The Internet Wiretap online edition of

            AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING
             HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

                     by
                 DAVID HUME

          Harvard Classics Volume 37
      Copyright 1910 P.F. Collier & Son

     Prepared by <dell@wiretap.spies.com>


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This text is in the PUBLIC DOMAIN, released August 1993.


SECTION I
OF THE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF PHILOSOPHY.

  MORAL philosophy, or the science of human nature, 
may be treated after two different manners; each 
of which has its peculiar merit, and may contribute 
to the entertainment, instruction, and reformation of man- 
kind. The one considers man chiefly as born for action; 
and as influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment; 
pursuing one object, and avoiding another, according to 
the value which these objects seem to possess, and accord- 
ing to the light in which they present themselves. As vir- 
tue, of all objects, is allowed to be the most valuable, this 
species of philosophers paint her in the most amiable 
colours; borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence, and 
treating their subject in an easy and obvious manner, and 
such as is best fitted to please the imagination, and engage 
the affections. They select the most striking observations 
and instances from common life; place opposite characters 
in a proper contrast; and alluring us into the paths of virtue 
by the views of glory and happiness, direct our steps in 
these paths by the soundest precepts and most illustrious 
examples. They make us feel the difference between vice 
and virtue; they excite and regulate our sentiments; and 
so they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity and 
true honour, they think, that they have fully attained the 
end of all their labours. 

  The other species of philosophers consider man in the 
light of a reasonable rather than an active being, and 
endeavour to form his understanding more than cultivate 
his manners. They regard human nature as a subject of 
speculation; and with a narrow scrutiny examine it, in 
order to find those principles, which regulate our under- 
standing, excite our sentiments, and make us approve or 
blame any particular object, action, or behaviour. They 
think it a reproach to all literature, that philosophy should 
not yet have fixed, beyond controversy, the foundation of 
morals, reasoning, and criticism; and should for ever talk 
of truth and falsehood, vice and virtue, beauty and de- 
formity, without being able to determine the source of 
these distinctions. While they attempt this arduous task, 
they are deterred by no difficulties; but proceeding from 
particular instances to general principles, they still push on 
their enquiries to principles more general, and rest not 
satisfied till they arrive at those original principles, by 
which, in every science, all human curiosity must be 
bounded. Though their speculations seem abstract, and 
even unintelligible to common readers, they aim at the 
approbation of the learned and the wise; and think them- 
selves sufficiently compensated for the labour of their whole 
lives, if they can discover some hidden truths, which may 
contribute to the instruction of posterity. 

  It is certain that the easy and obvious philosophy will 
always, with the generality of mankind, have the preference 
above the accurate and abstruse; and by many will be 
recommended, not only as more agreeable, but more useful 
than the other. It enters more into common life; moulds 
the heart and affections; and, by touching those principles 
which actuate men, reforms their conduct, and brings them 
nearer to that model of perfection which it describes. On 
the contrary, the abstruse philosophy, being founded on a 
turn of mind, which cannot enter into business and action, 
vanishes when the philosopher leaves the shade, and comes 
into open day; nor can its principles easily retain any in- 
fluence over our conduct and behaviour. The feelings of 
our heart, the agitation of our passions, the vehemence of 
our affections, dissipate all its conclusions, and reduce the 
profound philosopher to a mere plebeian. 

  This also must be confessed, that the most durable, 
as well as justest fame, has been acquired by the easy 
philosophy, and that abstract reasoners seem hitherto to 
have enjoyed only a momentary reputation, from the caprice 
or ignorance of their own age, but have not been able 
to support their renown with more equitable posterity. It 
is easy for a profound philosopher to commit a mistake 
in his subtile reasonings; and one mistake is the necessary 
parent of another, while he pushes on his consequences, 
and is not deterred from embracing any conclusion, by 
its unusual appearance, or its contradiction to popular 
opinion. But a philosopher, who purposes only to represent 
the common sense of mankind in more beautiful and more 
engaging colours, if by accident he falls into error, goes no 
farther; but renewing his appeal to common sense, and the 
natural sentiments of the mind, returns into the right path, 
and secures himself from any dangerous illusions. The 
fame of Cicero flourishes at present; but that of Aristotle 
is utterly decayed. La Bruyere passes the seas, and still 
maintains his reputation: but the glory of Malebranche 
is confined to his own nation, and to his own age. And 
Addison, perhaps, will be read with pleasure, when Locke 
shall be entirely forgotten. 

  The mere philosopher is a character, which is commonly 
but little acceptable in the world, as being supposed to 
contribute nothing either to the advantage or pleasure 
of society; while he lives remote from communication with 
mankind, and is wrapped up in principles and notions equally 
remote from their comprehension. On the other hand, 
the mere ignorant is still more despised; nor is any thing 
deemed a surer sign of an illiberal genius in an age and 
nation where the sciences flourish, than to be entirely 
destitute of all relish for those noble entertainments. The 
most perfect character is supposed to lie between those 
extremes; retaining an equal ability and taste for books, 
company, and business; preserving in conversation that 
discernment and delicacy which arise from polite letters; 
and in business, that probity and accuracy which are 
the natural result of a just philosophy. In order to diffuse 
and cultivate so accomplished a character, nothing can be 
more useful than compositions of the easy style and manner, 
which draw not too much from life, require no deep appli- 
cation or retreat to be comprehended, and send back the 
student among mankind full of noble sentiments and wise 
precepts, applicable to every exigence of human life. By 
means of such compositions, virtue becomes amiable, 
science agreeable, company instructive, and retirement en- 
tertaining. 

  Man is a reasonable being; and as such, receives from 
science his proper food and nourishment: But so narrow 
are the bounds of human understanding, that little satisfac- 
tion can be hoped for in this particular, either from the 
extent of security or his acquisitions. Man is a sociable, no 
less than a reasonable being: but neither can he always 
enjoy company agreeable and amusing, or preserve the 
proper relish for them. Man is also an active being; and 
from that disposition, as well as from the various necessities 
of human life, must submit to business and occupation: 
but the mind requires some relaxation, and cannot always 
support its bent to care and industry. It seems, then, that 
nature has pointed out a mixed kind of life as most suitable 
to the human race, and secretly admonished them to allow 
none of these biases to draw too much, so as to incapacitate 
them for other occupations and entertainments. Indulge 
your passion for science, says she, but let your science be 
human, and such as may have a direct reference to action 
and society. Abstruse thought and profound researches I 
prohibit, and will severely punish, by the pensive melancholy 
which they introduce, by the endless uncertainty in which 
they involve you, and by the cold reception which your 
pretended discoveries shall meet with, when communicated. 
Be a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy, be still 
a man. 

  Were the generality of mankind contented to prefer the 
easy philosophy to the abstract and profound, without 
throwing any blame or contempt on the latter, it might 
not be improper, perhaps, to comply with this general 
opinion, and allow every man to enjoy, without opposition, 
his own taste and sentiment. But as the matter is often 
carried farther, even to the absolute rejecting of all pro- 
found reasonings, or what is commonly called metaphysics, 
we shall now proceed to consider what can reasonably be 
pleaded in their behalf. 

  We may begin with observing, that one considerable 
advantage, which results from the accurate and abstract 
philosophy, is, its subserviency to the easy and humane; 
which, without the former, can never attain a sufficient 
degree of exactness in its sentiments, precepts, or reasonings. 
All polite letters are nothing but pictures of human life 
in various attitudes and situations; and inspire us with 
different sentiments, of praise or blame, admiration or ridi- 
cule, according to the qualities of the object, which they set 
before us. An artist must be better qualified to succeed in 
this undertaking, who, besides a delicate taste and a quick 
apprehension, possesses an accurate knowledge of the in- 
ternal fabric, the operations of the understanding, the 
workings of the passions, and the various species of senti- 
ment which discriminate vice and virtue. How painful 
soever this inward search or enquiry may appear, it becomes, 
in some measure, requisite to those, who would describe 
with success the obvious and outward appearances of life 
and manners. The anatomist presents to the eye the most 
hideous and disagreeable objects; but his science is useful 
to the painter in delineating even a Venus or an Helen. 
While the latter employs all the richest colours of his art, 
and gives his figures the most graceful and engaging airs; 
he must still carry his attention to the inward structure 
of the human body, the position of the muscles, the fabric 
of the bones, and the use and figure of every part or organ. 
Accuracy is, in every case, advantageous to beauty, and just 
reasoning to delicate sentiment. In vain would we exalt 
the one by depreciating the other. 

  Besides, we may observe, in every art or profession, even 
those which most concern life or action, that a spirit of 
accuracy, however acquired, carries all of them nearer their 
perfection, and renders them more subservient to the 
interests of society. And though a philosopher may live 
remote from business, the genius of philosophy, if carefully 
cultivated by several, must gradually diffuse itself through- 
out the whole society, and bestow a similar correctness on 
every art and calling. The politician will acquire greater 
foresight and subtility, in the subdividing and balancing 
of power; the lawyer more method and finer principles 
in his reasonings; and the general more regularity in his 
discipline, and more caution in his plans and operations. 
The stability of modern governments above the ancient, 
and the accuracy of modern philosophy, have improved, and 
probably will still improve, by similar gradations. 

  Were there no advantage to be reaped from these studies, 
beyond the gratification of an innocent curiosity, yet ought 
not even this to be despised; as being one accession to 
those few safe and harmless pleasures, which are bestowed 
on the human race. The sweetest and most inoffensive path 
of life leads through the avenues of science and learning; and 
whoever can either remove any obstructions in this way, 
or open up any new prospect, ought so far to be esteemed 
a benefactor to mankind. And though these researches 
may appear painful and fatiguing, it is with some minds 
as with some bodies, which being endowed with vigorous 
and florid health, require severe exercise, and reap a pleasure 
from what, to the generality of mankind, may seem burden- 
some and laborious. Obscurity, indeed, is painful to the 
mind as well as to the eye; but to bring light from 
obscurity, by whatever labour, must needs be delightful and 
rejoicing. 

  But this obscurity in the profound and abstract philos- 
ophy, is objected to, not only as painful and fatiguing, but 
as the inevitable source of uncertainty and error. Here in- 
deed lies the justest and most plausible objection against 
a considerable part of metaphysics, that they are not properly 
a science; but arise either from the fruitless efforts of 
human vanity, which would penetrate into subjects utterly 
inaccessible to the understanding, or from the craft of pop- 
ular superstitions, which, being unable to defend themselves 
on fair ground, raise these intangling brambles to cover and 
protect their weakness. Chased from the open country, these 
robbers fly into the forest, and lie in wait to break in upon 
every unguarded avenue of the mind, and overwhelm it 
with religious fears and prejudices. The stoutest antagonist, 
if he remit his watch a moment, is oppressed. And many, 
through cowardice and folly, open the gates to the enemies, 
and willingly receive them with reverence and submission, 
as their legal sovereigns. 

  But is this a sufficient reason, why philosophers should 
desist from such researches, and leave superstition still 
in possession of her retreat? Is it not proper to draw an 
opposite conclusion, and perceive the necessity of carrying 
the war into the most secret recesses of the enemy? In 
vain do we hope, that men, from frequent disappointment, 
will at last abandon such airy sciences, and discover the 
proper province of human reason. For, besides, that many 
persons find too sensible an interest in perpetually recalling 
such topics; besides this, I say, the motive of blind despair 
can never reasonably have place in the sciences; since, how- 
ever unsuccessful former attempts may have proved, there 
is still room to hope, that the industry, good fortune, or 
improved sagacity of succeeding generations may reach 
discoveries unknown to former ages. Each adventurous 
genius will still leap at the arduous prize, and find himself 
stimulated, rather than discouraged, by the failures of his 
predecessors; while he hopes that the glory of achieving 
so hard an adventure is reserved for him alone. The only 
method of freeing learning, at once, from these abstruse 
questions, is to enquire seriously into the nature of human 
understanding, and show, from an exact analysis of its 
powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted for 
such remote and abstruse subjects. We must submit to 
this fatigue in order to live at ease ever after: and must 
cultivate true metaphysics with some care, in order to 
destroy the false and adulterate. Indolence, which, to some 
persons, affords a safeguard against this deceitful philos- 
ophy, is, with others, overbalanced by curiosity; and de- 
spair, which, at some moments, prevails, may give place after- 
wards to sanguine hopes and expectations. Accurate and 
just reasoning is the only catholic remedy, fitted for all 
persons and all dispositions; and is alone able to subvert 
that abstruse philosophy and metaphysical jargon, which 
being mixed up with popular superstition, renders it in 
a manner impenetrable to careless reasoners, and gives it 
the air of science and wisdom. 

  Besides this advantage of rejecting, after deliberate en- 
quiry, the most uncertain and disagreeable part of learning, 
there are many positive advantages, which result from an 
accurate scrutiny into the powers and faculties of human 
nature. It is remarkable concerning the operations of the 
mind, that, though most intimately present to us, yet, 
whenever they become the object of reflexion, they seem 
involved in obscurity; nor can the eye readily find those 
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