%
%    Holmes' commentary on Caesar's De Bello Gallico.
%    The Credibility of Caesar's Narrative (preface 3).
%
%    Contributor: Konrad Schroder  <perseant@u.washington.edu>
%
%    Original publication data:
%         Holmes, T.  Rice.  _C._Iuli_Caesaris_Comantarii_Rerum_in_
%                   _Gallia_Gestarum_VII_A._Hirti_Commentarius_VIII._
%                             Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1914.
%
%    Version: 0.01 (Alpha), 7 April 1993
%
%    This file is in the Public Domain.
%
\input ks_macros.tex
\centerline{THE CREDIBILITY OF CAESAR'S}
\centerline{NARRATIVE}
\bigskip
F{\sc OR} the history of the first seven years of Caesar's conquest of Gaul
our principal authority is Caesar himself.  It is, indeed, impossible to
grasp the full meaning of his narrative without the help of the modern
scholars who have contributed so much to the task of solving the problems
which the Commentaries present.  It is true, moreover, that Cicero's
writings illustrate certain phases of the war, and that later writers, such
as Suetonius, Plutarch, and Dion Cassius, make certain statements, true or
false, which are not to be found in Caesar.  But Caesar is the authority;
and thoughtful readers will want to know how far his narrative is
trustworthy According to Suetonius,\footnote{$^1$}
     {{\it Diuus Iulius,} 56.}
Pollio, who served under Caesar in the civil war, thought that the
Commentaries were written carelessly and with little regard for truth; that
Caesar had accepted without due inquiry the reports of his officers; and
that, either intentionally or from failure of memory, he was inaccurate in
describing what he had done himself.  Now it is almost certain that Pollio
was referring to Caesar's Commentaries on the Civil War, with which we are
not here concerned;\footnote{$^2$}
     {According to Suetonius, Pollio thought that Caesar would have
     rewritten and corrected his narrative if he had had an
     opportunity ({\it existimatque rescriptorum et correcturum
     fuisse}).  A.~Klotz ({\it Rh.~M.,} 1911, p.~81) remarks that
     Pollio could hardly have said this in regard to the {\it
     Commentaries on the Gallic War,} which were published by Caesar
     himself.}
but suppose that he had the same opinion of the Gallic War.  If so, as he
did not serve in Gaul, he could only have repeated what he had heard from
others; and their opinions would have been of no value except about what
they had seen themselves.  As I have learned from conversation with men who
had taken part in Sir Charles Napier's conquest of Sind and in the Indian
Mutiny, and from letters which they wrote to me, how mistakes in military
histories arise, I believe that I can form a tolerably just idea of the
meaning of Pollio's criticism.  Caesar inevitably made mistakes; and Pollio
may have conversed with eyewitnesses who pointed out these mistakes, who
were perhaps aggrieved by them, and who, exaggerating their importance, as
men who have no sense of historical proportion will always do, shrugged
their shoulders and exclaimed, `Such is history.' Caesar's accuracy has
been confirmed, on various points, by modern investigations.  Every one who
has seen the places which he described will admit that he was gifted with
the faculty of observation.  Most of the operations which are pictured in
his narrative were performed under his own eye: he had opportunities for
observing what happened in a battle or a siege which a modern general,
whose operations extend over a vast area, cannot have; and he very rarely
indulges in that sort of detailed description which gives rise to most of
the mistakes that are made in modern military histories.  This is a point
which I could not make perfectly clear to a `general reader' unless he
would listen attentively while I explained to him the labour which I have
myself undergone in writing an account of a modern battle and the process
by which I have been enabled to correct mistakes which had crept into my
original draft.  But all who have tried to write military history from
original sources will understand what I mean.  As a rule Caesar gives us
only the outline of a battle,---he tells us just so much as may enable us
to understand the moves, and no more.  He sent dispatches to the Senate,
and it may be assumed that he kept copies of them: his generals sent
reports to him; and he finished his book within a year after the close of
the war.  His account, therefore, was a contemporary account by the
eyewitness who had the best eyes, the most favourable point of view, and
the most trustworthy information.

As for the speeches which he puts into the mouths of Vercingetorix and
others, nearly all are very short and written, like many reports in
newspapers of speeches, in {\it Oratio Obliqua,} which shows that he only
professed to give the gist of what was said.  Almost the only one which is
at all open to suspicion is the comparatively long speech in the
seventy-seventh chapter of the {\it Seventh Commentary,} which he
attributes to Critognatus.  Departing from his custom, he wrote this speech
in the form of {\it Oratio Recta;} and as there was certainly no shorthand
writer present when Critognatus was speaking, the words were of course
Caesar's own.  But we may reasonably suppose that he was informed of the
drift of Critognatus's arguments by some one who had listened to
them---perhaps by Vercingetorix himself---for he made at least 60,000
prisoners after the fall of Alesia.\footnote{$^3$}
     {Cf.  vii, 71, \S 3 with 89, \S 5 and 90, \S 3, and see the note
     on the first of these passages.}

Serious charges have, however, been brought against the general tone of
Caesar's narrative.  They may be grouped in two classes, according to the
motives which his accusers have imputed to him.  These motives are, first,
a desire to justify unconstitutional, illegal, or unrighteous acts, and
secondly, a desire to magnify his own exploits, to obtain for himself the
credit of certain exploits of his officers, and to conceal everything that
might damage his reputation as a general.  I shall examine in foot-notes
those of his statements which I believe to be either inaccurate or
misleading; but in this little book it would of course be out of place to
notice all the charges---or even all that are worth noticing---which have
been brought against him; and I have done so already in two other
works.\footnote{$^4$}
     {{\it Caesar's Conquest of Gaul,} 1899, pp.  173-244, and the
     second edition of the same, 1911, pp.  211-56; {\it Ancient
     Britain and the Invasions of Julius Caesar,} 1907, pp.  666-72.}
Good judges have accepted the conclusion which I reached,---that under
close scrutiny nearly all the charges break down.  As an acute critic has
remarked, Caesar took pains to justify his first two campaigns---those
which he conducted against the Helvetii and Ariovistus---because in
crossing the frontier of the Roman Province he had acted without the
sanction of the Senate; but he knew that if he could convince his readers
that he had done right in 58 {\sc B.C.} all would be well, for the other
campaigns followed as a matter of course.  And his self-justification was
sound.  Naturally he made out the best case that he could, but he did not
falsify facts: he only emphasized, as he had a right to do, the fact that
he had acted for his country's good.  So far as I am aware, no great
writer, no great historian, no great statesman or general has ever thrown
serious discredit upon the Commentaries.  Of course they are not absolutely
true: no history is.  Caesar was sometimes either uncritical or careless in
using the reports of his generals: he may have thought it discreet to
withhold some valuable information: he doubtless sometimes exaggerated,
probably because he was misinformed, the numbers of his enemies and the
losses which he or his officers had inflicted upon them; he may have
concocted an excuse for the one defeat---the defeat at Gergovia---which he
himself suffered; and I am willing to believe that his memoirs leave upon
the mind an impression of his prowess, if not of his character, more
favourable than would have been produced by the narrative of an impartial
historian.  But on the whole he could afford to tell the truth.  He did
full justice to his lieutenants; he wrote most generously of his
enemies;\footnote{$^5$}
     {See ii, 27, \S~5 and vii, 30, \S 3.}
and I see no reason for believing that he was ashamed of anything that he
had done.  `On ne peut contester', says the Duc d'Aumale, `que ses r\'ecits
respirent la sinc\'erit\'e';\footnote{$^6$}
     {{\it Rev.  des Deux Mondes,} 2$^e$ p\'er., xv, 1858, p.~119.}
and Montaigne, in a note written on the margin of his copy of the
Commentaries, called the author `le plus net, le plus disert, et le plus
sinc\`ere historien qui fut jamais '\footnote{$^7$}
     {{\it Ib.,} p.~118.}
Perhaps we shall hit the exact truth if we add the comment of the Duc
d'Aumale,---`le plus sinc\`ere de ceux qui ont \'ecrit leur propre
histoire.'\footnote{$^8$}
     {\it Ib.}
\bye