master Plumbers; Nassimos v. . 1244 New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services; Delbridge v. 1146 Newman v. Consolidation Coal Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Newman v. Worcester County Dept. of Social Services . . . . . . . . 1136 New Mexico; Aguilar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 New Mexico; Hernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 New Mexico; Texas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 New Mexico Dept. of Human Services v. Joseph A. . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 New Mexico Securities Division; Jenkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 517rep123b 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page News-Register Publishing Co.; McLeod v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Newton; Aguilar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145,1230 Newton v. Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants, Su- preme Court of Ga. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 New York; Abdul Hakeem v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 New York; Brito v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 New York; Iadarola v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 New York; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 New York; Kelley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 New York; Larrabee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 New York; New Jersey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 New York; Slade v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 New York; Sussman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 New York City; Bal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 New York City; Department of Commerce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 New York City; Oklahoma v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 New York City; Wisconsin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 New York City Police Dept.; Liu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 New York Comm'n of Correction; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 New York State Workers' Compensation Bd.; White v. . . . . . . . . 1144 New York Telephone; Olenick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Nguyen Huu To v. Rubin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Nicholas v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Nichols; Cotner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Nicit v. Nicit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Nighttime Concepts, Inc. v. Pennsylvania State Police, Bureau of Liquor Control Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 Nintendo of America, Inc.; Gussin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Noble v. Columbia County Redevelopment Authority . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Nobles v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Nobles v. Welborn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Nock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Nolan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Noland; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 535 Nooner v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Nordvik v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Norris v. Robinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Norris; Russell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 North Carolina; Boyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 North Carolina; Burr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 North Carolina; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 North Carolina; Frye v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 North Carolina; Gregory v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 North Carolina; Lynch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143,1252 517rep123b 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxiii Page North Carolina; McCarver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 North Carolina; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 North Carolina; Shrader v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 North Carolina; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 North Carolina; Sneeden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 North Carolina; Walls v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 North Carolina Bd. of Elections; McLaughlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Norton; Kailey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Norton; Ross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Norton; Salazar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Norwest Corp. v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Notheis v. Petkovich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Noxon, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Nuckles; Mulazim v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Nunez v. Costello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Nunez v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Nuss v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Nuth; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 NYNEX; Troni v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 NYSA­ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund; De Buono v. . . . 1232 Oberg; Honda Motor Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Occupational Safety and Health Administration; Mates v. . . . . 1105,1204 O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308 Oden v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Office of Personnel Management; Alcones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Office of Personnel Management; Alferos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139,1251 Office of Personnel Management; Alvarez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Office of Personnel Management; Bernardez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Office of Personnel Management; Bondad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139,1252 Office of Personnel Management; Cabiles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Office of Personnel Management; Calisaan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Office of Personnel Management; Carpio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Office of Personnel Management; Cayanan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Office of Personnel Management; Coronel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140,1252 Office of Personnel Management; Corpuz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Office of Personnel Management; Cudal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Office of Personnel Management; Custodio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Office of Personnel Management; Daguinotnot v. . . . . . . . . . . 1138,1251 Office of Personnel Management; Danao v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Office of Personnel Management; De Guzman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Office of Personnel Management; De Jesus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Office of Personnel Management; Dela Rea v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Office of Personnel Management; Delos Reyes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Office of Personnel Management; Dungca v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 517rep123b 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Office of Personnel Management; Escusa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Office of Personnel Management; Filamor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Office of Personnel Management; Florentino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139,1252 Office of Personnel Management; Foronda v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141,1252 Office of Personnel Management; Garcia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141,1252 Office of Personnel Management; Ibalio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Office of Personnel Management; Isla v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139 Office of Personnel Management; Magante v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Office of Personnel Management; Maglalang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Office of Personnel Management; Mauricio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Office of Personnel Management; Mayo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Office of Personnel Management; Navarro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Office of Personnel Management; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Office of Personnel Management; Nobles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Office of Personnel Management; Nuss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Office of Personnel Management; Paje v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Office of Personnel Management; Palo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Office of Personnel Management; Pantilon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Office of Personnel Management; Quiba v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138,1251 Office of Personnel Management; Rabe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139,1252 Office of Personnel Management; Reyes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Office of Personnel Management; Sanchez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Office of Personnel Management; Sandoval v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Office of Personnel Management; Santos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141,1252 Office of Personnel Management; Siwa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Office of Personnel Management; Tillo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Office of Personnel Management; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Office of Queens County District Attorney; Bernard v. . . . . . . . . 1143 O'Gilvie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Ohio; Bies v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Ohio; Burke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Ohio; Christopher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Ohio; D'Ambrosio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Ohio; Garner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147,1230 Ohio; Gumm v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Ohio; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Ohio; Kinley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Ohio; Oden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Ohio; Phillips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Ohio; Richey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Ohio v. Robinette . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154,1242 Ohio Adult Parole Authority; Winters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Ohio Agricultural Commodity Depositors Fund v. Mahern . . . . . . 1130 Ohio Department of Development; Liggins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 517rep123b 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxv Page Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction; Popke v. . . . . 1224 Okayfor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 O'Kicki, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117,1231 Oklahoma; Berget v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Oklahoma; Braun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Oklahoma; Bryson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Oklahoma; Colbert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Oklahoma; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348 Oklahoma; Cotner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Oklahoma; Current v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Oklahoma; Hai Cong Pham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Oklahoma; Hatch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Oklahoma; Hooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Oklahoma; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Oklahoma; Martinez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Oklahoma; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Oklahoma v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Oklahoma v. Ponca Tribe of Okla. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Oklahoma; Powell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Oklahoma; Shabazz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172,1196 Oklahoma City; Sawatzky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Okolie v. Richardson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Olds v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Oleka v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Olenick v. New York Telephone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Oliver v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Oliver v. Witkowski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Ollie v. Kuhn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Olsen v. Lane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158,1252 Olsen v. Sabal Marketing, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Oregon; Abbott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Oregon; Rise v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Oregon Lithoprint, Inc.; McLeod v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Oregon Public Utility Comm'n v. GTE Northwest Inc. . . . . . . . . . 1155 Oregon State Bar; Altstatt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Oregon State Bar; Kowalski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108,1230 Oregon State Prison; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Orlando; Hardy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139,1252 Ornelas v. Myers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Ornelas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 690 Ortiz v. Department of Health and Human Services . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Osborne v. First Federal Savings Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Osherow; Cluck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Owens v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 517rep123b 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Owens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Owensboro National Bank; Stephens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Brennan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Dudley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Pickering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Rekdahl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Assn., Inc.; Eagerton v. . . 1121 Oxford v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124,1252 OXY USA Inc. v. Continental Trend Resources, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Oyler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 P. v. Carlisle Area School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Pace; Tedder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Pacheco-Rodriguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Pacific Merchant Shipping Assn.; Veneman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Padgett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Padilla v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Padovano; Pearson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Pagan-San-Miguel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Page; Dedes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Page v. Texas Bd. of Pardons and Parole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123,1240 Paje v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Palacios v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Palmer Communications, Inc. v. Total TV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102,1152 Palmisano v. Bilandic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Palmisano v. Exec. Comm., U. S. Dist. Ct., N. Dist. of Ill. . . . . . . . 1223 Palo v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Pandey v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132,1251 Pantilon v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Parke; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 Parkhurst v. Shillinger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Parks v. Allstate Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Parsons; Shabazz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Paskvan; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Paster v. Tensas Basin Levee Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Pataki; McReynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Patent and Trademark Office; Schwarz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Pathology Laboratories of Ark.; Central States, S. E. & S. W. Areas Health and Welfare Fund v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Patin v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Patrick v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Patterson v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Paul Revere Life Ins. Co.; Pandey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132,1251 Pawtucket; Dyson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Pearson v. Padovano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 517rep123b 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxvii Page Pearson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Pedraza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Peeples v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Peloquin v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Pennsylvania; Bracey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Pennsylvania; Crawley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Pennsylvania; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Pennsylvania; Fried v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Pennsylvania; Graham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Pennsylvania; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Pennsylvania; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Pennsylvania; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141,1252 Pennsylvania; Wharton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections; Barbee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Pennsylvania Dept. of Environmental Resources; Mock v. . . . . . . 1216 Pennsylvania Municipal Service Co.; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Pennsylvania State Police, Bureau of Liquor Control Enforcement; Hospitality Investments of Philadelphia, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 Pennsylvania State Police, Bureau of Liquor Control Enforcement; Nighttime Concepts, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 Penson; Kelly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Pepper v. Damer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Perego v. King Instrument Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Perry v. Lewter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Petereit v. S. B. Thomas, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Petersen v. Government of Virgin Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Petitte Brothers Mining Co. v. Connors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Petkovich; Notheis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Pettee v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Pham v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Philadelphia Park; Robert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Philip Morris Inc. v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Philip Morris Products, Inc.; Arvin-Thornton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Phillips; McElrath v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Phillips v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Phillips v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Pic-A-State PA, Inc. v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Pickering; Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Pickering v. Unisys Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Pickering; Unisys Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Pickle v. Dutton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Pierce v. Iowa-Missouri Conference of Seventh-day Adventists . . 1220 Pillsbury Co. v. Port of Corpus Christi Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Piloto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 517rep123b 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Pincham, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Pine; D'Amario v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Pinkerton Security Services; Hardy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Piper, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Pitsch v. Michigan Attorney Grievance Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Pittman v. Chicago Bd. of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Pittsburgh Police Dept.; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Pittston Co. v. Babbitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Plaistow; New Hampshire Motor Transport v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic; Janklow v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Plantier; Emery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Platzer v. Barbour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Plenert; Bennett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Plott v. General Motors Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Plunk v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Plywood Panels, Inc.; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Poarch Band of Creek Indians; Alabama v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Pollack, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Polley v. Georgia State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Polur v. Grievance Committee for Southern Dist. of N. Y. . . . . . . 1196 Ponca Tribe of Okla.; Oklahoma v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Ponder v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Pope v. Hunt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Pope v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Popke v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction . . . . 1224 Porter v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Port of Corpus Christi Authority; Pillsbury Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Posner v. Central Synagogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Postmaster General; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Postmaster General; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Pourzandvakil v. Humphrey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Powell v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Powell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Powers v. Rockefeller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Powers; Rockefeller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Pozsgay v. Pozsgay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Pratt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Praxair, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 President Container, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . 1243 President of U. S.; Califorrniaa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Pressley v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Price v. Bossier Parish School Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Price v. McDade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 517rep123b 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxix Page Price v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Price Co. v. Fecht . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Price-El v. Gee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Prieto v. Crawford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Prince George's County; Thomason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Pringle v. Gillis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Pringle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Priore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Privett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Pro-Choice Network of Western N. Y.; Schenck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Procter & Gamble Co.; Bankers Trust Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Production Plated Plastics, Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Pruitt v. Howard County Sheriff's Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Pryce v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Public Access Shoreline Haw.; Nansay Haw., Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Public Utilities Comm'n of Cal.; Aaron v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Pudlo v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Pulido v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Purefoy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 Purkett; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Purkett; Woods v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Purnell; Smart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 706 Quantum Chemical Corp.; Lehtinen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Quantum Corp.; Rodime PLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Queens College of City Univ. of N. Y.; Soffer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Quiba v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138,1251 Rabe v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139,1252 Rader; Melancon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Radic v. Chicago Transit Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Ragan v. ContiCommodity Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Ram v. De Galan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Rambo; Daley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Ramer v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Ramer v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Ramey v. Ashland Oil, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109,1205 Ramos v. Bunnell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Ramos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Randall, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Raney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Rangel-Ibarra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Rashi v. Conley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Ratliff v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Rauser v. Beard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 517rep123c 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Ray; Dolcefino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Rayfield; Florida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Ready, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1131 Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. United States . . . . . . . . . 1208 Reed; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Reed v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Reese v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Reeves, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186,1207 Regency; Janneh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Reich; Skepton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Reich; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Reilly, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Rekdahl; Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Reliford v. Hodges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Reliford v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Reliford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Renelus v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Reno; Blackston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154,1232 Reno; Morrison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Reno; Nicholas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Reno; Pic-A-State PA, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Repsis; Crow Tribe of Indians v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Republican Party of Va.; Morse v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 Resorts International, Inc.; Lowenschuss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243 Revere Life Ins. Co.; Pandey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Reyes v. Lugo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Reyes v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Reynolds v. Vermont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Rhode Island; 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 484 Rhode Island; Gallipeau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Rhode Island; Jacques v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Rhodes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Richards v. Jefferson County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 793 Richardson v. Citibank (S. D.), N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Richardson; Okolie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Richardson; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Richey v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Richey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Rickles; Bishop v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Riggins v. Kasenow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Riggio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Riker v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 517rep123c 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxi Page Rios v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children and Family Servs. 1234 Rios v. New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Rise v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Rivens v. Dunn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Rivera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 Rivera Mining Co.; Simpson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109,1163 Riverdale Plating & Heat Treating Co.; Garcia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Rivers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Roach; Hines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Roach; Mattison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Roach; Murray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Roadway Express, Inc.; Dushaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Roane; Crawford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Roberson v. Suarez Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Robert v. Philadelphia Park . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Roberts v. Chater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Roberts v. Hanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Roberts; Hentz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Robertson; Alsberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Robertson; Alsberg Brothers Boatworks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Robertson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Robillard v. Baton Rouge Marine Contractors, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Robinette; Ohio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154,1242 Robinson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152,1230 Robinson; Edmond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Robinson v. Meloy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158,1230 Robinson; Norris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Robinson v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Robinson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149,1158,1220 Rockefeller v. Powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Rockefeller; Powers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 Rodenbaugh v. Leary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Rodime PLC v. Quantum Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Rodriguez; Caliendo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Rodriguez v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123,1205 Rodriguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112,1174 Rodriguez v. Wolf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Rodriguez de Castro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Rodriguez-Solel Botello v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Rogers v. Desiderio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Rogers v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Rogers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 517rep123c 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Roggy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Romer v. Evans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 620 Romero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Rosario v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Rose v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Roselin v. Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences . . . . . . . . . 1116 Rosen v. Iowa Bd. of Medical Examiners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Rosenberg v. Wachtler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Ross v. Nelthropp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Ross v. Norton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Ross v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Rourke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Roussos v. Allstate Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Roussos v. Baxley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Roussos v. Felter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Roy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132,1230 R. S. L. Layout & Design, Inc.; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Rubin; Nguyen Huu To v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Ruiz-Mendoza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Runyon; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Runyon; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Russell v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Russell v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Ruth v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Rutherford County Schools; Neely v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Rutledge v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292 Ruvalcaba v. Los Angeles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Rye Psychiatric Hospital Center, Inc. v. Surles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Saathoff v. Hesse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Sabal Marketing, Inc.; Olsen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Saccoccia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 St. Agnes Medical Center; Menna's Estate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 St. Augustine Manor; Cully v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 St. Clair v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 St. Johns County; Cafe 207, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 St. Ledger v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 St. Louis County v. Kornblum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. B & D Mechanical Contractors, Inc. 1167 St. Peter Villa, Inc. v. Linton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Salazar v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Salazar v. Norton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Saldamarco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Saleem v. NationsBanc Mortgage Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Sales v. Sparks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 517rep123c 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxiii Page Salzer v. Dellinger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Sampley; Indiana Dept. of Correction v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 San Antonio Independent School Dist.; DeLeon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Sanborn v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Sanchez v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Sanchez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173,1214,1246 Sanders v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Sanders v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147,1148,1238 San Diego County; Banks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 San Diego County; Klat v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Sandoval v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 San Francisco; Ziomek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist.; Gilbert v. . . . . . . . . 1108 San Mateo County Youth and Family Services Division; Hill v. . . 1170 Santa Ana Unified School Dist.; Class of Gutierrez v. . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Santa Clara County; Jensen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Santana-Castellano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228 Santiago v. Snyder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Santos v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141,1252 Saraco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Sarasota County; Bass v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Sartin v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125,1216 Saulsberry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Saunders v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Saunders; Graves v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Saunders v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Savage; Madden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Savell; Voigt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Sawatzky v. Oklahoma City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 S. B. Thomas, Inc.; Petereit v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Schake v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western N. Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Schmoke; Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 School Bd. of Norfolk; Morris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Schotten; Billups v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Schouman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Schriro; Harvey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Schroubroek; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Schulte v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Schumer; Hughes Aircraft Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Schusterman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Schutterle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Schwartz v. Aultman Health Services Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Schwartz v. Aultman Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 517rep123c 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Schwarz v. Patent and Trademark Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Schwarz v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Schwarzchild; Tse v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Scott v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 Scott v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Scott v. Moyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Scott; Reliford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Scott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114,1127 Scott; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Scott v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Scott P. v. Carlisle Area School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Seaman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117,1231 SeaRiver Maritime, Inc. v. Exxon Seamen's Union . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Sears v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Sears, Roebuck & Co.; Hanus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Sears, Roebuck & Co.; Woodbury v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Secakuku v. Hale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Secretary of Agriculture; Clifford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Secretary of Agriculture v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc. . . . 1232 Secretary of Agriculture; Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc. v. . . . 1233 Secretary of Army; Watkis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Secretary of Commerce; Environmental Coalition of Ojai v. . . . . . 1245 Secretary of HUD; Cost Control Marketing & Sales Mgmt. of Va. v. 1187 Secretary of Interior; Alaska v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Secretary of Interior; Fort Sumter Tours, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Secretary of Interior; Pittston Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Secretary of Interior v. Youpee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Secretary of Labor; Skepton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Secretary of Labor; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Secretary of Navy; Brazil v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Secretary of Treasury; Nguyen Huu To v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Aronson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Guzman Zayas v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1124,1205 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Jardine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; LeFevre v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Sudranski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110,1205 Securities and Exchange Comm'n; Blount v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Sedano v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Sedwick; Curiale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Seehan v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Seeley; Alabama v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Seikel, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117,1231 Sellers v. Boyd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 517rep123c 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxv Page Seminole Tribe of Fla.; Florida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Sessions; Bogan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Sever v. Bell Communications Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Sever v. Bellcore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Sever v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Sevigny v. Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107,1158 Sewell v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Shabazz v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172,1196 Shabazz v. Parsons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Shabazz v. Unknown Heads of Clandestine Secret Bodies of Lexing- ton Correc. Ctr. Mail Room & Lit. Rev. Comm. Members . . . . . . 1236 Shade; Fabian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Shaffer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 Shafii v. British Airways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Shak v. Tanaka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Sharif v. Welborn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Sharma; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Sharon; Tarabolski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Sharp v. Cawley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Shavers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Shaw v. Hunt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899 Shaw v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211 Shay; Borawick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc. v. Hughes, Hubbard & Reed . . . 1245 Shelby County Information Technology; Willis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Shelley School Dist.; Geery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Shell Oil Co.; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Shelstad v. West One Bank (Idaho) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Shelton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125,1239 Shepherd; Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Sheppard v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Sheraton-Palace Hotel; Mukherjee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Sheriff, Fulton County; Singer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Sherman; Citibank (S. D.), N. A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Sherman v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Sherrow v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Sherry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Sherwin-Williams; Central States, S. E. & S. W. Areas Pens. Fd. v. 1190 Shieh v. Ebershoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132,1218 Shieh v. Hathaway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132,1218 Shieh v. Kakita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343,1186 Shieh v. Krieger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343,1186 Shieh v. U. S. Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343,1186 Shillinger; Parkhurst v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 517rep123c 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Shipman; Barcher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Shoffeitt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Shorb v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Shores v. Foster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Shrader v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Siemens Power Corp.; Lindenmeier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Sikora v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Silks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Silva v. Madison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Silverburg v. Ashley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Simmons; Mangrum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Simmons v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173,1199 Simon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 Simone v. Worcester County Institution for Savings . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Simpson v. Childers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Simpson v. Cristino Rivera Mining Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109,1163 Sims v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Singer v. Sheriff, Fulton County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Singletary; Crabtree v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161,1240 Singletary; Dunn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Singletary; Koffiel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Singletary; Medina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Singletary; Mills v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Singletary; Smiddy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107,1205 Singletary; Stano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Singleton; Bolt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Sinis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Siqueros v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Sisk, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Siwa v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138 640 Broadway Renaissance Co. v. Eisner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Skepton v. Reich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Skupniewitz; Mack v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Slade v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Slaton v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Sledge v. Cummings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 S. L. J.; M. L. B. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118,1185 Small v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Small Business Administration; Eames v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Smart v. Purnell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Smiddy v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107,1205 Smiley v. Citibank (S. D.), N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 735,1118,1154 Smith; Broida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Smith v. Glenolden Borough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167,1251 517rep123c 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxvii Page Smith v. Hargett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Smith v. Herring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Smith v. Kuhlmann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 Smith v. McBride . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Smith v. New Hampshire Bd. of Licensure for Land Surveyors . . 1191 Smith v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Smith v. Nuth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Smith v. Parke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253 Smith v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141,1252 Smith v. Pittsburgh Police Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Smith v. Richardson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Smith v. R. S. L. Layout & Design, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1136 Smith v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188 Smith; Schulte v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Smith v. United States . . . . . . . 1101,1112,1122,1148,1191,1199,1249,1250 Smith; Wallace v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Smith & Nephew Dyonics, Inc. v. Violette . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Smithtown; SSC Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Sneeden v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Snurkowski v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Snyder; Claudio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Snyder; Santiago v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Soares v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Sobin v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Sofec, Inc.; Exxon Co., U. S. A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830 Soffer v. Queens College of City Univ. of N. Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Sokolow, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Soler-Somahano v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . 1144 Solventes y Quimica de Nicaragua, S. A. Solquimisa v. Weaver . . 1156 South Carolina; Holmes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 South Carolina Electric & Gas Co.; Griggs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Southeastern Pa. Transportation Authority; Dykes v. . . . . . . . . . 1142 Southwest Media Corp.; Dolenz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134,1240 Spagnoulo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Sparks; Dwyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Sparks; Sales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Sparky's Waterfront Saloon, Inc. v. Cosmopolitan, Inc. . . . . . . . . . 1189 Spears; Hayes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Spears v. State Bar of Ill. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Spellman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Spencer v. Spencer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Sperau; Ford Motor Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217 Spink; Lockheed Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882,1118 Spokane Tribe of Indians; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 517rep123c 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) lxxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Sprankle v. Sprankle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Spriggs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112 Springer v. Bend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 Spychala v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Square v. Morton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 SSC Corp. v. Smithtown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Stainer; Contreras v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Stancil v. Moo & Oink, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Standing Bear v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Stanislaw v. Navajo County Bd. of Supervisors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Stanley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 Stanley v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Stano v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Starbuck; Hernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Starks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 State. See also name of State. State Bar of Cal.; James v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 State Bar of Ill.; Spears v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 State Bar of Tex.; Levario v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 State Farm Automobile Ins. Co.; Barbee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.; Bolt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co.; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 State Farm Ins. Co.; Bynum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Stearns-Miller v. Ault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Stearns-Miller v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 Stedman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 Steeves v. Allen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Steeves v. Benson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Steinberg v. Bingham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134,1240 Steinberg v. Steinberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Stepard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Stephen v. Hewitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Stephens v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143,1205 Stephens v. Owensboro National Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Stern v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Steve Knight Steel Fabricators v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. 1134 Stevens v. Lincoln . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Stevens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 Stine v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Stitt v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Stone; Stramel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Stoorman v. Greenwood Trust Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Stork Brabant B. V. v. D'Almeida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Stramel v. Stone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 517rep123c 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxix Page Strickland v. Crowe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223 Strowski v. Bank of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106,1204 Struck v. Kennebec County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Strydom v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Stuart; Idaho v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Suarez Corp.; Roberson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Sudranski v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110,1205 Suggs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Sultan v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Summers, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Sumpter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Superintendent of penal or correctional institution. See name or title of superintendent. Superior Court of Cal., San Luis Obispo County; Dale v. . . . . . . . 1224 Superior Court of Cal., Santa Clara County; Hanlin v. . . . . . . . . . 1121 Supreme Court of Cal.; Hurst v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Surface Transp. Bd.; National Assn., Reversionary Prop. Owners v. 1106 Surles; Rye Psychiatric Hospital Center, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Sussman v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Suter; Jeffress v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Sutton v. Gibson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Swaim; Gurley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Swaim; Moltan Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Swano, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Swartz v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Sweat v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Sweeney; Apa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229 Sweeney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Swendra v. Woodford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Sykes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Sylvania Shoe Mfg. Corp.; Knapp Shoes Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Tafoya v. Zavaras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Talbott v. C. R. Bard, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Talley v. Flathead Valley Community College . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121,1216 Tam v. Continental Ins. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Tamakloe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127,1205 Tamburello v. Comm-Tract Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222 Tanaka; Shak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Tanner, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 Tarabolski v. Sharon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142 Target Sportswear, Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Tate v. James . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Tate v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Tatum v. Columbia Natural Resources, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 517rep123c 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xc TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Tax Comm'r of Ohio; General Motors Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Taylor, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Taylor v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Taylor v. Cobb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Taylor v. Hanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Taylor v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Taylor; Isaac v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238 Taylor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149,1222 Taylor; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Teague v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Teamsters v. National Labor Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Tedder v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 Tedder v. Pace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Tennessee; House v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Tennessee; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Tensas Basin Levee Dist.; Paster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Territory. See name of Territory. Terry v. Huffman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Terry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158 Texas; Baptiste v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 Texas; Bennett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109,1205 Texas; Campbell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140,1209 Texas; Casares v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 Texas; Fuller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Texas; McFarland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Texas; Morrow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Texas v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Texas; Oliver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Texas; Owens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Texas; Patrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 Texas Bd. of Pardons and Parole; Page v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123,1240 Tharp v. Iowa Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Tharpe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Tho Dinh Tran v. Dinh Truong Tran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Tho Dinh Tran; Dinh Truong Tran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Thomas; Echols v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Thomas v. Evans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Thomas; Felker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Thomas; Litz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135,1240 Thomas; Lonchar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314 Thomas; Moon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Thomas; Ramer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Thomas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128,1162,1191,1229,1240 Thomas, Inc.; Petereit v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 517rep123c 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xci Page Thomason v. Prince George's County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189 Thompson; Bartley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Thompson; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Thompson; Fields v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 Thompson; Lucas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Thompson; McBride v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Thompson; McCormack v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1173 Thompson v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Thompson; Windelberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Thomson v. Harmony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Thornbrugh v. Brett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Tighe, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Tilli v. Van Antwerpen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Tillo v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141 Tinsley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101 Tinsley v. Methodist Hospital of Ind. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 To v. Rubin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Tobisch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161 Tokhtameshev v. American National Can Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Toledo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Tootle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Total TV; Palmer Communications, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102,1152 Totemoff v. Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Tow-Motor Forklift Co.; Batts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Town. See name of town. Townzen v. El Dorado County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Tracey; General Motors Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 Tracy v. Chief of National Guard Bureau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Trahan v. Trahan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155,1251 Tran v. Dinh Truong Tran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Tran; Dinh Truong Tran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Tran v. Tho Dinh Tran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Tran; Tho Dinh Tran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Treadway v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 Trentz, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102 Triestman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157 Trippet v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Trippett; Kissane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Trivedi v. Department of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Troni, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 Troni v. NYNEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206 Truck Ins. Exchange; Melkonian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Trueblood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127 Truesdale v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215 517rep123c 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xcii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Trujillo v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Truong Tran v. Tho Dinh Tran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 Truong Tran; Tho Dinh Tran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1133 Tse v. Schwarzschild . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121 Tubridy; Fort Peck Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes v. . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Tucker, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207 Tucker v. Montgomery Ward Credit Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Tuggle; Netherland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1301 Turnbo; Coupar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Turner; McQueen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Turner; Ward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Turpin; Felker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1182,1218 Turpin; Graham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Turpin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1106 25th Judicial Dist. Probation Dept.; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Twin Cities Area New Party; McKenna v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Tyler v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Underwood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Union. For labor union, see name of trade. Union Security Life Ins. Co. v. Crocker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Unisys Corp. v. Pickering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Unisys Corp.; Pickering v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Unitarian-Universalist Society of Sacramento, Inc.; Burress v. . . . 1169 United Airlines, Inc.; Ellis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 United of Omaha Life Ins. Co.; Peloquin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 United Pentecostal Church International; Green v. . . . . . . . . 1134,1240 United States. See also name of other party. U. S. Congress; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 U. S. Court of Appeals; Arteaga v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 U. S. Court of Appeals; Calvo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 U. S. Court of Appeals; Free v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144 U. S. Court of Appeals; Graves v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124 U. S. Court of Appeals; Shieh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343,1186 U. S. District Court; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 U. S. District Court; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 U. S. District Judge; Curiale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 U. S. District Judge; Thornbrugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 U. S. District Judge; Tilli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.; Schwarz v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Co.; Knight v. . . . . . . . . . 1134 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Co.; Steve Knight Steel Fabricators v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134 "United States Marshal Edmo"; Harvey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 517rep123c 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xciii Page U. S. Postal Service; Morata v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 United States Soccer Federation; Nava v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 United States Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 University of Houston v. Chavez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184 University of Houston; Chavez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 University of N. M.; Moomchi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224 Unknown Heads of Clandestine Secret Bodies of Lexington Cor- rec. Ctr. Mail Room & Lit. Rev. Comm. Members; Shabazz v. . . 1236 Urban Homeowners' Corp. of New Orleans; Abrams v. . . . . . . . . 1165 Urena-Vasquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Ursery; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102,1153 USA Recycling, Inc. v. Babylon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Usher v. Duncan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Usry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 USX Corp.; American Premier Underwriters, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Utah; Duell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Utah; Glasscock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Utah State Tax Comm'n; Maryboy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220 Uzowuru v. Williams Brothers Construction Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Vahosky v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Vallejo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148 Van Antwerpen; Tilli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227 Van Dyke; Mier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Van Oss; Hernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Vanyo v. Fargo Women's Health Organization, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Vargas v. Garner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Vargas v. Gunn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107,1230 Vasquez v. Hernandez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Veneman v. Pacific Merchant Shipping Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221 Vera; Bush v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Vera; Lawson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Vera; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952 Verdugo v. California State Univ. at Los Angeles . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Vermont; Reynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Vickaryous v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Viclo Realty Co.; Gaston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Victory Savings Bank; Dingle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122 Villabona-Garnica v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114 Village. See name of village. Vining Industries, Inc.; Libman Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234 Violette; Smith & Nephew Dyonics, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Virginia; Al-Wahhab v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Virginia; Downs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Virginia; Fry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 517rep123c 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xciv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Virginia; Goodman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Virginia; Hawes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Virginia; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 Virginia; Sartin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125,1216 Virginia; Sheppard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Virginia; Wechsler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Virginia Beach; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Virginia Dept. of Taxation; Hyman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Virgin Islands; Peterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Virta v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199 Vista del Mar; Franklyn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169,1252 Voigt v. Savell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209 V­1 Oil Co. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 V­1 Propane v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208 Votteler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230 Vrba v. Milton S. Katz & Associates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 W. v. Margene L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 Wachtler; Rosenberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 Walden v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 Walker v. Ames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Walker v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109 Walker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 Wall, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Wallace v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Walls v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Walp v. Goodwin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Walsh v. Ivkovich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Walt Disney Co.; Bourne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Walt Disney Co.; Bourne Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240 Wapnick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1187 Ward; Brewer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164 Ward v. Turner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Warden. See name of warden. Warden, Md. House of Correction; Nasim v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163 Warmus v. Melahn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. . . . . . . . . . . . 1218 Warren, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Warren v. Keane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Washington v. Glucksberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 Washington; Hadley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111 Washington; Harvey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Washington; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Washington; Lucien v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108 Washington; Misch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 517rep123c 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xcv Page Washington v. Spokane Tribe of Indians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Washington v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Washington; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Westfarm Associates Ltd. Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Waterfront Comm'n of N. Y. Harbor; Carson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Watkis v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Watson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Watts v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 Waymer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119,1216 Weaver; Solventes y Quimica de Nicaragua, S. A. Solquimisa v. . . 1156 Webb v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 Webb v. Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Weber v. Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Wechsler v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Weinberg v. Management Co. Entertainment Group . . . . . . . . . . 1191 Weinig, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1242 Weitzman; Fraidin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Welborn; Nobles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Welborn; Sharif v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Welby; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 Wells, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Wells; Britt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213 Wells; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154 Wells County; Chapa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Wener; Maydak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236 Werner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119 Wesley v. Jenkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 West v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198 West; Watkis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Westfarm Associates Ltd. Partnership; Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 Westland Development Co. v. Albuquerque . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244 West One Bank (Idaho); Shelstad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156 Westview Instruments, Inc.; Markman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370 Whalen; Castner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Wharton v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247 Wheeler v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Wheless; Youngs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184,1247 Wherehouse Entertainment, Inc. v. McMahan & Co. . . . . . . . . . . 1190 White; Faunce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212 White v. New York State Workers' Compensation Bd. . . . . . . . . . 1144 White v. Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1103 White v. Zimmers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 517rep123c 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) xcvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Whitmore v. Federal Election Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Whren v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806 Wichita Falls State Hospital; Brooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Wilburta T. Holden Living Trust v. Joint City-County Bd. of Tax Assessors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167 Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc. v. Glickman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc.; Glickman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Williams, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186 Williams v. Abbey Medical, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239 Williams v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Williams; Bowersox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345 Williams v. Calderon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183 Williams v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Williams v. Love . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192 Williams v. National Basketball Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Williams v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148,1157,1228,1239 Williams v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Williams Brothers Construction Co.; Uzowuru v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152 Williamson; American Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231 Willis v. Bell, Rosenberg & Hughes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Willis v. General Dynamics Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Willis v. Georgia Dept. of Public Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210 Willis v. Shelby County Information Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Wilson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Wilson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246 Wilson v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233 Windelberg v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Windle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115 Winegarden; McCauley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149 Wingo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116 Winstar Corp.; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118,1185 Winston & Strawn v. Hyatt Regency Phoenix Hotel Co. . . . . . . . 1234 Winter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 Winters v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123 Wisconsin; Duquette v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Wisconsin v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Witkowski; Oliver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107 Witt, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185 Wodarski v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Wolf; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 Wolfberg v. Greenberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Wolfe v. Montana Dept. of Corrections and Human Services . . . . 1192 Wolff; Hosier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197 Wonderly v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146 517rep123c 01-05-99 17:52:23 PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume) TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xcvii Page Wood; Weber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Woodbury v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Woodford; Swendra v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Woods v. Purkett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Wootton v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Worcester County Dept. of Social Services; Newman v. . . . . . . . . 1136 Worcester County Institution for Savings; Simone v. . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd.; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Wornum v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1214 Worthey v. Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235 Wright v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Wright v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249 Wright v. Reich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237 Wright v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149,1163 Wyldes v. Hundley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172 Wynn v. AC Rochester . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Yarnell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201 Yates v. Godwin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159,1230 Ybarra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1174 Yeoman v. Dilley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196 Yildirim v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162 Youell; Exxon Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 Young v. Culver City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Young v. Harper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219 Young v. Office of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 Youngs v. Wheless . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184,1247 Youpee; Babbitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232 Zankich v. Allen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159 Zapata, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1132 Zavaras; Tafoya v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195 Zayas v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124,1205 Zhadanov v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169 Zilich v. Mazurkiewicz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248 Zimmers; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171 Ziomek v. San Francisco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Zolt v. Bingham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134,1230 Zzie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113 517us1$35z 02-23-99 16:33:32 PAGES OPINPGT CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AT OCTOBER TERM, 1995 WISCONSIN v. CITY OF NEW YORK et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit No. 94­1614. Argued January 10, 1996-Decided March 20, 1996* The Constitution's Census Clause vests Congress with the responsibility to conduct an "actual Enumeration" of the American public every 10 years, with the primary purpose of providing a basis for apportioning congressional representation among the States. That responsibility has been delegated to the Secretary of Commerce, who determined that an "actual Enumeration" would best be achieved in the 1990 census by not using a postenumeration survey (PES) statistical adjustment de- signed to correct an undercount in the initial enumeration. In this action brought by several of the respondents and others, the District Court concluded that the Secretary's decision not to statistically adjust the census violated neither the Constitution nor federal law. In revers- ing and remanding, the Court of Appeals looked to a line of precedent involving judicial review of intrastate districting decisions, see Wes- berry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1, and its progeny, and held, inter alia, that a heightened standard of review was required here because the Secre- tary's decision impacted the fundamental right to have one's vote counted and had a disproportionate impact upon certain identifiable minority racial groups. *Together with No. 94­1631, Oklahoma v. City of New York et al., and No. 94­1985, Department of Commerce et al. v. City of New York et al., also on certiorari to the same court. 1 517us1$35z 02-23-99 16:33:32 PAGES OPINPGT 2 WISCONSIN v. CITY OF NEW YORK Syllabus Held: Because it was reasonable to conclude that an "actual Enumeration" could best be achieved in the 1990 census without the PES-based statis- tical adjustment, the Secretary's decision not to use that adjustment was well within the constitutional bounds of discretion over the conduct of the census that is provided to the Federal Government. Pp. 13­24. (a) The Secretary's decision was not subject to heightened scrutiny. In two recent decisions, Department of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U. S. 442, and Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U. S. 788, this Court rejected the application of Wesberry's "one person-one vote" standard to Con- gress, concluding that the Constitution vests Congress with wide discre- tion over apportionment decisions and the conduct of the census, and that the appropriate standard of review examines a congressional deci- sion to determine whether it is "consistent with the constitutional lan- guage and the constitutional goal of equal representation," see Frank- lin, supra, at 804. Rather than the strict scrutiny standard applied in Wesberry and adopted by the Court of Appeals, the standard estab- lished in Montana and Franklin applies to the Secretary's decision here. The Constitution's text vests Congress with virtually unlimited discretion in conducting the "actual Enumeration," see Art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (Congress may conduct the census "in such Manner as they shall by Law direct"), and there is no basis for thinking that such discretion is more limited than that text provides. Through the Census Act, 13 U. S. C. § 141(a), Congress has delegated its broad authority over the census to the Secretary. Hence, so long as the Secretary's conduct of the census is "consistent with the constitutional language and the consti- tutional goal of equal representation," it is within the Constitution's limits. Pp. 13­20. (b) The Secretary's decision conformed to applicable constitutional and statutory provisions. In light of the Constitution's broad grant of au- thority to Congress, that decision need bear only a reasonable relation- ship to the accomplishment of an actual enumeration of the population, keeping in mind the census' constitutional purpose of apportioning congressional representation. The Secretary based the decision upon three determinations, each of which is well within the bounds of his constitutional discretion. First, he held that in light of the constitu- tional purpose, the census' distributive accuracy-i. e., getting most nearly correct the proportions of people in different areas-was more important than its numerical accuracy. A preference for distributive accuracy (even at the expense of some numerical accuracy) is not incon- sistent with the constitutional need to determine the apportionment of the Representatives among the States. Second, the Secretary's deter- mination that the unadjusted census data should be considered the most distributively accurate absent a showing to the contrary was based on 517us1$35z 02-23-99 16:33:32 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 1 (1996) 3 Syllabus his well-founded understanding of historical census practice and experi- ence, an important consideration in this context. See, e. g., Montana, supra, at 465. Respondents misplace their reliance on statistical ad- justments that were used in the 1970 and 1980 censuses, since those adjustments were of an entirely different type than the one at issue and took place on a dramatically smaller scale, and since a PES-based adjustment would have been the first time in history that the States' apportionment was based upon counts in other States. Third, respond- ents' contention that this Court should review de novo the Secretary's conclusions on this point fundamentally misapprehends the basis for def- erence to his determination, which arises not from the highly technical nature of his decision, but from the wide discretion bestowed by the Constitution upon Congress, and by Congress upon him. The Secre- tary's conclusion that the PES-based adjustment would not improve dis- tributive accuracy, which was based on his review of extensive research and the recommendations of some of his advisers, was a reasonable choice in an area where technical experts disagree. Pp. 20­24. 34 F. 3d 1114, reversed. Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Solicitor General Days argued the cause for the federal petitioners. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attor- ney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Malcolm L. Stewart, and Mark B. Stern. James E. Doyle, Attorney General of Wisconsin, argued the cause for peti- tioners in No. 94­1614 and No. 94­1631. With him on the brief for petitioner in No. 94­1614 was Peter C. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General. Don G. Holladay and Shelia D. Tims filed briefs for petitioner in No. 94­1631. Robert S. Rifkind argued the cause for respondents in all cases. With him on the brief were Paul A. Crotty, Lorna B. Goodman, Peter L. Zimroth, Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General of New York, Victoria Graffeo, Solicitor General, Barbara Billet, Deputy Solicitor General, and Lula Ander- son, Assistant Attorney General, James K. Hahn, Susan S. Sher, Benna Ruth Solomon, Robert A. Ginsburg, Helen M. Gros, Dennis Hayes, Frank Shafroth, Dan Morales, Attor- ney General of Texas, and Javier P. Guajardo, Special As- sistant Attorney General, Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney 517us1$35z 02-23-99 16:33:32 PAGES OPINPGT 4 WISCONSIN v. CITY OF NEW YORK Opinion of the Court General of Florida, and George L. Waas, Assistant Attorney General, Deborah T. Poritz, Attorney General of New Jersey, and Michael S. Bokar, Senior Deputy Attorney General, Grant Woods, Attorney General of Arizona, and Robert Carey, First Assistant Attorney General, Tom Udall, At- torney General of New Mexico, and Christopher D. Coppin, Assistant Attorney General, Ada Treiger, John J. Copelan, Jr., Louise Renne, Burk E. Delventhal, Stan M. Sharoff, T. Michael Mather, John P. Frank, Avis M. Russell, Nicholas Rodriguez, Robert Cohen, Michael W. L. McCrory, George Rios, Burton H. Levin, Pastel Vann, Assistant Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia, and Kendrick Smith. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. In conducting the 1990 United States Census, the Secre- tary of Commerce decided not to use a particular statistical adjustment that had been designed to correct an undercount in the initial enumeration. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Secretary's decision was subject to heightened scrutiny because of its effect on the right of individual respondents to have their vote counted equally. We hold that the Secretary's decision was not subject to heightened scrutiny, and that it conformed to applicable constitutional and statutory provisions. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Common- wealth of Pennsylvania by Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., Attorney General, and John G. Knorr III, Chief Deputy Attorney General; and for United States Senator Herb Kohl et al. by Brady C. Williamson. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the City of De- troit by Linda D. Fegins; and for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Jonathan L. Greenblatt, Paul C. Saunders, Herbert J. Hansell, Norman Redlich, Barbara R. Arnwine, Thomas J. Hender- son, Christopher A. Hansen, Steven R. Shapiro, Samuel Rabinove, Elaine R. Jones, Theodore M. Shaw, Charles Stephen Ralston, and Arthur N. Eisenberg. 517us1$35H 02-23-99 16:33:32 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 1 (1996) 5 Opinion of the Court I The Constitution requires an "actual Enumeration" of the population every 10 years and vests Congress with the au- thority to conduct that census "in such Manner as they shall by Law direct." 1 Art. I, § 2, cl. 3. Through the Census Act, 13 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., Congress has delegated to the Secre- tary of the Department of Commerce the responsibility to take "a decennial census of [the] population . . . in such form and content as he may determine . . . ." § 141(a). The Sec- retary is assisted in the performance of that responsibility by the Bureau of the Census and its head, the Director of the Census. See § 2; § 21 ("[The] Director shall perform such duties as may be imposed upon him by law, regulations, or orders of the Secretary"). The Constitution provides that the results of the census shall be used to apportion the Members of the House of Rep- resentatives among the States. See Art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("Repre- sentatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several States . . . according to their respective Numbers . . ."); Amdt. 14, § 2 ("Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State . . ."). Because the Constitution provides that the number of Representatives apportioned to each State determines in part the allocation to each State of votes for the election of the President, the decennial census also affects the allocation of members of the electoral college. See Art. II, § 1, cl. 2 ("Each State shall appoint . . . a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Num- ber of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress . . ."). Today, census data also have important consequences not delineated in the Consti- tution: The Federal Government considers census data in 1 The Census Clause provides in full: "The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct." Art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 517us1$35H 02-23-99 16:33:32 PAGES OPINPGT 6 WISCONSIN v. CITY OF NEW YORK Opinion of the Court dispensing funds through federal programs to the States, and the States use the results in drawing intrastate political districts. There have been 20 decennial censuses in the history of the United States. Although each was designed with the goal of accomplishing an "actual Enumeration" of the popula- tion, no census is recognized as having been wholly success- ful in achieving that goal.2 Cf. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 732 (1983) (recognizing that "census data are not per- fect," and that "population counts for particular localities are outdated long before they are completed"); Gaffney v. Cum- mings, 412 U. S. 735, 745 (1973) (census data "are inherently less than absolutely accurate"). Despite consistent efforts to improve the quality of the count, errors persist. Persons who should have been counted are not counted at all or are counted at the wrong location; persons who should not have been counted (whether because they died before or were born after the decennial census date, because they were not a resident of the country, or because they did not exist) are counted; and persons who should have been counted only once are counted twice. It is thought that these errors have resulted in a net "undercount" of the actual American popu- lation in every decennial census. In 1970, for instance, the Census Bureau concluded that the census results were 2.7% lower than the actual population.3 Brief for Respondents 12. 2 Indeed, even the first census did not escape criticism. Thomas Jeffer- son, who oversaw the conduct of that census in 1790 as Secretary of State, was confident that it had significantly undercounted the young Nation's population. See C. Wright, History and Growth of the United States Census 16­17 (1900). 3 One might wonder how the Census Bureau is able to determine whether there is an undercount and its size. Specifically: Against what standard are the census results measured? After all, if the actual popu- lation of the United States is known, then the conduct of the census would seem wholly redundant. For the most part, we are told, the size of the error in a particular census is determined by comparing the census results not with some defi- 517us1$35H 02-23-99 16:33:32 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 1 (1996) 7 Opinion of the Court The undercount is not thought to be spread consistently across the population: Some segments of the population are "undercounted" to a greater degree than are others, result- ing in a phenomenon termed the "differential undercount." Since at least 1940, the Census Bureau has thought that the undercount affects some racial and ethnic minority groups to a greater extent than it does whites. In 1940, for example, when the undercount for the entire population was 5.4%, the undercount for blacks was estimated at 8.4% (and the under- count for whites at 5.0%). Ibid. The problem of the differ- ential undercount has persisted even as the census has come to provide a more numerically accurate count of the popula- tion. In the 1980 census, for example, the overall under- count was estimated at 1.2%, and the undercount of blacks was estimated at 4.9%. Ibid. The Census Bureau has recognized the undercount and the differential undercount as significant problems, and in the past has devoted substantial effort toward achieving their reduction. Most recently, in its preparations for the 1990 census, the Bureau initiated an extensive inquiry into vari- ous means of overcoming the impact of the undercount and the differential undercount. As part of this effort, the Bu- reau created two task forces: the Undercount Steering Com- mittee, responsible for planning undercount research and pol- icy development; and the Undercount Research Staff (URS), which conducted research into various methods of improving the accuracy of the census. In addition, the Bureau con- sulted with state and local governments and various outside experts and organizations. Largely as a result of these efforts, the Bureau adopted a wide variety of measures designed to reduce the rate of nite and established measure of the population, but rather with estimates of the population developed from demographic data. See App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 94­1614, pp. 158a­168a, 366a­369a (hereinafter Pet. App.). A similar procedure traditionally has been used to determine the size and makeup of the differential undercount, see infra, at 9­10. 517us1$35H 02-23-99 16:33:32 PAGES OPINPGT 8 WISCONSIN v. CITY OF NEW YORK Opinion of the Court error in the 1990 enumeration, including an extensive ad- vertising campaign, a more easily completed census ques- tionnaire, and increased use of automation, which among other things facilitated the development of accurate maps and geographic files for the 1990 census. Pet. App. 321a­ 322a.4 The Bureau also implemented a number of improve- ments specifically targeted at eliminating the differential undercount; these included advertising campaigns developed by and directed at traditionally undercounted populations and expanded questionnaire assistance operations for non- English speaking residents. Ibid. In preparing for the 1990 census, the Bureau and the task forces also looked into the possibility of using large-scale statistical adjustment to compensate for the undercount and differential undercount. Although the Bureau had pre- viously considered that possibility (most recently in 1980), it always had decided instead to rely upon more traditional methodology and the results of the enumeration. See Cuomo v. Baldrige, 674 F. Supp. 1089 (SDNY 1987) (noting that Bureau rejected large-scale statistical adjustment of the 1980 census). In 1985, preliminary investigations by the URS suggested that the most promising method of statistical adjustment was the "capture-recapture" or "dual system estimation" (DSE) approach. The particular variations of the DSE considered by the Bureau are not important for purposes of this opinion, but an example may serve to make the DSE more understandable. Imagine that one wanted to use DSE in order to determine the number of pumpkins in a large pumpkin patch. First, one would choose a particular section of the patch as the representative subset to which the "recapture" phase will be applied. Let us assume here that it is a section exactly one-tenth the size of the entire patch that is selected. Then, 4 All references to Pet. App. are to the appendix to the petition for certiorari in No. 94­1614 unless otherwise noted. 517us1$35H 02-23-99 16:33:32 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 1 (1996) 9 Opinion of the Court at the next step-the "capture" stage-one would conduct a fairly quick count of the entire patch, making sure to record both the number of pumpkins counted in the entire patch and the number of pumpkins counted in the selected section. Let us imagine that this stage results in a count of 10,000 pumpkins for the entire patch and 1,000 pumpkins for the selected section. Next, at the "recapture" stage, one would perform an exacting count of the number of pumpkins in the selected section. Let us assume that we now count 1,100 pumpkins in that section. By comparing the results of the "capture" phase and the results of the "recapture" phase for the selected section, it is possible to estimate that approxi- mately 100 pumpkins actually in the patch were missed for every 1,000 counted at the "capture" phase. Extrapolating this data to the count for the entire patch, one would con- clude that the actual number of pumpkins in the patch is 11,000. In the context of the census, the initial enumeration of the entire population (the "capture") would be followed by the postenumeration survey (PES) (the "recapture") of certain representative geographical areas. The Bureau would then compare the results of the PES to the results of the initial enumeration for those areas targeted by the PES, in order to determine a rate of error in those areas for the initial enumeration (i. e., the rate at which the initial enumeration undercounted people in those areas). That rate of error would be extrapolated to the entire population, and thus would be used to statistically adjust the results of the ini- tial enumeration. The URS thought that the PES also held some promise for correcting the differential undercount. The PES would be conducted through the use of a system called post- stratification. Thus, each person counted through the PES would be placed into one, and only one, of over 1,000 post- strata defined by five categories: geography; age; sex; status 517us1$35H 02-23-99 16:33:32 PAGES OPINPGT 10 WISCONSIN v. CITY OF NEW YORK Opinion of the Court of housing unit (rent versus own); and race (including His- panic versus non-Hispanic origin).5 By comparing the post- stratified PES data to the results of the initial enumeration, the Bureau would be able to estimate not only an overall undercount rate, but also an undercount rate for each post- strata. Hence, the statistical adjustment of the census could reflect differences in the undercount rate for each poststrata. Through the mid-1980's, the Bureau conducted a series of field tests and statistical studies designed to measure the utility of the PES as a tool for adjusting the census. The Director of the Bureau decided to adopt a PES-based adjust- ment, and in June 1987, he informed his superiors in the De- partment of Commerce of that decision. The Secretary of Commerce disagreed with the Director's decision to adjust, however, and in October 1987, the Department of Commerce announced that the 1990 census would not be statistically adjusted. In November 1988, several plaintiffs (including a number of the respondents in this action) brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, arguing that the Secretary's decision against statistical ad- justment of the 1990 census was unconstitutional and con- trary to federal law. The parties entered into an interim stipulation providing, inter alia, that the Secretary would reconsider the possibility of a statistical adjustment. In July 1991, the Secretary issued his decision not to use the PES to adjust the 1990 census. Pet. App. 135a­415a. The Secretary began by noting that large-scale statistical 5 Examples of poststrata actually used include: female blacks between the ages of 20 and 29 who owned a home in either Detroit or Chicago; nonblack non-Hispanic females, aged 45­64, living in owned or rented housing in a nonmetropolitan area with a population of 10,000 or more in Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, or Wyo- ming; and male Asians or Pacific Islanders, aged 65 or above, renting a home in either the Los Angeles-Long Beach area or another central city in a metropolitan area in Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, or Washington. 517us1$35H 02-23-99 16:33:33 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 1 (1996) 11 Opinion of the Court adjustment of the census through the PES would "abandon a two hundred year tradition of how we actually count people." Id., at 138a. Before taking a "step of that magnitude," he held, it was necessary to be "certain that it would make the census better and the distribution of the population more accurate." Ibid. Emphasizing that the primary purpose of the census was to apportion political representation among the States, the Secretary concluded that "the primary crite- rion for accuracy should be distributive accuracy-that is, getting most nearly correct the proportions of people in dif- ferent areas." Id., at 146a­147a. After reviewing the recommendations of his advisers and the voluminous statistical research that had been compiled, the Secretary concluded that although numerical accuracy (at the national level) might be improved through statistical adjustment, he could not be confident that the distributive accuracy of the census-particularly at the state and local level-would be improved by a PES-based adjustment.6 Id., at 140a­141a, 200a­201a. In particular, the Secretary noted, the adjusted figures became increasingly unreliable as one focused upon smaller and smaller political subdivisions. Id., at 142a. The Secretary stated that his decision not to adjust was buttressed by a concern that adjustment of the 1990 census might present significant problems in the future. Id., at 143a. Because small changes in adjustment methodology would have a large impact upon apportionment-an impact that could be determined before a particular methodology was chosen-the Secretary found that statistical adjustment 6 The distinction between distributive and numerical accuracy becomes clear with an example. Imagine that the Bureau somehow were able to determine definitely that the census had failed to count exactly 10 million people nationwide. If those 10 million "persons" were added to the Na- tion's total population, and all 10 million were allocated to one particular State, then the numerical accuracy of the census would be improved, but the distributive accuracy would almost certainly be significantly impaired. 517us1$35H 02-23-99 16:33:33 PAGES OPINPGT 12 WISCONSIN v. CITY OF NEW YORK Opinion of the Court of the 1990 census might open the door to political tampering in the future. The Secretary also noted that statistical ad- justment might diminish the incentive for state and local po- litical leaders to assist in the conduct of the initial enumera- tion. See id., at 143a­144a. In conclusion, the Secretary stated that the Bureau would continue its research into the possibility of statistical adjustment of future censuses, and would maintain its efforts to improve the accuracy and inclu- siveness of the initial enumeration. Id., at 145a. The plaintiffs returned to court. The District Court con- cluded that the Secretary's decision violated neither the Con- stitution nor federal law. See New York v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 822 F. Supp. 906 (EDNY 1993). Respondents appealed, arguing that the District Court had adopted the wrong standard of review for their constitu- tional claim,7 and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed by a divided vote. 34 F. 3d 1114 (1994); Pet. App. 1a­40a. The majority looked to a line of precedent involv- ing judicial review of intrastate districting decisions, see, e. g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725 (1983); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1 (1964), and found that a heightened standard of review was required here both because the Sec- retary's decision impacted a fundamental right, viz., the right to have one's vote counted, and because the decision had a disproportionate impact upon certain identifiable mi- nority racial groups. 34 F. 3d, at 1128. The court then held that the plaintiffs had shown that the Secretary had failed to make a good-faith effort to achieve equal districts as nearly as possible, id., at 1130, and therefore that the defend- ants must bear the burden of proving that population devia- tions were necessary to achieve some legitimate state goal, id., at 1131. The court remanded for an inquiry into whether the Secretary could show that the decision not to 7 Respondents did not appeal the District Court's treatment of their statutory claims. 517us1$35H 02-23-99 16:33:33 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 1 (1996) 13 Opinion of the Court adjust was essential for the achievement of a legitimate governmental objective. Ibid. The dissenting judge stated that he would have affirmed based upon the decision of the District Court. See ibid. He also noted that the majority's decision created a conflict with two other decisions of the Courts of Appeals. See De- troit v. Franklin, 4 F. 3d 1367 (CA6 1993), and Tucker v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 958 F. 2d 1411 (CA7 1992). Wisconsin, Oklahoma, and the United States each filed a petition for certiorari. We granted those petitions, and consolidated them for argument. 515 U. S. 1190 (1995). We now reverse. II In recent years, we have twice considered constitutional challenges to the conduct of the census. In Department of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U. S. 442 (1992), the State of Montana, several state officials, and Montana's Members of Congress brought suit against the Federal Government, challenging as unconstitutional the method used to deter- mine the number of Representatives to which each State is entitled. A majority of a three-judge District Court looked to the principle of equal representation for equal numbers of people that was applied to intrastate districting in Wesberry v. Sanders, supra, and held it applicable to congressional ap- portionment of seats among the States. Noting a significant variance between the population of Montana's single district and the population of the "ideal district," the court found that Congress' chosen method of apportionment violated the principle of Wesberry, and therefore voided the federal stat- ute providing the method of apportionment. In a unanimous decision, this Court reversed. We began by revisiting Wesberry, a case in which the Court held uncon- stitutional wide disparities in the population of congressional districts drawn by the State of Georgia. Montana, supra, at 459­460. We recognized that the principle of Wesberry- " `equal representation for equal numbers of people' "-had 517us1$35H 02-23-99 16:33:33 PAGES OPINPGT 14 WISCONSIN v. CITY OF NEW YORK Opinion of the Court evolved though a line of cases into a strictly enforced re- quirement that a State " `make a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality' " among the populations of congressional districts. See Montana, supra, at 460, quot- ing Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S. 526, 530­531 (1969) (disparities between congressional districts in Missouri held unconstitutional); see also Karcher v. Daggett, supra (1% dis- parity between population of New Jersey districts held un- constitutional). Returning to Montana's challenge to Con- gress' apportionment decision, we noted that the Wesberry line of cases all involved intrastate disparities in the popu- lation of voting districts that had resulted from a State's redistricting decisions, whereas Montana had challenged in- terstate disparities resulting from the actions of Congress. Montana, supra, at 460. We found this difference to be significant beyond the sim- ple fact that Congress was due more deference than the States in this area. Wesberry required a State to make "a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality" in the size of voting districts. Kirkpatrick, supra, at 530­531. While this standard could be applied easily to intrastate dis- tricting because there was no "theoretical incompatibility en- tailed in minimizing both the absolute and the relative differ- ences" in the sizes of particular voting districts, we observed that it was not so easily applied to interstate districting deci- sions where there was a direct tradeoff between absolute and relative differences in size. Montana, supra, at 461­462. Finding that Montana demanded that we choose between several measures of inequality in order to hold the Wesberry standard applicable to congressional apportionment deci- sions, we concluded that "[n]either mathematical analysis nor constitutional interpretation provide[d] a conclusive answer" upon which to base that choice. Montana, supra, at 463. We further found that the Constitution itself, by guaran- teeing a minimum of one representative for each State, made it virtually impossible in interstate apportionment to achieve 517us1$35H 02-23-99 16:33:33 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 1 (1996) 15 Opinion of the Court the standard imposed by Wesberry. Montana, supra, at 463. In conclusion, we recognized the historical pedigree of the challenged method of apportionment, and reemphasized that Congress' "good-faith choice of a method of apportion- ment of Representatives among the several States `according to their respective Numbers' commands far more deference than a state districting decision that is capable of being reviewed under a relatively rigid mathematical standard." Montana, supra, at 464. In Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U. S. 788 (1992), we re- iterated our conclusion that the Constitution vests Congress with wide discretion over apportionment decisions and the conduct of the census. In Franklin, the State of Massachu- setts and two of its registered voters sued the Federal Gov- ernment, arguing that the method used by the Secretary to count federal employees serving overseas was (among other things) unconstitutional. Restating the standard of review established by Montana, we examined the Secretary's deci- sion in order to determine whether it was "consistent with the constitutional language and the constitutional goal of equal representation." See Franklin, supra, at 804; Mon- tana, supra, at 459. After a review of the historical practice in the area, we found that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving that a decision contrary to that made by the Secretary would "make representation . . . more equal." Franklin, 505 U. S., at 806. Concluding that the Secretary's decision reflected a "judgment, consonant with, though not dictated by, the text and history of the Constitution . . . ," we held the Secretary's decision to be well within the con- stitutional limits on his discretion. Ibid. In its decision in this action, the Court of Appeals found that a standard more strict than that established in Montana and Franklin should apply to the Secretary's decision not to statistically adjust the census. The court looked to equal protection principles distilled from the same line of state re- districting cases relied upon by the plaintiffs in Montana, 517us1$35H 02-23-99 16:33:33 PAGES OPINPGT 16 WISCONSIN v. CITY OF NEW YORK Opinion of the Court and found that both the nature of the right asserted by re- spondents-the right to have one's vote counted equally- and the nature of the affected classes-"certain identifiable minority groups"-required that the Secretary's decision be given heightened scrutiny. 34 F. 3d, at 1128. The court drew from the District Court's decision "implicit" findings: that the census did not achieve equality of voting power as nearly as practicable; "that for most purposes and for most of the population [the PES-based] adjustment would result in a more accurate count than the original census; and that the adjustment would lessen the disproportionate under- counting of minorities." Id., at 1129. The court recognized two significant differences between the intrastate districting cases and the instant action: first, that this case involves the federal rather than a state govern- ment; and second, that constitutional requirements make it impossible to achieve precise equality in voting power na- tionwide. Ibid. But it found these differences nondetermi- native, deciding that no deference was owed to the Executive Branch on a question of law, and that the "impossibility of achieving precise mathematical equality is no excuse for [the Federal Government] not making [the] mandated good-faith effort." Ibid. The court found that the respondents here had established a prima facie violation of the Wesberry standard both by showing that the PES-based adjustment would increase numerical accuracy, and by virtue of the fact that "the differential undercount in the 1990 enumeration was plainly foreseeable and foreseen." 34 F. 3d, at 1130­ 1131. The court held that the Secretary's decision would have to be vacated as unconstitutional unless on remand he could show that the decision not to adjust "(a) furthers a governmental objective that is legitimate, and (b) is essential for the achievement of that objective." Id., at 1131. We think that the Court of Appeals erred in holding the "one person-one vote" standard of Wesberry and its progeny applicable to the action at hand. For several reasons, the 517us1$35H 02-23-99 16:33:33 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 1 (1996) 17 Opinion of the Court "good-faith effort to achieve population equality" required of a State conducting intrastate redistricting does not translate into a requirement that the Federal Government conduct a census that is as accurate as possible. First, we think that the Court of Appeals understated the significance of the two differences that it recognized between state redistricting cases and the instant action. The court failed to recognize that the Secretary's decision was made pursuant to Con- gress' direct delegation of its broad authority over the cen- sus. See Art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (Congress may conduct the census "in such Manner as they shall by Law direct"). The court also undervalued the significance of the fact that the Consti- tution makes it impossible to achieve population equality among interstate districts. As we have noted before, the Constitution provides that "[t]he number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every 30,000 persons; each State shall have at least one Representative; and district bound- aries may not cross state lines." Montana, 503 U. S., at 447­448. While a court can easily determine whether a State has made the requisite "good-faith effort" toward population equality through the application of a simple mathematical formula, we see no way in which a court can apply the Wes- berry standard to the Federal Government's decisions re- garding the conduct of the census. The Court of Appeals found that Wesberry required the Secretary to conduct a census that would "achieve voting-power equality," which it understood to mean a census that was as accurate as possible. 34 F. 3d, at 1129. But in so doing, the court implicitly found that the Constitution prohibited the Secretary from prefer- ring distributive accuracy to numerical accuracy, and that numerical accuracy-which the court found to be improved by a PES-based adjustment-was constitutionally preferable to distributive accuracy. See id., at 1131 ("[T]he Secretary did not make the required effort to achieve numerical accu- racy as nearly as practicable, . . . the burden thus shifted to 517us1$35H 02-23-99 16:33:33 PAGES OPINPGT 18 WISCONSIN v. CITY OF NEW YORK Opinion of the Court the Secretary to justify his decision not to adjust . . ."). As in Montana, where we could see no constitutional basis upon which to choose between absolute equality and relative equality, so here can we see no ground for preferring numeri- cal accuracy to distributive accuracy, or for preferring gross accuracy to some particular measure of accuracy. The Con- stitution itself provides no real instruction on this point, and extrapolation from our intrastate districting cases is equally unhelpful. Quite simply, "[t]he polestar of equal represen- tation does not provide sufficient guidance to allow us to discern a single constitutionally permissible course." Mon- tana, supra, at 463. In Montana, we held that Congress' "apparently good- faith choice of a method of apportionment of Representatives among the several States `according to their respective Num- bers' " was not subject to strict scrutiny under Wesberry. Montana, supra, at 464. With that conclusion in mind, it is difficult to see why or how Wesberry would apply to the Federal Government's conduct of the census-a context even further removed from intrastate districting than is con- gressional apportionment. Congress' conduct of the census, even more than its decision concerning apportionment, "com- mands far more deference than a state districting decision that is capable of being reviewed under a relatively rigid mathematical standard." 8 Montana, supra, at 464. Rather than the standard adopted by the Court of Ap- peals, we think that it is the standard established by this 8 Nor do we think that strict scrutiny applies here for some other reason. Strict scrutiny of a classification affecting a protected class is properly invoked only where a plaintiff can show intentional discrimination by the Government. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239­245 (1976). Re- spondents here have not argued that the Secretary's decision not to adjust was based upon an intent to discriminate on the basis of race. Indeed, in light of the Government's extraordinary efforts to include traditionally undercounted minorities in the 1990 census, see Pet. App. 78a, 321a­322a, we think that respondents here would have had a tough row to hoe had they set out to prove intentional discrimination by the Secretary. 517us1$35H 02-23-99 16:33:33 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 1 (1996) 19 Opinion of the Court Court in Montana and Franklin that applies to the Secre- tary's decision not to adjust. The text of the Constitution vests Congress with virtually unlimited discretion in con- ducting the decennial "actual Enumeration," 9 see Art. I, § 2, cl. 3, and notwithstanding the plethora of lawsuits that inevi- tably accompany each decennial census,10 there is no basis for thinking that Congress' discretion is more limited than the text of the Constitution provides. See also Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U. S. 345, 361 (1982) (noting broad scope of Con- gress' discretion over census). Through the Census Act, Congress has delegated its broad authority over the census to the Secretary.11 See 13 U. S. C. § 141(a) (Secretary shall take "a decennial census of [the] population . . . in such form and content as he may determine . . ."). Hence, so long as the Secretary's conduct of the census is "consistent with the 9 We do not decide whether the Constitution might prohibit Congress from conducting the type of statistical adjustment considered here. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 94­1614, pp. 40­42. 10 See, e. g., Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U. S. 788, 790 (1992) ("As one season follows another, the decennial census has again generated a number of reapportionment controversies"); National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty v. Brown, appeal pending, No. 94­5312 (CADC) (argued Oct. 6, 1995) (challenging Census Bureau's procedures for finding and counting homeless persons); Carey v. Klutznick, 637 F. 2d 834 (CA2 1980) (seeking order directing Census Bureau to adopt certain proc- esses for counting persons); Borough of Bethel Park v. Stans, 449 F. 2d 575 (CA3 1971). 11 We do not here decide the precise bounds of the authority delegated to the Secretary through the Census Act. First, because no party here has suggested that Congress has, in its delegation of authority over the conduct of the census to the Secretary, constrained the Secretary's author- ity to decide not to adjust the census, we assume here that the Secretary's discretion not to adjust the census is commensurate with that of Congress. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 94­1614, p. 24, n. 19 (stating that "Congress did not enact any . . . legislation . . . to compel . . . statistical adjustment" of the 1990 census). Second, although Oklahoma argues that Congress has constrained the Secretary's discretion to statistically adjust the decen- nial census, see 13 U. S. C. § 195, we need not decide that question in order to resolve this action. 517us1$35H 02-23-99 16:33:33 PAGES OPINPGT 20 WISCONSIN v. CITY OF NEW YORK Opinion of the Court constitutional language and the constitutional goal of equal representation," Franklin, 505 U. S., at 804, it is within the limits of the Constitution. In light of the Constitution's broad grant of authority to Congress, the Secretary's deci- sion not to adjust need bear only a reasonable relationship to the accomplishment of an actual enumeration of the popu- lation, keeping in mind the constitutional purpose of the census. In 1990, the Census Bureau made an extraordinary effort to conduct an accurate enumeration, and was successful in counting 98.4% of the population. See 58 Fed. Reg. 70 (1993); Brief for Federal Parties 28. The Secretary then had to consider whether to adjust the census using statistical data derived from the PES. He based his decision not to adjust the census upon three determinations. First, he held that in light of the constitutional purpose of the census, its distributive accuracy was more important than its numer- ical accuracy. Second, he determined that the unadjusted census data would be considered the most distributively accurate absent a showing to the contrary. And finally, after reviewing the results of the PES in light of extensive research and the recommendations of his advisers, the Secretary found that the PES-based adjustment would not improve distributive accuracy. Each of these three determi- nations is well within the bounds of the Secretary's constitu- tional discretion. As we have already seen, supra, at 18, the Secretary's de- cision to focus on distributive accuracy is not inconsistent with the Constitution. Indeed, a preference for distributive accuracy (even at the expense of some numerical accuracy) would seem to follow from the constitutional purpose of the census, viz., to determine the apportionment of the Repre- sentatives among the States. Respondents do not dispute this point. See Brief for Respondents 54 ("Distributive ac- curacy is an appropriate criterion for judging census accu- racy because it calls attention to a concern with the uses 517us1$35H 02-23-99 16:33:33 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 1 (1996) 21 Opinion of the Court to which census data are put"). Rather, they challenge the Secretary's first determination by arguing that he improp- erly "regarded evidence of superior numeric accuracy as `not relevant' to the determination of distributive accuracy." Id., at 39 (quoting Pet. App. 201a); see also Brief for Respondents 51­54. In support of this argument, respondents note that an enumeration that results in increased numerical accuracy will also result in increased distributive accuracy. We think that respondents rest too much upon the state- ment by the Secretary to which they refer. When quoted in full, the statement reads: "While the preponderance of the evidence leads me to believe that the total population at the national level falls between the census counts and the ad- justed figures, that conclusion is not relevant to the deter- mination of distributive accuracy." Pet. App. 201a. In his decision, the Secretary found numerical accuracy (in addi- tion to distributive accuracy) to be relevant to his decision whether to adjust. See id., at 157a. Even if the Secretary had chosen to subordinate numerical accuracy, we are not sure why the fact that distributive and numerical accuracy correlate closely in an improved enumeration would require the Secretary to conclude that they correlate also for a PES- based statistical adjustment. Turning to the Secretary's second determination, we pre- viously have noted, and respondents do not dispute, the im- portance of historical practice in this area. See Franklin, supra, at 803­806 (noting importance of historical experience in conducting the census); cf. Montana, 503 U. S., at 465 ("To the extent that the potentially divisive and complex issues associated with apportionment can be narrowed by the adop- tion of both procedural and substantive rules that are con- sistently applied year after year, the public is well served . . ."). Nevertheless, respondents challenge the Secretary's second determination by arguing that his understanding of historical practice is flawed. According to respondents, the Secretary assumed that the census traditionally was con- 517us1$35H 02-23-99 16:33:33 PAGES OPINPGT 22 WISCONSIN v. CITY OF NEW YORK Opinion of the Court ducted via a simple "headcount," thereby ignoring the fact that statistical adjustment had been used in both the 1970 and 1980 censuses. See Brief for Respondents 4­5. We need not tarry long with this argument. The Secre- tary reasonably recognized that a PES-based statistical ad- justment would be a significant change from the traditional method of conducting the census. The statistical adjust- ments in 1970 and 1980 to which respondents refer were of an entirely different type than the adjustment considered here, and they took place on a dramatically smaller scale. See Cuomo v. Baldrige, 674 F. Supp., at 1107 (rejecting ar- gument that Secretary had to conduct PES-like statistical adjustment of 1980 census and finding that "none of [the] adjustments in 1970 were even remotely similar to the types of wholesale adjustments presently suggested . . ."). More- over, the PES-based adjustment would have been the first time in history that the States' apportionment would have been based upon counts in other States. See Pet. App. 251a­252a. Here, the Secretary's understanding of the tra- ditional method of conducting the census was well founded, as was his establishment of a rebuttable presumption that the traditional method was the most accurate. The Secretary ultimately determined that the available evidence "tends to support the superior distributive accu- racy of the actual enumeration," id., at 185a, and it is this determination at which respondents direct the brunt of their attack. Respondents contend that the Secretary's review of the evidence is due no deference from this Court. They argue that the Secretary's decision is not the sort of "highly technical" administrative decision that normally commands judicial deference, and that regardless of its technical com- plexity, the Secretary's review of the evidence presents a constitutional issue that deserves no deference. Respond- ents contend that the Secretary's review of the evidence is of dubious validity because the Secretary is admittedly "not a statistician," id., at 139a, and because his conclusion is at 517us1$35H 02-23-99 16:33:33 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 1 (1996) 23 Opinion of the Court odds with that of the Director of the Census. According to respondents, we should carefully comb the Secretary's deci- sion in order to review his conclusions de novo. Respondents' argument fundamentally misapprehends the basis for our deference to the Secretary's determination that the adjusted census results do not provide a more distribu- tively accurate count of the population. Our deference arises not from the highly technical nature of his decision, but rather from the wide discretion bestowed by the Consti- tution upon Congress, and by Congress upon the Secretary. Regardless of the Secretary's statistical expertise, it is he to whom Congress has delegated its constitutional authority over the census. For that same reason, the mere fact that the Secretary's decision overruled the views of some of his subordinates is by itself of no moment in any judicial review of his decision. Turning finally to review the Secretary's conclusion that the PES-based adjustment would not improve distributive accuracy, we need note only that the Secretary's conclusion is supported by the reasoning of some of his advisers, and was therefore a reasonable choice in an area where technical experts disagree. Cf. Tucker v. United States Dept. of Com- merce, 958 F. 2d, at 1418 (Plaintiffs seeking PES-based sta- tistical adjustment "are asking [courts] to take sides in a dispute among statisticians, demographers, and census offi- cials concerning the desirability of making a statistical ad- justment to the census headcount"). The Under Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs and the Administrator of the Economics and Statistics Administration both voted against adjustment. Pet. App. 59a, 140a. Moreover, even those who recommended in favor of adjustment recognized that their conclusion was not compelled by the evidence: The Director of the Census Bureau, upon whose recommendation respondents heavily rely, stated in her report to the Secre- tary that "[a]djustment is an issue about which reasonable men and women and the best statisticians and demographers 517us1$35H 02-23-99 16:33:33 PAGES OPINPGT 24 WISCONSIN v. CITY OF NEW YORK Opinion of the Court can disagree." App. 73. And one of the principal statisti- cians at the Bureau, Dr. Robert E. Fay, " `told the Secretary that . . . reasonable statisticians could differ' " on the ques- tion of adjustment. Pet. App. 91a. Therefore, and because we find the Secretary's two prior determinations as well to be entirely reasonable, we conclude that his decision not to adjust the 1990 census was "consonant with . . . the text and history of the Constitution." Franklin, 505 U. S., at 806. III The Constitution confers upon Congress the responsibility to conduct an "actual Enumeration" of the American public every 10 years, with the primary purpose of providing a basis for apportioning political representation among the States. Here, the Secretary of Commerce, to whom Con- gress has delegated its constitutional authority over the cen- sus, determined that in light of the constitutional purpose of the census, an "actual Enumeration" would best be achieved without the PES-based statistical adjustment of the results of the initial enumeration. We find that conclusion entirely reasonable. Therefore we hold that the Secretary's decision was well within the constitutional bounds of discretion over the conduct of the census provided to the Federal Govern- ment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. 517us1$36z 02-16-99 16:42:37 PAGES OPINPGT OCTOBER TERM, 1995 25 Syllabus BARNETT BANK OF MARION COUNTY, N. A. v. NELSON, FLORIDA INSURANCE COMMISSIONER, et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit No. 94­1837. Argued January 16, 1996-Decided March 26, 1996 A 1916 federal law (Federal Statute) permits national banks to sell insur- ance in small towns, but a Florida law (State Statute) prohibits such banks from selling most types of insurance. When petitioner Barnett Bank, a national bank doing business in a small Florida town, bought a state licensed insurance agency, respondent State Insurance Commis- sioner ordered the agency to stop selling the prohibited forms of insur- ance. In this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, the District Court held that the State Statute was not pre-empted, but only because of the McCarran-Ferguson Act's special insurance-related anti-pre- emption rule. That rule provides that a federal law will not pre-empt a state law enacted "for the purpose of regulating the business of insur- ance"-unless the federal statute "specifically relates to the business of insurance." 15 U. S. C. § 1012(b) (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: The Federal Statute pre-empts the State Statute. Pp. 30­43. (a) Under ordinary pre-emption principles, the State Statute would be pre-empted, for it is clear that Congress, in enacting the Federal Statute, intended to exercise its constitutionally delegated authority to override contrary state law. The Federal and State Statutes are in "irreconcilable conflict," Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U. S. 654, 659, since the Federal Statute authorizes national banks to engage in activities that the State Statute expressly forbids. Thus, the State's prohibition would seem to "stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplish- ment" of one of the Federal Statute's purposes, Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67, unless, as the State contends, Congress intended to limit federal permission to sell insurance to those circumstances permitted by state law. However, by providing, without relevant qualification, that national banks "may . . . act as the agent" for insurance sales, 12 U. S. C. § 92, the Federal Statute's language suggests a broad, not a limited, permission. That this authority is granted in "addition to the powers now vested . . . in national [banks]," ibid. (emphasis added), is also sig- nificant. Legislative grants of both enumerated and incidental "pow- ers" to national banks historically have been interpreted as grants of 517us1$36z 02-16-99 16:42:37 PAGES OPINPGT 26 BARNETT BANK OF MARION CTY., N. A. v. NELSON Syllabus authority not normally limited by, but rather ordinarily pre-empting, contrary state law. See, e. g., First Nat. Bank of San Jose v. Califor- nia, 262 U. S. 366, 368­369. Where, as here, Congress has not ex- pressly conditioned the grant of power upon a grant of state permission, this Court has ordinarily found that no such condition applies. See Franklin Nat. Bank of Franklin Square v. New York, 347 U. S. 373. The State's argument that special circumstances surrounding the Fed- eral Statute's enactment demonstrate Congress' intent to grant only a limited permission is unpersuasive. Pp. 30­37. (b) The McCarran-Ferguson Act's anti-pre-emption rule does not gov- ern this case, because the Federal Statute "specifically relates to the business of insurance." This conclusion rests upon the Act's language and purposes, taken together. The word "relates" is highly general; and in ordinary English, the Federal Statute-which focuses directly upon industry-specific selling practices and affects the relation of in- sured to insurer and the spreading of risk-"specifically" relates to the insurance business. The Act's mutually reinforcing purposes-that state regulation and taxation of the insurance business are in the public interest, and that Congress' "silence . . . shall not be construed to impose any barrier to [such] regulation or taxation," 15 U. S. C. § 1011 (emphasis added)-also support this view. This phrase, especially the word "silence," indicates that the Act seeks to protect state regulation pri- marily against inadvertent federal intrusion, not to insulate state in- surance regulation from the reach of all federal law. The circumstances surrounding the Act's enactment also suggest that the Act was passed to ensure that generally phrased congressional statutes, which do not mention insurance, are not applied to the issuance of insurance poli- cies, thereby interfering with state regulation in unanticipated ways. The parties' remaining arguments to the contrary are unconvincing. Pp. 37­43. 43 F. 3d 631, reversed. Breyer, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Nathan Lewin argued the cause and filed briefs for peti- tioner. With him on the briefs were Scott L. Nelson, James R. Heavner, Jr., and Richard E. Swartley. Richard P. Bress argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney Gen- eral Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Bender, Edward C. DuMont, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, Jacob M. Lewis, Julie L. 517us1$36z 02-16-99 16:42:37 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 25 (1996) 27 Opinion of the Court Williams, L. Robert Griffin, Ernest C. Barrett III, and Joan M. Bernott. Daniel Y. Sumner argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents Bill Nelson et al. With him on the brief were David J. Busch, Dennis Silverman, and Karen Asher-Cohen. Ann M. Kappler argued the cause and filed a brief for re- spondents Florida Association of Life Underwriters et al. With her on the brief were Scott A. Sinder, Sam Hirsch, Bruce J. Ennis, Jr., Paul M. Smith, and Donald B. Ver- rilli, Jr.* Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in this case is whether a federal statute that permits national banks to sell insurance in small towns pre- empts a state statute that forbids them to do so. To answer this question, we must consider both ordinary pre-emption principles, and also a special federal anti-pre-emption rule, which provides that a federal statute will not pre-empt a *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Bankers Association et al. by John J. Gill III, Michael F. Crotty, Mathew H. Street, Richard M. Whiting, Leonard J. Rubin, M. Thurman Senn, and David L. Glass; for American Deposit Corp. et al. by Thaddeus Holt and Dennis M. Gingold; for the Consumer Bankers Association et al. by David W. Roderer, Eric L. Hirschhorn, Donn C. Meindertsma, John W. Ander- son, and Jeffrey D. Quayle; for the Florida Bankers Association by J. Thomas Cardwell and Virginia B. Townes; and for the New York Clearing House Association by Bruce E. Clark, Michael M. Wiseman, and Norman R. Nelson. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Council of Life Insurance by David Overlock Stewart, James M. Licht- man, Gary E. Hughes, and Phillip E. Stano; for the Council of Insurance Agents and Brokers by Mark E. Herlihy; for the National Association of Insurance Commissioners by Ellen Dollase Wilcox; for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Richard Ruda, Lee Fennell, and Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.; and for Don W. Stephens et al. by Stephen B. Cox, Suetta W. Dickinson, Julie A. Fuselier, Richard Blumenthal, At- torney General of Connecticut, and John G. Haines, Assistant Attorney General. 517us1$36Q 02-16-99 16:42:37 PAGES OPINPGT 28 BARNETT BANK OF MARION CTY., N. A. v. NELSON Opinion of the Court state statute enacted "for the purpose of regulating the busi- ness of insurance"-unless the federal statute "specifically relates to the business of insurance." McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1012(b) (emphasis added). We decide that the McCarran-Ferguson Act's special anti-pre-emption rule does not govern this case, because the federal statute in question "specifically relates to the business of insurance." We conclude that, under ordinary pre-emption principles, the federal statute pre-empts the state statute, thereby prohibit- ing application of the state statute to prevent a national bank from selling insurance in a small town. I In 1916 Congress enacted a federal statute that says that certain national banks "may" sell insurance in small towns. It provides in relevant part: "In addition to the powers now vested by law in national [banks] organized under the laws of the United States any such [bank] located and doing business in any place [with a population] . . . [of not more than] five thousand . . . may, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Comptroller of the Currency, act as the agent for any fire, life, or other insurance company authorized by the authorities of the State . . . to do business [there], . . . by soliciting and selling insur- ance . . . Provided, however, That no such bank shall . . . guarantee the payment of any premium . . . And pro- vided further, That the bank shall not guarantee the truth of any statement made by an assured [when applying] . . . for insurance." Act of Sept. 7, 1916 (Fed- eral Statute), 39 Stat. 753, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 92 (emphases changed). In 1974 Florida enacted a statute that prohibits certain banks from selling most kinds of insurance. It says: 517us1$36Q 02-16-99 16:42:37 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 25 (1996) 29 Opinion of the Court "No [Florida licensed] insurance agent . . . who is associated with, . . . owned or controlled by . . . a financial institution shall engage in insurance agency activities . . . ." Fla. Stat. § 626.988(2) (Supp. 1996) (State Statute). The term "financial institution" includes "any bank . . . [except for a] bank which is not a subsid- iary or affiliate of a bank holding company and is located in a city having a population of less than 5,000 . . . ." § 626.988(1)(a). Thus, the State Statute says, in essence, that banks cannot sell insurance in Florida-except that an unaffiliated small town bank (i. e., a bank that is not affiliated with a bank holding company) may sell insurance in a small town. Ibid. In October 1993 petitioner Barnett Bank, an "affiliate[d]" national bank which does business through a branch in a small Florida town, bought a Florida licensed insurance agency. The Florida State Insurance Commissioner, point- ing to the State Statute (and noting that the unaffiliated small town bank exception did not apply), ordered Barnett's insurance agency to stop selling the prohibited forms of insurance. Barnett, claiming that the Federal Statute pre-empted the State Statute, then filed this action for declaratory and injunctive relief in federal court. The District Court held that the Federal Statute did not pre-empt the State Statute, but only because of the spe- cial insurance-related federal anti-pre-emption rule. The McCarran-Ferguson Act, which creates that rule, says: "No act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance . . . ." McCarran-Ferguson Act, § 2(b), 59 Stat. 34, 15 U. S. C. § 1012(b). 517us1$36Q 02-16-99 16:42:37 PAGES OPINPGT 30 BARNETT BANK OF MARION CTY., N. A. v. NELSON Opinion of the Court The District Court decided both (1) that the Federal Stat- ute did not fall within the McCarran-Ferguson Act's excep- tion because it did not "specifically relat[e] to the business of insurance"; and (2) that the State Statute was a "law enacted . . . for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance." Barnett Bank of Marion County, N. A. v. Gallagher, 839 F. Supp. 835, 840­841, 843 (MD Fla. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, the McCarran-Ferguson Act, in the District Court's view, instructs courts not to "constru[e]" the Federal Statute "to invalidate" the State Statute. 15 U. S. C. § 1012(b). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, for similar reasons, agreed that the Federal Stat- ute did not pre-empt the State Statute. Barnett Bank of Marion County, N. A. v. Gallagher, 43 F. 3d 631, 634­637 (1995). We granted certiorari due to uncertainty among lower courts about the pre-emptive effect of this Federal Statute. See Owensboro Nat. Bank v. Stephens, 44 F. 3d 388 (CA6 1994) (pre-emption of Kentucky statute that prevents na- tional banks from selling insurance in small towns); First Advantage Ins., Inc. v. Green, 652 So. 2d 562 (La. Ct. App.), cert. and review denied, 654 So. 2d 331 (1995) (no pre- emption). We now reverse the Eleventh Circuit. II We shall put the McCarran-Ferguson Act's special anti- pre-emption rule to the side for the moment, and begin by asking whether, in the absence of that rule, we should con- strue the Federal Statute to pre-empt the State Statute. This question is basically one of congressional intent. Did Congress, in enacting the Federal Statute, intend to exercise its constitutionally delegated authority to set aside the laws of a State? If so, the Supremacy Clause requires courts to follow federal, not state, law. U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2; see California Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Guerra, 479 U. S. 272, 280­281 (1987) (reviewing pre-emption doctrine). 517us1$36Q 02-16-99 16:42:37 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 25 (1996) 31 Opinion of the Court Sometimes courts, when facing the pre-emption question, find language in the federal statute that reveals an explicit congressional intent to pre-empt state law. E. g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525, 530­531 (1977). More often, explicit pre-emption language does not appear, or does not directly answer the question. In that event, courts must consider whether the federal statute's "structure and pur- pose," or nonspecific statutory language, nonetheless reveal a clear, but implicit, pre-emptive intent. Id., at 525; Fidel- ity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141, 152­153 (1982). A federal statute, for example, may create a scheme of federal regulation "so pervasive as to make rea- sonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947). Alternatively, federal law may be in "irreconcilable conflict" with state law. Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U. S. 654, 659 (1982). Compliance with both statutes, for example, may be a "physical impossibility," Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142­143 (1963); or, the state law may "stan[d] as an ob- stacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur- poses and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941). In this case we must ask whether or not the Federal and State Statutes are in "irreconcilable conflict." The two stat- utes do not impose directly conflicting duties on national banks-as they would, for example, if the federal law said, "you must sell insurance," while the state law said, "you may not." Nonetheless, the Federal Statute authorizes national banks to engage in activities that the State Statute expressly forbids. Thus, the State's prohibition of those activities would seem to "stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment" of one of the Federal Statute's purposes-unless, of course, that federal purpose is to grant the bank only a very limited permission, that is, permission to sell insurance to the extent that state law also grants permission to do so. 517us1$36Q 02-16-99 16:42:37 PAGES OPINPGT 32 BARNETT BANK OF MARION CTY., N. A. v. NELSON Opinion of the Court That is what the State of Florida and its supporting amici argue. They say that the Federal Statute grants national banks a permission that is limited to circumstances where state law is not to the contrary. In their view, the Federal Statute removes only federal legal obstacles, not state legal obstacles, to the sale of insurance by national banks. But we do not find this, or the State's related, ordinary pre- emption arguments, convincing. For one thing, the Federal Statute's language suggests a broad, not a limited, permission. That language says, with- out relevant qualification, that national banks "may . . . act as the agent" for insurance sales. 12 U. S. C. § 92. It spe- cifically refers to "rules and regulations" that will govern such sales, while citing as their source not state law, but the federal Comptroller of the Currency. Ibid. It also specifi- cally refers to state regulation, while limiting that reference to licensing-not of banks or insurance agents, but of the insurance companies whose policies the bank, as insurance agent, will sell. Ibid. For another thing, the Federal Statute says that its grant of authority to sell insurance is in "addition to the powers now vested by law in national [banks]." Ibid. (emphasis added). In using the word "powers," the statute chooses a legal concept that, in the context of national bank legislation, has a history. That history is one of interpreting grants of both enumerated and incidental "powers" to national banks as grants of authority not normally limited by, but rather ordinarily pre-empting, contrary state law. See, e. g., First Nat. Bank of San Jose v. California, 262 U. S. 366, 368­369 (1923) (national banks' "power" to receive deposits pre-empts contrary state escheat law); Easton v. Iowa, 188 U. S. 220, 229­230 (1903) (national banking system normally "inde- pendent, so far as powers conferred are concerned, of state legislation"); cf. Waite v. Dowley, 94 U. S. 527, 533 (1877) ("[W]here there exists a concurrent right of legislation in the States and in Congress, and the latter has exercised its 517us1$36Q 02-16-99 16:42:37 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 25 (1996) 33 Opinion of the Court power, there remains in the States no authority to legislate on the same matter"). Thus, this Court, in a case quite similar to this one, held that a federal statute permitting, but not requiring, national banks to receive savings deposits pre-empts a state statute prohibiting certain state and national banks from using the word "savings" in their advertising. Franklin Nat. Bank of Franklin Square v. New York, 347 U. S. 373, 375­379 (1954) (Federal Reserve Act provision that national banks "may continue . . . to receive . . . savings deposits" read as "declara- tory of the right of a national bank to enter into or remain in that type of business"). See also De la Cuesta, supra, at 154­159 (federal regulation permitting, but not requiring, national banks to include in mortgage contracts a debt accel- erating "due on sale" clause pre-empts a state law forbidding the use of such a clause); cf. Lawrence County v. Lead- Deadwood School Dist. No. 40­1, 469 U. S. 256 (1985) (federal statute providing that local government units "may" expend federal funds for any governmental purpose pre-empts state law restricting their expenditure). In defining the pre-emptive scope of statutes and regula- tions granting a power to national banks, these cases take the view that normally Congress would not want States to forbid, or to impair significantly, the exercise of a power that Congress explicitly granted. To say this is not to deprive States of the power to regulate national banks, where (unlike here) doing so does not prevent or significantly interfere with the national bank's exercise of its powers. See, e. g., Anderson Nat. Bank v. Luckett, 321 U. S. 233, 247­252 (1944) (state statute administering abandoned deposit accounts did not "unlawful[ly] encroac[h] on the rights and privileges of national banks"); McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U. S. 347, 358 (1896) (application to national banks of state statute forbid- ding certain real estate transfers by insolvent transferees would not "destro[y] or hampe[r]" national banks' functions); National Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall. 353, 362 (1870) 517us1$36Q 02-16-99 16:42:37 PAGES OPINPGT 34 BARNETT BANK OF MARION CTY., N. A. v. NELSON Opinion of the Court (national banks subject to state law that does not "interfere with, or impair [national banks'] efficiency in performing the functions by which they are designed to serve [the Federal] Government"). Nor do these cases control the interpretation of federal banking statutes that accompany a grant of an explicit power with an explicit statement that the exercise of that power is subject to state law. See, e. g., 12 U. S. C. § 36(c) (McFadden Act) (authorizing national banks to operate branches, but only where state law authorizes state banks to do so); § 92a(a) (Comptroller of Currency may grant fiduciary powers "by special permit to national banks applying therefor, when not in contravention of State or local law"). Not surprisingly, this Court has interpreted those explicit provisions to mean what they say. See, e. g., First Nat. Bank in Plant City v. Dickinson, 396 U. S. 122, 131 (1969) (under McFadden Act, state branching restrictions apply to national banks); First Nat. Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U. S. 252, 260­261 (1966) (same); see also Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573, 586 (1866) (enforcing 1864 amendments to National Bank Act expressly authorizing state taxation of national bank shares). But, as we pointed out, supra, at 32­33, where Congress has not expressly conditioned the grant of "power" upon a grant of state permission, the Court has ordinarily found that no such condition applies. In Franklin Nat. Bank, the Court made this point explicit. It held that Congress did not intend to subject national banks' power to local restric- tions, because the federal power-granting statute there in question contained "no indication that Congress [so] intended . . . as it has done by express language in several other instances." 347 U. S., at 378, and n. 7 (emphasis added) (collecting examples). The Federal Statute before us, as in Franklin Nat. Bank, explicitly grants a national bank an authorization, permis- sion, or power. And, as in Franklin Nat. Bank, it contains 517us1$36Q 02-16-99 16:42:37 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 25 (1996) 35 Opinion of the Court no "indication" that Congress intended to subject that power to local restriction. Thus, the Court's discussion in Frank- lin Nat. Bank, the holding of that case, and the other prece- dent we have cited above, strongly argue for a similar inter- pretation here-a broad interpretation of the word "may" that does not condition federal permission upon that of the State. Finally, Florida and its supporters challenge this interpre- tation by arguing that special circumstances surrounding the enactment of the Federal Statute nonetheless demonstrate Congress' intent to grant only a limited permission (subject to state approval). They point to a letter to Congress writ- ten by the Comptroller of the Currency in 1916. The Comp- troller attached a draft of what became the Federal Statute, and the letter explains to Congress why the Comptroller wants Congress to enact his proposal. The letter says that, since 1900, many small town national banks had failed; that some States had authorized small town state banks to sell insurance; that providing small town national banks with authority to sell insurance would help them financially; and that doing so would also improve their competitive position vis-a -vis state banks. The relevant language in the letter (somewhat abridged) reads as follows: "[Since 1900, of 3,084 small national banks, 438] have either failed or gone into liquidation. . . . [T]here are many banks located in [small towns] . . . where the small deposits which the banks receive may make it somewhat difficult [to earn] . . . a satisfactory return . . . . "For some time I have been giving careful consider- ation to the question as to how the powers of these small national banks might be enlarged so as to provide them with additional sources of revenue and place them in a position where they could better compete with local State banks and trust companies which are sometimes 517us1$36Q 02-16-99 16:42:37 PAGES OPINPGT 36 BARNETT BANK OF MARION CTY., N. A. v. NELSON Opinion of the Court authorized under the law to do a class of business not strictly that of commercial banking. . . . "[The federal banking laws, while granting national banks certain "incidental powers," do not give them] either expressly nor by necessary implication the power to act as agents for insurance companies. . . . . . . . . "My investigations lead me respectfully to recommend to Congress an amendment to the national-bank act by which national banks located in [small towns] . . . may be permitted to act as agents for insurance companies . . . . "It seems desirable from the standpoint of public pol- icy and banking efficiency that this authority should be limited to banks in small communities. This additional income will strengthen them and increase their ability to make a fair return . . . . "I think it would be unwise and therefore undesirable to confer this privilege generally upon banks in large cities where the legitimate business of banking affords ample scope for the energies of trained and expert bank- ers . . . . "I inclose . . . a draft . . . designed to empower national banks located in [small] towns . . . under such regulations and restrictions as may from time to time be approved and promulgated by the Comptroller of the Currency, to act as agents for the placing of insurance policies . . . ." 53 Cong. Rec. 11001 (1916) (letter from Comptroller Wil- liams to the Chairman of the Senate Bank and Cur- rency Committee). Assuming for argument's sake that this letter is relevant, and in response to the arguments of Florida and its support- ers, we point out that the letter does not significantly advance their cause. Although the letter mentions that enlarging the powers of small national banks will help them "better compete with local State banks," it primarily focuses upon small town national banks' need for added revenue- 517us1$36Q 02-16-99 16:42:37 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 25 (1996) 37 Opinion of the Court an objective met by a broad insurance-selling authority that is not limited by state law. The letter refers to limitations that federal regulation might impose, but it says nothing about limitations imposed by state regulation or state law. The letter makes clear that authority to sell insurance in small towns is an added "incidental power" of a national bank-a term that, in light of this Court's then-existing cases, suggested freedom from conflicting state regulation. See Easton, 188 U. S., at 229­230; First Nat. Bank of San Jose, 262 U. S., at 368­369. The letter sets forth as potential objections to the proposal (or to its extension to larger na- tional banks) concerns about distracting banking manage- ment or inhibiting the development of banking expertise- not concerns related to state regulatory control. We have found nothing elsewhere in the Federal Statute's background or history that significantly supports the State's arguments. And as far as we are aware, the Comptroller's subsequent interpretation of the Federal Statute does not suggest that the statute provides only a limited authority subject to similar state approval. Cf. 12 CFR § 7.7100 (1995); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 366, CCH Fed. Banking L. Rep. ¶ 85,536, p. 77,833 (1986). In light of these considerations, we conclude that the Fed- eral Statute means to grant small town national banks au- thority to sell insurance, whether or not a State grants its own state banks or national banks similar approval. Were we to apply ordinary legal principles of pre-emption, the federal law would pre-empt that of the State. III We now must decide whether ordinary legal principles of pre-emption, or the special McCarran-Ferguson Act anti- pre-emption rule, governs this case. The lower courts held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act's special anti-pre-emption rule applies, and instructs courts not to "construe" the Fed- eral Statute to "invalidate, impair, or supersede" that of the 517us1$36Q 02-16-99 16:42:37 PAGES OPINPGT 38 BARNETT BANK OF MARION CTY., N. A. v. NELSON Opinion of the Court State. 15 U. S. C. § 1012(b). By its terms, however, the Act does not apply when the conflicting federal statute "specifi- cally relates to the business of insurance." Ibid. (emphasis added). In our view, the Federal Statute in this case "spe- cifically relates to the business of insurance"-therefore the McCarran-Ferguson Act's special anti-pre-emption rule does not apply. Our conclusion rests upon the McCarran-Ferguson Act's language and purpose, taken together. Consider the lan- guage-"specifically relates to the business of insurance." In ordinary English, a statute that says that banks may act as insurance agents, and that the Comptroller of the Cur- rency may regulate their insurance-related activities, "re- lates" to the insurance business. The word "relates" is highly general, and this Court has interpreted it broadly in other pre-emption contexts. See, e. g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41, 47 (1987) (words " `relate to' " have " `broad common-sense meaning, such that a state law "re- late[s] to" a benefit plan ". . . if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan" ' ") (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 739 (1985), in turn quot- ing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, 97 (1983)); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374, 383­384 (1992) (interpreting similarly the words " `relating to' " in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978). More importantly, in ordinary English, this statute "spe- cifically" relates to the insurance business. "Specifically" can mean "explicitly, particularly, [or] definitely," Black's Law Dictionary 1398 (6th ed. 1990), thereby contrasting a specific reference with an implicit reference made by more general language to a broader topic. The general words "business activity," for example, will sometimes include, and thereby implicitly refer, to insurance; the particular words "finance, banking, and insurance" make that reference explic- itly and specifically. 517us1$36Q 02-16-99 16:42:37 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 25 (1996) 39 Opinion of the Court Finally, using ordinary English, one would say that this statute specifically relates to the "business of insurance." The statute explicitly grants national banks permission to "act as the agent for any fire, life, or other insurance com- pany," to "solici[t] and sel[l] insurance," to "collec[t] premi- ums," and to "receive for services so rendered . . . fees or commissions," subject to Comptroller regulation. 12 U. S. C. § 92. It also sets forth certain specific rules prohib- iting banks from guaranteeing the "payment of any premium on insurance policies issued through its agency . . ." and the "truth of any statement made by an assured in filing his application for insurance." Ibid. The statute thereby not only focuses directly upon industry-specific selling practices, but also affects the relation of insured to insurer and the spreading of risk-matters that this Court, in other contexts, has placed at the core of the McCarran-Ferguson Act's con- cern. See Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U. S. 119, 129 (1982) (citing Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U. S. 205 (1979); see also Department of Treas- ury v. Fabe, 508 U. S. 491, 502­504 (1993). Consider, too, the McCarran-Ferguson Act's basic pur- poses. The Act sets forth two mutually reinforcing pur- poses in its first section, namely, that "continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insur- ance is in the public interest," and that "silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States." 15 U. S. C. § 1011 (emphasis added). The latter phrase, particularly the word "silence," indicates that the Act does not seek to insulate state insurance regulation from the reach of all federal law. Rather, it seeks to protect state regulation primarily against inadvertent federal intrusion- say, through enactment of a federal statute that describes an affected activity in broad, general terms, of which the insur- ance business happens to constitute one part. 517us1$36Q 02-16-99 16:42:37 PAGES OPINPGT 40 BARNETT BANK OF MARION CTY., N. A. v. NELSON Opinion of the Court The circumstances surrounding enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act suggest the same. Just prior to the law's enactment, this Court, in United States v. South- Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944), held that a federal antitrust law, the Sherman Act, applied to the business of insurance. The Sherman Act's highly general language said nothing specifically about insurance. See 15 U. S. C. § 1 (forbidding every "contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States"). The Sherman Act applied only to activi- ties in or affecting interstate commerce. Hopkins v. United States, 171 U. S. 578, 586 (1898). Many lawyers and insur- ance professionals had previously thought (relying, in part, on this Court's opinion in Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 183 (1869), and other cases) that the issuance of an insurance policy was not a "transaction of commerce," and therefore fell outside the Sherman Act's scope. South-Eastern Un- derwriters told those professionals that they were wrong about interstate commerce, and that the Sherman Act did apply. And South-Eastern Underwriters' principle meant, consequently, that other generally phrased congressional statutes might also apply to the issuance of insurance poli- cies, thereby interfering with state regulation of insurance in similarly unanticipated ways. In reaction to South-Eastern Underwriters, Congress "moved quickly," enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act "to restore the supremacy of the States in the realm of insurance regulation." Fabe, supra, at 500. But the circumstances we have just described mean that "restor[ation]" of "su- premacy" basically required setting aside the unanticipated effects of South-Eastern Underwriters, and cautiously avoid- ing similar unanticipated interference with state regulation in the future. It did not require avoiding federal pre- emption by future federal statutes that indicate, through their "specific relat[ion]" to insurance, that Congress had focused upon the insurance industry, and therefore, in all 517us1$36Q 02-16-99 16:42:37 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 25 (1996) 41 Opinion of the Court likelihood, consciously intended to exert upon the insurance industry whatever pre-emptive force accompanied its law. See also, e. g., insofar as relevant, 91 Cong. Rec. 483 (1945) (statement of Sen. O'Mahoney, floor manager of the Act, that the Act was intended to be "a sort of catch-all provision to take into consideration other acts of Congress which might affect the insurance industry, but of which we did not have knowledge at the time"); ibid. (similar statement of Sen. Ferguson). The language of the Federal Statute before us is not gen- eral. It refers specifically to insurance. Its state regula- tory implications are not surprising, nor do we believe them inadvertent. See Part II, supra. Consequently, considera- tions of purpose, as well as of language, indicate that the Federal Statute falls within the scope of the McCarran- Ferguson Act's "specifically relates" exception to its anti- pre-emption rule. Cf. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust and Sav. Bank, 510 U. S. 86, 98 (1993) (adopt- ing the United States' view that language in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 defining a "guaran- teed benefit policy" as a certain kind of "insurance" policy "obviously and specifically relates to the business of insur- ance") (internal quotation marks omitted). We shall mention briefly why we are not convinced by sev- eral of the parties' remaining arguments. Florida says that the Federal Statute "specifically relates" to banking, not to insurance. But a statute may specifically relate to more than one thing. Just as an ordinance forbidding dogs in city parks specifically relates to dogs and to parks, so a statute permitting banks to sell insurance can specifically relate to banks and to insurance. Neither the McCarran-Ferguson Act's language, nor its purpose, requires the Federal Statute to relate predominantly to insurance. To the contrary, specific detailed references to the insurance industry in proposed legislation normally will achieve the McCarran- Ferguson Act's objectives, for they will call the proposed leg- 517us1$36Q 02-16-99 16:42:37 PAGES OPINPGT 42 BARNETT BANK OF MARION CTY., N. A. v. NELSON Opinion of the Court islation to the attention of interested parties, and thereby normally guarantee, should the proposal become law, that Congress will have focused upon its insurance-related effects. An amicus argues that our interpretation would give the Act "little meaning," because "whenever a state statute `regulates' the business of insurance, any conflicting federal statute necessarily will `specifically relate' to the insurance business." Brief for American Council of Life Insurance as Amicus Curiae 4. We disagree. Many federal statutes with potentially pre-emptive effect, such as the bankruptcy statutes, use general language that does not appear to "spe- cifically relate" to insurance; and where those statutes con- flict with state law that was enacted "for the purpose of reg- ulating the business of insurance," the McCarran-Ferguson Act's anti-pre-emption rule will apply. See generally Fabe, supra, at 501 (noting the parties' agreement that federal bankruptcy priority rules, although conflicting with state law, do not "specifically relate" to the business of insurance). The lower courts argued that the Federal Statute's 1916 date of enactment was significant, because Congress would have then believed that state insurance regulation was be- yond its "Commerce Clause" power to affect. The lower courts apparently thought that Congress therefore could not have intended the Federal Statute to pre-empt contrary state law. The short answer to this claim is that there is no reason to think that Congress believed state insurance regulation beyond its constitutional powers to affect-inso- far as Congress exercised those powers to create, to em- power, or to regulate national banks. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819); Farmers' and Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29, 33 (1875); see also, e. g., Easton v. Iowa, 188 U. S., at 238. We have explained, see Part II, supra, why we conclude that Congress indeed did intend the Federal Statute to pre-empt conflicting state law. 517us1$36Q 02-16-99 16:42:37 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 25 (1996) 43 Opinion of the Court Finally, Florida points to language in Fabe, which states that the McCarran-Ferguson Act "imposes what is, in effect, a clear-statement rule" that forbids pre-emption "unless a federal statute specifically requires otherwise." 508 U. S., at 507. Florida believes that this statement in Fabe means that the Federal Statute would have to use the words "state law is pre-empted," or the like, in order to fall within the McCarran-Ferguson Act exception. We do not believe, how- ever, that Fabe imposes any such requirement. Rather, the quoted language in Fabe was a general description of the Act's effect. It simply pointed to the existence of the clause at issue here-the exception for federal statutes that "spe- cifically relat[e] to the business of insurance." But it did not purport authoritatively to interpret the "specifically relates" clause. That matter was not at issue in Fabe. We there- fore believe that Fabe does not require us to reach a different result here. For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. 517us1$37Z 02-23-99 16:36:04 PAGES OPINPGT 44 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 Syllabus SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA v. FLORIDA et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit No. 94­12. Argued October 11, 1995-Decided March 27, 1996 The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, passed by Congress pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause, allows an Indian tribe to conduct certain gaming activities only in conformance with a valid compact between the tribe and the State in which the gaming activities are located. 25 U. S. C. § 2710(d)(1)(C). Under the Act, States have a duty to negoti- ate in good faith with a tribe toward the formation of a compact, § 2710(d)(3)(A), and a tribe may sue a State in federal court in order to compel performance of that duty, § 2710(d)(7). In this § 2710(d)(7) suit, respondents, Florida and its Governor, moved to dismiss petitioner Sem- inole Tribe's complaint on the ground that the suit violated Florida's sovereign immunity from suit in federal court. The District Court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the Indian Commerce Clause did not grant Congress the power to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity and that Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, does not permit an Indian tribe to force good-faith negotia- tions by suing a State's Governor. Held:1. The Eleventh Amendment prevents Congress from authorizing suits by Indian tribes against States to enforce legislation enacted pur- suant to the Indian Commerce Clause. Pp. 54­73. (a) The Eleventh Amendment presupposes that each State is a sov- ereign entity in our federal system and that " `[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without [a State's] consent.' " Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 13. However, Congress may abrogate the States' sovereign immunity if it has "unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate the immunity" and has acted "pursuant to a valid exercise of power." Green v. Mansour, 474 U. S. 64, 68. Here, through the numerous references to the "State" in § 2710(d)(7)(B)'s text, Congress provided an "unmistakably clear" statement of its intent to abrogate. Pp. 54­57. (b) The inquiry into whether Congress has the power to abrogate unilaterally the States' immunity from suit is narrowly focused on a single question: Was the Act in question passed pursuant to a constitu- tional provision granting Congress such power? This Court has found authority to abrogate under only two constitutional provisions: the 517us1$37Z 02-23-99 16:36:04 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 45 Syllabus Fourteenth Amendment, see, e. g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, and, in a plurality opinion, the Interstate Commerce Clause, Pennsyl- vania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S. 1. The Union Gas plurality found that Congress' power to abrogate came from the States' cession of their sovereignty when they gave Congress plenary power to regulate commerce. Under the rationale of Union Gas, the Indian Commerce Clause is indistinguishable from the Interstate Commerce Clause. Pp. 57­63. (c) However, in the five years since it was decided, Union Gas has proved to be a solitary departure from established law. Reconsidering that decision, none of the policies underlying stare decisis require this Court's continuing adherence to its holding. The decision has been of questionable precedential value, largely because a majority of the Court expressly disagreed with the plurality's rationale. Moreover, the deeply fractured decision has created confusion among the lower courts that have sought to understand and apply it. The plurality's rationale also deviated sharply from this Court's established federalism jurispru- dence and essentially eviscerated the Court's decision in Hans, since the plurality's conclusion-that Congress could under Article I expand the scope of the federal courts' Article III jurisdiction-contradicted the fundamental notion that Article III sets forth the exclusive catalog of permissible federal-court jurisdiction. Thus, Union Gas was wrongly decided and is overruled. The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circum- vent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction. Pp. 63­73. 2. The doctrine of Ex parte Young may not be used to enforce § 2710(d)(3) against a state official. That doctrine allows a suit against a state official to go forward, notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar, where the suit seeks prospective injunctive relief in order to end a continuing federal-law violation. However, where, as here, Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the en- forcement against a State of a statutorily created right, a court should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting an Ex parte Young action. The intricate procedures set forth in § 2710(d)(7) show that Congress intended not only to define, but also significantly to limit, the duty imposed by § 2710(d)(3). The Act mandates only a mod- est set of sanctions against a State, culminating in the Secretary of the Interior prescribing gaming regulations where an agreement is not reached through negotiation or mediation. In contrast, an Ex parte Young action would expose a state official to a federal court's full reme- dial powers, including, presumably, contempt sanctions. Enforcement through an Ex parte Young suit would also make § 2710(d)(7) super- 517us1$37Z 02-23-99 16:36:04 PAGES OPINPGT 46 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Syllabus fluous, for it is difficult to see why a tribe would suffer through § 2710(d)(7)'s intricate enforcement scheme if Ex parte Young's more complete and more immediate relief were available. The Court is not free to rewrite the statutory scheme in order to approximate what it thinks Congress might have wanted had it known that § 2710(d)(7) was beyond its authority. Pp. 73­76. 11 F. 3d 1016, affirmed. Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'Con- nor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 76. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 100. Bruce S. Rogow argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Beverly A. Pohl, Jerry C. Straus, Michael L. Roy, Judith A. Shapiro, Eugene Gressman, and John J. Gibbons. Solicitor General Days argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Irving L. Gornstein, Edward J. Shawaker, and Anne S. Almy. Jonathan A. Glogau, Assistant Attorney General of Florida, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida by Sonia Escobio O'Donnell; for the National Indian Gaming Association et al. by Jerome L. Levine, Frank R. Law- rence, and Kurt V. BlueDog; for the Poarch Band of Creek Indians et al. by William R. Perry, Donald J. Simon, and Gary Pitchlynn; for the San Manuel Band of Mission Indians et al. by Howard L. Dickstein, Jerome L. Levine, and Frank R. Lawrence; for the Spokane Tribe of Indians et al. by Michael J. Wahoske; and for the Tohono O'Odham Nation et al. by Eric N. Dahlstrom and Robert C. Brauchli. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of California et al. by Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, Manuel M. Medeiros, Deputy Attorney General, and Thomas F. Gede, Special Assistant Attorney General, Christine O. Gregoire, Attorney Gen- eral of Washington, and Jonathan Tate McCoy, Assistant Attorney Gen- eral, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:04 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 47 Opinion of the Court Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act provides that an In- dian tribe may conduct certain gaming activities only in con- formance with a valid compact between the tribe and the State in which the gaming activities are located. 102 Stat. 2475, 25 U. S. C. § 2710(d)(1)(C). The Act, passed by Con- gress under the Indian Commerce Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, imposes upon the States a duty to negotiate in good faith with an Indian tribe toward the formation of a compact, § 2710(d)(3)(A), and authorizes a tribe to bring suit in federal court against a State in order to compel perform- ance of that duty, § 2710(d)(7). We hold that notwithstand- ing Congress' clear intent to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity, the Indian Commerce Clause does not grant Con- gress that power, and therefore § 2710(d)(7) cannot grant ju- risdiction over a State that does not consent to be sued. We further hold that the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), may not be used to enforce § 2710(d)(3) against a state official. follows: Jeff Sessions of Alabama, Grant Woods of Arizona, Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Gale A. Norton of Colorado, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, Alan Lance of Idaho, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Andrew Ketterer of Maine, Scott Harshbarger of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. Nixon of Missouri, Joseph P. Ma- zurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Jeffrey R. Howard of New Hampshire, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, Mark Barnett of South Dakota, Dan Morales of Texas, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, James S. Gilmore III of Virginia, and Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia; and for the National Governors' Association et al. by Richard Ruda and Richard G. Taranto. Richard Dauphinais, Arlinda F. Locklear, Francis R. Skenandore, Curtis G. Berkey, and Donald Juneau filed a brief for the Stockbridge- Munsee Indian Community et al. as amici curiae. 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:04 PAGES OPINPGT 48 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court I Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in 1988 in order to provide a statutory basis for the operation and regulation of gaming by Indian tribes. See 25 U. S. C. § 2702. The Act divides gaming on Indian lands into three classes-I, II, and III-and provides a different regulatory scheme for each class. Class III gaming-the type with which we are here concerned-is defined as "all forms of gaming that are not class I gaming or class II gaming," § 2703(8), and includes such things as slot machines, casino games, banking card games, dog racing, and lotteries.1 It is the most heavily regulated of the three classes. The Act provides that class III gaming is lawful only where it is: (1) authorized by an ordinance or resolution that (a) is adopted by the governing body of the Indian tribe, (b) satisfies cer- tain statutorily prescribed requirements, and (c) is approved by the National Indian Gaming Commission; (2) located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity; and (3) "conducted in con- formance with a Tribal-State compact entered into by the 1 Class I gaming "means social games solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming engaged in by individuals as a part of, or in connection with, tribal ceremonies or celebrations," 25 U. S. C. § 2703(6), and is left by the Act to "the exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian tribes," § 2710(a)(1). Class II gaming is more extensively defined to include bingo, games similar to bingo, nonbanking card games not illegal under the laws of the State, and card games actually operated in particular States prior to the passage of the Act. See § 2703(7). Banking card games, electronic games of chance, and slot machines are expressly excluded from the scope of class II gaming. § 2703(B). The Act allows class II gaming where the State "permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization or en- tity," and the "governing body of the Indian tribe adopts an ordinance or resolution which is approved by the Chairman" of the National Indian Gaming Commission. § 2710(b)(1). Regulation of class II gaming con- templates a federal role, but places primary emphasis on tribal self- regulation. See §§ 2710(c)(3)­(6). 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 49 Opinion of the Court Indian tribe and the State under paragraph (3) that is in effect." § 2710(d)(1). The "paragraph (3)" to which the last prerequisite of § 2710(d)(1) refers is § 2710(d)(3), which describes the permis- sible scope of a Tribal-State compact, see § 2710(d)(3)(C), and provides that the compact is effective "only when notice of approval by the Secretary [of the Interior] of such compact has been published by the Secretary in the Federal Regis- ter," § 2710(d)(3)(B). More significant for our purposes, however, is that § 2710(d)(3) describes the process by which a State and an Indian tribe begin negotiations toward a Tribal-State compact: "(A) Any Indian tribe having jurisdiction over the In- dian lands upon which a class III gaming activity is being conducted, or is to be conducted, shall request the State in which such lands are located to enter into nego- tiations for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact governing the conduct of gaming activities. Upon receiving such a request, the State shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such a compact." The State's obligation to "negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith" is made judicially enforceable by §§ 2710(d) (7)(A)(i) and (B)(i): "(A) The United States district courts shall have ju- risdiction over- "(i) any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a State to enter into negotia- tions with the Indian tribe for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact under paragraph (3) or to conduct such negotiations in good faith . . . . "(B)(i) An Indian tribe may initiate a cause of action described in subparagraph (A)(i) only after the close of the 180-day period beginning on the date on which the 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 50 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court Indian tribe requested the State to enter into negotia- tions under paragraph (3)(A)." Sections 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii)­(vii) describe an elaborate remedial scheme designed to ensure the formation of a Tribal-State compact. A tribe that brings an action under § 2710(d) (7)(A)(i) must show that no Tribal-State compact has been entered and that the State failed to respond in good faith to the tribe's request to negotiate; at that point, the burden then shifts to the State to prove that it did in fact negotiate in good faith. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii). If the district court con- cludes that the State has failed to negotiate in good faith toward the formation of a Tribal-State compact, then it "shall order the State and Indian Tribe to conclude such a compact within a 60-day period." § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii). If no compact has been concluded 60 days after the court's order, then "the Indian tribe and the State shall each submit to a mediator appointed by the court a proposed compact that represents their last best offer for a compact." § 2710(d)(7) (B)(iv). The mediator chooses from between the two pro- posed compacts the one "which best comports with the terms of [the Act] and any other applicable Federal law and with the findings and order of the court," ibid., and submits it to the State and the Indian tribe, § 2710(d)(7)(B)(v). If the State consents to the proposed compact within 60 days of its submission by the mediator, then the proposed compact is "treated as a Tribal-State compact entered into under para- graph (3)." § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vi). If, however, the State does not consent within that 60-day period, then the Act provides that the mediator "shall notify the Secretary [of the Inte- rior]" and that the Secretary "shall prescribe . . . procedures . . . under which class III gaming may be conducted on the Indian lands over which the Indian tribe has jurisdiction." § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii).2 2 Sections 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii)­(vii) provide in full: "(ii) In any action described in subparagraph (A)(i), upon the introduc- tion of evidence by an Indian tribe that- 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 51 Opinion of the Court In September 1991, the Seminole Tribe of Florida, peti- tioner, sued the State of Florida and its Governor, Lawton Chiles, respondents. Invoking jurisdiction under 25 U. S. C. "(I) a Tribal-State compact has not been entered into under paragraph (3), and "(II) the State did not respond to the request of the Indian tribe to negotiate such a compact or did not respond to such request in good faith, the burden of proof shall be upon the State to prove that the State has negotiated with the Indian tribe in good faith to conclude a Tribal-State compact governing the conduct of gaming activities. "(iii) If, in any action described in subparagraph (A)(i), the court finds that the State has failed to negotiate in good faith with the Indian tribe to conclude a Tribal-State compact governing the conduct of gaming ac- tivities, the court shall order the State and the Indian Tribe to conclude such a compact within a 60-day period. In determining in such an action whether a State has negotiated in good faith, the court- "(I) may take into account the public interest, public safety, criminality, financial integrity, and adverse economic impacts on existing gaming activ- ities, and "(II) shall consider any demand by the State for direct taxation of the Indian tribe or of any Indian lands as evidence that the State has not negotiated in good faith. "(iv) If a State and an Indian tribe fail to conclude a Tribal-State com- pact . . . within the 60-day period provided in the order of a court issued under clause (iii), the Indian tribe and the State shall each submit to a mediator appointed by the court a proposed compact that represents their last best offer for a compact. The mediator shall select from the two proposed compacts the one which best comports with the terms of this chapter and any other applicable Federal law and with the findings and order of the court. "(v) The mediator appointed by the court under clause (iv) shall submit to the State and the Indian tribe the compact selected by the mediator under clause (iv). "(vi) If a State consents to a proposed compact during the 60-day period beginning on the date on which the proposed compact is submitted by the mediator to the State under clause (v), the proposed compact shall be treated as a Tribal-State compact entered into under paragraph (3). "(vii) If the State does not consent during the 60-day period described in clause (vi) to a proposed compact submitted by a mediator under clause (v), the mediator shall notify the Secretary and the Secretary shall pre- scribe, in consultation with the Indian tribe, procedures- [Footnote 2 is continued on p. 52] 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 52 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court § 2710(d)(7)(A), as well as 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331 and 1362, peti- tioner alleged that respondents had "refused to enter into any negotiation for inclusion of [certain gaming activities] in a tribal-state compact," thereby violating the "requirement of good faith negotiation" contained in § 2710(d)(3). Peti- tioner's Complaint ¶ 24, see App. 18. Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the suit violated the State's sovereign immunity from suit in federal court. The District Court denied respondents' motion, 801 F. Supp. 655 (SD Fla. 1992), and respondents took an interlocutory appeal of that decision. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U. S. 139 (1993) (col- lateral order doctrine allows immediate appellate review of order denying claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision of the District Court, holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred petitioner's suit against respondents.3 11 F. 3d 1016 (1994). The court agreed with the District Court that Congress in § 2710(d)(7) intended to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity, and also agreed that the Act had been passed pursuant to Congress' power under the Indian Commerce Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The court disagreed with the District Court, however, that the Indian "(I) which are consistent with the proposed compact selected by the mediator under clause (iv), the provisions of this chapter, and the relevant provisions of the laws of the State, and "(II) under which class III gaming may be conducted on the Indian lands over which the Indian tribe has jurisdiction." 3 The Eleventh Circuit consolidated petitioner's appeal with an appeal from another suit brought under § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) by a different Indian tribe. Although the District Court in that case had granted the defend- ants' motions to dismiss, the legal issues presented by the two appeals were virtually identical. See Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp. 550 (SD Ala. 1991) (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against State), and 784 F. Supp. 1549 (SD Ala. 1992) (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against Governor). 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 53 Opinion of the Court Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to abrogate a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit, and con- cluded therefore that it had no jurisdiction over petitioner's suit against Florida. The court further held that Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), does not permit an Indian tribe to force good-faith negotiations by suing the Governor of a State. Finding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit remanded to the District Court with directions to dismiss petitioner's suit.4 Petitioner sought our review of the Eleventh Circuit's decision,5 and we granted certiorari, 513 U. S. 1125 (1995), in order to consider two questions: (1) Does the Eleventh Amendment prevent Congress from authorizing suits by In- dian tribes against States for prospective injunctive relief to enforce legislation enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause?; and (2) Does the doctrine of Ex parte Young permit suits against a State's Governor for prospective injunctive relief to enforce the good-faith bargaining requirement of the Act? We answer the first question in the affirmative, the second in the negative, and we therefore affirm the Eleventh Circuit's dismissal of petitioner's suit.6 4 Following its conclusion that petitioner's suit should be dismissed, the Court of Appeals went on to consider how § 2710(d)(7) would operate in the wake of its decision. The court decided that those provisions of § 2710(d)(7) that were problematic could be severed from the rest of the section, and read the surviving provisions of § 2710(d)(7) to provide an Indian tribe with immediate recourse to the Secretary of the Interior from the dismissal of a suit against a State. 11 F. 3d 1016, 1029 (1994). 5 Respondents filed a cross-petition, No. 94­219, challenging only the Eleventh Circuit's modification of § 2710(d)(7), see n. 4, supra. That peti- tion is still pending. 6 While the appeal was pending before the Eleventh Circuit, the District Court granted respondents' earlier filed summary judgment motion, find- ing that Florida had fulfilled its obligation under the Act to negotiate in good faith. The Eleventh Circuit has stayed its review of that decision pending the disposition of this case. 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 54 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com- menced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Although the text of the Amendment would appear to re- strict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, "we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms." Blatchford v. Native Village of Noa- tak, 501 U. S. 775, 779 (1991). That presupposition, first ob- served over a century ago in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), has two parts: first, that each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system; and second, that " `[i]t is inher- ent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent,' " id., at 13 (empha- sis deleted), quoting The Federalist No. 81, p. 487 (C. Ros- siter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). See also Puerto Rico Aque- duct and Sewer Authority, supra, at 146 ("The Amendment is rooted in a recognition that the States, although a union, maintain certain attributes of sovereignty, including sover- eign immunity"). For over a century we have reaffirmed that federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States "was not contemplated by the Constitution when es- tablishing the judicial power of the United States." Hans, supra, at 15.7 7 E. g., North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U. S. 22, 30 (1890); Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 516, 524 (1899); Bell v. Mississippi, 177 U. S. 693 (1900); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 446 (1900); Palmer v. Ohio, 248 U. S. 32, 34 (1918); Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U. S. 311, 313 (1920); Ex parte New York, 256 U. S. 490, 497 (1921); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 26 (1933); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 51 (1944); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Ind., 323 U. S. 459, 464 (1945); Georgia Rail- road & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304, n. 13 (1952); Parden v. Terminal Railway of Ala. Docks Dept., 377 U. S. 184, 186 (1964); United 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 55 Opinion of the Court Here, petitioner has sued the State of Florida and it is undisputed that Florida has not consented to the suit. See Blatchford, supra, at 782 (States by entering into the Consti- tution did not consent to suit by Indian tribes). Petitioner nevertheless contends that its suit is not barred by state sov- ereign immunity. First, it argues that Congress through the Act abrogated the States' sovereign immunity. Alterna- tively, petitioner maintains that its suit against the Governor may go forward under Ex parte Young, supra. We consider each of those arguments in turn. II Petitioner argues that Congress through the Act abro- gated the States' immunity from suit. In order to deter- mine whether Congress has abrogated the States' sovereign immunity, we ask two questions: first, whether Congress has "unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate the immu- nity," Green v. Mansour, 474 U. S. 64, 68 (1985); and second, whether Congress has acted "pursuant to a valid exercise of power," ibid. A Congress' intent to abrogate the States' immunity from suit must be obvious from "a clear legislative statement." Blatchford, supra, at 786. This rule arises from a recogni- tion of the important role played by the Eleventh Amend- States v. Mississippi, 380 U. S. 128, 140 (1965); Employees of Dept. of Public Health and Welfare of Mo. v. Department of Public Health and Welfare of Mo., 411 U. S. 279, 280 (1973); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 662­663 (1974); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976); Cory v. White, 457 U. S. 85 (1982); Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halder- man, 465 U. S. 89, 97­100 (1984); Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 237­238 (1985); Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Pub- lic Transp., 483 U. S. 468, 472­474 (1987) (plurality opinion); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U. S. 223, 227­229, and n. 2 (1989); Port Authority Trans- Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U. S. 299, 304 (1990); Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U. S. 775, 779 (1991); Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U. S. 139, 144 (1993). 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 56 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court ment and the broader principles that it reflects. See Atas- cadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 238­239 (1985); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332, 345 (1979). In Atas- cadero, we held that "[a] general authorization for suit in federal court is not the kind of unequivocal statutory lan- guage sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment." 473 U. S., at 246; see also Blatchford, supra, at 786, n. 4 ("The fact that Congress grants jurisdiction to hear a claim does not suffice to show Congress has abrogated all defenses to that claim") (emphases deleted). Rather, as we said in Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U. S. 223 (1989): "To temper Congress' acknowledged powers of abroga- tion with due concern for the Eleventh Amendment's role as an essential component of our constitutional structure, we have applied a simple but stringent test: `Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally se- cured immunity from suit in federal court only by mak- ing its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.' " Id., at 227­228. See also Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U. S. 468, 474 (1987) (plurality opinion). Here, we agree with the parties, with the Eleventh Circuit in the decision below, 11 F. 3d, at 1024, and with virtually every other court that has confronted the question8 that Con- gress has in § 2710(d)(7) provided an "unmistakably clear" statement of its intent to abrogate. Section 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) 8 See Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma, 37 F. 3d 1422, 1427­1428 (CA10 1994), cert. pending, No. 94­1029; Spokane Tribe v. Washington, 28 F. 3d 991, 994­995 (CA9 1994); Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Da- kota, 3 F. 3d 273, 280­281 (CA8 1993); Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma v. Okla- homa, 834 F. Supp. 1341, 1345 (WD Okla. 1992); Maxam v. Lower Sioux Indian Community of Minnesota, 829 F. Supp. 277 (D. Minn. 1993); Kicka- poo Tribe of Indians v. Kansas, 818 F. Supp. 1423, 1427 (D. Kan. 1993); 801 F. Supp. 655, 658 (SD Fla. 1992) (case below); Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Michigan, 800 F. Supp. 1484, 1488­1489 (WD Mich. 1992); Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp., at 557­558. 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 57 Opinion of the Court vests jurisdiction in "[t]he United States district courts . . . over any cause of action . . . arising from the failure of a State to enter into negotiations . . . or to conduct such nego- tiations in good faith." Any conceivable doubt as to the identity of the defendant in an action under § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) is dispelled when one looks to the various provisions of § 2710(d)(7)(B), which describe the remedial scheme available to a tribe that files suit under § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i). Section 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii)(II) provides that if a suing tribe meets its burden of proof, then the "burden of proof shall be upon the State . . ."; § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii) states that if the court "finds that the State has failed to negotiate in good faith . . . , the court shall order the State . . ."; § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv) provides that "the State shall . . . submit to a mediator appointed by the court" and subsection (B)(v) of § 2710(d)(7) states that the mediator "shall submit to the State." Sections 2710(d) (7)(B)(vi) and (vii) also refer to the "State" in a context that makes it clear that the State is the defendant to the suit brought by an Indian tribe under § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i). In sum, we think that the numerous references to the "State" in the text of § 2710(d)(7)(B) make it indubitable that Congress in- tended through the Act to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity from suit.9 B Having concluded that Congress clearly intended to abro- gate the States' sovereign immunity through § 2710(d)(7), we 9 Justice Souter, in his dissenting opinion, argues that in order to avoid a constitutional question, we should interpret the Act to provide only a suit against state officials rather than a suit against the State itself. Post, at 182. But in light of the plain text of § 2710(d)(7)(B), we disagree with the dissent's assertion that the Act can reasonably be read in that way. "We cannot press statutory construction `to the point of disingenu- ous evasion' even to avoid a constitutional question." See United States v. Locke, 471 U. S. 84, 96 (1985), quoting George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373, 379 (1933) (Cardozo, J.). We already have found the clear statement rule satisfied, and that finding renders the preference for avoiding a constitutional question inapplicable. 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 58 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court turn now to consider whether the Act was passed "pursuant to a valid exercise of power." Green v. Mansour, 474 U. S., at 68. Before we address that question here, however, we think it necessary first to define the scope of our inquiry. Petitioner suggests that one consideration weighing in favor of finding the power to abrogate here is that the Act authorizes only prospective injunctive relief rather than ret- roactive monetary relief. But we have often made it clear that the relief sought by a plaintiff suing a State is irrelevant to the question whether the suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See, e. g., Cory v. White, 457 U. S. 85, 90 (1982) ("It would be a novel proposition indeed that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit to enjoin the State itself simply because no money judgment is sought"). We think it follows a fortiori from this proposition that the type of relief sought is irrelevant to whether Congress has power to abrogate States' immunity. The Eleventh Amendment does not exist solely in order to "preven[t] federal-court judg- ments that must be paid out of a State's treasury," Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 513 U. S. 30, 48 (1994); it also serves to avoid "the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the in- stance of private parties," Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority, 506 U. S., at 146 (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, petitioner argues that the abrogation power is validly exercised here because the Act grants the States a power that they would not otherwise have, viz., some meas- ure of authority over gaming on Indian lands. It is true enough that the Act extends to the States a power withheld from them by the Constitution. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U. S. 202 (1987). Neverthe- less, we do not see how that consideration is relevant to the question whether Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment immunity may not be lifted by Congress unilaterally deciding that it will be re- 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 59 Opinion of the Court placed by grant of some other authority. Cf. Atascadero, 473 U. S., at 246­247 ("[T]he mere receipt of federal funds cannot establish that a State has consented to suit in fed- eral court"). Thus our inquiry into whether Congress has the power to abrogate unilaterally the States' immunity from suit is narrowly focused on one question: Was the Act in question passed pursuant to a constitutional provision granting Congress the power to abrogate? See, e. g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 452­456 (1976). Previously, in conduct- ing that inquiry, we have found authority to abrogate under only two provisions of the Constitution. In Fitzpatrick, we recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment, by expanding federal power at the expense of state autonomy, had funda- mentally altered the balance of state and federal power struck by the Constitution. Id., at 455. We noted that § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment contained prohibitions ex- pressly directed at the States and that § 5 of the Amendment expressly provided that "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." See id., at 453 (internal quotation marks omitted). We held that through the Fourteenth Amendment, federal power extended to intrude upon the province of the Eleventh Amendment and therefore that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amend- ment allowed Congress to abrogate the immunity from suit guaranteed by that Amendment. In only one other case has congressional abrogation of the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity been upheld. In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S. 1 (1989), a plural- ity of the Court found that the Interstate Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, granted Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity, stating that the power to regulate interstate commerce would be "incomplete without the au- thority to render States liable in damages." 491 U. S., at 19­20. Justice White added the fifth vote necessary to the result in that case, but wrote separately in order to express 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 60 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court that he "[did] not agree with much of [the plurality's] reason- ing." Id., at 57 (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). In arguing that Congress through the Act abrogated the States' sovereign immunity, petitioner does not challenge the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that the Act was passed pursu- ant to neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Interstate Commerce Clause. Instead, accepting the lower court's con- clusion that the Act was passed pursuant to Congress' power under the Indian Commerce Clause, petitioner now asks us to consider whether that Clause grants Congress the power to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity. Petitioner begins with the plurality decision in Union Gas and contends that "[t]here is no principled basis for finding that congressional power under the Indian Commerce Clause is less than that conferred by the Interstate Commerce Clause." Brief for Petitioner 17. Noting that the Union Gas plurality found the power to abrogate from the "ple- nary" character of the grant of authority over interstate commerce, petitioner emphasizes that the Interstate Com- merce Clause leaves the States with some power to regulate, see, e. g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U. S. 186 (1994), whereas the Indian Commerce Clause makes "Indian relations . . . the exclusive province of federal law." County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y., 470 U. S. 226, 234 (1985). Contending that the Indian Commerce Clause vests the Federal Government with "the duty of protect- [ing]" the tribes from "local ill feeling" and "the people of the States," United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 383­384 (1886), petitioner argues that the abrogation power is neces- sary "to protect the tribes from state action denying feder- ally guaranteed rights." Brief for Petitioner 20. Respondents dispute petitioner's analogy between the In- dian Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause. They note that we have recognized that "the Interstate Commerce and Indian Commerce Clauses have very differ- 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 61 Opinion of the Court ent applications," Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U. S. 163, 192 (1989), and from that they argue that the two provisions are "wholly dissimilar." Brief for Respond- ents 21. Respondents contend that the Interstate Com- merce Clause grants the power of abrogation only because Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce would be "incomplete" without that "necessary" power. Id., at 23, citing Union Gas, supra, at 19­20. The Indian Commerce Clause is distinguishable, respondents contend, because it gives Congress complete authority over the Indian tribes. Therefore, the abrogation power is not "necessary" to Con- gress' exercise of its power under the Indian Commerce Clause.10 Both parties make their arguments from the plurality deci- sion in Union Gas, and we, too, begin there. We think it clear that Justice Brennan's opinion finds Congress' power to abrogate under the Interstate Commerce Clause from the States' cession of their sovereignty when they gave Con- gress plenary power to regulate interstate commerce. See Union Gas, 491 U. S., at 17 ("The important point . . . is that the provision both expands federal power and contracts state power"). Respondents' focus elsewhere is misplaced. While the plurality decision states that Congress' power under the Interstate Commerce Clause would be incomplete without the power to abrogate, that statement is made solely in order to emphasize the broad scope of Congress' authority over interstate commerce. Id., at 19­20. Moreover, re- spondents' rationale would mean that where Congress has 10 Respondents also contend that the Act mandates state regulation of Indian gaming and therefore violates the Tenth Amendment by allowing federal officials to avoid political accountability for those actions for which they are in fact responsible. See New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144 (1992). This argument was not considered below by either the Eleventh Circuit or the District Court, and is not fairly within the question pre- sented. Therefore we do not consider it here. See this Court's Rule 14.1; Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519 (1992). 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 62 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court less authority, and the States have more, Congress' means for exercising that power must be greater. We read the plu- rality opinion to provide just the opposite. Indeed, it was in those circumstances where Congress exercised complete authority that Justice Brennan thought the power to abro- gate most necessary. Id., at 20 ("Since the States may not legislate at all in [the aforementioned] situations, a conclu- sion that Congress may not create a cause of action for money damages against the States would mean that no one could do so. And in many situations, it is only money dam- ages that will carry out Congress' legitimate objectives under the Commerce Clause"). Following the rationale of the Union Gas plurality, our inquiry is limited to determining whether the Indian Com- merce Clause, like the Interstate Commerce Clause, is a grant of authority to the Federal Government at the expense of the States. The answer to that question is obvious. If anything, the Indian Commerce Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of power from the States to the Federal Government than does the Interstate Commerce Clause. This is clear enough from the fact that the States still exer- cise some authority over interstate trade but have been di- vested of virtually all authority over Indian commerce and Indian tribes. Under the rationale of Union Gas, if the States' partial cession of authority over a particular area includes cession of the immunity from suit, then their virtu- ally total cession of authority over a different area must also include cession of the immunity from suit. See id., at 42 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ., dissenting) ("[I]f the Article I commerce power enables abrogation of state sovereign immunity, so do all the other Article I powers"); see Ponca Tribe of Okla- homa v. Oklahoma, 37 F. 3d 1422, 1428 (CA10 1994) (Indian Commerce Clause grants power to abrogate), cert. pending, No. 94­1029; Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F. 3d 273, 281 (CA8 1993) (same); cf. Chavez v. Arte Publico 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 63 Opinion of the Court Press, 59 F. 3d 539, 546­547 (CA5 1995) (After Union Gas, Copyright Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, must grant Congress power to abrogate). We agree with petitioner that the plurality opinion in Union Gas allows no principled distinction in favor of the States to be drawn between the Indian Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause. Respondents argue, however, that we need not conclude that the Indian Commerce Clause grants the power to abro- gate the States' sovereign immunity. Instead, they contend that if we find the rationale of the Union Gas plurality to extend to the Indian Commerce Clause, then "Union Gas should be reconsidered and overruled." Brief for Respond- ents 25. Generally, the principle of stare decisis, and the interests that it serves, viz., "the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, . . . reliance on judicial decisions, and . . . the actual and perceived integ- rity of the judicial process," Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827 (1991), counsel strongly against reconsideration of our precedent. Nevertheless, we always have treated stare decisis as a "principle of policy," Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 119 (1940), and not as an "inexorable command," Payne, 501 U. S., at 828. "[W]hen governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, `this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.' " Id., at 827 (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 665 (1944)). Our willing- ness to reconsider our earlier decisions has been "particu- larly true in constitutional cases, because in such cases `cor- rection through legislative action is practically impossible.' " Payne, supra, at 828 (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 407 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). The Court in Union Gas reached a result without an ex- pressed rationale agreed upon by a majority of the Court. We have already seen that Justice Brennan's opinion re- ceived the support of only three other Justices. See Union Gas, 491 U. S., at 5 (Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 64 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court joined Justice Brennan). Of the other five, Justice White, who provided the fifth vote for the result, wrote separately in order to indicate his disagreement with the plurality's rationale, id., at 57 (opinion concurring in judgment and dis- senting in part), and four Justices joined together in a dissent that rejected the plurality's rationale, id., at 35­45 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ.). Since it was issued, Union Gas has created confusion among the lower courts that have sought to under- stand and apply the deeply fractured decision. See, e. g., Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, supra, at 543­545 ("Justice White's concurrence must be taken on its face to disavow" the plurality's theory); 11 F. 3d, at 1027 (Justice White's "vague concurrence renders the continuing validity of Union Gas in doubt"). The plurality's rationale also deviated sharply from our es- tablished federalism jurisprudence and essentially eviscer- ated our decision in Hans. See Union Gas, supra, at 36 ("If Hans means only that federal-question suits for money dam- ages against the States cannot be brought in federal court unless Congress clearly says so, it means nothing at all") (Scalia, J., dissenting). It was well established in 1989 when Union Gas was decided that the Eleventh Amendment stood for the constitutional principle that state sovereign im- munity limited the federal courts' jurisdiction under Article III. The text of the Amendment itself is clear enough on this point: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit . . . ." And our decisions since Hans had been equally clear that the Eleventh Amend- ment reflects "the fundamental principle of sovereign immu- nity [that] limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III," Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 97­98 (1984); see Union Gas, supra, at 38 (" `[T]he entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private par- ties against a State without consent given . . . ' ") (Scalia, 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 65 Opinion of the Court J., dissenting) (quoting Ex parte New York, 256 U. S. 490, 497 (1921)); see also cases cited at n. 7, supra. As the dissent in Union Gas recognized, the plurality's conclusion-that Con- gress could under Article I expand the scope of the federal courts' jurisdiction under Article III-"contradict[ed] our unvarying approach to Article III as setting forth the exclusive catalog of permissible federal-court jurisdiction." Union Gas, supra, at 39. Never before the decision in Union Gas had we suggested that the bounds of Article III could be expanded by Congress operating pursuant to any constitutional provision other than the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, it had seemed funda- mental that Congress could not expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond the bounds of Article III. Mar- bury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). The plurality's cita- tion of prior decisions for support was based upon what we believe to be a misreading of precedent. See Union Gas, 491 U. S., at 40­41 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The plurality claimed support for its decision from a case holding the unre- markable, and completely unrelated, proposition that the States may waive their sovereign immunity, see id., at 14­15 (citing Parden v. Terminal Railway of Ala. Docks Dept., 377 U. S. 184 (1964)), and cited as precedent propositions that had been merely assumed for the sake of argument in earlier cases, see 491 U. S., at 15 (citing Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U. S., at 475­476, and n. 5, and County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y., 470 U. S., at 252). The plurality's extended reliance upon our decision in Fitz- patrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976), that Congress could under the Fourteenth Amendment abrogate the States' sovereign immunity was also, we believe, misplaced. Fitz- patrick was based upon a rationale wholly inapplicable to the Interstate Commerce Clause, viz., that the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted well after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment and the ratification of the Constitution, oper- 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 66 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court ated to alter the pre-existing balance between state and fed- eral power achieved by Article III and the Eleventh Amend- ment. Id., at 454. As the dissent in Union Gas made clear, Fitzpatrick cannot be read to justify "limitation of the prin- ciple embodied in the Eleventh Amendment through appeal to antecedent provisions of the Constitution." Union Gas, supra, at 42 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In the five years since it was decided, Union Gas has proved to be a solitary departure from established law. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U. S. 139 (1993). Reconsidering the decision in Union Gas, we conclude that none of the policies underly- ing stare decisis require our continuing adherence to its hold- ing. The decision has, since its issuance, been of question- able precedential value, largely because a majority of the Court expressly disagreed with the rationale of the plurality. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U. S. 738, 746 (1994) (the "degree of confusion following a splintered decision . . . is itself a reason for reexamining that decision"). The case in- volved the interpretation of the Constitution and therefore may be altered only by constitutional amendment or revision by this Court. Finally, both the result in Union Gas and the plurality's rationale depart from our established under- standing of the Eleventh Amendment and undermine the accepted function of Article III. We feel bound to conclude that Union Gas was wrongly decided and that it should be, and now is, overruled. The dissent makes no effort to defend the decision in Union Gas, see post, at 100, but nonetheless would find con- gressional power to abrogate in this case.11 Contending that our decision is a novel extension of the Eleventh Amend- ment, the dissent chides us for "attend[ing]" to dicta. We adhere in this case, however, not to mere obiter dicta, but rather to the well-established rationale upon which the 11 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the dissent are to the dissenting opinion authored by Justice Souter. 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 67 Opinion of the Court Court based the results of its earlier decisions. When an opinion issues for the Court, it is not only the result but also those portions of the opinion necessary to that result by which we are bound. Cf. Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Marin, 495 U. S. 604, 613 (1990) (exclusive basis of a judgment is not dicta) (plurality); County of Alle- gheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pitts- burgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 668 (1989) ("As a general rule, the principle of stare decisis directs us to adhere not only to the holdings of our prior cases, but also to their explications of the governing rules of law") (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting); Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U. S. 421, 490 (1986) ("Although technically dicta, . . . an important part of the Court's rationale for the result that it reache[s] . . . is entitled to greater weight . . .") (O'Connor, J., concurring). For over a century, we have grounded our decisions in the oft-repeated understanding of state sovereign immunity as an essential part of the Eleventh Amendment. In Princi- pality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313 (1934), the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred a suit brought against a State by a foreign state. Chief Justice Hughes wrote for a unanimous Court: "[N]either the literal sweep of the words of Clause one of § 2 of Article III, nor the absence of restriction in the letter of the Eleventh Amendment, permits the conclu- sion that in all controversies of the sort described in Clause one, and omitted from the words of the Eleventh Amendment, a State may be sued without her consent. Thus Clause one specifically provides that the judicial Power shall extend `to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.' But, although a case may arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States, the judicial power does not extend to it if the suit is 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 68 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court sought to be prosecuted against a State, without her consent, by one of her own citizens. . . . "Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal appli- cation of the words of § 2 of Article III, or assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits against non-consenting States. Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control. There is the essen- tial postulate that the controversies, as contemplated, shall be found to be of a justiciable character. There is also the postulate that States of the Union, still pos- sessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, without their consent, save where there has been a `surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention.' " Id., at 321­323 (citations and footnote omitted). See id., at 329­330; see also Pennhurst, 465 U. S., at 98 ("In short, the principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III"); Ex parte New York, 256 U. S., at 497 ("[T]he entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a State without consent given . . ."). It is true that we have not had occasion previously to apply established Eleventh Amendment principles to the question whether Congress has the power to abrogate state sovereign immu- nity (save in Union Gas). But consideration of that ques- tion must proceed with fidelity to this century-old doctrine. The dissent, to the contrary, disregards our case law in favor of a theory cobbled together from law review articles and its own version of historical events. The dissent cites not a single decision since Hans (other than Union Gas) that supports its view of state sovereign immunity, instead rely- ing upon the now-discredited decision in Chisholm v. Geor- gia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). See, e. g., post, at 152, n. 47. Its un- documented and highly speculative extralegal explanation of 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 69 Opinion of the Court the decision in Hans is a disservice to the Court's traditional method of adjudication. See post, at 120­123. The dissent mischaracterizes the Hans opinion. That de- cision found its roots not solely in the common law of Eng- land, but in the much more fundamental " `jurisprudence in all civilized nations.' " Hans, 134 U. S., at 17, quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527, 529 (1858); see also The Federalist No. 81, p. 487 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) (sovereign immunity "is the general sense and the general practice of mankind"). The dissent's proposition that the common law of England, where adopted by the States, was open to change by the Legislature is wholly unexceptionable and largely be- side the point: that common law provided the substantive rules of law rather than jurisdiction. Cf. Monaco, supra, at 323 (state sovereign immunity, like the requirement that there be a "justiciable" controversy, is a constitutionally grounded limit on federal jurisdiction). It also is notewor- thy that the principle of state sovereign immunity stands distinct from other principles of the common law in that only the former prompted a specific constitutional amendment. Hans-with a much closer vantage point than the dis- sent-recognized that the decision in Chisholm was contrary to the well-understood meaning of the Constitution. The dissent's conclusion that the decision in Chisholm was "rea- sonable," post, at 106, certainly would have struck the Fram- ers of the Eleventh Amendment as quite odd: That decision created "such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh Amend- ment was at once proposed and adopted." Monaco, supra, at 325. The dissent's lengthy analysis of the text of the Eleventh Amendment is directed at a straw man-we long have recognized that blind reliance upon the text of the Elev- enth Amendment is " `to strain the Constitution and the law to a construction never imagined or dreamed of.' " Monaco, supra, at 326, quoting Hans, supra, at 15. The text dealt in terms only with the problem presented by the decision in Chisholm; in light of the fact that the federal courts did not 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 70 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court have federal-question jurisdiction at the time the Amend- ment was passed (and would not have it until 1875), it seems unlikely that much thought was given to the prospect of federal-question jurisdiction over the States. That same consideration causes the dissent's criticism of the views of Marshall, Madison, and Hamilton to ring hollow. The dissent cites statements made by those three influential Framers, the most natural reading of which would preclude all federal jurisdiction over an unconsenting State.12 Strug- gling against this reading, however, the dissent finds signifi- cant the absence of any contention that sovereign immu- nity would affect the new federal-question jurisdiction. Post, at 142­150. But the lack of any statute vesting general federal-question jurisdiction in the federal courts until much later makes the dissent's demand for greater specificity about a then-dormant jurisdiction overly exacting.13 12 We note here also that the dissent quotes selectively from the Fram- ers' statements that it references. The dissent cites the following, for instance, as a statement made by Madison: "[T]he Constitution `give[s] a citizen a right to be heard in the federal courts; and if a state should condescend to be a party, this court may take cognizance of it.' " Post, at 143 (opinion of Souter, J.). But that statement, perhaps ambiguous when read in isolation, was preceded by the following: "[J]urisdiction in con- troversies between a state and citizens of another state is much objected to, and perhaps without reason. It is not in the power of individuals to call any state into court. The only operation it can have, is that, if a state should wish to bring a suit against a citizen, it must be brought before the federal courts. It appears to me that this can have no opera- tion but this:" See 3 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 533 (2d ed. 1836). 13 Although the absence of any discussion dealing with federal-question jurisdiction is therefore unremarkable, what is notably lacking in the Framers' statements is any mention of Congress' power to abrogate the States' immunity. The absence of any discussion of that power is par- ticularly striking in light of the fact that the Framers virtually always were very specific about the exception to state sovereign immunity aris- ing from a State's consent to suit. See, e. g., The Federalist No. 81, pp. 487­488 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) ("It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual with- 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 71 Opinion of the Court In putting forward a new theory of state sovereign immu- nity, the dissent develops its own vision of the political sys- tem created by the Framers, concluding with the statement that "[t]he Framers' principal objectives in rejecting English theories of unitary sovereignty . . . would have been impeded if a new concept of sovereign immunity had taken its place in federal-question cases, and would have been substantially thwarted if that new immunity had been held untouchable by any congressional effort to abrogate it." 14 Post, at 157. This sweeping statement ignores the fact that the Nation survived for nearly two centuries without the question of the existence of such power ever being presented to this Court. And Congress itself waited nearly a century before even con- ferring federal-question jurisdiction on the lower federal courts.15 out its consent. . . . Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the States and the danger intimated must be merely ideal") (emphasis in the original); 3 Elliot, supra, at 533 (J. Madison) ("It is not in the power of individuals to call any state into court. . . . [The Constitution] can have no operation but this: . . . if a state should condescend to be a party, this court may take cognizance of it"). 14 This argument wholly disregards other methods of ensuring the States' compliance with federal law: The Federal Government can bring suit in federal court against a State, see, e. g., United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 621, 644­645 (1892) (finding such power necessary to the "perma- nence of the Union"); an individual can bring suit against a state officer in order to ensure that the officer's conduct is in compliance with federal law, see, e. g., Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908); and this Court is empow- ered to review a question of federal law arising from a state-court decision where a State has consented to suit, see, e. g., Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821). 15 Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, makes two points that merit separate response. First, he contends that no distinction may be drawn between state sovereign immunity and the immunity enjoyed by state and federal officials. But even assuming that the latter has no con- stitutional foundation, the distinction is clear: The Constitution specifically recognizes the States as sovereign entities, while government officials enjoy no such constitutional recognition. Second, Justice Stevens criti- 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 72 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court In overruling Union Gas today, we reconfirm that the background principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dissi- pate when the subject of the suit is an area, like the regula- tion of Indian commerce, that is under the exclusive control of the Federal Government. Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over a par- ticular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congres- sional authorization of suits by private parties against uncon- senting States.16 The Eleventh Amendment restricts the cizes our prior decisions applying the "clear statement rule," suggesting that they were based upon an understanding that Article I allowed Con- gress to abrogate state sovereign immunity. His criticism, however, ig- nores the fact that many of those cases arose in the context of a statute passed under the Fourteenth Amendment, where Congress' authority to abrogate is undisputed. See, e. g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979). And a more fundamental flaw of the criticism is its failure to recognize that both the doctrine requiring avoidance of constitutional questions, and principles of federalism, require us always to apply the clear statement rule before we consider the constitutional question whether Congress has the power to abrogate. 16 Justice Stevens understands our opinion to prohibit federal juris- diction over suits to enforce the bankruptcy, copyright, and antitrust laws against the States. He notes that federal jurisdiction over those statu- tory schemes is exclusive, and therefore concludes that there is "no rem- edy" for state violations of those federal statutes. Post, at 78, n. 1. That conclusion is exaggerated both in its substance and in its signifi- cance. First, Justice Stevens' statement is misleadingly overbroad. We have already seen that several avenues remain open for ensuring state compliance with federal law. See n. 14, supra. Most notably, an individ- ual may obtain injunctive relief under Ex parte Young in order to remedy a state officer's ongoing violation of federal law. See n. 14, supra. Sec- ond, contrary to the implication of Justice Stevens' conclusion, it has not been widely thought that the federal antitrust, bankruptcy, or copyright statutes abrogated the States' sovereign immunity. This Court never has awarded relief against a State under any of those statutory schemes; in the decision of this Court that Justice Stevens cites (and somehow labels "incompatible" with our decision here), we specifically reserved the ques- tion whether the Eleventh Amendment would allow a suit to enforce the antitrust laws against a State. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 73 Opinion of the Court judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction. Petitioner's suit against the State of Florida must be dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction. III Petitioner argues that we may exercise jurisdiction over its suit to enforce § 2710(d)(3) against the Governor notwith- standing the jurisdictional bar of the Eleventh Amendment. Petitioner notes that since our decision in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), we often have found federal jurisdiction over a suit against a state official when that suit seeks only prospective injunctive relief in order to "end a continuing violation of federal law." Green v. Mansour, 474 U. S., at 68. The situation presented here, however, is sufficiently different from that giving rise to the traditional Ex parte Young action so as to preclude the availability of that doctrine. Here, the "continuing violation of federal law" alleged by petitioner is the Governor's failure to bring the State into compliance with § 2710(d)(3). But the duty to negotiate imposed upon the State by that statutory provision does not stand alone. Rather, as we have seen, supra, at 49­50, Congress passed § 2710(d)(3) in conjunction with the care- U. S. 773, 792, n. 22 (1975). Although the copyright and bankruptcy laws have existed practically since our Nation's inception, and the antitrust laws have been in force for over a century, there is no established tradition in the lower federal courts of allowing enforcement of those federal stat- utes against the States. Notably, both Court of Appeals decisions cited by Justice Stevens were issued last year and were based upon Union Gas. See Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F. 3d 539 (CA5 1995); Matter of Merchants Grain, Inc. v. Mahern, 59 F. 3d 630 (CA7 1995). Indeed, while the Court of Appeals in Chavez allowed the suit against the State to go forward, it expressly recognized that its holding was unprecedented. See Chavez, 59 F. 3d, at 546 ("[W]e are aware of no case that specifically holds that laws passed pursuant to the Copyright Clause can abrogate State immunity"). 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 74 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Opinion of the Court fully crafted and intricate remedial scheme set forth in § 2710(d)(7). Where Congress has created a remedial scheme for the enforcement of a particular federal right, we have, in suits against federal officers, refused to supplement that scheme with one created by the judiciary. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U. S. 412, 423 (1988) ("When the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it consid- ers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional viola- tions that may occur in the course of its administration, we have not created additional . . . remedies"). Here, of course, the question is not whether a remedy should be created, but instead is whether the Eleventh Amendment bar should be lifted, as it was in Ex parte Young, in order to allow a suit against a state officer. Nevertheless, we think that the same general principle applies: Therefore, where Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the enforce- ment against a State of a statutorily created right, a court should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting an action against a state officer based upon Ex parte Young. Here, Congress intended § 2710(d)(3) to be enforced against the State in an action brought under § 2710(d)(7); the intricate procedures set forth in that provision show that Congress intended therein not only to define, but also to limit significantly, the duty imposed by § 2710(d)(3). For example, where the court finds that the State has failed to negotiate in good faith, the only remedy prescribed is an order direct- ing the State and the Indian tribe to conclude a compact within 60 days. And if the parties disregard the court's order and fail to conclude a compact within the 60-day pe- riod, the only sanction is that each party then must submit a proposed compact to a mediator who selects the one which best embodies the terms of the Act. Finally, if the State fails to accept the compact selected by the mediator, the only sanction against it is that the mediator shall notify the Secre- 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 75 Opinion of the Court tary of the Interior who then must prescribe regulations governing class III gaming on the tribal lands at issue. By contrast with this quite modest set of sanctions, an ac- tion brought against a state official under Ex parte Young would expose that official to the full remedial powers of a federal court, including, presumably, contempt sanctions. If § 2710(d)(3) could be enforced in a suit under Ex parte Young, § 2710(d)(7) would have been superfluous; it is difficult to see why an Indian tribe would suffer through the intricate scheme of § 2710(d)(7) when more complete and more imme- diate relief would be available under Ex parte Young.17 Here, of course, we have found that Congress does not have authority under the Constitution to make the State su- able in federal court under § 2710(d)(7). Nevertheless, the fact that Congress chose to impose upon the State a liability 17 Contrary to the claims of the dissent, we do not hold that Congress cannot authorize federal jurisdiction under Ex parte Young over a cause of action with a limited remedial scheme. We find only that Congress did not intend that result in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Although one might argue that the text of § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i), taken alone, is broad enough to encompass both a suit against a State (under an abrogation theory) and a suit against a state official (under an Ex parte Young the- ory), subsection (A)(i) of § 2710(d)(7) cannot be read in isolation from sub- sections (B)(ii)­(vii), which repeatedly refer exclusively to "the State." See supra, at 56­57. In this regard, § 2710(d)(7) stands in contrast to the statutes cited by the dissent as examples where lower courts have found that Congress implicitly authorized suit under Ex parte Young. Compare 28 U. S. C. § 2254(e) (federal court authorized to issue an "order directed to an appropriate State official"); 42 U. S. C. § 11001 (1988 ed.) (requiring "the Governor" of a State to perform certain actions and holding "the Governor" responsible for nonperformance); 33 U. S. C. § 1365(a) (authoriz- ing a suit against "any person" who is alleged to be in violation of relevant water pollution laws). Similarly the duty imposed by the Act-to "nego- tiate . . . in good faith to enter into" a compact with another sovereign- stands distinct in that it is not of the sort likely to be performed by an individual state executive officer or even a group of officers. Cf. State ex rel. Stephan v. Finney, 836 P. 2d 1169, 251 Kan. 559 (1992) (Governor of Kansas may negotiate but may not enter into compact without grant of power from legislature). 517us1$37H 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 76 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Stevens, J., dissenting that is significantly more limited than would be the liability imposed upon the state officer under Ex parte Young strongly indicates that Congress had no wish to create the latter under § 2710(d)(3). Nor are we free to rewrite the statutory scheme in order to approximate what we think Congress might have wanted had it known that § 2710(d)(7) was beyond its authority. If that effort is to be made, it should be made by Congress, and not by the federal courts. We hold that Ex parte Young is inapplicable to petitioner's suit against the Governor of Florida, and therefore that suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment and must be dis- missed for a lack of jurisdiction. IV The Eleventh Amendment prohibits Congress from mak- ing the State of Florida capable of being sued in federal court. The narrow exception to the Eleventh Amendment provided by the Ex parte Young doctrine cannot be used to enforce § 2710(d)(3) because Congress enacted a remedial scheme, § 2710(d)(7), specifically designed for the enforce- ment of that right. The Eleventh Circuit's dismissal of petitioner's suit is hereby affirmed.18 It is so ordered. Justice Stevens, dissenting. This case is about power-the power of the Congress of the United States to create a private federal cause of action against a State, or its Governor, for the violation of a federal right. In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793), the entire Court-including Justice Iredell whose dissent provided the blueprint for the Eleventh Amendment-assumed that Con- gress had such power. In Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890)-a case the Court purports to follow today-the Court 18 We do not here consider, and express no opinion upon, that portion of the decision below that provides a substitute remedy for a tribe bringing suit. See 11 F. 3d, at 1029. 517us1$37I 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 77 Stevens, J., dissenting again assumed that Congress had such power. In Fitz- patrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976), and Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S. 1, 24 (1989) (Stevens, J., concur- ring), the Court squarely held that Congress has such power. In a series of cases beginning with Atascadero State Hos- pital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 238­239 (1985), the Court formulated a special "clear statement rule" to determine whether specific Acts of Congress contained an effective ex- ercise of that power. Nevertheless, in a sharp break with the past, today the Court holds that with the narrow and illogical exception of statutes enacted pursuant to the En- forcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has no such power. The importance of the majority's decision to overrule the Court's holding in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. cannot be overstated. The majority's opinion does not simply pre- clude Congress from establishing the rather curious statu- tory scheme under which Indian tribes may seek the aid of a federal court to secure a State's good-faith negotiations over gaming regulations. Rather, it prevents Congress from providing a federal forum for a broad range of actions against States, from those sounding in copyright and patent law, to those concerning bankruptcy, environmental law, and the regulation of our vast national economy.1 1 See, e. g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S. 1 (1989) (holding that a federal court may order a State to pay cleanup costs pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980); In re Merchants Grain, Inc., 59 F. 3d 630 (CA7 1995) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a bankruptcy court from issu- ing a money judgment against a State under the Bankruptcy Code); Cha- vez v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F. 3d 539 (CA5 1995) (holding that a state university could be sued in federal court for infringing an author's copy- right). The conclusion that suits against States may not be brought in federal court is also incompatible with our cases concluding that state enti- ties may be sued for antitrust violations. See, e. g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773, 791­792 (1975). As federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under these federal laws, the majority's conclusion that the Eleventh Amend- 517us1$37I 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 78 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Stevens, J., dissenting There may be room for debate over whether, in light of the Eleventh Amendment, Congress has the power to ensure that such a cause of action may be enforced in federal court by a citizen of another State or a foreign citizen. There can be no serious debate, however, over whether Congress has the power to ensure that such a cause of action may be brought by a citizen of the State being sued. Congress' au- thority in that regard is clear. As Justice Souter has convincingly demonstrated, the Court's contrary conclusion is profoundly misguided. De- spite the thoroughness of his analysis, supported by sound reason, history, precedent, and strikingly uniform scholarly commentary, the shocking character of the majority's affront to a coequal branch of our Government merits additional comment. I For the purpose of deciding this case, I can readily assume that Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall., at 429­450, and the Court's opinion in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), correctly stated the law that should gov- ern our decision today. As I shall explain, both of those opinions relied on an interpretation of an Act of Congress rather than a want of congressional power to authorize a suit against the State. In concluding that the federal courts could not entertain Chisholm's action against the State of Georgia, Justice Ire- dell relied on the text of the Judiciary Act of 1789, not the State's assertion that Article III did not extend the judicial power to suits against unconsenting States. Justice Iredell argued that, under Article III, federal courts possessed only ment shields States from being sued under them in federal court suggests that persons harmed by state violations of federal copyright, bankruptcy, and antitrust laws have no remedy. See Harris & Kenny, Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence After Atascadero: The Coming Clash With An- titrust, Copyright, and Other Causes of Action Over Which the Federal Courts Have Exclusive Jurisdiction, 37 Emory L. J. 645 (1988). 517us1$37I 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 79 Stevens, J., dissenting such jurisdiction as Congress had provided, and that the Ju- diciary Act expressly limited federal-court jurisdiction to that which could be exercised in accordance with " `the prin- ciples and usages of law.' " Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall., at 434 (quoting § 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789). He reasoned that the inclusion of this phrase constituted a command to the federal courts to construe their jurisdiction in light of the prevailing common law, a background legal regime that he believed incorporated the doctrine of sovereign im- munity. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall., at 434­436 (dissent- ing opinion).2 Because Justice Iredell believed that the expansive text of Article III did not prevent Congress from imposing this common-law limitation on federal-court jurisdiction, he con- cluded that judges had no authority to entertain a suit against an unconsenting State.3 At the same time, although he acknowledged that the Constitution might allow Congress to extend federal-court jurisdiction to such an action, he con- cluded that the terms of the Judiciary Act of 1789 plainly had not done so. "[Congress'] direction, I apprehend, we cannot super- sede, because it may appear to us not sufficiently exten- sive. If it be not, we must wait till other remedies are provided by the same authority. From this it is plain that the Legislature did not chuse to leave to our own 2 Because Justice Iredell read the Judiciary Act of 1789 to have incorpo- rated the common law, he did not even conclude that Congress would have to make a clear statement in order to override the common law's recogni- tion of sovereign immunity. 3 Actually, he limited his conclusion to the narrower question whether an action of assumpsit would lie against a State, which he distinguished from the more general question whether a State can ever be sued. Chis- holm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 430 (1793). He did so because he recognized "that in England, certain judicial proceedings not inconsistent with the sovereignty, may take place against the Crown, but that an action of as- sumpsit will not lie," and because he had "often found a great deal of confusion to arise from taking too large a view at once." Ibid. 517us1$37I 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 80 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Stevens, J., dissenting discretion the path to justice, but has prescribed one of its own. In doing so, it has, I think, wisely, referred us to principles and usages of law already well known, and by their precision calculated to guard against that inno- vating spirit of Courts of Justice, which the Attorney- General in another case reprobated with so much warmth, and with whose sentiments in that particular, I most cordially join." Id., at 434 (emphasis added). For Justice Iredell then, it was enough to assume that Ar- ticle III permitted Congress to impose sovereign immunity as a jurisdictional limitation; he did not proceed to resolve the further question whether the Constitution went so far as to prevent Congress from withdrawing a State's immunity.4 Thus, it would be ironic to construe the Chisholm dissent as precedent for the conclusion that Article III limits Congress' power to determine the scope of a State's sovereign immu- nity in federal court. The precise holding in Chisholm is difficult to state be- cause each of the Justices in the majority wrote his own opinion. They seem to have held, however, not that the Judiciary Act of 1789 precluded the defense of sovereign immunity, but that Article III of the Constitution itself required the Supreme Court to entertain original actions 4 In two sentences at the end of his lengthy opinion, Justice Iredell stated that his then-present view was that the Constitution would not permit a "compulsive suit against a State for the recovery of money." Id., at 449. In light of Justice Iredell's express statement that the only ques- tion before the Court was the propriety of an individual's action for as- sumpsit against a State, an action which, of course, results in a money judgment, see n. 2, supra, this dicta should not be understood to state the general view that the Constitution bars all suits against unconsenting States. Moreover, even as to the limited question whether the Constitu- tion permits actions for money judgments, Justice Iredell took pains to reserve ultimate judgment. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall., at 449. Thus, nothing in Justice Iredell's two sentences of dicta provides a basis for concluding that Congress lacks the power to authorize the suit for the nonmonetary relief at issue here. 517us1$37I 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 81 Stevens, J., dissenting against unconsenting States.5 I agree with Justice Iredell that such a construction of Article III is incorrect; that Arti- cle should not then have been construed, and should not now be construed, to prevent Congress from granting States a sovereign immunity defense in such cases.6 That reading of Article III, however, explains why the majority's holding in Chisholm could not have been reversed by a simple statu- tory amendment adopting Justice Iredell's interpretation of the Judiciary Act of 1789. There is a special irony in the fact that the error committed by the Chisholm majority was its decision that this Court, rather than Congress, should define the scope of the sovereign immunity defense. That, of course, is precisely the same error the Court commits today. In light of the nature of the disagreement between Justice Iredell and his colleagues, Chisholm's holding could have been overturned by simply amending the Constitution to re- store to Congress the authority to recognize the doctrine. As it was, the plain text of the Eleventh Amendment would seem to go further and to limit the judicial power itself in a certain class of cases. In doing so, however, the Amend- 5 In this respect, Chisholm v. Georgia should be understood to be of a piece with the debate over judicial power famously joined in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 337 (1816). There, too, the argument cen- tered on whether Congress had the power to limit the seemingly expan- sive jurisdictional grant that Article III had conferred, not on whether Article III itself provided the relevant limitation. 6 The contention that Article III withdrew Georgia's sovereign immu- nity had special force precisely because Chisholm involved an action prem- ised on the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. While Article III leaves it to Congress to establish the lower federal courts, and to make exceptions to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, it specifically mandates that there be a Supreme Court and that it shall be vested with original jurisdiction over those actions in which "a State shall be Party." Art. III, § 2. In light of that language, the Chisholm majority's conclusion that the Supreme Court had a constitutional obligation to take jurisdiction of all suits against States was not implausible. 517us1$37I 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 82 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Stevens, J., dissenting ment's quite explicit text establishes only a partial bar to a federal court's power to entertain a suit against a State.7 Justice Brennan has persuasively explained that the Elev- enth Amendment's jurisdictional restriction is best under- stood to apply only to suits premised on diversity jurisdic- tion, see Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S., at 247 (dissenting opinion), and Justice Scalia has agreed that the plain text of the Amendment cannot be read to apply to federal-question cases. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U. S., at 31 (dissenting opinion).8 Whatever the precise dimensions of the Amendment, its express terms plainly do not apply to all suits brought against unconsenting States.9 7 It should be remembered that at the time of Chisholm, there was a general fear of what Justice Iredell termed the "innovating spirit" of the Federal Judiciary. See, e. g., 3 A. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall 19­30 (1919) (discussing the consternation that the federal courts' creation of common-law felonies engendered). Thus, there is good reason to be- lieve that the reaction to Chisholm reflected the popular hostility to the Federal Judiciary more than any desire to restrain the National Legislature. 8 Of course, even if the Eleventh Amendment applies to federal-question cases brought by a citizen of another State, its express terms pose no bar to a federal court assuming jurisdiction in a federal-question case brought by an in-state plaintiff pursuant to Congress' express authorization. As that is precisely the posture of the suit before us, and as it was also pre- cisely the posture of the suit at issue in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, there is no need to decide here whether Congress would be barred from author- izing out-of-state plaintiffs to enforce federal rights against States in fed- eral court. In fact, Justice Brennan left open that question in his dissent in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 288, n. 41 (1985). "When the Court is prepared to embark on a defensible interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment consistent with its history and purposes, the question whether the Amendment bars federal-question or admiralty suits by a noncitizen or alien against a State would be open." Ibid. 9 Under the "plain text" of the Eleventh Amendment, I note that there would appear to be no more basis for the conclusion that States may consent to federal-court jurisdiction in actions brought by out-of-state or foreign citizens than there would be for the view that States should be permitted to consent to the jurisdiction of a federal court in a case that poses no federal question. See, e. g., Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. 517us1$37I 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 83 Stevens, J., dissenting The question thus becomes whether the relatively modest jurisdictional bar that the Eleventh Amendment imposes should be understood to reveal that a more general jurisdic- tional bar implicitly inheres in Article III. The language of Article III certainly gives no indication that such an implicit bar exists. That provision's text spe- cifically provides for federal-court jurisdiction over all cases arising under federal law. Moreover, as I have explained, Justice Iredell's dissent argued that it was the Judiciary Act of 1789, not Article III, that prevented the federal courts from entertaining Chisholm's diversity action against Geor- gia. Therefore, Justice Iredell's analysis at least suggests that it was by no means a fixed view at the time of the found- ing that Article III prevented Congress from rendering States suable in federal court by their own citizens. In sum, little more than speculation justifies the conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment's express but partial limitation on the scope of Article III reveals that an implicit but more general one was already in place. II The majority appears to acknowledge that one cannot de- duce from either the text of Article III or the plain terms of Kroger, 437 U. S. 365, 377, n. 21 (1978); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 398 (1975); California v. LaRue, 409 U. S. 109, 112­113, n. 3 (1972); American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U. S. 6, 17­18, and n. 17 (1951); Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U. S. 237, 244 (1934); Jackson v. Ashton, 8 Pet. 148, 149 (1834). We have, however, construed the Amendment, despite its text, to apply only to unconsenting States. See, e. g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436, 447 (1883). In so doing, we of course left it for Congress to determine whether federal courts should entertain any claim against a State in fed- eral court. A departure from the text to expand the class of plaintiffs to whom the Eleventh Amendment's bar applies would, however, limit Con- gress' authority to exercise its considered judgment as to the propriety of federal-court jurisdiction. The absence of a textual warrant for imposing such a broad limitation on the legislative branch counsels against this Court extratextually imposing one. 517us1$37I 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 84 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Stevens, J., dissenting the Eleventh Amendment that the judicial power does not extend to a congressionally created cause of action against a State brought by one of that State's citizens. Nevertheless, the majority asserts that precedent compels that same con- clusion. I disagree. The majority relies first on our deci- sion in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), which involved a suit by a citizen of Louisiana against that State for a claimed violation of the Contracts Clause. The majority suggests that by dismissing the suit, Hans effectively held that federal courts have no power to hear federal-question suits brought by same-state plaintiffs. Hans does not hold, however, that the Eleventh Amend- ment, or any other constitutional provision, precludes federal courts from entertaining actions brought by citizens against their own States in the face of contrary congressional direc- tion. As I have explained before, see Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S., at 25­26 (Stevens, J., concurring), and as Justice Souter effectively demonstrates, Hans in- stead reflects, at the most, this Court's conclusion that, as a matter of federal common law, federal courts should decline to entertain suits against unconsenting States. Because Hans did not announce a constitutionally mandated jurisdic- tional bar, one need not overrule Hans, or even question its reasoning, in order to conclude that Congress may direct the federal courts to reject sovereign immunity in those suits not mentioned by the Eleventh Amendment. Instead, one need only follow it. Justice Bradley's somewhat cryptic opinion for the Court in Hans relied expressly on the reasoning of Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm, which, of course, was premised on the view that the doctrine of state sovereign immunity was a common-law rule that Congress had directed federal courts to respect, not a constitutional immunity that Congress was powerless to displace. For that reason, Justice Bradley ex- plained that the State's immunity from suit by one of its own 517us1$37I 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 85 Stevens, J., dissenting citizens was based not on a constitutional rule but rather on the fact that Congress had not, by legislation, attempted to overcome the common-law presumption of sovereign immu- nity. His analysis so clearly supports the position rejected by the majority today that it is worth quoting at length. "But besides the presumption that no anomalous and unheard of proceedings or suits were intended to be raised up by the Constitution-anomalous and unheard of when the Constitution was adopted-an additional reason why the jurisdiction claimed for the Circuit Court does not exist, is the language of the act of Con- gress by which its jurisdiction is conferred. The words are these: `The circuit courts of the United States shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at com- mon law or in equity, . . . arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties,' etc.-`Concur- rent with the courts of the several States.' Does not this qualification show that Congress, in legislating to carry the Constitution into effect, did not intend to in- vest its courts with any new and strange jurisdictions? The state courts have no power to entertain suits by individuals against a State without its consent. Then how does the Circuit Court, having only concurrent ju- risdiction, acquire any such power? It is true that the same qualification existed in the judiciary act of 1789, which was before the court in Chisholm v. Georgia, and the majority of the court did not think that it was suffi- cient to limit the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. Jus- tice Iredell thought differently. In view of the manner in which that decision was received by the country, the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, the light of his- tory and the reason of the thing, we think we are at liberty to prefer Justice Iredell's views in this regard." Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S., at 18­19. 517us1$37I 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 86 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Stevens, J., dissenting As this passage demonstrates, Hans itself looked to see whether Congress had displaced the presumption that sover- eign immunity obtains. Although the opinion did go to great lengths to establish the quite uncontroversial historical proposition that unconsenting States generally were not sub- ject to suit, that entire discussion preceded the opinion's statutory analysis. See id., at 10­18. Thus, the opinion's thorough historical investigation served only to establish a presumption against jurisdiction that Congress must over- come, not an inviolable jurisdictional restriction that inheres in the Constitution itself. Indeed, the very fact that the Court characterized the doc- trine of sovereign immunity as a "presumption" confirms its assumption that it could be displaced. The Hans Court's inquiry into congressional intent would have been wholly in- appropriate if it had believed that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was a constitutionally inviolable jurisdictional limitation. Thus, Hans provides no basis for the majority's conclusion that Congress is powerless to make States suable in cases not mentioned by the text of the Eleventh Amend- ment. Instead, Hans provides affirmative support for the view that Congress may create federal-court jurisdiction over private causes of action against unconsenting States brought by their own citizens. It is true that the underlying jurisdictional statute in- volved in this case, 28 U. S. C. § 1331, does not itself purport to direct federal courts to ignore a State's sovereign immu- nity any more than did the underlying jurisdictional statute discussed in Hans, the Judiciary Act of 1875. However, un- like in Hans, in this case Congress has, by virtue of the In- dian Gaming Regulatory Act, affirmatively manifested its in- tention to "invest its courts with" jurisdiction beyond the limits set forth in the general jurisdictional statute. 134 U. S., at 18. By contrast, because Hans involved only an implied cause of action based directly on the Constitution, the Judiciary Act of 1875 constituted the sole indication as 517us1$37I 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 87 Stevens, J., dissenting to whether Congress intended federal-court jurisdiction to extend to a suit against an unconsenting State.10 Given the nature of the cause of action involved in Hans, as well as the terms of the underlying jurisdictional statute, the Court's decision to apply the common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity in that case clearly should not control the outcome here. The reasons that may support a federal court's hesitancy to construe a judicially crafted constitu- tional remedy narrowly out of respect for a State's sover- eignty do not bear on whether Congress may preclude a State's invocation of such a defense when it expressly estab- lishes a federal remedy for the violation of a federal right. No one has ever suggested that Congress would be power- less to displace the other common-law immunity doctrines that this Court has recognized as appropriate defenses to certain federal claims such as the judicially fashioned rem- edy in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 10 In his dissent in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S., at 36­37, Justice Scalia contended that the existence of the Judiciary Act of 1875 at the time of Hans requires one to accept the "gossamer distinction be- tween cases in which Congress has assertedly sought to eliminate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its powers to create and organize courts, and cases in which it has assertedly sought to do so pursuant to some of its other powers," in order to conclude that, in spite of Hans, Congress may authorize federal courts to hear a suit against an unconsenting State. I rely on no such "gossamer distinction" here. Congress has the authority to withdraw sovereign immunity in cases not covered by the Eleventh Amendment under all of its various powers. Nothing in Hans is to the contrary. As the passage quoted above demon- strates, Hans merely concluded that Congress, in enacting the Judiciary Act of 1875, did not manifest a desire to withdraw state sovereign immu- nity with sufficient clarity to overcome the countervailing presumption. Therefore, I rely only on the distinction between a statute that clearly directs federal courts to entertain suits against States, such as the one before us here, and a statute that does not, such as the Judiciary Act of 1875. In light of our repeated application of a clear-statement rule in Eleventh Amendment cases, from Hans onward, I would be surprised to learn that such a distinction is too thin to be acceptable. 517us1$37I 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 88 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Stevens, J., dissenting U. S. 388 (1971). See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800 (1982). Similarly, our cases recognizing qualified officer immunity in 42 U. S. C. § 1983 actions rest on the conclusion that, in passing that statute, Congress did not intend to displace the common-law immunity that officers would have retained under suits premised solely on the general jurisdictional statute. See Tower v. Glover, 467 U. S. 914, 920 (1984). For that reason, the federal common law of officer immunity that Congress meant to incorporate, not a contrary state immunity, applies in § 1983 cases. See Martinez v. California, 444 U. S. 277, 284 (1980). There is no reason why Congress' undoubted power to displace those common-law immunities should be either greater or lesser than its power to displace the common-law sovereign immunity defense. Some of our precedents do state that the sovereign immu- nity doctrine rests on fundamental constitutional "postu- lates" and partakes of jurisdictional aspects rooted in Article III. See ante, at 67­70. Most notably, that reasoning underlies this Court's holding in Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313 (1934). Monaco is a most inapt precedent for the majority's hold- ing today. That case barred a foreign sovereign from suing a State in an equitable state-law action to recover payments due on state bonds. It did not, however, involve a claim based on federal law. Instead, the case concerned a purely state-law question to which the State had interposed a fed- eral defense. Id., at 317. Thus, Monaco reveals little about the power of Congress to create a private federal cause of action to remedy a State's violation of federal law. Moreover, although Monaco attributes a quasi- constitutional status to sovereign immunity, even in cases not covered by the Eleventh Amendment's plain text, that characterization does not constitute precedent for the propo- sition that Congress is powerless to displace a State's immu- 517us1$37I 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 89 Stevens, J., dissenting nity. Our abstention doctrines have roots in both the Tenth Amendment and Article III, and thus may be said to rest on constitutional "postulates" or to partake of jurisdictional aspects. Yet it has not been thought that the Constitution would prohibit Congress from barring federal courts from abstaining. The majority offers no reason for making the federal common-law rule of sovereign immunity less suscep- tible to congressional displacement than any other quasi- jurisdictional common-law rule. In this regard, I note that Monaco itself analogized sover- eign immunity to the prudential doctrine that "controver- sies" identified in Article III must be "justiciable" in order to be heard by federal courts. Id., at 329. The justiciability doctrine is a prudential rather than a jurisdictional one, and thus Congress' clearly expressed intention to create federal jurisdiction over a particular Article III controversy nec- essarily strips federal courts of the authority to decline ju- risdiction on justiciability grounds. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 791 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 100­101 (1968). For that reason, Monaco, by its own terms, fails to resolve the question be- fore us.11 More generally, it is quite startling to learn that the rea- soning of Hans and Monaco (even assuming that it did not undermine the majority's view) should have a stare decisis effect on the question whether Congress possesses the au- thority to provide a federal forum for the vindication of a federal right by a citizen against its own State. In light of the Court's development of a "clear-statement" line of juris- 11 Indeed, to the extent the reasoning of Monaco was premised on the ground that a contrary ruling might permit foreign governments and States indirectly to frustrate Congress' treaty power, 292 U. S., at 331, the opinion suggests that its outcome would have been quite different had Congress expressly authorized suits by foreign governments against indi- vidual States as part of its administration of foreign policy. 517us1$37I 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 90 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Stevens, J., dissenting prudence, see, e. g., Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S., at 238­239; Hoffman v. Connecticut Dept. of In- come Maintenance, 492 U. S. 96 (1989), I would have thought that Hans and Monaco had at least left open the question whether Congress could permit the suit we consider here. Our clear-statement cases would have been all but unintelli- gible if Hans and Monaco had already established that Con- gress lacked the constitutional power to make States suable in federal court by individuals no matter how clear its inten- tion to do so.12 Finally, the particular nature of the federal question in- volved in Hans renders the majority's reliance upon its rule even less defensible. Hans deduced its rebuttable presump- tion in favor of sovereign immunity largely on the basis of its extensive analysis of cases holding that the sovereign could not be forced to make good on its debts via a private suit. See Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711 (1883); Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. S. 52 (1886); In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443 (1887). Because Hans, like these other cases, involved a suit that attempted to make a State honor its debt, its holding need not be read to stand even for the relatively limited proposition that there is a presumption in favor of sovereign immunity in all federal-question cases.13 12 Moreover, they would have most unnecessarily burdened Congress. For example, after deciding that Congress had not made sufficiently ex- plicit its intention to withdraw the state sovereign immunity defense in certain bankruptcy actions, see Hoffman v. Connecticut Dept. of Income Maintenance, 392 U. S. 96 (1989), Congress understandably concluded that it could correct the confusion by amending the relevant statute to make its intentions to override such a defense unmistakably clear. See In re Merchants Grain, Inc., 59 F. 3d 630 (CA7 1995). Congress will no doubt be surprised to learn that its exercise in legislative clarification, which it undertook for our benefit, was for naught because the Constitution makes it so. 13 Significantly, Chief Justice Marshall understood the Eleventh Amend- ment's bar to have been designed primarily to protect States from being sued for their debts. See Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 406 (1821). 517us1$37I 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 91 Stevens, J., dissenting In Hans, the plaintiff asserted a Contracts Clause claim against his State and thus asserted a federal right. To show that Louisiana had impaired its federal obligation, however, Hans first had to demonstrate that the State had entered into an enforceable contract as a matter of state law. That Hans chose to bring his claim in federal court as a Contract Clause action could not change the fact that he was, at bot- tom, seeking to enforce a contract with the State. See Burnham, Taming the Eleventh Amendment Without Over- ruling Hans v. Louisiana, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 931 (1990). Because Hans' claimed federal right did not arise inde- pendently of state law, sovereign immunity was relevant to the threshold state-law question of whether a valid contract existed.14 Hans expressly pointed out, however, that an in- dividual who could show that he had an enforceable contract under state law would not be barred from bringing suit in federal court to prevent the State from impairing it. "To avoid misapprehension it may be proper to add that, although the obligations of a State rest for their performance upon its honor and good faith, and cannot be made the subject of judicial cognizance unless the State consents to be sued, or comes itself into court; yet where property or rights are enjoyed under a grant or contract made by a State, they cannot wantonly be in- vaded. Whilst the State cannot be compelled by suit to perform its contracts, any attempt on its part to violate property or rights acquired under its contracts, may be 14 Significantly, many of the cases decided after Hans in which this Court has recognized state sovereign immunity involved claims premised on the breach of rights that were rooted in state law. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Ind., 323 U. S. 459 (1945); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47 (1944); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436 (1900). In such cases, the Court's application of the state-law immunity appears simply to foreshadow (or follow) the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), not to demark the limits of Article III. 517us1$37I 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 92 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Stevens, J., dissenting judicially resisted; and any law impairing the obligation of contracts under which such property or rights are held is void and powerless to affect their enjoyment." Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S., at 20­21. That conclusion casts doubt on the absolutist view that Hans definitively establishes that Article III prohibits fed- eral courts from entertaining federal-question suits brought against States by their own citizens. At the very least, Hans suggests that such suits may be brought to enjoin States from impairing existing contractual obligations. The view that the rule of Hans is more substantive than jurisdictional comports with Hamilton's famous discussion of sovereign immunity in The Federalist Papers. Hamilton of- fered his view that the federal judicial power would not ex- tend to suits against unconsenting States only in the context of his contention that no contract with a State could be en- forceable against the State's desire. He did not argue that a State's immunity from suit in federal court would be absolute. "[T]here is no color to pretend that the State govern- ments would, by the adoption of [the plan of convention], be divested of the privilege of paying their own debts in their own way, free from every constraint but that which flows from the obligations of good faith. The contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive force. They confer no right of action inde- pendent of the sovereign will." The Federalist No. 81, p. 488 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Here, of course, no question of a State's contractual obliga- tions is presented. The Seminole Tribe's only claim is that the State of Florida has failed to fulfill a duty to negotiate that federal statutory law alone imposes. Neither the Fed- 517us1$37I 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 93 Stevens, J., dissenting eralist Papers, nor Hans, provides support for the view that such a claim may not be heard in federal court. III In reaching my conclusion that the Constitution does not prevent Congress from making the State of Florida suable in federal court for violating one of its statutes, I emphasize that I agree with the majority that in all cases to which the judicial power does not extend-either because they are not within any category defined in Article III or because they are within the category withdrawn from Article III by the Eleventh Amendment-Congress lacks the power to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts. As I have previously in- sisted: "A statute cannot amend the Constitution." Penn- sylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S., at 24. It was, therefore, misleading for the Court in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976), to imply that § 5 of the Four- teenth Amendment authorized Congress to confer jurisdic- tion over cases that had been withdrawn from Article III by the Eleventh Amendment. Because that action had been brought by Connecticut citizens against officials of the State of Connecticut, jurisdiction was not precluded by the Elev- enth Amendment. As Justice Brennan pointed out in his concurrence, the congressional authority to enact the provi- sions at issue in the case was found in the Commerce Clause and provided a sufficient basis for refusing to allow the State to "avail itself of the nonconstitutional but ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity." Id., at 457 (opinion concurring in judgment). In confronting the question whether a federal grant of ju- risdiction is within the scope of Article III, as limited by the Eleventh Amendment, I see no reason to distinguish among statutes enacted pursuant to the power granted to Congress to regulate commerce among the several States, and with the Indian tribes, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, the power to establish 517us1$37I 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 94 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Stevens, J., dissenting uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy, Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, the power to promote the progress of science and the arts by granting exclusive rights to authors and inventors, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, the power to enforce the provisions of the Four- teenth Amendment, § 5, or indeed any other provision of the Constitution. There is no language anywhere in the consti- tutional text that authorizes Congress to expand the borders of Article III jurisdiction or to limit the coverage of the Eleventh Amendment. The Court's holdings in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976), and Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S. 1 (1989), do unquestionably establish, however, that Congress has the power to deny the States and their officials the right to rely on the nonconstitutional defense of sovereign immu- nity in an action brought by one of their own citizens. As the opinions in the latter case demonstrate, there can be le- gitimate disagreement about whether Congress intended a particular statute to authorize litigation against a State. Nevertheless, the Court there squarely held that the Com- merce Clause was an adequate source of authority for such a private remedy. In a rather novel rejection of the doc- trine of stare decisis, the Court today demeans that holding by repeatedly describing it as a "plurality decision" because Justice White did not deem it necessary to set forth the rea- sons for his vote. As Justice Souter's opinion today dem- onstrates, the arguments in support of Justice White's posi- tion are so patent and so powerful that his actual vote should be accorded full respect. Indeed, far more significant than the "plurality" character of the three opinions supporting the holding in Union Gas is the fact that the issue confronted today has been squarely addressed by a total of 13 Justices, 8 of whom cast their votes with the so-called "plurality." 15 15 It is significant that Justice Souter's opinion makes it perfectly clear that Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and he did not consider it necessary to rely on the holding in Union Gas to support their conclu- 517us1$37I 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 95 Stevens, J., dissenting The fundamental error that continues to lead the Court astray is its failure to acknowledge that its modern embodi- ment of the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity "has ab- solutely nothing to do with the limit on judicial power con- tained in the Eleventh Amendment." Id., at 25 (Stevens, J., concurring). It rests rather on concerns of federalism and comity that merit respect but are nevertheless, in cases such as the one before us, subordinate to the plenary power of Congress. IV As I noted above, for the purpose of deciding this case, it is not necessary to question the wisdom of the Court's deci- sion in Hans v. Louisiana. Given the absence of precedent for the Court's dramatic application of the sovereign immu- nity doctrine today, it is nevertheless appropriate to identify the questionable heritage of the doctrine and to suggest that there are valid reasons for limiting, or even rejecting that doctrine altogether, rather than expanding it. Except insofar as it has been incorporated into the text of the Eleventh Amendment, the doctrine is entirely the prod- uct of judge-made law. Three features of its English ances- try make it particularly unsuitable for incorporation into the law of this democratic Nation. First, the assumption that it could be supported by a belief that "the King can do no wrong" has always been absurd; the bloody path trod by English monarchs both before and after they reached the throne demonstrated the fictional character of any such assumption. Even if the fiction had been acceptable in Britain, the recitation in the Declaration of Independence of the wrongs committed by George III made that proposition unacceptable on this side of the Atlantic. sion. I find today's decision particularly unfortunate because of its failure to advance an acceptable reason for refusing to adhere to a precedent upon which the Congress, as well as the courts, should be entitled to rely. 517us1$37I 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 96 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Stevens, J., dissenting Second, centuries ago the belief that the monarch served by divine right made it appropriate to assume that redress for wrongs committed by the sovereign should be the exclu- sive province of still higher authority.16 While such a justi- fication for a rule that immunized the sovereign from suit in a secular tribunal might have been acceptable in a jurisdic- tion where a particular faith is endorsed by the government, it should give rise to skepticism concerning the legitimacy of comparable rules in a society where a constitutional wall separates the State from the Church. Third, in a society where noble birth can justify prefer- ential treatment, it might have been unseemly to allow a commoner to hale the monarch into court. Justice Wilson explained how foreign such a justification is to this Nation's principles. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall., at 455. More- over, Chief Justice Marshall early on laid to rest the view that the purpose of the Eleventh Amendment was to protect a State's dignity. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 406­407 (1821). Its purpose, he explained, was far more practical. "That its motive was not to maintain the sovereignty of a State from the degradation supposed to attend a compulsory appearance before the tribunal of the nation, may be inferred from the terms of the amendment. . . . We must ascribe the amendment, then, to some other cause than the dignity of a State. There is no difficulty in finding this cause. Those who were inhibited from commencing a suit against a State, or from prosecuting one which might be commenced before the adoption of the amendment, were persons who might probably be its creditors. There was not much reason to fear that foreign or sister States would be creditors to any consid- erable amount, and there was reason to retain the juris- 16 See Stevens, Is Justice Irrelevant?, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1121, 1124­ 1125 (1993). 517us1$37I 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 97 Stevens, J., dissenting diction of the Court in those cases, because it might be essential to the preservation of peace." Ibid.17 Nevertheless, this Court later put forth the interest in preventing "indignity" as the "very object and purpose of the [Eleventh] Amendment." In re Ayers, 123 U. S., at 505. That, of course, is an "embarrassingly insufficient" rationale for the rule. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Author- ity v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U. S. 139, 151 (1993) (Ste- vens, J., dissenting). Moreover, I find unsatisfying Justice Holmes' explanation that "[a] sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right de- pends." Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349, 353 (1907). As I have explained before, Justice Holmes' justifi- cation fails in at least two respects. "First, it is nothing more than a restatement of the obvi- ous proposition that a citizen may not sue the sovereign unless the sovereign has violated the citizen's legal rights. It cannot explain application of the immunity defense in cases like Chisholm, in which it is assumed that the plaintiff's rights have in fact been violated- and those cases are, of course, the only ones in which the immunity defense is needed. Second, Holmes's statement does not purport to explain why a general grant of jurisdiction to federal courts should not be treated as an adequate expression of the sovereign's consent to suits against itself as well as to suits against 17 Interestingly, this passage demonstrates that the Court's application of a common-law sovereign immunity defense in Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313 (1934), was quite probably justified. There a foreign state sued a State as a substantial creditor, and thus implicated the very purpose of the Eleventh Amendment. 517us1$37I 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 98 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Stevens, J., dissenting ordinary litigants." Stevens, Is Justice Irrelevant?, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1121, 1126 (1993). In sum, as far as its common-law ancestry is concerned, there is no better reason for the rule of sovereign immunity "than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897). That "reason" for the perpetuation of this ancient doctrine certainly cannot justify the majority's expansion of it.In this country the sovereignty of the individual States is subordinate both to the citizenry of each State and to the supreme law of the federal sovereign. For that reason, Jus- tice Holmes' explanation for a rule that allows a State to avoid suit in its own courts does not even speak to the ques- tion whether Congress should be able to authorize a federal court to provide a private remedy for a State's violation of federal law. In my view, neither the majority's opinion today, nor any earlier opinion by any Member of the Court, has identified any acceptable reason for concluding that the absence of a State's consent to be sued in federal court should affect the power of Congress to authorize federal courts to remedy violations of federal law by States or their officials in actions not covered by the Eleventh Amendment's explicit text.18 While I am persuaded that there is no justification for per- manently enshrining the judge-made law of sovereign immu- nity, I recognize that federalism concerns-and even the in- 18 Because Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), was the first case in which the Court held that a State could not be sued in federal court by one of its citizens, this comment is of interest: "It is not necessary that we should enter upon an examination of the reason or the expediency of the rule which exempts a sovereign State from prosecution in a court of justice at the suit of individuals. This is fully discussed by writers on public law. It is enough for us to declare its existence." Id., at 21. So it is today. 517us1$37I 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 99 Stevens, J., dissenting terest in protecting the solvency of the States that was at work in Chisholm and Hans-may well justify a grant of immunity from federal litigation in certain classes of cases. Such a grant, however, should be the product of a reasoned decision by the policymaking branch of our Government. For this Court to conclude that timeworn shibboleths iter- ated and reiterated by judges should take precedence over the deliberations of the Congress of the United States is simply irresponsible. V Fortunately, and somewhat fortuitously, a jurisdictional problem that is unmentioned by the Court may deprive its opinion of precedential significance. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act establishes a unique set of procedures for resolving the dispute between the Tribe and the State. If each adversary adamantly adheres to its understanding of the law, if the District Court determines that the State's in- flexibility constitutes a failure to negotiate in good faith, and if the State thereafter continues to insist that it is acting within its rights, the maximum sanction that the Court can impose is an order that refers the controversy to a member of the Executive Branch of the Government for resolution. 25 U. S. C. § 2710(d)(7)(B). As the Court of Appeals inter- preted the Act, this final disposition is available even though the action against the State and its Governor may not be maintained. 11 F. 3d 1016, 1029 (CA11 1994). (The Court does not tell us whether it agrees or disagrees with that disposition.) In my judgment, it is extremely doubtful that the obviously dispensable involvement of the judiciary in the intermediate stages of a procedure that begins and ends in the Executive Branch is a proper exercise of judicial power. See Gordon v. United States, 117 U. S. Appx. 697, 702­703 (1864) (opinion of Taney, C. J.); United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40, 48 (1852). It may well follow that the misguided opinion of today's majority has nothing more than an advi- sory character. Whether or not that be so, the better rea- 517us1$37I 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 100 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting soning in Justice Souter's far wiser and far more scholarly opinion will surely be the law one day. For these reasons, as well as those set forth in Justice Souter's opinion, I respectfully dissent. Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer join, dissenting. In holding the State of Florida immune to suit under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, the Court today holds for the first time since the founding of the Republic that Con- gress has no authority to subject a State to the jurisdiction of a federal court at the behest of an individual asserting a federal right. Although the Court invokes the Eleventh Amendment as authority for this proposition, the only sense in which that amendment might be claimed as pertinent here was tolerantly phrased by Justice Stevens in his concur- ring opinion in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S. 1, 23 (1989). There, he explained how it has come about that we have two Eleventh Amendments, the one ratified in 1795, the other (so-called) invented by the Court nearly a century later in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890). Justice Stevens saw in that second Eleventh Amendment no bar to the exercise of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause in providing for suits on a federal question by individ- uals against a State, and I can only say that after my own canvass of the matter I believe he was entirely correct in that view, for reasons given below. His position, of course, was also the holding in Union Gas, which the Court now overrules and repudiates. The fault I find with the majority today is not in its deci- sion to reexamine Union Gas, for the Court in that case produced no majority for a single rationale supporting con- gressional authority. Instead, I part company from the Court because I am convinced that its decision is fundamen- tally mistaken, and for that reason I respectfully dissent. 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 101 Souter, J., dissenting I It is useful to separate three questions: (1) whether the States enjoyed sovereign immunity if sued in their own courts in the period prior to ratification of the National Con- stitution; (2) if so, whether after ratification the States were entitled to claim some such immunity when sued in a federal court exercising jurisdiction either because the suit was be- tween a State and a nonstate litigant who was not its citizen, or because the issue in the case raised a federal question; and (3) whether any state sovereign immunity recognized in federal court may be abrogated by Congress. The answer to the first question is not clear, although some of the Framers assumed that States did enjoy immunity in their own courts. The second question was not debated at the time of ratification, except as to citizen-state diversity jurisdiction; 1 there was no unanimity, but in due course the Court in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793), answered that a state defendant enjoyed no such immunity. As to federal-question jurisdiction, state sovereign immunity seems not to have been debated prior to ratification, the silence probably showing a general understanding at the time that the States would have no immunity in such cases. The adoption of the Eleventh Amendment soon changed the result in Chisholm, not by mentioning sovereign immu- nity, but by eliminating citizen-state diversity jurisdiction over cases with state defendants. I will explain why the 1 The two Citizen-State Diversity Clauses provide as follows: "The judi- cial Power shall extend . . . to Controversies . . . between a State and Citizens of another State; . . . and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." U. S. Const., Art. III, § 2. In his opinion in Union Gas, Justice Stevens referred to these Clauses as the "citizen-state" and "alien-state" Clauses, respectively, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S. 1, 24 (1989) (concurring opinion). I have grouped the two as "Citizen-State Diversity Clauses" for ease in frequent repetition here. 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 102 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting Eleventh Amendment did not affect federal-question juris- diction, a notion that needs to be understood for the light it casts on the soundness of Hans's holding that States did enjoy sovereign immunity in federal-question suits. The Hans Court erroneously assumed that a State could plead sovereign immunity against a noncitizen suing under federal-question jurisdiction, and for that reason held that a State must enjoy the same protection in a suit by one of its citizens. The error of Hans's reasoning is underscored by its clear inconsistency with the Founders' hostility to the im- plicit reception of common-law doctrine as federal law, and with the Founders' conception of sovereign power as divided between the States and the National Government for the sake of very practical objectives. The Court's answer today to the third question is likewise at odds with the Founders' view that common law, when it was received into the new American legal system, was al- ways subject to legislative amendment. In ignoring the reasons for this pervasive understanding at the time of the ratification, and in holding that a nontextual common-law rule limits a clear grant of congressional power under Article I, the Court follows a course that has brought it to grief before in our history, and promises to do so again. Beyond this third question that elicits today's holding, there is one further issue. To reach the Court's result, it must not only hold the Hans doctrine to be outside the reach of Congress, but must also displace the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), that an officer of the government may be ordered prospectively to follow federal law, in cases in which the government may not itself be sued directly. None of its reasons for displacing Young's jurisdictional doc- trine withstand scrutiny. A The doctrine of sovereign immunity comprises two distinct rules, which are not always separately recognized. The one rule holds that the King or the Crown, as the font of law, is 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 103 Souter, J., dissenting not bound by the law's provisions; the other provides that the King or Crown, as the font of justice, is not subject to suit in its own courts. See, e. g., Jaffe, Suits Against Gov- ernments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 3­4 (1963).2 The one rule limits the reach of substantive law; the other, the jurisdiction of the courts. We are con- cerned here only with the latter rule, which took its common-law form in the high Middle Ages. "At least as early as the thirteenth century, during the reign of Henry III (1216­1272), it was recognized that the king could not be sued in his own courts." C. Jacobs, Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity 5 (1972). See also 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *244­*245; Jaffe, supra, at 2 ("By the time of Bracton (1268) it was settled doctrine that the King could not be sued eo nomine in his own courts"). The significance of this doctrine in the nascent American law is less clear, however, than its early development and steady endurance in England might suggest. While some colonial governments may have enjoyed some such immunity, Jacobs, supra, at 6­7, the scope (and even the existence) of this governmental immunity in pre-Revolutionary America remains disputed. See Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1889, 1895­1899 (1983). 2 The first of these notions rests on the ancient maxim that "the King can do no wrong." See, e. g., 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *244. Professor Jaffe has argued this expression "originally meant precisely the contrary to what it later came to mean," that is, " `it meant that the king must not, was not allowed, not entitled, to do wrong.' " Jaffe, 77 Harv. L. Rev., at 4 (quoting L. Ehrlich, Proceedings Against the Crown (1216­1377), p. 42, in 6 Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History (P. Vinogradoff ed. 1921), p. 42); see also 1 Blackstone, supra, at *246 (interpreting the maxim to mean that "the prerogative of the crown extends not to do any injury"). In any event, it is clear that the idea of the sovereign, or any part of it, being above the law in this sense has not survived in American law. See, e. g., Langford v. United States, 101 U. S. 341, 342­343 (1880); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 415 (1979). 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 104 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting Whatever the scope of sovereign immunity might have been in the Colonies, however, or during the period of Con- federation, the proposal to establish a National Government under the Constitution drafted in 1787 presented a prospect unknown to the common law prior to the American experi- ence: the States would become parts of a system in which sovereignty over even domestic matters would be divided or parcelled out between the States and the Nation, the latter to be invested with its own judicial power and the right to prevail against the States whenever their respective sub- stantive laws might be in conflict. With this prospect in mind, the 1787 Constitution might have addressed state sov- ereign immunity by eliminating whatever sovereign immu- nity the States previously had, as to any matter subject to federal law or jurisdiction; by recognizing an analogue to the old immunity in the new context of federal jurisdiction, but subject to abrogation as to any matter within that jurisdic- tion; or by enshrining a doctrine of inviolable state sovereign immunity in the text, thereby giving it constitutional protec- tion in the new federal jurisdiction. See Field, The Elev- enth Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 515, 536­538 (1977). The 1787 draft in fact said nothing on the subject, and it was this very silence that occasioned some, though appar- ently not widespread, dispute among the Framers and others over whether ratification of the Constitution would preclude a State sued in federal court from asserting sovereign immu- nity as it could have done on any matter of nonfederal law litigated in its own courts. As it has come down to us, the discussion gave no attention to congressional power under the proposed Article I but focused entirely on the limits of the judicial power provided in Article III. And although the jurisdictional bases together constituting the judicial power of the national courts under § 2 of Article III included questions arising under federal law and cases between States 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 105 Souter, J., dissenting and individuals who are not citizens,3 it was only upon the latter citizen-state diversity provisions that preratifica- tion questions about state immunity from suit or liability centered.4 Later in my discussion I will canvass the details of the debate among the Framers and other leaders of the time, see infra, at 142­150; for now it is enough to say that there was no consensus on the issue. See Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 263­280 (1985) (Brennan, J., dis- senting); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 419 (1979); Jacobs, supra, at 40 ("[T]he legislative history of the Constitution hardly warrants the conclusion drawn by some that there was a general understanding, at the time of ratification, that the states would retain their sovereign immunity"). There was, on the contrary, a clear disagreement, which was left to fester during the ratification period, to be resolved only thereafter. One other point, however, was also clear: the 3 The text reads that "[t]he Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Author- ity;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con- suls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controver- sies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different States,-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." 4 The one statement I have found on the subject of States' immunity in federal-question cases was an opinion that immunity would not be applica- ble in these cases: James Wilson, in the Pennsylvania ratification debate, stated that the federal-question clause would require States to make good on pre-Revolutionary debt owed to English merchants (the enforcement of which was promised in the Treaty of 1783) and thereby "show the world that we make the faith of treaties a constitutional part of the character of the United States; that we secure its performance no longer nominally, for the judges of the United States will be enabled to carry it into effect, let the legislatures of the different states do what they may." 2 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 490 (2d ed. 1836) (Elliot's Debates). 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 106 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting debate addressed only the question whether ratification of the Constitution would, in diversity cases and without more, abrogate the state sovereign immunity or allow it to have some application. We have no record that anyone argued for the third option mentioned above, that the Constitution would affirmatively guarantee state sovereign immunity against any congressional action to the contrary. Nor would there have been any apparent justification for any such argu- ment, since no clause in the proposed (and ratified) Constitu- tion even so much as suggested such a position. It may have been reasonable to contend (as we will see that Madison, Marshall, and Hamilton did) that Article III would not alter States' pre-existing common-law immunity despite its un- qualified grant of jurisdiction over diversity suits against States. But then, as now, there was no textual support for contending that Article III or any other provision would "constitutionalize" state sovereign immunity, and no one ut- tered any such contention. B The argument among the Framers and their friends about sovereign immunity in federal citizen-state diversity cases, in any event, was short lived and ended when this Court, in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793), chose between the constitutional alternatives of abrogation and recognition of the immunity enjoyed at common law. The 4-to-1 majority adopted the reasonable (although not compelled) interpreta- tion that the first of the two Citizen-State Diversity Clauses abrogated for purposes of federal jurisdiction any immunity the States might have enjoyed in their own courts, and Geor- gia was accordingly held subject to the judicial power in a common-law assumpsit action by a South Carolina citizen suing to collect a debt.5 The case also settled, by implica- 5 This lengthy discussion of the history of the Constitution's ratification, the Court's opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793), and the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment is necessary to explain why, in my view, the contentions in some of our earlier opinions that Chisholm cre- 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 107 Souter, J., dissenting tion, any question there could possibly have been about rec- ognizing state sovereign immunity in actions depending on the federal question (or "arising under") head of jurisdiction ated a great "shock of surprise" misread the history. See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313 (1934). The Court's response to this historical analysis is simply to recite yet again Monaco's erroneous asser- tion that Chisholm created "such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh Amendment was at once proposed and adopted," 292 U. S., at 325. See ante, at 69. This response is, with respect, no response at all. Monaco's ipse dixit that Chisholm created a "shock of surprise" does not make it so. This Court's opinions frequently make assertions of his- torical fact, but those assertions are not authoritative as to history in the same way that our interpretations of laws are authoritative as to them. In Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U. S. 424, 434 (1902), which was, like Monaco, decided a century after the event it purported to recount, the Court baldly stated that "in September 1790, General Washington, on the advice of Mr. Adams, did refuse to permit British troops to march through the territory of the United States from Detroit to the Mississippi, appar- ently for the reason that the object of such movement was an attack on New Orleans and the Spanish possessions on the Mississippi." Modern historians agree, however, that there was no such request, see J. Daly, The Use of History in the Decisions of the Supreme Court: 1900­1930, pp. 65­66 (1954); W. Manning, The Nootka Sound Controversy, in Annual Report of the American Historical Association, H. R. Doc. No. 429, 58th Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 415­423 (1905), and it would of course be absurd for this Court to treat the fact that Tucker asserted the existence of the re- quest as proof that it actually occurred. Cf. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 72­73 (1938) ("But it was the more recent research of a competent scholar, who examined the original document, which established that the construction given to [the Judiciary Act of 1789] by the Court was errone- ous; and that the purpose of the section was merely to make certain that, in all matters except those in which some federal law is controlling, the federal courts exercising jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases would apply as their rules of decision the law of the State, unwritten as well as written"). Moreover, in this case, there is ample evidence contradicting the "shock of surprise" thesis. Contrary to Monaco's suggestion, the Eleventh Amendment was not "at once proposed and adopted." Congress was in session when Chisholm was decided, and a constitutional amendment in response was proposed two days later, but Congress never acted on it, and in fact it was not until two years after Chisholm was handed down that 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 108 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting as well. The constitutional text on federal-question juris- diction, after all, was just as devoid of immunity language as it was on citizen-state diversity, and at the time of Chisholm any influence that general common-law immunity might have had as an interpretive force in construing constitutional lan- guage would presumably have been no greater when ad- dressing the federal-question language of Article III than its Diversity Clauses. See Sherry, The Eleventh Amendment and Stare Decisis: Overruling Hans v Louisiana, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1260, 1270 (1990). Although Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm seems at times to reserve judgment on what I have called the third question, whether Congress could authorize suits against the States, Chisholm, supra, at 434­435, his argument is largely devoted to stating the position taken by several federalists that state sovereign immunity was cognizable under the Citizen-State Diversity Clauses, not that state immunity was somehow invisibly codified as an independent constitutional defense. As Justice Stevens persuasively explains in greater detail, ante, at 78­81, Justice Iredell's dissent fo- cused on the construction of the Judiciary Act of 1789, not Article III. See also Orth, The Truth About Justice Ire- dell's Dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), 73 N. C. L. Rev. 255 (1994). This would have been an odd focus, had he be- lieved that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to impose liability. Instead, on Justice Iredell's view, States sued in diversity retained the common-law sovereignty "where no special act of Legislation controuls it, to be in force in each State, as it existed in England, (unaltered by any statute) at the time of the first settlement of the coun- try." 2 Dall., at 435 (emphasis deleted). While in at least some circumstances States might be held liable to "the au- thority of the United States," id., at 436, any such liability an Amendment was ratified. See Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1889, 1926­1927 (1983). 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 109 Souter, J., dissenting would depend upon "laws passed under the Constitution and in conformity to it," ibid.6 Finding no congressional action abrogating Georgia's common-law immunity, Justice Iredell concluded that the State should not be liable to suit.7 C The Eleventh Amendment, of course, repudiated Chisholm and clearly divested federal courts of some jurisdiction as to cases against state parties: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com- menced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." There are two plausible readings of this provision's text. Under the first, it simply repeals the Citizen-State Diversity 6 See also 2 Dall., at 435 ("[I]t is certain that in regard to any common law principle which can influence the question before us no alteration has been made by any statute"); id., at 437 (if "no new remedy be provided . . . we have no other rule to govern us but the principles of the pre- existent laws, which must remain in force till superseded by others"); Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 283 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see Justice Iredell's dicta suggesting that the Con- stitution would not permit suits against a State. Chisholm, supra, at 449 (dissenting opinion); Atascadero, supra, at 283, n. 34 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 7 Of course, even if Justice Iredell had concluded that state sovereign immunity was not subject to abrogation, it would be inappropriate to as- sume (as it appears the Court does today, and Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), did as well) that the Eleventh Amendment (regardless of what it says) "constitutionalized" Justice Iredell's dissent, or that it simply adopted the opposite of the holding in Chisholm. It is as odd to read the Eleventh Amendment's rejection of Chisholm (which held that States may be sued in diversity) to say that States may not be sued on a federal question as it would be to read the Twenty-Sixth Amendment's rejection of Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 (1970) (which held that Congress could not require States to extend the suffrage to 18-year-olds) to permit Con- gress to require States to extend the suffrage to 12-year-olds. 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 110 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting Clauses of Article III for all cases in which the State appears as a defendant. Under the second, it strips the federal courts of jurisdiction in any case in which a state defendant is sued by a citizen not its own, even if jurisdiction might otherwise rest on the existence of a federal question in the suit. Neither reading of the Amendment, of course, fur- nishes authority for the Court's view in today's case, but we need to choose between the competing readings for the light that will be shed on the Hans doctrine and the legitimacy of inflating that doctrine to the point of constitutional immuta- bility as the Court has chosen to do. The history and structure of the Eleventh Amendment convincingly show that it reaches only to suits subject to federal jurisdiction exclusively under the Citizen-State Di- versity Clauses.8 In precisely tracking the language in Ar- ticle III providing for citizen-state diversity jurisdiction, the text of the Amendment does, after all, suggest to common 8 The great weight of scholarly commentary agrees. See, e. g., Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Im- munity, 98 Yale L. J. 1 (1988); Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L. J. 1425 (1987); Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Elev- enth Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 1033 (1983); Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1889 (1983); Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congres- sional Imposition of Suit Upon the States, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1203 (1978). While a minority has adopted the second view set out above, see, e. g., Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1342 (1989); Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 61 (1989), and others have criticized the diversity theory, see, e. g., Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1372 (1989), I have discovered no commentator affirmatively advocating the position taken by the Court today. As one scholar has observed, the literature is "remark- ably consistent in its evaluation of the historical evidence and text of the amendment as not supporting a broad rule of constitutional immunity for states." Jackson, supra, at 44, n. 179. 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 111 Souter, J., dissenting sense that only the Diversity Clauses are being addressed. If the Framers had meant the Amendment to bar federal- question suits as well, they could not only have made their intentions clearer very easily, but could simply have adopted the first post-Chisholm proposal, introduced in the House of Representatives by Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts on instructions from the Legislature of that Commonwealth. Its provisions would have had exactly that expansive effect: "[N]o state shall be liable to be made a party defendant, in any of the judicial courts, established, or which shall be established under the authority of the United States, at the suit of any person or persons, whether a citizen or citizens, or a foreigner or foreigners, or of any body politic or corporate, whether within or without the United States." Gazette of the United States 303 (Feb. 20, 1793). With its references to suits by citizens as well as non- citizens, the Sedgwick amendment would necessarily have been applied beyond the Diversity Clauses, and for a reason that would have been wholly obvious to the people of the time. Sedgwick sought such a broad amendment because many of the States, including his own, owed debts subject to collection under the Treaty of Paris. Suits to collect such debts would "arise under" that Treaty and thus be subject to federal-question jurisdiction under Article III. Such a suit, indeed, was then already pending against Massachusetts, having been brought in this Court by Christopher Vassal, an erstwhile Bostonian whose move to England on the eve of revolutionary hostilities had presented his former neighbors with the irresistible temptation to confiscate his vacant man- sion. 5 Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789­1800, pp. 352­449 (M. Marcus ed. 1994).9 9 Vassall initiated a suit against Massachusetts, invoking the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Although the marshal for the district of Massachusetts served a subpoena on Governor John Hancock and Attor- 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 112 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting Congress took no action on Sedgwick's proposal, however, and the Amendment as ultimately adopted two years later could hardly have been meant to limit federal-question juris- diction, or it would never have left the States open to federal-question suits by their own citizens. To be sure, the majority of state creditors were not citizens, but nothing in the Treaty would have prevented foreign creditors from sell- ing their debt instruments (thereby assigning their claims) to citizens of the debtor State. If the Framers of the Elev- enth Amendment had meant it to immunize States from federal-question suits like those that might be brought to enforce the Treaty of Paris, they would surely have drafted the Amendment differently. See Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1261, 1280­1282 (1989). It should accordingly come as no surprise that the weighti- est commentary following the Amendment's adoption de- scribed it simply as constricting the scope of the Citizen- State Diversity Clauses. In Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821), for instance, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, emphasized that the Amendment had no effect on federal courts' jurisdiction grounded on the "arising under" provision of Article III and concluded that "a case arising under the constitution or laws of the United States, is cogni- zable in the Courts of the Union, whoever may be the parties to that case." Id., at 383. The point of the Eleventh Amendment, according to Cohens, was to bar jurisdiction in suits at common law by Revolutionary War debt creditors, ney General James Sullivan, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts did not appear by the original return date of August 1793, and the case was con- tinued to the February 1794 Term. Massachusetts never did appear, and the case was "simply continued from term to term through 1796." 5 Doc- umentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, at 369. In February 1797 the suit was "dismissed with Costs, for reasons unknown," ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted), perhaps because "Vassall failed to prosecute it properly," ibid. 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 113 Souter, J., dissenting not "to strip the government of the means of protecting, by the instrumentality of its courts, the constitution and laws from active violation." Id., at 407. The treatment of the Amendment in Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (1824), was to the same effect. The Amendment was held there to be no bar to an action against the State seeking the return of an unconstitutional tax. "The eleventh amendment of the constitution has ex- empted a State from the suits of citizens of other States, or aliens," Marshall stated, omitting any reference to cases that arise under the Constitution or federal law. Id., at 847. The good sense of this early construction of the Amend- ment as affecting the diversity jurisdiction and no more has the further virtue of making sense of this Court's repeated exercise of appellate jurisdiction in federal-question suits brought against States in their own courts by out-of-staters. Exercising appellate jurisdiction in these cases would have been patent error if the Eleventh Amendment limited federal-question jurisdiction, for the Amendment's uncondi- tional language ("shall not be construed") makes no distinc- tion between trial and appellate jurisdiction.10 And yet, again and again we have entertained such appellate cases, even when brought against the State in its own name by a 10 We have generally rejected Eleventh Amendment challenges to our appellate jurisdiction on the specious ground that an appeal is not a "suit" for purposes of the Amendment. See, e. g., McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Fla. Dept. of Business Regulation, 496 U. S. 18, 27 (1990). Although Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 412 (1821), is cited for this proposition, that case involved a State as plaintiff. See generally Jackson, 98 Yale L. J., at 32­35 (rejecting the appeal/suit distinction). The appeal/suit distinction, in any case, makes no sense. Whether or not an appeal is a "suit" in its own right, it is certainly a means by which an appellate court exercises jurisdiction over a "suit" that began in the courts below. Cf. Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U. S. 56, 58 (1982) (per curiam) ("The filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance-it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal"). 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 114 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting private plaintiff for money damages. See, e. g., Common- wealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U. S. 609 (1981); Minne- apolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U. S. 575 (1983). The best explanation for our practice belongs to Chief Justice Marshall: the Eleventh Amendment bars only those suits in which the sole basis for federal juris- diction is diversity of citizenship. See Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S., at 294 (Brennan, J., dissent- ing); Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amend- ment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 Yale L. J. 1, 44 (1988). In sum, reading the Eleventh Amendment solely as a limit on citizen-state diversity jurisdiction has the virtue of coher- ence with this Court's practice, with the views of John Mar- shall, with the history of the Amendment's drafting, and with its allusive language. Today's majority does not appear to disagree, at least insofar as the constitutional text is con- cerned; the Court concedes, after all, that "the text of the Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts." Ante, at 54.11 Thus, regardless of which of the two plausible readings one adopts, the further point to note here is that there is no pos- sible argument that the Eleventh Amendment, by its terms, deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over all citizen law- 11 See also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S., at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("If this text [of the Eleventh Amendment] were intended as a comprehensive description of state sover- eign immunity in federal courts . . . then it would unquestionably be most reasonable to interpret it as providing immunity only when the sole basis of federal jurisdiction is the diversity of citizenship that it describes (which of course tracks some of the diversity jurisdictional grants in U. S. Const., Art. III, § 2). For there is no plausible reason why one would wish to protect a State from being sued in federal court for violation of federal law . . . when the plaintiff is a citizen of another State or country, but to permit a State to be sued there when the plaintiff is citizen of the State itself"). 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 115 Souter, J., dissenting suits against the States. Not even the Court advances that proposition, and there would be no textual basis for doing so.12 Because the plaintiffs in today's case are citizens of the 12 The Court does suggest that the drafters of the Eleventh Amendment may not have had federal-question jurisdiction in mind, in the apparent belief that this somehow supports its reading. Ante, at 69­70. The pos- sibility, however, that those who drafted the Eleventh Amendment in- tended to deal "only with the problem presented by the decision in Chis- holm" would demonstrate, if any demonstration beyond the clear language of the Eleventh Amendment were necessary, that the Eleventh Amend- ment was not intended to address the broader issue of federal-question suits brought by citizens. Moreover, the Court's point is built on a faulty foundation. The Court is simply incorrect in asserting that "the federal courts did not have federal-question jurisdiction at the time the Amendment was passed." Ibid. Article III, of course, provided for such jurisdiction, and early Congresses exercised their authority pursuant to Article III to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts to resolve various matters of federal law. E. g., Act of Apr. 10, 1790, § 5, 1 Stat. 111; Act of Feb. 21, 1793, § 6, 1 Stat. 322; Act of Mar. 23, 1792, §§ 2, 3, 1 Stat. 244; see also Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (1824) (holding that federal statute conferred federal-question jurisdiction in cases involving the Bank of the United States); see generally P. Bator, D. Meltzer, P. Mishkin, & D. Shapiro, Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 960­982 (3d ed. 1988). In fact, only six years after the passage of the Eleventh Amendment, Congress enacted a statute providing for general federal- question jurisdiction. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, § 11, 2 Stat. 92 ("[T]he said circuit courts respectively shall have cognizance of . . . all cases in law or equity, arising under the constitution and laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority"). It is, of course, true that this statute proved short lived (it was repealed by the Act of Mar. 8, 1802, 2 Stat. 132), and that Congress did not pass another statute conferring general federal jurisdiction until 1875, but the drafters of the Eleventh Amendment obviously could not have predicted such things. The real significance of the 1801 Act is that it demonstrates the awareness among the Members of the early Congresses of the potential scope of Article III. This, in combination with the pre-Eleventh Amend- ment statutes that conferred federal-question jurisdiction on the federal courts, cast considerable doubt on the Court's suggestion that the issue of federal-question jurisdiction never occurred to the drafters of the Elev- 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 116 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting State that they are suing, the Eleventh Amendment simply does not apply to them. We must therefore look elsewhere for the source of that immunity by which the Court says their suit is barred from a federal court.13 II The obvious place to look elsewhere, of course, is Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), and Hans was indeed a leap in the direction of today's holding, even though it does not take the Court all the way. The parties in Hans raised, and the Court in that case answered, only what I have called the second question, that is, whether the Constitution, without enth Amendment; on the contrary, just because these early statutes under- score the early Congresses' recognition of the availability of federal- question jurisdiction, the silence of the Eleventh Amendment is all the more deafening. 13 The majority chides me that the "lengthy analysis of the text of the Eleventh Amendment is directed at a straw man," ante, at 69. But plain text is the Man of Steel in a confrontation with "background principle[s]" and " `postulates which limit and control,' " ante, at 68, 72. An argument rooted in the text of a constitutional provision may not be guaranteed of carrying the day, but insubstantiality is not its failing. See, e. g., Mon- aghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 353, 383­384 (1981) ("For the purposes of legal reasoning, the binding quality of the constitu- tional text is itself incapable of and not in need of further demonstration"); cf. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U. S. 171, 178 (1987) (Rehnquist, C. J.) ("It would be extraordinary to require legislative history to confirm the plain meaning of [Federal Rule of Evidence] 104"); Garcia v. United States, 469 U. S. 70, 75 (1984) (Rehnquist, J.) ("[O]nly the most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions from [the legislative history] would justify a limitation on the `plain meaning' of the statutory language"). This is particularly true in construing the jurisdictional provisions of Article III, which speak with a clarity not to be found in some of the more open- textured provisions of the Constitution. See National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U. S. 582, 646­647 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dis- senting); Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 399, 424 (1985) (noting the "seemingly plain linguistic mandate" of the Eleventh Amendment). That the Court thinks otherwise is an indication of just how far it has strayed beyond the boundaries of traditional constitutional analysis. 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 117 Souter, J., dissenting more, permits a State to plead sovereign immunity to bar the exercise of federal-question jurisdiction. See id., at 9. Although the Court invoked a principle of sovereign immu- nity to cure what it took to be the Eleventh Amendment's anomaly of barring only those state suits brought by nonciti- zen plaintiffs, the Hans Court had no occasion to consider whether Congress could abrogate that background immunity by statute. Indeed (except in the special circumstance of Congress's power to enforce the Civil War Amendments), this question never came before our Court until Union Gas, and any intimations of an answer in prior cases were mere dicta. In Union Gas the Court held that the immunity rec- ognized in Hans had no constitutional status and was subject to congressional abrogation. Today the Court overrules Union Gas and holds just the opposite. In deciding how to choose between these two positions, the place to begin is with Hans's holding that a principle of sovereign immu- nity derived from the common law insulates a State from federal-question jurisdiction at the suit of its own citizen. A critical examination of that case will show that it was wrongly decided, as virtually every recent commentator has concluded.14 It follows that the Court's further step today of constitutionalizing Hans's rule against abrogation by Con- gress compounds and immensely magnifies the century-old mistake of Hans itself and takes its place with other historic examples of textually untethered elevations of judicially de- rived rules to the status of inviolable constitutional law. A The Louisiana plaintiff in Hans held bonds issued by that State, which, like virtually all of the Southern States, had issued them in substantial amounts during the Reconstruc- tion era to finance public improvements aimed at stimulating 14 Professor Jackson has noted the "remarkabl[e] consisten[cy]" of the scholarship on this point, Jackson, 98 Yale L. J., at 44, n. 179. See also n. 8, supra. 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 118 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting industrial development. E. Foner, Reconstruction: Ameri- ca's Unfinished Revolution 1863­1877, pp. 383­384 (1988); Gibbons, 83 Colum. L. Rev., at 1976­1977. As Recon- struction governments collapsed, however, the post- Reconstruction regimes sought to repudiate these debts, and the Hans litigation arose out of Louisiana's attempt to renege on its bond obligations. Hans sued the State in federal court, asserting that the State's default amounted to an impairment of the obligation of its contracts in violation of the Contract Clause. This Court affirmed the dismissal of the suit, despite the fact that the case fell within the federal court's "arising under," or federal-question, jurisdiction. Justice Bradley's opinion did not purport to hold that the terms either of Article III or of the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit, but that the an- cient doctrine of sovereign immunity that had inspired adop- tion of the Eleventh Amendment applied to cases beyond the Amendment's scope and otherwise within the federal- question jurisdiction. Indeed, Bradley explicitly admitted that "[i]t is true, the amendment does so read [as to permit Hans's suit], and if there were no other reason or ground for abating his suit, it might be maintainable." Hans, 134 U. S., at 10. The Court elected, nonetheless, to recognize a broader immunity doctrine, despite the want of any textual manifestation, because of what the Court described as the anomaly that would have resulted otherwise: the Eleventh Amendment (according to the Court) would have barred a federal-question suit by a noncitizen, but the State would have been subject to federal jurisdiction at its own citizen's behest. Id., at 10­11. The State was accordingly held to be free to resist suit without its consent, which it might grant or withhold as it pleased. Hans thus addressed the issue implicated (though not di- rectly raised) in the preratification debate about the Citizen- State Diversity Clauses and implicitly settled by Chisholm: whether state sovereign immunity was cognizable by federal 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 119 Souter, J., dissenting courts on the exercise of federal-question jurisdiction. Ac- cording to Hans, and contrary to Chisholm, it was. But that is all that Hans held. Because no federal legislation purporting to pierce state immunity was at issue, it cannot fairly be said that Hans held state sovereign immunity to have attained some constitutional status immunizing it from abrogation.15 Taking Hans only as far as its holding, its vulnerability is apparent. The Court rested its opinion on avoiding the supposed anomaly of recognizing jurisdiction to entertain a citizen's federal-question suit, but not one brought by a non- citizen. See Hans, supra, at 10­11. There was, however, no such anomaly at all. As already explained, federal- question cases are not touched by the Eleventh Amendment, which leaves a State open to federal-question suits by citi- zens and noncitizens alike. If Hans had been from Massa- chusetts the Eleventh Amendment would not have barred his action against Louisiana. Although there was thus no anomaly to be cured by Hans, the case certainly created its own anomaly in leaving federal courts entirely without jurisdiction to enforce paramount federal law at the behest of a citizen against a State that broke it. It destroyed the congruence of the judicial power under Article III with the substantive guarantees of the Constitution, and with the provisions of statutes passed by Congress in the exercise of its power under Article I: when a State injured an individual in violation of federal law no federal forum could provide direct relief. Absent an alter- native process to vindicate federal law (see Part IV, infra) John Marshall saw just what the consequences of this anom- aly would be in the early Republic, and he took that conse- quence as good evidence that the Framers could never have intended such a scheme. 15 Indeed, as Justice Stevens suggests, there is language in Hans suggesting that the Court was really construing the Judiciary Act of 1875 rather than the Constitution. See ante, at 84­87. 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 120 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting "Different States may entertain different opinions on the true construction of the constitutional powers of con- gress. We know that, at one time, the assumption of the debts contracted by the several States, during the war of our Revolution, was deemed unconstitutional by some of them. . . . States may legislate in conformity to their opinions, and may enforce those opinions by penal- ties. It would be hazarding too much to assert that the judicatures of the States will be exempt from the preju- dices by which the legislatures and people are influ- enced, and will constitute perfectly impartial tribunals. In many States the judges are dependent for office and for salary on the will of the legislature. The constitu- tion of the United States furnishes no security against the universal adoption of this principle. When we ob- serve the importance which that constitution attaches to the independence of judges, we are the less inclined to suppose that it can have intended to leave these con- stitutional questions to tribunals where this independ- ence may not exist." Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat., at 386­387. And yet that is just what Hans threatened to do. How such a result could have been threatened on the basis of a principle not so much as mentioned in the Constitution is difficult to understand. But history provides the explana- tion. As I have already said, Hans was one episode in a long story of debt repudiation by the States of the former Confederacy after the end of Reconstruction. The turning point in the States' favor came with the Compromise of 1877, when the Republican Party agreed effectively to end Recon- struction and to withdraw federal troops from the South in return for Southern acquiescence in the decision of the Elec- toral Commission that awarded the disputed 1876 presiden- tial election to Rutherford B. Hayes. See J. Orth, Judicial Power of the United States: The Eleventh Amendment in American History 53­57 (1987); Gibbons, supra, at 1978­ 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 121 Souter, J., dissenting 1982; see generally Foner, Reconstruction, at 575­587 (de- scribing the events of 1877 and their aftermath). The troop withdrawal, of course, left the federal judiciary "effectively without power to resist the rapidly coalescing repudiation movement." Gibbons, 83 Colum. L. Rev., at 1981. Contract Clause suits like the one brought by Hans thus presented this Court with "a draconian choice between repudiation of some of its most inviolable constitutional doctrines and the humiliation of seeing its political authority compromised as its judgments met the resistance of hostile state govern- ments." Id., at 1974. Indeed, Louisiana's brief in Hans un- mistakably bore witness to this Court's inability to enforce a judgment against a recalcitrant State: "The solemn obliga- tion of a government arising on its own acknowledged bond would not be enhanced by a judgment rendered on such bond. If it either could not or would not make provision for paying the bond, it is probable that it could not or would not make provision for satisfying the judgment." Brief for Respondent in No. 4, O. T. 1889, p. 25. Given the likelihood that a judgment against the State could not be enforced, it is not wholly surprising that the Hans Court found a way to avoid the certainty of the State's contempt.16 16 See Gibbons, 83 Colum. L. Rev., at 2000 ("Without weakening the con- tract clause, which over the next two decades the Fuller Court might need both in its fight against government regulation of business and as a weapon against defaulting local governments, the justices needed a way to let the South win the repudiation war. The means Bradley chose was to rewrite the eleventh amendment and the history of its adoption"). The commentators' contention that this Court's inability to enforce the obliga- tion of Southern States to pay their debts influenced the result in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), is substantiated by three anomalies of this Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence during that period. First, this Court held in 1885 that Virginia's sovereign immunity did not allow it to abrogate its bonds. Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 269. The differ- ence from the situation in other States, however, was that Virginia had made its bond coupons receivable in payment of state taxes; "[u]nder these circumstances federal courts did not need to rely on the political branches of government to enforce their orders but could protect creditors by a 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 122 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting So it is that history explains, but does not honor, Hans. The ultimate demerit of the case centers, however, not on its politics but on the legal errors on which it rested.17 Before judgment that their taxes had in fact been paid. In these cases the Elev- enth Amendment faded into the background." J. Orth, Judicial Power of the United States: The Eleventh Amendment in American History 9 (1987); see generally id., at 90­109. Second, at the same time that this Court was articulating broad principles of immunity for States, we refused to recognize similar immunity for municipalities and similar state political subdivisions. See, e. g., Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U. S. 529 (1890). Professor Orth suggests that this seeming inconsistency is traceable to the enforcement difficulties arising from the withdrawal of federal troops from the South. "It just so happened," he points out, "that counties had tended to issue bonds in the West, while in the South, states had usually done the job. Property in the form of bonds could be defended in the mid-West and West, but similar property in the South had to be sacrificed to the higher politics of the Compromise of 1877." Orth, supra, at 111. Finally, Professor Orth attributes this Court's recognition (or revival) of the Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), action as a way around state sovereign immunity to the fact that, by 1908, "the problem of repudiated Southern bonds was clearly a specter from an increasingly distant past." Orth, supra, at 128. See also Gibbons, supra, at 2002 (arguing that the Court's unanimous revival of its power to grant equitable relief against state officers in Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1 (1891), was made possible by the fact that the case "did not involve Southern State bonds"). I am reluctant, to be sure, to ascribe these legal developments to a single, extralegal cause, and at least one commentator has suggested that the Southern debt crisis may not have been the only factor driving the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence during this period. See generally Collins, The Conspiracy Theory of the Eleventh Amendment, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 212 (1988) (reviewing Orth). But neither would I ignore the pat- tern of the cases, which tends to show that the presence or absence of enforcement difficulties significantly influenced the path of the law in this area. See id., at 243 (acknowledging that "[i]t is perfectly conceivable that Compromise-related politics exerted their influence at the margin- in doubtful cases in which the Court might have gone either way"). 17 Today's majority condemns my attention to Hans's historical circum- stances as "a disservice to the Court's traditional method of adjudication." Ante, at 69. The point, however, is not that historical circumstance may undermine an otherwise defensible decision; on the contrary, it is just because Hans is so utterly indefensible on the merits of its legal analysis 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 123 Souter, J., dissenting considering those errors, it is necessary to address the Court's contention that subsequent cases have read into Hans what was not there to begin with, that is, a background principle of sovereign immunity that is constitutional in stat- ure and therefore unalterable by Congress. B The majority does not dispute the point that Hans v. Loui- siana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), had no occasion to decide whether Congress could abrogate a State's immunity from federal- question suits. The Court insists, however, that the nega- tive answer to that question that it finds in Hans and subse- quent opinions is not "mere obiter dicta, but rather . . . the well-established rationale upon which the Court based the results of its earlier decisions." Ante, at 66­67. The exact rationale to which the majority refers, unfortunately, is not easy to discern. The Court's opinion says, immediately after its discussion of stare decisis, that "[f]or over a century, we have grounded our decisions in the oft-repeated under- standing of state sovereign immunity as an essential part of the Eleventh Amendment." Ante, at 67. This cannot be the "rationale," though, because this Court has repeatedly acknowledged that the Eleventh Amendment standing alone that one is forced to look elsewhere in order to understand how the Court could have gone so far wrong. Nor is there anything new or remarkable in taking such a look, for we have sought similar explanations in other cases. In Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U. S. 219 (1987), for example, we suggested that the Court's holding in Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (1861), that "the Federal Government, under the Constitution, has no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it," id., at 107, was influenced by "the looming shadow of a Civil War," Branstad, supra, at 227, and we ultimately determined that Dennison should be overruled, 483 U. S., at 230. The author of the Court's opinion today joined that analysis, as did the other Members of today's majority who were then on the Court. See ibid. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (joining the relevant por- tion of the majority opinion); id., at 231 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (same). 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 124 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting cannot bar a federal-question suit against a State brought by a state citizen. See, e. g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 662 (1974) (acknowledging that "the Amendment by its terms does not bar suits against a State by its own citi- zens").18 Indeed, as I have noted, Justice Bradley's opinion in Hans conceded that Hans might successfully have pursued his claim "if there were no other reason or ground [other than the Amendment itself] for abating his suit." 134 U. S., at 10. The Hans Court, rather, held the suit barred by a non- constitutional common-law immunity. See supra, at 116­117. The "rationale" which the majority seeks to invoke is, I think, more nearly stated in its quotation from Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 321­323 (1934). There, the Court said that "we cannot rest with a mere lit- eral application of the words of § 2 of Article III, or assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits against non-consenting States." Id., at 322.19 This statement certainly is true to Hans, which 18 See also Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304 (1952) (same); Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 516, 524 (1899) (same). Even Justice Scalia's dissent in Union Gas, the reasoning of which the major- ity adopts today, acknowledged that its view of sovereign immunity de- pended upon "some other constitutional principle beyond the immediate text of the Eleventh Amendment." 491 U. S., at 31 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). To the extent that our prior cases do refer to Hans immunity as part of the Eleventh Amendment, they can only be referring to Justice Stevens's "other" Eleventh Amendment. Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 513 U. S. 30, 53 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., supra, at 23­29 (Stevens, J., concurring) (same). 19 See also Union Gas, 491 U. S., at 31­32 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("What we said in Hans was, essentially, that the Eleventh Amendment was important not merely for what it said but for what it reflected: a consensus that the doctrine of sovereign immunity, for States as well as for the Federal Government, was part of the understood background against which the Constitution was adopted, and which its jurisdictional provisions did not mean to sweep away"); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S., at 440 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (interpreting Monaco as 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 125 Souter, J., dissenting clearly recognized a pre-existing principle of sovereign im- munity, broader than the Eleventh Amendment itself, that will ordinarily bar federal-question suits against a noncon- senting State. That was the "rationale" which was suffi- cient to decide Hans and all of its progeny prior to Union Gas. But leaving aside the indefensibility of that rationale, which I will address further below, that was as far as it went. The majority, however, would read the "rationale" of Hans and its line of subsequent cases as answering the further question whether the "postulate" of sovereign immunity that "limit[s] and control[s]" the exercise of Article III jurisdic- tion, Monaco, supra, at 322, is constitutional in stature and therefore unalterable by Congress. It is true that there are statements in the cases that point toward just this conclu- sion. See, e. g., Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 98 (1984) ("In short, the principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III"); Ex parte New York, 256 U. S. 490, 497 (1921) ("[T]he entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a State without consent given . . ."). These statements, however, are dicta in the classic sense, that is, sheer speculation about what would happen in cases not before the court.20 But this "rel[ying] on precepts underlying but not explicit in Art. III and the Eleventh Amendment"). 20 There are good reasons not to take many of these statements too seriously. Some are plainly exaggerated; for example, the suggestion in Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 51 (1944), that "[a] state's freedom from litigation was established as a constitutional right through the Eleventh Amendment" obviously ignores a State's liability to suit by other States, see, e. g., South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286 (1904), and by the National Government, see, e. g., United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 621 (1892). See also Nevada v. Hall, supra, at 420, n. 19 (noting that "the Eleventh Amendment has not accorded the States abso- lute sovereign immunity in federal-court actions"). Similarly, statements such as in Ex parte New York, 256 U. S., at 497, that "the entire judicial 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 126 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting is not the only weakness of these statements, which are coun- terbalanced by many other opinions that have either stated the immunity principle without more, see, e. g., Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U. S. 223, 229, n. 2 (1989) (noting that "an uncon- senting State is immune from liability for damages in a suit brought in federal court by one of its own citizens," without suggesting that the immunity was unalterable by Con- gress),21 or have suggested that the Hans immunity is not of constitutional stature. The very language quoted by the majority from Monaco, for example, likens state sovereign immunity to other "essential postulates" such as the rules of justiciability. 292 U. S., at 322. Many of those rules, as Justice Stevens points out, are prudential in nature and therefore not unalterable by Congress. See ante, at 88­90.22 More generally, the proponents of the Court's theory have repeatedly referred to state sovereign immunity as a "back- ground principle," ante, at 72, "postulate," Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S., at 437 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), or "implicit limitation," Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U. S. 468, 496 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), and as resting on the "in- herent nature of sovereignty," Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 51 (1944), rather than any explicit con- power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to enter- tain a suit brought by private parties against a State without consent given" should not necessarily be taken as affirming that Article III itself incorporated a constitutional immunity doctrine. How else to explain Jus- tice Harlan's concurring opinion in Hans, which stated, practically in the same breath, that "a suit directly against a State by one of its own citizens is not one to which the judicial power of the United States extends," and that Chisholm "was based upon a sound interpretation of the Constitution as that instrument then was"? 134 U. S., at 21. 21 See also Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Redwine, supra, at 304; Fitts v. McGhee, supra, at 524­525. 22 See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 501 (1975) ("Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules"); E. Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 2.1, pp. 42­43 (2d ed. 1994). 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 127 Souter, J., dissenting stitutional provision.23 But whatever set of quotations one may prefer, taking heed of such jurisprudential creations in assessing the contents of federal common law is a very differ- ent thing from reading them into the Founding Document itself. The most damning evidence for the Court's theory that Hans rests on a broad rationale of immunity unalterable by Congress, however, is the Court's proven tendency to disre- gard the post-Hans dicta in cases where that dicta would have mattered.24 If it is indeed true that "private suits against States [are] not permitted under Article III (by virtue of the understanding represented by the Eleventh Amendment)," Union Gas, 491 U. S., at 40 (Scalia, J., con- curring in part and dissenting in part), then it is hard to see how a State's sovereign immunity may be waived any more than it may be abrogated by Congress. See, e. g., Atasca- dero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S., at 238 (recognizing that immunity may be waived). After all, consent of a party is in all other instances wholly insufficient to create subject- 23 Indeed, The Chief Justice could hardly have been clearer in Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542 (1975), where he explained that "[t]he Court's decision in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), offers impressive author- ity for the principle that the States as such were regarded by the Framers of the Constitution as partaking of many attributes of sovereignty quite apart from the provisions of the Tenth Amendment. . . . "As it was not the Eleventh Amendment by its terms which justified the result in Hans, it is not the Tenth Amendment by its terms that prohibits congressional action which sets a mandatory ceiling on the wages of all state employees. Both Amendments are simply examples of the under- standing of those who drafted and ratified the Constitution that the States were sovereign in many respects, and that although their legislative au- thority could be superseded by Congress in many areas where Congress was competent to act, Congress was nonetheless not free to deal with a State as if it were just another individual or business enterprise subject to regulation." Id., at 556­557 (dissenting opinion). 24 Indeed, in Nevada v. Hall, supra, at 439, The Chief Justice com- plained in dissent that the same statements upon which he relies today had been "dismiss[ed] . . . as dicta." 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 128 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting matter jurisdiction where it would not otherwise exist. See, e. g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 398 (1975); see also E. Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 7.6, p. 405 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that "allowing such waivers seems inconsistent with viewing the Eleventh Amendment as a restriction on the federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction"). Likewise, the Court's broad theory of immunity runs doubly afoul of the appellate jurisdiction problem that I noted earlier in reject- ing an interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment's text that would bar federal-question suits. See supra, at 109­116. If "the whole sum of the judicial power granted by the Con- stitution to the United States does not embrace the authority to entertain a suit brought by a citizen against his own State without its consent," Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U. S. 311, 313 (1920), and if consent to suit in state court is not sufficient to show consent in federal court, see Atascadero, supra, at 241, then Article III would hardly permit this Court to exer- cise appellate jurisdiction over issues of federal law arising in lawsuits brought against the States in their own courts. We have, however, quite rightly ignored any post-Hans dicta in that sort of case and exercised the jurisdiction that the plain text of Article III provides. See, e. g., Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U. S. 325 (1996); see also supra, at 113­114. If these examples were not enough to distinguish Hans's rationale of a pre-existing doctrine of sovereign immunity from the post-Hans dicta indicating that this immunity is constitutional, one would need only to consider a final set of cases: those in which we have assumed, without deciding, that congressional power to abrogate state sovereign immu- nity exists even when § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment has no application. A majority of this Court was willing to make that assumption in Hoffman v. Connecticut Dept. of Income Maintenance, 492 U. S. 96, 101 (1989) (plurality opinion), in Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., supra, at 475 (plurality opinion), and in County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y., 470 U. S. 226, 252 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 129 Souter, J., dissenting (1985).25 Although the Court in each of these cases failed to find abrogation for lack of a clear statement of congressional intent, the assumption that such power was available would hardly have been permissible if, at that time, today's majori- ty's view of the law had been firmly established. It is one thing, after all, to avoid an open constitutional question by assuming an answer and rejecting the claim on another ground; it is quite another to avoid a settled rationale (an emphatically settled one if the majority is to be taken seri- ously) only to reach an issue of statutory construction that the Court would otherwise not have to decide. Even worse, the Court could not have been unaware that its decision of cases like Hoffman and Welch, on the ground that the stat- utes at issue lacked a plain statement of intent to abrogate, would invite Congress to attempt abrogation in statutes like the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U. S. C. § 2701 et seq. (IGRA). Such a course would have been wholly irresponsi- ble if, as the majority now claims, the constitutionally unal- terable nature of Hans immunity had been well established for a hundred years. Hans itself recognized that an "observation [in a prior case that] was unnecessary to the decision, and in that sense extra judicial . . . ought not to outweigh" present reasoning that points to a different conclusion. 134 U. S., at 20. That is good advice, which Members of today's majority have been willing to heed on other occasions. See, e. g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U. S. 375, 379 (1994) ("It is to the holdings of our cases, rather than their dicta, that we 25 In Hoffman, one Member of the four-Justice plurality expressly disa- vowed the plurality's assumption that Congress could abrogate the States' immunity by making its intent to do so clear. See 492 U. S., at 105 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The four dissenters, however, not only as- sumed that Congress had the power to abrogate but found that it had done so. See id., at 106 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Likewise, in Welch, the four-Justice plurality was joined by four dissenters who insisted upon a congressional power of abrogation. See 483 U. S., at 519 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 130 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting must attend"); Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U. S. 442, 450 (1996). But because the Court disregards this norm today, I must consider the soundness of Hans's original recognition of a background principle of sovereign immunity that applies even in federal-question suits, and the reasons that counsel against the Court's extension of Hans's holding to the point of rendering its immunity unalterable by Congress. III Three critical errors in Hans weigh against constitutional- izing its holding as the majority does today. The first we have already seen: the Hans Court misread the Eleventh Amendment, see supra, at 118­123. It also misunderstood the conditions under which common-law doctrines were received or rejected at the time of the founding, and it fun- damentally mistook the very nature of sovereignty in the young Republic that was supposed to entail a State's im- munity to federal-question jurisdiction in a federal court. While I would not, as a matter of stare decisis, overrule Hans today, an understanding of its failings on these points will show how the Court today simply compounds already serious error in taking Hans the further step of investing its rule with constitutional inviolability against the considered judgment of Congress to abrogate it. A There is and could be no dispute that the doctrine of sover- eign immunity that Hans purported to apply had its origins in the "familiar doctrine of the common law," The Siren, 7 Wall. 152, 153 (1869), "derived from the laws and practices of our English ancestors," United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 205 (1882).26 Although statutes came to affect its impor- 26 The Court seeks to disparage the common-law roots of the doctrine, and the consequences of those roots which I outline infra, at 132­142 and 159­164, by asserting that Hans "found its roots not solely in the common law of England, but in the much more fundamental ` "jurisprudence in all 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 131 Souter, J., dissenting tance in the succeeding centuries, the doctrine was never reduced to codification, and Americans took their under- standing of immunity doctrine from Blackstone, see 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, ch. 17 (1768). Here, as in the mother country, it remained a common-law rule. See generally Jaffe, 77 Harv. L. Rev., at 2­19; Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, VI, 36 Yale L. J. 1, 17­41 (1926). This fact of the doctrine's common-law status in the period covering the founding and the later adoption of the Eleventh Amendment should have raised a warning flag to the Hans Court and it should do the same for the Court today. For although the Court has persistently assumed that the com- mon law's presence in the minds of the early Framers must civilized nations." ' " Ante, at 69 (quoting Hans, 134 U. S., at 17). The Hans Court, however, relied explicitly on the ground that a suit against the State by its own citizen was "not known . . . at the common law" and was not among the departures from the common law recognized by the Constitution. Id., at 15. Moreover, Hans explicitly adopted the reason- ing of Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm, see 134 U. S., at 18­19, and that opinion could hardly have been clearer in relying exclusively on the common law. "The only principles of law . . . which can affect this case," Justice Iredell wrote, "[are] those that are derived from what is properly termed `the common law,' a law which I presume is the ground-work of the laws in every State in the Union, and which I consider, so far as it is applicable to the peculiar circumstances of the country, and where no spe- cial act of Legislation controuls it, to be in force in each State, as it existed in England, (unaltered by any statute) at the time of the first settlement of the country." 2 Dall., at 435 (emphasis deleted). See also Employees of Dept. of Public Health and Welfare of Mo. v. Department of Public Health and Welfare of Mo., 411 U. S. 279, 288 (1973) (Marshall, J., concur- ring in result) ("Sovereign immunity is a common-law doctrine that long predates our Constitution and the Eleventh Amendment, although it has, of course, been carried forward in our jurisprudence"); R. Watkins, The State as a Party Litigant 51­52 (1927) ("It thus seems probable that the doctrine of state immunity was accepted rather as an existing fact by the people of the states, than adopted as a theory. It was a matter of univer- sal practice, and was accepted from the mother country along with the rest of the common law of England applicable to our changed state and condition"). 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 132 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting have functioned as a limitation on their understanding of the new Nation's constitutional powers, this turns out not to be so at all. One of the characteristics of the founding genera- tion, on the contrary, was its joinder of an appreciation of its immediate and powerful common-law heritage with caution in settling that inheritance on the political systems of the new Republic. It is not that the Framers failed to see them- selves to be children of the common law; as one of their con- temporaries put it, "[w]e live in the midst of the common law, we inhale it at every breath, imbibe it at every pore . . . [and] cannot learn another system of laws without learning at the same time another language." P. Du Ponceau, A Disserta- tion on the Nature and Extent of Jurisdiction of Courts of the United States 91 (1824). But still it is clear that the adoption of English common law in America was not taken for granted, and that the exact manner and extent of the common law's reception were subject to careful consideration by courts and legislatures in each of the new States.27 An examination of the States' experience with common-law re- ception will shed light on subsequent theory and practice at the national level, and demonstrate that our history is en- tirely at odds with Hans's resort to a common-law principle to limit the Constitution's contrary text. 1 This American reluctance to import English common law wholesale into the New World is traceable to the early colo- nial period. One scholar of that time has written that "[t]he 27 See, e. g., Hall, The Common Law: An Account of its Reception in the United States, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 791, 796 (1951) ("Whether we emphasize the imitation by the colonists of the practices of English local courts or whether we say the early colonial judges were really applying their own common-sense ideas of justice, the fact remains that there was an incom- plete acceptance in America of English legal principles, and this indige- nous law which developed in America remained as a significant source of law after the Revolution"). 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 133 Souter, J., dissenting process which we may call the reception of the English com- mon law by the colonies was not so simple as the legal theory would lead us to assume. While their general legal concep- tions were conditioned by, and their terminology derived from, the common law, the early colonists were far from applying it as a technical system, they often ignored it or denied its subsidiary force, and they consciously departed from many of its most essential principles." P. Reinsch, English Common Law in the Early American Colonies 58 (1899).28 For a variety of reasons, including the absence of trained lawyers and judges, the dearth of law books, the reli- gious and ideological commitments of the early settlers, and the novel conditions of the New World, the colonists turned to a variety of other sources in addition to principles of common law.29 It is true that, with the development of colonial society and the increasing sophistication of the colonial bar, English common law gained increasing acceptance in colonial prac- tice. See id., at 7­8; Hall, The Common Law: An Account of its Reception in the United States, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 791, 28 See also Jones, The Common Law in the United States: English Themes and American Variations, in Political Separation and Legal Conti- nuity 95­98 (H. Jones ed. 1976) (Jones) (acknowledging that a true common-law system had not yet developed in the early colonial period); Stoebuck, Reception of English Common Law in the American Colonies, 10 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 393, 406­407 (1968) (same). 29 See, e. g., Reinsch, English Common Law in the Early American Colo- nies, at 7 (finding that the colonists developed their own "rude, popular, summary" system of justice despite professed adhesion to the common law); C. Hilkey, Legal Development in Colonial Massachusetts, 1630­1686, p. 69 (1967) (emphasizing Biblical and indigenous sources); Radin, The Ri- valry of Common-Law and Civil Law Ideas in the American Colonies, in 2 Law: A Century of Progress 404, 407­411 (1937) (emphasizing natural law and Roman law); Goebel, King's Law and Local Custom in Seven- teenth Century New England, 31 Colum. L. Rev. 416 (1931) (finding that the early settlers imported the law and procedure of the borough and manor courts with which they had been familiar in England). 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 134 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting 797 (1951).30 But even in the late colonial period, Americans insisted that "the whole body of the common law . . . was not trans- planted, but only so much as was applicable to the colo- nists in their new relations and conditions. Much of the common law related to matters which were purely local, which existed under the English political organization, or was based upon the triple relation of king, lords and commons, or those peculiar social conditions, habits and customs which have no counterpart in the New World. Such portions of the common law, not being applicable to the new conditions of the colonists, were never recog- nised as part of their jurisprudence." Dale, The Adop- tion of the Common Law by the American Colonies, 30 Am. L. Reg. 553, 554 (1882).31 The result was that "the increasing influx of common-law principles by no means obliterated the indigenous systems which had developed during the colonial era and that there existed important differences in law in action on the two sides of the Atlantic." Hall, supra, at 797. 30 See also Stoebuck, supra, at 411­412 (indicating that the Colonies be- came significantly more receptive to the common law after 1700, in part because of a British desire to regularize colonial legal systems). 31 See also Jones 98 ("The selective nature of the reception is evident in any examination of the state of law in the colonies in the years immedi- ately preceding the Revolution"). An example is Trott's law, adopted by South Carolina in 1712, which declared which English statutes were in force in the Colony. Many laws of England, Trott conceded, were "alto- gether useless" in South Carolina "by reason of the different way of agri- culture and the differing productions of the earth of this Province from that of England"; others were "impracticable" because of differences in institutions. L. Friedman, A History of American Law 90­93 (2d ed. 1985); see also C. Warren, History of the American Bar 122­123 (1911) (quoting North Carolina statute, passed in 1715, providing that the com- mon law would be in force " `so far as shall be compatible with our way of living and trade' "). 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 135 Souter, J., dissenting Understandably, even the trend toward acceptance of the common law that had developed in the late colonial period was imperiled by the Revolution and the ultimate break be- tween the Colonies and the old country. Dean Pound has observed that, "[f]or a generation after the Revolution, . . . political conditions gave rise to a general distrust of English law. . . . The books are full of illustrations of the hostility toward English law simply because it was English which pre- vailed at the end of the eighteenth and in the earlier years of the nineteenth century." R. Pound, The Formative Era of American Law 7 (1938); see also C. Warren, A History of the American Bar 224­225 (1911) (noting a "prejudice against the system of English Common Law" in the years following the Revolution). James Monroe went so far as to write in 1802 that " `the application of the principles of the English common law to our constitution' " should be consid- ered " `good cause for impeachment.' " Letter from James Monroe to John Breckenridge, Jan. 15, 1802 (quoted in 3 A. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall: Conflict and Construc- tion 1800­1815, p. 59 (1919)).32 Nor was anti-English senti- 32 American hostility to things English was so pronounced for a time that Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Kentucky proscribed by statute the citation of English decisions in their courts, and the New Hampshire courts promulgated a rule of court to the same effect. See Hall, 4 Vand. L. Rev., at 806; Warren, supra, at 227. This hostility may appear some- what paradoxical in view of the colonists' frequent insistence during the revolutionary crisis that they were entitled to common-law rights. See, e. g., First Continental Congress Declaration and Resolves (1774), in Docu- ments Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States, H. R. Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 1, 3 (C. Tansill ed. 1927) ("That the respective colonies are entitled to the common law of England"). In this context, however, the colonists were referring "not to the corpus of English case-law doctrine but to such profoundly valued common law pro- cedures as trial by jury and the subjection of governmental power to what John Locke had called the `standing laws,' " such as Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, the Bill of Rights of 1689, and the Act of Settlement of 1701. Jones 110; see also Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1231, 1256 (1985) (Jay II) (noting that "Antifederalists 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 136 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting ment the only difficulty; according to Dean Pound, "[s]ocial and geographical conditions contributed also to make the work of receiving and reshaping the common law exception- ally difficult." Pound, supra, at 7. The consequence of this anti-English hostility and aware- ness of changed circumstances was that the independent States continued the colonists' practice of adopting only so much of the common law as they thought applicable to their local conditions.33 As Justice Story explained, "[t]he com- used the term common law to mean the great rights associated with due process"). The cardinal principles of this common-law vision were parlia- mentary supremacy and the rule of law, conceived as the axiom that "all members of society, government officials as well as private persons, are equally responsible to the law and . . . `equally amenable to the jurisdiction of ordinary tribunals.' " Jones 128­129 (quoting A. Dicey, Introduction to Study of the Law of Constitution 192 (9th ed. 1939)). It is hard to imagine that the doctrine of sovereign immunity, so profoundly at odds with both these cardinal principles, could have been imported to America as part of this more generalized common-law vision. 33 See, e. g., Conner v. Shepherd, 15 Mass. 164 (1818) (rejecting English common-law rule regarding assignment of dower rights as inapplicable to the state and condition of land in Massachusetts); Parker & Edgarton v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309, 318 (N. Y. 1838) (rejecting English rule entitling a landowner to damages for the stopping of his lights; the court noted that "[i]t cannot be necessary to cite cases to prove that those portions of the common law of England which are hostile to the spirit of our institutions, or which are not adapted to the existing state of things in this country, form no part of our law"); Fitch v. Brainerd, 2 Conn. 163, 189 (1805) (ac- cepting English common-law rule barring married woman from disposing of her real estate by will, and observing that "it long since became neces- sary . . . to make [the English common law] our own, by practical adop- tion-with such exceptions as a diversity of circumstances, and the incipi- ent customs of our own country, required") (emphasis in original); Martin v. Bigelow, 2 Aiken 184 (Vt. 1827) (declaring English common law as to stream rights inappropriate for conditions of Vermont waterways); Hall v. Smith, 1 Bay 330, 331 (S. C. Sup. Ct. 1793) (refusing to apply strict English rules regarding promissory notes as unsuited to the "local situa- tion of Carolina"). See also Hall, supra, at 805 ("[A] review of the cases shows that no matter what the wording of the reception statute or consti- tutional provision of the particular state, the rule developed, which was 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 137 Souter, J., dissenting mon law of England is not to be taken in all respects to be that of America. Our ancestors brought with them its gen- eral principles, and claimed it as their birthright; but they brought with them and adopted only that portion which was applicable to their situation." Van Ness v. Pacard, 2 Pet. 137, 144 (1829). In 1800, John Marshall had expressed the similar view that "our ancestors brought with them the laws of England, both statute & common law as existing at the settlement of each colony, so far as they were applicable to our situation." Letter from John Marshall to St. George Tucker, Nov. 27, 1800, reprinted in Jay II, App. A, at 1326, 1327. Accordingly, in the period following independence, "[l]egislatures and courts and doctrinal writers had to test the common law at every point with respect to its applicabil- ity to America." Pound, supra, at 20; see also Jones 103 (observing that "suitab[ility] to local institutions and condi- tions" was "incomparably the most important" principle of reception in the new States). 2 While the States had limited their reception of English common law to principles appropriate to American condi- tions, the 1787 draft Constitution contained no provision for adopting the common law at all. This omission stood in sharp contrast to the state constitutions then extant, virtu- ally all of which contained explicit provisions dealing with common-law reception. See n. 55, infra. Since the experi- ence in the States set the stage for thinking at the national level, see generally G. Wood, Creation of the American Re- public, 1776­1787, p. 467 (1969) (Wood), this failure to ad- dress the notion of common-law reception could not have been inadvertent. Instead, the Framers chose to recognize only particular common-law concepts, such as the writ of ha- sooner or later to be repeated in practically every American jurisdiction, that only those principles of the common law were received which were applicable to the local situation"). 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 138 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting beas corpus, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, and the distinction between law and equity, U. S. Const., Amdt. 7, by specific reference in the constitutional text. See 1 J. Goebel, Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States, Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801, pp. 229­ 230 (1971).34 This approach reflected widespread agreement that ratification would not itself entail a general reception of the common law of England. See Letter from John Marshall to St. George Tucker, Nov. 27, 1800, reprinted in Jay II, App. A, at 1326 ("I do not believe one man can be found" who maintains "that the common law of England has . . . been adopted as the common law of America by the Constitution of the United States"); Jay II, at 1255 (noting that the use of the term "laws" in Article III "could not have been meant to accomplish a general reception of British common law"). Records of the ratification debates support Marshall's un- derstanding that everyone had to know that the new Consti- tution would not draw the common law in its train. Anti- federalists like George Mason went so far as to object that 34 See also Jones 123­124 (noting that the common-law institutions of habeas corpus and jury trial were "not merely received as ordinary law," but rather "received by [specific textual provisions] of the Constitution itself, as part of the supreme law of the land"). Sovereign immunity, of course, was not elevated to constitutional status in this way; such immu- nity thus stands on the same footing as any other common-law principle which the Framers refused to place beyond the reach of legislative change. That such principles were and are subject to legislative alteration is con- firmed by our treatment of other forms of common-law immunities, such as the immunity enjoyed under certain circumstances by public officials. Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 508 (1978) (officer immunity is derived from the common law); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 421 (1976) (same). In this context, "our immunity decisions have been informed by the common law" only "in the absence of explicit . . . congressional guid- ance." Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731, 747 (1982). See generally ante, at 87­88 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Jackson, 98 Yale L. J., at 75­104. Surely no one would deny Congress the power to abrogate those immuni- ties if it should so choose. 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 139 Souter, J., dissenting under the proposed Constitution the people would not be "secured even in the enjoyment of the benefit of the common law." Mason, Objections to This Constitution of Govern- ment, in 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 637 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) (Farrand); see also 3 Elliot's Debates 446­449 (Patrick Henry, Virginia Convention). In particu- lar, the Antifederalists worried about the failure of the pro- posed Constitution to provide for a reception of "the great rights associated with due process" such as the right to a jury trial, Jay II, at 1256, and they argued that "Congress's powers to regulate the proceedings of federal courts made the fate of these common-law procedural protections uncer- tain," id., at 1257.35 While Federalists met this objection by arguing that nothing in the Constitution necessarily ex- cluded the fundamental common-law protections associated with due process, see, e. g., 3 Elliot's Debates 451 (George Nicholas, Virginia Convention), they defended the decision against any general constitutional reception of the common law on the ground that constitutionalizing it would render it "immutable," see id., at 469­470 (Edmund Randolph, Vir- ginia Convention), and not subject to revision by Congress, id., at 550 (Edmund Pendleton, Virginia Convention); see also infra, at 163­164. The Framers also recognized that the diverse development of the common law in the several States made a general fed- eral reception impossible. "The common law was not the same in any two of the Colonies," Madison observed; "in some the modifications were materially and extensively dif- ferent." Report on the Virginia Resolutions, House of Dele- gates, Session of 1799­1800, Concerning Alien and Sedition Laws, in 6 Writings of James Madison 373 (G. Hunt ed. 1906) 35 See, e. g., 2 Elliot's Debates 400 (Thomas Tredwell, New York Conven- tion) ("[W]e are ignorant whether [federal proceedings] shall be according to the common, civil, the Jewish, or Turkish law . . ."). 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 140 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting (Alien and Sedition Laws).36 In particular, although there is little evidence regarding the immunity enjoyed by the var- ious colonial governments prior to the Revolution, the pro- found differences as to the source of colonial authority be- tween chartered colonies, royal colonies, and so on seems unlikely, wholly apart from other differences in circumstance, to have given rise to a uniform body of immunity law. There was not, then, any unified "Common Law" in America that the Federal Constitution could adopt, Jay I, at 1056; Stoebuck, Reception of English Common Law in the Ameri- can Colonies, 10 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 393, 401 (1968) ("The assumption that colonial law was essentially the same in all colonies is wholly without foundation"), and, in particular, probably no common principle of sovereign immunity, cf. Alien and Sedition Laws 376. The Framers may, as Madi- son, Hamilton, and Marshall argued, have contemplated that federal courts would respect state immunity law in diversity cases, but the generalized principle of immunity that today's majority would graft onto the Constitution itself may well never have developed with any common clarity and, in any event, has not been shown to have existed. Finally, the Framers' aversion to a general federal recep- tion of the common law is evident from the Federalists' re- 36 See also Justice Jay's Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of New York (Apr. 4, 1790) (observing that at the time the Nation was formed, "[o]ur jurisprudence varied in almost every State, and was accom- modated to local, not general convenience-to partial, not national policy") (quoted in Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1003, 1056, n. 261 (1985) (Jay I)); United States v. Worrall, 28 F. Cas. 774, 779 (No. 16,766) (CC Pa. 1798) (Chase, J.) (noting that "[t]he common law . . . of one state, is not the common law of another"); 8 Annals of Cong. 2137 (1798) (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin) (asserting that there could be no national common law because "[t]he common law of Great Britain received in each colony, had in every one received modifications arising from their situation . . . and now each State had a common law, in its general principles the same, but in many particulars differing from each other"). 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 141 Souter, J., dissenting sponse to the Antifederalist claim that Article III granted an unduly broad jurisdiction to the federal courts. That re- sponse was to emphasize the limited powers of the National Government. See, e. g., 3 Elliot's Debates 553 (John Mar- shall, Virginia Convention) ("Has the government of the United States power to make laws on every subject? . . . Can they make laws affecting the mode of transferring property, or contracts, or claims, between citizens of the same state? Can they go beyond the delegated powers?"); Jay II, at 1260.37 That answer assumes, of course, no generalized re- ception of English common law as federal law; otherwise, "arising under" jurisdiction would have extended to any sub- ject comprehended by the general common law. Madison made this assumption absolutely clear during the subsequent debates over the Alien and Sedition Acts, which raised the issue of whether the Framers intended to recog- nize a general federal jurisdiction to try common-law crimes. Rejecting the idea of any federal reception, Madison in- sisted that "the consequence of admitting the common law as the law of the United States, on the authority of the individ- ual States, is as obvious as it would be fatal. As this law relates to every subject of legislation, and would be paramount to the Constitutions and laws of the States, the admission of it would overwhelm the residuary sov- ereignty of the States, and by one constructive opera- tion new model the whole political fabric of the country." Alien and Sedition Laws 381. See also 1 Goebel, Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States, at 651­655 (discuss- 37 See also Jay II, at 1241­1250 (arguing that Jeffersonian Republicans resisted the idea of a general federal reception of the common law as an incursion on States' rights); Jay I, at 1111 (same). Given the roots of the Framers' resistance, the Court's reception of the English common law into the Constitution itself in the very name of state sovereignty goes beyond the limits of irony. 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 142 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting ing the lack of evidence to support the proposition that the Framers intended a general reception of the English com- mon law through the Constitution); Jay II, at 1254 (arguing that "[i]t would have been untenable to maintain that the body of British common law had been adopted by the Consti- tution . . . "). Madison concluded that "[i]t is . . . distressing to reflect that it ever should have been made a question, whether the Constitution, on the whole face of which is seen so much labor to enumerate and define the several objects of Federal power, could intend to introduce in the lump, in an indirect manner, and by a forced construction of a few phrases, the vast and multifarious jurisdiction involved in the common law-a law filling so many ample volumes; a law over- spreading the entire field of legislation; and a law that would sap the foundation of the Constitution as a system of limited and specified powers." Alien and Sedition Laws 382. B Given the refusal to entertain any wholesale reception of common law, given the failure of the new Constitution to make any provision for adoption of common law as such, and given the protests already quoted that no general reception had occurred, the Hans Court and the Court today cannot reasonably argue that something like the old immunity doc- trine somehow slipped in as a tacit but enforceable back- ground principle. But see ante, at 72. The evidence is even more specific, however, that there was no pervasive under- standing that sovereign immunity had limited federal- question jurisdiction. 1 As I have already noted briefly, see supra, at 105­106, the Framers and their contemporaries did not agree about the 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 143 Souter, J., dissenting place of common-law state sovereign immunity even as to federal jurisdiction resting on the Citizen-State Diversity Clauses. Edmund Randolph argued in favor of ratification on the ground that the immunity would not be recognized, leaving the States subject to jurisdiction.38 Patrick Henry opposed ratification on the basis of exactly the same reading. See 3 Elliot's Debates 543. On the other hand, James Madi- son, John Marshall, and Alexander Hamilton all appear to have believed that the common-law immunity from suit would survive the ratification of Article III, so as to be at a State's disposal when jurisdiction would depend on diversity. This would have left the States free to enjoy a traditional immunity as defendants without barring the exercise of judi- cial power over them if they chose to enter the federal courts as diversity plaintiffs or to waive their immunity as diversity defendants. See id., at 533 (Madison: the Constitution "give[s] a citizen a right to be heard in the federal courts; and if a state should condescend to be a party, this court may take cognizance of it"); 39 id., at 556 (Marshall: "I see a diffi- 38 See 3 Elliot's Debates 573 (the Constitution would "render valid and effective existing claims" against the States). See also 2 id., at 491 (James Wilson, in the Pennsylvania ratification debate: "When a citizen has a controversy with another state, there ought to be a tribunal where both parties may stand on a just and equal footing"). Wilson, as I noted above, took a similar position in addressing the federal question, or arising under, clause, remarking that the effect of the clause would be to require States to honor pre-Revolutionary debt owed to English merchants, as had been promised in the Treaty of 1783. See n. 4, supra. 39 The Court accuses me of quoting this statement out of context, ante, at 70, n. 12, but the additional material included by the Court makes no difference. I am conceding that Madison, Hamilton, and Marshall all agreed that Article III did not of its own force abrogate the States' pre- existing common-law immunity, at least with respect to diversity suits. None of the statements offered by the Court, however, purports to deal with federal-question jurisdiction or with the question whether Congress, acting pursuant to its Article I powers, could create a cause of action against a State. As I explain further below, the views of Madison and his 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 144 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting culty in making a state defendant, which does not prevent its being plaintiff"). As Hamilton stated in The Federalist No. 81: "It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every state in the Union. Unless therefore, there is a surren- der of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the states, and the danger intimated must be merely ideal." The Federalist No. 81, pp. 548­549 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See generally Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Af- firmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 1033, 1045­1054 (1983) (discussing the adoption of the Citizen-State Diversity Clauses); Gibbons, 83 Colum. L. Rev., at 1902­1914. The majority sees in these statements, and chiefly in Hamilton's discussion of sovereign immunity in The Federalist No. 81, an unequivocal mandate "which would preclude all federal jurisdiction over an unconsenting State." Ante, at 70. But there is no such mandate to be found. As I have already said, the immediate context of Hamil- ton's discussion in Federalist No. 81 has nothing to do with federal-question cases. It addresses a suggestion "that an assignment of the public securities of one state to the citizens of another, would enable them to prosecute that state in the federal courts for the amount of those securities." The Fed- eralist No. 81, at 548. Hamilton is plainly talking about a allies on this more difficult question can be divined, if at all, only by refer- ence to the more extended discussions by Hamilton in The Federalist No. 32, and by Justice Iredell in his Chisholm dissent. Both those dis- cussions, I submit, tend to support a congressional power of abrogation. 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 145 Souter, J., dissenting suit subject to a federal court's jurisdiction under the Citizen-State Diversity Clauses of Article III. The general statement on sovereign immunity emphasized by the majority then follows, along with a reference back to The Federalist No. 32. The Federalist No. 81, at 548. What Hamilton draws from that prior paper, however, is not a general conclusion about state sovereignty but a particular point about state contracts: "A recurrence to the principles there established will satisfy us, that there is no colour to pretend that the state governments, would by the adoption of that plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their own debts in their own way, free from every constraint but that which flows from the obligations of good faith. The contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive force. They confer no right of action independent of the sovereign will." Id., at 549. The most that can be inferred from this is, as noted above, that in diversity cases applying state contract law the immu- nity that a State would have enjoyed in its own courts is carried into the federal court. When, therefore, the Hans Court relied in part upon Hamilton's statement, see 134 U. S., at 20, its reliance was misplaced; Hamilton was ad- dressing diversity jurisdiction, whereas Hans involved federal-question jurisdiction under the Contracts Clause. No general theory of federal-question immunity can be in- ferred from Hamilton's discussion of immunity in contract suits. But that is only the beginning of the difficulties that accrue to the majority from reliance on The Federalist No. 81.Hamilton says that a State is "not . . . amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent . . . . [u]nless . . . there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention." The Federalist No. 81, at 548­549 (emphasis deleted). He 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 146 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting immediately adds, however, that "[t]he circumstances which are necessary to produce an alienation of state sovereignty, were discussed in considering the article of taxation, and need not be repeated here." Id., at 549. The reference is to The Federalist No. 32, also by Hamilton, which has this to say about the alienation of state sovereignty: "[A]s the plan of the Convention aims only at a partial Union or consolidation, the State Governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had and which were not by that act exclusively delegated to the United States. This exclusive delega- tion or rather this alienation of State sovereignty would only exist in three cases; where the Constitution in ex- press terms granted an exclusive authority to the Union; where it granted in one instance an authority to the Union and in another prohibited the States from exercis- ing the like authority; and where it granted an authority to the Union, to which a similar authority in the States would be absolutely and totally contradictory and re- pugnant. I use these terms to distinguish this last case from another which might appear to resemble it; but which would in fact be essentially different; I mean where the exercise of a concurrent jurisdiction might be productive of occasional interferences in the policy of any branch of administration, but would not imply any direct contradiction or repugnancy in point of constitu- tional authority." Id., at 200 (emphasis in original). As an instance of the last case, in which exercising con- current jurisdiction may produce interferences in "policy," Hamilton gives the example of concurrent power to tax the same subjects: "It is indeed possible that a tax might be laid on a partic- ular article by a State which might render it inexpedient that thus a further tax should be laid on the same article 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 147 Souter, J., dissenting by the Union; but it would not imply a constitutional inability to impose a further tax. The quantity of the imposition, the expediency or inexpediency of an in- crease on either side, would be mutually questions of prudence; but there would be involved no direct contra- diction of power. The particular policy of the national and of the State systems of finance might now and then not exactly coincide, and might require reciprocal for- bearances. It is not however a mere possibility of in- convenience in the exercise of powers, but an immediate constitutional repugnancy, that can by implication alien- ate and extinguish a pre-existing right of sovereignty." Id., at 202 (emphasis in original). The first embarrassment Hamilton's discussion creates for the majority turns on the fact that the power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes has been interpreted as making "Indian relations . . . the exclusive province of federal law." County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y., 470 U. S., at 234.40 We have accordingly recognized that "[s]tate laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an In- dian reservation except where Congress has expressly pro- vided that State laws shall apply." McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164, 170­171 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S. 786, 789 (1945) ("The policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in the Nation's 40 See also Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 560­561 (1832) ("The Chero- kee nation . . . is a distinct community . . . in which the laws of Georgia can have no force. . . . The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States"). This Court has repeatedly rejected state at- tempts to assert sovereignty over Indian lands. See, e. g., The New York Indians, 5 Wall. 761, 769 (1867) (rejecting state attempt to tax reservation lands); Worcester, supra, at 561­563 (nullifying an attempted prosecution by the State of Georgia of a person who resided on Indian lands in viola- tion of state law). 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 148 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting history").41 We have specifically held, moreover, that the States have no power to regulate gambling on Indian lands. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U. S. 202, 221­222 (1987). In sum, since the States have no sover- eignty in the regulation of commerce with the tribes, on Hamilton's view there is no source of sovereign immunity to assert in a suit based on congressional regulation of that commerce. If Hamilton is good authority, the majority of the Court today is wrong. Quite apart, however, from its application to this particu- lar Act of Congress exercising the Indian commerce power, Hamilton's sovereignty discussion quoted above places the Court in an embarrassing dilemma. Hamilton posited four categories: congressional legislation on (a) subjects com- mitted expressly and exclusively to Congress, (b) subjects over which state authority is expressly negated, (c) subjects over which concurrent authority would be impossible (as "contradictory and repugnant"), and (d) subjects over which concurrent authority is not only possible, but its exercise by both is limited only by considerations of policy (as when one taxing authority is politically deterred from adding too much to the exaction the other authority is already making). But what of those situations involving concurrent powers, like the power over interstate commerce, see, e. g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia ex rel. Soc. for Relief of Distressed Pilots, 12 How. 299 (1852) (recognizing power of States to engage in some regulation of interstate commerce), when a congressional statute not only binds the States but even creates an affirmative obligation on the State 41 Although we have rejected a per se bar to state jurisdiction, it is clear that such jurisdiction remains the exception and not the rule. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U. S. 324, 331­332 (1983) (footnotes omitted) ("[U]nder certain circumstances a State may validly assert authority over the activities of nonmembers on a reservation, and . . . in exceptional circumstances a State may assert jurisdiction over the on-reservation activities of tribal members"). 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 149 Souter, J., dissenting as such, as in this case? Hamilton's discussion does not seem to cover this (quite possibly because, as a good political polemicist, he did not wish to raise it). If in fact it is fair to say that Hamilton does not cover this situation, then the Court cannot claim him as authority for the preservation of state sovereignty and consequent immunity. If, however, on what I think is an implausible reading, one were to try to shoehorn this situation into Hamilton's category (c) (on the theory that concurrent authority is impossible after passage of the congressional legislation), then any claim of sover- eignty and consequent immunity is gone entirely. In sum, either the majority reads Hamilton as I do, to say nothing about sovereignty or immunity in such a case, or it will have to read him to say something about it that bars any state immunity claim. That is the dilemma of the majority's reliance on Hamilton's The Federalist No. 81, with its ref- erence to No. 32. Either way, he is no authority for the Court's position. Thus, the Court's attempt to convert isolated statements by the Framers into answers to questions not before them is fundamentally misguided.42 The Court's difficulty is far more fundamental, however, than inconsistency with a par- ticular quotation, for the Court's position runs afoul of the general theory of sovereignty that gave shape to the Fram- ers' enterprise. An enquiry into the development of that concept demonstrates that American political thought had so revolutionized the concept of sovereignty itself that calling 42 See The Federalist No. 82, p. 553 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) (disclaiming any intent to answer all the "questions of intricacy and nicety" arising in a judicial system that must accommodate "the total or partial incorporation of a number of distinct sovereignties"); S. Elkins & E. McKitrick, The Age of Federalism 64 (1993) (suggesting that "[t]he amount of attention and discussion given to the judiciary in the Constitu- tional Convention was only a fraction of that devoted to the executive and legislative branches," and that the Framers deliberately left many ques- tions open for later resolution). 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 150 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting for the immunity of a State as against the jurisdiction of the national courts would have been sheer illogic. 2 We said in Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U. S. 775, 779 (1991), that "the States entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact," but we surely did not mean that they entered that system with the sovereignty they would have claimed if each State had assumed inde- pendent existence in the community of nations, for even the Articles of Confederation allowed for less than that. See Articles of Confederation, Art. VI, § 1 ("No State without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, shall send any embassy to, or receive any embassy from, or enter into any conference, agreement, alliance or treaty with any king, prince or state . . ."). While there is no need here to calculate exactly how close the American States came to sovereignty in the classic sense prior to ratification of the Constitution, it is clear that the act of ratification affected their sovereignty in a way different from any previous politi- cal event in America or anywhere else. For the adoption of the Constitution made them members of a novel federal sys- tem that sought to balance the States' exercise of some sov- ereign prerogatives delegated from their own people with the principle of a limited but centralizing federal supremacy. As a matter of political theory, this federal arrangement of dual delegated sovereign powers truly was a more revolu- tionary turn than the late war had been. See, e. g., U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Federalism was our Nation's own discovery. The Framers split the atom of sover- eignty").43 Before the new federal scheme appeared, 18th- 43 Regardless of its other faults, Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857), recognized as a structural matter that "[t]he new Government was not a mere change in a dynasty, or in a form of government, leaving the nation or sovereignty the same, and 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 151 Souter, J., dissenting century political theorists had assumed that "there must re- side somewhere in every political unit a single, undivided, final power, higher in legal authority than any other power, subject to no law, a law unto itself." B. Bailyn, The Ideologi- cal Origins of the American Revolution 198 (1967); see also Wood 345.44 The American development of divided sover- eign powers, which "shatter[ed] . . . the categories of govern- ment that had dominated Western thinking for centuries," id., at 385, was made possible only by a recognition that the ultimate sovereignty rests in the people themselves. See id., at 530 (noting that because "none of these arguments about `joint jurisdictions' and `coequal sovereignties' convinc- ingly refuted the Antifederalist doctrine of a supreme and indivisible sovereignty," the Federalists could succeed only by emphasizing that the supreme power " `resides in the PEOPLE, as the fountain of government' " (citing 1 Penn- sylvania and the Federal Constitution, 1787­1788, p. 302 (J. McMaster & F. Stone eds. 1888) (quoting James Wilson)).45 The People possessing this plenary bundle of specific powers clothed with all the rights, and bound by all the obligations of the preced- ing one." Id., at 441. See also F. McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution 276 (1985) ("The constitutional re- allocation of powers created a new form of government, unprecedented under the sun . . ."); S. Beer, To Make a Nation: The Rediscovery of Ameri- can Federalism 150­151 (1993) (American view of sovereignty was "radi- cally different" from that of British tradition). 44 Cf., e. g., 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 49, 160­162 (Cooper ed. 1803). This modern notion of sovereignty is traceable to the writings of Jean Bodin in the late 16th century. See J. Bodin, Six Books of the Common- wealth, bk. 2, ch. I, pp. 52­53 (M. Tooley, abr. & transl. 1967) (1576); see also T. Hobbes, Leviathan, Part II, ch. 29, pp. 150­151 (N. Fuller ed. 1952) (1651). 45 See Wood 530 (noting that James Wilson "[m]ore boldly and fully than anyone else . . . developed the argument that would eventually become the basis of all Federalist thinking" about sovereignty); see also The Federal- ist No. 22, at 146 (A. Hamilton) (acknowledging the People as "that pure original fountain of all legitimate authority"); id., No. 49, at 339 (J. Madi- son) ("[T]he people are the only legitimate fountain of power"). 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 152 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting were free to parcel them out to different governments and different branches of the same government as they saw fit. See F. McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Or- igins of the Constitution 278 (1985). As James Wilson em- phasized, the location of ultimate sovereignty in the People meant that "[t]hey can distribute one portion of power to the more contracted circle called State governments; they can also furnish another proportion to the government of the United States." 1 Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitu- tion, 1787­1788, supra, at 302.46 Under such a scheme, Alexander Hamilton explained, "[i]t does not follow . . . that each of the portions of powers dele- gated to [the national or state government] is not sovereign with regard to its proper objects." Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank, in 8 Papers of Alexander Hamilton 98 (Syrett ed. 1965) (emphasis in orig- inal).47 A necessary consequence of this view was that "the Government of the United States has sovereign power as to its declared purposes & trusts." Ibid. Justice Iredell was to make the same observation in his Chisholm dissent, com- menting that "[t]he United States are sovereign as to all the powers of Government actually surrendered: Each State in the Union is sovereign as to all the powers reserved." 2 Dall., at 435. And to the same point was Chief Justice Mar- 46 See also U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (the Constitution "created a legal system un- precedented in form and design, establishing two orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it"). 47 See Amar, 96 Yale L. J., at 1434­1435 ("The ultimate American answer [to the British notion that the sovereign was by definition above the law], in part, lay in a radical redefinition of governmental `sovereignty.' Just as a corporation could be delegated limited sovereign privileges by the King-in-Parliament, so governments could be delegated limited powers to govern. Within the limitations of their charters, governments could be sovereign, but that sovereignty could be bounded by the terms of the delegation itself" (footnote omitted)). 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 153 Souter, J., dissenting shall's description of the National and State Governments as "each sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign with respect to the objects committed to the other." McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 410 (1819). Given this metamorphosis of the idea of sovereignty in the years leading up to 1789, the question whether the old immu- nity doctrine might have been received as something suit- able for the new world of federal-question jurisdiction is a crucial one.48 The answer is that sovereign immunity as it would have been known to the Framers before ratification thereafter became inapplicable as a matter of logic in a fed- eral suit raising a federal question. The old doctrine, after all, barred the involuntary subjection of a sovereign to the system of justice and law of which it was itself the font, since to do otherwise would have struck the common-law mind from the Middle Ages onward as both impractical and ab- surd. See, e. g., Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349, 353 (1907) (Holmes, J.) ("A sovereign is exempt from suit . . . on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends").49 But the ratification demonstrated 48 See, e. g., Amar, supra, at 1436 ("By thus relocating true sovereignty in the People themselves . . . Americans domesticated government power and decisively repudiated British notions of `sovereign' governmental om- nipotence" (footnote omitted)). That this repudiation extended to tradi- tional principles of sovereign immunity is clear from Justice Wilson's opin- ion in Chisholm, in which he blasted "the haughty notions of state independence, state sovereignty and state supremacy" as allowing "the state [to] assum[e] a supercilious pre-eminence above the people who have formed it." 2 Dall., at 461. 49 See also Hobbes, supra, at 130 ("The sovereign of a Commonwealth, be it an assembly or one man, is not subject to the civil laws. . . . For he is free that can be free when he will: nor is it possible for any person to be bound to himself, because he that can bind can release; and therefore he that is bound to himself only is not bound"); Bodin, supra, at 28­29 ("One may be subject to laws made by another, but it is impossible to bind oneself in any matter which is the subject of one's own free exercise of 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 154 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting that state governments were subject to a superior regime of law in a judicial system established, not by the State, but by the people through a specific delegation of their sovereign power to a National Government that was paramount within its delegated sphere. When individuals sued States to en- force federal rights, the Government that corresponded to the "sovereign" in the traditional common-law sense was not the State but the National Government, and any state immu- nity from the jurisdiction of the Nation's courts would have required a grant from the true sovereign, the people, in their Constitution, or from the Congress that the Constitution had empowered. We made a similar point in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S., at 416, where we considered a suit against a State in another State's courts: "This [traditional] explanation [of sovereign immunity] adequately supports the conclusion that no sovereign may be sued in its own courts without its consent, but it affords no support for a claim of immunity in another sovereign's courts. Such a claim necessarily implicates the power and authority of a second sovereign; its source must be found either in an agreement, express or im- plied, between the two sovereigns, or in the voluntary decision of the second to respect the dignity of the first as a matter of comity." Cf. United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 621, 646 (1892) (recogniz- ing that a suit by the National Government against a State "does no violence to the inherent nature of sovereignty"). Subjecting States to federal jurisdiction in federal-question cases brought by individuals thus reflected nothing more than Professor Amar's apt summary that "[w]here govern- ments are acting within the bounds of their delegated `sover- eign' power, they may partake of sovereign immunity; where will. . . . It follows of necessity that the king cannot be subject to his own laws"). 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 155 Souter, J., dissenting not, not." Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L. J. 1425, 1490­1491, n. 261 (1987). State immunity to federal-question jurisdiction would, moreover, have run up against the common understanding of the practical necessity for the new federal relationship. According to Madison, the "multiplicity," "mutability," and "injustice" of then-extant state laws were prime factors re- quiring the formation of a new government. 1 Farrand 318­ 319 (remarks of J. Madison).50 These factors, Madison wrote to Jefferson, "contributed more to that uneasiness which produced the Convention, and prepared the Public mind for a general reform, than those which accrued to our national character and interest from the inadequacy of the Confedera- tion to its immediate objects." 5 Writings of James Madison 27 (G. Hunt ed. 1904). These concerns ultimately found con- crete expression in a number of specific limitations on state power, including provisions barring the States from enacting bills of attainder or ex post facto laws, coining money or emitting bills of credit, denying the privileges and immuni- ties of out-of-staters, or impairing the obligation of contracts. But the proposed Constitution also dealt with the old prob- lems affirmatively by granting the powers to Congress enu- merated in Article I, § 8, and by providing through the Su- premacy Clause that Congress could pre-empt state action in areas of concurrent state and federal authority. Given the Framers' general concern with curbing abuses by state governments, it would be amazing if the scheme of delegated powers embodied in the Constitution had left the National Government powerless to render the States judi- cially accountable for violations of federal rights. And of course the Framers did not understand the scheme to leave 50 See also Wood 466 ("[O]nce men grasped, as they increasingly did in the middle [1780's], that reform of the national government was the best means of remedying the evils caused by the state governments, then the revision of the Articles of Confederation assumed an impetus and an im- portance that it had not had a few years earlier"). 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 156 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting the Government powerless. In The Federalist No. 80, at 535, Hamilton observed that "[n]o man of sense will believe that such prohibitions [running against the States] would be scrupulously regarded, without some effectual power in the government to restrain or correct the infractions of them," and that "an authority in the federal courts, to over-rule such as might be in manifest contravention of the articles of union" was the Convention's preferred remedy. By speak- ing in the plural of an authority in the federal "courts," Ham- ilton made it clear that he envisioned more than this Court's exercise of appellate jurisdiction to review federal questions decided by state courts. Nor is it plausible that he was thinking merely of suits brought against States by the Na- tional Government itself, which The Federalist's authors did not describe in the paternalistic terms that would pass with- out an eyebrow raised today. Hamilton's power of the Gov- ernment to restrain violations of citizens' rights was a power to be exercised by the federal courts at the citizens' behest. See also Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1342, 1367­1371 (1989) (dis- cussing the Framers' concern with preserving as much state accountability as possible even in the course of enacting the Eleventh Amendment). This sketch of the logic and objectives of the new federal order is confirmed by what we have previously seen of the preratification debate on state sovereign immunity, which in turn becomes entirely intelligible both in what it addressed and what it ignored. It is understandable that reasonable minds differed on the applicability of the immunity doctrine in suits that made it to federal court only under the original Diversity Clauses, for their features were not wholly novel. While they were, of course, in the courts of the new and, for some purposes, paramount National Government, the law that they implicated was largely the old common law (and in any case was not federal law). It was not foolish, therefore, 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 157 Souter, J., dissenting to ask whether the old law brought the old defenses with it. But it is equally understandable that questions seem not to have been raised about state sovereign immunity in federal- question cases. The very idea of a federal question de- pended on the rejection of the simple concept of sovereignty from which the immunity doctrine had developed; under the English common law, the question of immunity in a system of layered sovereignty simply could not have arisen. Cf., e. g., Jay II, at 1282­1284; Du Ponceau, A Dissertation on the Nature and Extent of Jurisdiction of Courts of the United States, at 6­7.51 The Framers' principal objectives in re- jecting English theories of unitary sovereignty, moreover, would have been impeded if a new concept of sovereign im- munity had taken its place in federal-question cases, and would have been substantially thwarted if that new immu- nity had been held to be untouchable by any congressional effort to abrogate it.52 51 Cf. Jay I, at 1033­1034 ("English common law might afford clues to the meaning of some terms in the Constitution, but the absence of any close federal model was recognized even at the Convention"); F. Coker, Commentary, in R. Pound, C. McIlwain, & R. Nichols, Federalism as a Democratic Process 81­82 (1942). 52 See, e. g., Prout v. Starr, 188 U. S. 537, 543 (1903) (acknowledging the immunity recognized in Hans and other cases, but observing that "[i]t would, indeed, be most unfortunate if the immunity of the individual States from suits by citizens of other States, provided for in the Eleventh Amendment, were to be interpreted as nullifying those other provisions which confer power on Congress . . . all of which provisions existed before the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, which still exist, and which would be nullified and made of no effect, if the judicial power of the United States could not be invoked to protect citizens affected by the passage of state laws disregarding these constitutional limitations"). The majority contends that state compliance with federal law may be enforced by other means, ante, at 71, n. 14, but its suggestions are all pretty cold comfort: the enforcement resources of the Federal Government itself are limited; appellate review of state court decisions is contingent upon state consent to suit in state court, and is also called into question by the majority's rationale, see supra, at 114; and the Court's decision today illustrates 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 158 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting Today's majority discounts this concern. Without citing a single source to the contrary, the Court dismisses the histori- cal evidence regarding the Framers' vision of the relation- ship between national and state sovereignty, and reassures us that "the Nation survived for nearly two centuries with- out the question of the existence of [the abrogation] power ever being presented to this Court." Ante, at 71.53 But we are concerned here not with the survival of the Nation but the opportunity of its citizens to enforce federal rights in a way that Congress provides. The absence of any general federal-question statute for nearly a century following rati- fication of Article III (with a brief exception in 1800) hardly counts against the importance of that jurisdiction either in the Framers' conception or in current reality; likewise, the fact that Congress has not often seen fit to use its power of abrogation (outside the Fourteenth Amendment context, at least) does not compel a conclusion that the power is not important to the federal scheme. In the end, is it plausible the uncertainty that the Court will always permit enforcement of federal law by suits for prospective relief against state officers. Moreover, the majority's position ignores the importance of citizen suits to enforcement of federal law. See, e. g., Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soci- ety, 421 U. S. 240, 263 (1975) (acknowledging that, in many instances, "Con- gress has opted to rely heavily on private enforcement to implement public policy"); see also S. Rep. No. 94­1011, p. 2 (Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U. S. C. § 1988) (recognizing that "[a]ll of these civil rights laws depend heavily upon private enforcement"); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U. S. 711, 737 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting importance of citizens' suits under fed- eral environmental laws). 53 The Court's further assertion, that "Congress itself waited nearly a century before even conferring federal-question jurisdiction on the lower federal courts," ante, at 71, is simply incorrect. As I have noted, numer- ous early statutes conferred federal-question jurisdiction on the federal courts operating under the original Judiciary Act in particular kinds of cases, and the Judiciary Act of 1800 provided for general federal-question jurisdiction in the brief period before its repeal in 1801. See n. 12, supra. 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 159 Souter, J., dissenting to contend that the plan of the convention was meant to leave the National Government without any way to render individ- uals capable of enforcing their federal rights directly against an intransigent State? C The considerations expressed so far, based on text, Chis- holm, caution in common-law reception, and sovereignty the- ory, have pointed both to the mistakes inherent in Hans and, even more strongly, to the error of today's holding. Al- though for reasons of stare decisis I would not today disturb the century-old precedent, I surely would not extend its error by placing the common-law immunity it mistakenly recognized beyond the power of Congress to abrogate. In doing just that, however, today's decision declaring state sovereign immunity itself immune from abrogation in federal-question cases is open to a further set of objections peculiar to itself. For today's decision stands condemned alike by the Framers' abhorrence of any notion that such common-law rules as might be received into the new legal systems would be beyond the legislative power to alter or repeal, and by its resonance with this Court's previous es- says in constitutionalizing common-law rules at the expense of legislative authority. 1 I have already pointed out how the views of the Framers reflected the caution of state constitutionalists and legisla- tors over reception of common-law rules, a caution that the Framers exalted to the point of vigorous resistance to any idea that English common-law rules might be imported wholesale through the new Constitution. The state politi- cians also took pains to guarantee that once a common-law rule had been received, it would always be subject to legisla- tive alteration, and again the state experience was reflected in the Framers' thought. Indeed, the Framers' very insist- 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 160 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting ence that no common-law doctrine would be received by vir- tue of ratification was focused in their fear that elements of the common law might thereby have been placed beyond the power of Congress to alter by legislation. The imperative of legislative control grew directly out of the Framers' revolutionary idea of popular sovereignty. Ac- cording to one historian, "[s]hared ideas about the sover- eignty of the people and the accountability of government to the people resulted at an early date in a new understanding of the role of legislation in the legal system. . . . Whereas a constitution had been seen in the colonial period as a body of vague and unidentifiable precedents and principles of com- mon law origin that imposed ambiguous restrictions on the power of men to make or change law, after independence it came to be seen as a written charter by which the people delegated powers to various institutions of government and imposed limitations on the exercise of those powers. . . . [T]he power to modify or even entirely to repeal the common law . . . now fell explicitly within the jurisdiction of the legis- lature." W. Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law 90 (1975).54 Virtually every state reception provision, be it constitu- tional or statutory, explicitly provided that the common law was subject to alteration by statute. See Wood 299­300; Jones 99. The New Jersey Constitution of 1776, for in- stance, provided that "the common law of England, as well as so much of the statute law, as have been heretofore prac- tised in this Colony, shall still remain in force, until they shall 54 Considering the example of Massachusetts, Professor Nelson observes that "the clearest illustration that legislation was coming to rest on the arbitrary power of a majoritarian legislature rather than on its conformity with past law and principle was the ease with which statutes altering common law rights were enacted and repealed in the 1780s in response to changing election results." Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law, at 91­92. 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 161 Souter, J., dissenting be altered by a future law . . . ." N. J. Const., Art. XXII (1776), in 6 W. Swindler, Sources and Documents of United States Constitutions 452 (1976).55 Just as the early state 55 See also Del. Const., Art. 25 (1776), in 2 Swindler, Sources and Docu- ments of United States Constitutions, at 203 ("The common law of Eng- land, as well as so much of the statute law as has been heretofore adopted in practice in this State, shall remain in force, unless they shall be altered by a future law of the legislature; such parts only excepted as are repug- nant to the rights and privileges contained in this constitution . . ."); Act of Feb. 25, 1784, in 1 First Laws of the State of Georgia 290 (1981) (declar- ing "the common laws of England" to be "in full force" "so far as they are not contrary to the constitution, laws and form of government now established in this State"); Mass. Const., Ch. VI, Art. VI (1780), in 5 Swin- dler, supra, at 108 ("All the laws which have heretofore been adopted, used, and approved in the province, colony, or State of Massachusetts Bay . . . shall still remain and be in full force, until altered or repealed by the legislature . . ."); Commonwealth v. Churchill, 2 Met. 118, 123­124 (Mass. 1840) (Shaw, C. J.) (construing "laws" in this provision to include common law); N. H. Const., Part II (1784), in 6 Swindler, supra, at 356 ("All the laws which have heretofore been adopted, used and approved, in the prov- ince, colony, or state of New-Hampshire . . . shall remain and be in full force, until altered and repealed by the legislature . . ."); N. C. Laws 1778, Ch. V, in 1 First Laws of the State of North Carolina 353 (1984) ("[A]ll . . . such Parts of the Common Law, as were heretofore in Force and Use within this Territory . . . as are not destructive of, repugnant to, or incon- sistent with the Freedom and Independence of this State, and the Form of Government therein established, and which have not been otherwise provided for, . . . not abrogated, repealed, expired, or become obsolete, are hereby declared to be in full Force within this State"); N. Y. Const., Art. XXXV (1777), in 7 Swindler, supra, at 177­178 ("[S]uch parts of the com- mon law of England . . . as together did form the law of the said colony [of New York] on [April 19, 1775], shall be and continue the law of this State, subject to such alterations and provisions as the legislature of this State shall, from time to time, make concerning the same"); R. I. Digest of 1766, quoted in 1 R. Powell & P. Rohan, Powell On Real Property ¶ 62, p. 212 (1995) (" `[I]n all actions, causes, matters and things whatsoever, where there is no particular law of this colony, or act of parliament . . . then and in such cases the laws of England shall be in force for the decision and determination of the same' "); 2 T. Cooper, Statutes at Large of South Carolina 413 (1837) (Act of Dec. 12, 1712, § V) (receiving "the Common Law of England, where the same is not . . . inconsistent with the particular 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 162 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting governments did not leave reception of the common law to implication, then, neither did they receive it as law immune to legislative alteration.56 constitutions, customs and laws of this Province"); S. C. Const., Art. VII (1790), in 8 Swindler, supra, at 480 ("All laws of force in this State at the passing of this constitution shall so continue, until altered or repealed by the legislature . . ."); W. Slade, Vermont State Papers 450 (1823) (Act of June 1782) (adopting "so much of the common law of England, as is not repugnant to the constitution or to any act of the legislature of this State"); Act of May 6, 1776, Ch. V, § VI, in First Laws of the State of Virginia 37 (1982) ("the common law of England . . . shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered as in full force, until the same shall be altered by the Legislative power of this colony"). Connecticut, which did not enact any reception statute or constitutional provision, adopted the common law by judicial decision insofar as it was appropriate for local conditions. See 1 Powell & Rohan, supra, ¶ 52, at 140­141, and n. 77; Hall, 4 Vand. L. Rev., at 800; Fitch v. Brainerd, 2 Day 163 (Conn. 1805). Maryland's position appears to have been articulated in an oath prescribed by the Assembly in 1728 for justices of the Provincial Court. The oath required that the justices act "according to the Laws, Customs, and Directions of the Acts of Assembly of this Province; and where they are silent, according to the Laws, Statutes, and reasonable Customs of England, as have been used and practiced in this Province . . . ." M. Andrews, History of Maryland 227 (1929). Finally, although Pennsylvania's reception statute did not state that the common law could be altered by legislative enactment in so many words, it may be read as assuming the primacy of legislative enactments, see 9 Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania 29­30 (Mitchell & Flanders eds. 1903) (Act of Jan. 28, 1777) (declaring prior Acts of the general assembly to still be in force, as well as "the common law and such of the statute laws of England as have heretofore been in force in the said province . . ."), and the state assembly seems to have believed it had the power to depart from common law even prior to independence. See Warren, History of the American Bar, at 103; cf. Kirk v. Dean, 2 Binn. 341, 345 (Pa. 1810) (interpreting the state consti- tution as permitting departures from common-law rules where local cir- cumstances required it). 56 It bears emphasis that, in providing for statutory alteration of the common law, the new States were in no way departing from traditional understandings. It is true that the colonial charters had generally ren- dered colonial legislation void to the extent that it conflicted with English common law, but this principle was simply indicative of the Colonies' legal 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 163 Souter, J., dissenting I have already indicated that the Framers did not forget the state-law examples. When Antifederalists objected that the 1787 draft failed to make an explicit adoption of certain common-law protections of the individual, part of the Feder- alists' answer was that a general constitutional reception of the common law would bar congressional revision. Madison was particularly concerned with the necessity for legislative control, noting in a letter to George Washington that "every State has made great inroads & with great propriety on this monarchical code." Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Oct. 18, 1787), reprinted in 3 Farrand 130, App. A (emphasis in original).57 Madison went on to insist that subjugation to the mother country and, in any event, seldom enforced in practice. See Stoebuck, 10 Wm. & Mary L. Rev., at 396­398, 419­420. The traditional conception of the common law as it developed in England had always been that it was freely alterable by statute. T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 336­337 (5th ed. 1956); see also T. Plucknett, Statutes and Their Interpretation in the First Half of the Four- teenth Century 26­31 (1922) (finding no historical support for the claim that common law was "fundamental" or otherwise superior to statutes). Coke appears to have attempted at one time to establish a paramount common law, see, e. g., Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 652 (C. P. 1610), but that attempt never took root in England. See Plucknett, Concise History of the Common Law, at 337; Jones 130; J. Gough, Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History 202 (1955) (observing that "[b]y the nineteenth century the overriding authority of statute-law had become the accepted principle in the courts"). And al- though Coke's dictum was to have a somewhat greater influence in America, that influence took the form of providing an early foundation for the idea that courts might invalidate legislation that they found inconsist- ent with a written constitution. See Jones 130­132; Gough, supra, at 206­ 207 (noting that Coke's view of fundamental law came to be transformed and subsumed in American practice by treatment of the written constitu- tion as fundamental law in the exercise of judicial review). As I demon- strate infra, the idea that legislation may be struck down based on princi- ples of common law or natural justice not located within the constitutional text has been squarely rejected in this country. See infra, at 165­168. 57 See also 3 Elliot's Debates 469­470 (Edmund Randolph, Virginia Con- vention) (arguing that constitutional incorporation of the common law would be "destructive to republican principles"). Indeed, one reason for 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 164 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting "[t]he Common law is nothing more than the unwritten law, and is left by all the Constitutions equally liable to legislative alterations." Ibid.58 Indeed, Madison anticipated, and re- jected, the Court's approach today when he wrote that if "the common law be admitted as . . . of constitutional obligation, it would confer on the judicial department a discretion little short of a legislative power . . . [which] would be permanent and irremediable by the Legislature." Alien and Sedition Laws 380. "A discretion of this sort," he insisted, "has al- ways been lamented as incongruous and dangerous . . . ." Id., at 381.59 Madison's suspicion of the common law was that it included "a thousand heterogeneous & antirepublican doctrines." Letter from Madison to Washington (Oct. 18, 1787), reprinted in 3 Farrand 130, App. A. "[I]t will merit the most profound consideration," Madison was later to warn in his Report on the Virginia Resolutions Concerning the Alien and Sedition Laws, "how far an indefinite admission of the common law . . . might draw after it the various prerogatives making part of the unwritten law of Eng- land." Alien and Sedition Laws 380. Such an admission, Madison feared, would mean that "the whole code, with all its incongruities, barbarisms, and bloody maxims, would be inviolably saddled on the good people of the United States." Ibid. See also Amar, 96 Yale L. J., at 1490 ("[The] sole basis [of absolute government immunity from all suits] is the British idea that the sovereign government, as the source of all law, cannot itself be bound by any law absent its consent. . . . [L]iterally every article of the Federalist Constitution and every amendment in the Bill of Rights rests on the repudiation of the British view" (footnote omitted)). 58 See Wood 304, n. 75 ("To Jefferson in 1785 judicial discretion in the administration of justice was still the great evil and codification the great remedy"); G. White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815­1835, p. 130 (1991) ("[A]n assumption of the constitutional design was that if Congress exercised [its enumerated] powers through legislation, its laws would supersede any competing ones"). 59 The Court attempts to sidestep this history by distinguishing sover- eign immunity as somehow different from other common-law principles. Ante, at 69. But see Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall., at 435 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (arguing that the common law of England should control the case "so far as it is applicable to the peculiar circumstances of the country, and where no special act of Legislation controuls it"). The Court cannot find solace in any distinction between "substantive rules of law" and "ju- 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 165 Souter, J., dissenting 2 History confirms the wisdom of Madison's abhorrence of constitutionalizing common-law rules to place them beyond the reach of congressional amendment. The Framers feared judicial power over substantive policy and the ossification of law that would result from transforming common law into constitutional law, and their fears have been borne out every time the Court has ignored Madison's counsel on subjects that we generally group under economic and social policy. It is, in fact, remarkable that as we near the end of this risdiction," ante, at 69, however; it is abundantly clear that we have drawn both sorts of principles from the common law. See, e. g., Burnham v. Su- perior Court of Cal., County of Marin, 495 U. S. 604, 609 (1990) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) (noting that American notion of personal jurisdiction is a "common-law principle" that predates the Fourteenth Amendment). Nothing in the history, moreover, suggests that common-law rules were more immutable when they were jurisdictional rather than substantive in nature. Nor is it true that "the principle of state sovereign immunity stands distinct from other principles of the common law in that only the former prompted a specific constitutional amendment." Ante, at 69. The Seventh Amendment, after all, was adopted to respond to Antifederalist concerns regarding the right to jury trial. See n. 34, supra. Indeed, that Amendment vividly illustrates the distinction between provisions in- tended to adopt the common law (the Amendment specifically mentions the "common law" and states that the common-law right "shall be pre- served") and those provisions, like the Eleventh Amendment, that may have been inspired by a common-law right but include no language of adoption or specific reference. Finally, the Court's recourse to a vague "jurisprudence in all civilized nations," ante, at 69, rather than the com- mon law of England is unavailing. When the Constitution has received such general principles into our law, for example, in the Admiralty Clause's adoption of the general "law of nations" or "law of the sea," those princi- ples have always been subject to change by congressional enactment. See, e. g., Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 386 (1924) (noting that although "the principles of the general maritime law, sometimes called the law of the sea," were "embodied" in Art. III, § 2, of the Constitution, they remained "subject to power in Congress to alter, qualify or supplement"); The Nereide, 9 Cranch 388, 423 (1815) (Marshall, C. J.) (stating that the Court would be "bound by the law of nations" until Congress passed a contrary enactment). 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT 166 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting century the Court should choose to open a new constitutional chapter in confining legislative judgments on these matters by resort to textually unwarranted common-law rules, for it was just this practice in the century's early decades that brought this Court to the nadir of competence that we iden- tify with Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905).60 It was the defining characteristic of the Lochner era, and its characteristic vice, that the Court treated the common- law background (in those days, common-law property rights and contractual autonomy) as paramount, while regarding congressional legislation to abrogate the common law on these economic matters as constitutionally suspect. See, e. g., Adkins v. Childrens Hospital of D. C., 261 U. S. 525, 557 (1923) (finding abrogation of common-law freedom to con- tract for any wage an unconstitutional "compulsory exac- tion"); see generally Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873 (1987). And yet the superseding lesson that seemed clear after West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937), that action within the legislative power is not subject to greater scrutiny merely because it trenches upon the case law's ordering of economic and social relationships, seems to have been lost on the Court. The majority today, indeed, seems to be going Lochner one better. When the Court has previously constrained the express Article I powers by resort to common-law or back- ground principles, it has done so at least in an ostensible effort to give content to some other written provision of the Constitution, like the Due Process Clause, the very object of 60 Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 606 (1995) (Souter, J., dis- senting) ("The fulcrums of judicial review in [the Lochner cases] were the notions of liberty and property characteristic of laissez-faire economics, whereas the Commerce Clause cases turned on what was ostensibly a structural limit of federal power, but under each conception of judicial review the Court's character for the first third of the century showed itself in exacting judicial scrutiny of a legislature's choice of economic ends and of the legislative means selected to reach them"). 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:05 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 167 Souter, J., dissenting which is to limit the exercise of governmental power. See, e. g., Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161 (1908). Some tex- tual argument, at least, could be made that the Court was doing no more than defining one provision that happened to be at odds with another. Today, however, the Court is not struggling to fulfill a responsibility to reconcile two arguably conflicting and Delphic constitutional provisions, nor is it struggling with any Delphic text at all. For even the Court concedes that the Constitution's grant to Congress of plenary power over relations with Indian tribes at the expense of any state claim to the contrary is unmistakably clear, and this case does not even arguably implicate a textual trump to the grant of federal-question jurisdiction. I know of only one other occasion on which the Court has spoken of extending its reach so far as to declare that the plain text of the Constitution is subordinate to judicially dis- coverable principles untethered to any written provision. Justice Chase once took such a position almost 200 years ago: "There are certain vital principles in our free Republi- can governments, which will determine and over-rule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power. . . . An act of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) con- trary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority." Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 388 (1798) (em- phasis deleted). This position was no less in conflict with American consti- tutionalism in 1798 than it is today, being inconsistent with the Framers' view of the Constitution as fundamental law. Justice Iredell understood this, and dissented (again) in an opinion that still answers the position that "vital" or "back- ground" principles, without more, may be used to confine a clear constitutional provision: "[S]ome speculative jurists have held, that a legislative act against natural justice must, in itself, be void; but I 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:06 PAGES OPINPGT 168 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting cannot think that, under such a government, any Court of Justice would possess a power to declare it so. . . . ". . . [I]t has been the policy of the American states, . . . and of the people of the United States . . . to define with precision the objects of the legislative power, and to restrain its exercise within marked and settled boundaries. If any act of Congress, or of the Legisla- ture of a state, violates those constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably void. . . . If, on the other hand, the Legislature of the Union, or the Legislature of any member of the Union, shall pass a law, within the gen- eral scope of their constitutional power, the Court can- not pronounce it to be void, merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice. The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and the purest men have differed upon the subject; and all that the Court could properly say, in such an event, would be, that the Legislature (possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed an act which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with the abstract principles of natural justice." Id., at 398­399 (emphasis deleted) (opinion dissenting in part). Later jurisprudence vindicated Justice Iredell's view, and the idea that "first principles" or concepts of "natural justice" might take precedence over the Constitution or other posi- tive law "all but disappeared in American discourse." J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 52 (1980). It should take more than references to "background principle[s]," ante, at 72, and "implicit limitation[s]," Welch, 483 U. S., at 496 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), to revive the judicial power to overcome clear text unopposed to any other provision, when that clear text is in harmony with an almost equally clear intent on the part of the Framers and the constitutionalists of their generation. 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:06 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 169 Souter, J., dissenting IV The Court's holding that the States' Hans immunity may not be abrogated by Congress leads to the final question in this case, whether federal-question jurisdiction exists to order prospective relief enforcing IGRA against a state offi- cer, respondent Chiles, who is said to be authorized to take the action required by the federal law. Just as with the issue about authority to order the State as such, this ques- tion is entirely jurisdictional, and we need not consider here whether petitioner Seminole Tribe would have a meritorious argument for relief, or how much practical relief the re- quested order (to bargain in good faith) would actually pro- vide to the Tribe. Nor, of course, does the issue turn in any way on one's views about the scope of the Eleventh Amend- ment or Hans and its doctrine, for we ask whether the state officer is subject to jurisdiction only on the assumption that action directly against the State is barred. The answer to this question is an easy yes, the officer is subject to suit under the rule in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), and the case could, and should, readily be decided on this point alone. A In Ex parte Young, this Court held that a federal court has jurisdiction in a suit against a state officer to enjoin offi- cial actions violating federal law, even though the State itself may be immune. Under Young, "a federal court, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, may enjoin state officials to conform their future conduct to the requirements of federal law." Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332, 337 (1979); see also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 289 (1977). The fact, without more, that such suits may have a signifi- cant impact on state governments does not count under Young. Milliken, for example, was a suit, under the author- ity of Young, brought against Michigan's Governor, Attorney General, Board of Education, Superintendent of Public In- 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:06 PAGES OPINPGT 170 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting struction, and Treasurer, which resulted in an order obligat- ing the State of Michigan to pay money from its treasury to fund an education plan. The relief requested (and obtained) by the plaintiffs effectively ran against the State: state mon- eys were to be removed from the state treasury, and they were to be spent to fund a remedial education program that it would be the State's obligation to implement. To take another example, Quern v. Jordan involved a court order requiring state officials to notify welfare beneficiaries of the availability of past benefits. Once again, the defendants were state officials, but it was the obligation of the State that was really at issue: the notices would be sent from the state welfare agency, to be returned to the state agency, and the state agency would pay for the notices and any ensuing awards of benefits. Indeed, in the years since Young was decided, the Court has recognized only one limitation on the scope of its doctrine: under Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974), Young permits prospective relief only and may not be applied to authorize suits for retrospective monetary relief. It should be no cause for surprise that Young itself ap- peared when it did in the national law. It followed as a mat- ter of course after the Hans Court's broad recognition of immunity in federal-question cases, simply because "[r]eme- dies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law." Green v. Mansour, 474 U. S. 64, 68 (1985). Young provided, as it does today, a sensible way to reconcile the Court's expansive view of immunity expressed in Hans with the principles embodied in the Supremacy Clause and Article III. If Young may be seen as merely the natural consequence of Hans, it is equally unsurprising as an event in the longer history of sovereign immunity doctrine, for the rule we speak of under the name of Young is so far inherent in the jurisdictional limitation imposed by sovereign immunity as to have been recognized since the Middle Ages. For that 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:06 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 171 Souter, J., dissenting long it has been settled doctrine that suit against an officer of the Crown permitted relief against the government de- spite the Crown's immunity from suit in its own courts and the maxim that the King could do no wrong. See Jaffe, 77 Harv. L. Rev., at 3, 18­19; Ehrlich, No. XII: Proceedings Against the Crown (1216­1377), pp. 28­29, in 6 Oxford Stud- ies in Social and Legal History (P. Vinogradoff ed. 1921). An early example, from "time immemorial" of a claim "af- fecting the Crown [that] could be pursued in the regular courts [without consent since it] did not take the form of a suit against the Crown," Jaffe, supra, at 1, was recognized by the Statute of Westminster I, 1275, which established a writ of disseisin against a King's officers. When a King's officer disseised any person in the King's name, the wrong- fully deprived party could seek the draconian writ of attaint against the officer, by which he would recover his land. Jaffe, 77 Harv. L. Rev., at 9. Following this example for- ward, we may see how the writ of attaint was ultimately overtaken by the more moderate common-law writs of cer- tiorari and mandamus, "operat[ing] directly on the govern- ment; [and commanding] an officer not as an individual but as a functionary." Id., at 16. Thus the Court of King's Bench made it clear in 1701 that "wherever any new jurisdic- tion is erected, be it by private or public Act of Parliament, they are subject to the inspections of this Court by writ of error, or by certiorari and mandamus." The Case of Cardiffe Bridge, 1 Salk. 146, 91 Eng. Rep. 135 (K. B.). B This history teaches that it was only a matter of course that once the National Constitution had provided the oppor- tunity for some recognition of state sovereign immunity, the necessity revealed through six centuries or more of history would show up in suits against state officers, just as Hans would later open the door to Ex parte Young itself. Once, then, the Eleventh Amendment was understood to forbid suit 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:06 PAGES OPINPGT 172 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting against a State eo nomine, the question arose "which suits against officers will be allowed and which will not be." Jaffe, 77 Harv. L. Rev., at 20. "It early became clear that a suit against an officer was not forbidden simply because it raised a question as to the legality of his action as an agent of government or because it required him, as in mandamus, to perform an official duty. These as we know had been well estab- lished before the eleventh amendment as not necessarily requiring consent. To be sure the renewed emphasis on immunity given by the eleventh amendment might conceivably have been taken so to extend the doctrine as to exclude suits against state officers even in cases where the English tradition would have allowed them. There was a running battle as to where the line would be drawn. The amendment was appealed to as an argu- ment for generous immunity. But there was the vastly powerful counterpressure for the enforcement of consti- tutional limits on the states. The upshot . . . was to confine the amendment's prohibition more or less to the occasion which gave it birth, to wit, the enforcement of contracts and to most (though not all) suits involving the title and disposition of a state's real and personal property." Id., at 20­21. The earliest cases, United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch 115 (1809), and Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (1824), embrace the English practice of permitting suits against officers, see Orth, Judicial Power of the United States, at 34­35, 40­41, 122, by focusing almost exclusively on whether the State had been named as a defendant. Gov- ernor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 1 Pet. 110, 123­124 (1828), shifted this analysis somewhat, finding that a Governor could not be sued because he was sued "not by his name, but by his title," which was thought the functional equivalent of suing the State itself. Madrazo did not, however, erase the 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:06 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 173 Souter, J., dissenting fundamental principle of Osborn that sovereign immunity would not bar a suit against a state officer. See, e. g., Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203 (1873) (applying Osborn by enjoining the Governor of Texas to interfere with the possession of land granted by the State); United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196 (1882) (applying Osborn in context of federal sovereign immunity). This simple rule for recognizing sovereign immunity with- out gutting substantial rights was temporarily muddled in Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711 (1883), where the Court, although it "did not clearly say why," refused to hear a suit that would have required a state treasurer to levy taxes to pay interest on a bond. Currie, Sovereign Immunity and Suits Against Government Officers, 1984 S. Ct. Rev. 149, 152. (One recalls the circumstances of Hans itself, see supra, at 117­121.) The Court, however, again applied Osborn in the Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 269 (1885) (permitting in- junctions, restitution, and damages against state officers who seized property to collect taxes already paid with interest coupons the State had agreed to accept). In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 502 (1887), sought to rationalize the competing strands of doctrine on the ground that an action may be "sus- tained only in those instances where the act complained of, considered apart from the official authority alleged as its jus- tification, and as the personal act of the individual defendant, constituted a violation of right for which the plaintiff was entitled to a remedy at law or in equity against the wrong- doer in his individual character." Ex parte Young restored the old simplicity by comple- menting In re Ayers with the principle that state officers never have authority to violate the Constitution or federal law, so that any illegal action is stripped of state character and rendered an illegal individual act. Suits against these officials are consequently barred by neither the Eleventh Amendment nor Hans immunity. The officer's action "is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state official in at- 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:06 PAGES OPINPGT 174 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting tempting by the use of the name of the State to en- force a legislative enactment which is void because un- constitutional. . . . The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme author- ity of the United States." Ex parte Young, 209 U. S., at 159­160. The decision in Ex parte Young, and the historic doctrine it embodies, thus plays a foundational role in American con- stitutionalism, and while the doctrine is sometimes called a "fiction," the long history of its felt necessity shows it to be something much more estimable, as we may see by consider- ing the facts of the case. "Young was really and truly about to damage the interest of plaintiffs. Whether what he was about to do amounted to a legal injury depended on the authority of his employer, the state. If the state could con- stitutionally authorize the act then the loss suffered by plaintiffs was not a wrong for which the law provided a remedy. . . . If the state could not constitutionally authorize the act then Young was not acting by its authority." Orth, Judicial Power of the United States, at 133. The doctrine we call Ex parte Young is nothing short of "indispensable to the establishment of constitutional government and the rule of law." C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts 292 (4th ed. 1983). See also Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, at 393. A rule of such lineage, engendered by such necessity, should not be easily displaced, if indeed it is displaceable at all, for it marks the frontier of the enforceability of federal law against sometimes competing state policies. We have in fact never before inferred a congressional intent to eliminate this time-honored practice of enforcing federal law. That, of course, does not mean that the intent may never be inferred, and where, as here, the underlying right is one of statutory rather than constitutional dimension, I do not in theory re- ject the Court's assumption that Congress may bar enforce- ment by suit even against a state official. But because in practice, in the real world of congressional legislation, such 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:06 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 175 Souter, J., dissenting an intent would be exceedingly odd, it would be equally odd for this Court to recognize an intent to block the customary application of Ex parte Young without applying the rule rec- ognized in our previous cases, which have insisted on a clear statement before assuming a congressional purpose to "af- fec[t] the federal balance," United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 349 (1971). See also Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 65 (1989) ("[I]f Congress intends to alter the `usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,' it must make its intention to do so `unmistakably clear in the language of the statute' ") (quoting Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S., at 242); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 460­461 (1991). Our ha- bitual caution makes sense for just the reason we mentioned in Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U. S., at 230­231: it is "difficult to believe that . . . Congress, taking careful stock of the state of Eleventh Amendment law, decided it would drop coy hints but stop short of making its intention manifest." C There is no question that by its own terms Young's indis- pensable rule authorizes the exercise of federal jurisdiction over respondent Chiles. Since this case does not, of course, involve retrospective relief, Edelman's limit is irrelevant, and there is no other jurisdictional limitation. Obviously, for jurisdictional purposes it makes no difference in principle whether the injunction orders an official not to act, as in Young, or requires the official to take some positive step, as in Milliken or Quern. Nothing, then, in this case renders Young unsuitable as a jurisdictional basis for determining on the merits whether petitioner is entitled to an order against a state official under general equitable doctrine. The Court does not say otherwise, and yet it refuses to apply Young. There is no adequate reason for its refusal. No clear statement of intent to displace the doctrine of Ex parte Young occurs in IGRA, and the Court is instead 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:06 PAGES OPINPGT 176 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting constrained to rest its effort to skirt Young on a series of suggestions thought to be apparent in Congress's provision of "intricate procedures" for enforcing a State's obligation under the Act. The procedures are said to implicate a rule against judicial creativity in devising supplementary proce- dures; it is said that applying Young would nullify the statu- tory procedures; and finally the statutory provisions are said simply to reveal a congressional intent to preclude the appli- cation of Young. 1 The Court cites Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U. S. 412, 423 (1988), in support of refraining from what it seems to think would be judicial creativity in recognizing the applicability of Young. The Court quotes from Chilicky for the general proposition that when Congress has provided what it consid- ers adequate remedial mechanisms for violations of federal law, this Court should not "creat[e]" additional remedies. Ante, at 74. The Court reasons that Congress's provision in IGRA of "intricate procedures" shows that it considers its remedial provisions to be adequate, with the implication that courts as a matter of prudence should provide no "addi- tional" remedy under Ex parte Young. Ante, at 73­76. Chilicky's remoteness from the point of this case is, how- ever, apparent from its facts. In Chilicky, Congress had ad- dressed the problem of erroneous denials of certain govern- ment benefits by creating a scheme of appeals and awards that would make a successful claimant whole for all benefits wrongly denied. The question was whether this Court should create a further remedy on the model of Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), for such harms as emotional distress, when the erroneous denial of benefits had involved a violation of procedural due process. The issue, then, was whether to create a supplemental rem- edy, backward looking on the Bivens model, running against a federal official in his personal capacity, and requiring an 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:06 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 177 Souter, J., dissenting affirmative justification (as Bivens does). See Bivens, supra; FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U. S. 471, 484­486 (1994). The Bivens issue in Chilicky (and in Meyer) is different from the Young issue here in every significant respect. Young is not an example of a novel rule that a proponent has a burden to justify affirmatively on policy grounds in every context in which it might arguably be recognized; it is a gen- eral principle of federal equity jurisdiction that has been rec- ognized throughout our history and for centuries before our own history began. Young does not provide retrospective monetary relief but allows prospective enforcement of fed- eral law that is entitled to prevail under the Supremacy Clause. It requires not money payments from a govern- ment employee's personal pocket, but lawful conduct by a public employee acting in his official capacity. Young would not function here to provide a merely supplementary regime of compensation to deter illegal action, but the sole jurisdic- tional basis for an Article III court's enforcement of a clear federal statutory obligation, without which a congressional act would be rendered a nullity in a federal court. One can- not intelligibly generalize from Chilicky's standards for im- posing the burden to justify a supplementary scheme of tort law to the displacement of Young's traditional and indispen- sable jurisdictional basis for ensuring official compliance with federal law when a State itself is immune from suit. 2 Next, the Court suggests that it may be justified in dis- placing Young because Young would allow litigants to ignore the "intricate procedures" of IGRA in favor of a menu of streamlined equity rules from which any litigant could order as he saw fit. But there is no basis in law for this sugges- tion, and the strongest authority to reject it. Young did not establish a new cause of action and it does not impose any particular procedural regime in the suits it permits. It stands, instead, for a jurisdictional rule by which paramount 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:06 PAGES OPINPGT 178 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting federal law may be enforced in a federal court by substitut- ing a nonimmune party (the state officer) for an immune one (the State itself). Young does no more and furnishes no authority for the Court's assumption that it somehow pre-empts procedural rules devised by Congress for particu- lar kinds of cases that may depend on Young for federal jurisdiction.61 If, indeed, the Court were correct in assuming that Con- gress may not regulate the procedure of a suit jurisdiction- ally dependent on Young, the consequences would be revolu- tionary, for example, in habeas law. It is well established that when a habeas corpus petitioner sues a state official al- leging detention in violation of federal law and seeking the prospective remedy of release from custody, it is the doctrine identified in Ex parte Young that allows the petitioner to evade the jurisdictional bar of the Eleventh Amendment (or, more properly, the Hans doctrine). See Young, 209 U. S., at 167­168; Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 689­690 (1949).62 And yet Congress has im- 61 The Court accuses me of misrepresenting its argument. Ante, at 75, n. 17. The Court's claim, as I read it, is not that Congress cannot author- ize federal jurisdiction under Ex parte Young over a cause of action with a limited remedial scheme, but rather that remedial limitations on the underlying cause of action do not apply to a claim based on Ex parte Young. Otherwise, the existence of those remedial limitations would pro- vide no reason for the Court to assume that Congress did not intend to permit an action under Young; rather, the limitations would apply regard- less of whether the suit was brought against the State or a state officer. 62 See also Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F. 2d 1248, 1252, n. 6 (CA5 1988) ("[A]lthough not usually conceptualized as Ex parte Young cases, most of the huge number of habeas claims in the federal courts under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 are effectively suits against the states. These suits pass muster under the Eleventh Amendment because the habeas theory of a civil suit against the bad jailer fits perfectly with the Ex parte Young fiction"); United States ex rel. Elliott v. Hendricks, 213 F. 2d 922, 926­928 (CA3) (exercising jurisdiction over a habeas suit despite an Eleventh Amend- ment challenge on the theory that the suit was against a state officer), cert. denied, 348 U. S. 851 (1954). 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:06 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 179 Souter, J., dissenting posed a number of restrictions upon the habeas remedy, see, e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 2254(b) (requiring exhaustion of state reme- dies prior to bringing a federal habeas petition), and this Court has articulated several more, see, e. g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467 (1991) (abuse of the writ); Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989) (limiting applicability of "new rules" on habeas); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619 (1993) (apply- ing a more deferential harmless-error standard on habeas review). By suggesting that Ex parte Young provides a free-standing remedy not subject to the restrictions other- wise imposed on federal remedial schemes (such as habeas corpus), the Court suggests that a state prisoner may cir- cumvent these restrictions by ostensibly bringing his suit under Young rather than 28 U. S. C. § 2254. The Court's view implies similar consequences under any number of similarly structured federal statutory schemes.63 This, of course, cannot be the law, and the plausible ra- tionale for rejecting the Court's contrary assumption is that Congress has just as much authority to regulate suits when jurisdiction depends on Young as it has to regulate when Young is out of the jurisdictional picture. If Young does not preclude Congress from requiring state exhaustion in habeas cases (and it clearly does not), then Young does not bar the application of IGRA's procedures when effective relief is sought by suing a state officer. 3 The Court's third strand of reasoning for displacing Ex parte Young is a supposed inference that Congress so in- 63 Many other federal statutes impose obligations on state officials, the enforcement of which is subject to "intricate provisions" also statutorily provided. See, e. g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1365(a) (citizen-suit provision to enforce States' obligations under federal environmental law); Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act, 42 U. S. C. § 11001 (privately enforceable requirement that States form commissions, appointed by the Governor, to generate plans for addressing hazardous material emergencies). 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:06 PAGES OPINPGT 180 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting tended. Since the Court rests this inference in large part on its erroneous assumption that the statute's procedural limitations would not be applied in a suit against an officer for which Young provided the jurisdictional basis, the error of that assumption is enough to show the unsoundness of any inference that Congress meant to exclude Young's applica- tion. But there are further reasons pointing to the utter implausibility of the Court's reading of the congressional mind. IGRA's jurisdictional provision reads as though it had been drafted with the specific intent to apply to officer liabil- ity under Young. It provides that "[t]he United States dis- trict courts shall have jurisdiction over . . . any cause of action . . . arising from the failure of a State to enter into negotiations . . . or to conduct such negotiations in good faith." 25 U. S. C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) (emphasis added). This language does not limit the possible defendants to States and is quite literally consistent with the possibility that a tribe could sue an appropriate state official for a State's failure to negotiate.64 The door is so obviously just as open to juris- diction over an officer under Young as to jurisdiction over a State directly that it is difficult to see why the statute would have been drafted as it was unless it was done in anticipation that Young might well be the jurisdictional basis for enforce- ment action. But even if the jurisdictional provision had spoken nar- rowly of an action against the State itself (as it subsequently speaks in terms of the State's obligation), that would be no indication that Congress had rejected the application of Young. An order requiring a "State" to comply with federal 64 In order for any person (whether individual or entity) to be a proper defendant under § 2710(d)(7) (and in order for standing to exist, since one of its requirements is redressability), that person, of course, would need to have some connection to the State's negotiations. See Young, 209 U. S., at 157; Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U. S. 788, 803 (1992). The obvious candidates are the responsible state officials. 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:06 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 181 Souter, J., dissenting law can, of course, take the form of an order directed to the State in its sovereign capacity. But as Ex parte Young and innumerable other cases show, there is nothing incongruous about a duty imposed on a "State" that Congress intended to be effectuated by an order directed to an appropriate state official. The habeas corpus statute, again, comes to mind. It has long required "the State," by "order directed to an appropriate State official," to produce the state-court record where an indigent habeas petitioner argues that a state court's factual findings are not fairly supported in the record. See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(e) ("the State shall produce such part of the record and the Federal court shall direct the State to do so by order directed to an appropriate State official"). If, then, IGRA's references to "a State's" duty were not enforce- able by order to a state official, it would have to be for some other reason than the placement of the statutory duty on "the State." It may be that even the Court agrees, for it falls back to the position, see ante, at 75, n. 17, that only a State, not a state officer, can enter into a compact. This is true but wholly beside the point. The issue is whether negotiation should take place as required by IGRA and an officer (in- deed, only an officer) can negotiate. In fact, the only case cited by the Court, State ex rel. Stephan v. Finney, 251 Kan. 559, 836 P. 2d 1169 (1992), makes that distinction abun- dantly clear. Finally, one must judge the Court's purported inference by stepping back to ask why Congress could possibly have intended to jeopardize the enforcement of the statute by ex- cluding application of Young's traditional jurisdictional rule, when that rule would make the difference between success or failure in the federal court if state sovereign immunity was recognized. Why would Congress have wanted to go for broke on the issue of state immunity in the event the State pleaded immunity as a jurisdictional bar? Why would Congress not have wanted IGRA to be enforced by means of 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:06 PAGES OPINPGT 182 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting a traditional doctrine giving federal courts jurisdiction over state officers, in an effort to harmonize state sovereign im- munity with federal law that is paramount under the Su- premacy Clause? There are no plausible answers to these questions. D There is, finally, a response to the Court's rejection of Young that ought to go without saying. Our longstanding practice is to read ambiguous statutes to avoid constitutional infirmity, Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988) (" `every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality' ") (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 657 (1895)). This prac- tice alone (without any need for a clear statement to displace Young) would be enough to require Young's application. So, too, would the application of another rule, requiring courts to choose any reasonable construction of a statute that would eliminate the need to confront a contested constitutional issue (in this case, the place of state sovereign immunity in federal-question cases and the status of Union Gas). NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490, 500­501 (1979). Construing the statute to harmonize with Young, as it readily does, would have saved an Act of Congress and ren- dered a discussion on constitutional grounds wholly unneces- sary. This case should be decided on this basis alone. V Absent the application of Ex parte Young, I would, of course, follow Union Gas in recognizing congressional power under Article I to abrogate Hans immunity. Since the rea- sons for this position, as explained in Parts II­III, supra, tend to unsettle Hans as well as support Union Gas, I should add a word about my reasons for continuing to accept Hans's holding as a matter of stare decisis. 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:06 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 183 Souter, J., dissenting The Hans doctrine was erroneous, but it has not pre- viously proven to be unworkable or to conflict with later doc- trine or to suffer from the effects of facts developed since its decision (apart from those indicating its original errors). I would therefore treat Hans as it has always been treated in fact until today, as a doctrine of federal common law. For, as so understood, it has formed one of the strands of the federal relationship for over a century now, and the stability of that relationship is itself a value that stare decisis aims to respect. In being ready to hold that the relationship may still be altered, not by the Court but by Congress, I would tread the course laid out elsewhere in our cases. The Court has repeatedly stated its assumption that insofar as the relative positions of States and Nation may be affected consistently with the Tenth Amendment,65 they would not be modified without deliberately expressed intent. See Gregory v. Ash- croft, 501 U. S., at 460­461. The plain-statement rule, which "assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judi- cial decision," United States v. Bass, 404 U. S., at 349, is par- ticularly appropriate in light of our primary reliance on "[t]he effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving the States' interests," Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, 552 (1985).66 Hence, we 65 The scope of the Tenth Amendment's limitations of congressional power remains a subject of debate. New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144 (1992), holds that principles of federalism are "violated by a formal command from the National Government directing the State to enact a certain policy." United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S., at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Some suggest that the prohibition extends further than bar- ring the Federal Government from directing the creation of state law. The views I express today should not be understood to take a position on that disputed question. 66 See also The Federalist No. 46, at 319 (J. Madison) (explaining that the Federal Government "will partake sufficiently of the spirit [of the States], to be disinclined to invade the rights of the individual States, or the pre- 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:06 PAGES OPINPGT 184 SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLA. v. FLORIDA Souter, J., dissenting have required such a plain statement when Congress pre- empts the historic powers of the States, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947), imposes a condition on the grant of federal moneys, South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U. S. 203, 207 (1987), or seeks to regulate a State's ability to determine the qualifications of its own officials, Gregory, supra, at 464. When judging legislation passed under unmistakable Arti- cle I powers, no further restriction could be required. Nor does the Court explain why more could be demanded. In the past, we have assumed that a plain-statement require- ment is sufficient to protect the States from undue federal encroachments upon their traditional immunity from suit. See, e. g., Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways & Public Transp., 483 U. S., at 475; Atascadero State Hospital v. Scan- lon, 473 U. S., at 239­240. It is hard to contend that this rule has set the bar too low, for (except in Union Gas) we have never found the requirement to be met outside the con- text of laws passed under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The exception I would recognize today proves the rule, moreover, because the federal abrogation of state immunity comes as part of a regulatory scheme which is itself designed to invest the States with regulatory powers that Congress need not extend to them. This fact suggests to me that the political safeguards of federalism are working, that a plain- statement rule is an adequate check on congressional over- reaching, and that today's abandonment of that approach is wholly unwarranted. There is an even more fundamental "clear statement" prin- ciple, however, that the Court abandons today. John Mar- shall recognized it over a century and a half ago in the very context of state sovereign immunity in federal-question cases: rogatives of their governments"); Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954). 517us1$37M 02-23-99 16:36:06 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996) 185 Souter, J., dissenting "The jurisdiction of the court, then, being extended by the letter of the constitution to all cases arising under it, or under the laws of the United States, it follows that those who would withdraw any case of this description from that jurisdiction, must sustain the exemption they claim on the spirit and true meaning of the constitution, which spirit and true meaning must be so apparent as to overrule the words which its framers have employed." Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat., at 379­380. Because neither text, precedent, nor history supports the majority's abdication of our responsibility to exercise the jurisdiction entrusted to us in Article III, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 517us1$38z 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT 186 OCTOBER TERM, 1995 Syllabus MORSE et al. v. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VIRGINIA et al. appeal from the united states district court for the western district of virginia No. 94­203. Argued October 2, 1995-Decided March 27, 1996 Appellee Republican Party of Virginia (Party) invited all registered Vir- ginia voters willing to declare their support for the Party's nominees at the 1994 general election to become delegates to a convention to nomi- nate the Party's candidate for United States Senator upon payment of a registration fee. Appellants Bartholomew and Enderson desired, and were qualified, to become delegates, but were rejected because they refused to pay the fee; appellant Morse paid the fee with funds advanced by supporters of the eventual nominee. Alleging, inter alia, that the imposition of the fee violated §§ 5 and 10 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, appellants filed a complaint seeking an injunction preventing the Party from imposing the fee and ordering it to return the fee paid by Morse. The three-judge District Court convened to consider the § 5 and § 10 claims granted the Party's motion to dismiss, concluding that the "general rule" that § 5 covers political parties to the extent that they are empowered to conduct primary elections is inapplicable to the selection of nominating convention delegates under a regulation promul- gated by the Attorney General of the United States and under this Court's summary decision in Williams v. Democratic Party of Georgia, 409 U. S. 809; and that only the Attorney General has authority to en- force § 10. Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded. 853 F. Supp. 212, reversed and remanded. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concluded: 1. The Party's decision to exact the registration fee was subject to § 5, which, among other things, prohibits Virginia and other cov- ered jurisdictions from enacting or enforcing "any voting qualification or prerequisite . . . different from that in force . . . on" a specified date unless the change has been precleared by the Attorney General. Pp. 193­229. (a) The District Court erred in its application of the Attorney Gen- eral's regulation, which unambiguously requires § 5 preclearance when a political party makes a change affecting voting if, inter alia, the party is "acting under authority explicitly or implicitly granted by a covered jurisdiction." Because Virginia law provides that the nominees of the 517us1$38z 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 186 (1996) 187 Syllabus two major political parties shall automatically appear on the general election ballot, without the need to declare their candidacy or to demon- strate their support with a nominating petition, and authorizes the two parties to determine for themselves how they will select their nominees, whether by primary, nominating convention, or some other method, the Party "act[ed] under authority" of Virginia when it picked its candidate at the convention and certified the nominee for automatic placement on the general election ballot. Cf. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 653, n. 6, 660, 663. Because the conclusion that the Party's activities fall directly within the regulation's scope is not contradicted, but is in fact supported, by this Court's narrow holding in Williams, supra, the Dis- trict Court also erred when it based its dismissal of appellants' com- plaint on that case. Pp. 194­203. (b) The Act's language and structure compel the conclusion that § 5 of its own force covers changes such as the Party's filing fee when the electoral practice at issue is a nominating convention. This Court has consistently construed the Act to require preclearance of any change bearing on the "effectiveness" of a vote cast in a primary, special, or general election, including changes in the composition of the electorate that votes for a particular office. See, e. g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elec- tions, 393 U. S. 544, 570. By limiting the opportunity for voters to par- ticipate in the convention, the Party's filing fee undercuts their influence on the field of candidates whose names will appear on the ballot, and thus weakens the "effectiveness" of their votes cast in the general elec- tion itself. That § 5 covers nonprimary nomination methods is also sup- ported by Whitley v. Williams, decided with Allen, supra; by the text and legislative history of § 14, which defines the terms "vote" or "vot- ing" to include "all action necessary to make a vote effective in any . . . election," including the selection of persons for "party office"; and by the text of § 2, which bans any racially discriminatory voting qualification or prerequisite if "the political processes leading to nomination or elec- tion . . . are not equally open to . . . [protected group] members." (Em- phasis added.) Pp. 203­210. (c) Consideration of the historical background which informed the 89th Congress when it passed the Act-particularly Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461, and the other "White Primary Cases," in which the Court applied the Fifteenth Amendment to strike down a succession of meas- ures by Texas authorities to exclude minority voters from their nomina- tion processes-confirms the conclusion that § 5 applies here. None of the reasons offered to support appellees' contention that the White Pri- mary Cases have no bearing on the Act's proper interpretation-(1) that the Party's convention did not operate in a racially discriminatory man- ner; (2) that, although the Act was meant to enforce the Fifteenth 517us1$38z 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT 188 MORSE v. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VA. Syllabus Amendment, the 89th Congress did not intend to legislate to that Amendment's "outer limit"; and (3) that present-day Virginia is not a one-party Commonwealth, unlike post-Reconstruction Texas-is per- suasive. Pp. 210­219. (d) None of the dissents' arguments for rejecting the foregoing con- struction of § 5-that a political party is not a "State or political subdivi- sion" within § 5's literal meaning because it is not a governmental unit; that the Court should not defer to the Attorney General's regulation when construing § 5's coverage; that a major political party is not a "state actor" under the Court's decisions unless its nominees are virtu- ally certain to win the general election; and that the construction amounts to adoption of a "blanket rule" that all political parties must preclear all of their internal procedures-is convincing. Pp. 220­226. (e) Appellees' practical objections to the foregoing construction of § 5-(1) that it will create an administrative nightmare for political par- ties and the Justice Department, and (2) that it threatens to abridge First Amendment associational rights-are rejected. Pp. 227­229. 2. Section 10 of the Act-which does not expressly mention private actions when it authorizes the Attorney General to file suit against ra- cially motivated poll taxes-does not preclude appellants from challeng- ing the Party's registration fee as a prohibited poll tax. Evaluation of congressional action must take into account its contemporary legal con- text. See, e. g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 698­ 699. Because the Act was passed against a "backdrop" of decisions in which implied causes of action were regularly found, see id., at 698, and nn. 22­23, private parties may sue to enforce § 10, just as they may enforce § 5, see Allen, supra, at 556, 557, n. 23, or § 2, see, e. g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U. S. 380. Appellees' argument to the contrary was re- jected in Allen, supra, at 556, n. 20, and is also refuted by §§ 3 and 14(e) of the Act, both of which recognize the existence of a private § 10 right of action. Appellees' argument that a delegate registration fee is not a poll tax addresses the merits and should be considered by the District Court in the first instance. Pp. 230­235. Justice Breyer, joined by Justice O'Connor and Justice Sou- ter, concluded: 1. In light of the legislative history demonstrating that, in 1965, Con- gress was well aware of the White Primary Cases, the failure of case- by-case enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment, and Mississippi's then-recent efforts to use an "all-white" convention process to help nom- inate a Democratic candidate for President, and that the Act's "party office" provision was adopted to cover the latter type of situation, the Act cannot be interpreted to contain a loophole excluding all political party activity, but must be read to apply to certain convention-based 517us1$38z 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 186 (1996) 189 Syllabus practices and procedures with respect to voting. That is as far as the Court need go to answer the statutory question presented by this case. Indeed, it is as far as the Court should go, given the difficult First Amendment questions about the extent to which the Federal Govern- ment, through preclearance procedures, can regulate the workings of a political party convention, and about the limits imposed by the state- action doctrine. Such questions are properly left for a case that squarely presents them. The fee imposed here, however, is within the scope of § 5, and well outside the area of greatest associational con- cern. Pp. 235­240. 2. Congress intended to establish a private right of action to enforce § 10, no less than it did to enforce §§ 2 and 5. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 556­557. Justice Breyer expressed no view as to the merits of the underlying § 10 claim. P. 240. Stevens, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined. Breyer, J., filed an opinion con- curring in the judgment, in which O'Connor and Souter, JJ., joined, post, p. 235. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 241. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., joined, post, p. 247. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, J., joined, and in which Kennedy, J., joined as to Part II, post, p. 253. Pamela S. Karlan argued the cause for appellants. With her on the briefs were George A. Rutherglen, Eben Moglen, and Daniel R. Ortiz. Deputy Solicitor General Bender argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attor- ney General Patrick, Richard H. Seamon, and Steven H. Rosenbaum. E. Duncan Getchell, Jr., argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were J. Robert Brame III, Patrick M. McSweeney, Donald W. Lemons, and Robert L. Hodges.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law et al. by Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Michael A. Cooper, Herbert J. Hansell, Norman Redlich, Barbara R. Arn- wine, Thomas J. Henderson, Brenda Wright, and Laughlin McDonald; 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT 190 MORSE v. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VA. Opinion of Stevens, J. Justice Stevens announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Justice Ginsburg joins. In 1994, all registered voters in Virginia who were willing to declare their intent to support the Republican Party's nominees for public office at the next election could partici- pate in the nomination of the Party's candidate for the office of United States Senator if they paid either a $35 or $45 registration fee. Appellants contend that the imposition of that fee as a condition precedent to participation in the can- didate selection process was a poll tax prohibited by the Vot- ing Rights Act of 1965. The questions we must decide are whether § 5 of the Act required preclearance of the Party's decision to exact the fee and whether appellants were per- mitted to challenge it as a poll tax prohibited by § 10. I On December 16, 1993, the Republican Party of Virginia (Party) issued a call for a state convention to be held on June 3, 1994, to nominate the Republican candidate for United States Senator. The call invited all registered voters in Virginia to participate in local mass meetings, canvasses, or conventions to be conducted by officials of the Party. Any voter could be certified as a delegate to the state convention by a local political committee upon payment of a registration fee of $35 or $45 depending on the date of certification. Over 14,000 voters paid the fee and took part in the convention. In response to the call, appellants Bartholomew, Enderson, and Morse sought to become delegates to the convention. and for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People by Ronald D. Maines, Dennis Courtland Hayes, and Willie Abrams. James S. Gilmore III, Attorney General, David E. Anderson, Chief Deputy Attorney General, John Paul Woodley, Jr., and William H. Hurd, Deputy Attorneys General, and Maureen Riley Matsen, Assistant Attor- ney General, filed a brief for the Commonwealth of Virginia as amicus curiae urging affirmance. 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 186 (1996) 191 Opinion of Stevens, J. As a registered voter in Virginia willing to declare his or her intent to support the Party's nominee, each was eligible to participate upon payment of the registration fee. Bar- tholomew and Enderson refused to pay the fee and did not become delegates; Morse paid the fee with funds advanced by supporters of the eventual nominee. On May 2, 1994, appellants filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia alleging that the imposition of the registration fee violated §§ 5 and 10 of the Voting Rights Act, 79 Stat. 439, 442, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1973c 1 and 1973h, as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 2 and 1 As originally enacted, § 5 provided: "Sec. 5. Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 4(a) are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964, such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, and unless and until the court enters such judgment no per- son shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such quali- fication, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, stand- ard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney Gen- eral and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission, except that neither the Attorney General's failure to object nor a declaratory judgment entered under this section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. Any action under this sec- tion shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accord- ance with the provisions of section 2284 of title 28 of the United States Code and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court." 79 Stat. 437. 2 "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U. S. Const., Amdt. 14. 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT 192 MORSE v. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VA. Opinion of Stevens, J. the Twenty-fourth Amendment 3 to the Constitution. They sought an injunction preventing the Party from imposing the fee and ordering it to return the fee paid by Morse. As §§ 5 and 10 require, a three-judge District Court was convened to consider the statutory claims. See Morse v. Oliver North for U. S. Senate Comm., Inc., 853 F. Supp. 212 (WD Va. 1994). That court remanded the two constitutional claims to a single-judge District Court,4 and, after expedited briefing and argument, granted the Party's motion to dismiss the § 5 and § 10 claims. After noting "a general rule" that political parties are sub- ject to § 5 to the extent that they are empowered to conduct primary elections, the court gave two reasons for concluding that the rule did not apply to the selection of delegates to a state nominating convention. First, it read a regulation promulgated by the Attorney General as disavowing § 5 coverage of political party activities other than the conduct of primary elections. Second, it relied on our summary af- firmance of the District Court's holding in Williams v. Dem- ocratic Party of Georgia, Civ. Action No. 16286 (ND Ga., Apr. 6, 1972), that § 5 does not cover a party's decision to change its method of selecting delegates to a national con- vention. See 409 U. S. 809 (1972). Its dismissal of the § 10 claim rested on its view that only the Attorney General has authority to enforce that section of the Act. 853 F. Supp., at 215­217. 3 "Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax. "Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U. S. Const., Amdt. 24. 4 A separate statutory claim alleging that the loan to appellant Morse violated § 11(c) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1973i(c), was also remanded to the single-judge District Court. Neither that claim nor either of the constitu- tional claims is before us. 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 186 (1996) 193 Opinion of Stevens, J. We noted probable jurisdiction, 513 U. S. 1125 (1995), and now reverse. II In the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Congress enacted a com- plex scheme of remedies for racial discrimination in voting that were to be applied in areas where such discrimination had been most flagrant. Section 4 of the Act sets forth the formula for identifying the jurisdictions in which such dis- crimination had occurred, see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 317­318 (1966), and § 5 prescribes the most stringent of those remedies. It prohibits the enactment or enforcement by any covered jurisdiction of voting qualifica- tions or procedures that differ from those in effect on No- vember 1, 1964, or two later dates, unless they have been precleared by the Attorney General or approved by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 548­550 (1969).5 Virginia is one of the seven States to which the § 4 coverage formula was found applicable on August 7, 1965.6 The entire Commonwealth has been subject to the preclear- ance obligation of § 5 ever since. It is undisputed that the Party's practice of charging a registration fee as a prerequisite to participation in the proc- ess of selecting a candidate for United States Senator was 5 In order to obtain preclearance, the covered jurisdiction must demon- strate that its new procedure "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or [membership in a language minority group]," 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. The fact that such a showing could have been made, but was not, will not excuse the failure to follow the statutory preclearance procedure. "Fail- ure to obtain either judicial or administrative preclearance `renders the change unenforceable.' " Clark v. Roemer, 500 U. S. 646, 652 (1991) (quot- ing Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U. S. 255, 269 (1982)). 6 30 Fed. Reg. 9897 (1965). The others were Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. Ibid. In addition, portions of North Carolina, Arizona, Hawaii, and Idaho were designated then or shortly thereafter. See 30 Fed. Reg. 14505 (1965). 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT 194 MORSE v. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VA. Opinion of Stevens, J. not in effect on November 1, 1964. It is also undisputed that if the candidate had been selected in a primary election, the Party could not have enforced a voting qualification or proce- dure different from those in effect on November 1, 1964, without first preclearing it under § 5. Finally, we under- stand the Party to agree that if the registration fee had been mandated by state law, or by a state election official, pre- clearance would have been required. What is in dispute is whether the coverage of § 5 encom- passes the Party's voting qualifications and procedures when its nominees are chosen at a convention. In answering that question, we first note that the District Court's decision is not supported either by the Attorney General's regulation or by the narrow holding in the Williams case. We then ex- plain why coverage is mandated by our consistent construc- tion of the text and history of the Act. Finally, we discuss the § 10 private cause of action issue. III The Party does not question the validity of the Attorney General's regulation. That regulation unambiguously pro- vides that when a political party makes a change affecting voting, § 5 requires preclearance if two conditions are satis- fied: The change must relate to "a public electoral function of the party" and the party must be "acting under authority explicitly or implicitly granted by a covered jurisdiction." 7 7 The regulation, which was adopted in 1981, provides: "Political parties. Certain activities of political parties are subject to the preclearance requirement of section 5. A change affecting voting effected by a political party is subject to the preclearance requirement: (a) If the change relates to a public electoral function of the party and (b) if the party is acting under authority explicitly or implicitly granted by a covered jurisdiction or political subunit subject to the preclearance re- quirement of section 5. For example, changes with respect to the recruit- ment of party members, the conduct of political campaigns, and the drafting of party platforms are not subject to the preclearance require- 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 186 (1996) 195 Opinion of Stevens, J. The Party does not deny that the delegate fee is a change that relates to a public electoral function of the Party. It argues, instead, that the regulation did not apply when it selected its nominee for United States Senator at a conven- tion because it was not "acting under authority" granted by Virginia. We disagree. The District Court erred in its application of the regulation, because the Party exercised delegated state power when it certified its nominee for auto- matic placement on Virginia's general election ballot. Virginia law creates two separate tracks for access to the ballot, depending on the affiliation of the candidate. An in- dependent candidate for a statewide office must comply with several requirements. The candidate must file a declaration of candidacy with the State Board of Elections. He or she must also file a petition signed by a predetermined number of qualified voters. For elections to the United States Sen- ate, that number is equal to one-half of one percent of the registered voters in the Commonwealth, with at least 200 signatures from each of the 11 congressional districts. Va. Code Ann. § 24.2­506 (1993). In 1994, the required number of signatures was 14,871.8 By contrast, the election code provides that the nominees of the two major political parties 9 shall automatically appear ment. Changes with respect to the conduct of primary elections at which party nominees, delegates to party conventions, or party officials are cho- sen are subject to the preclearance requirement of section 5. Where ap- propriate the term `jurisdiction' (but not `covered jurisdiction') includes political parties." 28 CFR § 51.7 (1995). 8 Virginia had 2,974,149 registered voters on January 1, 1994. See State Bd. of Elections, Commonwealth of Virginia, Number of Precincts and Registered Voters as of January 1, 1994, p. 4 (rev. Jan. 10, 1994). One-half of one percent of that figure is 14,871. 9 Virginia law defines the term "political party" to include an organiza- tion of Virginia citizens "which, at either of the two preceding statewide general elections, received at least ten percent of the total vote cast for any statewide office filled in that election." Va. Code Ann. § 24.2­101 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT 196 MORSE v. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VA. Opinion of Stevens, J. on the general election ballot, without the need to declare their candidacy or to demonstrate their support with a nomi- nating petition. § 24.2­511. Party nominees are listed sequentially on the ballot before independent candidates, all of whom are grouped together in a separate row or column or spaced apart from the former.10 §§ 24.2­613, 24.2­640. Virginia law authorizes the two parties to determine for themselves how they will select their nominees-by pri- mary, by nominating convention, or by some other method. § 24.2­509(A).11 The Republican Party has taken advantage (1993). The Democratic Party of Virginia and the Republican Party of Virginia are the only organizations that satisfy that definition. The definition has not been set in stone, however. Before 1991, the term "political party" included only parties that polled 10 percent of the vote at the last preceding statewide election. The Democratic Party, however, did not field a candidate for the 1990 Senate race, and thus would have lost its automatic ballot access for the next election. See 29 Council of State Governments, Book of the States 260 (1992­1993 ed.). Rather than allow that outcome, the Virginia Legislature amended the definition to qualify parties that polled the requisite number of votes at either of the two preceding elections and provided that the amendment would apply retroactively. See 1991 Va. Acts, ch. 12, § 1(7). 10 Virginia law also allows the major political parties to substitute a new nominee should the chosen nominee die, withdraw, or have his or her nomi- nation set aside. In that circumstance, other parties and independent candidates are also permitted to make nominations, but the triggering event occurs only when a party nominee cannot run. The statute thus ensures that the major parties will always have a candidate on the ballot. See Va. Code Ann. §§ 24.2­539, 24.2­540 (1993). 11 In some circumstances, a primary election is required unless the in- cumbent officeholder from that party consents to a different method of nomination. Va. Code Ann. § 24.2­509(B) (1993). In its brief, the Party suggested that this one exception to plenary party control over the method of nomination is unconstitutional. See Brief for Appellees 31. While it appeared that the Party might bring suit before the 1996 election to try to have the provision struck down, see Whitley, Republicans Wrestle with Primary Issue, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Oct. 25, 1995, p. B1, it relented after the Attorney General of Virginia determined that the law was prob- ably valid. See Va. Op. Atty. Gen. (Nov. 22, 1995). In any event, because the incumbent United States Senator was a Democrat in 1994, the Party 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 186 (1996) 197 Opinion of Stevens, J. of these options in past elections. Its nominee has some- times been selected by the Party's State Central Committee, sometimes by statewide convention, and sometimes by pri- mary election. Whatever method is chosen, state law re- quires the Commonwealth to place the name of the nominee on the general election ballot.12 In this dual regime, the parties "ac[t] under authority" of Virginia when they decide who will appear on the general election ballot. 28 CFR § 51.7 (1995). It is uncontested that Virginia has sole authority to set the qualifications for ballot access. Pursuant to that authority, the Common- wealth has prescribed stringent criteria for access with which nearly all independent candidates and political organi- zations must comply. But it reserves two places on its bal- lot-indeed, the top two positions 13-for the major parties to fill with their nominees, however chosen. Those parties are effectively granted the power to enact their own qualifi- cations for placement of candidates on the ballot, which the Commonwealth ratifies by adopting their nominees. By holding conventions, for example, the Party does not need to was authorized to follow any method it chose, so long as it named its candidate within the time period prescribed by the statute. 12 The Secretary of the Party is required to certify the name of the nominee to the State Board of Elections. If certification is not timely, however, the board will declare the chosen candidate to be the nominee and treat his or her name as if certified. Va. Code Ann. § 24.2­511 (1993). 13 Research has shown that placement at the top of a ballot often confers an advantage to candidates so positioned. The classic study of the phenomenon is H. Bain & D. Hecock, Ballot Position and Voter's Choice: The Arrangement of Names on the Ballot and its Effect on the Voter (1957). See also Note, California Ballot Position Statutes: An Unconstitu- tional Advantage to Incumbents, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 365 (1972) (listing other studies); Note, Constitutional Problems with Statutes Regulating Ballot Position, 23 Tulsa L. J. 123 (1987). Some studies have suggested that the effect of favorable placement varies by type of election, visibility of the race, and even the use of voting machines. See id., at 127. While the research is not conclusive, it is reasonable to assume that candidates would prefer positions at the top of the ballot if given a choice. 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT 198 MORSE v. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VA. Opinion of Stevens, J. assemble thousands of signatures on a petition for its nomi- nee. In some years, as few as 550 nominators have selected the Party's candidate for United States Senate.14 Even in 1994, when the Party convention had its largest attendance to date, fewer nominators were present than would have been necessary to meet the petition requirement.15 In any event, state law permits the Party to allow as many or as few delegates as it sees fit to choose the Party nominee. The Party is thus delegated the power to determine part of the field of candidates from which the voters must choose. Correspondingly, when Virginia incorporates the Party's selection, it "endorses, adopts and enforces" the delegate qualifications set by the Party for the right to choose that nominee. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 664 (1944). The major parties have no inherent right to decide who may appear on the ballot. That is a privilege conferred by Virginia law, not natural law. If the Party chooses to avail itself of this delegated power over the electoral process, it necessarily becomes subject to the regulation.16 14 App. 24 (affidavit of David S. Johnson, Exec. Dir. of Republican Party of Virginia ¶ 12). 15 According to the Party, 14,614 voters attended the 1994 convention. Ibid. A total of 14,871 signatures were required to qualify as an inde- pendent candidate. See n. 8, supra. 16 The Party argues that automatic ballot access is merely a "practical accommodation to political reality" because the major parties have shown, through their performance in previous elections, significant levels of voter support. Brief for Appellees 32. According to the Party, the Party nom- inee need not demonstrate personal support because he or she is credited with the Party's showing. Id., at 33 (citing Weisburd, Candidate-Making and the Constitution: Constitutional Restraints on and Protections of Party Nominating Methods, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 213, 242 (1984)). Such "crediting" does not answer the question why the Party nominee should receive automatic ballot access. The fact that the Party has polled well in previous elections does not logically entail any conclusion about the success of its present candidate-especially when that nominee is cho- sen at a convention attended by limited numbers of Party members, rather than a primary. Furthermore, ballot access for all other candidates is 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 186 (1996) 199 Opinion of Stevens, J. In concluding that the regulation applies to the Party, we are guided by the reasoning of Smith v. Allwright, decided more than half a century ago. There, Texas gave automatic ballot access to the nominee of any party that polled a cer- tain number of votes at the preceding general election, and required independent candidates to file nominating petitions. Id., at 653, n. 6, 663. We explained that "recognition of the place of the primary in the electoral scheme," rather than the degree of state control over it, made clear that "state delegation to a party of the power to fix the qualifications of primary elections is delegation of a state function that may make the party's action the action of the State." Id., at 660. The only difference here is that Virginia has not required its political parties to conduct primary elections to nominate their candidates. But the right to choose the method of nomination makes the delegation of authority in this case more expansive, not less, for the Party is granted even greater power over the selection of its nominees. See generally L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 13­24, p. 1121, and n. 3 (2d ed. 1988); Rotunda, Constitutional and Statutory Restrictions on Political Parties in the Wake of Cousins v. Wigoda, 53 Texas L. Rev. 935, 953­954 (1975); predicated on a showing of individual electability. The Commonwealth certainly may choose to recognize the Party's selection of a nominee, but such recognition is not mandated by any right of the Party to demand placement on the ballot. Contrary to appellees, cases such as Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1968), Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U. S. 431 (1971), and American Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U. S. 767 (1974), establish only that political parties with at least a modicum of public support must be pro- vided a reasonable method of ballot access. They do not establish that they are entitled to choose the method itself. According to Justice Thomas, the Party merely "takes advantage of favorable state law" when it certifies its nominee for automatic placement on the ballot. Post, at 274. On that theory, the requirements of 28 CFR § 51.7 (1995) would not be met even if Virginia let only the two major parties place their candidates on the ballot, and no one else. For the same reasons we give below, see infra, at 220­221, it is implausible to think the regulation was meant to apply only in one-party States. 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT 200 MORSE v. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VA. Opinion of Stevens, J. Developments in the Law-Elections, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1111, 1159­1163 (1975). By the logic of Smith, therefore, the Party acted under authority of the Commonwealth.17 It is true that the example set forth in the Attorney Gen- eral's regulation describes changes in the conduct of primary elections. That example, however, does not purport to de- fine the outer limits of the coverage of § 5. Moreover, both in its brief amicus curiae supporting appellants in this case and in its prior implementation of the regulation, the Depart- ment of Justice has interpreted it as applying to changes affecting voting at a party convention.18 We are satisfied 17 Justice Thomas argues that our decision in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944), depended on the State's regulation of the Party's activi- ties. Post, at 268. While it is true that political parties in Smith were subject to extensive regulation, nothing in our decision turned on that factor. Only nine years before Smith, the Court had surveyed the same statutory regime in Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U. S. 45, 50 (1935), and con- cluded that primary elections were private voluntary activity. What changed was not the extent of state regulation, but the Court's under- standing, based on its intervening decision in United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1941), that primaries were "a part of the machinery for choosing officials." 321 U. S., at 664. On that basis, the Court overruled Grovey, even though the objectionable practice there of excluding blacks from membership in the party was undertaken by a private, unregulated entity. The irrelevance of state regulation was confirmed in two cases decided after Smith. Subsequent to Smith, South Carolina repealed all of its laws regulating political primaries. The Democratic primary was thereafter conducted under rules prescribed by the Democratic Party alone, which included rules restricting the primary to white persons. The Fourth Cir- cuit struck down those practices, reasoning that "[s]tate law relating to the general election gives effect to what is done in the primary and makes it just as much a part of the election machinery of the state by which the people choose their officers as if it were regulated by law, as formerly." Rice v. Elmore, 165 F. 2d 387, 390­391 (1947) (emphasis added); accord, Baskin v. Brown, 174 F. 2d 391 (1949). The principal opinion in Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953), declared that these cases were "in accord with the commands of the Fifteenth Amendment and the laws passed pur- suant to it." Id., at 466 (opinion of Black, J.). 18 See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11­13. Since 1981, when the regulation was promulgated, there have been nearly 2,000 pre- clearance submissions involving more than 16,000 proposed changes by 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 186 (1996) 201 Opinion of Stevens, J. that the Department's interpretation of its own regulation is correct. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U. S. 36, 45 (1993); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U. S. 410, 414 (1945). Accordingly, we conclude that the regulation required preclearance of the Party's delegate filing fee. The decision in Williams v. Democratic Party of Georgia, upon which the District Court relied in dismissing this com- plaint, is not to the contrary. The fact that Virginia statutes grant the nominee of the Party a position on the general election ballot graphically distinguishes the two cases. Wil- political parties in covered jurisdictions. See letter from Drew S. Days III, Solicitor General, to William K. Suter, Clerk of the Supreme Court, dated Oct. 4, 1995 (lodged with Clerk of this Court). Of particular note, on April 12, 1982, the Attorney General precleared changes in the delegate selection plan adopted by the Democratic Party of Virginia for its sena- torial nominating convention. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12, n. 7; letter from Wm. Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Div., to Russel Rosen, Executive Director, Demo- cratic Party of Va., dated Apr. 12, 1982 (lodged with Clerk of this Court). Political parties submitted changes in their rules for preclearance, and the Department of Justice interposed objections to those changes, long before 1981. For example: the Sumter County, Alabama, Democratic Ex- ecutive Committee submitted changes in 1974, and the Democratic Party of New York City submitted changes in 1975. See Extension of the Vot- ing Rights Act: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitu- tional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, pp. 2246, 2265 (1981) (app. to letter from James P. Turner, Acting Ass't Attorney General, to Rep. Edwards dated Apr. 9, 1981). Parties from New York, North Carolina, and Alabama submitted changes in 1972. See D. Hunter, Federal Review of Voting Changes 69, n. 30 (1974), reprinted in Hearings before the Subcommittee on Civil and Con- stitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 1541 (1975). In MacGuire v. Amos, 343 F. Supp. 119, 121 (MD Ala. 1972), a three-judge court held that rules promulgated by the Ala- bama Democratic and Republican Parties governing election of national delegates required preclearance, despite the fact that the rules were not passed by "the State's legislature or by a political subdivision of the State." As a result of this decision, the Democratic Party of Alabama sought judicial preclearance under § 5. See Vance v. United States, Civ. Action No. 1529­72 (DDC Nov. 30, 1972), cited in Hunter, Federal Review of Voting Changes, at 69, n. 30. 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT 202 MORSE v. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VA. Opinion of Stevens, J. liams did not concern the selection of nominees for state elective office, but rather a political party's compliance with a rule promulgated by the Democratic National Party gov- erning the selection of delegates to its national convention. According to the District Court's interpretation of Georgia law, the State exercised no control over, and played no part in, the state Party's selection of delegates to the Democratic National Convention.19 Because the Commonwealth dele- gated no authority to the Party to choose the delegates, the Party did not act under the authority, implicit or explicit, of the Commonwealth. If anything, the logic of Williams supports application of the preclearance requirement. The District Court stated that it was "convinced that voting rights connected with the delegate election process are the type of rights Congress in- tended to safeguard" by passage of the Act. Civ. Action No. 16286, at 4. It declined to require the party to preclear changes in its nominating methods only because there were no administrative procedures for submission of such changes at the time of the decision. Id., at 5. Since then, however, the Attorney General has clarified that "an appropriate offi- cial of the political party" may submit party rules affecting 19 "The State has no connection with the delegate selection process or State Party's rules and regulations other than allowing the rules and regu- lations to be filed under Ga. Code Ann. § 34­902. The purpose of such filing is merely to provide a place for public inspection of the State Party's rules and regulations." Williams v. Democratic Party of Georgia, Civ. Action No. 16286 (ND Ga., Apr. 6, 1972), pp. 4­5. In their motion to affirm in that case, the appellees noted that the Secretary of State of Georgia was obligated to approve a political party's rules applicable to the selection of candidates for public office by convention but had no authority to review the rules and regulations promulgated by the National Democratic Party governing the selection of delegates to its national convention. Under the Attorney General's regulation that is now in effect, preclearance of the National Democratic Party's rule change would not have been required if the District Court's interpretation of Georgia law was correct. Our sum- mary affirmance no doubt accepted that court's view of the relevant state law. Cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 345­346 (1976). 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 186 (1996) 203 Opinion of Stevens, J. voting for preclearance, 28 CFR § 51.23(b) (1993), thereby eliminating this one practical obstacle. Other lower courts have subsequently required preclearance of internal party rules, even when those rules do not relate to the conduct of primary elections.20 Indeed, if the rationale of Williams were still valid, § 5 would not cover party primaries either, for the party (by hypothesis) would likewise have no means of preclearing changes. But it is firmly established- and the Party does not dispute-that changes affecting pri- maries carried out by political parties must be precleared.21 The District Court was therefore incorrect to base its deci- sion on either the Attorney General's regulation or on our summary affirmance in Williams. The Party's activities fall directly within the scope of the regulation. We next con- clude, based on the language and structure of the Act, and the historical background which informed the Congress that enacted it, that § 5 of its own force covers changes in elec- toral practices such as the Party's imposition of a filing fee for delegates to its convention. IV Section 5 of the Act requires preclearance of changes in "any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or stand- ard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting." Section 20 See, e. g., Fortune v. Kings County Democratic Comm., 598 F. Supp. 761, 764 (EDNY 1984) (requiring preclearance of change in voting mem- bership of county party executive committee, because those members per- formed a "public electoral function" in filling vacancies in nominations for state office). 21 We also note that a summary affirmance by this Court is a "rather slender reed" on which to rest future decisions. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 784­785, n. 5 (1983). "A summary disposition affirms only the judgment of the court below, and no more may be read into our action than was essential to sustain that judgment." Ibid. Either of the two grounds discussed above-the State's noninvolvement or the absence of suitable administrative procedures for submission-would have sufficed for our affirmance. 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT 204 MORSE v. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VA. Opinion of Stevens, J. 14 defines the terms "vote" or "voting" to include "all action necessary to make a vote effective in any primary, special, or general election, including, but not limited to, registration, listing pursuant to this subchapter, or other action required by law prerequisite to voting, casting a ballot, and having such ballot counted properly and included in the appropriate totals of votes cast with respect to candidates for public or party office and propositions for which votes are received in an election." 42 U. S. C. § 1973l(c)(1). Although a narrow reading of the text of the Voting Rights Act might have confined the coverage of § 5 to changes in election practices that limit individual voters' access to the ballot in jurisdictions having authority to register voters, see United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm'rs, 435 U. S. 110, 140­ 150 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Holder v. Hall, 512 U. S. 874, 892, 914 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment), the Court has squarely rejected that construction. Shortly after the statute was passed, the Court thoroughly reviewed its legislative history and found that Congress intended § 5 to have "the broadest possible scope" reaching "any state enactment which altered the election law of a covered State in even a minor way." Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U. S., at 566­567. Similarly, in Sheffield, the Court con- cluded that "the language of the Act does not require such a crippling interpretation, but rather is susceptible of a reading that will fully implement the congressional objec- tives." 435 U. S., at 117. We expressly held that "§ 5, like the constitutional provisions it is designed to implement, ap- plies to all entities having power over any aspect of the elec- toral process within designated jurisdictions, not only to counties or to whatever units of state government perform the function of registering voters." Id., at 118. More re- cently we noted that § 5 is "expansive within its sphere of operation" and "comprehends all changes to rules governing voting." Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U. S. 491, 501 (1992). 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 186 (1996) 205 Opinion of Stevens, J. We have consistently construed the Act to require pre- clearance of any change in procedures or practices that may bear on the "effectiveness" of a vote cast in "any pri- mary, special, or general election." 42 U. S. C. § 1973l(c)(1). Rules concerning candidacy requirements and qualifications, we have held, fall into this category because of their poten- tial to "undermine the effectiveness of voters who wish to elect [particular] candidates." Allen, 393 U. S., at 570; see also Dougherty County Bd. of Ed. v. White, 439 U. S. 32, 40 (1978). Changes in the composition of the electorate that votes for a particular office-that is, situations that raise the specter of vote dilution-also belong to this class because they could "nullify [voters'] ability to elect the candidate of their choice just as would prohibiting some of them from vot- ing." 393 U. S., at 569. This nexus between the changed practice and its impact on voting in the general election has been a recurring theme in our cases interpreting the Act. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U. S. 380, 397 (1991) ("Any abridgment of the opportunity of members of a protected class to participate in the political process inevitably impairs their ability to influence the outcome of an election"). In its reenactments and extensions of the Act, moreover, Congress has endorsed these broad constructions of § 5. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 97­417, pp. 6­7, and n. 8 (1982). A filing fee for party delegates operates in precisely the same fashion as these covered practices. By limiting the opportunity for voters to participate in the Party's conven- tion, the fee undercuts their influence on the field of candi- dates whose names will appear on the ballot, and thus weak- ens the "effectiveness" of their votes cast in the general election itself. As an elementary fact about our Nation's po- litical system, the significance of the nominating convention to the outcome in the general election was recognized as long ago as Justice Pitney's concurrence in Newberry v. United States, 256 U. S. 232 (1921). Joined by Justices Brandeis and Clarke, he wrote: "As a practical matter, the ultimate choice 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT 206 MORSE v. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VA. Opinion of Stevens, J. of the mass of voters is predetermined when the nominations [by the major political parties] have been made." Id., at 286 (opinion concurring in part). See also United States v. Clas- sic, 313 U. S. 299, 319 (1941) (endorsing the Newberry concur- rence). Just like a primary, a convention narrows the field of candidates from a potentially unwieldy number to the seri- ous few who have a realistic chance to win the election. We have held, in fact, that the State's compelling interest in win- nowing down the candidates justifies substantial restrictions on access to the ballot. American Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U. S. 767, 782, and n. 14 (1974). Virginia, no doubt, would justify its own ballot access rules-including those for the major parties-on just this basis.22 We have previously recognized that § 5 extends to changes affecting nomination processes other than the primary. In Whitley v. Williams, one of the companion cases decided with Allen, this Court affirmed § 5 coverage of a scheme that placed new burdens on voters who wished to nominate inde- pendent candidates by petition. The Court was uncon- cerned that the changes did not directly relate to the conduct of a primary, because they had an effect on the general elec- tion. See Allen, 393 U. S., at 570. One of those changes was a requirement that each nominator sign the petition per- sonally and state his or her polling precinct and county. See id., at 551. Like the filing fee in this case, that condition made it more difficult for voters to participate in the nomina- 22 Virginia created its first signature requirement for self-nominated can- didates in 1936. See Va. Code Ann., Tit. 6, § 154 (1936) (requiring petition signed by 250 qualified voters of the Commonwealth). Although the Com- monwealth maintains limited legislative history records, contemporary news accounts reported that the provision was designed to "discourage cranks and persons who for personal glorification take advantage of the very liberal terms of the election code." New Qualification, The Rich- mond News Leader, Mar. 6, 1936, p. 8. Then as now, political parties were exempt from the signature requirement. 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 186 (1996) 207 Opinion of Stevens, J. tion process, and therefore properly fell within § 5's scope. A fee of $45 to cast a vote for the Party nominee is, if any- thing, a more onerous burden than a mere obligation to in- clude certain public information about oneself next to one's name on a nominating petition. In dissent, Justice Harlan agreed that "the nominating petition is the functional equiv- alent of the political primary." Id., at 592 (opinion concur- ring in part and dissenting in part). Delegate qualifications are in fact more closely tied to the voting process than practices that may cause vote dilution, whose coverage under § 5 we have repeatedly upheld. Vir- ginia, like most States, has effectively divided its election into two stages, the first consisting of the selection of party candidates and the second being the general election itself. See United States v. Classic, 313 U. S., at 316. Exclusion from the earlier stage, as two appellants in this case experi- enced, does not merely curtail their voting power, but abridges their right to vote itself. To the excluded voter who cannot cast a vote for his or her candidate, it is all the same whether the party conducts its nomination by a pri- mary or by a convention open to all party members except those kept out by the filing fee. Each is an "integral part of the election machinery." Id., at 318. The reference to "party office" in § 14, which defines the terms "vote" and "voting" as they appear throughout the Act, reinforces this construction of § 5. Section 14 specifi- cally recognizes that the selection of persons for "party of- fice" is one type of action that may determine the effective- ness of a vote in the general election. Delegates to a party convention are party officers. See H. R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 32 (1965) ("Thus, for example, an election of delegates to a State party convention would be covered by the act"). The phrase "votes cast with respect to candidates for public or party office" in § 14 is broad enough to encom- pass a variety of methods of voting beyond a formal elec- 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT 208 MORSE v. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VA. Opinion of Stevens, J. tion.23 Cf. Classic, 313 U. S., at 318. The Party itself rec- ognizes this point, for both in its brief to this Court and in its Plan of Organization, it repeatedly characterizes its own method of selecting these delegates as an "election." 24 The legislative history of § 14 supports this interpretation. Representative Bingham proposed addition of the term "party office" to the language of the section for the express purpose of extending coverage of the Act to the nominating activities of political parties. See Hearings on H. R. 6400 before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 456­457 (1965) (proposing coverage of "political party meetings, councils, conventions, and referendums which lead to endorsement or selection of candidates who will run in primary or general elections"). Congressional concern that the Act reach the selection of party delegates was not merely speculative. On the floor of the House, Representative Bingham expressed the impor- tance of preventing a reprise of the fiasco of the previous year, 1964, "when the regular Democratic delegation from Mississippi to the Democratic National Convention was chosen through a series of Party caucuses and conventions from which Negroes were excluded." 111 Cong. Rec. 16273 (1965); see also Hearings on H. R. 6400, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 23 Quoting this very language, we have observed that candidates are nominated, not elected. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U. S. 380, 400 (1991). It is not anomalous, therefore, to hold that § 5 applies regardless of the means of nomination. 24 See Brief for Appellees 2; App. 32 (Republican Party Plan, Art. II, ¶ 22) (defining "Party Canvass" as "a method of electing . . . delegates to Conventions"); id., at 52 (Plan, Art. VIII, § A, ¶ 3) (referring to "any elec- tion by a Mass Meeting, Party Canvass, or Convention"); id., at 56 (Plan, Art. VIII, § H, ¶ 4); id., at 23 (affidavit of David S. Johnson, Exec. Dir. of Republican Party of Virginia, ¶¶ 5, 8). The call for the state convention itself, to which appellants responded, stated: "The delegates and alter- nates shall be elected in county and city Mass Meetings, Conventions or Party Canvasses that shall be held between March 1, 1994 and April 1, 1994." Id., at 62. 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 186 (1996) 209 Opinion of Stevens, J. at 456 ("The events of 1964 demonstrate the need" to expand § 14). As he later explained, the solution that was reached to this problem was "to add to the definition of the word `vote' in section 14(c)(1)." 111 Cong. Rec. 16273. The Par- ty's delegates to its 1994 convention were chosen through precisely the same methods Representative Bingham de- scribed: mass meetings, conventions, and canvasses. Ex- empting the Party from the scope of § 14 would thus defeat the purpose for which the House and eventually Congress as a whole adopted Representative Bingham's amendment. The text of § 2 also makes apparent the Act's intended cov- erage of nonprimary nomination methods. Section 2, which bans any "voting qualification or prerequisite" that discrimi- nates on account of race or color, considers a violation to have occurred if "the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of [groups protected by the Act] in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political proc- ess and to elect representatives of their choice." 42 U. S. C. § 1973(b) (1988 ed.) (emphasis added). Under the broad sweep of this language, exclusion from a nominating conven- tion would qualify as a violation. Section 2 "adopts the functional view of `political process' " and applies to "any phase of the electoral process." S. Rep. No. 97­417, at 30, and n. 120. If such practices and procedures fall within the scope of § 2, they must also be subject to § 5. In recent cases, some Members of this Court have questioned whether § 2 is as broad as § 5, see Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U. S., at 416­417 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Holder v. Hall, 512 U. S., at 882­885 (opinion of Kennedy, J.); id., at 930 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment), but there has never been any doubt about the converse-that changes in practices within covered jurisdic- tions that would be potentially objectionable under § 2 are also covered under § 5. The purpose of preclearance is to 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT 210 MORSE v. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VA. Opinion of Stevens, J. prevent all attempts to implement discriminatory voting practices that change the status quo. If § 5 were narrower than § 2, then a covered jurisdiction would not need to pre- clear changes in voting practices known to be illegal. "It is unlikely that Congress intended such an anomalous result." Chisom, 501 U. S., at 402.25 A fair reading of the text of § 5 unquestionably supports the conclusion that by imposing its filing fee the Party sought to administer a "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1968." 42 U. S. C. § 1973c (1988 ed.). V Consideration of the history that led to passage of the Act confirms our construction of § 5. The preamble to the stat- 25 In fact, it did not. The 1981 House Report states that "whether a discriminatory practice or procedure is of recent origin affects only the mechanism that triggers relief, i. e., litigation or preclearance." H. R. Rep. No. 97­227, p. 28. That statement indicates that the substantive standards for § 2 and § 5 violations are the same, so long as the challenged practice represents a change from 1965 conditions, as the filing fee did here. Even more explicitly, the 1982 Senate Report states that "a section 5 objection also follow[s] if a new voting procedure itself so discriminates as to violate section 2." S. Rep. No. 97­417, p. 12, n. 31. The Report refers to voting procedures that dilute minority voting strength. See id., at 10. We have recognized that measures undertaken by both " `[s]tate legislatures and political party committees' " have had just such dilutive effects, through devices that included " `switching to at-large elections where Negro voting strength is concentrated in particular election dis- tricts, facilitating the consolidation of predominantly Negro and predomi- nantly white counties, and redrawing the lines of districts to divide con- centrations of Negro voting strength.' " Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 389 (1971) (quoting Hearings on Voting Rights Act Extension before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 17 (1969) (remarks of Mr. Glickstein)) (emphasis added). See also n. 27, infra. Contrary to Justice Thomas, therefore, Congress has already "harmonize[d]" §§ 2 and 5, see post, at 282; it is he who seeks to sunder them. 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 186 (1996) 211 Opinion of Stevens, J. ute expressly identifies the "fifteenth amendment" as the constitutional provision the Act was designed to imple- ment.26 Our cases dealing with the applicability of that Amendment to the selection of party candidates in States that engaged in the sort of voting discrimination that § 5 was designed to remedy are therefore directly relevant. See McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U. S. 236, 246 (1984) (interpreting Act "in light of its prophylactic purpose and the historical experience which it reflects"); Dougherty County Bd. of Ed. v. White, 439 U. S., at 37 (seeking "guidance from the history and purpose of the Act"). In a series of decisions known as the White Primary Cases, this Court applied the Fifteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to strike down a succession of measures by authorities in Texas to exclude minority voters from their nomination processes. These cases demonstrate that electoral practices implemented by political parties have the potential to "den[y] or abridg[e] the right to vote on account of race or color," which § 5 prohibits. 42 U. S. C. § 1973c (1988 ed.). Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 (1927), involved the valid- ity of a Texas statute enacted in 1923 that flatly provided " `in no event shall a negro be eligible to participate in a Democratic party primary election held in the State of Texas,' " id., at 540. It took only a paragraph for Justice Holmes to conclude that it was "unnecessary to consider the Fifteenth Amendment, because it seems to us hard to imag- ine a more direct and obvious infringement of the Four- teenth." Id., at 540­541. Promptly after the announce- ment of that decision, the Texas Legislature responded to what it regarded as an emergency by replacing the invalid provision with a substitute that authorized the executive committee of every political party to determine "in its own way" who shall be "qualified to vote or otherwise participate in such political party." Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73, 82 26 "To enforce the fifteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other purposes." 79 Stat. 437. 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT 212 MORSE v. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VA. Opinion of Stevens, J. (1932). The State Executive Committee of the Democratic Party adopted a rule that only "white democrats" could par- ticipate in the party's primary elections. Pursuant to that rule, Mr. Nixon was again refused a primary ballot and again persuaded this Court that the authors of the discriminatory rule should be "classified as representatives of the State to such an extent and in such a sense that the great restraints of the Constitution set limits to their action." Id., at 89. The decision in Nixon v. Condon relied on the fact that a state statute authorized the Party's Executive Committee to determine the qualifications of voters. Thereafter the Party implemented the same discriminatory policy without statutory authorization by adopting a resolution at a state convention restricting party membership to "white persons." When it first confronted the issue, the Court held that imple- mentation of that rule was not state action. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U. S. 45 (1935). A few years later, however, Grovey was overruled and the Court decided that the resolu- tion adopted by the party's state convention constituted state action violative of the Fifteenth Amendment even though it was not expressly authorized by statute. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944). We wrote: "The United States is a constitutional democracy. Its organic law grants to all citizens a right to participate in the choice of elected officials without restriction by any State because of race. This grant to the people of the opportunity for choice is not to be nullified by a State through casting its electoral process in a form which permits a private organization to practice racial discrimination in the election. Constitutional rights would be of little value if they could be thus indirectly denied. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268, 275 [(1939)]." Id., at 664. The same policy of excluding all nonwhite voters from the electoral process was thereafter implemented in certain 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 186 (1996) 213 Opinion of Stevens, J. Texas counties by a private organization known as the Jaybird Democratic Association. It conducted a so-called "Jaybird primary" at which white voters selected candidates who thereafter ran in and nearly always won the Democratic Party's primary and the general election. Although the Jaybirds had no official status, received no state funds, and conducted a purely private election, the Court readily con- cluded that this voluntary association's exclusion of black voters from its primaries on racial grounds was prohibited by the Fifteenth Amendment. Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953). Citing our earlier cases, Justice Clark tersely noted that an "old pattern in new guise is revealed by the record." Id., at 480 (concurring opinion). Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1964 because it concluded that case-by-case enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment, as exemplified by the history of the white pri- mary in Texas, had proved ineffective to stop discriminatory voting practices in certain areas of the country on account of the intransigence of officials who "resorted to the extraordi- nary stratagem of contriving new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal court decrees." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 335 (citing H. R. Rep. No. 439, at 10­11; S. Rep. No. 162, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, pp. 8, 12 (1965)). The preclearance system of § 5 was designed to end this evasion once and for all. By prohibiting officials in cov- ered jurisdictions from implementing any change in voting practices without prior approval from the District Court for the District of Columbia or the Attorney General, it sought to "shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpe- trators of the evil to its victims." South Carolina v. Katz- enbach, 383 U. S., at 328.27 27 Congress was plainly aware of the power of political parties to carry out discriminatory electoral practices as a supplement to or a substitute for voting discrimination by government officials. Of course, the White Primary Cases supplied the primary historical examples of such prac- 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT 214 MORSE v. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VA. Opinion of Stevens, J. The distinction between a primary and a nominating con- vention is just another variation in electoral practices that § 5 was intended to cover. The imposition of a $45 fee on tices. See H. R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1965). In addition, during the 1970 extension of the Act, Congress heard testimony from the Director of the United States Civil Rights Commission wherein he reiter- ated the influence political parties continued to exercise over the electoral process in jurisdictions designated under the Act. He testified that "[s]tate legislatures and political party committees in Alabama and Missis- sippi have adopted laws or rules since the passage of the act which have had the purpose or effect of diluting the votes of newly enfranchised Negro voters." Hearings on Voting Rights Act Extension before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 17 (1969) (remarks of Mr. Glickstein), quoted in Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S., at 389. As examples, he introduced evidence that in 1968 the Mis- sissippi Democratic Party persisted in its "pattern of exclusion of and dis- crimination against Negroes at precinct meetings, county conventions and the State convention," Hearings on Voting Rights Act Extension, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 18­19; that other officials "withheld information from black party members about party precinct meetings and conventions or have prevented them from participating fully," id., at 18, 43; that the Ala- bama Democratic Party raised candidate filing fees for some of its pri- maries tenfold after blacks began voting in large numbers, id., at 18, 27; and that various party executive committees refused to count votes by blacks who were not on the registration books, even if they were listed by the Federal Examiner, id., at 46, engaged in discriminatory purges of black voters, id., at 48, and misled black candidates about the requirements for running in primary elections or did not notify them of their failure to qualify until after deadlines had passed, id., at 46­47. In his testimony, Director Glickstein summarized the more extensive findings about discriminatory electoral practices carried out by the estab- lished political parties that were set forth in a report prepared by the United States Commission on Civil Rights pursuant to congressional direc- tive. See id., at 17­18. It concluded that, three years after passage of the Act, "in some areas there has been little or no progress in the entry and partici- pation by Negroes in political party affairs-the key to meaningful partici- pation in the electoral process. Some of the practices found are reminis- cent of those which existed at an earlier time during Reconstruction when fear of `Negro government' gave rise to intimidation and a number of elec- tion contrivances which finally led to disenfranchisement of the Negro citi- 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 186 (1996) 215 Opinion of Stevens, J. the privilege of participating in the selection of the Party's nominee for the United States Senate is equally a practice or procedure relating to voting whether the selection is made by primary election or by a "convention" in which every voter willing to pay the fee is eligible to cast a vote. A primary election would not cease to be a practice relating to voting if the Party imposed such a high fee that only 14,000 voters cast ballots; nor should a "convention" performing the same electoral function as a primary avoid coverage because fewer voters participate in the process than normally vote in a primary. As was true in Sheffield, "the District Court's interpretation of the Act . . . makes § 5 coverage depend upon a factor completely irrelevant to the Act's purposes, and thereby permits precisely the kind of circumvention of con- gressional policy that § 5 was designed to prevent." 435 U. S., at 117. It would undermine the Act to permit " `[s]uch a variation in the result from so slight a change in form.' " Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S., at 465, n. 1 (quoting Smith v. All- wright, 321 U. S., at 661). Section 5 coverage of nominating conventions follows di- rectly from our decision in Terry. Although called a "pri- mary," the Jaybird election was the equivalent of the Party's nominating convention, for it did not involve the State's elec- toral apparatus in even the slightest way-neither to supply election officials, nor ballots, nor polling places. See 345 U. S., at 471 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). In fact, the Jay- birds went far beyond the Party in immunizing their nomina- tion process from the State's control. The Jaybird nominee did not receive any form of automatic ballot access. He filed individually as a candidate in the Democratic primary, paid the filing fee, and complied with all requirements to which other candidates were subject. Id., at 486­487 (Minton, J., dissenting). No mention of the nominee's Jaybird affiliation was ever made, either on the primary or on the general elec- zen." U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, Political Participation 178 (May 1968). 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT 216 MORSE v. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VA. Opinion of Stevens, J. tion ballot. Those elections, moreover, were open to any candidate who was able to meet the filing requirements, and to black as well as white voters. If the Jaybirds' nominating process violated the Fifteenth Amendment because black voters were not permitted to participate, despite the entirely voluntary nature of the Jaybird association, then § 5-which requires preclearance of all practices with the potential to discriminate-must cover the Party's exclusion of voters from its convention.28 Appellees nevertheless assert that Terry, like the other White Primary Cases, has no bearing on the proper interpre- tation of the Voting Rights Act. They offer three reasons for that contention: first, that their convention did not oper- ate in a racially discriminatory manner, Brief for Appellees 37; second, that the 89th Congress did not intend to legislate to the "outer limit" of the Fifteenth Amendment, ibid.; and third, that present-day Virginia is not a one-party Common- wealth, unlike Texas after Reconstruction, id., at 36. None of these reasons is persuasive. First, while it is true that the case before us today does not involve any charge of racial discrimination in voting, the decision whether discrimination has occurred or was in- tended to occur, as we have explained on many occasions, is for the Attorney General or the District Court for the Dis- trict of Columbia to make in the first instance. NAACP v. Hampton County Election Comm'n, 470 U. S. 166, 181 (1985); McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U. S., at 250; Dougherty County Bd. of Ed. v. White, 439 U. S., at 42; Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526, 534 (1973); Perkins v. Matthews, 28 The analogy is even closer, for the Jaybirds originally performed their nominations in mass meetings. See 345 U. S., at 470 (opinion of Frank- furter, J.); id., at 480 (Clark, J., concurring). Nothing in any of the opin- ions suggests-and it would be perverse to suppose-that the Jaybirds' nominating activities only became unconstitutional when they switched to balloting methods. 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 186 (1996) 217 Opinion of Stevens, J. 400 U. S. 379, 383­385 (1971); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U. S., at 570. The critical question for us, as for the District Court below, is whether "the challenged alteration has the potential for discrimination." Hampton County Election Comm'n, 470 U. S., at 181 (emphasis in original). It is not contested that the Party's filing fee had that potential.29 The second argument misconceives the purpose of the pre- clearance system and the nature of the Act as a whole. Again, the very preamble of the Act states that its purpose is to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. 79 Stat. 437. Sec- tion 5 "is a means of assuring in advance the absence of all electoral illegality, not only that which violates the Voting Rights Act but that which violates the Constitution as well." Chisom, 501 U. S., at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). It is beyond question, therefore, that the Act en- compassed the discriminatory practices struck down in Terry and Smith, which this Court had found violative of the same constitutional guarantees. Not only were they the leading cases securing the right to vote against racial discrimination at the time of enactment, but Congress passed the Act to facilitate the enforcement effort they embodied. It strains credulity to suppose that despite Congress' professed impa- tience with the "case-by-case" method of enforcing voting rights, it did not mean to cover the cases that capped the struggle to end the white primary.30 29 Justice Thomas' claim that there has been no purposeful evasion of the Constitution, see post, at 269­270, is therefore irrelevant. 30 Appellees' theory is particularly unpersuasive in light of the fact that other parts of the Voting Rights Act reach beyond the scope of § 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment. For example, the Act created a per se ban on literacy tests despite this Court's decision that facially fair tests are not themselves unconstitutional. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U. S. 45 (1959). We upheld this exercise of Congress' power under § 2 of the Amendment without overruling Lassiter. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 334 (1966); see also City of Rome 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT 218 MORSE v. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VA. Opinion of Stevens, J. The final argument fares no better. We have expressly rejected the contention that the right to vote depends on the success rate of the candidates one endorses. Voting at the nomination stage is protected regardless of whether it "in- variably, sometimes or never determines the ultimate choice of the representative." United States v. Classic, 313 U. S., at 318. The operative test, we have stated repeatedly, is whether a political party exercises power over the electoral process. See United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm'rs, 435 U. S., at 122 ("§ 5 has to apply to all entities exercising con- trol over the electoral processes within the covered States or subdivisions"); Dougherty County Bd. of Ed. v. White, 439 U. S., at 44­45 (§ 5 coverage depends only on the "impact of a change on the elective process"); Terry, 345 U. S., at 481 ("[A]ny `part of the machinery for choosing officials' becomes subject to the Constitution's restraints") (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S., at 664). That situation may arise in two-party States just as in one-party States. Indeed, the Terry concurrence summarized Smith as holding that "the Democratic Party of itself, and perforce any other political party, is prohibited by [the Fifteenth] Amendment from con- ducting a racially discriminatory primary election." Terry, 345 U. S., at 481 (Clark, J., concurring) (emphasis added). See also Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814, 818 (1969) (holding that the use of nomination petitions by independent candi- dates is a procedure that "must pass muster against the charges of discrimination or of abridgment of the right to vote"); Classic, 313 U. S., at 318.31 The contrary position v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 173­178 (1980). Congress again legislated beyond the reach of the Fifteenth Amendment when it amended § 2 of the Act to reject the "intent test" propounded in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980). See S. Rep. No. 97­417, at 39­43. 31 Justice Thomas contends that United States v. Classic is inapplicable because Party nominating conventions are not " `by law made an integral part of the election machinery.' " Post, at 270, n. 12. Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814 (1969), shows that this view is incorrect. The Court in Moore held that the use of nominating petitions by independent candidates 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 186 (1996) 219 Opinion of Stevens, J. would make little sense. On appellees' theory, one political party could not exclude blacks from the selection of its nomi- nee, however it chose that individual, but two parties each independently could. In any event, the controlling factor for our construction of § 5 is Congress' intent. It is apparent from the legislative history that Congress did not mean to limit § 5 to political parties whose nominating procedures "foreordained" the results of the general election, see post, at 269 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The impetus behind the addition of the term "party office" to § 14 was the exclusion of blacks from the Mississippi delegation to the National Democratic Conven- tion in 1964. See supra, at 208­209. The activities of those delegates did not settle the result of the Presidential race; Republican candidates won the general election in 1952 and 1956, and from 1968 until 1992, excluding 1976. Neverthe- less, Congress insisted that the selection of those delegates must be open to all voters, black and white. The imposition by an established political party-that is to say, a party authorized by state law to determine the method of selecting its candidates for elective office and also authorized to have those candidates' names automatically ap- pear atop the general election ballot-of a new prerequisite to voting for the party's nominees is subject to § 5's preclear- ance requirement. was an " `integral part of the election process,' " even though a nominating petition obviously is not a primary, and that procedure plainly was not "merged by law," post, at 270, n. 12, into the State's election apparatus. See 394 U. S., at 818 (citing Classic and Smith); MacDougall v. Green, 335 U. S. 281, 288 (1948) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Hearings on H. R. 6400 before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 457 (1965) (statement of Rep. Bingham) ("It is clear that political party meetings, councils, conventions, and referendums which lead to endorsement or selection of candidates who will run in pri- mary or general elections are, in most instances, a vital part of the election process") (citing Smith and Terry). 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT 220 MORSE v. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VA. Opinion of Stevens, J. VI Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas reject our con- struction of § 5 for a number of reasons, none of which is convincing. They rely primarily on the argument that, under a literal reading of the statutory text, a political party is not a "State or political subdivision" within the meaning of § 5 because it is not a unit of government. See post, at 253­276 (Thomas, J., dissenting); post, at 248­250 (Ken- nedy, J., dissenting). The radicalism of this position should not be underestimated. It entirely rejects the distinction between primary elections and conventions that is the cen- terpiece of the Party's argument. On this view, even if a political party flagrantly discriminated in the selection of candidates whose names would appear on the primary elec- tion ballot or in the registration of voters in a primary elec- tion, it would not fall within the coverage of § 5. Unsurpris- ingly, neither the District Court nor the Party advanced this extreme argument, for it is plainly at war with the intent of Congress and with our settled interpretation of the Act.32 Almost two decades ago we held in United States v. Shef- field Bd. of Comm'rs that "§ 5, like the constitutional pro- visions it is designed to implement, applies to all entities having power over any aspect of the electoral process within designated jurisdictions." 435 U. S., at 118 (emphasis added). We understood the phrase "State or political subdi- vision" to have a "territorial reach" that embraced "actions that are not formally those of the State." Id., at 127. The Court even invoked Terry to make its point. 435 U. S., at 127. Justice Thomas' efforts to confine Sheffield and our subsequent decision in Dougherty do not make sense of those cases. Dougherty held that a county school board qualifies 32 The Party makes passing reference to the idea in its brief, but the surrounding argument makes clear that it only challenges application of the regulation to its nominating activities. See Brief for Appellees 30­40. At oral argument, moreover, the Party confirmed that it believed § 5 could encompass the activities of political parties. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 28­30. 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 186 (1996) 221 Opinion of Stevens, J. as a "State or political subdivision" even though it is clearly neither "one of the 50 constituent States of the Union," post, at 254, nor "a political subdivision" of any such State in a literal sense or as that term is defined in the statute itself.33 Indeed, a major political party has far more power over the electoral process than a school board, which we conceded has "no nominal electoral functions." Dougherty, 439 U. S., at 44. Besides the fact that it contravenes our precedents, this argument fails at the purely textual level. The Voting Rights Act uses the same word as the Fifteenth Amend- ment-"State"-to define the authorities bound to honor the right to vote. Long before Congress passed the Voting Rights Act, we had repeatedly held that the word "State" in the Fifteenth Amendment encompassed political parties. See Smith v. Allwright; Terry v. Adams. How one can si- multaneously concede that "State" reaches political parties under the Fifteenth Amendment, yet argue that it "plainly" excludes all such parties in § 5, is beyond our understanding. Imposing different constructions on the same word is espe- cially perverse in light of the fact that the Act-as it states on its face-was passed to enforce that very Amendment. See United States v. CIO, 335 U. S. 106, 112 (1948) ("There is no better key to a difficult problem of statutory construc- tion than the law from which the challenged statute emerged"). Speculations about language that might have more clearly reached political parties are beside the point. It would be a mischievous and unwise rule that Congress cannot rely on our construction of constitutional language when it seeks to exercise its enforcement power pursuant to the same provisions.34 33 The statute defines "political subdivision" as a unit of government that registers voters. 42 U. S. C. § 1973l(c)(2) (1988 ed.). 34 Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas nevertheless argue that Congress should have borrowed language from 42 U. S. C. § 1983 if it had intended § 5 to cover political parties. To bolster the point, they cite the "Prohibited acts" provision of the Act, § 11(a), which forbids any "per- 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT 222 MORSE v. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VA. Opinion of Stevens, J. Justice Thomas makes two other arguments. First, he contends that we should not defer to the Attorney General's regulation when construing the coverage of § 5. See post, at 258. The argument is surprising because our explanation of why § 5 applies to political parties places no reliance on principles of administrative deference. It is nevertheless interesting to note that the regulation has been endorsed by three successive administrations.35 son acting under color of law" to interfere with the exercise of the right to vote. See 42 U. S. C. § 1973i(a) (1988 ed.). It is quite natural, however, that Congress would draw on § 1983 when it sought to draft provisions that established individual liability for persons who violate civil rights such as the right to vote. Section 1983 was designed "to give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official's abuse of his position." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 172 (1961). Section 11(a) served exactly the same end, and therefore used similar language. By contrast, Congress would not have looked to § 1983 to supply lan- guage for § 5 for the simple reason that § 1983 does not reach the one type of entity Congress most desired § 5 to cover: the States themselves. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58 (1989). Justice Thomas tries to avoid this problem by proposing a new, disjunctive statu- tory phrase that is supposedly clearer than the present § 5: " `State or political subdivision or any person acting under color of State law.' " Post, at 265 (emphasis deleted). That concatenation of elements, however, appears in no statute ever enacted, so it is unclear why it is preferable to language that had already been construed by this Court. Furthermore, the "person acting under color of state law" locution would be simultane- ously too broad and too narrow in that context. Section 5 focuses not on actions that individuals carry out, but on voting practices that organiza- tions enact or implement. Ordinary "persons" do not create and imple- ment voting practices. At the same time, the "plain meaning" of the word "person" does not include political parties. While "person" can be read more broadly, so can "State," as our precedents show. Finally, if "person" reached nonnatural entities, it would become partly redundant with the word "State," which the dissent itself concedes encompasses political units smaller than States. See Sheffield; Dougherty. In short, it is hardly sur- prising that Congress opted for the language of the Constitution rather than Justice Thomas' concocted phrase. 35 Justice Thomas is unwilling to accept our representation as to the reasoning underlying our decision; he goes on at great length about our 517us1$38I 02-23-99 16:40:25 PAGES OPINPGT Cite as: 517 U. S. 186 (1996) 223 Opinion of Stevens, J. Second, relying principally on Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U. S. 345 (1974), and Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U. S. 149 (1978), Justice Thomas argues that a major political party is not a "state actor" unless its nomi- nees are virtually certain to win the general election. See post, at 264­276. Thus, the Party would be a state actor if Virginia allowed on