Subject: RISKS DIGEST 16.42 REPLY-TO: risks@csl.sri.com RISKS-LIST: RISKS-FORUM Digest Friday 23 September 1994 Volume 16 : Issue 42 FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator ***** See last item for information on RISKS (comp.risks) ***** Contents: Power Outage in Russia? (Bradford Wetmore) The Future of the Internet is Secure: Press Conference (Winn Schwartau) Telephone background noise RISKS (Michael P. Gerlek) Re: Uninterruptable Thought Patterns (A. Padgett Peterson) Re: Computer disk crash causes misprinted ballots (Douglas W. Jones) Re: Yet More daring tales of address disasters! (Steve Bellovin et al.) Re: Address disasters (John Cantrell, Martin Ewing) Re: Highest Quality Company Logos (Jim Prall, Gary Greene, Ray T. Stevens) Call For Papers: 8th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop 1994 (Li Gong) Info on RISKS (comp.risks), contributions, subscriptions, FTP, etc. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 23 Sep 1994 13:10:08 -0700 From: Bradford.Wetmore@ebay.sun.com (Brad R. Wetmore) Subject: Power Outage in Russia? Did you hear about the plug getting pulled in Russia at a major missile site not too long ago? Apparently, the folks in charge didn't pay their electric bill, so the company cut them off...backup generators took over. One wonders what happens if they also don't pay their rent...? :) It was in The New York Times not too long ago, and in the San Jose Murky News this morning, Fri the 23rd. Brad R. Wetmore, Computer Security Engineer, Sun Federal, Inc. MS UMIL06-94 2550 Garcia Ave., Mountain View, CA 94043-1100 (408) 276-5557 ext, x35557 int [The answer to Brad's wonder: rent asunder instead of rent us under. PGN] ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 23 Sep 94 12:58:12 -0500 From: "Winn Schwartau" Subject: The Future of the Internet is Secure: Press Conference The Future of the Internet is Secure! On October 11, 1994, The Internet Will Become A Safe Place To Do Business. Sidewinder: Internet Security That Strikes Back The Internet is a dangerous place. Ask anyone. * Between 85-97% of all computer break-ins go undetected. * Industrial espionage is up 400% since the late 1980's. * Hacker attacks increase exponentially. * Over 1 million computer break-ins last year alone. * Theft of confidential information costs billions to America's financial infrastructure. * Privacy is almost nonexistent. Yet, the Internet is the fastest growing segment of the National Information Infrastructure. Over 20 million users and businesses conduct global affairs on the Internet today, and over 125 million will by the year 2000. Join us to witness the technological breakthrough in internetworking that finally makes the Internet a safe place to be. The future of the Internet is secure. Come see how. October 11, 1994 10:00 AM National Press Club Zenger Room 529 14St. NW Washington, DC 20045 _Continental Breakfast_ RSVP Presented by: Secure Computing Corporation 2675 Long Lake Road Roseville, MN 55112 For more information contact: Interpact, Inc., Winn Schwartau, 813.393.6600 P00506@Psilink.Com Secure Computing: Kevin Sorensen, 1.612.627.2800, 1.800.692.LOCK Sorensen@Sctc.Com ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 22 Sep 1994 13:57:26 -0700 From: "Michael P. Gerlek" Subject: telephone background noise RISKS Just another horror story: I called a major airline the other day to make reservations. In the course of my dialog with the agent she put me on hold for a minute or so while she checked something, and I listened to the usual canned music interspersed with promos for the airline. Then, after more dialog with the agent, again she put me on hold... but this time didn't switch on the music. As I waited, I could clearly make out another reservations agent working in the background: "yes, Mr. Smith, flight 234 from Portland to San Francisco..." "thank you, Mr. Smith -- to confirm, that was a charge of $567.89 to your Mastercard, account number 1234-5..." I discussed this with my agent when she came back on the line. She said it was her mistake (she didn't press the right button or something), and that the official policy was to switch the line to hold, so as to allow the customer to hear the promotional ads while waiting. I pointed out the privacy advantages, too, and she agreed this was a good thing and promised to be more careful next time. :-) -[mpg] ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 23 Sep 94 15:23:12 -0400 From: padgett@tccslr.dnet.mmc.com (A. Padgett Peterson) Subject: Re: Uninterruptable Thought Patterns (Agre, RISKS-16.41) The falling ladder problem reminded me of something that happened at a facility I was working at in Texas a number of years ago. Disaster planning was taken very seriously and the facility had an emergency diesel generator *and* backup battery supplies to hold the data center up in case the diesel was hard to start. Except for the dump truck that lost control while descending a rise, left the road and slammed into the adjacent power pole. The pole broke off at the base and fell onto the generator building, doing grievous damage to the generator. The broken engine cooling & fuel lines added to broken water mains to flood the battery room with a noxious mess (the engine bay had a fuel loss containment system but it was not designed to cope with a water main). Along the way, the fire control system triggered adding to the mayhem. Needless to say, the data center lost power rather suddenly. Padgett [Rube Goldberg Strikes Again! PGN] ------------------------------ Date: 22 Sep 1994 19:10:18 GMT From: jones@pyrite.cs.uiowa.edu (Douglas W. Jones) Subject: Re: Computer disk crash causes misprinted ballots Lani Teshima-Miller, writing on Tue, 13 Sep 1994, commented on a computer crash that led to misprinted ballots. I'm a member of the Iowa State Commission on Electronic Voting Machines (actually, the name is longer) -- we oversee the approval by the state of voting systems. Anyway ... Last night, as it happens, I was reading the Federal Election Commission standards document for electronic voting machinery, and I note that these standards are generally very well thought out. There were a few places where, if anything, they seemed to require excessively expensive solutions to problems, but few places where they seemed to be open to failures. The standards mandate considerable fault tolerance in the systems actually installed in polling places, whether they be mark-sense machines, punched card machines, or direct recording computerized voting systems. These have a serious real-time response requirement -- they must work on election day, all day. The standards do not mandate a similar degree of fault-tolerance in off-line systems, such as those used to prepare ballots. What they do mandate is a clear audit trail and strong safeguards against tampering. In addition, they mandate provisions for many manual checks. It is in the latter area where the system in Hawaii clearly failed! On taking delivery of a shipment of printed ballots, they should have been inspected -- this means examining a sample ballot from every press run, preferably from both ends of the run! (Different press runs may have required different ballot layouts, for example, by permuting the orders of candidate names, as required in some contexts). Furthermore, the workers at the polling places, at setup time, are required to perform certain inspection tasks, for example, by assuring themselves that the voting machine counters are all reset to zero. The system seems to be designed well; this error in Hawaii seems to be a human error. The risk we face is complacency "it's all computerized, these checks in the system are just bureaucratic requirements, nothing ever goes wrong, so we can skip this". One of the fundamental requirements of a democratic system is a corps of election workers who take the requirements for running an honest election very seriously! I cannot imagine any way to use automation to eliminate this requirement. Doug Jones jones@cs.uiowa.edu ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 22 Sep 94 13:46:14 EDT From: smb@research.att.com Subject: Re: Yet More daring tales of address disasters! [...] He moved and sent an address correction to a company in which he holds some stock. The company acknowledged his change of address, but sent it to his *old* address. [...] In fact, in this case the company did exactly the right thing. This is their mechanism for discovering forged address changes. If the request is false, the true owner will receive a notice, and can take corrective action. If the request is genuine, the Post Office will forward the acknowledgment to the proper place. --Steve Bellovin [This was also noted by Jim Horning , Alan Miller , Craig_Everhart@transarc.com, Martin Ewing , Robert.L.Drysdale@dartmouth.edu, Patricia Shanahan , Nevin Liber , James E. Leinweber , ROBINSON_PAUL@tandem.com, Crystal Linn Trexel , Clark , John Sullivan , Jim Berets , Geoff Kuenning , and they are still coming in... But thus far NO ONE remarked on the problem that a bogus Change of Address form previously sent to the local Post Office would result in the acknowledgment being forwarded to the imposter instead of the victim. Correction: Just after I wrote the above lines, I found a note from Charles Reichley , who suggested that the acknowledgement should be sent to BOTH the OLD and NEW addresses. Congratulations to Charles, who gets the RISKS-ALERTNESS prize for today. PGN] ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 22 Sep 94 12:21:31 PDT From: cantrell@sparky1.aero.org (John Cantrell) Subject: Re: Address disasters After reading Paul T. Keener's comment about a friend's receiving a change of address acknowledgement from a company that was sent to his *old* address, I was overcome with deja vu. Wasn't it here in RISKS that I read about the scam of changing the address for your credit-card bills so a thief could run up $$$$ without your ever knowing about it (until it was too late, that is)? I would rather get the info at the old address and then forwarded by the post office than run the risk of having to correct an "unauthorized" change of address with the trouble that goes with it. cantrell@aero.org ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 22 Sep 1994 15:22:27 -0400 From: martin.ewing@yale.edu (Martin Ewing) Subject: Postal address disasters [...] We had a related problem recently, when the US Post Office decided on its own to return all our mail with a yellow computer-printed sticker saying "Addressee moved - no forwarding address". We only found out when my parents called up to ask where we had gone. Of course, our mail box being empty for several days was definitely suspicious. Our credit card company thought we'd absconded, when they got their statement back, and there were other unpleasant effects. The P.O. was non-repentant, saying only they had had a new man on the route. At least they didn't blame it on the computer. -Martin Ewing (martin.ewing@yale.edu) Yale University ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Sep 1994 14:15:09 -0400 From: sq!trigraph!jimp@uunet.uu.net (Jim Prall) Subject: Re: Highest Quality Company Logos (Lawrence, RISKS-16.41) >What a wonderful gift for con artists! Well, it's not as crazy as it sound. Lots of stores use the logos and company identities of their suppliers in advertising. E.g. if WalMart sells, say, Timex watches, their flyer uses the official Timex logo on ads on the watch page. Service bureaus can get a substantial amount of work creating good, clean, accurate electronic versions of such corporate identities for such advertisers. Once in a while a corporation actually supplies its corporate identity in electronic form, but so far this is rare. More common is a printed identity book with specs and samples for several fixed sizes, vertical and horizontal arrangement, and the Pantone color specs for corporate colors. Also common is trying to get by working from old output; this makes a lot harder to get a clean electronic logo. Heaven help the creative director who starts to get creative with a supplier's corporate identity. This is greatly frowned upon. The one risk is not knowing the trade standards. If you display another company's identity, you better match it 100%. Jim Prall, Trigraph, Inc., Toronto, CANADA jimp%trigraph.uucp@csri.utoronto.ca ------------------------------ Date: 23 Sep 1994 17:11:02 GMT From: garyg@unity.sj.unisys.com (Gary Greene) Subject: Re: Digital Logos (Denning RISKS-16.41 on Lawrence, RISKS-16.40) Peter Denning writes: > ... If TigerDirect has the explicit permission of the owners of >the logos, all is well. If not, then not only they, but anyone else using >the logo without authorization, is breaking the law. Anyone who would use >a logo, authorization or no, to commit a fraud is also breaking the law. What Peter says is technically true but ignores the doctrine of "fair use." I've been a graphic artist for over 25 years. Throughout that time there have been clip-art books, either print and lately digital that provide libraries of such logos for use in authorized situations. Virtually all such books I am aware of get their material directly from the trademark owners and therefore are authorized, but a few have not. A company certainly may impose and require that their logo not be distributed within the trade in this manner. But what does that gain them? Then they must supply such clip art to the artist. In practice, many people authorized to let advertising or some other use do not have easy access to their company's style sheets, or simply don't think to provide them. When the advertising is created in-house this is not a problem since the art department always has access to the style sheets, but a great deal of advertising is created by contractors and specialty houses. When that happens the artist is reduced to drawing them from memory or making a fuzzy copy from the yellow pages. Drawing from memory is usually unsatisfactory. The yellow pages are hardly much better. And I have often done both in my time. Inclusion of such logos in a library is usually considered "fair use" under the copyright law unless the copyright owner specifically objects to the publisher. Only the subsequent unauthorized reuse of the logo in a specific advertisement or other publication would constitute a violation of copyright and/or trademark. Further, there are other "fair use" situations that are also excepted, such as news and personal photography (Amtrak derails! ...accompanied by footage of an Amtrak emblazoned passenger car on its side... News at 11). I will reiterate what Peter very rightly points out: anyone using a company's logo in a fraudulent manner is breaking the law. Gary Greene Santa Clara, CA. ------------------------------ Date: 22 Sep 94 20:06:22 EDT From: "Ray T. Stevens" <74074.1746@compuserve.com> Subject: Re: Digital Logos (Peter J Denning, Risks 16.41) It may very well be that the DISTRIBUTION of these logos without the owner's permission is legal [although USE may not be]. It would take a lawyer to figure it out (and most likely two lawyers to make a debate on the subject). In the printing industry we get books of clip art, and some of these books contain a large number of Logos. I can't believe that the people putting out the books really got permission from everyone. In fact, all of these books that contain trademarks contain a disclaimer that says in legal gibberish that you and darn well better have permission from the trademark holder before using them. The real risk I see is to the user who may not realize what they need to do in order to be legal. This is another case where technology has brought a tool, which in the past required a specialist, directly to the users without bringing with it the knowledge of using it properly. [This interpretation may indeed violate copyright law. However, we are drifting beyond the scope of RISKS... PGN] ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 22 Sep 94 15:45:53 -0700 From: Li Gong Subject: Call For Papers: 8th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop 1994 Call For Papers 8th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop June 13-15, 1995 County Kerry, Ireland Sponsored by the IEEE Computer Society This workshop series brings together researchers in computer science to examine foundational issues in computer security. We are interested both in papers that describe new results in the theories of computer security and in papers and panels that explore open questions and raise fundamental concerns about existing theories. Possible topics include, but are not limited to: access control authentication data and system integrity database security network security distributed systems security security protocols security models formal methods for security as well as foundational issues relating to other critical system properties and in emerging areas such as ubiquitous computing. The proceedings are published by the IEEE Computer Society and will be available at the workshop. Selected papers will be invited for submission to the Journal of Computer Security. Instructions for Participants: Workshop attendance will be by invitation only and limited to about 35 participants. Prospective participants should send 5 copies of a paper (limit 7500 words) or proposal for panel discussion to Li Gong at the address below. Please clearly identify the contact author and provide email addresses and telephone numbers (both voice and fax). Important Dates: Author's submission: February 3, 1995 Notification of acceptance: March 14, 1995 Camera-ready final papers: April 3, 1995 Workshop Location: The Computer Security Foundations Workshop is known for its peaceful rural setting, and in 1995 the workshop will be held at Dromquinna Manor, County Kerry, which is situated on the South West coast of Ireland. Built in 1850, and located in quiet picturesque countryside about 3 miles from Kenmare town, Dromquinna Manor has its own private grounds of woodland and lawns that sweep down to the sea. The South West coast of Ireland claims some of the most varied and spectacular scenery in the country, and the coastline, sculptured by the ice-age and influenced by the warm waters of the Gulf Stream, is steeped in ancient history and folklore. This mountainous area has an abundance of natural beauty and is enriched by sub-tropical flora produced by the unusually warm and temperate climate. The nearest international airports are Shannon and Cork. There are direct flights from North America to Shannon and Dublin, and from major European cities (for example, London and Amsterdam) to Cork. Connections from many other cities can be best made by using London or Amsterdam or by availing of the scheduled services from Dublin to Cork. There are also car/passenger ferries from the United Kingdom and Europe to Cork, Dublin and Rosslare. For further information contact: General Chair Program Chair Publications Chair Simon Foley Li Gong Joshua Guttman Dept of Computer Science SRI Computer Science Lab The MITRE Corp. University College 333 Ravenswood Avenue 202 Burlington Road Cork Menlo Park, CA 94025 Bedford, MA 01730-1420 Ireland U.S.A. U.S.A. +353 21-276871 x2929 +1 415-859-3232 +1 617-271-2654 s.foley@cs.ucc.ie gong@csl.sri.com guttman@mitre.org More information at http://www.csl.sri.com/ieee-csfw/csfw.html. ------------------------------ Date: 31 May 1994 (LAST-MODIFIED) From: RISKS-request@csl.sri.com Subject: Info on RISKS (comp.risks), contributions, subscriptions, FTP, etc. The RISKS Forum is a moderated digest. Its USENET equivalent is comp.risks. Undigestifiers are available throughout the Internet, but not from RISKS. SUBSCRIPTIONS: PLEASE read RISKS as a newsgroup (comp.risks or equivalent) on your system, if possible and convenient for you. 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